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March 29, 2023 | Author: Anonymous | Category: N/A
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TANGGUH EXPANSION
PROJECT DEFINE
LNG FEE
PRELIMINARY SIL VERIFICATION REPORT
Code Description A
Proceed - No comment
B
Proceed - With comment
C
Do Not Proceed - Revise & Resubmit
D
Cancelled
E
Received as information
Signature:
A01 Rev
Issued for Review Reason for Issue
Enza Fiore/ Ganda Himawan Author
! This document is copyright and shall not be reproduced without the permission of BP
23-Oct-15 Date
Niccolo Gerrosa/ Jumriani Checked
23-Oct-15 Date
Marco D’Amico D’Amico Approver
23-Oct-15 Date
Document Number
Contractor Doc Number
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
870300-PTS-900-LPE-REP-12004 Document Class
© BP p.l.c. Security Classification: BP Confidential Confidential
2
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Table of Contents 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
Introdu Intr oducti ction on ............................................................. ...................................... ............................................ .................................... ............... 5 Project Overview ..........................................................................................................5 Scope Scop e .................................. .................................................. ................................. .................................. ................................. ................................. .......................5 ......5 Owner and Contractual Standards ..............................................................................22 International Standards ...............................................................................................22 Contractor Document .................................................................................................22 Order of Precedence ..................................................................................................22
2
Symbols, Abbreviations and Definitions ....................................................... 23
3
Method Met hodolo ology gy.................... ......................................... ........................................... ........................................... ............................... .......... 24
3.1 Gener General al ............................... ................................................ .................................. .................................. .................................. ................................. ....................24 ....24 3.2 Probability Requirements ............................................................................................24 3.2.1 Genera Generall .................................................................. ................................................................................................... ...............................................................2 ..............................24 4 3.2.2 PFD Formulas Formulas ............................... .................................................................. ...................................................................... .....................................................25 ..................25
3.3 Hardware Fault Tolerance ...........................................................................................28
4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
Reliab Rel iabili ility ty Data Data ..................................................... ................................ .......................................... ...................................... ................. 31 General ............................... General ................................................ .................................. .................................. .................................. ................................. ....................31 ....31 Sensors Sens ors .................................. .................................................. ................................. ................................. .................................. .................................. .................32 .32 Logic Logi c Solver Solver (SIS)....................................... ....................................................... .................................. .................................. ...............................3 ...............32 2 Final Elements ............................................................................................................32
4.5 PFD Calculation Chart .................................................................................................32 4.6 Architectural Constraints.............................................................................................32
5
SIL Ve Verifi rificat cation ion Results Results ....................... ............................................ .......................................... ................................... .............. 34
6
Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................ 36
Append App endix ix A
PFD Ca Calcu lculat lation ion She Sheet et .................... ......................................... ............................................ ......................... .. 42
Append App endix ix B
HFT Com Compli plianc ance e Shee Sheett ................... ........................................ ............................................ ......................... .. 43
List of Table Table 1 – Allocation Results and SIL Verification Scope of Work ............................................................ 5 Table 2 – SIFs to be verifi verified ed ........................... ............................................................. .................................................................... ................................................... ................. 21 Table 3 – Probability of failure on demand for SIL levels (Low Demand Mode)..................................... 24 Table 4 – Minimum hardware fault tolerance of sensors and final elements ........................................ 28 Table 5 – Minimum hardware fault tolerance of PE logic solvers.......................................................... 29 Table 6 – Maximum allowable SIL for a SIF carried out by a type A safety-related element or subsystem ................................................................. .............................. ..................................................................... ..................................................................... ........................................................ ..................... 30 Table 7 – Maximum allowable SIL for a SIF carried out by a type B safety-related element or subsystem ................................................................. .............................. ..................................................................... ..................................................................... ........................................................ ..................... 30
Table 8 – Reli Reliabili ability ty Data for Compo Components nents ......................................... ........................................................................... .................................................. ................ 3 31 1 TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
Page 2 of 43
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Table 9 – SIL satisfied based on SFF and redundancy............................ ............................................................... .............................................. ........... 33 Table 10 – SIL verifi verification cation result results s ............................................................................ ........................................................................................................ ............................ 34 Table 11 – USVE Reli Reliabili ability ty Data................. Data.................................................. ................................................................... ........................................................ ...................... 36 Table 12 – Recommenda Recommendations tions Table ............................................ .............................................................................. ........................................................ ...................... 36 List of Figures Figure 1 – Block diagram, diagram, votin voting g logi logic c 1oo1................................. .................................................................... ........................................................ ..................... 25 Figure 2 – Block diagram, diagram, voting logic 1oo2................................. .................................................................... ........................................................ ..................... 26 Figure 3 – Block diagram, diagram, votin voting g logi logic c 2oo2................................. .................................................................... ........................................................ ..................... 27 Figure 4 – Block diagram, voting logic valid for 1oo3, 2oo3 and 3oo3 ................................................... 27
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
Page 3 of 43
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Revision History Amendment Date
Revision Number
Amender Name
Amendment
OMS references OMS section ref 3.3 5.2
OMS section title
Relevant section of this document
Process Safety Design and Construction
Related documents Document number
Document name
Description of Content
Stakeholders Name A. Muldoon - Engineering Lead
Date Reviewed
I. Musthafa - Process Safety Lead A. Daya Wiguna – Process Lead A. Witjaksono – I and C Lead
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
Page 4 of 43
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
1 Introduction 1.1
Project Overview
BP Berau Ltd., hereafter known as COMPANY, is the operator of Tangguh LNG, a two train natural gas (NG) liquefaction facility in Bintuni Bay, Papua, Indonesia. The facility includes associated onshore infrastructure, two offshore platforms, pipelines and twelve wells. These facilities are the Trains 1 and 2 developments at Tangguh. COMPANY has initiated the Tangguh Expansion Project to commercialize the incremental resource into high margin gas markets based on a single LNG (liquefied natural gas) train expansion (Train 3). Tangguh Expansion Project will consist of new offshore facilities, including wellhead platforms and pipelines, and onshore development on the existing Tangguh brownfield site. The new onshore facilities will include one additional natural gas liquefaction train of a similar design and capacity to the existing trains, an onshore receiving facility (ORF), new LNG and condensate loading berth, additional boil off gas (BOG) recovery, utilities, flares and the infrastructure to support logistics and the associated increase in the temporary and permanent workforce. The Tangguh Expansion Project comprises of the following new facilities:
•
•
•
•
[New] Onshore Receiving Facility (ORF) [New] LNG Train 3 [New] Condensate Stabilization Train 3 [New/Interconnection] Plant Utility Facilities
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
[New] Condensate LNG LoadingLoading SystemSystem [New] [Expansion] Integrated Control and Safety System (ICSS) [Expansion] Telecommunication System [New] Trestle Jetty Structure [Expansion] Onshore Infrastructure Hazardous and Non-hazardous Waste Management Ma nagement System
1.2
Scope
The objective of the SIL verification activity is to confirm that the analyzed automatic protection loops meet the SIL requirements, assigned by means of LOPA analysis, both from probability of failure on demand (according to equations described in IEC 61508-6) and architectural constrains. The LOPA was conducted by a BP-approved Atkins Leader and was attended by a multi-disciplinary team which included representatives from the Contractor A TEP FEED team, representatives from the BP embedded team and Tangguh LNG operations team members. The LOPA was held over two weeks from 3rd August to the 15th August 2015 in Alamanda Tower, Jakarta, Indonesia. The present document describes methodology and reports the results of the SIL verification process. SIL verification has been performed for SIF Loops Allocated as reported in the LOPA Report. The complete list of LOPA scenario and related allocation results is reported in following Table 1, together with identified SIF, if any, and the relevant SIL requirements. For each SIL rated item of the table it is indicated if included in SIL Verification process Scope of Work, taking into account if a SIF is associated to the scenario. Table 1
Allocation Results and SIL Verification Scope of Work LOPA Report Results Hazardous Scenario
No.
SIF to be verified
LOPA Result
-
SIL 0
Consequences
1
043-E-31002 shellside high pressure
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
Page 5 of 43
SIL Verification Notes
Scope of Work Work Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
SIF to be verified
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
Scope of Work Work
Notes Report
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2
053-C-31001 discharge high pressure
053-PAHH-31187
SIL 3
Included in Preliminary SIL Preliminary Verification Report
043-T-31001 high 043-T-31001 pressure
043-PAHH-31032
SIL 2
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
2
043-E-31003 shellside high pressure
3
4
5
043-E-31001 shell side high pressure
6
043-E-31001 tube side high pressure (warm tube bundle feed gas)
053-PAHH-31858
-
SIL 2
Upon close out of Recommendation #64 from the Critical P&ID Review an additional SIF may be considered (e.g. high pressure trip)
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Not included Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF d efined in LOPA
SIL 1
LPG reinjection high
Included in Preliminary SIL
7
pressure
043-PAHH-31726
SIL 2
Verification Report
8
053-D-31007 high pressure
053-PAHH-31487
SIL 2
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
9
LNG rundown line low t emper emperature ature
-
-
10
LNG rundown line high temperature
-
SIL 0
Sudden contraction will not lead to LOPC. LOPC is only considered credible due to a bowing effect (i.e. liquid LNG introduced into line).
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Upon close out of Recommendation #19 from the Critical P&ID Review an additional IPL may be considered for Causes 1 to 4.
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
11
043-E-31004 tube side low temperature
-
SIL 3
12
043-T-31001 low 043-T-31001 level
043-LAHH-31044 043-LAHH-310 44
SIL 2
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
13
043-E-31004 tube side high pressure
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
14
071-TK-1001/2 high pressure
043-TAHH-31258
-
Existing systems were not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in existing facilities which were not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
incomplete. 15
LNG rundown line
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
-
SIL 0
Page 6 of 43
Not SIL rated, not included in
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
SIF to be verified
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
Notes
bowing.
16
Scope of Work Work Preliminary SIL Verification Report
043-E-31001 tube side high pressure (middle and cold tube bundles - LNG product)
-
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF d efined in LOPA
SIL 1
SIL 4+
Upon close out of Recommendation #21 from the Critical P&ID Review an additional SIF may be considered.
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
043-PAHH-31273
SIL 4+
Upon close out of Recommendation #150 from the Critical P&ID Review this hazard may be removed.
No SIL Verification required since hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #150 implementation
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
17
043-T-31002 high 043-T-31002 level
18
043-T-31003 feed 043-T-31003 line high temperature
19
MP steam condensate flash drum high pressure
20
043-T-31002 low 043-T-31002 level
043-LALL-31285 043-LALL31285
SIL 2
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
21
043-T-31002 high 043-T-31002 pressure
043-PAHH-31273
SIL 2
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
22
053-C-31002 discharge high pressure
053-PAHH-31487
SIL 2
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
23
-
074-TK-1001 high level
-
-
Existing systems were not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in existing facilities which were not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
incomplete.
24
C2 transfer line high temperature
-
SIL 4+
25
043-E-31006 shell side high pressure
-
SIL 1
26
043-T-31003 high 043-T-31003 level
043-LAHH-31434 043-LAHH-314 34
SIL 3
27
043-T-31003 high 043-T-31003 pressure
043-PAHH-31423
SIL 3
28
043-T-31004 feed 043-T-31004 line high temperature
-
SIL 4+
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
Upon close out of Recommendation #39 from the Critical P&ID Review this hazard may be removed.
No SIL Verification required since hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #39 implementation Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
Upon close out of Recommendation #24 from the Critical P&ID Review an additional SIF may be considered.
Included in SIL Verification Report
Included in SIL Verification Report Upon close out of Recommendation #26 from the Critical P&ID
Page 7 of 43
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #26
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
SIF to be verified
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
Notes Review this hazard may be removed.
29
043-T-31003 low 043-T-31003 level
30
074-TK-1002A/B high level
31
C3 transfer line high pressure
32
043-LALL-31434 043-LALL31434
-
053-PAHH-31359
SIL 1
043-T-31004 043-T-3100 4 high
-
Existing systems were not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in existing facilities which were not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
043-T-31004 high 043-T-31004 pressure
34
C2 liquid for LPG reinjection pipework high pressure
35
C2 vapour for LPG reinjection pipework high pressure
36
C3 liquid for LPG reinjection pipework high pressure
37
Dilution gas line high pressure
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in SIL Verification Report
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in
SIL 3
leve
33
implementation Included in SIL Verification Report
SIL 2
-
Scope of Work Work
Preliminary SIL Verification Report 043-PAHH-31573
SIL 4+
SIF consider ed outstandin outstanding g
-
Due to close out of Recommendation #48 this consequence has been removed.
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #48 implementation
-
Due to close out of Recommendation #48 this consequence has been removed.
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #48 implementation
-
-
Due to close out of Recommendation #48 this consequence has been removed.
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #48 implementation
-
-
Due to close out of Recommendation #52 this consequence has been removed.
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #52 implementation
Upon close out of Recommendation #93 from the Critical P&ID Review an additional IPL may be considered.
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #93 implementation
-
-
38
043-E-31012 shell side high pressure
-
SIL 1
39
043-E-31001 tube side high pressure (warm, middle and cold tube bundles LPG reinjection)
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
40
N2 system high pressure
053-PDALL-31469
SIL 2
Included in SIL Verification Report
41
053-C-31003 suction low pressure
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
-
-
Due to close out of
Hazard has been removed
Recommendation #67 this consequence has been removed.
following Company approval of Recommendation #67 implementation
Page 8 of 43
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
42
053-C-31002 discharge low temperature
43
053-C-31003 discharge high temperature
44
SIF to be verified
-
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
SIL 3
Notes Upon close out of Recommendation #93 from the Critical P&ID Review this hazard may
Scope of Work Work
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #93 implementation
be removed. 053-TAHH-31578 053-TAHH-315 78
SIL 4+
053-C-31002 excess nitrogen flow
-
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
45
053-C-31003 excess nitrogen flow
053-TAHH-31578 053-TAHH-315 78
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
46
053-C-31004 excess nitrogen flow
053-TAHH-31638 053-TAHH-316 38
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
47
053-C-31004 discharge high temperature
053-TAHH-31638 053-TAHH-316 38
SIL 4+
SIF considered outstanding
48
053-C-31002 discharge high temperature
053-TAHH-31489 053-TAHH-314 89
SIL 2
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
49
053-C-31003 discharge high pressure
053-PAHH-31576
SIL 2
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
50
053-C-31004 suction low pressure
51
053-C-31003 discharge low temperature
-
SIL 3
52
053-C-31004 discharge high pressure
053-PAHH-31636
SIL 2
-
-
SIF considered outstanding
Due to close out of Recommendation #67 this consequence has been removed.
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #67 implementation
Upon close out of Recommendation #71 from the Critical P&ID Review this hazard may be removed.
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #71 implementation Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Upon close out of Recommendation #71 from the Critical P&ID Review this hazard may be removed.
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #71 implementation
53
053-C-31004 discharge low temperature
54
053-E-31007 shell side high pressure
-
SIL 2
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
55
053-E-31008 shell side high pressure
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
56
053-E-31009 shell side high pressure
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
57
053-E-31010 shell side high pressure
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
-
SIL 3
Page 9 of 43
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
58
59
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
SIF to be verified
053-E-31009 shell side low temperature
-
053-E-31010 shell side low temperature
-
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
SIL 3
SIL 3
Notes Upon close out of Recommendation #75 from the Critical P&ID Review this hazard may be removed. Upon close out of Recommendation #75 from the Critical P&ID Review this hazard may be removed. Existing systems were not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in existing facilities which were not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
Scope of Work Work
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #75 implementation Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #75 implementation
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
60
074-TK-1001 high pressure
-
-
61
043-E-31001 tube side high pressure (warm and middle tube bundles - MR liquid)
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
62
043-E-31001 tube side high pressure (middle and cold tube bundles - MR lquid)
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
63
053-C-31001 suction high pressure
64
053-C-31001 discharge high temperature
65
053-C-31001 excess nitrogen flow
66
053-D-31004 high pressure
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
-
SIL 4+
053-TAHH-31189 053-TAHH-311 89
SIL 3
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
-
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
SIL 3
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
-
67
053-D-31006 low 053-D-31006 pressure
-
SIL 3
68
053-P-31006 high pressure
053-PAHH-31359
SIL 1
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
Upon close out of Recommendation #86 from the Critical P&ID Review 053-PSV- 31151 on the HP C3 Compressor Suction Drum may be considered as an additional IPL.
Upon close out of Recommendation #97 from the Critical P&ID Review additional IPLs may be considered.
Page 10 of 43
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
SIF to be verified
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
Notes
Scope of Work Work
69
053-D-31006 high level
-
SIL 3
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
70
023-D-31004 low 023-D-31004 level
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
71
023-D-31008 low 023-D-31008 water level
023-LALL-31057 023-LALL31057
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2
72
023-D-31008 low 023-D-31008 condensate condensat e level
023-LALL-31056 023-LALL31056
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2
73
023-E-31005 shell side high pressure
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
74
033-E-31001 shell side high pressure
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
75
033-D-310 033-D-31001 01 low condensate condensat e level
033-LALL-31054 033-LALL31054
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2
76
033-D-31001 low 033-D-31001 water level
033-LALL-31055 033-LALL31055
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2
77
78
033 Regeneration gas circuit high pressure (Fire/VCE)
071 BOG compressor discharge high pressure
-
SIL 3
Upon close out of Recommendation #103 from the Critical P&ID Review Cause 8 may be changed to ‘PV fails closed during start-up’. start- up’. OG compressor is not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes
-
-
in existing facilities and other parts of the project facilities not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete. Upon close out of Recommendation #101 from the Critical P&ID Review this hazard may be removed.
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #101 implementation
79
033-E-31006 shell side high temperature
-
SIL 3
80
053-D-31103 high pressure
-
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
81
033-E-31005 shell side high pressure
-
No further risk reduction required.
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
82
033-E-31006 shell side high pressure
-
No further risk reduction
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
Page 11 of 43
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
SIF to be verified
(Jet Fire)
83
SIL Verification
LOPA Result required.
033-E-31006 shell side high pressure
-
Scope of Work Work
Notes Report
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
SIL 3
(Fire/VCE) Fuel gas system is not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in other parts of the project facilities not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
84
HP fuel gas turbines 033-TAHH-31454 high temperature
85
033-D-31003 low 033-D-31003 water level
86
033-D-31003 low 033-D-31003 condensate condensat e level
-
risk reduction required.
Preliminary SIL Verification Report
87
023-T-31001 low 023-T-31001 amine level
023-LALL-31084 023-LALL31084
SIL 2
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
88
023-T-31001 low 023-T-31001 condensate condensat e level
-
SIL 2
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
89
023-D-31001 high pressure
023-PAHH-31128
No further risk reduction required
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
90
023-D-31001 low 023-D-31001 amine level
023-LALL-31139 023-LALL31139
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
033-LALL-31502 033-LALL31502
-
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
No further
Not SIL rated, not included in
Upon close out of Recommendation #101
No SIF defined in LOPA,
91
023-D-31009 high pressure
-
SIL 1
92
023-D-31001 low 023-D-31001 condensate condensat e level
-
SIL 0
93
023-P31001A/B/C/D suction high pressure
023-FALL-31099 023-FALL31099
SIL 4+
SIF considered outstanding
94
023-T-31002 high 023-T-31002 pressure
023-FALL-31099 023-FALL-31 099
SIL 4+
SIF considered outstanding /Same as SIF 93
95
023-D-31002 high pressure
023-PAHH-31215
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2
No further
Not SIL rated, not included in
96
017-D-31004 inlet piping high pressure
97
017-D-31004 high
-
risk reduction required
017-PAHH-31258
No further
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
from the Critical P&ID Review an additional IPL may be considered.
Page 12 of 43
scenario not included in SIL SIL Verification Report Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Preliminary SIL Verification Report Not SIL rated, not included in
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
SIF to be verified
pressure
98
017-D-31004 high
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
Notes
risk reduction required 017-LAHH-31252 017-LAHH-312 52
Preliminary SIL Verification Report Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2
SIL 1
level
99
LP fuel gas circuit high pressure
-
-
100
017-D-31004 low 017-D-31004 condensate condensat e level
017-LAHH-31252
No further risk reduction required
Scope of Work Work
Fuel gas system is not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in other parts of the project facilities not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report Produced water system is
101
Produced water tank high pressure
102
Recovered oil tank high pressure
103
011-T-31001 inlet 011-T-31001 piping high pressure
-
-
-
-
011-PAHH-31013
No further risk reduction required
not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations SIL to be defined in EPC need to consider causes phase. SIF not included in SIL in other parts of the Verification Report project facilities not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete. Recovered oil system is not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations SIL to be defined in EPC need to consider causes phase. SIF not included in SIL in other parts of the Verification Report project facilities not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete. Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report Upon close out of Recommendation #117 from the Critical P&ID Review an additional IPL may be considered for Cause 3.
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2
104
011-T-31001 high 011-T-31001 pressure
011-PAHH-31013
SIL 1
105
011-T-31001 high 011-T-31001 level
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
106
011-T-1001A/B inlet piping high pressure
011-PAHH-31013
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, included in Preliminary SIL not Verification Report
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
Page 13 of 43
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
SIF to be verified
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
Notes
Scope of Work Work
Existing systems were not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in existing facilities which were not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in SIL Verification Report
107
011-T-1001A/B high level
-
108
011-E-31001 shell side high pressure
-
No further risk reduction required.
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
109
017-D-31008 high pressure
-
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
110
011-P-31001A/B suction low pressure
-
No further risk reduction required.
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
111
112
113
114
115
116
017-D-31001A low condensate condensat e level
017-D-31001A low water level
017-D-31001B low condensate condensat e level
017-D-31001B low water level
017-LALL-31057 017-LALL31057
017-LALL-31060 017-LALL31060
017-LALL-31107 017-LALL31107
017-LALL-31110 017-LALL-31110
-
016-PAHH-XXXX (2oo3)
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
SIL 3
Upon close out of Recommendation #152 from the Critical P&ID Review additional IPLs may be considered.
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
SIL 3
Upon close out of Recommendation #152 from the Critical P&ID Review additional IPLs may be considered.
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Upon close out of Recommendation #152
017-V-31305 high pressure
016-D-1006 high 016-D-1006 pressure (HIPPS)
SIL 3
Upon close out of Recommendation #152 from the Critical P&ID Review additional IPLs may be considered.
SIL 3
-
from the Critical P&ID Review additional IPLs may be considered. This system is not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in other parts of the project facilities not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete. Existing systems were not part of the critical P&ID review and hence
-
not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in existing facilities which
Page 14 of 43
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
SIF to be verified
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
Notes
Scope of Work Work
were not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete. Existing systems were not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in existing facilities which were not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
117
016-D-1006 high 016-D-1006 pressure (PSV + Trip)
016-PAHH-XXXX
-
118
017-D-31006 low 017-D-31006 level
017-LALL-31203 017-LALL31203
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2
017-PAHH-31308
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
017-LALL-31302 017-LALL31302
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
119
017-D-31005 high pressure
120
121
017-D-31005 high level
017-D-31009 low 017-D-31009 level
017-LALL-31357
-
The coalescer is not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in other parts of the project facilities not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete
017-D-31005 017-D-310 05 low
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Not SIL rated, not included in
122
level
017-LALL-31305 017-LALL-31305
SIL 0
123
017-D-31005 low 017-D-31005 condensate condensat e level
017-LALL-31302
No further risk reduction required
124
ORF high pressure (HIPPS)
017-PAHH-31152 (2oo3)
SIL 4+
SIF consider ed outstanding
125
ORF high pressure (PSV + Trip)
017-PAHH-31152 (1oo1)
SIL 2
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
126
017-TK-31001 high 017-TK-31001 pressure
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
-
-
Open Recommendation Recommendation
SIL Verification Report Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Produced water system is not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in other parts of the project facilities not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
Page 15 of 43
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
SIF to be verified
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
Scope of Work Work
Notes Existing systems were not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA
127
128
129
130
016-TK-31001 high 016-TK-31001 pressure
-
087-TK-1004 high pressure
-
LNG loading arms sudden flow increase
-
LNG tanker high level
-
-
-
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
-
This scenario is not considered in LOPA as the team has insufficient information to decide on its credibility. Discuss when detailed drawings and documentation for loading arm package are available (during EPC).
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
-
This scenario is not considered in LOPA as the team has insufficient information to identify safeguards on the tankers at this stage of the project. Discuss when detailed information for the LNG tankers are available (during EPC).
072-D-31002 high level
132
LNG loading arms bowing / thermal shock
-
SIL 2
133
LNG loading line low pressure
-
No further risk reduction required.
134
LNG loading line high pressure
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004 © BP p.l.c.
-
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Existing systems were not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in existing facilities which were not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
131
072-LAHH-31204 072-LAHH-312 04
as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in existing facilities which were not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
Report
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2
SIL 1
SIL 2
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification
Upon close out of Recommendation #154 this hazard may be removed or an additional IPL may be considered.
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in SIL SIL Verification Report Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Upon close out of Recommendation #124 from the Critical P&ID Review, cause 2 may be removed.
Page 16 of 43
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in SIL Verification Report
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
135
LNG vapour return line high pressure
136
072-P-31008 discharge pipework high pressure
137
LNG loading/circulation line bowing
138
Circulation line surge
139
LNG loading line surge
140
SIF to be verified
N2 system low temperature
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
Notes
Scope of Work Work
SIL 1
Upon close out of Recommendation #123 from the Critical P&ID Review.
Hazard has been removed following Company approval of Recommendation #123 implementation
-
SIL 2
Upon close out of Recommendation #139 from the Critical P&ID Review, cause 4 may be removed.
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
-
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
-
SIL 2
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
-
Not included in Preliminary SIL -
SIL 1
Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA Upon close out of Recommendation #126 from the Critical P&ID Review an additional IPL may be considered.
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
141
Jetty 1 circulation line high flow
-
SIL 1
142
Jetty 2 circulation line high flow
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
143
LNG circulation line low pressure
-
No further risk reduction required.
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
144
LNG circulation line high pressure
145
146
LNG tanker high pressure
LNG storage tank low pressure
-
-
-
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
SIL 2
-
-
This scenario is not considered in LOPA as the team has insufficient information to identify safeguards on the tankers at this stage of the project. Discuss when detailed information for the LNG tankers are available (during EPC). Existing systems were not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in existing facilities which
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
were not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
Page 17 of 43
Rev: A01
© BP p.l.c.
BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
SIF to be verified
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
Notes
Scope of Work Work
conducted, it would be incomplete. Existing systems were
147
148
LNG storage tank high pressure
LNG vapour return line bowing
-
-
-
SIL 1
149
Tankage flare low pressure
150
Vapour return arm/line high pressure (asphyxiation)
-
SIL 2
151
LNG loading arm high pressure
-
No further risk reduction required.
-
-
not part of theand critical P&ID review hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in existing facilities which were not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Upon close out of Recommendation #132 from the Critical P&ID Review, cause 1 may be removed.
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
The tankage flare is not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in other parts of the project facilities not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report Scenario not considered credible as cooldown facilities have not yet been provided for 072-P31008 (design error).
152
072-P-31008 uncontrolled cooldown
-
-
153
072-D-31002 low 072-D-31002 pressure
-
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
154
072-D-31002 high pressure
-
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
155
072-D-31002 rapid 072-D-31002 cooldown
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
156
Condensate loading line surge
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
157
Condensate tanker high level
-
-
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
This scenario is not considered in LOPA as the team has insufficient
Page 18 of 43
No SIF defined in LOPA, not included in preliminary SIL Verification Report
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification
Rev: A01
© BP p.l.c.
BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
SIF to be verified
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
Scope of Work Work
Notes information to identify Report safeguards on the tankers at this stage of the project. Discuss when detailed information for the condensate tankers are available (during EPC). This scenario is not considered in LOPA as the team has insufficient information to identify safeguards on the tankers at this stage of the project. Discuss when detailed information for the condensate tankers are available (during EPC).
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
158
Condensate tanker high pressure
-
-
159
Condensate loading line low pressure
-
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
160
Condensate loading arm low pressure
-
No further risk reduction required.
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
161
Condensate loading line high pressure
-
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
162
076-P-31004 inlet piping low pressure
-
No further risk reduction required.
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
163
162-D-31001A high level
162-LAHH-31682 162-LAHH-316 82
SIL 2
Included in SIL Verification Report
164
162-D-31001B high level
162-LAHH-31722 162-LAHH-317 22
SIL 2
Included in SIL Verification Report
165
LP steam header high pressure
-
SIL 1
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
166
167
LP steam header high temperature
LP steam header hammering
-
-
SIL 3
Upon close out of Recommendation #146 from the Critical P&ID Review an IPL may be considered.
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in SIL SIL Verification Report
SIL 3
Upon close out of Recommendation #153 from the Critical P&ID Review, this hazard may be removed or additional IPLs may be considered.
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in SIL SIL Verification Report
Upon close out of Recommendation #147 from the Critical P&ID Review, this hazard may be removed or additional IPLs may be considered.
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
168
MP steam header high temperature
-
SIL 2
169
MP steam header high pressure
-
SIL 1
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
Page 19 of 43
Not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report since < SIL 2 and no SIF defined in LOPA
Rev: A01
© BP p.l.c.
BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
LOPA Report Results No.
170
Hazardous Scenario Consequences
MP steam header hammering
SIF to be verified
162-TALL-31486 162-TALL31486
SIL Verification
LOPA Result
SIL 3
Notes Upon close out of Recommendation #153 from the Critical P&ID Review, this hazard may
Scope of Work Work
Included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
be removed or additional IPLs may be considered.
171
172
HP steam header hammering
Oxygen scavenger tank high level
-
-
SIL 3
-
Upon close out of Recommendation #153 from the Critical P&ID Review, this hazard may be removed or additional IPLs may be considered. This tank is not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in other parts of the project facilities not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was
No SIF defined in LOPA, scenario not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
conducted, it would be incomplete. This tank is not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in other parts of the project facilities not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
173
Neutralization amine tank high level
-
-
174
162-D-31001A high pressure
-
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
175
162-D-31001B high pressure
-
SIL 0
Not SIL rated, included in Preliminary SIL not Verification Report
176
De-emulsfier storage drum high pressure
-
-
This tank is not part of the critical P&ID review and hence not considered in LOPA as the LOPA calculations need to consider causes in other parts of the project facilities not included in the Critical P&ID review. Therefore if a LOPA was conducted, it would be incomplete.
SIL to be defined in EPC phase. SIF not included in Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Analysing the above table and excluding all scenario not associated t a specific SIF, a total of 57 SIFs have been identified, distributed as follows: 7 SIFs rated SIL 4+;
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
Page 20 of 43
Rev: A01
© BP p.l.c.
BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
9 SIFs rated SIL 3;
17 SIFs rated SIL 2;
11 SIFs rated SIL 1;
8 SIFs rated SIL 0;
5 SIFs not rated (No further risk reduction required).
The Preliminary SIL verification has been performed for all the loops requiring SIL level 2 or SIL 3. However outstanding since further investigation is required, for SIL 4+ rated loops it has been investigated the maximum achievable SIL according to actual SIF design considered during LOPA analysis. In Table 2 the list of 33 SIFs to be subjected to FEED SIL Verification process. SIL 1 loops, not considered critical critical will not be included in the Preliminary SIL verification report.
Table 2 – SIFs to be verified No.
SIF to be verified
SIL
3
053-PAHH-31187
SIL 3
4
043-PAHH-31032
SIL 2
5
053-PAHH-31858
SIL 2
7
043-PAHH-31726
SIL 2
8
053-PAHH-31487
SIL 2
12
043-LAHH-31044
SIL 2
20
043-LALL-31285
SIL 2
21
043-PAHH-31273
SIL 2
22
053-PAHH-31487
SIL 2
26
043-LAHH-31434
SIL 3
27
043-PAHH-31423
SIL 3
29
043-LALL-31434
SIL 2
33
043-PAHH-31573
SIL 4+
40
053-PDALL-31469
SIL 2
43
053-TAHH-31578
SIL 4+
47
053-TAHH-31638
SIL 4+
48
053-TAHH-31489
SIL 2
49
053-PAHH-31576
SIL 2
52
053-PAHH-31636
SIL 2
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
Page 21 of 43
Rev: A01
© BP p.l.c.
BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
No.
SIF to be verified
SIL
64
053-TAHH-31189
SIL 3
87
023-LALL-31084
SIL 2
93
023-FALL-31099
SIL 4+
023-FALL-31099
SIL 4+
111
017-LALL-31057
SIL 3
112
017-LALL-31060
SIL 3
113
017-LALL-31107
SIL 3
114
017-LALL-31110
SIL 3
124
017-PAHH-31152 (2oo3)
SIL 4+
125
017-PAHH-31152 (1oo1)
SIL 2
163
162-LAHH-31682
SIL 2
164
162-LAHH-31722
SIL 2
170
162-TALL-31486
SIL 3
94 (same as 93)
1.3
Owner and Contractual Standards
GP 30-75
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) - Management of the Safety Lifecycle
GP 30-80
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) – Specification and Implementation
GP 48-06
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA).
1.4
International Standards
IEC 61508
Functional Safety: Safety Related Systems
IEC 61511
Functional Safety: Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector.
1.5
Contractor Document
TEP-930-RPT-HS-BP4-0019
1.6
LOPA WORKSHOP REPORT
Order of Precedence
1. National or local regulatory standards where the work is being performed and/or where the facilities are to be installed; 2. Contractual Requirements and Specifications, Datasheets etc.)
Project
Specific
Requirements
or
Standards
(e.g.
3. BP Group Practice (GP); 4. COMPANY Guidelines, Manuals and Procedures; International Regulations, Codes and Standards.
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
Page 22 of 43
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© BP p.l.c.
BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
2 Symbol Symbols, s, Abbreviations and Defini Definitions tions Abbreviations BOG
Boil Off Gas.
EPC
Engineering, Procurement, and Construction.
FEED
Front End Engineering Design
HFT
Hardware Fault Tolerance
IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission
IPL
Independent Protection Layer
PFD
Probability of Failure on Demand
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas.
LOPA
Layer of Protections Analysis
LPG
Liquefied Petroleum Gas.
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association.
PFDs
Process Flow Diagrams
P&IDs
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
ORF
Onshore Receiving Facilities.
SIF
Safety Instrumented Function
SIL
Safety Integrity Level
SIS
Safety Instrumented Function
TMR
Triple modular redundancy
TEP
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED
1oo1
Voting logic: 1 out of 1
1oo2
Voting logic: 1 out of 2
1oo3
Voting logic: 1 out of 3
2oo3
Voting logic: 2 out of 3
3oo3
Voting logic: 3 out of 3
Description
Definitions
Description
COMPANY
BP Berau Ltd.
CONTRACTOR
A selected company who has agreed to perform the work on the terms and conditions contained in the respective FEED and/or EPC contract.
Shall
Mandatory
Should/May
Discretional, but COMPANY approval to be sought for deviation.
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3 Methodology Methodology 3.1
General
According to IEC 61508/61511, for each Safety Integrity Level, there is a corresponding probability of failure on demand that the system must not exceed. For the classification the greater the potential consequences and the expected frequency of demand are, the more reliable the loop must be. SIL levels and their associated target probabilities are shown in Table 3. For the target PFD, it has been considered the upper limit of each SIL requirement (as no margin requirements have been specified during the SIL Allocation) considering that literature data are conservatively used for the reliability calculation. Table 3 – Probability of failure on demand for SIL levels (Low Demand Mode) SIL
Probability of Failure on Demand
1
10-1÷10-2
2
10-2÷10-3
3
10-3÷10-4
4
10-4÷10-5
After the SIL required for a SIF has been identified by means of LOPA sessions, the SIF must be verified in order to check its adequacy both for the maximum required PFD and for architectural constrains (hardware fault tolerance). As per good engineering practice, loop testing frequency for PFD calculation has been assumed one year (8760 hours). The methodology for SIL verification is given by IEC 61508/61511 and is summarized in this document. Therefore two different requirements are given for each SIF in order to achieve the compliance to the standard: both probability performance and hardware fault tolerance (HFT) must be satisfied. No continuous mode of operation SIFs have been identified during the allocation activity.
3.2
Probability Requirements
3.2.1
General
The protection loops (SIF) are considered to be composed by the following items:
The sensing element(s) The logic solver (SIS) The final element(s).
The average probability of failure on demand of the safety related system is determined by calculating and combining the average probability of failure on demand for all the subsystems which provide protection against a hazardous event. This is expressed by the following relationship: PFD PF D AVG
PF PF PFD D SE PFD D LS PFD PFD FE
where,
PFDAVG is the average probability of failure on demand of the safety-related system
PFDSE is the probability of failure on demand of the sensing element(s)
PFDLS is the probability of failure on demand of the logic system element
PFDFE is the probability of failure on demand of final element(s)
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To determine the probability of failure on demand of each of the components (i.e. sensors, logic system and final elements), the following procedure should be adhered to: 1. Consider the block diagram showing the system input elements, logic solver or system output elements and represent each set of elements as 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 2oo3, 1oo3, 3oo3. Only the final elements that are critical for the protection function shall be considered in the evaluation of PFDFE, in fact critical is intended the action that protect the system against the deviation controlled by the SIF loop analyzed. Not all action foreseen by the C&E diagram are to be considered part of SIF (critical). 2. For each sub-system element, select the parameters relevant to:
probability of failure per hour, λ , for the element; diagnostic coverage (DC); the common cause β-factor; proof test interval.
3. Obtain the probability of failure on demand. The complete verification tables summarizing calculation reports for each analysed function are reported in Appendix A.
3.2.2
PFD Formulas
In this paragraph the equations used for the SIL verification (i.e. for calculating the probability of failure on demand) are described per each architecture. Only reliability block diagrams present in actual design have been considered and used in the calculation reported in Appendix A. Voting logic 1oo1 This architecture consists of a single element, where any dangerous failure will prevent a valid alarm signal from being correctly processed.
Figure 1
Block diagram, voting logic 1oo1
Probability of failure can be calculated using the following formulas:
DU D DD
:
(REF. IEC 61508-6 B.3.2.2.1)
(REF. IEC 61508-6 B.3.2.2.1)
1 DC DU D
(REF. IEC 61508-6 B.3.2.2.1)
DD D DC
(REF. IEC 61508-6 B.3.2.2.1)
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The value of device equivalent mean down time can be obtained as follows:
t CE
DU T 1 MTTR DD MTTR D 2 D
(REF. IEC 61508-6 B.3.2.2.1)
Average probability of failure on demand can then be evaluated:
P PF FD AVG
DU DD t CE
(REF. IEC 61508-6 B.3.2.2.1).
Voting logic 1oo2 This architecture consists of two elements connected in parallel, such that either element can command a shutdown output. Thus, there would have to be a dangerous failure in both elements in order for a valid alarm signal not to be correctly processed. It is assumed that any diagnostic testing would only report the faults and would not change any output states or the output voting.
Figure 2
Block diagram, voting logic 1oo2
To evaluate average probability of failure on demand, system equivalent mean down time (tGE) shall be defined, using the following formula:
T t GE
DU 1 DD MTTR 3 MTTR D D
(REF. IEC 61508-6 B.3.2.2.2).
Average probability of failure on demand can then be evaluated:
PFD PF D AVG
2 1 1
2
D
DD
DU
t CE t GE
D
DD
T MTTR 2
MTTR DU
1
(REF. IEC 61508-6 B.3.2.2.2) D.
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Voting logic 2oo2 This architecture has two channels connected in parallel so that both channels need to demand the safety function before it can take place. It is assumed that any diagnostic testing would only report the faults and would not change any output states or the output voting.
Figure 3
Block diagram, voting logic 2oo2
Average probability of failure on demand can then be evaluated:
PF PFD AVG 2 D t CE
(REF. IEC 61508-6 B.3.2.2.3)
Voting logic 2oo3 This architecture consists of three elements connected in parallel with a majority voting arrangement for the output signals, such that the output state is not changed if only one channel demands the safety function to intervene. It is assumed that any diagnostic testing would only report the faults and would not change any output states or the output voting.
Figure 4
Block di diagram, agram, voting logic valid for 1oo3, 2oo3 and 3oo3
Average probability of failure on demand can then be evaluated: PFD PF D AVG
6 1 1 D
DD
DU
2
t CE t GE
D
DD
T MTTR 2
MTTR DU
1
(REF. IEC 61508-6 B.3.2.2.5).
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Voting logic 1oo3 This architecture consists of three channels connected in parallel with a voting arrangement for the output signals, such that the output state follows 1oo3 voting. It is assumed that any diagnostic testing would only report the faults found and would not change any output states or change the output voting. The average probability of failure on demand for the architecture is: PFD PF D AVG
61 1
3
D
DD
t G 2 E
DU
t CE t GE t G 2 E
D
MTTR 4
DU T 1
DD
D
T MTTR 2
MTTR DU DD
1
MTTR
D
(REF. IEC 61508-6 B.3.2.2.6). Voting logic 3oo3 This architecture has three channels connected in parallel so that all the three channels need to demand the safety function before it can take place. It is assumed that any diagnostic testing would only report the faults and would not change any output states or the output voting. Average probability of failure on demand has been evaluated considering the structure of 2oo2 equation: PF PFD AVG 3 D t CE
3.3
Hardware Fault Tolerance
Safety instrumented functions, may need to have a minimum Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) requirements based on the SIL level allocated. It is important to note that the Hardware Fault Tolerance represents the minimum component or subsystem redundancy requirements. In particular, hardware fault tolerance is the capability of a component or subsystem to continue to be able to function with one or more dangerous faults in the hardware. A Hardware Fault Tolerance equal to 1 means that there are for example two devices and the architecture is such that the dangerous failure of one of the two components or subsystems does not prevent the safety action from occurring on demand. A Hardware Fault Tolerance equal to 2 means that there are for example three devices and the architecture is such that the dangerous failure of two of the three components or subsystems does not prevent the safety action from occurring on demand. Requirements related to HFT foreseen by IEC 61511 are shown in the following Table 4 for each level. Table 4 – Minimum hardware fault tolerance of sensors and final elements SIL
Minimum Hardware Fault Tolerance
1
0
2
1
3
2
4
Special requirements apply - see IEC-61508
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If elements are not fail safe, above requirements have to be increased by 1 order. Vice versa, HFT can be reduced by 1 order if the following requirements are satisfied:
the hardware of the device is selected on the basis of prior use;
the device allows adjustment of process-related parameters only, e.g., measuring range, upscale or downscale failure direction;
the adjustment of the process-related parameters of the device is protected, e.g., jumper, password;
the function has a SIL requirement less than 4.
Above approach applies to sensors and final elements only. Logic solver HTF follows only the requirements given in IEC-61511 part 1 clauses 11.4.2 to 11.4.4, based on SFF, as reported in Table 5. Table 5 – Minimum hardware fault tolerance of PE logic solvers Minimum Hardware Fault Tolerance SIL
SFF < 60
SFF 60
to 90
SFF > 90
1
1
0
0
2
2
1
0
3
3
2
1
4
Special requirements apply - see IEC 61508
According to IEC-61508, IEC-61508, redundancies can be evaluated following the SFF approach, if vendor’s certifications are available. Elements and subsystems are divided in two categories, type A and type B, as defined: An element can be regarded as type A if, for the components required to achieve the safety function: a. the failure modes of all constituent components are well defined; and b. the behaviour of the element under fault conditions can be completely determined; and c. there is sufficient dependable failure data to show that the claimed rates of failure for detected and undetected dangerous failures are met. Instead an element shall be regarded as type B if, for the components required to achieve the safety function: a. the failure mode of at least one constituent component is not well defined; or b. the behaviour of the element under fault conditions cannot be completely determined; or c. there is insufficient dependable failure data to support claims for rates of failure for detected and undetected dangerous failures. For each type of elements and subsystems IEC-61508 lists the architectural requirements as per following tables (Table 6 and Table 7).
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Table 6 – Maximum allowable SIL for a SIF carried out by a type A safety-related element or subsystem Safe failure fraction of an element
Hardware fault tolerance 0
1
2
< 60 %
SIL 1
SIL 2
SIL 3
60 % – < 90 %
SIL 2
SIL 3
SIL 4
90 % – < 99 %
SIL 3
SIL 4
SIL 4
SIL 3
SIL 4
SIL 4
99
%
Table 7 – Maximum allowable SIL for a SIF carried out by a type B safety-related element or subsystem Safe failure fraction of an element
Hardware fault tolerance 0
1
2
< 60 %
Not Allowed
SIL 1
SIL 2
60 % – < 90 %
SIL 1
SIL 2
SIL 3
90 % – < 99 %
SIL 2
SIL 3
SIL 4
SIL 3
SIL 4
SIL 4
99
%
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4 Reliability Data 4.1
General
Reliability data used during the verification activity, relating to each component of the SIF, are presented in the following Table 8. The following information are shown per single subsystem:
instrument code as per SIL verification sheet; reliability data;
subsystem Type, as per IEC 61508;
β factor;
MTTR as per contractual requirements;
references.
According to project phase, barriers, QEV, aut similia are not considered in this report. A general β factor of 5% has been considered in PFD calculation. As per contractual requirement, a minimum of SFF=60% is consider for all subsystems, even though differently reported in relevant databank reference.
Table 8 – Reliability Data for Components λ
Component
Code
Failure rate [oc/hr]
Level transmitter (radar)
Generic Pressure Transmitter
λ D
Dangerous failure rate [oc/hr]
DC [-]
β
[-]
MTTR
SFF
[hr]
[-]
Type
Reference
Exida FMEDA LT
PT
1,60E-06
1,30E-06
1,60E-06
8,00E-07
86%
60%
5%
5%
8
8
91%
75%
B
Report No.: Rosemount 08/02-17 R005
B
Item 5.1.3 "Reliability Data for Safety Instrumented Systems", SINTEF PDS Data Handbook, 2010 Edition
Generic Temperature Transmitter
TT
2,00E-06
7,00E-07
60%
5%
8
86%
B
Item 5.1.5 "Reliability Data for Safety Instrumented Systems", SINTEF PDS Data Handbook, 2010 Edition
SIS Logic Solver
SIS
--
--
--
--
--
>99 %
B
PFD=1.0E-04 (Average data from Vendors)
A
Item 5.3.4 "Reliability Data for Safety Instrumented Systems", SINTEF PDS Data Handbook, 2010 Edition
Solenoid Valve
SIS/XV including actuator
SY
XV
3,00E-06
5,30E-06
1,10E-06
3,00E-06
30%
0%
5%
5%
(excluding pilot)
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
72
72
74%
43%
A
Item 5.3.1 "Reliability Data for Safety Instrumented Systems", SINTEF PDS Data Handbook, 2010 Edition
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λ
Component
USVE valve
Code
USVE
Failure rate
λ D
[oc/hr]
Dangerous failure rate [oc/hr]
8,30E-06
4,10E-06
DC
β
MTTR
SFF
[-]
[-]
[hr]
[-]
0%
5%
72
51%
Type
A
Reference
Combined value from solenoid valve and XV valve.
As specific reliability data provided from vendors are not available, generic figures, referenced in international hand books has been used to perform the reliability assessment. When available, the reliability data of Vendor will be verified and used for the next Verification calculations. According to the equations described in IEC 61508, β factor listed in Table 8 doesn’t have any effect if not redundant NooN architecture are used (e.g. 1oo1, 2oo2); if redundant NooM (N99%.
4.4
Final Elements
Final elements are mainly represented by valve closure/opening and machine trips actions and are generally considered the weak part of the SIF. In order to calculate the PFD related to the final elements the analysis has been focused only on the final elements considered critical for the evaluated function, i.e. those final elements that actually provide a protection for the concerned process deviation as defined summaries during the enclosed allocationinmeetings. calculation the report.Moreover these critical end modules are shown in the The probabilities of failure on demand have been obtained on the basis of the failure rates values, DC and β factor shown in Table 8. Probability of failure on demand for final elements has been calculated on the basis of an initial proof test period of 8760 hours and of the equations described in relevant paragraph.
4.5
PFD Calculation Chart
Considering the abovementioned assumptions, methodology and reliability data, for each subsystem the following PFD values apply, according to relevant architecture.
4.6
Architectural Constraints
Based on component reliability (i.e. SFF), it is possible to identify which safety integrity level can be achieved based on the loop architecture provided; for each type of component, according to its SFF, maximum SIL level for each redundancy (HFT) is shown in the following Table 9.
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Table 9
SIL satisfied based on SFF and redundancy Component
Code
Flow transmitter
FT
Level transmitter transmitter
Type
HFT=0
HFT=1
HFT=2
84%
B
SIL 1
SIL 2
SIL 3
LT
81%
B
SIL 1
SIL 2
SIL 3
Generic Pressure Transmitter
PT
75%
B
SIL 1
SIL 2
SIL 3
Generic Temperature Transmitter
TT
86%
B
SIL 1
SIL 2
SIL 3
SIS Logic Solver
SIS
>99%
B
SIL 3
SIL 4
SIL 4
Motor failure to trip/start
MT
60%
A
SIL 3
SIL 4
SIL 4
Blowdown valve (excluding pilot)
USVD
33%
A
SIL 2
SIL 3
SIL 4
X-tree valve (excluding pilot)
ESV
45%
A
SIL 1
SIL 2
SIL 3
SIS/XV including actuator (excluding pilot)
XV
43%
A
SIL 1
SIL 2
SIL 3
Solenoid Valve
SY
74%
A
SIL 2
SIL 3
SIL 4
Control valve
CV
68%
A
SIL 2
SIL 3
SIL 4
UZV valve
USVE
60%
A
SIL 2
SIL 3
SIL 4
(*) Outside BIDDER Scope of Work
SFF [
]
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5 SIL Verificatio Verification n Results The SIL verification has been performed for all the loops requiring SIL level 2 or higher, as specified in par. 1.2.. For all safety functions classified as SIL 2 and SIL 3, it has been verified if the specific reliability requirement is satisfied in terms of both probability of failure on demand (PFD) and architectural constraints (HFT). For SIL 4+ considered outstanding sinceSIL further investigation is required, it hasduring been indicated in rated Notesloops, column the maximum achievable according to SIF design considered LOPA analysis. SIL Verification has been performed considering actual SIF arrangement, as modified incorporating recommendations from Critical P&ID Review. The summary of the results of the SIL verification for all SIL rated functions are reported in Table 10, together with relevant remarks indicating the necessary improving actions in order to fulfil SIL requirements, both in terms of PFD and HFT, for all SIFs not positively verified. Test interval used during verification study is equal to 8760 h (1 year). Detailed calculations for each SIF is given in following attachments:
A – PFD SIL Verification Sheets
B – HFT SIL Verification Sheets
Table 10 – SIL verification results N.
SIF
3
Compliance
SIL
Notes
target
PFD
HFT
SIL
053-P 053-PIT-31187-HH IT-31187-HH
3
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
4
043-P 043-PIT-31032-HH IT-31032-HH
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
5
053-P 053-PIT-31858-HH IT-31858-HH
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
7
043-P 043-PIT-31726-HH IT-31726-HH
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
8
053-P 053-PIT-31487-HH IT-31487-HH
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
12
043-LIT-31 043-LIT-31044-LL 044-LL
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
20
043-LIT-31 043-LIT-31285-LL 285-LL
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
21
043-PIT-31273-HH 043-PIT-31273-HH
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
22
053-PIT-31487-HH 053-PIT-31487-HH
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
26
043-LIT-31434-HH 043-LIT-31434-HH
3
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
27
043-PIT-31423-HH 043-PIT-31423-HH
3
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
29
043-LIT-31 043-LIT-31434-LL 434-LL
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
33
043-PIT-31573-HH 043-PIT-31573-HH
4+
--
--
--
Refer to Table 12
40
053-PDIT-31469-LL 053-PDIT-31469-LL
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
43
053-TIT-31578-HH 053-TIT-31578-HH
4+
--
--
--
Refer to Table 12
47
053-TIT-31638-HH 053-TIT-31638-HH
4+
--
--
--
Refer to Table 12
48
053-TIT-31489-HH 053-TIT-31489-HH
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
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N.
SIF
49
Compliance
SIL
Notes
target
PFD
HFT
SIL
053-PIT-31576-HH 053-PIT-31576-HH
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
52
053-PIT-31636-HH 053-PIT-31636-HH
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
64
053-TIT-31189-HH 053-TIT-31189-HH
3
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
87
023-LIT-31 023-LIT-31084-LL 084-LL
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
93
023-FIT-31 023-FIT-31099-LL 099-LL
4+
--
--
--
Refer to Table 12
94
Same as 93
Same as 93
Same as 93
Same as 93
Same as 93
Same as 93
111
017-LIT-31 017-LIT-31057-LL 057-LL
3
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
112
017-LIT-31 017-LIT-31060-LL 060-LL
3
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
113
017-LIT-31 017-LIT-31107-LL 107-LL
3
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
114
017-LIT-31 017-LIT-31110-LL 110-LL
3
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
124
017-PIT-31152A/B/C-HH 017-PIT-31152A/B/CHH
4+
--
--
--
Refer to Table 12
125
017-PIT-31152 017-PIT-31152
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
163
162-LI-31682-HH 162-LI-31682-HH
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
164
162-LI-31722-HH 162-LI-31722-HH
2
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
170
162-TI162-TI-31486-LL 31486-LL
3
NO
NO
NO
Refer to Table 12
NOTES:
YES:
SIL achieved
NO:
SIL not achieved
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6 Conclusions and Recommendations In this section conclusions/recommendations arisen after verification step for each SIF are presented; when a SIF doesn’t satisfy SIL requirements (refer to Table 10), a specific recommendation applicable to the mention subsystem has been issued and listed in Table 12.
Regarding USVE valves, consisting of a system including solenoid and XV valve body, in order to support valves vendors selection in Table 11 it has been indicated reliability data to fulfil SIL 2 requirement, without redundancy. This value shall be considered as a the maximum reliability requirement to be considered in EPC phase, in case redundancy for sensors in SIL 2 loop will be not applied.
Table 11 – USVE Reliability Data λ
Component
USVE valve
Failure rate [oc/hr]
Dangerous failure rate [oc/hr]
1,00E-06
4,00E-07
Code
USVE
λ D
DC
β
MTTR
SFF
[-]
[-]
[hr]
[-]
0%
5%
72
60%
Type
Reference
A
According to GP 30-80, par. 9.5, bullet m., for SIL 3 a minimum of 2 final element shall be utilized, consequently final element should have a redundancy.
Table 12 – Recommendations Table N.
3
4
5
SIF
053-P 053-PAHH-31187 AHH-31187
043-PIT-31032-HH 043-PIT-31032-HH
053-PIT-31858-HH
SIL Target
Involved Subsystems
Proposed Recommendation
053-PAHH-31187
For sensor a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied unless on market transmitter certified for SIL 3 application is available
053-USVE-31222 (Trip HP FG to 053-CG-31001)
For valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied (ref. BP 30-80)
043-PIT-31032-HH
Sensor to be certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied
043-USVE-31062
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
3
2
2
053-PIT-31858-HH
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied
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N.
7
8
SIF
043-PIT-31726-HH 043-PIT-31726-HH
053-PIT-31487-HH 053-PIT-31487-HH
SIL Target
Involved Subsystems
053-USVE-31990/31951 31989/31988
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
043-PIT-31726-HH
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied
043-USVE31085/31725/31866/3186 7/31868
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
053-PIT-31487-HH
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied
2
2
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be 053-USVE-31464
12
043-LIT-31044-LL 043-LIT-31044-LL
Proposed Recommendation
provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
043-LIT-31044-LL
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy redundan cy (i.e. voting 1oo2 o r 2oo3) shall be applied
043-USVE-31047
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
2
043-LIT-31285-LL
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied
20
21
043-LIT-31285-LL 043-LIT-31285-LL
043-PIT 043-PIT-31273-HH -31273-HH
2 043-USVE-31288
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
043-PIT-31273-HH
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied
043-USVE31293/31277/31047
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2
2
053-USVE-31885
application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
Page 37 of 43
Rev: A01
© BP p.l.c.
BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
N.
SIF
SIL Target
Involved Subsystems
053-PIT-31487-HH
22
053-PIT 053-PIT-31487-HH -31487-HH
2
27
29
33
40
43
043-LIT 043-LIT-31434-HH -31434-HH
043-PIT 043-PIT-31423-HH -31423-HH
043-LIT-31434-LL 043-LIT-31434-LL
043-PIT 043-PIT-31573-HH -31573-HH
053-PDIT 053-PDIT-31469-LL -31469-LL
053-TIT 053-TIT-31578-HH -31578-HH
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be
053-USVE-31522 (Trip HP FG to 053-CG-31002)
26
Proposed Recommendation
provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
043-LIT-31434-HH
For sensor a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied unless on market transmitter certified for SIL 3 application is available
043-USVE-31441/31288
For valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied (ref. BP 30-80)
043-PIT-31423-HH
For sensor a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied unless on market transmitter certified for SIL 3 application is available
043-USVE31452/31441/31288
For valves and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied (ref. BP 30-80)
043-LIT-31434-LL
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied
043-USVE-31437
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
043-PIT-31573-HH
SIF to be further investigate investigated. d.
043-USVE-31602/31437
Maximum achievable SIL: 2 according to SIF design analyzed during LOPA. In this case the recommendation are the same as for other SIL 2 rated SIFs
053-PDIT-31469-LL
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied
053-USVE-31466
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
053-TIT-31578-HH
SIF to be further investigate investigated. d.
053-USVE-31522 (Trip HP FG to 053-CG-31002)
Maximum achievable SIL: 2 according to SIF design analyzed during LOPA. In this case the recommendation are the same as for other SIL 2 rated SIFs
3
3
2
4+
2
4+
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
Page 38 of 43
Rev: A01
© BP p.l.c.
BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
N.
47
48
49
52
64
87
93
SIF
053-TIT 053-TIT-31638-HH -31638-HH
053-TIT 053-TIT-31489-HH -31489-HH
053-PIT 053-PIT-31576-HH -31576-HH
053-PIT 053-PIT-31636-HH -31636-HH
053-TIT 053-TIT-31189-HH -31189-HH
023-LIT-31084-LL 023-LIT-31084-LL
023-FIT-31099- LL
SIL Target
4+
Involved Subsystems
Proposed Recommendation
053-TIT-31638-HH
SIF to be further investigate investigated. d.
053-USVE-31222 (Trip HP FG to 053-CG-31001)
Maximum achievable SIL: 2 according to SIF design analyzed during LOPA. In this case the recommendation are the same as for other SIL 2 rated SIFs
053-TIT-31489-HH
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied
053-USVE-31522 (Trip HP FG to 053-CG-31002)
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
053-PIT-31576-HH
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied
053-USVE-31522 (Trip HP FG to 053-CG-31002)
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
053-PIT-31636-HH
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied
053-USVE-31222 (Trip HP FG to 053-CG-31001)
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
053-TIT-31189-HH
For sensor a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied unless on market transmitter certified for SIL 3 application is available
053-USVE-31222 (Trip HP FG to 053-CG-31001)
For valves and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied (ref. BP 30-80)
023-LIT-31084-LL
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy redundan cy (i.e. voting 1oo2 o r 2oo3) shall be applied
023-USVE-31103
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
023-FIT-31099- LL
SIF to be further investigate investigated. d.
2
2
2
3
2
4+
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
Page 39 of 43
Rev: A01
© BP p.l.c.
BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
N.
94
111
112
SIF
Same as 93
017-LIT 017-LIT-31057-LL -31057-LL
017-LIT 017-LIT-31060-LL -31060-LL
SIL Target
Same as 93
Involved Subsystems
Proposed Recommendation
023-USVE-31101
Maximum achievable SIL: 2 according to SIF design analyzed during LOPA. In this case the recommendation are the same as for other SIL 2 rated SIFs
Same as 93
Same as 93
017-LIT-31057-LL
For sensor a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied unless on market transmitter certified for SIL 3 application is available
017-USVE-31064
For valves and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied (ref. BP 30-80)
017-LIT-31060-LL
For sensor a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied unless on market transmitter certified for SIL 3 application is available
3
3 017-USVE-31065
For valves and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied (ref. BP 30-80)
113
114
124
125
017-LIT 017-LIT-31107-LL -31107-LL
017-LIT 017-LIT-31110-LL -31110-LL
017-PIT-31152A/B/ 017-PIT-31152A/B/C-HH C-HH
017-PIT 017-PIT-31152-HH -31152-HH
017-LIT-31107-LL
For sensor a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied unless on market transmitter certified for SIL 3 application is available
017-USVE-31114
For valves and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied (ref. BP 30-80)
017-LIT-31110-LL
For sensor a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied unless on market transmitter certified for SIL 3 application is available
017-USVE-31115
For valves and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied (ref. BP 30-80)
017-PIT-31152A/B/C-H H
SIF to be further investigate investigated. d.
017-USVE-31156
Maximum achievable SIL: 2 according to SIF design analyzed during LOPA. In this case the recommendation are the same as for other SIL 2 rated SIFs
017-PIT-31152-HH
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied
3
3
4+
2 017-USVE-31156
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
Page 40 of 43
© BP p.l.c.
Rev: A01 BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
N.
SIF
SIL Target
Involved Subsystems
162-LI-31682-HH
163
162-LI162-LI-31682-HH 31682-HH
2
162-LI-31722-HH
162-LI162-LI-31722-HH 31722-HH
Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied Currently under BPCS. It shall be moved to SIS
162-XV-31690
164
Proposed Recommendation
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied Sensor to be provided certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied Currently under BPCS. It shall be moved to SIS
2 162-XV-31722
Valve and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) to be provided with minimum reliability data as per Table 11 and certified suitable to SIL 2 application (HFT=0), otherwise a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied
170
162-TI162-TI-31486-LL 31486-LL
162-TI-31486-LL
For sensor a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2 or 2oo3) shall be applied u nless on market transmitter certified for SIL 3 application is available
162-USVE-31845
For valves and its components (e.g. solenoid, actuator, body, et other applicable) a redundancy (i.e. voting 1oo2) shall be applied (ref. BP 30-80)
3
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
Page 41 of 43
© BP p.l.c.
BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Appendix A SIL Verification Report_Att. 1.pdf Report_Att.
Rev: A01
PFD Calculati Calculation on Sheet
TEP-900-RPT-HS-BP4-0004
Page 42 of 43
© BP p.l.c.
BP Confidential
Tangguh Expansion Project – LNG FEED Preliminary SIL Verification Report
Appendix B
SIL Verification Report_Att. 2.pdf Report_Att.
Rev: A01
HFT Compliance Sheet
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