st31 - 201 (1978) PDF

ST 31-201 SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

US ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER NOVEMBER 1978

ST 31-201 CONTENTS CHAPTER 1. 1-1. 1-2. CHAPTER 2.

INTRODUCTION PURPOSE AND SCOPE RECOMMENDATIONS

1-1 1-1

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

Section I. INTRODUCTION 2-1 2-1. GENERAL 2-1 2-2. INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS IN AN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA (UWOA) 2-1 Section II. AREA STUDY/AREA INTELLIGENCE/AREA ASSESS MENT 2-3. GENERAL 2-4. AREA STUDY Source of Information Preparation Preparation by Operational Detachments 2-5. OPERATIONAL AREA INTELLIGENCE AND BRIEFBACK Operational Area Intelligence Study The "Asset" Briefback Briefback Guide Training Aids 2-6. AREA ASSESSMENT

2-2 2-2 2-2 2-2 2-2 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-4 2-4 2-5 2-5 2-5

Section III.INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION WITHIN THE UWOA 2-7. GENERAL 2-8. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION COLLECTION 2-9. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS Internal Operations Higher Headquarters

2-6 2-6 2-6 2-7 2-7 2-7

Section IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE UWOA 2-10. GENERAL 2-11. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS Screening of Personnel and Potential Recruits Surveillance of the Local Populace Penetration of Enemy Intelligence Systems Internal Security Operational Security

2-7 2-7 2-8 2-8 2-8 2-8 2-8 2-8 i

Section V. TACTICAL SECURITY WITHIN THE UWOA 2-12. GENERAL 2-13. PRINCIPLES Security System Inner security zone Outer security zone Dispersion and Tactical Security Mobility of Units and Installations Camouflage, Cover, and Deception March Security

2-9 2-9 2-9 2-9 2-9 2-11 2-11 2-12 2-12 2-12

CHAPTER 3. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP) Section I. INTRODUCTION 3-1. GENERAL 3-1 3-2. COORDINATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

3-1

Section II. TARGET AUDIENCE 3-3. TYPES OF TARGET AUDIENCES Enemy Military Forces Persons Sympathetic to the Enemy The Uncommitted Persons Sympathetic to the Resistance Movement

3-2 3-2 3-2 3-2 3-3

Section III.THE MESSAGE 3-4. MESSAGE DEVELOPMENT 3-5. MESSAGE FORMS 3-6. TYPES OF MEDIA Radio 3-4 Printed Material Symbolic Devices Face-to-Face Communications Entertainment Gifts 3-6 3-7. ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS 3-8. CONSIDERATIONS 3-9. REFERENCE CHAPTER 4. INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION Section I. INFILTRATION 4-1. GENERAL 4-1 4-2. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN SELECTING METHOD OF INFILTRATION Mission Enemy Situation Weather Topography Hydrography Training Accompanying Equipment/Supplies ii

3-1

3-3 3-3 3-3 3-4 3-4 3-4 3-5 3-5 3-6 3-6 3-6 3-7 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-2

4-3. 4-4.

4-5.

4-6.

Distance INITIAL ENTRY REPORT AIR INFILTRATION Advantages Disadvantages General Specific Considerations Drop zone (DZ) selection Drop zone identification and authentication procedures Jump procedures Blind-Drop Infiltration Free-Fall Operations Equipment/Supplies/Reception Committee Control and Assembly Procedures Control procedures Assembly procedures Emergency Procedures Final Ground Procedures WATER INFILTRATION Advantages Disadvantages General Considerations for Water Infiltration Craft limitations Equipment/supplies/reception committee Ship-to-shore movement Rehearsals LAND INFILTRATION Advantages Disadvantages General

4-2 4-2 4-3 4-3 4-3 4-3 4-4 4-4 4-4 4-5 4_5 4-6 4-6 4-7 4-7 4-7 4-7 4-7 4-8 4-8 4-8 4-8 4-8 4-8 4-9 4-9 4-9 4-9 4-9 4-9 4-9

Section II. EXFILTRATION 4-7. GENERAL 4-10 4-8. METHODS 4-10 General By Air and Water Recovery areas Recovery methods Recovery times By Land

4-10

Section III. INFILTRATION CHECKLIST 4-9. GENERAL 4-12 4-10. AIR INFILTRATION

4-12

4-10 4-10 4-10 4-11 4-11 4-11

4-12 iii

4-11.

4-12.

4-13.

CHAPTER 5.

Planning at the Special Forces Operational Base Actions Prior to Drop Action on DZ SEA INFILTRATION Planning at the SFOB Actions Prior to Embarking Actions En Route to Operational Area Action During Ship-to-Shore Movement Action at Landing Site LAND INFILTRATION Planning at the SFOB Action Prior to Departure Action After Departure OTHER CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL METHODS OF INFILTRATION Contact Plan Infiltration and Contact Site Movement to Safe Area

4-19 4-19 4-19 4-19

ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT (BUILDUP) OF THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA

Section I.PLANNING THE INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA 5-1. GENERAL 5-2. SELECTION OF OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS Character of the Resistance Movement Within the Area Environment and Tactical Situations Subdivided "A" Detachment Assessment Teams Tailoring Unilateral Missions 5-3. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND SUPPORT General Possible UWOA-SFOB Communications Area Command, Control, and Support 5-4. THE AREA COMMAND General Composition Command group Resistance forces 5-5. SPECIAL FORCES OBJECTIVES IN THE UWOA General Special Forces-Resistance Force Relations iv

4-12 4-13 4-14 4-14 4-14 4-15 4-16 4-16 4-16 4-17 4-17 4-18 4-18

5-1 5-1 5-1 5-1 5-1 5-2 5-3 5-3 5-3 5-3 5-3 5-4 5-4 5-5 5-5 5-5 5-5 5-5 5-5 5-5 5-5

5-6. 5-7.

CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING RELATIONS GENERAL AREA ORGANIZATION General Major Considerations Internal Area Organization The area complex The guerrilla base Locations

Section II. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UWOA 5-8. GENERAL 5-9. UNIT ORGANIZATION General Principles of Organizations Command and control Basic organization Size of Units Area Missions Political considerations Enemy control Available personnel Supply and support capability Social tradition 5-10. THE AUXILIARY AND THE UNDERGROUND General Membership Organization Method of Operation The Underground Section III.ORGANIZATION OF RESISTANCE FORCE SUPPORT SYSTEMS 5-11. GENERAL 5-12. CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING SUPPORT FUNCTIONS AND SYSTEMS Security and Warning Intelligence Counterintelligence Logistics Recruiting Psychological Warfare Civilian Control Evasion and Escape Other Missions Section IV. ADMINISTRATION, LAW, AND ORDER 5-13. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

5-6 5-7 5=7 5-7 5-7 5-7 5-8 5-8 5-9 5-9 5-10 5-10 5-10 5-10 5-10 5-11 5-11 5-11 5-11 5-11 5-11 5-11 5-12 5-12 5-12 5_13 5-13 5-14 5-15 5-15 5-15 5-16 5-16 5-16 5-17 5-17 5-17 5-17 5-17 5-17 5-17 5-18 5-18 v

5-14.

5-15.

RECORDS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES Operation Journal Command Structure Personnel Roster Personnel Records Oath of Enlistment Casualty Records Graves Registration Information Medical Records Payrolls Claims Awards and Decorations DISCIPLINE

Section V. TRAINING OF THE RESISTANCE FORCE 5-16. GENERAL 5-17. CHARACTERISTICS OF GUERRILLA TRAINING 5-18. THE TRAINING PLAN General Analysis of the Mission Analysis of the Local Training Situation Essential training to be conducted Personnel Time Training facilities Training aids System and Organization for Training 5-19. OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT TRAINING

5-19 5-19 5-19 5-19 5-19 5-20 5-20 5-20 5-20 5-20 5-20 5-20 5-21 5-22 5-22 5-23 5-23 5-23 5-24 5-24 5-24 5-24 5-24 5-24 5-25 5-25 5-25

CHAPTER 6. AIR OPERATIONS Section I. GENERAL 6-1. BASIC CRITERIA IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 6-2. TYPES OF AIR OPERATIONS 6-3. SEQUENCE OF AIR RESUPPLY MISSION Operational Element SFOB Air Support Unit Operational Element Section II. DROP ZONE SELECTION 6-4. GENERAL 6-3 6-5. CONSIDERATIONS FOR SELECTING DZ's Terrain Weather Obstacles Shape and Size Dispersion vi

6-1 6-1 6-1 6-2 6-2 6-2 6-3 6-3 6-3 6-3 6-3 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5

Surfaces6-6 Security6-7 Section III. DROP ZONE REPORTING 6-6. REPORTS AND MISSION REQUESTS 6-7. ALTERNATE DROP ZONES 6-8. MISSION CONFIRMATION FOR AIR DROP 6-9. AREA DROP ZONE

6-7 6-7 6-9 6-9 6-9

Section IV. DROP ZONE MARKING 6-10. DROP ZONE IDENTIFICATION 6-11. BEACONS/TRANSPONDERS 6-12. COMPUTING GROUND RELEASE POINT Dispersion Wind Drift Forward Throw High-Velocity and Free-Drop Loads 6-13. DZ MARKING 6-14. PLACEMENT OF MARKINGS 6-15. UNMARKED DROP ZONES 6-16. DROP ZONE AUTHENTICATION Air to Ground Ground to Air

6-12 6-12 6-12 6-12 6-12 6-12 6-14 6-14 6-14 6-15 6-16 6-17 6-17 6-17

Section V.RECEPTION COMMITTEES 6-17. GENERAL Air to Ground Ground to Air Marking Party Security Party Recovery Party Transport Party 6-19. DZ/LZ STERILIZATION

6-17 6-17 6-17 6-18 6-18 6-18 6-19 6-19 6-19

Section VI. LANDING ZONE OPERATIONS 6-20. GENERAL 6-21. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR LANDING ZONES (LZ's) Basic Considerations Aircraft Limitations LZ RequirementsTerrain Features Weather Sizmitations LZ Requirements Terrain Features Weather Size Surface

6-20 6-20 6-20 6-20 6-20 6-21 6-21 6-21 6-21 6-21 6-21 6-21 6-21 6-23 vii

6-22. 6-23.

Approach and Takeoff Clearance DIMENSIONS AND LAYOUT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

6-23 6-23 6-26

Section VII. LANDING ZONES (WATER) 6-24. GENERAL 6-27

6-27

Section VIII. LANDING ZONES (ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT) 6-25. GENERAL 6-26. SELECTION CRITERIA Surface Size 6-27. DISPLAY AND AUTHENTICATION 6-28. DIMENSIONS 6-29. MARKING 6-31

6-27 6-27 6-28 6-28 6-28 6-30 6-30

Section IX. MISCELLANEOUS AIR OPERATIONS 6-30. GENERAL 6-32

6-32

Section X. CHECKLIST FOR RECEPTION OPERATIONS (DZ/LZ/RZ/BLS) 6-31. GENERAL Training Conduct of Operations Alternate Sites

6-32 6-32 6-32 6-33 6-33

CHAPTER 7. COMBAT EMPLOYMENT OF RESISTANCE FORCES Section I. GENERAL 7-1. PURPOSE 7-2. PLANNING 7-3. GUERRILLA WARFARE MISSIONS Section II. MISSIONS TO SUPPORT THE UNIFIED COMMAND 7-4. TYPE MISSIONS 7-5. INTERDICTION 7-6. TYPES OF INTERDICTION OPERATIONS Raid 7-5 Ambush Mines and Boobytraps Sniping 7-7. TARGET ANALYSIS 7-8. TARGET SYSTEMS 7-9. TACTICAL CONTROL MEASURES General Common Control Measures Target assignment Zones of action Routes of movement Mission support site (MSS) viii

7-1 7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 7_4 7-4 7-5 7-5 7-5 7-6 7-6 7-7 7-9 7-9 7-9 7-10 7-10 7-10 7-10

7-10. 7-11.

Other Control Measures INTELLIGENCE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

7-10 7-10 7-11

Section III.MISSIONS TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL COMBAT FORCES 7-11 7-12. GENERAL 7-13. OFFENSE 7-11 7-14. DEFENSE 7-11 7-15. RETROGRADE 7-13 Section IV. LINKUP OPERATIONS 7-16. GENERAL 7-17. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 7-18. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Liaison Contact Points Coordination of Schemes of Maneuver Fire Coordination Measures Communications Coordination Employment Following Linkup 7-19. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS 7-20. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

7-13 7-13 7-14 7-14 7-14 7-14 7-14 7-15 7-15 7-15 7-15 7-15

Section V. POST LINKUP OPERATIONS 7-21. GENERAL 7-16 7-22. MISSIONS7-16 Conventional Combat Operations Reconnaissance Counterguerrilla Operations Rear Area Security Civil Support Retrain Host Country Conventional Military Units

7-16

Section VI. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 7-23. GENERAL 7-24. INDICATORS COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS 7-25. DEFENSIVE TACTICS Diversion Activities Defense of Fixed Positions Delay and Harassment Activities Withdrawal 7-26. DEFENSIVE MEASURES THAT THE GUERRILLAS, MAY EMPLOY 7-27. GUERRILLA BREAKOUT OPERATIONS

7-19 7-19 7-19 7-20 7-20 7-20 7-20 7-21

Section VII.STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS 7-28. GENERAL

7-17 7-17 7-17 7-17 7-17 7-13

7-21 7-22 7-24 7-24 ix

7-29. 7-30. 7-31. 7-32.

x

ADVANTAGES OF STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS DISADVANTAGES OF STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ACTIVITIES

7-24 7-25 7-25 7-25

Section VIII.THE RAID 7-33. PURPOSE 7-34. ORGANIZATION OF THE RAID FORCE Command Element Assault Element Support Element Security Element 7-35. PREPARATION Planning Considerations Intelligence Rehearsals of Participants Final Inspection 7-36. MOVEMENT7-29 7-37. ACTION IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA 7-38. WITHDRAWAL 7-39. LARGE RAIDS General Movement to Objective Area Control Training Fire Support Timing Withdrawal

7-25 7-25 7-26 7-26 7-26 7-26 7-27 7-27 7-27 7-28 7-28 7-28

Section IX. AMBUSHES 7-40. INTRODUCTION 7-41. PURPOSE Destruction Harassment 7-42. TYPES OF AMBUSHES 7-43. DESCRIPTIVE TERMS/DISCUSSIONS OF AMBUSH OPERATIONS Ambush Site Killing Zone Ambush Force Attack Force Security Element "Rise From the Ground" Ambush Near Ambush Far Ambush Harassing Ambush Destruction Ambush

7-33 7-33 7-34 7-34 7-34 7-34

7-29 7-30 7-31 7-31 7-32 7-32 7-32 7-32 7-33 7-33

7-34 7-34 7-34 7-34 7-35 7-35 7-35 7-35 7-35 7-35 7-35

7-44.

7-45.

7-46.

7-47.

7-48.

Deliberate Ambush Ambush of Opportunity Line, L, Z, T, V, Triangle, (Open and Closed) and Box FUNDAMENTALS OF SUCCESSFUL AMBUSH Surprise Coordinated Fires Control POINT AMBUSH General Point Ambush Formations Line The L The Z The T The V Triangle Box AREA AMBUSH Background Area Ambush (British Version) Area Ambush (Baited Trap Version) UNUSUAL AMBUSH TECHNIQUES General "Rise from the Ground" Ambush Demolition Ambush Special Ambush Situations AMBUSH PATROLS General Planning and Preparation Simplicity Type of ambush Deployment Manner of attack Size of ambush force Organization Equipment Routes Site Occupation of the site Positions Camouflage Movement, noise, and light discipline Execution Signals Fire discipline

7-35 7-35 7-36 7-36 7-36 7-36 7-36 7-37 7-37 7-37 7-37 7-39 7-41 7-42 7-44 7-46 7-50 7-52 7-52 7-52 7-53 7-55 7-55 7-55 7-57 7-57 7-58 7-58 7-58 7-59 7-59 7-59 7-59 7-59 7-59 7-59 7-61 7-61 7-61 7-61 7-62 7-62 7-62 7-62 7-63 xi

Withdrawal to the objective rallying point Section X. MINING AND SNIPING 7-49. GENERAL 7-63 7-50. MINING 7-63 7-51. SNIPING 7-64 General The Sniper Missions Selection and Training Planning for Their Use Sniper Teams The Individual Sniper Equipment 7-52. OBSTACLES Security of Base Operations Raids and Ambushes

7-63 7-63

7-64 7-64 7-64 7-64 7-65 7-65 7-65 7-65 7-65 7-65 7-66

CHAPTER 8. LOGISTICS Section I. INTRODUCTION 8-1. GENERAL 8-2. RESISTANCE FORCE SUPPORT 8-3. SUPPLY OF OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS 8-4. RESISTANCE FORCE LOGISTICS

8-1 8-1 8-1 8-1 8-2

Section II. INTERNAL SUPPORT 8-5. GENERAL 8-6. LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS Necessities of Life Equipment for Operations Medical Transportation Storage Maintenance and Repairs 8-7. LOGISTICS ORGANIZATION 8-8. SOURCES OF SUPPLY Offensive Operations and Battlefield Recovery Purchase Levy Barter Confiscation Production

8-2 8-2 8-3 8-3 8-3 8-4 8-4 8-4 8-5 8-5 8-6

Section III. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 8-9. GENERAL 8-10. PHASES OF SUPPLY xii

8-6 8-7 8-7 8-7 8-7 8-7 8-8 8-8 8-9

8-11. 8-12. 8-13. 8-14. 8-15. 8-16.

Phase A - Accompanying Supply Phase B - Resupply Phase C - On-Call/Routine DELIVERY ACCOUNTABILITY CLASSES OF SUPPLY CATALOG SUPPLY SYSTEM PACKING AND RIGGING REQUEST PROCEDURES

Section IV. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING SUPPLY SYSTEMS 8-17. GENERAL 8-18. AREAS OF CONSIDERATION Ammunition Weapons Explosives Individual Equipment Medical Supplies Food Supplies 8-19. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPPLY SYSTEMS

8-9 8-9 8-11 8-11 8-12 8-12 8-13 8-13 8-14 8-17 8-17 8-17 8-17 8-18 8-19 8-20 8-20 8-20 8-21

CHAPTER 9. COMMUNICATIONS Section I. GENERAL 9-1. GENERAL 9-2. EXTENT AND TYPE OF COMMUNICATIONS Communications Within Friendly Territory Communications To and From the UWOA Communications Within the UWOA 9-3. COMMUNICATION MEANS Messenger Radio Telephone Audible Signals Visual Signals Local Communication Systems Pigeons or Trained Animals

9-1 9-1 9-1

Section II. COMMUNICATION TRAINING 9-4. GENERAL 9-5. CODE SPEED AND PROCEDURES 9-6. MAINTENANCE AND USE OF EQUIPMENT 9-7. RADIO PROPAGATION 9-8. MESSAGE WRITING

9-4 9-4 9-5 9-5 9-5 9-5

Section III.ANTENNAS

9-7

9-1 9-1 9-1 9-2 9-2 9-2 9-2 9-3 9-4 9-4 9-4

xiii

9-9.

GENERAL Field Expedient Insulators Quarter-Wavelength Antenna Half-Wave Doublet Antenna Slant-Wire Antenna Fourteen Percent Off-Center Fed Antenna Indoor Antennas Other Antennas

9-7 9-7 9-8 9-9 9-10 9-11 9-11 9-14

CHAPTER 10. MEDICAL Section I. INTRODUCTION 10-1. GENERAL 10-2. TRAINING 10-3. INTELLIGENCE Medical Area Study/Area Assessment Veterinary Information 10-4. SUPPLY 10-3 10-5. HOSPITALIZATION 10-6. EVACUATION 10-7. VETERINARY MEDICAL SUPPORT IN A UWOA 10-8. THE SPECIAL FORCES GUERRILLA HOSPITAL General Staffing Organization Command Relationships Employment

10-1 10-1 10-2 10-2 10-2 10-3 10-3 10-4 10-5 10-7 10-7 10-8 10-8 10-9 10-9

Section II. DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL SUPPORT IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREAS10-10 10-9. GENERAL 10-10 10-10. MEDICAL REQUIREMENT DURING THE BUILDUP PHASE 10-11 10-11. MEDICAL SUPPORT DURING EMPLOYMENT PHASE 10-12 10-12. MEDICAL SUPPORT DURING DEMOBILIZATION PHASE 10-12 CHAPTER 11. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE Section I. INTRODUCTION 11-1. GENERAL 11-2. CONCEPT

11-1 11-1 11-1

Section II. OPERATIONS 11-3. GENERAL 11-4. TYPES OF OPERATIONS Intelligence Operations Psychological Operations Civil Affairs Operations Populace and Resources Control Operations

11-2 11-2 11-2 11-2 11-2 11-3 11-3

xiv

Operations Against Insurgent Base Areas Operations Against Interior Infiltration Routes Remote Area Operations Urban Operations Border Operations

11-3 11-3 11-3 11-4 11-4

Section III.INTELLIGENCE 11-5. INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS 11-6. AREA STUDY Preparation Preparation Methods Operational Area Intelligence

11-4 11-4 11-5 11-5 11-5 11-5

Section IV. INFILTRATION TECHNIQUES 11-7. GENERAL

11-6 11-6

Section V. COMMUNICATIONS 11-8. SYSTEMS AND TECHNIQUES 11-9. WIRE COMMUNICATIONS 11-10. TRAINING

11-6 11-6 11-6 11-7

Section VI. POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL 11-11. GENERAL 11-7 11-12. CONTROLS11-8

11-7

Section VII.FIELD ENGINEERING 11-13. GENERAL 11-9 11-14. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS

11-9

Section VIII.MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS 11-15. GENERAL 11-10 11-16. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE IN FID 11-17. VETERINARY PROCEDURES IN FID

11-9 11-10 11-10 11-12

APPENDIX A - AREA STUDY GUIDE, AREA INTELLIGENCE STUDY GUIDE, AND BRIEFBACK GUIDE A-1 APPENDIX B - AREA ASSESSMENT

B-1

APPENDIX C - FIELD-EXPEDIENT PRINTING METHODS

C-1

APPENDIX D - EXAMPLES OF MASTER TRAINING PROGRAM FOR RESISTANCE FORCES

D-1

APPENDIX E - IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS FOR FOOT PATROLS

E-1

APPENDIX F - DEFENSE AGAINST AMBUSH

F-1

APPENDIX G - PATROL BASES

G-1

APPENDIX H - COMBAT INTELLIGENCE AND TRACKING

H-1 xv

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1-1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose of this special text (ST) is to describe Special Forces (SF) operational techniques. Material in this text is structured to meet the requirements of students and instructors of the Special Forces School. 1-2. RECOMMENDATIONS Users of this text are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments for improvement. Recommendations should be keyed to specific page, paragraph,and line of text. All recommendations should be addressed to:

The use of the words "he," "his," "himself," etc., in this special text is intended to include both the masculine and feminine genders. Any exception to this will be so noted. 1-1

1-2

CHAPTER 2 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY Section I. INTRODUCTION 2-1. GENERAL This chapter provides information andguidance to Special Forces operational detachments in planning for unconventional warfare (UW) operations and in analyzing areas of operation through area study and area assessment. Itdiscusses intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and security aspects of concern to an operational detachment during theorganization, buildup, and combat employment phases of developing an unconventional warfare operational area (UWOA). 2-2. INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS IN AN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA (UWOA) a. Intelligence, counterintelligence, and security operations become extremely significant to the survival, effectiveness, and success of Special Forces elements operating in areas controlled by the enemy and in association with elements of the population regarded as criminals or traitors by the enemy. b. A much broader understanding and ability in all aspects of intelligence are required for unconventional warfare than for conventional combat operations. (1) Guerrilla operations require thorough knowledge and careful application of all combat intelligence and security techniques common to infantry operations. However, the distance from the guerrilla base of both targets and enemy units usually makes it necessary to rely heavily on clandestine nets of the auxiliary and underground for intelligence and security information. (2) Other UW missions require support or direct participation in clandestine activities. Therefore, in addition to their ability to employ sound conventional combat intelligence techniques, Special Forces personnel must possess a basic understanding of clandestine organization, operations, and techniques. (For application of operational intelligence techniques see FM 30-17, FM 30-18, FM 31-20, and Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM) 58-11.) c. Once deployed, the Special Forces detachment is ideally situated to contribute to the overall theater intelligence plan. By using resistance force sources subordinate to the area command, it can assemble and relay to the Special Forces operational base (SFOB) intelligence information of value to the unified and component commanders.Security of the Special Forces detachment and the 2-1

resistance efforts may restrict radio traffic, thus limiting the amount of intelligence information that can be relayed. Section II. AREA STUDY/AREA INTELLIGENCE/AREA ASSESSMENT 2-3. GENERAL Special Forces operational detachments (SFOD) committed into operational areas to support the US Army's role in any intensity of conflict will usually find that activities in the area are supported and accompanied by extensive political and economic activities. These activities, conducted by individuals or groups integrated or acting in concert with recognized resistance forces, may be overt or clandestine. In order for Special Forces detachments to improve their chances for success, they require more predeployment intelligence than conventional Army combat units. To obtain this, SFOD's conduct general area studies of assigned countries and specific intelligence studies of areas of operations. Although area studies are normally prepared and provided by special research agencies, the detachments assemble their own studies in a format appropriate for operational use. 2-4. AREA STUDY An area study is the prescribed collection of specific information pertaining to a given area developed from sources available prior to entering the area (AR 310-25). For a sample area study guide and format, see appendix A. a. Source of Information. The Special Forces group intelligence section (S2) procures the necessary intelligence documents from which the detachment's general area studies are prepared. Coordination is effected through prescribed intelligence with all appropriate theater intelligence agencies for the continuous procurement of timely intelligence. b. Preparation. The area study may be prepared by: (1) Operational detachments. (2) Group S2. Entire area study may be prepared by the S2 based on available information concerning the operational missions and areas of operations. (3) Area specialist teams (AST's). These teams are assigned operational responsibilities based on geographic or mission consideration. (4) A combination of the operational detachments, group S2, and area specialist teams.

2-2

c. Preparation by Operational Detachments. Although unit training requirements limit the time available for operational detachments to prepare a detailed comprehensive general area study, preparation by the operational detachments has the following advantages: (1) The extensive research required enables the detachments to learn more about their area of interest, and once placed in isolation, the detachments can quickly assimilate the data for their respective areas of operation based on mission requirements. (2) The detachment commander can assign specific areas of interest to selected personnel in keeping with their particular specialty. For example: (a) The detachment operations and intelligence sergeants can conduct extensive research and study on the political structure of the area of operations, on groups in opposition to the recognized government, and on order of battle of a real or potential enemy. (b) The detachment engineer sergeant and the combat demolition specialist can prepare studies on the major lines of communication and bridges throughout the country by gathering pictures and data on bridge structures, rail yards, tunnels, and highway nets. This includes information on both primary and secondary roads--surfaces, gradients, and traffic capabilities during any kind of weather. (c) By assigning both members of a specific specialty within a detachment to a specific area of interest, the detachment commander is assured of having personnel with intimate knowledge of the operational area in the event the split-team concept must be used. In either case, the detachment will have depth within each specialist's area of responsibility. (3) Once these studies have been completed and the detachment personnel responsible for specific sections have prepared their summaries, extensive briefings and orientations can be conducted for the remainder of the detachment. These should be continued daily until each member of the detachment is intimately familiar with the assigned area and its peoples. 2-5. OPERATIONAL AREA INTELLIGENCE AND BRIEFBACK a. OperationalArea Intelligence Study. This detailed intelligence of a specific area of operation. It includes information acquired from: (1) Selected personnel exfiltrated from objective area. (2) Existing resistance elements. (3) Recent conventional operations conducted in the area. 2-3

(4) Reaction to active propaganda programs. (5) Conduct of intelligence operations. (6) Intelligence studies prepared by other DOD and governmental agencies. (7) Libraries, periodicals, universities, travel agencies, etc. b. The "Asset." When a detachment is selected for commitment into a specific UWOA, it will be placed in isolation at the SFOB. At this time, the operational area intelligence briefing will be given. The latest and best available information from all agencies and sources is contained in this briefing and is the basis for operational planning. During the intelligence briefing, one source of information referred to as an "asset" may be introduced. The preferable "asset" is a person native to the assigned area of operations who (1) has recently been exfiltrated from that area, (2) has been thoroughly interrogated for intelligence information, and (3) volunteered or was recruited to assist in the Special Forces mission. As such, the asset would have a comprehensive background knowledge of the objective area; also, it is desirable that he be a member of the resistance movement. If the situation warrants, he may be infiltrated back into the operational area with the detachment to assist in contacting members of the resistance movement. For a sample format of an area intelligence study guide see appendix A. c. Briefback. The purpose of a briefback is to assure the Special Forces group commander, his staff, representatives of the SFOB, and other interested agencies and services that all aspects of the assigned mission are understood and that the detachment is ready for deployment. After the detachment completes its preparation for deployment and concludes its studies of the area in relation to its operational mission, it presents the briefback to demonstrate its operational readiness in: (1) Detachment functioning. (a) Teamwork. (b) Attitude. (c) Morale. (d) Use of available time. (e) Rehearsals of initial classes. (f) Equal distribution of loads among detachment members. (g) Rigging of equipment. 2-4

(h) Responsibilities in each phase of operation. (2) Detachment knowledge. (a) Area study. (b) Background of movement and leaders. (c) Mission of the SFOD. (d) Enemy situation. (e) Infiltration plan. (f) Alternate plans. (g) Contact plans. (h) Emergency plans. (i) Emergency resupply. (j) Automatic resupply. (k) Evasion and escape (E&E) operations. (l) Concepts of operations. (m) Detachment brevity code systems. (n) Location of sensitive items of equipment in the event of injury (SOI, SSI, crystals, radio equipment, explosives). A.

d. Briefback Guide. A recommended format is presented in appendix

e. Training Aids. Maximum use of simply constructed training aids (i.e., maps, overlays, blackboards, and sand-tables, if applicable) should be used to support briefback. 2-6. AREA ASSESSMENT a. Area assessment is the prescribed collection of specific information by the Special Forces detachment to update the area study. It commences immediately upon entering the area of operations and is a continuous process that confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired before commitment. It is also the basis for changing detachment operational and logistical plans that were made before commitment into the area.

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b. Assessment may assume two degrees of urgency—immediate and subsequent. Matters of immediate urgency are included in the "initial" assessment; the "principal" assessment is a continuous collection 'of information conducted until exfiltration or evacuation from the operational area. (See appendix B for sample format.) c. Major changes in the area study indicated by area assessments will be furnished to the Special Farces operational base/forward operational base (SFOB/FOB) via normal communications. These changes provide the latest intelligence information to the AST's. Section III. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION WITHIN THE UWOA 2-7. GENERAL The nature and locale of UW operations require that Special Forces and supported resistance forces have accurate, timely information and intelligence in planning and conducting operations, securing bases, and preventing compromise by enemy forces. Intelligence systems in the UWOA are primarily geared to support (1) Special Forces and unconventional warfare forces in planning support functions and (2) the underground in planning and conducting subversive operations to disrupt enemy activities. But they are also organized to support and answer essential elements of information (EEI) of higher headquarters. 2-8. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION COLLECTION a. The deployed detachment may be required to obtain information within the UWOA or adjoining areas to support conventional operations. The area command is frequently in a position to provide intelligence which is otherwise unavailable to forces operating outside the UWOA. In the assignment of intelligence tasks, the area command considers the impact on the detachment's primary missions and security and communications limitations. When requirements exceed the capability or degree of skill possessed by the detachments, Special Forces operational detachments may be augmented by intelligence specialists. b. In addition to the Special Forces personnel, the area command has three primary sources for collecting and producing intelligence: the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground. A guerrilla force normally employs conventional, unsophisticated informationgathering techniques such as patrols, area and target reconnaissance, and surveillance. Information gathered in this manner is supplemented by information provided by the auxiliary and underground components of the resistance. c. Intelligence from theater collection and production agencies may be procured from the theater UW command through the SFOB.

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2-9. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS Through its three primary sources for intelligence information, the area command can support its intelligence requirements for: a. Internal Operations. The intelligence system of the area command is designed for and oriented towards the support of its own requirements. As a result, most of the intelligence is produced for use of the guerrilla, auxiliary, and underground elements. b. Higher Headquarters. The area command may be required to provide: (1) Order of battle data. (2) Information to support psychological operations (PSYOP). (3) Targets of opportunity. (4) Poststrike assessments. (5) Information on political, sociological, and economic matters. (6) Intelligence information to support specific air, ground, and naval operations. (7) Technical information. (8) Identification, location, and affiliation of all known or suspected supporters and sympathizers to the government in power. Section IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE UWOA 2-10. GENERAL a. Another basic function of the area command is the establishment of a sound counterintelligence system designed to: (1) Neutralize or reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's intelligence gathering systems. (2) Prevent penetration of the resistance force by enemy agents and informants. b. For detailed information on intelligence nets and counterintelligence operations, see FM 30-17, FM 30-18, FM 31-20, and DIAM 58-11.

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2-11. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS a. Screening of Personnel and Potential Recruits. As a protective measure against enemy penetration, personnel trained in counterintelligence carefully screen all members of the resistance force. b. Surveillance of the Local Populace. In order to uncover enemy agents, counterintelligence programs include continual checks of the civilian population. That segment of the population which does not support the guerrilla force is one of the most potent dangers to the guerrilla. These people, willingly or by coercion, act as informants for the enemy. All resistance personnel must be thoroughly indoctrinated in safeguarding information and resisting interrogation. c. Penetration of Enemy Intelligence Systems. Counterintelligence measures are also used (1 to determine enemy counterguerrilla techniques and operations and (2) to identify enemy intelligence personnel and indigenous informants. Such information may be obtained from defectors or through penetration of enemy intelligence and counterintelligence organizations. d. Internal Security. Within the UWOA or elsewhere in the theater, information concerning present or planned UW operations is disseminated only on a need-to-know basis. Specific safeguards appropriate to UWOA's should include: (1) Minimizing the number of administrative and operational records. Records should be reviewed frequently to determine need for retaining, and unnecessary records should be destroyed. Retained records should be cached and the cache location revealed only to personnel with a need to know. (2) Coding of names and places, and the key to the code disseminated on a need-to-know basis only. (3) Developing resistance force organization and communication systems to minimize penetration; e.g., cellularization, compartmentation, and employing secure interface. e. Operational Security. (1) Strict security measures must be enforced. Minimum measures required are: (a) Camouflage discipline. (b) Isolation of units from each other and from the civilian population. Contact with civilians is held to the minimum and is made solely by designated individuals or groups. 2-8

(c) Proper selection and rigid supervision of courier routes between headquarters and units. (d) Controlled installations.

entry

and

exit

from

campsites

and

(e) Control of movement. (f) Compartmentation of information to prevent possible identification of personnel or planned missions. (g) Separation of encryption cells/drop-maintenance cells.

cells

and

communication

(2) Requirements for security are continually impressed on resistance personnel. Commanders at all levels constantly strive to improve security measures. Particular attention is given to those units and elements which have recently been inactive or which are located in relatively safe areas. (3) Premature or unnecessary movement of guerrilla units tends to disrupt their operations, reduce their security, and unnecessarily expose them to the enemy or informants. The decision to move should be made only on actual threat of enemy counterguerrilla operations. Section V. TACTICAL SECURITY WITHIN THE UWOA 2-12. GENERAL Security procedures of the area command are designed to prevent the enemy (1) from identifying organizational structures or missions arid (2) from neutralizing or destroying the guerrilla organization. Such procedures include both active and passive measures to increase overall security. 2-13. PRINCIPLES a. Security System. Guerrilla units normally employ an inner and outer zone in establishing a security system. Specific delineations of security responsibilities must be made and coordination procedures established if more than one resistance element is involved. (1) Inner security zone (fig. 2-1). The guerrilla force is responsible for this zone, and its security system depends on standard military practice (i.e., patrols, outguards and outposts, a guardpost system, detection and warning devices, and camouflage and deception techniques).

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Figure 2-1 Inner security zone.

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Figure 2-2 Outer security zone a. Outer security zone (fig. 2-2). Normally, the auxiliary and the underground are responsible for furnishing guerrilla forces timely information of enemy activity within this zone. The guerrilla force should not fully rely on such supplementary warning systems. The auxiliary and underground elements may be required to harass arid delay the enemy, thus allowing the guerrilla force time to disperse. b. Dispersion and Tactical Security. (1) Guerrilla forces must avoid concentrating on the march, in camps, or in bivouacs. Even though the tactical and logistical situations may favor concentrating the guerrilla force, security requirements dictate that the guerrilla force organize into smaller units and tactically disperse. A large force may be concentrated to conduct a specific operation, but upon completion of the operation it quickly reverts to the original organizational and dispersion pattern. (2) The principle of dispersion should be applied to command as well as to tactical and support elements. 2-11

(3) In the event of large-scale enemy operations against the guerrilla force, the area commander may be forced to divide units into even smaller elements to achieve greater dispersion or to facilitate escape. This extreme dispersion will reduce the effectiveness of command and control, lower the morale of the guerrilla force, and hinder the ability of the auxiliaries to render support. Therefore, excessively dispersed units roust be reassembled as quickly as possible. Operational plans must provide for such contingencies and include post-operation assembly areas (rallying points). c. Mobility of Units and Installations. (1) Guerrilla installations and forces must maintain a high degree of mobility. Emergency evacuation plans for guerrilla installations and forces should include actions to eliminate all traces of guerrilla activity prior to departure from an area. (2) Mobility may be facilitated by preparing equipment to be moved in one-man loads and by caching less mobile equipment. d. Camouflage, Cover, and Deception. Another principle of security is the use of cover and camouflage and the execution of deception operations. These operations are planned to conceal the nature and extent of guerrilla operations and to provide the enemy with misleading or false information. Such operations are an integral part of all resistance activities. e. March Security. (1) Tactical security on the march is based on knowledge of the enemy's location and strength. The intelligence section of the area command provides this vital information for security of movement and operations. (2) Units are briefed on the local enemy situation, primary and alternate routes, dispersal and reassembly areas along the way, and security measures to be observed en route. Areas through which the guerrilla force plans to pass may require assistance from the auxiliary to provide security for the guerrilla force. (3) The guerrilla forces employ standard march security techniques such as advance, rear, and flank guards. Preselected bivouacs are reconnoitered by patrols prior to the arrival of guerrilla units. As feasible, contact is established with local auxiliary units in order to obtain the latest information on enemy forces in the area.

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CHAPTER 3 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP) Section I. INTRODUCTION 4-1. GENERAL a. Psychological operations (PSYOP) are applicable warfare as well as all other aspects of UW, and must into all tactical planning. PSYOP is salesmanship used weak cause and make a strong cause stronger. The cause and taught to others to sell. If this is not done, success are slim.

to guerrilla be integrated to develop a must be sold chances for

b. Special Forces must have a thorough knowledge of PYSOP fundamentals and capabilities, and the imagination to adapt to the operational environment. In the UWOA, the Special Forces element must be prepared to advise the area command on PSYOP programs, to train selected resistance members in the application of PSYOP, and to initiate its own PSYOP programs. c. Intelligence is the life blood of effective psychological operations. Special Forces deployed in contact with guerrilla forces are in a position to gather the kind of intelligence that bears most intimately upon the attitudes of the people at grass-roots level. Propaganda programs which are shaped without extensive knowledge of feelings and persuasions of human target groups are not likely to succeed. d. The presence of Special Forces in a UWOA has a psychological impact on the resistance and on segments of the population. The psychological effect of every action or activity on all segments of the population is an important planning consideration. Action programs include those area command operations which are designed to have a psychological effect on a specific target audience. Some combat actions may be initiated solely to raise the morale of the guerrillas or to demonstrate guerrilla support of the people. 4-2. COORDINATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS Psychological operations (PSYOP) are supportive of all activities within the conduct of UW. PSYOP are basically planned operations conducted alone or in conjunction with other tactical operations and have as their purpose the influencing of behavior through modification or reinforcement of attitudes and beliefs. PSYOP programs, when properly coordinated and applied by the United States and it sallies, can: a. Maintain morale among the resistance forces. 3-1

b. Add to the determination of the resistance forces. c. Disassociate the people from the government or occupying power. d. Create common goals between the resistance forces and the population. e. Elicit active assistance from the people for the resistance forces. f. Demoralize the government or occupying armed forces and police forces. Section II. TARGET AUDIENCE 4-3. TYPES OF TARGET AUDIENCES Propaganda and information efforts are directed at the target audience to maintain or change existing favorable/unfavorable attitudes and behavior. Target audiences are selected based on theater guidance provided through the SFOB/FOB and evaluation of potential by Special Forces in conjunction with resistance forces. PSYOP efforts are aimed at producing specific desirable actions and attitudes. Target audiences in the UWOA are: a. Enemy Military Forces. Enemy military forces may be of the same nationality as the population or they may represent an occupying foreign power. Psychological operations programs are directed against this group to cause its members to feel isolated, improperly supported, doubtful of the outcome of the struggle, and unsure of the morality of their cause. By focusing on the enemy soldier's frustrations, PSYOP can lower his morale, reduce his effectiveness, and create a feeling of inadequacy, insecurity, and fear. This feeling of inadequacy and fear tends to increase his susceptibility to psychological operations, and may make him more vulnerable to persuasion, surrender, malingering, disaffection, or desertion. b. Persons Sympathetic to the Enemy. Enemy supporters include those civilians in an operational area w o willingly collaborate with the enemy, those who collaborate with the enemy under duress, and those civilians whose actions may be passive but whose sympathies are with the occupying power. Psychological operations programs directed against this group must be carefully oriented. The broad psychological objectives, however, are the same as for those directed against enemy military forces. A program to instill doubt and fear may be conducted in conjunction with a positive political action program. Programs are conducted to identify and discredit the collaborator, or weaken the collaborator's belief in the strength and power of the enemy military forces. Punitive action against collaborators may result in reprisals by the enemy and consequent loss of broad civilian support for psychological operations objectives; however, overreaction by the enemy can, when skillfully 3-2

exploited, build popular support for the guerrilla cause. Special Forces will not take part in nor condone those punitive actions which are contrary to the rules of land warfare or US national policy. c. The Uncommitted. In the initial stage of hostilities, the population may be neutral or even actively opposed to the resistance effort because of fear or uncertainty about the aims of the movement or its eventual success. Under the best of conditions, therefore, the populace is caught between the demands and controls of the enemy force and those of the guerrillas. Accordingly, the psychological operations programs must stress that the guerrillas share the political and social goals of the population, that the United States and its allies in supporting the guerrilla force support these same goals, and that the resistance movement will be successful. d. Persons Sympathetic to the Resistance Movement. Resistance supporters include those civilians who are sympathetic toward the goals of the movement but who are not active members of some element of the resistance force. The abject here is to provide moral support and tactical instruction on what is to be done and how to do it. PSYOP programs directed at this target audience stress appeals for the populace to support or cooperate passively with the resistance force in achieving common objectives. The members of the movement must follow a code of conduct which insures that the people and their reeds are always respected; that the people can always count on the movement for help and protection from all enemies, natural and human; and that the movement is the instrument of political, social, and economic progress. Section III. THE MESSAGE 4-4. MESSAGE DEVELOPMENT When writing a message for the various target audiences, the theme of the message, as well as the objectives of the PSYOP campaign, must be carefully considered. Each message is created with a distinct purpose in mind and is skillfully designed to accomplish that purpose. In developing the message, it should be: a. Based on the social values and experiences of the specific target audience, not those of the writer. b. Directed to specific audiences within the target country rather than to the public at large. c. Designed to exploit the existing attitudes of the audience rather than attempt to effect a complete change in attitudes. d. Realistic; claims should not exceed the limits of belief of the audience.

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4-5. MESSAGE FORMS A message can take many forms. Some common ones are: a. Words, spoken or written. b. Music, arrangements and vocals. c. Pictures. d. Gifts. e. Theatrical performances, pantomime or dance. f. Combinations of several of these forms. Section IV. THE MEDIA 4-6. TYPES OF MEDIA In directing a message at a target audience, the communications media available and the level of literacy must first be determined. Some media which should be considered are: a. Radio. (1) External radio broadcasts may be directed to various audiences within a target country. Within the country, the resistance may use clandestine radio to broadcast for short periods on popular channels. It may also interrupt or jam enemy radio broadcasts. (2) One important advantage of radio is, of course, that one does not have to be literate in order to hear and understand radio broadcasts. This medium, however, has some disadvantages. To be sure that the target group listens, the resistance must find a way to inform the audience of the time and channel on which the illicit broadcast will be made. Furthermore, broadcasts by low-power portable transmitters have limited range. Enemy radio-locating equipment can pinpoint the position of a transmitter, forcing the resistance to change the frequency and the site of the transmitter frequently. b. Printed Material. (1) The advantage of printed material is that it can be used and reused by passing it on from person to person. Clandestine newspapers and leaflets can be used to disseminate information concerning collaborators and traitors, techniques of sabotage, war aims and policies of the resistance, and a variety of other messages. (2) Written materials do present certain problems. Large quantities of paper, ink, and other supplies are required for 3-4

continuing publication, and strict controls are usually imposed on printing materials and presses. Also, the distribution of printed matter requires a complex and coordinated effort if the material and the distributors are not to be intercepted. Finally, the possession of subversive literature is hazardous to readers as well as distributors. The most difficult problems in running an underground newspaper are staffing it with reporters, printers, and distributors, and finding a safe place to print it. In some cases, newspapers may be printed outside the country. News is often obtained from foreign broadcasts via shortwave. Where presses and printing materials are licensed or under close surveillance, chain letters have been used effectively to communicate information to a large segment of the population. (3) Within the UWOA, guerrilla forces may not have the facilities to produce large amounts of printed material. However, Special Forces may supply lightweight, portable printing equipment or devise field expedients (see appendix D) that can produce a limited number of leaflets, posters, or bulletins for the guerrilla force. c. Symbolic Devices. Another way to transmit information and harass the enemy is by symbolic devices such as slogans or symbols written on walls or in public places which are convenient to the target groups. Antigovernment slogans and messages can be displayed on walls in such a way that they cannot easily be eradicated. Jokes and cartoons carry great impact and are an effective way of conveying disrespect and resistance in a socially acceptable manner. d. Face-to-Face Communications. (1) In countries where a large portion of the population is illiterate and few radio receivers are available, word-of-mouth messages are the principal means of communication. Agitators circulating in crowds, spreading rumors, and appealing for aid to the resistance can be effective. Face-to-face communications have the advantage that the message is usually spread by people who know each other, and, therefore, it gains credibility. Another advantage is the fact that the messages, though subversive in content, may not sound subversive when presented by the agent, and there are no materials to incriminate the agent. A big disadvantage, however, is that the message may be distorted or may never reach the target group. (2) In effect, all members of the Special Forces operational element and the resistance force are used as active propagandists within the limits of security. Depending on the situation and the target audience, face-to-face communications can be the most effective means of communicating propaganda messages. It enables the psychological operator to design his appeals for specific targets and to fudge by direct observation, the response to, and effect of, his propaganda appeals. Thus, he can respond immediately to audience reaction. 3-5

(3) Rumor cap be an effective propaganda device, but requires extreme skill and care in its use. Although rumors are difficult to control and are virtually impossible to trace, the target audience can never be specifically isolated. Since rumors may also be used by the enemy, those which are detrimental to the guerrilla effort may be countered by leaflets or face-to-face meetings with selected members of the civilian populace. e. Entertainment. Forms of entertainment which are traditional or popular in the area of operations are excellent potential media. They usually draw full audience attention, are well received, and lend themselves to the communication of PSYOP messages. Such forms as pantomime, dance, and music employ universal sounds and symbols. When Special Forces sponsor such performances, the good will and favorable attitudes created can lead to desired actions. In this case, the target audience must identify with the host government and not Special Forces. f. Gifts. Gifts can be used to carry propaganda messages. Such items as soap, matches, salt, needles and thread, seeds, clothing, and other items of value make suitable gifts which are acceptable for general distribution. These gifts should be printed on or be wrapped in a piece of paper containing a propaganda message or symbol which conveys the meaning desired. In selecting the gifts, be sure that the gifts are useful and that the use of symbols or messages do not antagonize the receiver. For example, it may be poor taste to have a piece of soap wrapped in a leaflet containing a copy of the recipient's national flag. The sender must be aware of countermeasures which the enemy may take, such as giving gifts of food which are poisonous and attributing the gifts to the resistance. 4-7. ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS The effectiveness of PSYOP must be continually assessed to provide a basis for future operations. In Special Forces operations, partial or complete estimates of PSYOP effectiveness can be based on conferences, conversations, and personal observations. The most significant indicator of an effective PSYOP effort is the degree to which the people support the resistance force. Support can be measured by the amount of intelligence, recruits, food, and materials furnished by the people. 4-8. CONSIDERATIONS a. The level of support (effectiveness) must be considered in the light of the freedom of action available to the target audience. Where PSYOP missions require a series of actions over a long period of time, the desired audience behavior normally will be extremely difficult to discern and estimate. In these instances, PSYOP intelligence requirements for assessing effectiveness are extensive and continuing. Assessments provide the basis for adjusting and 3-6

improving methods, developing and revising plans, and setting new PSYOP objectives. b. Lessons from past history show that resistance movements have used coercion, threats, and terrorism to obtain the support of undecided or uncommitted people when persuasion alone had failed. Special Forces must understand that these techniques are not sanctioned by the US government. In advising guerrilla forces, Special Forces must make every effort to persuade them against the use of these techniques. c. Potential enemies nave made extensive use of government controlled terrorism as an integral part of population control. Special Forces should be prepared to assess the effectiveness of these measures and to influence resistance forces to exploit the counterproductive elements of these measures. 4-9. REFERENCE For PSYOP planning, use FM 33-1, Psychological Operations.

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CHAPTER 4 INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION

Section I. INFILTRATION 4-1. GENERAL The success of a Special Forces operational detachment's infiltration into a designated UWOA depends primarily on detailed planning and preparation. Method of infiltration—air, water, or land—and the procedures and techniques used will depend on certain factors. 4-2. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN SELECTING METHOD OF INFILTRATION a. Mission. The operational mission of the alerted detachment is the prime consideration in determining the method of infiltration. For example, the mission may require rapid deployment into the operational area, thereby dictating the most expeditious method of infiltration. b. Enemy Situation. Enemy capabilities and security measures affect the selection of infiltration method. A heavily guarded border, for example, may preclude land infiltration; a strongly defended and patrolled coastline may eliminate water as a means of infiltration. The capability of the enemy air defense systems will reduce air delivery potential. c. Weather. Certain weather conditions may adversely affect air or water infiltration, yet favor land infiltration. Bad weather with storms, high winds, or protracted periods of reduced visibility is an example. d. Topography. Land formations must also be considered. Land infiltration will have a better chance for success if the chosen routes pass through mountainous, swampy, or heavily forested areas. On the other hand, the presence of mountains could force aircraft to fly at higher altitudes resulting in greater exposure to enemy detection and air defense systems. e. Hydrography. Hydrographic factors, i.e., tides, depth of offshore water, beach gradients, currents, and the location of reefs and sandbars influence the selection of water as a means of infiltration. f. Training. The training given Special Forces is usually sufficient to prepare them for any means of infiltration/ exfiltration. However, it is not anticipated that all members of a selected operational element will be equally proficient in a given 4-1

skill or technique at any given time. Should areas be discovered in which weaknesses exist, added emphasis is placed on such areas. A properly balanced training program will produce a reasonably proficient team member. Special training programs are required to attain and maintain proficiency for: (1) Surface and open water swimming. (2) Self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA). (3) Military free-fall (MFF) parachuting. (4) Submarine operations. (5) Inflatable boat handling. (6) Insertion/extraction techniques. (7) Survival, evasion, resistance, and escape. g. Accompanying Equipment/Supplies. The quantity and types of accompanying equipment/supplies carried on initial infiltration are influenced by: (1) The situation in the UWOA. (2) The size of the resistance force. (3) The enemy threat. (4) The capabilities/limitations of the mission air/naval craft. h. Distance. The distance to the objective area must be considered in selection of infiltration means. 4-3. INITIAL ENTRY REPORT a. Infiltration of the detachment into its operational area is not complete until the Initial Entry Report is made to the SFOB. The Initial Entry Report is submitted as soon as practical after infiltration whether or not contact has been made with the local resistance. b. The following is an example of an Initial Entry Report. (1) Proword. Designated in accordance with the CEOI. The proword designates the type of report being submitted.

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(2) Paragraph A. Code Word. Designated in accordance with the CEOI. The code word identifies the operational detachment making the report. (3) Paragraph B. Location. Complete military coordinates to nearest 1,000 meters and designation of the location from which reporting. (4) Paragraph C. Casualties. Report last name and whether fatality or injury. Also, report missing personnel. (5) Paragraph D. Contact. Report whether contact was made with local resistance. (6) Paragraph E. Strength. Report strength of resistance force as known at time of report. (7) Paragraph F. Additional information, such as a request to cancel or modify the automatic resupply drop. 4-4. AIR INFILTRATION a. Advantages. (1) Flexibility. (2) Speed and accuracy of delivery. (3) Short exposure to enemy countermeasures. (4) Precise navigation. (5) Capability of delivering supplies in excess of individual loads. b. Disadvantages. (1) Vulnerability to enemy, air detection and defense systems. (2) Affected by weather conditions. (3) Possible injury to personnel and damage/loss of equipment. (4) Requires specially trained aircrews. (5) Requires sterilization of infiltration site. c. General. Air delivery by parachute is one of the most practical and rapid means available for the infiltration of SFOD's. In most instances standard troop carrier aircraft are well equipped and satisfy airdrop requirements. Some situations may require an aircraft 4-3

capable of parachute delivery of personnel and equipment from high altitudes using free-fall parachute techniques. In scene instances assault-type aircraft as well as amphibious and utility types used by other services may be available, and certain situations may require that these aircraft have the capability of using relatively short, unprepared airstrips and conduct air landing operations during infiltration. Under other circumstances, longer-range tactical aircraft may be used. (See TM 57-210 for dimensions, flight characteristics, and data on US Army and US Air Force aircraft.) Support for UW operations requires aircraft that: (1) Can paradrop the required number of operational personnel and accompanying equipment/supplies. (2) Carp operate at varying altitudes during darkness or adverse weather conditions. (3) Possess the required navigational aids to allow the aircrew to locate and deliver personnel and equipment on small DZ's with no terminal guidance and ground contact. (4) Have sufficient combat radius to reach the operational area and return to a friendly base, (5) Can land and take off from short, unprepared airstrips. (6) Can, under certain circumstances, land and take off from water. (7) Possess the capability of parachute delivery of personnel and equipment from high altitudes. d. Specific Considerations. (1) Drop zone (DZ) selection. DZ requirements for clandestine parachute entry differ from those for normal airborne operations. Security of the entry operation and survival of those infiltrated are the overriding considerations. Obviously, ideal DZ's may be under either continuous or periodic surveillance by security forces or by technical means. Therefore, populated areas and areas occupied or patrolled by enemy security forces muse be avoided. These considerations, in combination with the topography of the remaining area, may dictate the use of small, rough-terrain DZ's or deliberate tree landings in densely forested or jungle areas. Use of such DZ's may require special equipment and training in specialized techniques. (2) Drop, zone identification and authentication procedures. Although proper identification and authentication of the primary DZ selected for the initial infiltration is the joint responsibility of the aircraft commander and the Special Forces element commander, other factors must be discussed: 4-4

(a) For the initial infiltration, the decision to proceed with or abort the drop if improper markings or authentication signals are displayed is the responsibility of the joint commanders for the overall mission and is normally contained in the operation order. There are two courses of action that may be employed: 1. A complete abort of the mission and return to the operational base. 2. Abort the primary DZ and proceed to the preselected, alternate DZ. (b) Whatever the decision, it must be known to the aircraft commander and the Special Forces commander. Each of the aircrew and operational members will also be notified of the impending changes. (3) Jump procedures. (a) Whenever a visual ground signal is not available, the aircrew determines the point of exit of personnel from the aircraft. The drop will be made on a computed air release point (CARP) or on a visible preselected release point. (b) When the ground release point marking system is used for personnel drops, the following procedure is used: 1. Upon spotting the designated drop zone markings, the pilot will align his aircraft to pass over the release point at the proper altitude and track. 2. Once the above has been accomplished and the pilot considers conditions safe for the drop, he will turn on the "green light" to notify the jumpmaster. 3. The jumpmaster will give the command for exit of bundles and/or personnel over the release point. e. Blind-Drop Infiltration. (1) Blind-drop infiltrations into preselected DZ's are conducted where reception committees are not available or the ground situation precludes prior occupation. (2) Once the DZ is selected in the operational area, the Air Force has responsibility for flight planning, initial point (IP)' selection, and crew procedures throughout the flight. Normally, the drop will be made .on a CARP or a visible, preselected release point. If free-fall techniques are employed and the ground is not visible, the high-altitude, free-fall release system is used.

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f. Free-Fall Operations. Parachute entry from high altitudes may be necessary in certain situations. Whenever a free-fall operation is planned in hostile areas protected by enemy radar and other detection devices, a system of jamming or disruption of these devices must be established. In addition, the availability of aircraft and capability of aircrews trained to work in depressurized aircraft at extremely high altitudes must be considered. Once free-fall parachutists have exited the aircraft, they maintain a stable free-fall position in the air, falling to a designated altitude before opening their parachutes. Parachutists then manipulate their parachutes to assemble in the air and to insure landing close to each other on the ground. Operational free-fall parachute techniques are contained in FM 31-19, Special Forces Military Free-Fall Parachuting. g. Equipment/Supplies/Reception Committee. (1) The detachment must have in its possession the equipment with which to accomplish initial tasks. These items normally consist of radios, individual arms, and operational TOE equipment (medical kits, photographic equipment, binoculars, compasses, etc.). (2) The presence of a reception committee on the DZ influences the amount of accompanying equipment and supplies as well as the initial actions of the Special Forces element. When a reception committee is available, sterilization of the DZ and disposal of parachute equipment is a lesser problem than when a "blind-drop" infiltration is conducted. When serviced by a reception committee, additional equipment and supplies, beyond immediate requirements, may be dropped with the element. (3) The equipment and supplies to accompany the element may be dropped using one of the following techniques: (a) Air delivery containers. All element equipment and supplies are rigged in air-delivery containers. They may be dropped as door bundles or by some mechanical means. This technique permits the individual parachutist to jump unencumbered by excess equipment; however, it may result in the loss of equipment if containers are not recovered. This technique should be used only when an adequate reception committee is assured, or in low-level drops (500-700 ft) where dispersion is less of a problem, and there is little time to release a rucksack in the air. Detailed information on container sizes is listed in TM 55-450-15 and TM 10-500. (b) Individual loads. Essential items such as radios are jumped on element members while less important items may be rigged in air-delivery containers as outlined above. All element equipment and supplies, however, may be jumped as individual loads. This restricts the amount that can be dropped but reduces the loss of items through failure, to recover containers. This method is best suited for "blind-drop" infiltration or when a reception committee is not 4-6

available. The present method of dropping individual loads consists of packing all items in a rucksack; the jumper suspends the rucksack a safe distance below himself and then releases it before he lands. h. Control and Assembly Procedures. (1) Control procedures. The Special Forces element commander places himself in the optimum position in the stick to control his element. Special signals and emergency procedures are set for each situation that may arise. These include emergency abort procedures, ground assembly procedures, and contact procedures with the resistance force. Rehearsals are conducted to insure that signals are clearly understood and properly employed. Prior to departure, electronic equipment used by the element in assembly is carefully checked to insure proper functioning. (2) Assembly procedures. Each member of the element is thoroughly briefed on assembly procedures. This includes: (a) Location of an assembly (contact) point. (b) Actions of the individual when approached by guerrillas (i.e., exchange of recognition signals). (c) Location of primary and alternate assembly points if contact is not made with the reception committee. The primary assembly point should be referenced to an easily recognized terrain feature located 200 to 300 yards off the DZ, and should provide sufficient concealment. The alternate assembly point should also be near an easily recognized terrain feature and provide sufficient concealment, but it should be located 3 to 5 miles from the DZ. (d) Disposal of individual parachute equipment and the techniques of erasing signs of the drop. i. Emergency Procedures. In-flight abort plans are developed before infiltration. (1) Simple ground assembly plans and rally points along the flight route are selected. The Special Forces element receives a preflight briefing on the route to be flown and during flight is informed periodically on progress. (2) A plan is also prepared for enemy contact on the DZ. j. Final Ground Procedures. Once on the ground, personnel move to and secure the selected assembly area. They then attempt to make contact with the local resistance, or they continue with the assigned mission if it is of a unilateral nature. From his assessment of the area, the element commander recommends the organization of the area and commitment of additional Special Forces units. 4-7

4-5. WATER INFILTRATION a. Advantages. (1) Long-range delivery capability. (2) Relatively unaffected by weather up to the point of debarkation. (3) Operational briefings and rehearsals can be continued en route. (4) Large quantities of supplies can be transported with surface craft. b. Disadvantages. (1) Time-consuming unloading and transshipment from offshore drop-off points. (2) Vulnerability to enemy shore defenses during landing operations. (3) Possible loss of personnel and supplies during ship-to-shore movement. (4) Limited cargo capacity of submarines. (5) Special training is necessary. (6) Additional packaging is required to waterproof equipment. (7) High winds which affect surf conditions. c. General. Water infiltration either by undersea craft or surface craft may frequently be employed in UWOA's having exposed coastlines, coastal river junctions, and harbors. Water infiltration using seaplane landings on large bodies of water, rivers, or coastal waters may be possible; in such eases, the element commander considers the ship-to-shore movement and subsequent land-movement characteristics o f a normal water infiltration operation. d. Considerations for Water Infiltration. (1) Craft limitations. The characteristics and limitations of the landing craft largely determine the landing techniques. Another consideration, however, is the capability of the naval support craft to carry and off-load the landing craft to be used for the ship-toshore movement phase of the operation.

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(2) Equipment/supplies/reception committee. Adequate waterproofing should be provided to protect supplies and equipment from the effects of salt water. As in air operations, the presence of a reception committee influences the element's action before and after the landing, and the amount of equipment and supplies it transports. When fleet-type submarines are used, all items are packaged in a size and configuration that will allow them, to pass through the narrow access openings into the pressure hull. Size, configuration, and packaging must be coordinated with the ship's personnel prior to embarking. (3) Ship-to-shore movement. Assignment of boat teams, distribution of equipment and supplies, methods of debarkation, and means of navigation to the landing beach are carefully planned. In addition, consideration is given to methods of recognizing the reception committee and disposing of the landing craft. (4) Rehearsals. As in air operations complete rehearsals must be conducted frequently. In water infiltration operations the major advantage lies in the fact that continuous rehearsals and debarking procedures can be conducted en route to the operational area. 4-6. LAND INFILTRATION a. Advantages. (1) Minimum logistical support. (2) Concurrent collection.

area familiarization and

intelligence

(3) Flexibility of movement and timing. (4) Minimum interservice coordination. b. Disadvantages. (1) Time consuming. (2) Increased vulnerability to enemy detection and interdiction. (3) Limited capability for carrying supplies and equipment. c. General. Land infiltration is conducted similar to that of a long-range patrol into enemy territory. Generally, guides are required. If guides are not available, the detachment must have detailed intelligence of the route, particularly if borders are to be crossed. Routes are selected to take maximum advantage .of cover and concealment and to avoid enemy outposts, patrols, and installations. The location and means of contacting selected individuals who will furnish assistance are provided to the detachment. The individuals 4-9

may be used as local guides and as sources of information, food, and shelter. Equipment and supplies to be carried will necessarily be restricted to individual arms and equipment and communication equipment. Section II. EXFILTRATION 4-7. GENERAL Exfiltration is the extraction or evacuation of personnel, documents, or equipment from an operational area. 4-8. METHODS a. General. The planning considerations, preparations, tactics, and techniques for exfiltration are basically the same as those used for infiltration; however, here we are concerned with the recovery methods. Since Special Forces operations are normally conducted deep in enemy or hostile areas, the distance involved will generally preclude an all-land exfiltration. The initial phase of the exfiltration will normally be by land, terminating in an air or water recovery. Aircraft, surface craft, and submarines, or various combinations of these three methods can be used for the recovery of: (1) Seriously ill or wounded Special Forces personnel. (2) Operational elements following mission completion. (3) Operational elements under direct enemy pressure. (4) Selected personnel, documents, or equipment, as directed by the SFOB. (5) Military personnel and other selected individuals who become isolated in hostile areas or who escape from captivity. b. By Air and Water. (1) Recovery areas. (a) The area selected for recovery should be easily identified to both the Special Forces element and the recovering unit. It should permit the secure exchange of recognition signals. The recovery area should meet these additional criteria: 1. Allow the undetected approach and departure of the recovery vehicle. 2. Allow the secure use of beacons when required.

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3. Allow the maneuver or landing of the recovery vehicle. teams.

4. Allow for errors in predicted drift of swimmer or boat

(b) Alternate recovery areas are selected to provide for the possibility of enemy activity in the primary area. They are selected in the same manner as the primary recovery area and usually lie along the same route to be used by the recovery vehicle. (2) Recovery methods. The recovery method selected should permit a simple and rapid recovery with the least probability of detection. Recovery may be made by: (a) Embarking directly aboard a surface ship or submarine. (b) Aircraft landing in operational area. (c) Aircraft equipped with Fulton Surface-To-Air Recovery (STAR) system. (d) Water landings by fixed-wing amphibious aircraft or properly prepared helicopters. (e) Helicopters, equipped with winches, rope ladders, or the STABO extraction system. (The STABO system requires special personnel harnesses which may be carried into the operational area on initial infiltration, delivered during resupply, or dropped at the recovery site.) (3) Recovery times. (a) The exact recovery time selected must be late enough to permit the element to move to the recovery area under cover of darkness, but early enough to allow the recovery prior to dawn. Precise execution and good tinning will insure minimum time on station. (b) Alternate recovery times to provide for changes in weather or surf conditions are selected in the same manner as primary tunes, and usually occur at approximately 24-hour intervals. c. By Land. Special Forces may exfiltrate over predetermined land routes all the way to friendly control. This is the least desirable method and would be used only in exceptional circumstances. Here, major emphasis is placed on employing evasive tactics and techniques and patrol procedures when passing through enemy lines. Land exfiltration is favored when:

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(1) The distance to friendly lines is relatively short. (2) The terrain provides cover and concealment for movement on foot and limits the employment of enemy mobile units against the exfiltrating force. (3) The exfiltrating force is lightly equipped and is not encumbered by captured personnel or material. (4) The exfiltrating force moves through an area occupied by friendly civilians who can assist the withdrawal. (5) Areas along exfiltration routes are uninhabited. (6) The enemy force: (a) Is widely dispersed or is under such pressure that it is difficult for it to concentrate against the exfiltrating force. (b) Has a capability that makes air or water recovery prohibitive. Section III. INFILTRATION CHECKLIST 4-9. GENERAL The checklist (para 4-10 - 4-13) is provided as a guide to assist in operational planning. Although this checklist does not cover complete details of all missions that may be assigned to Special Forces, it does give a broad coverage in problem areas that may be overlooked. 4-10. AIR INFILTRATION a. Planning at the Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB). (1) Selection of primary and alternate DZ's. DZ).

(2) Assembly plans (to include actions in the event of :injury on (3) Assembly areas (primary and alternate). (4) Primary contact plan. (5) Alternate contact plan.

(6) Pertinent information concerning time of loading, time of drop, stick assignments, equipment assignments, and designation of jumpmaster and alternate.

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(7) Communication procedures (en route and after drop). (8) In-flight abort plan: (a) Line of flight. (b) Check points en route. (c) Safe areas. (d) Contingency plans. 1. Element evasion plan. 2. No contact with resistance forces. 3. No contact with SFOB. 4. Enemy contact on DZ. (9) Land movement to secure area plan. (10) Initial entry report (IER). (11) DZ sterilization plan. b. Actions Prior to Drop. (1) Departure from isolation area to marshalling area at scheduled tine. (2) Final briefing of element. (3) Jumpmaster inspection of aircraft. (4) Final briefing of pilot. (5) Inspection of personnel. (6) Inspection of equipment. (7) Meeting station time. (8) Orientation during flight. (9) Jump commands. (10) Final check with pilot for proper DZ recognition signals. (11) Execute drop. 4-13

c. Action on DZ. (1) Noise discipline. (2) Light discipline. (3) Rapid assembly. (4) Assembly plan followed: (a) Equipment accounted for. (b) Personnel accounted for. (5) Actions in the event of injury. (6) Time on DZ. (7) Action if there is no reception party. (8) Action in case of enemy contact. (9) Sterilize the DZ. 4-11. SEA INFILTRATION a. Planning at the SFOB. (1) Selection of landing site. (2) Selection of alternate landing site. (3) Selection of landing craft. (4) Landing site reconnaissance (reports, maps, aerial photos). (5) Authentication signal. (6) Contact plan. (7) Alternate contact plan. (8) Contingency plans. (a) No contact with resistance forces. (b) No contact with SFOB. (c) Enemy contact on landing site. (9) Communications (en route and after landing). 4-14

(10) Initial entry report (IER). (11) Pertinent information concerning time of loading, departure, and debarking. (12) Training (loading, unloading, stowing equipment). (13) Type of launching (wet or dry). (14) Rehearsals. (15) Equipment preparation. (16) Equipment waterproofing. (17) Equipment identification marking. (18) Embarkation procedures. (19) Debarkation procedures. (20) Sea movement plan to designated operational area. (21) Navigational checks. (22) Information concerning antiswimmer detection or other security measures. (23) Information concerning hydrographic data. (24) Landing procedures. (25) Disposal of landing craft. (26) Land movement to secure area. b. Actions Prior to Embarking. (1) Movement from isolation area to embarking site on time. (2) Briefing of element. (3) Inspection of watercraft. (4) Final briefing with watercraft commander. (5) Inspection of personnel. (6) Ship assignments (to include bunks, messing, restricted area, naval customs).

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(7) Assignment of boat landing teams. (8) Distribution of equipment and supplies. (9) Inspection of equipment. (10) Meeting embarkation time. c. Actions En Route to Operational Area. (1) Orientation during movement. (2) Continuous rehearsals on debarking procedures. (3) Continuous rehearsals on landing procedures, contact plans, assembly procedures, and actions in the event of no reception committee. (4) Maintain physical training program. (5) Keep element informed on latest changes and up--to-date intelligence. d. Action During Ship-to-Shore Movement. (1) Noise discipline. (2) Light discipline. (3) Debarking rapidly and efficiently. (4) Debarkation plan followed. (5) Equipment and personnel accounted for. (6) Launching. (7) Paddling (crew procedures and steering). (8) Maintaining course. (9) Dispatching of swimmer reconnaissance teams outside of surf. (10) Signal "all clear" by reconnaissance party. (11) Landing procedures. e. Action at Landing Site. (1) Noise discipline. 4-16

(2) Light discipline. (3) Unloading rapidly and efficiently. (4) Landing plan followed: (a) Equipment accounted for. (b) Personnel accounted for. (c) Actions in the event of injury sustained during landing. (5) Disposal of landing craft. (6) Time on landing site. (7) Action if there is no reception committee. (8) Action in case of enemy contact. 4-12. LAND INFILTRATION a. Planning at the SFOB. (1) Selection of point-of-departure. (2) Alternate point-of-departure. (3) Coordination: (a) Movement in friendly area. (b) Departure from friendly area. (c) Fire support. (d) Guides. (4) Route selection. (5) Reconnaissance. (6) Equipment preparation. (7) Movement to departure point. (8) Movement through departure point. (9) Medical coverage.

4-17

(10) Location of assets and identities. (11) Asset contact procedures. (12) Communications (in friendly area; after departure from friendly lines). (13) Caches en route. (14) Guides en route. (15) Safe areas en route. (16) Control measures. (17) Contact areas (primary and alternates). (18) Contact procedures. b. Action Prior to Departure. (1) Movement from isolation to departure point on time. (2) Final briefing of element. (3) Reconnaissance of departure point. (4) Inspection of personnel and equipment. (5) Coordination with friendly unit. (6) Challenges and password. (7) Guides. (8) Meeting departure time. (9) Formation for departure. c. Action After Departure. (1) Departure from friendly area. (2) Actions at rallying points. (3) Noise discipline. (4) Light discipline. (5) Actions on enemy contact. 4-18

(6) Actions at danger areas. (7) Navigation. (8) Control during movement. (9) Security during movement. (10) Security during halts. (11) Communications en route. (12) Surveillance of contact areas. (13) Action at contact points. 4-13. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL METHODS OF INFILTRATION a. Contact Plan. (1) Contact made by minimum or selected personnel. (Air infiltration--all personnel must be prepared to initiate contact if man-to-man coverage is available on DZ.) (2) Proper security procedures. (3) Signals (i.e., verbal signals, light signal, visual signal) correct. (4) Noise discipline during contact. (5) Minimum time used. (6) Actions if contact area, signal, or person is suspected of being compromised. (7) Alternate plan. b. Infiltration and Contact Site. (1) Sterilization plan put into effect. (2) Insure security of site is adequate and in effect. (3) Execute continuous surveillance of infiltration or contact site for a significant period of time. (4) Execute deception plans if required. c. Movement to Safe Area.

4-19

(1) Noise discipline. (2) Light discipline. (3) March security. (4) Selection of rallying points. (5) Element's reaction to resistance leader's orders. (6) Resistance force reaction to element's presence and initial requirements and actions. (7) Element commander's observation and checks used during movement. (8) Element commander attempts to keep element oriented, during route movement, as to location and immediate actions to be taken in the event of enemy interference. (9) Location and rotation of heavy equipment in column. (10) Rapid movement. (11) Security during halts. (12) Plans for recontact with resistance force in event of separation. (13) Medical check of physical condition during march. (14) Initial assessment begins. (15) Establish initial communications with SFOB and render initial entry report (IER).

4-20

CHAPTER 5 ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT (BUILDUP) OF THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA Section I. PLANNING THE INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA 5-1. GENERAL The organization of a UWOA involves initial area organization and buildup of the resistance force. Initial organization includes establishing the required command and administrative structure, taking necessary security precautions, and training a nucleus of guerrilla personnel. Buildup is the expansion of the original nucleus into an operational unit capable of accomplishing the assigned mission. No matter what degree of organization is encountered, in order to organize support functions and systems for the guerrilla force, the basic organizational objectives discussed in this section must exist or must be organized and implemented immediately. 5-2. SELECTION OF OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS Once the UWOA has been designated, any Special Forces element may be selected for initial infiltration. Some factors influencing type and size selected are: a. Character of the Resistance Movement Within the Area. The size and composition of the resistance movement may not be known, or it may be known to be extremely small and unorganized but with a potential for expansion under proper guidance and with logistical support. In either event, the immediate infiltration of an operational element to begin the initial organization and development of the resistance movement may be necessary. On the other hand, the resistance movement may be highly organized and, except for logistical support and coordination of -resistance force activities, will require little additional assistance from Special Forces units. Situations may develop whereby a known leader of the resistance movement is of such importance or caliber that a senior Special Forces officer and a staff will be required to effect the necessary coordination and future development of the force. At this time, an appropriate command and control element may be chosen for infiltration. b. Environment and Tactical Situations. The terrain, the enemy situation, complex political problems, or the ethnic groupings with the resistance movement ray require that two or more elements be infiltrated simultaneously. If the UWOA is relatively large and compartmented for security, it may be preferable to have several elements in the area initially to form two independent sector commands and to organize, develop, train, equip, direct, and 5-1

coordinate the efforts of scattered resistance forces. Regardless of the number of detachments initially infiltrated into a specified area, infiltration of additional operational elements may be necessary because of increased operations, expanding of existing guerrilla elements, or for political reasons.

Figure 5-1 Two independent sector commands. c. Subdivided "A" Detachment. The operational detachment "A" may be subdivided into two similar teams which retain a mixture of the basic skills. (1) Subdivision would be appropriate: (a) Where the size and state of training of a guerrilla force make it desirable to split the force and subdivide the operational area into two sectors. (b) When enemy pressure forces dispersal of the guerrilla force by subunit for separate movement to areas of temporary refuge. (c) To exploit an unforeseen resistance potential in an adjacent area.

5-2

(2) Initial deployment as a subdivided element would also be appropriate to: (a) Compartment a sensitive operation for security reasons. (b) Situations which require Special Forces presence to provide liaison and communications only. (c) Supervise reception and distribution of logistical support. d. Assessment Teams. Under certain circumstances initial infiltration may be made by a small, carefully selected "Pilot Team" composed of individuals possessing specialized skills. The mission of this team is to assess designated areas to determine the feasibility of developing the resistance potential and to establish contact with indigenous leaders. Once a determination has been made by the theater command or JUWTF as to the feasibility of developing the area, additional Special Forces elements may be infiltrated. The assessment team may remain with the operational elements or be exfiltrated as directed. e. Tailoring. When the requirement exists to conduct special operations using Special Forces personnel only to accommodate a particular task or mission or to meet an unusual requirement in an area, a provisional or composite operational element may be formed from the Special Forces group resources. Because forming this type unit would probably deplete several organic operational detachments, planners or commanders should consider this solution only after carefully weighing all alternatives. f. Unilateral Missions. Only the number of Special Forces personnel required to perform the unilateral mission are used. This number will vary depending on the type and duration of the mission. In some instances, this element may be infiltrated into UWOA's already containing Special Forces elements; however, upon successful completion of the mission, operational control and final disposition of the element rests with the SFOB. 5-3. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND SUPPORT a. General. For planning purposes, a Special Forces operational element has the capability to organize, equip, train, and direct the operations of a battalion-size force. However, the size of the resistance force, which Special Forces may organize and employ, will vary. It may be affected by the size and differences in ethnic groups, by the political factions, and by the general educational level and previous military experience of resistance personnel. Of significant importance are the capability and motivation of resistance leaders and how much guidance they will accept. Command and control measures to be employed in operational areas will differ 5-3

from those normally employed when working with conventional forces. Special Forces elements usually establish a communications system to insure adequate command, control, and support for operations that are widespread, varied, and, in most instances, sporadic. b. Possible UWOA-SFOB Communications. Once committed into the UWOA, operational elements may have _the use of one channel of communication for both operational control and logistical support or, if deemed advisable and in accordance with SOP's, have two channels of communications--one for logistical support and one for operational command and control. Communications between the Special Forces element and the SFOB can be organized in any one of several ways. (1) Operational elements committed individually are directly responsible to the SFOB for all operations; however, the element contacts the logistical support element directly to request necessary supplies and materials. (2) All Special Forces operational elements communicate directly with the SFOB and have no established lateral link with each other. The SFOB relays required information between operational elements. (3) In a well-established area containing several operational elements, a command and control headquarters may be formed using Special Forces group resources. In this case, subordinate elements normally communicate directly with the command and control headquarters on all matters, but they may communicate directly with the SFOB on administrative or supply matters. Emergency communications, however, may be conducted between all operational elements and the SFOB at any time. c. Area Command, Control, and Support. (1) Normally, a guerrilla force will communicate with its respective area command and not directly with the SFOB. (2) Dispersion to reduce the vulnerability of resistance elements to enemy countermeasures may preclude continuous, direct control of subordinates in an area command. Command direction may be accomplished by periodic meetings or by messenger. Accordingly, specific guidance to subordinate units is contained in operation orders to cover extended periods of time. (3) Maximum use is made of SOP's which include long-term guidance on such matters as psychological operations, security, intelligence, guerrilla/civilian relations, targets, logistical support, evasion and escape, and emergency procedures.

5-4

5-4. THE AREA COMMAND a. General. As discussed in chapter 4, the area command normally is a combined organization designed to integrate the Special Forces element and the resistance organization in a UWOA. Details of organization vary according to the situation, mission, size of the resistance organization, and the relationship between the resistance force and the Special Forces elements. b. Composition. The area command usually is composed of two basic subdivisions: (1) Command group. The command group may consist: of the Special Forces element/ selected members, the resistance leader and his staff and, as appropriate, representatives from the auxiliary, underground, and guerrilla force in the area. Either a formal staff is organized or the command group meets periodically or "on call." The purpose of the command group is to provide centralized control and coordination of all resistance activities in the UWOA. (2) Resistance forces. The resistance force may include three components: the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground. 5-5. SPECIAL FORCES OBJECTIVES IN THE UWOA a. General. A well organized UWOA insures close coordination between operational elements and resistance elements. After infiltration, the major task facing operational elements is to develop all resistance elements into an effective operational force to achieve the unified commander's guerrilla warfare objectives. There are several tasks that may be completed separately or concurrently as the organization and development of the area progresses. b. Special Forces-Resistance Force Relations. (1) The Special Forces element commander must impress on the resistance leaders that all personnel involved have a common goal against a common enemy and that it is to their mutual benefit, for the guerrillas to accept sponsorship and operational guidance from the United States. (2) Once the guerrillas have been convinced of the advantages of close cooperation, the Special Forces commander in conjunction with the resistance leader develops a command structure. This structure, called the area command, integrates the Special Forces and the resistance organizations.

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(3) In some situations, the nucleus ;of resistance elements may be recruited from exiled or liberated personnel currently located in friendly territory. These personnel may be infiltrated using normal infiltration techniques discussed in chapter 4. 5-6. CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING RELATIONS a. Although the military advantages of close cooperation among various elements of the resistance force are obvious, political considerations may encourage guerrilla units to resist Special Forces efforts to unify them. Opposition may stem from many causes (e.g., personal antagonisms, religious beliefs, or ethnic differences). The Special Forces commander and his subordinates must have a knowledge and appreciation of these attitudes and of the personalities concerned. They must know the extent of the initial psychological preparation, including any promises made and commitments to be honored. Without specific guidance from authorized US officials, political commitments in the name of the US Government cannot be made. Guidance in political matters will normally emanate from the unified commander through the SFOB. At some point prior .to linkup with conventional US forces, political responsibilities may be assumed by Army Civil Affairs (CA), and at that time a Civil Affairs liaison officer may be assigned to Special Forces within the UWOA. b. Perhaps the most delicate part of a Special Forces commander's responsibility is insuring that competent indigenous personnel occupy key positions. If leaders and staff members of the resistance organization do not appear qualified to fill positions held, the Special Forces commander should endeavor to increase their effectiveness. Increasing the effectiveness of these personnel will normally increase the influence of the Special Forces commander. If this effort fails and tie future effectiveness of the resistance force is in doubt, he should discreetly attempt to influence the selection of new leaders. It is mandatory that the Special Forces commanders exercise extreme caution in this potentially explosive area, lest he jeopardize his mission or even the survival of his element. c. Special Forces should have a working knowledge of the local language. When an interpreter is needed, he must be carefully selected and cautiously used. The interpreter is in a very sensitive and powerful position as he is the only one who knows what both parties are saying.. Also, considerable difficulty may be experienced in gaining the confidence of the guerrillas who may either dislike or distrust the interpreter. Special Forces personnel must know and respect local traditions, customs, and courtesies. They must abide by the resistance code and, in so doing, encourage the guerrillas to display loyalty to their own nation's future. d. To facilitate the control and influence of resistance elements, all Special Forces members must display a high degree of professional competence. 5-6

5-7. GENERAL AREA ORGANIZATION a. General. An initial requirement is the establishment of a good working relationship between Special Forces and the resistance elements. This relationship helps to develop a high degree of cooperation and some degree of control over the resistance force. Control over the resistance force is achieved when resistance leaders are receptive to orders and requirements necessary to accomplish mission requirements. b. Major Considerations. The command structure and the physical organization of the area are priority tasks of the Special Forces commander. Whether the organization of the area is well established, incomplete, or lacking, some improvement in physical area organization will probably be necessary. Organization of the UWOA is dictated by a number of requirements and depends more on local conditions than on any fixed set of rules. Factors for consideration include: (1) Area command organization. (2) Guerrilla force organization. (3) Cooperation of local population. (4) Tactical situation. (5) Geography. (6) Future missions. c. Internal Area Organization. The ultimate shape, size, and organization of an operational area follow no definite pattern. Administrative divisions, terrain, enemy activities, targets, population patterns, and attitudes clearly influence internal organization of the area. (1) The area complex. (a) An area complex consists of guerrilla operational base(s), safe areas, and various supporting elements and facilities. Normally included in the area complex are security and intelligence systems, communication systems, mission support sites (MSS), supply installations, training areas, DZ's, LZ's (landing zones), reception sites, and evasion and escape (E&E) mechanisms as required. (b) The complex is not a continuous pattern of tangible installations but a series of intangible lines of communications emanating from the guerrilla bases) connecting all other resistance elements. The main guerrilla force base is the hub of a spider-like complex which is never static, but constantly changing. The command group is normally located in the guerrilla base. 5-7

(2) The guerrilla base. (a) A guerrilla base is a temporary site wherein command and control headquarters, installations, facilities, and operational units are located. There is usually more than one guerrilla base in the sector/area. (b) From one base, lines of communication connect; other bases and various elements of the area complex. Installations and facilities normally found at a guerrilla base are command posts, training areas, supply caches, and communications and medical facilities. Both occupants and facilities must be capable of rapid displacement with little or no warning. (3) Locations. Remote inaccessible areas are ideal for the location of guerrillas; however, the lack of remote areas does not prevent the organization and development of operational base areas. All approaches to base areas and facilities should be well guarded and concealed. The approaches to selected base facilities such as communication centers, caches, and certain supply depots are revealed only an a need-to-know basis. Alternate base areas must always be established to give mobility and flexibility to guerrilla forces and to provide them safe areas. These sanctuaries offer relief from enemy pressure and offensive operations. Alternate bases must have the same characteristics and requirements as a primary base.

Figure 5-2 Guerrilla base. 5-8

Section II. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UWOA 5-8. GENERAL a. Under close supervision and guidance in the early phases of development and based on tentative organizational plans, limited recruiting and training of personnel previously spotted and selected by resistance leaders may be conducted. Based on the Special Forces element's mission and the extent of training of the existing resistance force, small-scale operations may be continued and intensified. Most of the guerrilla actions undertaken should be widely dispersed and of the simple harassment type (i.e., cutting of telephone wires, putting tire puncturing devices on roads and highways, contaminating gasoline and oil in vehicles and exposed storage facilities, and attacking small, remote outposts and facilities of the enemy). Of paramount importance is the fact that the enemy is in full control: no activity should be undertaken that will bring the enemy down in force on the guerrilla organization, possibly wiping out or destroying its effectiveness. b. A large part of the activity of this period may be directed toward creating a political and psychological climate that will induce resisters, or potential resisters, to risk their lives for the "common cause." Under a strong leadership exerted by the area command, these resistance groups will ultimately grow larger, become better equipped, and become better trained. "Natural leaders," such as former military personnel, clergymen, local officeholders, and neighborhood spokesmen, will usually emerge. These provide the area command with a potential resource on which to plan the growth and expansion of the resistance force and the operational area. c. Regardless of the degree of organization of the resistance force, primary consideration should be given to insuring that certain basic functions and operations exist. These are established concurrently and developed as required. These functions include: (1) Unit organization. (2) Security and intelligence systems. (3) Communication systems. (4) Administrative systems. (5) Logistical support systems. (6) Training programs and facilities. (7) Planning and execution of combat operations. (8) Expanding the resistance force. 5-9

5-9. UNIT ORGANIZATION a. General. The most important point to be made about guerrilla organizations is that they cannot be categorically described. Guerrilla force missions and tactics are primary organization considerations. These are strongly influenced in turn by available manpower and material assets. Direction and control are made easier when units are organized along military lines. At the same time, a too-rigid adherence to military form reduces the flexibility which guerrilla organizations must have. Generally there are two approaches to this problem of organization: (1) From the beginning, the effort is coordinated by a high command and by regional or district commands as dictated by geographic and other factors. (2) The effort begins with the independent, uncoordinated activities of relatively small guerrilla units. As these ,separate activities grow in size and scope, district and higher commands necessarily develop. b. Principles of Organizations. (1) Command and control. Simplicity and flexibility are essential. Leaders must delegate authority to capable and loyal subordinates. Each person, from the highest to the lowest member, of the unit, must know to whom he is responsible and who is responsible to him. No person should be responsible to more than one superior. No superior officer should have more subordinate units than he can effectively direct. (2) Basic organization. The basic structure of the unit must correspond to the conditions of the terrain, the climate, and the area command's objectives. When organizing guerrilla units, consider the following: (a) Self-containment is essential in a guerrilla unit. Each unit must have its own communication system, must be able to obtain its own local supplies, must conduct its own reconnaissance, and must establish a means of procuring additional information and intelligence as operations require. (b) Strong firepower and offensive armament capable of inflicting great losses within a short period of time are imperative (speed, effectiveness, destruction). (c) Heavy weapon units should be easily divided to provide support for subordinate elements. (d) Smaller units should be able to act independently.

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(e) The merging of small units into the larger organization should be done without causing disharmony. (f) Knowledge of the location and activities of other units must be limited to the persons responsible for internal liaison. c. Size of Units. During early development, unit size may be fewer than 75 men, perhaps as few as 15 to 20. In the latter stages, units will rarely exceed battalion size with personnel numbering from 200 to 500. The following factors influence unit size: (1) Area. The size and physical aspects of the area of operations and the availability of suitable bases will limit the number of guerrillas that can be employed successfully and will restrict the types of operations. (2) Missions. A guerrilla unit should include no more men than needed to accomplish its overall mission. No more than two primary missions should be given to a small unit at any one time. (3) Political considerations. Although the leader is the focal point of the resistance effort, the mission objectives of the unified command and the Special Forces element are foremost. Political ambitions should never influence the leader to build up his organization beyond the point of efficiency just for the sake of sheer numbers. When this situation occurs, the element commander through judicious use of supplies may control its expansion. He should influence the guerrilla leader by making him aware that his political stature is enhanced more by success in operations than by the number of followers. (4) Enemy control. Where population control measures are stringent and the enemy is strong, security, mobility, and dispersion strongly favor small units. (5) Available personnel. The size of guerrilla units depends on the availability of personnel. Included in the preliminary planning phase is the spotting of potential volunteers. In determining the availability of personnel, the area command must consider the ratio of men to be recruited to the total male population of a town or village. The wholesale disappearance of the town's able-bodied men would arouse the enemy's suspicions and provoke reprisals. (6) Supply and support capability. (a) Guerrillas should not be assembled in such numbers that supplying and supporting them becomes a major problem. Sufficient food and water resources should exist within the base area itself or should be available from readily accessible sources (i.e., local auxiliary or support units). 5-11

(b) The equipment of the guerrillas must be based, at least initially, on what is available and not on what the guerrilla wants or needs. The enemy may be the principal source of supply until a sound external logistical system can be established. (c) A guerrilla commander who allows his organization to become burdened with too many personnel to feed, shelter, or equip will soon have major problems. If his supply and support capability is exceeded, lie will probably lose control of his personnel. Even if control is not lost, supply gathering will replace training and tactics against the enemy. (7) Social tradition. Strong family or ethnic traditions may make it difficult to persuade the guerrillas that their wives and children should be left behind. Traditions may also have a bearing on the suitability of certain tactics, weapons, and disciplinary principles. These, in turn, may affect the size of the unit as well as the planning for future development, operations, and support. 5-10. THE AUXILIARY AND THE UNDERGROUND a. General. (1) Resistance membership includes persons whose principal function is to conduct operations against the enemy and persons who support the operational elements. Here, we are primarily concerned with the auxiliary--the internal support element of the resistance movement. Its organization and operation are clandestine in nature and its members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the resistance movement. The auxiliary's primary mission is to provide support for the guerrilla force by organizing civilian supporters of the resistance movement. (2) Clandestine support functions can be organized on a regional, district, or sector basis depending on the degree to which guerrilla units are organized. All functions should be compartmented from each other as well as from the guerrilla unit or group of units which they support. Support functions needed by the guerrilla unit to supplement its own capabilities are: (a) Air or maritime reception support. (b) Systems for internal acquisition of supplies. (c) Systems for the acquisition of operational information and intelligence. (d) Medical facilities for "hospitalization," treatment, and rehabilitation of sick and wounded.

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(e) Counterintelligence systems to counter enemy penetration attempts and provide external and internal security. (f) Systems and procedures for recruitment of personnel. (g) Compartmented communication systems for various support functions. (h) Manufacture/maintenance of equipment. (i) Transportation systems. b. Membership. (1) It is possible for segments of the population to continue participating in the life of their community, appearing concerned only with their normal occupations but engaging in resistance operations. Such personnel are leading double lives, and their success in guerrilla warfare depends on their ability to keep that side of their lives secret from their fellow citizens as well as from the enemy. The "farmer by day, fighter by night," commonly referred to as a "part-time guerrilla," often is the forerunner to the fulltime guerrilla who later will disappear from the public scene to live in guerrilla encampments and undertake more extensive operations. (2) On the other hand, some "part-time guerrillas" may remain in that status for the duration of hostilities. Functions or tasks are assigned to groups or individuals according to their capability, their dependability, and the degree to which they are willing and able to participate. Those who unwittingly furnish support or are coerced into doing so are not considered auxiliaries. The normal daily activities of many auxiliaries can serve as a cover for their guerrilla support mission. (3) Functions which require travel or transportation might be accomplished by such persons as foresters, farmers, fishermen, truckers, or transportation workers. Other functions, such as security and warning, require persons with a valid reason for remaining at a given location; housewives and shopkeepers are examples. Some members of the community may sympathize strongly with the resistance but be under such close surveillance by the enemy that they would be of little value as an auxiliary. Open contact with former political leaders or technicians employed by the enemy, for example, might prove more dangerous than profitable. c. Organization. (1) Auxiliary forces normally organize to coincide with or parallel the existing political administrative divisions of the country. This method of organization insures that each community and the surrounding countryside are the responsibility of an auxiliary 5-13

unit. It is relatively simple to initiate since auxiliary commands may be established at each administrative level, for example, regional, country, district, or local (communities and villages). This organization varies from country to country depending upon the existing political structure. Organization of auxiliary units can commence at any level or at several levels simultaneously and is either centralized or decentralized. (2) A command committee at each level controls and coordinates auxiliary activities within its area of responsibility. In this respect it resembles the command group and staff of a military unit. Members of a command committee are assigned specific duties such as supply, recruiting, transportation, communications, security, intelligence, and operations. At the lowest level, one individual may perform two or three of these duties. (3) A command committee may organize civilian sympathizers into subordinate elements or employ them individually. When possible, these subordinate elements are organized functionally into a compartmented structure. However, because of a shortage of loyal personnel, it is often necessary for each subordinate auxiliary element to perform several functions. d. Method of Operation. (1) Auxiliary units derive their protection in two principal ways—a compartmented structure and operating under cover. While enemy counterguerrilla activities often force the guerrillas to cove temporarily away from given areas, the auxiliaries survive by remaining in place and conducting their activities so as to avoid detection. Individual auxiliary members carry on their normal, dayto-day routine, while secretly carrying out the many facets of resistance activities. (2) Auxiliary units frequently use passive or neutral elements of the population to provide active support to the common cause. Usually this is done on a one-time basis because of the security risks involved in repeated use of such people. The ability of auxiliary forces to manipulate large segments of the neutral population is further enhanced by the demonstrated success of friendly forces.

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The population is your greatest friend. Without their sympathy and active support you cannot exist for extended periods of time. As a result, you cannot afford to alienate them by brutal behavior or lack of discipline. If you have to requisition something, appeal to the common goal and patriotism; do not demand it. Do not forget that the laws of land warfare are valid even though they do not specifically cover every possible situation. For better or worse, you are practically dependent upon the good will of the population. You also depend upon their steady "I-do-not-know, I-have-not-heard-nor-seen-anything" replies to enemy interrogators, even though this attitude might mean their deportation or death. Even if the population should act only half-heartedly in your behalf, you will always find some people willing to help you as observers, scouts, and messengers. You must be extremely cautious in your contact with elements of the civilian resistance movement, even in liberated areas. You must not expose their "cover" for a temporary advantage since they will be captured and liquidated by the enemy after your departure.

Figure 5-3 Keys to good relations and support. e. The Underground. The underground extends resistance operations in areas normally denied to guerrilla forces and/or conducts operations not suitable for guerrillas. The underground is a covert, compartmented organization whose members make every effort to conceal their participation. It is largely self-contained and performs most of its own support functions; however, requirements beyond its capability may be procured through other resistance channels or from a sponsoring power. The success of an underground depends on its careful selection of members and a superior security system. Section III. ORGANIZATION OF RESISTANCE FORCE SUPPORT SYSTEMS 5-11. GENERAL Once the area and unit organizations are underway the area command must establish support functions and systems. These support functions 5-15

and systems include security and warning, logistics, communications, medical support, recruiting, and, in some instances, providing parttime guerrillas for diversionary operations. a. Normally, auxiliary units are assigned direct-support missions for guerrilla units in their area of responsibility. b. In specific missions, selected tasks assigned to the auxiliary force may be coordinated directly with the supported guerrilla command while others are controlled by the auxiliary's own higher headquarters. c. In the assessment of the area, it may be determined that enemy security measures or attitudes of certain segments of the population deny portions of operational areas to the guerrilla force or the auxiliary. Since these areas are usually essential to support enemy operations, the resistance force attempts to extend its influence into them. In such cases, the underground may be employed to achieve= these objectives. d. When considering using the underground, the area command must be made to realize that in many respects the underground closely resembles the auxiliary force. The major differences are: (1) The underground is tailored to conduct operations in areas normally denied the auxiliary force and the guerrilla force. (2) The underground is not dependent on control or influence over the civilian populace for its success; however, the degree to which the underground achieves its objectives is a byproduct of other operations. 5-12. CONSIDERATION IN ESTABLISHING SUPPORT FUNCTIONS AND SYSTEMS The support missions discussed herein are the principal ones performed by auxiliary forces to support the area command. Some of these tasks are coordinated directly with guerrilla units while others are controlled by their own headquarters. Normally, auxiliary units are assigned direct support missions for guerrilla units in their area. a. Security and Warning. Auxiliary units provide a physical security and warning system for guerrilla forces. They organize extensive systems of civilian sympathizers who keep enemy forces under surveillance and provide early warning of enemy movements. These civilians are selected because of their advantageous location which permits them to monitor the enemy. b. Intelligence. Auxiliary units collect information to support their own operations and those of the area command. They provide direct intelligence support .to guerrilla units operating within the area of responsibility. 5-16

c. Counterintelligence. The auxiliary assists the area command counterintelligence effort by maintaining watch over transitory civilians, by screening recruits for guerrilla units, and by monitoring refugees and other non-inhabitants of the area. Because of their intimate knowledge of local people, auxiliaries should be able to report attempts by enemy agents to infiltrate the area. They can also name those inhabitants whose loyalty to the resistance might be suspect. d. Logistics. The auxiliary supports guerrillas in all phases of logistical operations. They provide transportation and/or porters for the movement of supplies and equipment. Auxiliaries often care for the sick and wounded, provide medical supplies, and arrange for doctors and other medical personnel. They collect food, clothing, and other supplies through a controlled system of levy, barter', or contribution. Sometimes auxiliaries provide essential services such as repair of clothing, shoes, and certain items of equipment. Auxiliaries also furnish personnel to assist at reception sites. They distribute supplies throughout the area. The extent of logistical support furnished by the auxiliary depends upon the resources of the area, the degree of influence it exerts on the population, and enemy activities. e. Recruiting. Guerrilla units depend upon the local population for recruits to replace operational losses and to expand their forces. Auxiliaries spot, screen, and recruit personnel for active guerrilla units. If recruits are provided from reliable auxiliary sources, the enemy's chances for placing agents in the guerrilla force are greatly reduced. f. Psychological Warfare. A very important mission in which auxiliary units assist is psychological warfare. The spreading of rumors, leaflets, and posters is timed with guerrilla tactical missions to deceive the enemy. Leaflets can mislead the enemy regarding guerrilla intentions, capabilities, and location. The spreading of this propaganda is very difficult for the enemy to control. g. Civilian Control. To control the population and give the enemy are impression of guerrilla power, auxiliary units establish a legal control system to assist in preventing black marketing and profiteering. Collaborators may be terrorized or punished by the auxiliaries. h. Evasion and Escape. Auxiliary units are ideally suited for the support of evasion and escape mechanisms. Their contact with and control over segments of the civilian population provide the area command with a means of assisting evaders. i. Other Missions. Auxiliary units may be called upon to perform a number of other guerrilla support missions such as: (1) Coordinated actions with the guerrillas against other targets (e.g., cutting of telephone lines between enemy installations and reserve forces prior to a guerrilla attack). 5-17

(2) Furnishing guides. (3) Operation of courier systems. (4) Conducting active guerrilla type operations on a part-time basis. (5) Raising funds. Section IV. ADMINISTRATION, LAW, AND ORDER 5-13. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS a. When planning and preparing for commitment into operational areas to support a resistance force in the conduct of unconventional warfare, the Special Forces commander will, based on preinfiltration intelligence, make tentative plans for the formalization of administrative machinery to support this force. The SFOB should, prior to infiltration and based on contact made by the unified unconventional warfare command with the government in exile (if one exists), provide guidance for the establishment of pay scales, rank structure, and codes and legal systems. This will provide uniformity in all operational areas throughout a country and will preclude inflated rank structures, unrealistic pay scales, and "drumhead" or "kangaroo" courts. Necessary administrative forms to support this administrative machinery may be drafted and printed during the isolation phase. Final decisions pertaining to the administrative organization must be delayed until post infiltration and the details have been resolved by the resistance leader in concert with the Special Forces commander. Flocks of personnel serial numbers may be assigned by the SFOB to the various UWOA's prior to infiltration for assignment to guerrillas. b. Administrative systems should be established early in the stages of development. They should be simple and effective and, as a minimum, include: (1) Supply accountability of sensitive items (e.g., weapons, radios, drugs). (2) Personnel rosters. (3) Registers of sick, wounded, and deceased. (4) Awards and decorations. (5) A daily journal. (Written operation orders and reports will be kept to a minimum and issued on a need-to-know basis.) c. An administrative section is established within the command group of the area command to maintain essential records. As the area develops, it may become feasible to decentralize administration to 5-18

subordinate echelons. In such cases duplicate information and records that can compromise the operation should be forwarded to the administrative section of the area command for miniaturization and disposition. 5-14. RECORDS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES a. Operation Journal. Because of its ultimate historical importance, an operation journal should be maintained. Reports of combat engagements should include the designation and commander of the guerrilla force, the type of action, approximate strength of the guerrilla force, and guerrilla casualties. This data should be made available to PSYOP personnel. b. Command Structure. This record should reflect the designation of the various units within the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, the underground, and the names and designation of key personnel. c. Personnel Roster. The personnel roster should list members of the various organizations within the area command, and it must be kept current. In the initial stages of organization and development, such rosters may be maintained by the individual unit, with duplicate copies forwarded to the area command when feasible. d. Personnel Records. (1) Personnel records should be maintained on guerrillas as well as the other personnel in the resistance movement in order to substantiate or refute posthostility claims for wartime service. Opposition may be expected when a recommendation is made to the resistance leader that all personnel be photographed and fingerprinted. This can be overcome, however, when assurances are given that a viable, secure system can be established, and that the records will be exfiltrated from the UWOA and maintained at the SFOB. Records may be microfilmed and placed in a secure cache in the UWOA as an alternate means to exfiltration. Photographing these documents and subsequently caching or exfiltrating the negatives provides a method of preserving and securing records not obtainable by other means. Special Forces operational elements will find their organic photographic equipment important in making identification photographs for populace control and for organization and control of resistance forces. To avoid having a large amount of sensitive material on hand, items may be photographed at frequent intervals. After processing the negatives and determining their acceptability, the originals of unit records may be destroyed. (2) The information placed on personnel records should include the individual's full name, home village or city, date he joined the resistance force, whether or not an oath of enlistment was taken, date discharged, promotions, demotions, acts of bravery, awards and decorations, rank or position attained in the resistance force, and any disciplinary action taken against the individual. 5-19

(3) Postings to the initial record may be by serial number. In this manner, there is no reference to individuals by name nor is there incriminating data that would associate them with the resistance movement. A sample initial record 'is shown as an inclosure to the Master Training Schedule (app D). e. Oath of Enlistment. (1) Resistance leaders should be convinced of the need for a formal oath of loyalty to the resistance movement. At an appropriate ceremony, the local indigenous leader should administer an oath of enlistment to each new member of the resistance force. This may provide a basis for recognition by the local government, after hostilities, of the jurisdictional authority exercised b y guerrilla unit commanders over individual guerrillas. (2) Personnel should should become a part of accordingly. Ideally, the code and to punishments

be required to sign the oath, and the oath the initial personnel record and secured oath should make reference to the guerrilla for violation.

f. Casualty Records. This information includes records of personnel killed, wounded, missing in action, or separated from the guerrilla force because of illness or for other reasons. g. Graves Registration Information. This information, as a minimum, should include name, date and cause of death, and location of the remains. h. Medical Records. These records should include data as to type of prevalent diseases, preventive medicine actions taken, types of wounds and general information on the organization of the medical structure for the area command. i. Payrolls. Appropriate records must be maintained to support any commitment made to members of the resistance force for services rendered. j. Claims. The area command should maintain sufficient records to assist in settling claims after hostilities. k. Awards and Decorations. Valorous acts, meritorious acts, and meritorious service should be formalized within the guerrilla force and systems established to support the program. In some instances, US awards may be recommended; however, guidance in this area is the responsibility of the group S1, and should be provided in the isolation phase. A government in exile may wish to act as the final approving authority and may provide general guidelines for the establishment; of an awards and decorations program. Once an award or decoration has been approved, it should be awarded at an appropriate ceremony, consistent with security regulations. 5-20

5-15. DISCIPLINE a. Strict discipline is an integral part of command and control procedures instigated over any paramilitary force. Without it, no force can survive, let alone carry out effective operations against the enemy. Since guerrillas are usually not uniformed, and they appear dirty or bedraggled, an impression persists that discipline is loose in guerrilla units. Discipline must be extremely harsh but fair in guerrilla units, and orders must be executed without delay or question. Minor infractions of orders, especially during the conduct of operations, have far-reaching consequences for guerrillas and supporting resistance elements. b. More often than not, a guerrilla force will have a code, possibly not in writing, but certainly an understanding of what is expected of all guerrillas. A code, in writing, however, should be developed by the resistance leader with advice by the Special. Forces commander; each new recruit should be required to know and understand its provisions as well as the penalties for treason, desertion, and dereliction of duty. Codes for guerrilla forces are usually simple, but call for extreme punishments for what would be minor infractions in conventional forces. (1) Any legal code for guerrilla forces should, if possible, be generally in line with that which existed for the regular military forces of that country. When this is impractical, the guerrilla chief and his officers may draft a code. (2) There should be provisions for punishments similar to those imposed under Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice, as well as provisions for more severe punishments. The guerrilla chief should be advised to establish a court-martial or tribunal to try cases, rather than arbitrarily make decisions as to the fate of an accused. (3) As soon as possible after infiltration, an understanding must be reached with guerrilla leader concerning the exercise of disciplinary and judicial authority over the Special Forces unit. The Special Forces commander will not cede his disciplinary or judicial authority to the guerrilla leader or to any other resistance official unless directed by competent authority. c. With decentralization of command and widely dispersed operations, individuals are habitually given mission-type orders with little guidance or supervision, and they are expected to accomplish their missions: no excuses are accepted. Therefore, guerrillas must understand that their personal conduct has to be above reproach when dealing with the civilian populace. Every act which loses civilian supporters is harmful to the resistance movement. d. Although maintaining discipline is the responsibility of the resistance leader, the Special Forces is normally expected to 5-21

recommend measures which will insure proper discipline. The culture of a group is instrumental, since what encourages discipline within one group may not work with other groups. Section V. TRAINING OF THE RESISTANCE FORCE 5-16. GENERAL a. Training requires a maximum and continuous effort. The level of resistance force training must be determined, and training programs must be designed to provide and improve common levels of training. Training programs should be simple but effective with training areas secure from enemy observation and action. b. Before commitment into operational areas, Special Forces elements simplify their task of training the forces by developing tentative training programs. Guided by area studies and intelligence, the element prepares and collects training aids and other equipment that may be required. When committed into a UWOA, these items can be delivered with the automatic supply. c. Although maximum improvisation must be used in all phases of operations, the following items accompanying deployed detachments may prove useful in conducting training: (1) Grease pencils and colored chalk. (2) Target cloth or ponchos (blackboard substitutes). (3) Basic manuals on weapons generally found in the area (in the language of the country if possible). (4) Lesson plans for basic subjects as outlined in Master Training Schedule (app D). (5) GTA's improvised from parachutes or other such material. (6) Other similar items that are of particular value in training the indigenous force and that can be used to support training outlined in appendix D. d. Guerrilla personnel must receive training in the tactics, techniques, and skills peculiar to guerrilla warfare. Command, staff, and support echelons of the guerrilla forces must attain proficiency and flexibility in order to accomplish the assigned mission. e. The primary training mission of Special Forces is to develop a selected guerrilla cadre into competent trainers of guerrilla personnel and units.

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5-17. CHARACTERISTICS OF GUERRILLA TRAINING a. In each situation the Special Forces commander decides which of the following training systems will be the most beneficial to resistance force personnel: (1) centralized training, (2) decentralized training, (3) individual or on-the-job training, or (4) specialized training for selected personnel. In most instances one or all of the systems noted above will be used. To expedite training programs and to provide effective instruction to dispersed units, a centralized training course may be designed and presented to selected resistance personnel, who in turn act as instructor cadres to dispersed units. When this occurs, a decentralized training system is put into effect. b. Other characteristics of training resistance forces that must be considered are: (1) A wide range of education and capability levels of resistance personnel. (2) Divergences of motivation for joining resistance forces. (3) Variance in the extent of previous military experience. (4) Possible language barriers requiring training through interpreters. (5) Probability of limited training material available. (6) Use of combat engagements as a training device. c. Examples of a toaster training program for a leadership school and a 30-day master training program for preparing individual training are shown in appendix D, 5-18. TIDE TRAINING PLAN a. General. (1) The training plan is an outline of the manner in which the commander determines he can best accomplish the training mission. It results from his estimate of the training situation reflecting the state of training of the guerrilla force, the personnel available, the weather and climate, and the training objective. The mission is the most important element in any training situation. (2) The development of a training plan consists of: (a) Analyzing the mission. (b) Analyzing the local training situation. 5-23

(c) Determining a system for training. (3) After the training estimate, the training plan is developed. These training steps may have been completed prior to infiltration and require only refinement in the UWOA. Training is then programed into units of instruction which will facilitate accomplishment of the training objectives. b. Analysis of the Mission. (1) Based on directives from higher authority, Special Forces recommend specific tasks for the guerrilla force to accomplish. (2) If the guerrilla force has been assigned multiple missions, priorities of training must be established. (3) If implied missions are derived from the specified mission, it must be determined if all requirements can be met within the time specified and with the facilities and personnel available. (4) The mission and operational objectives must be specifically delineated for the guidance of all concerned. The shorter the training time, the greater the care that must be taken in defining the training mission or objectives. c. Analysis of the Local Training Situation. The element must evaluate all aspects of the local training situation to determine shortcomings. This analysis may reveal obstacles that cannot be resolved or which dictate the selection of another organization or program for training. Personnel recruited for the guerrilla force may have little or no previous military training. Evaluation of resistance personnel capabilities and state of training is made by personal observation, inspections, and the results of limited operational missions. Principal factors to be considered are: (1) Essential training to be conducted. Priorities of training subjects must be established. Lesson plans brought on infiltration may have to be modified. (2) Personnel. Special training in techniques and tactics of guerrilla warfare may have to be presented to resistance leaders. (3) Time. Available training time is one of the more critical factors to be considered. Initially, the operational element will estimate the time required to accomplish the training mission. Makeup training is an integral part of the training program. (4) Training facilities. Requirements for ranges, rehearsal areas, improvised classrooms, and other training facilities must be determined. Physical security is a prerequisite for all training 5-24

areas. Ranges and rehearsal areas should be located away from the guerrilla base to avoid enemy detection. (5) Training aids. Consistent with the situation, training aids and equipment may accompany the operational element at the time of infiltration. Initially equipment available for training will be limited, and improvised training aids and mockups should be used. d. System and Organization for Training. The requirement for physical security in the UWOA generally dictates that guerrilla forces be dispersed over a wide area. Consequently, the system and organization for training normally is decentralized. Training should be planned, organized, and inspected by Special Forces members and their counterparts. Each major training area should be supervised by Special Forces members during the conduct of training. Training, even the conduct of combat operations, is accomplished primarily by practical applications. 5-19. OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT TRAINING a. Throughout the organization, development, and training of the guerrilla force, small combat operations are conducted to test its readiness. The goals of these operations are to: (1) Attract additional recruits to the resistance forces. (2) Assist in gaining support of the civilian populace. (3) Give the area command an evaluation of the training conducted. (4) Increase the morale and esprit de corps of the resistance and guerrilla force. b. The selection, planning, and execution of combat action should strive for maximum success with a minimum of casualties. Combat operations should be commensurate with the status of training and equipment available to the resistance force. As training is completed and units are organized, more complex and larger operations can be planned and executed. Typical training operations may be reconnaissance patrols, ambushes, raids, and limited demolitions missions, and surveillance of future objectives.

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CHAPTER 6 AIR OPERATIONS This chapter is a guide; in actual operations, local approved Standing Operating Procedures (SOPS) must be followed. Section I. GENERAL 6-1. BASIC CRITERIA IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW) a. In conventional military operations, the selection of drop zones/landing zones (DZ's/LZ's) is a joint responsibility of the Air Force and Army. The marking of these sites (in conventional warfare) is an Air Force responsibility. The nature of UW makes Air Force marking impracticable and Special Forces assumes the functions of selecting, reporting, and marking DZ's/LZ's and of organizing and conducting reception operations. b. Before infiltration, Special Forces planners will select DZ's/LZ's by using all available intelligence sources and maps. Following infiltration, Special Forces operational elements select and report additional DZ's/LZ's. They also confirm or make changes to the DZ/LZ data on file at the SFOB. c. UW joint airborne operations are small-scale operations. Basic considerations for these operations are low detection of aircraft by enemy, security of the objective area, exact timing, precise execution, and full coordination of mission. In a UW environment, airborne operations will normally be conducted at night. 6-2. TYPE OF AIR OPERATIONS a. An activity requiring the integration of air support (i.e., planes, crew, personnel, and facilities of the Army, Air Force, or civilians) with Special Forces operational elements, assets, or commands is generally termed an air operation. Air operations are usually a sub-element of a greater operation/mission. b. A complete list of types of air operations would be almost endless and beyond the scope of instructional requirements or capabilities. Therefore, this chapter will address those air operations which will be a primary concern to the student. These air operations (i.e., DZ's, LZ's, and reception committees) will form a foundation for knowledge later gained in unit training, experience, and self-study. c. Other common air operations used by Special Forces include:

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(1) Snow LZ's. (2) Water LZ's. (3) Helicopter cast and recovery. (4) Message pickup. (5) Recovery operations. d. Techniques and procedures for these air operations are discussed in (C) TC 31-20-3, Special Forces Air and Maritime Operations (U). 6-3. SEQUENCE OF AIR RESUPPLY MISSION A typical air resupply mission involves a particular sequence of actions (figure 6-1).

Figure 6-1 Sample UW Air Resupply Mission. a. Operational Element. (1) Identifies and reports DZ/LZ sites. (2) Transmits DZ/LZ data and resupply requests to SFOB. b. SFOB. (1) Processes DZ/LZ data and resupply requests. 6-2

(2) Coordinates mission with air support unit. (3) Transmits mission confirmation message to operational element. (4) Prepares and delivers supplies/personnel to departure site. (Supplies are packed and rigged in aerial delivery containers which have a capacity of 500 pounds or less. To facilitate rapid clearance of the DZ/LZ, the contents of each container are further packaged in 50-pound man-portable increments.) c. Air Support Unit. (1) Prepares mission confirmation data for SFOB. (2) Receives and loads supplies/personnel. (3) Executes air delivery mission. d. Operational Element. (1) Organizes reception committee. (2) Establishes DZ/LZ. (3) Receives personnel/supplies. (4) (u) Removes and distributes incoming supplies. Section II. DROP ZONE SELECTION 6-4. GENERAL Special Forces is responsible for selecting, reporting, and marking DZ's. The selection of a DZ must satisfy the requirements of both the aircrew and the reception committee. The aircrew must be able to locate and identify the DZ. The best site is one that is accessible, reasonably secure, and safe for delivery of incoming personnel/supplies. 6-5. CONSIDERATIONS FOR SELECTING DZ's a. Terrain. (1) The general area surrounding the site should be relatively free from obstacles which may interfere with safe flight. Flat or rolling terrain is desirable. However, in mountainous or hilly terrain, broad ridges and level plateaus can be used. Small valleys or pockets completely surrounded by hills are difficult to locate and normally will not be selected.

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(2) It is desirable that the aircraft be able to approach the DZ from any direction, and that there is an open approach quadrant of at least 45 degrees to allow the aircrew flexibility to assume the appropriate approach track. (3) DZ's having a single clear line of approach are acceptable, provided there is a level turning radius (2 nautical miles on each side of the site for medium aircraft—figure 6-2 (1 nautical mile for STOL aircraft—figure 6-3). (4) Rising ground or hills of more than 1000 feet/300 meters should normally be no closer than 2 nautical miles to the DZ. (In areas where the above criteria cannot be met, the deviation will be noted in the mission request and forwarded by the SFOB to the air support unit for decision/consideration.)

Figure 6-2 Level turning radius required for one-approach DZ’s and LZ’s (medium aircraft) 6-4

Figure 6-3 Level turn radius for STOL aircraft. b. Weather. The seasonal weather conditions in the drop area must be considered. Ground fogs, mists, haze, smoke, and low-hanging clouds may interfere with the pilot's observation of DZ markings. Excessive winds also hinder operations. c. Obstacles. Due to the low altitudes at which operational drops are conducted, obstacles in excess of 300 meters above the level of the DZ and within a radius of 2 nautical miles must be identified and reported. When operational drops are scheduled for altitudes of less than 400 feet, obstacles in -excess of 30 meters must be identified and reported. d. Shape and Size. (1) The most desirable shapes for DZ's are square or round. The width of rectangular-shaped DZ's should allow for minor errors in computation of wind drift. (2) The required length of a DZ depends primarily on the number of units to be dropped and the length of their dispersal pattern. e. Dispersion. (1) Dispersion occurs when two or more personnel or containers are released consecutively from an aircraft in flight. The long axis of the landing pattern generally parallels the direction of the flight.

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(2) Dispersion is computed using this rule-of-thumb formula: 1/2 speed of aircraft (knots) X exit time (seconds) - dispersion (meters). Exit time is the elapsed time between the exits of the first and last items (fig. 6-4). (3) The length of the dispersal pattern represents the minimum desirable length for DZ's. If personnel are to be dropped, a desirable safety factor of at least 100 meters is added to each end of the dispersal pattern to ascertain minimum DZ length required.

Figure 6-4 Computation of dispersion. f. Surfaces. (1) The ground surface of the DZ should be reasonably level and relatively free from obstructions such as rocks, trees, fences, and powerlines. Tundra and pastures are ideal terrain for both personnel and cargo reception. (2) Personnel DZ's located at comparatively high elevations (6,000 feet or higher) will, where possible, be on soft snow or grasslands. The increased rate of parachute descent at these altitudes make these DZ's less desirable than those at or near sea level. (3) Swamps, paddies, and marshy ground are marginally suitable for personnel and bundles in the wet season. The presence of water compounds recovery problems and is hazardous. Frozen paddies present a rough, hard surface, marginally suitable for personnel drops. (4) Water depth will be no less than 4 feet for a personnel drop on a water DZ. There will be no underwater obstructions to a depth of 6-6

4 feet, and the surface will be clear of floating debris or moored craft and without protruding boulders, ledges, or pilings. Minimum safe water temperature for personnel drops is 50 degrees F. (+ 10 degrees C.). (a) Water reception points will not be near shallows or where currents are swift. (b) Arrangements must be made for rapid pickup. g. Security. (1) The DZ should provide maximum freedom from enemy ground interference and be accessible to the reception committee by routes which are concealed from enemy observation or which can be secured against interdiction or ambush. (2) Additionally, the DZ should be near areas suitable for the caching of supplies and the disposition of air delivery equipment. Section III. DROP ZONE REPORTING 6-6. REPORTS AND MISSION REQUESTS a. As soon as practicable after infiltration, each Special Forces operational element will reconnoiter its operational area. The purpose of this reconnaissance is to select sites for DZ's and to confirm, reassess, or refute the sites selected during premission isolation. b. The operational element transmits information on DZ locations back to the SFOB. The importance of DZ reporting is to identify these sites to the SFOB for current or future use. DZ information can be transmitted in this manner or as a component of a specific mission request from the Special Forces operational element wherein the delivery site, if a DZ, is or can be identified. c. For brevity purposes, the communications from operational elements to the SFOB are concise and utilize precise message formats. Each Special Forces operational element, using its own unique communications-electronics operating instructions (CEOI), reports data on each DZ site whether as a mission request or an information report. DZ information most likely would include code name (from CEOI, or as appropriate), physical location (i.e., grid coordinates, including grid designations, to the center of the DZ), track of recommended aircraft approach (fig. 6-5), obstacles (fig. 6-6), and reference point(s). d. DZ information in a mission request could contain additional items of information such as the time of drop, services/items desired, and alternate DZ(s). Prevailing requirements as stated in the respective CEOI determine actual information items, message formats, and message contents. 6-7

Figure 6-6 Computation of open (desired heading)

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Figure 6-6 Reporting obstacles and reference points.

6-7. ALTERNATE DROP ZONES Alternate DZ 's will be designated for every mission requested; however, separate drop times are established and the alternate DZ is manned by a skeleton reception committee. If the primary DZ is not suitable for reception due to unfavorable conditions, the aircraft proceeds to the alternate DZ. This DZ should be as close to the aircraft primary heading as possible to preclude turn around and possible enemy detection of the operation. Drop times for alternate DZ's are determined by the air support unit based on flight time and are included in the mission confirmation message. 6-8. MISSION CONFIRMATION FOR AIR DROP Following the processing of the DZ report and resupply request at the SFOB, a confirmation message is transmitted to the operational detachment, usually in a blind transmission broadcast (BTB). The confirmation message format, content, and codes will be found in the respective CEOI of each SF operational element. 6-9. AREA DROP ZONE a. An area DZ consists of a prearranged flight track over a series of acceptable drop sites. This establishes a line of flight between two points, "A" and "B" (fig. 6-7). The distance between these points should not exceed 15 miles and have no major changes in ground elevation in excess of 90 meters. Drop sites may be selected not more than 1 mile to the left or right of the established line of flight. The aircraft arrives at point "A" at the scheduled time and proceeds towards point "B" observing for the DZ markings. Once the markings are located, the drop is conducted in a normal manner. The area DZ system is particularly well adapted for use in conjunction with preplanned, automatic resupply operations where DZ's are frequently selected on the basis of map reconnaissance. The DZ is illuminated a total of 10 minutes (starting 2 minutes prior to ETA over point "A") or until the first deployed parachute is observed. b. Area DZ's are reported by using the normal DZ report format, with the following exceptions: (1) Locations of both point "A" and "B", including reference points (fig. 6-7). (2) The open quadrant is not reported. (3) Obstacles over 90 meters above the level of the terrain along the line of flight, within 2 nautical miles ,on either side, and not shown on the issued map (fig. 6-8). These obstacles are reported in reference to either points "A" or "B."

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Figure 6-7 Area DZ (reference points) 6-10

Figure 6-8 Obstacles and reference points (area DZ). 6-11

Section IV. DROP ZONE MARKING 6-10. DROP ZONE IDENTIFICATION a. The purpose of DZ marking is to identify the site, indicate the point over which personnel/cargo will be released, and provide visual terminal guidance for the aircraft. The patterns for marking DZ's are included in the CEOI. Marking of DZ's during the hours of darkness or periods of low visibility is accomplished by using lighting devices such as flashlights, flares, and small wood, oil, or gas fires. For daylight operations a satisfactory marking method is a Panel Marking Set. If panels are not available, sheets, strips of colored cloth, or other substitutes can be used provided there is sharp contrast with the background. b. The light source selection by the ground reception committee must consider security requirements and atmospheric and terrain conditions. From a security standpoint the flashlight is the best light source. Light sources other than flashlights may be required to penetrate haze or ground fog, or to form a distinctive light pattern which can be more readily identified than a flashlight pattern. If local conditions dictate use of other light sources, all lights in a pattern must be of the same type. Light sources other than flashlights will be screened on three sides or placid in pits with sides sloping toward the direction of the approaching aircraft. 6-11. BEACONS/TRANSPONDERS The use of electronic homing devices (called beacons or transponders) permits reception operations during conditions of low visibility. Such devices may also be used in conjunction with the visual marking systems. (See TC 31-20-3.) 6-12. COMPUTING GROUND RELEASE POINT The ground release point is determined to ensure delivery of personnel or cargo within the usable limits of the DZ. Computing the ground release point for personnel and low-velocity cargo drops involves (fig. 6-9) a. Dispersion. Dispersion is the length of the pattern formed by the impact of the parachutists/containers. The desired point of impact for the first parachutist/container depends on how the calculated dispersal pattern is fitted into available DZ space. b. Wind Drift. Wind drift is the horizontal distance traveled from the point of parachute deployment to the point of impact as a result of wind conditions. The release point is located a calculated distance upwind from the desired impact point. To determine the amount of drift, use the following formulas:

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Figure 6-9 Computation of ground release point (RP). (1) Personnel using parachutes with 35-foot canopies: Multiply the wind velocity (knots) by each 100 feet to drop altitude. Multiply this product by 4.1 (the constant or K factor for a 35-foot canopy)'. The formula is: Wind (V) times altitude (A) times 4.1 (K) equals drift (D) in yards, Thus: D = VAK. Example: Drop altitude is 800 feet and wind velocity is 10 MPH; drift is 10 x 8 x 4.1 or 329 yards. (a) An anemometer is used to measure wind velocity. Some anemometers give readings in knots, others in miles-per-hour. To convert to knots, miles-per-hour is multiplied by .86, but for practical purposes, the direct substitution of miles-per-hour for knots in wind drift formulas gives sufficiently accurate results for winds below 10 knots. 6-13

(b) Since anemometers will not always be available, or may have been damaged or destroyed, Special Forces personnel manning DZ's must be able to estimate wind velocity with acceptable accuracy. Detachment personnel can learn to do this during training by observing the effect of winds of varying strengths on grass, dust, bushes, small pieces of paper, small pieces of cloth or handkerchiefs held at arms length, and then comparing these effects with those associated with anemometer reading. (2) Low-velocity types of parachute drops (using G-13 cargo parachutes): Use the same formula; however, substitute a constant factor of 2.6 for 4.1. (3) Static line deployed, maneuverable personnel parachute: The maneuverable parachute is the same as the T-10 (35-foot canopy) parachute except material has been removed from the rear of the parachute near the lower lateral band to form an oval-shaped orifice to assist in maneuvering. When the canopy is manipulated in such a manner that the orifice faces into the wind, the rate of drift is greater than that of other 35-foot canopies; when the orifice is faced away from the wind, considerably less drift results. Thus, when computing wind drift formula for the maneuverable parachute, use the same formula as noted above but substitute a constant factor of 4.0 for 4.1. (4) Personnel and cargo drop: When receiving both personnel and cargo in the same drop, use the same formula as noted above, but use the constant factor of 4.0. c. Forward Throw. Forward throw is the horizontal distance traveled by the parachutist or cargo container between the point of exit and the opening of the parachute. This factor, combined with reaction time of the personnel in the aircraft, is compensated for by moving the release point an additional 185 meters in the direction of the aircraft approach. d. High-Velocity and Free-Drop Loads. High-velocity and free-drop loads are not materially affected by wind conditions; therefore, wind drift is disregarded. Dispersion is computed the same as for lowvelocity drops. On the other hand, without the restraint of a parachute, forward throw is compensated for by moving the ground release point marking in the direction from which the aircraft will approach a distance equal to the altitude of the aircraft above the ground (e.g., if altitude of aircraft is 600 feet, move ground release marking 600 feet in the direction of the aircraft approach). 6-13. DZ MARKING a. Primarily, marking employs lights or panels in a distinctive configuration according to the unit's CEOI. In addition to marking the ground release point (RP), this configuration serves to identify the DZ to the aircrew. 6-14

(1) The number of markers used seldom exceeds six. (2) The distance between markers is usually 50 yards. (3) The drop zone markings will normally form a distinctive shape (square, rectangle, or triangle) or letter ("T," "L," or "X"). (4) In executing drops, the aircraft is aligned as accurately as possible 50 meters to the right of the right hand row of markers. The drop is made when the aircraft becomes adjacent to the last light in the right hand row. b. The standard marking method employs a standard four-marker pattern (fig. 6-9) positioned in the form of an inverted “L.°’ 6-14. PLACEMENT OE MARKINGS a. Markings must be clearly visible to the pilot of the approaching aircraft. The formula for determining mask clearance is 15 units of horizontal distance to 1 unit of vertical distance (a ratio of 15 to 1, for each unit of obstruction). As an example, markings shown in figure 6-10 are placed 1500 feet from a 100-foot mask of vegetation and a terrain feature.

Figure 6-10 “Mask” clearance ration 15:1 b. Precautions must be taken to insure that the markings can be seen only from the direction of the aircraft approach. All flashlights should be hooded for security (side glow) and aimed in the direction of the expected aircraft approach. Fires or improvised flares are screened on three sides or placed in pits with sides sloping toward the direction of the aircraft's approach (fig. 6-11). 6-15

Figure 6-11 Security of DZ markings. c. When panels are used for daylight DZ marking they are positioned at an angle of approximately 450 from the horizontal to present the maximum surface toward the approaching aircraft. If the drop is taking place during the period of sunrise or sunset, and the sun is in the eyes of the pilot during the approach to the DZ or LZ, smoke grenades or simple smudge fires should be used in conjunction with panel markings to assist in sighting the DZ markings on the approach. 6-15. UNMARKED DROP ZONES a. Drop zones cannot always be marked. A DZ site which has no marking (either visual or electronic) is referred to as an unmarked DZ. Personnel and equipment may be dropped on unmarked DZ's when necessary. This technique is generally limited to specific moon phases or daylight because of the need for visibility. A DZ selected for this purpose should be located in an isolated or remote area and free from possible enemy interference. b. Drops on unmarked DZ's may be preplanned for specific periods of time. The receiving unit is required to keep the DZ under constant surveillance during the time the drop is scheduled. As soon as the 6-16

cargo is delivered, observers alert the receiving unit, measures are taken to dispose of the items received, and the DZ is sterilized (elimination of all signs of the drop). To aid in recognition, the DZ's should be of odd configuration and size and have specific, recognizable landmarks. Unmarked DZ's are also used to support emergency resupply procedures. 6-16. DROP ZONE AUTHENTICATION a. Air to Ground. The aircraft is scheduled to arrive over the DZ within a specified time limit (usually extending from 2 minutes before to 2 minutes after scheduled drop time). DZ markings are displayed within this time frame. Arrival of the aircraft during this specific time period, approach on the designated track, and flying at designated altitude are factors that authenticate (identify) the aircraft to the reception committee. b. Ground to Air. (1) No standard authentication system(s) exists for UW reception operations. Each mission is considered separately and an authentication system determined dependent upon the situation. An authentication system to be used is mutually agreed upon during mission planning by commanders concerned with the mission. (2) Authentication between the aircraft pilot/navigator and the reception committee leader (RCL) may be accomplished by using a coded light source, panel signal, radio contact, beacon/transponder, or combinations thereof. These may be employed individually or in conjunction with the marking pattern. (3) The DZ markings, identification, and authentication signals are contained in the CEOI. As frequently as necessary for security, these authentication factors are changed. Section V. RECEPTION COMMITTEES 6-17. GENERAL Once established in the operational area, Special Forces organize, train, and supervise indigenous reception committees to conduct future air reception operations. The functions of a reception committee are to a. Provide security for the reception operation„ b. Emplace markings and identification equipment;. c. Maintain surveillance of the site (before and after the reception operations). d. Recover incoming personnel/supplies. 6-17

e. Move supplies to distribution or cache sites. f. Sterilize the site. 6-18. COMPOSITION AND DUTIES The reception committee normally is organized into five parties. Small reception committees may combine the functions of two or more parties (e.g., the command and marking parties may be consolidated). a. Command Party. (1) Includes the reception committee leader (RCL), communication personnel (consisting of messengers and a radio operator), and the Special Forces advisor. (2) Controls and coordinates all committee actions. (3) Provides medical support when necessary. b. Marking Party. (1) Size is governed by the type marking system to be used. (2) Emplaces/operates the marking system. (3) Lights and extinguishes lights as directed. (4) Assists in recovery of personnel/supplies. (5) Assists in sterilizing DZ/LZ. c. Security Party. (1) Prevents or delays interference with the operation. (2) Consists (normally) of inner and outer security elements. The inner security element is positioned in the immediate vicinity of the site and is prepared to fight delaying or holding actions. The outer security element consists of outposts established along approaches to the area. They may prepare ambushes and roadblocks to prevent enemy movement toward the site. (3) May be supplemented by auxiliary personnel to maintain surveillance over enemy activities, keep the security party informed of enemy movements, and conduct limited objective attacks or ambushes to divert or prevent enemy movement toward a site. (4) Provides march security for transport of supply/personnel. d. Recovery Party. (1) Recovers cargo and air-delivery equipment from the DZ. 6-18

(2) Consists of at least two men for each parachutist or cargo container. The recovery party is dispersed along the length of the anticipated impact area, spots each parachute as it descends, and moves to the impact point. (3) Locates bundle. (One man must stay with it while the second takes the parachute to the recovery collection point and guides a detail back to carry off the packages. Another technique is to divide the recovery party into two-man teams which have been assigned a parachute number coinciding with the sequence of exit from the aircraft. If personnel are available, the recovery party leader stations a separate recovery detail at the far end of the DZ to track and locate bundles if the exit is delayed or disrupted. Recovery party personnel must have a simple signaling means, such as a metal cricket or tone sticks, to preclude shouting or unnecessary movement. When the first bundle, or parachutist, exits from the aircraft, the recovery party leader should station a man directly under the point of exit. This man remains in place until all bundles or parachutists are recovered. He serves as a reference for the point of exit and can subsequently indicate the aircraft's exact line of flight if a bundle is lost and a sweep of the DZ must be made.) e. Transport Party. (1) Consists of part, or all, of the members of the command, marking, and recovery parties. (2) Transports supplies to distribution or cache sites. 6-19. DZ/LZ STERILIZATION a. To insure sterilization, the reception committee: (1) Must police or obliterate cigarette butts, candy and gum wrappers, equipment, and other signs of occupancy, (crushed undergrowth, heel scuffs, trails, human waste). (2) Recover all rigging straps and other air delivery equipment. (3) Assign an individual at the recovery collection point to be responsible for accounting for air items and packages as recovery teams bring them off the DZ/LZ. (4) Provide a two- or three-man surveillance team, preferably from the supporting auxiliary element to maintain a close watch on the DZ/LZ area for enemy activity during the 48 hours following the drop.

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b. To assist in sterilization, the individual parachutist: (1) Recovers all parachute items, straps, bundles, and equipment, which he wore on the drop. (2) Buries unwanted air items separately, preferably at the base of thick bushes. (3) Erases drag marks, footprints, and impact marks. So far as possible, he disguises freshly cut tree branch stubs with mud. (4) Avoids trampling or crushing vegetation; bypasses plowed areas and grass fields when moving off the DZ/LZ. (5) Prevents accidental compromise of the operation by avoiding paths and roads and by moving cross-country to the assembly point. Section VI. LANDING ZONE OPERATIONS 6-20. GENERAL a. Landing zone operations are a speedy and efficient means to insert or recover personnel and cargo from an operational area. Such operations are difficult and require highly trained aircrews and reception committees. Normally, landing zone operations are conducted at night but may be conducted in daylight if conditions permit. b. A landing zone operation entails an actual landing on a previously selected site, aided by the reception committee leader (RCL) from the ground. As a general rule, DZ selection considerations also apply to LZ selection, with the exception that site size and approach features are far more important factors. Certain specified minimums must be met to assure safe landing and takeoff. 6-21. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR LANDING ZONES (LZ's) a. Basic Considerations. The basic selection criteria for a LZ fall into four categories: (1) Aircraft limitations. (2) The mission at hand (i.e., the secure reception or dispatch of personnel or cargo, and importance of mission). (3) Ease of identification of the LZ from the air. (4) LZ size and terrain features. b. Aircraft Limitations. In LZ operations, limitations of the aircraft are primary factors in site selection. When performing landings on unprepared terrain, the aircrew's safety is entirely in the hands of the RCL. The LZ personnel insure the safety necessary 6-20

for landing operations by being familiar with and executing the basic LZ requirements. c. LZ Requirements. The selection of LZ's and the coordination activities required prior to implementation of an LZ operation closely parallel the procedures used in DZ operations. However, the physical requirements for an LZ are more exacting (i.e., site size, ground surface conditions, and approach features). The LZ should not be near a heavily defended area. Low-flying aircraft are extremely vulnerable to light flak and ground fire. Physical security of the LZ area is of paramount importance in that enemy observation during the operation could result in the capture of the aircraft or failure of the mission. d. Terrain Features. (1) LZ's should be located in flat or rolling terrain or located on ridges or plateaus in mountainous terrain. (2) Pockets or small valleys, completely surrounded by hills, are usually unsuitable for landing operations by fixed-wing aircraft. (3) Although undesirable, sites with only a single approach can be used. When using such sites, it is mandatory that: (a) There is sufficient clearance at both ends of the LZ to permit a 1800 turn to either side within a radius of 2 nautical miles for medium aircraft and 1 nautical mile for light aircraft (fig. 6-2 and 6-3). (b) All landings and takeoffs are made into the wind. e. Weather. Prevailing weather in the landing area should be favorable. In particular, there must be a prior determination of prevailing wind direction and velocities and of conditions restricting visibility (i.e., ground fog, haze, or low hanging cloud formations). f. Size. The required size of LZ's varies with each type and model of aircraft used in air operations. LZ size and dimensions for each type and model of aircraft are determined by a complex and scientific mathematical process. This process weighs performance and environment facts to produce dimensions. Such a weighty process is not acceptable for use in LZ operations and certainly not feasible for the UWOA. Therefore, the LZ sizes for different types of aircraft have been grouped into two categories--STOL and medium aircraft. (1) STOL aircraft: (a) U-6

6-21

(b) Twin Otter (c) Porter (d) U-10 (e) C-7 (2) Medium aircraft: (a) C-123 (b) C-46 (c) C-47 (d) C-130 (e) C-119 (3) In addition to the basic dimensions, extra clearances to provide a safety factor are required. (a) A cleared surface or safe area of 10 percent of the minimum required length is added to each end of the runway. (These safe areas are never less than 100 feet/30 meters.) (b) A 25-foot/8-meter area, extending along both sides of the strip is added. It must be free of obstacles over 3-feet/1 meter high. (c) Owing to decreased air density, landings at higher elevations require increased LZ dimensions. If the LZ is located on terrain above 4000 feet/1220 meters with a very high temperature, the minimum length must be increased. 1. Add 10 percent to. LZ minimum for each 1000 feet/305 meters of altitude above 4000 feet/1220 meters, or fraction thereof. 2. Add 10 percent to LZ minimums for temperature between 90100 degrees F (30 degrees C and 38 degrees C). Add 20 percent for temperatures above 100 degrees F (38 degrees C). (4) It is important to remember that the 10 percent safe area is added to each end of the runway after the altitude and temperature increase has been added.

6-22

g. Surface. (1) The surface of the LZ must be level and free of obstructions such as ditches, deep ruts, logs, fences, hedges, rocks larger than a man's fist, low shrubbery, or grass over 1 foot/1 /3 meter in height. (2) The subsoil must be firm to a depth of 2 feet or 2/3 meter. (3) A surface containing gravel and small stones or thin layers of loose sand over a firm layer of subsoil is acceptable. However, if a JATO-assisted takeoff is made, such surface is not suitable. Plowed fields or fields containing crops should not be used. (4) LZ 's that are not suitable in summer may be ideal in winter. Ice with a thickness of 8 inches will support a STOL aircraft. Ice 24 inches thick will support medium aircraft. Unless the aircraft is equipped for snow-landing, snow in excess of 4 inches must be packed or removed from the strip. (5) The surface gradient of the LZ should not exceed 2 percent (applicable to both length and width). h. Approach and Takeoff Clearance. The approach and takeoff clearances are based on the glide/climb ratio of the aircraft (figure 6-10). For STOL aircraft the glide/climb ratio is 1 to 11 (e.g., 1 foot of gain or loss of altitude for every 11 feet of horizontal distance traveled). The ratio for medium aircraft is 1 to 40. As a further precaution, any obstruction in approach and departure lanes must conform to these specifications: (1) A 2-meter obstruction may not be nearer than 22 meters for STOL aircraft or 80 meters for medium aircraft. (2) A 15-meter obstruction may not be nearer than 165 meters for STOL aircraft or 620 meters for medium aircraft. (3) A 153-meter obstruction may not be nearer than 1 nautical mile for STOL aircraft or 3 nautical miles for medium aircraft. (4) The heights of obstacles are computed from the level of the landing strip. Where landfalls away from the LZ, objects of considerable height may be ignored provided they do not cut the line of ascent or descent. This condition is most likely to exist in mountainous terrain where plateaus are selected for LZ's. 6-22. DIMENSIONS AND LAYOUT Illustrations in figure 6-12 and 6-13 show how to lay out LZ markings for both STOL and medium aircraft. Use of these dimensions are appropriate for most Special Forces LZ operations. 6-23

a. A cleared surface (called a safe area) must be added to each end of the LZ. Each safe area is cleared of all obstacles over 1 meter high.

*Figure 6-12 Land LZ for STOL aircraft. *Dimensions used in this figure are simulated for SF S instructional purposes. Simulated dimensions are satisfactory for actual operations in a training environment. See (C) TC 31-20-3, Special Forces Air and Maritime Operations, for SF unit use.

6-24

*Figure 6-13 Land LZ for medium aircraft. *Dimensions used in this figure are simulated for SFS instructional purposes. Simulated dimensions are satisfactory for actual operations in a training environment. See (C) TC 31-20-3, Special Forces Air and Maritime Operations, for SF unit use. 6-25

b. The marking pattern which outlines the limits of the LZ consists of (1) Five (5) marker stations for STOL aircraft. (2) Seven (7) or more marker stations for medium aircraft. For LZ's longer than the depicted minimum length, the number of left-hand markers beyond station "C" will be increased to retain a marker spacing of 505 feet. c. Stations "A" and "B" always mark the downwind end and provide the entrance "gate" for aircraft approach. These stations represent the first point at which the aircraft should touch the ground. d. Station "B" is the aircraft offload/load position. The RCL station is located, as depicted, 15 meters to the right of marker station "B". e. Station "C" marks the very last point at which the aircraft can touch down and still complete a safe landing. f. Stations "D" and "E" or "F" and "G" mark the upwind extreme of the landing area. 6-23. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS a. Two minutes before scheduled arrival time, the RCL directs all marker stations to be displayed. The RCL flashes the authentication code signal toward the direction of expected aircraft approach (track). b. When the aircraft arrives in the area (within 15 degrees to either side of the approach track and below 1,000 feet altitude), and when the RCL determines the aircraft is on final approach, he will cease flashing the code signal and aim a continuous signal in the direction of the landing aircraft. c. The pilot will attempt to make a straight-in landing on initial approach. When this is not possible due to a sudden change in wind direction/conditions, a modified landing pattern will be flown at minimum altitude for security purposes. d. If a "go-around" is required, all lights will follow the aircraft until it has landed safely. e. All lights continue to follow the aircraft during touchdown and landing roll, and are extinguished as the aircraft passes each successive marker station. f. After touchdown and landing roll, the aircraft will turn right and taxi back to the offload/load position guided by the RCL 6-26

continuous light source at station “B” One or more engines will remain running during the entire operation. g. To eliminate confusion and insure rapid handling, incoming personnel/material are offloaded first. To insure safety, all off/on loading will be from the rear behind the running engine(s). h. After off/on-loading is completed, the aircraft prepares for immediate takeoff. The RCL moves to a vantage point clear of the aircraft, directs the LZ to be illuminated, and signals the pilot to take off by flashing his light toward ground level in front of the aircraft. i. The LZ illumination is extinguished as soon as the aircraft is airborne. j. The aircraft pilot will not land when: (1) There is a lack of or improper identification/ authentication received from the LZ. (2) An abort signal is given by the RCL (e.g., extinguishing the LZ markings). (3) Any condition that, in his opinion, makes it unsafe to land. Section VII. LANDING ZONES (WATER) 6-24. GENERAL The selection criteria, LZ marking, and dimensions and layout are similar to those for land LZ's. However, water LZ criteria, dimensions, and concept of operation are more complex and require more precise planning and execution than land LZ's. To gain a workable knowledge of the selection and execution of water LZ's requires greater study using TC 31-20-3, Special Forces Air and Maritime Operations. Section VIII. LANDING ZONES (ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT) 6-25. GENERAL a. Within their range limitations, helicopters provide an excellent means of infiltration, exfiltration, and evacuation from operational areas. Their advantages include the ability to: (1) Ascend and descend almost vertically. (2) Land in relatively small areas of ground.

6-27

(3) Hover nearly motionless and take on or discharge personnel and cargo without landing. (4) Fly safely and efficiently at low altitudes. b. Sane unfavorable characteristics of helicopters are: (1) Engine and rotor noise compromise security. (2) Icing, or high gusty winds, make flying difficult or sometimes impossible. (3) Changes in atmospheric conditions affect the aircraft's lift capability. (4) Dust clouds caused by the rotor compromise security of location. c. For the maximum effective use of helicopters, LZ's should be located to allow landings and takeoffs into the wind. d. During night operations, helicopters usually must land to transfer personnel or cargo. e. A decrease in normal air density limits the helicopter payload and requires lengthened running distances for landing and takeoff. Air density is largely determined by altitude and temperature. Low altitudes and moderate to low temperatures result in increased air density. Conversely, high altitudes and high temperatures cause decreased air density. 6-26. SELECTION CRITERIA a. Surface. (1) The surface should be relatively level and free of obstructions such as rocks, logs, tall grass, ditches, and fences. (2) The maximum ground slope permitted is 15 ,percent. (3) The ground must be firm enough to support the aircraft. (4) Heavy dust or loose snow will interfere with pilot vision just before touchdown. This effect can be reduced by clearing, wetting down, or using improvised landing mats or platforms. b. Size. (1) Under ideal conditions, and provided the necessary clearance for the rotors exists, a helicopter can land on ground slightly larger than the spread 'of its landing gear. 6-28

(2) Landing platforms may be prepared in swamp or marsh areas by building platforms of locally available materials (fig. 6-14). Such LZ's normally are used for daylight operations only. The size of the clearing, and the approach and takeoff requirements for this type of LZ are discussed below with the following additional requirements for the platform: (a) The area should be large enough to accommodate the spread of the landing gear plus 10 feet. (b) The surface should be capable of supporting the weight of the aircraft. (c) The LZ should be of firm construction that will not move when the helicopter touches down and rolls slightly forward. (d) The LZ should be level. (e) If logs or bamboo are used, the LZ should be constructed so that the top layer of poles is at right angles to the touchdown direction. (3) Landing pads can also be prepared on mountains or hillsides by cutting and filling (fig. 6-15). Caution should be exercised to insure there is adequate clearance for the rotors. (4) Helicopters with a flotation capability present no problem in landing zone preparation. They are equipped to land in water of any depth. However, helicopters can land in water without the use of special flotation equipment provided: (a) The water depth does not exceed 12 inches. (b) A firm bottom such as gravel or sand exists.

Figure 6-14 Examples of platform LZ’s for rotary-wing aircraft.

6-29

Figure 6-15 Preparing landing pads for rotary-wing aircraft in mountainous terrain. 6-27. DISPLAY AND AUTHENTICATION a. LZ markings will be displayed for 4 minutes -- beginning 2 minutes before until 2 minutes past the scheduled arrival time or until off/on-loading is completed and the helicopter departs. b. Authentication procedures/code signals will be prescribed in the CEOI; however: (1) Arrival at the LZ within the specified time block, on or near the designated approach track, will serve to authenticate the mission aircraft. (2) At night, the RCL displays the proper authentication code signal by flashing a green light (or other designated signal) aimed toward the approach track of the oncoming aircraft. When the helicopter is on its final approach, the RCL then displays a continuous green light aimed at the underside of the fuselage to assist pilot ground orientation. (3) In daylight, a distinctive panel or smoke signal is displayed. When smoke is used, the LZ must be planned to preclude the prevailing wind from causing the smoke to obscure the LZ. 6-28. DIMENSIONS The criteria depicted below represent the minimum dimensions of each LZ. Helicopter units will designate Size 1, 2, 3, or 4 circular LZ's or Size 3 or 4 rectangular LZ's, to be used for specific operations. Numerous considerations such as helicopter type, unit proficiency, nature of loads, climatic conditions and day or night operations may apply to size of landing points used. 6-30

Figure 6-16 Dimensions for Landing Zones. 6-29. MARKING Visual ground markings for helicopter LZ's provide the wind directions, identification, direction of approach, and the designated touchdown area. Visible light sources are used at night and panels in daylight as prescribed in the CEOI. a. In order not to disclose the LZ to the enemy, markings should be kept to a minimum and be displayed only when required. They should be firmly secured or removed before the helicopter hovers so they will not blow into the rotors or engine intakes. b. LZ markers should be adjusted for existing winds. When surface winds are a factor (10 knots or more for infiltrations under load and 15 knots or more for exfiltration under load), the markers will be 6-31

positioned to insure landing is made into the wind, regardless of the approach track established in the mission request and confirmation message. The helicopter will make its initial approach to the LZ along the designated track and, if necessary, will adjust to the final approach track indicated by the LZ markings. The following illustration shows the helicopter LZ "Y" marking pattern used for night operations:

Figure 6-17 Night Markings for Helicopter Landing Zones. 6-30. GENERAL Exfiltration is the means employed to return or bring personnel out of operational areas to friendly territory. Exfiltration and evacuation techniques normally employed in support of unconventional warfare operations are discussed in TC 31-20-3, Special Forces Air and Maritime Operations. Section X. CHECKLIST FOR RECEPTION OPERATIONS (DZ/LZ/RZ/BLS) 6-31. GENERAL a. Training.

6-32

(1) Guerrillas and auxiliaries for their mission. (2) Rehearsal. (3) Security compromise.

measures

stressed

during

training

to

avoid

b. Conduct of Operations. (1) Surveillance prior to, and after, operation. (2) Outer security established. (3) Close security established. (4) Assembly points. (5) Marking conforms with CEOI. (6) Recovery parties. (7) Transport parties. (8) Determining release point. (9) Time lights on and extinguished. (10) Noise discipline. (11) Sterilization of site. (12) Site cleared rapidly and in an orderly manner. (13) Movement from the site. (14) Sensitive items secured and controlled. c. Alternate Site(s). (1) Identification and reporting. (2) Security. (3) Marking party. (4) Provisions for temporary caching. (5) Security of cache. (6) Sterilization of site. 6-33

6-34

CHAPTER 7 COMBAT EMPLOYMENT OF RESISTANCE FORCES Section I. GENERAL 7-1. PURPOSE a. Guerrilla warfare is a series of tactical strikes designed to weaken an enemy that is superior in total resources. Rather than attempting to overwhelm the enemy in combat, the guerrilla inflicts as much damage as he can in successively paralyzing blows, withdrawing after each action before the enemy recovers. b. It is impossible for an enemy to guard everything, everywhere; therefore, guerrillas should attempt to keep the enemy off balance by continually striking at targets, day after day, month after month, in widely dispersed patterns so that the enemy will become confused, demoralized, and frustrated. To accomplish this, guerrillas use various methods of interdiction. c. Responsibility for the various aspects of unconventional warfare has been delegated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to that service having primary concern. The US Army is responsible for guerrilla warfare and related ground activities. Guerrilla warfare is defined in JCS Pub 1 as "military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces." d. During World War II, guerrilla forces were organized and used extensively. Basically, their operations behind enemy lines applied old principles and techniques to modern warfare. Nevertheless, many factors impeded the efficient organization and conduct of guerrilla operations. Military professionals generally did not understand the art of guerrilla warfare and many of them regarded it as illegal and dishonorable. The strategic and tactical relationships of guerrilla forces to conventional forces were rarely appreciated. Special operations organizations, shrouded in secrecy, were erroneously judged by many as "cloak and dagger outfits" engaged in wild exploits. e. Adding to the confusion that often existed, the responsibility for organizing, supplying, and exploiting guerrilla forces was often shifted from intelligence to operations staffs or, when problems became too large for each in turn to handle, to a special agency. The command relationships between guerrilla forces and a theater headquarters often remained vague and caused confusion within and between guerrilla forces. The logistical support of guerrilla forces was, often neglected or ill-timed with the operation plans of conventional forces. Because of these major factors, the potentials of guerrilla warfare were never fully developed and exploited. 7-1

f. To conduct successful guerrilla operations, the following must be considered: (1) The people. (2) Strengths and weaknesses. (3) Planning. (4) Intelligence. (5) Tactics. (6) Mobility. (7) Surprise. (8) Areas of operation. (9) Time and space. 7-2. PLANNING a. Guerrilla operations feature centralized planning and decentralized execution. The actions of all resistance elements are directed and coordinated by the underground resistance committee through an area command. However, within the guidance furnished by the area commander, subordinate leaders are allowed the widest possible latitude in the conduct of their operations. b. Planning provides for the attack of selected targets and for subsequent operations designed to exploit the advantage gained. Additionally, alternate targets are designated to allow subordinate units flexibility in taking advantage of sudden changes in the tactical situation. Once committed to an operation, the large zone of action or lack of communication equipment within a small guerrilla unit may reduce the area command's capability to rapidly divert subordinate units to other missions. Therefore, plans must be thorough and flexible to allow subordinate leaders to adopt alternate predetermined courses of action when contingencies arise. c. Planning must consider the exploitation of successes by psychological operations and propaganda programs. Also, if an attack is unsuccessful, psychological operations will be required to lessen adverse effects on the resistance movement. d. Once a target has been selected for attack, a plan is developed; it must be simple, understood by all, and well rehearsed. The attack must be timed with precision and it should move rapidly. There must be total surprise, thorough execution, and 'a planned withdrawal. 7-2

7-3. GUERRILLA WARFARE MISSIONS a. To gain a military decision against strong and, determined enemy opposition, guerrilla forces may have to adopt the tactics of conventional forces. When guerrillas adopt these tactics, they sacrifice many of their inherent advantages, primarily their mobility. b. Guerrilla forces increase their chance for success when they coordinate their activities with those of conventional forces. In an established theater of operations where significant conventional military actions are to take place, guerrilla warfare can be implemented to complement, support, or extend conventional operations. Where conventional forces are not to be deployed, guerrilla warfare may be conducted as an economy of force measure.

Figure 7-1 Special Forces Missions. 7-3

Guerrilla warfare missions (figure 7-1) which contribute to the land battle may be described as: (1) Missions to support the unified command (section II). (2) Missions to support conventional combat forces (section III). (3) Linkup operations (section IV). (4) Post linkup operations (section V). (5) Defensive operations (section VI). (6) Stay-behind operations (section VII). (7) Raid (section VIII). (8) Ambush (section IX). (9) Sniping and mining (section X). Section II. MISSIONS TO SUPPORT THE UNIFIED COMMAND 7-4. TYPE MISSIONS Special Forces-supported guerrillas give the unified commander more course-of-action options and enable him to influence activities far in advance of conventional forces and beyond the range of most Armycontrolled weapons systems. These missions which are strategic in nature and have both long-range and immediate effects on the enemy include: a. Interdiction. b. Intelligence. c. Psychological operations. 7-5. INTERDICTION Interdiction planning is begun during the preinfiltration time period. The area study and operational area intelligence may well indicate a weak link in an entire system that may be attacked with optimum results. a. During combat employment, major emphasis is placed on interdiction operations which include denying the enemy the use of selected areas through the partial or complete destruction of facilities, military installations, and equipment. Interdiction operations are basic to guerrilla warfare and range from the destruction of one vehicle by one individual to attacks by larger groups or forces against strategic and tactical industrial targets or 7-4

sites. When properly coordinated and conducted with other activities, interdiction operations can make significant contributions to the destruction of enemy combat power and his will to fight. Although tactical in execution, interdiction operations have a strategic objective and have both long-range and immediate effects on the enemy, his military force, and ultimate population support. b. Interdiction operations are conducted against an enemy to hinder or interrupt lines of communication; to deny use of certain key areas; and to destroy industrial facilities, military installations, equipment, and resources. When properly coordinated with other unified command operations, interdiction can help destroy enemy combat power and the will to fight. Of all guerrilla operations, interdiction has the greatest impact on the enemy and, consequently, is considered the basic guerrilla warfare operational mission. c. Normally, operations are directed against targets on a broad scale using all available resistance forces capable of accomplishing the task. Guerrilla units conduct overt attacks against the enemy, his supply and production facilities, and his sources of power and lines of communications. Attacks are timed to achieve maximum results from surprise and confusion and often to coincide with operations of other theater forces. Closely coordinated with these guerrilla operations, the underground and the auxiliary may conduct widespread programs of sabotage, strikes, and disaffection. d. The enemy reaction to large-scale UW operations is usually violent, immediate, and may result in reprisals against the civilian population. Losses among civilian support elements (auxiliaries and the underground) and a concentration of operations against the guerrilla forces may result. To relieve pressure being exerted by the enemy, a reduction in the number of guerrilla operations may be ordered in particular areas, or the theater UW command may direct that guerrilla operations in contiguous areas be intensified to help dissipate enemy retaliation efforts. 7-6. TYPES OF INTERDICTION OPERATIONS a. Raid. A raid is an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. b. Ambush. An ambush is a surprise attack used against moving or temporarily halted targets such as railroad trains, truck convoys, individual vehicles, and dismounted troops. c. Mines and Boobytraps. Standard or unproved mines and boobytraps afford a means of interdicting enemy routes of communication and key areas with little expenditure of manpower. The use of these items as 7-5

an interdiction technique can be planned to produce a demoralizing effect on enemy forces. Mines and boobytraps may be effectively used in defensive operations. d. Sniping. Sniping tends to impede enemy operations and to demoralize personnel. A few snipers can cause casualties among enemy personnel, deny or hinder use of certain routes, and require employment of a disproportionate number of troops to neutralize the snipers. These reasons make snipers effective for defensive operations for covering a mined area, as part of a raiding or ambush force, or for a separate operation. 7-7. TARGET ANALYSIS a. Targets are not attacked indiscriminately; they are part of an overall plan to destroy an entire system. Interdiction is based on the assigned mission which directs, as a minimum, the results desired and the priorities of attack for specific systems. Based on this mission, the area commander selects the specific targets and those elements to conduct the attack. b. Target selection requires detailed intelligence, thorough planning, and is based on these factors: (1) Criticality. A target is critical when its destruction or damage will have a significant influence upon the enemy's ability to conduct or support operations. Each target is considered in relation to other elements of the particular target system designated for interdiction. The criticality of a target changes with the situation. For example, when the enemy has few locomotives, a railroad bridge is less critical; however, its safeguarding may be critical when friendly conventional force plans require its use. (2) Accessibility. A target is accessible when a resistance element can infiltrate the target area either physically or by direct or indirect weapons fire (if and when that particular, target can be destroyed/damaged by indirect fire methods). (3) Recuperability. A target's recuperability is measured in time; i.e., how long will it take the enemy to replace, repair, or bypass the damage/destruction of that particular target.. (4) Vulnerability. A target is vulnerable if the detachment has the means (i.e., explosives, weapons, manpower) and expertise to destroy that target. (5) Effect. Enemy reaction to interdiction operations may result in reprisals against the civilian population. The possible political, economic, and sociological impact of operations on friendly civilians must always be considered. Guerrilla forces seek to destroy the core of enemy power, while at the same time conserving the energy, unity, 7-6

and fighting spirit of the friendly civilian population. Conversely, the objective of the operation may be purposely designed to cause a violent reaction by the enemy against the civilian population. If properly handled by the PSYOP operators, these reactions can be exploited to further alienate the population and the government. 7-8. TARGET SYSTEMS a. A target system is a series of interrelated functions which together serve a common purpose. Specifically: (1) A target is one element, installation, or activity identified for attack such as a locomotive, a train, a bridge, or a prison. (2) A target complex is several or numerous targets in the same general area such as a railway marshaling yard, an airfield, or port/dock facilities. (3) A target system consists of an industrial system and its sources of raw materials; the rail, highway, waterway, or airway systems over which these materials are transported; the source of power and method of transmission; the factory complex itself; and the means by which the finished product is transported to the user. b. Major target systems operations include:

ideal

for

guerrilla

interdiction

(1) Railway systems. (a) Rail networks are one of the most profitable target systems for attack by guerrilla forces. Railroad tracks are easily interdicted because it is almost impossible to effectively guard long stretches of track. Rolling stock may be simultaneously attacked with track interdiction. Loosening tie mountings, removing fishplates, offsetting track, and using demolitions or special devices on curved sections of track or switches to cause train derailment result in captured or destroyed supplies, elimination of enemy personnel, or liberation of prisoners. Repair facilities and equipment are usually guarded and may be more difficult to attack. This difficulty can be overcome by- careful planning and precise execution. Results expected from these operations are weighed against the probability of increased guerrilla casualties. (b) Limited operations against rail way systems and related facilities only cause harassment; therefore, widespread operations are needed to severely affect the enemy. Harassment of repair crews by snipers and ambushes reduces their morale and willingness to work. Primarily, early railway interdiction interferes with the enemy's offensive momentum by disrupting his flow of supplies, movement of troops, and industrial production. Secondary effects include:

7-7

1. Disruption of daily dispatch and control procedures for rail movements; causes delays, erratic time schedules, and misrouting; and causes trains to accumulate at rail terminals, junctions, and marshaling yards. This presents lucrative targets for attack by other theater forces. 2. Destruction of reserve repair materials to cause the dismantling of secondary rail lines for the repair of primary lines. 3. Transfer of rail traffic to overload roads and highways, which are vulnerable to guerrilla and air attack. 4. Increasing the burden upon enemy security forces and repair crews. (c) The primary and secondary effects of railway interdiction generally apply to the interdiction of other lines of communication; i.e., highway, waterway, and airway systems. (2) Highway systems. Damaged highways are easily repaired and require less critical materials and skilled labor than railway systems. Therefore, points selected for interdiction should be in areas where the enemy cannot easily reestablish movement by making a short detour. Since highways have fewer vulnerable spots, these points will likely be heavily defended. Where highways cannot be destroyed, traffic can be disrupted by successive roadblocks, real and dummy mines, boobytraps, sniping, misdirection of route signs, or by spreading tetrahedrons for puncturing tires. Ambushes are conducted when suitable terrain is available. Small bridges, tunnels, culverts, and levees may be lightly protected and thereby vulnerable to guerrilla attacks. As these attacks increase in frequency and effect, the enemy will be forced to commit additional reserves for control and security of the roads, occupy all important points simultaneously at all times, and at the same time conduct counterguerrilla operations. (3) Waterway systems. The most critical facilities of waterway systems are ports, dams, canals, locks, and related repair equipment. They are usually well guarded since their destruction can disrupt water traffic for long periods. Waterway control and navigational equipment such as signal lights, beacons, microwave communication systems, and channel markers can be attacked effectively. Sinking vessels in restricted channels, dropping bridges into waterways, creating slides, and destroying levees can block waterway traffic. Because of security and the amount of explosives required, destroying a dam will often be beyond the capability of resistance forces. One solution, if approved, is to use atomic demolitions munitions. Another solution is to cause a lesser degree of damage; i.e., destroy floodgates, sluice gates, etc. (4) Airway systems. The enemy's military/commercial. airway systems can be disrupted by interdicting airfields, parked aircraft, 7-8

and related ground facilities, such as terminals, hangars, repair shops, field depots; radar, radio, navigation, control, lighting, telephone communications, and defense systems; and by 'eliminating flight and ground personnel. Also, modern weapons systems give the guerrilla force a capability to attack and destroy low flying aircraft. (5) Communication systems. Widely dispersed communication systems present excellent targets. Cutting telephone wires, damaging telephone terminals, destroying radio antennas, or destroying the radio station usually results in a loss of communications. Alternate and emergency means of communication are usually available. However, destruction of any part of a communication system harasses an enemy and creates an overload on remaining facilities. In addition, guerrillas may temporarily capture radio stations to broadcast announcements to the population and communicate with friendly foreign nations. (6) Power systems. Electrical power nets can be interdicted by destroying large cross-country or local high tension and distribution powerlines, transmission towers or poles located in remote areas and difficult terrain which make repair/replacement difficult, or transformer substations. Substations, although critical, can be bypassed in a relatively short time by improvising wiring. Also, interdiction of power nets can be accomplished by destroying power generating stations and related equipment. These interdiction operations are carried out by individual raid techniques or by using long-range weapons. (7) Water supply systems. Water systems supplying industry can be disrupted by attacks against reservoirs, pipelines, and purification plants. However, these attacks may impact adversely on the friendly civilian population and must be weighed against the tactical advantages to be gained. (8) Fuel supply systems. Attacks against an enemy's fuel supply system have far-reaching effects on his economy as well as his ability to conduct and support military operations. Surface and underground fuel storage tanks, depots, pipelines, refueling systems for tank trucks, rail tank cars, transport vehicles, and vessels all provide profitable targets. 7-9. TACTICAL CONTROL MEASURES a. General. In interdiction operations against a target complex, committing and coordinating all elements of the area command, which includes the guerrilla force, underground, and auxiliary, in widespread activities will produce a maximum effect. The area commander uses appropriate control measures to aid in directing and coordinating resistance force tactical operations. b. Common Control Measures. 7-9

(1) Target assignment. Targets or objectives are designated for attack. These targets are usually lines of communication, military installations and units, and industrial facilities. Normally, targets or objectives for guerrilla forces are not held for any length of time, nor are they cleared of determined enemy resistance. (2) Zones of action. Zones of action are used to designate area of responsibility for offensive operations by subordinate units. Within the zone of action, the subordinate commander exercises considerable freedom in the conduct of operations. Movement of other guerrilla units through an adjacent zone of action is coordinated by the area command. The auxiliary units within a zone of action provide support to the guerrilla unit responsible for the area. Boundaries of zones of action are changed as required. (3) Routes of movement. Guerrilla force commanders may prescribe routes of movement in order to control movement to targets. Guerrilla units approach the objective area either by single or multiple routes. (4) Mission support site (MSS). The MSS is a preselected area used as a temporary storage site or stopover point and is normally located in areas not controlled by the guerrilla force. Guerrilla units use an MSS to increase their operational range and to enable them to remain away from their bases for longer periods of time. MSS's can be used prior to and after an operation. They are occupied for short periods of time, seldom longer than a day. As in an assembly area, the using unit prepares for further operations and may be provided with supplies and intelligence by the auxiliary. Prior to occupation by the main guerrilla force, the MSS should be reconnoitered and outposted. c. Other Control Measures. Additional control measures, such as rallying points, direction of attack; assault positions, and lines of departure, may be employed by smaller guerrilla units. These control measures are employed in a manner similar to that of a conventional military unit. 7-10. INTELLIGENCE Special Forces, although not primarily an intelligence collection agency, may be required to support information gathering tasks of a special nature. Special Forces located deep behind enemy lines are ideally situated to contribute to the overall intelligence plan of the unified command. However, security restricts radio traffic, thus limiting the amount of intelligence information which can be relayed. Special tasks may require information pertaining to: a. Order of battle data. b. Support of psychological operations. 7-10

c. Targets of opportunity. d. Poststrike assessments. e. Political, sociological, and economic matters. f. Support of specific air, ground, and naval operations. g. Technical intelligence. h. Identification, location, and affiliation of all known or suspected enemy collaborators. 7-11. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP) Guerrilla operations are conducted in a manner that creates a favorable impact on the indigenous population since adverse psychological effects of guerrilla operations may outweigh the tactical results. The ability of guerrilla forces to influence the population and elicit civilian support is dependent largely upon the psychological impact of the resistance movement upon the populace. Guerrilla forces operating in enemy territory psychologically demoralize the enemy. This benefits the resistance movement and should be fully exploited by Special Forces. Normally, psychological operations conducted by guerrilla forces support the needs of the operational area and are governed by the overall objectives of the unified command. Section III. MISSIONS TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL COMBAT FORCES 7-12. GENERAL a. Unconventional warfare operations may be ongoing before the decision to commit conventional military combat forces. Special Forces-supported guerrilla missions may be expanded, once conventional forces are committed, to assist the tactical commander's scheme of maneuver. These missions can complement, support, or extend conventional force offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations, and usually occur when the conventional force's area of interest encompasses a UWOA or when its area of influence approaches a UWOA prior to linkup. b. To fight outnumbered, survive, and accomplish these missions, the Special Forces and guerrilla commander must know and understand the enemy--his usual tactics, his organization and equipment, and his capabilities and limitations. 7-13. OFFENSE a. Missions which may be assigned to guerrilla units to assist conventional offensive operations are designed to: (1) Destroy enemy forces or their will to fight. 7-11

(2) Secure key terrain. (3) Deprive enemy of resources. (4) Demoralize the enemy. (5) Deceive the enemy. (6) Divert enemy forces. (7) Obtain intelligence information. (8) Destroy key command, control, and communications systems. (9) Interdict lines of communications. (10) Prevent movement of reserves. b. Special Forces-supported guerrilla forces can enhance the tactical commander's ability to: (1) See the battlefield—by conducting reconnaissance and maintaining surveillance of critical routes, areas, installations, and dispositions to provide highly accurate and timely intelligence information. (2) Concentrate overwhelming combat power--by conducting deception operations to allow the commander to concentrate his combat power for the attack. False rumors, a sudden increase in resistance activities, or a shifting of such activities to other areas assists in deceiving the enemy as to the actual time and place of attack. (3) Suppress the enemy's defensive fires--by attacking enemy weapon systems to support the commander's fire suppression plan. (4) Shock, overwhelms and destroy the enemy--by: (a) Interdicting and blocking approaches sealing exit routes from an objective area.

to

or

(b) Occupying and holding key terrain features for a limited time. (c) Seizing key installations, such as bridges, tunnels, dams, and power facilities, to prevent destruction by the enemy. (d) Conducting supporting forces and facilities. (e) Assisting enemy units. 7-12

in

attacks

containing/

against

eliminating

enemy

bypassed

(5) Attack deep into the enemy rear--by attacking at every opportunity and destroying vulnerable command posts, communication centers, supply and maintenance facilities, ammunition and POL depots, and reserve elements. This aggressive, relentless destruction paralyzes the enemy and disintegrates his overall system of defense. These operations spread fear, demoralize, and achieve disproportionate results as rear echelon elements, not trained nor equipped for battle, succumb to confusion, indecision, and panic. c. Guerrilla forces may also assist conventional forces conducting airborne, air assault, or amphibious raids on objectives deep in the enemy's rear. Timing for employment of guerrilla forces is extremely important. Premature commitment may alert the enemy and lead to the destruction of both the guerrilla and raid force. Conversely, late employment may not have the desired effect upon the enemy. Another factor which must be considered is the adverse effect of enemy reaction on resistance elements and the friendly civilian populace following the withdrawal of the raiding force. 7-14. DEFENSE Tactical commanders must have prompt, accurate information to anticipate and react to an enemy attack. In the active defense, accurate, timely intelligence is essential to concentrate combat power at the critical time and place. Special Forces-supported guerrilla forces deep within enemy territory can provide this intelligence. These forces operating within enemy rear echelons may also divert enemy reserves and resources from tactical employment by interdiction, by blocking approaches to an objective area, or by direct attack: 7-15. RETROGRADE Special Forces-supported guerrilla forces may be tasked to assist conventional force retrograde operations. The tactical commander's ability to see the battlefield is critical during delay, withdrawal, or retirement operations. The guerrilla force is uniquely situated to provide him with real-time intelligence. Section IV. LINKUP OPERATIONS 7-16. GENERAL Many offensive operations in which guerrilla forces assist conventional combat forces involve a linkup between elements of the two forces. This linkup may occur in ground, airborne, or amphibious operations. As linkup becomes imminent, coordination and control are intensified and positive restrictions are placed on the forces involved.

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7-17. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS When linkup becomes imminent, operational control of UW forces is passed to the conventional force commander (normally a corps). Initial passage of such control will be coordinated and directed by the headquarters exercising control over both forces. The tactical commander exercises operational control of UW forces through a Special Forces liaison party which is provided to him by the SFOB. For a detailed discussion of command relationships in various situations, see chapter 4, TC 31-20-1. 7-18. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Regardless of the conditions under which linkup is effected, the following considerations govern linkup planning: a. Liaison. (1) A transfer of operational control of UW forces from the unified command level to tactical commands requires the exchange of liaison personnel. The SFOB attaches a Special Forces liaison party to the corps headquarters being assigned operational control of UW forces. If operational control is passed to division level; the Special Forces liaison party provides the necessary liaison to the division headquarters. (2) The SFOB may direct that a liaison party consisting of Special Forces and resistance representatives be exfiltrated from the UWOA to assist in linkup planning. This party can provide timely information concerning the latest resistance and enemy situations, and recommend linkup coordination measures and missions for guerrilla forces. (3) The tactical commander may infiltrate a liaison party into the UWOA. This liaison party may include representatives from the G3 section, Special Forces liaison personnel, tactical air control parties, forward observer teams, and communications personnel and equipment. This liaison party must be knowledgeable of the scope and purpose of the linkup plan and appropriate missions for the guerrilla force. b. Contact Points. Specific locations must be established for the two forces to effect contact. Usually these points are well-defined terrain features. c. Coordination of Schemes of Maneuver. Tactical control measures must be established to assist linkup. Guerrilla forces are usually dispersed over a large area; consequently, linkup may take place at several widely separated points and at different times. Not all guerrilla forces may be involved in linkup with tactical units. For example, during a raid or area interdiction operation by airborne forces or when conducting operations as part of a cover and deception 7-14

plan for an amphibious force, it is often undesirable to linkup all guerrilla forces with the attacking force. d. Fire Coordination Measures. Fire coordination measures such as fire support coordination lines (FSCL) must be established to protect both the linkup and guerrilla force. Because of the wide dispersion of guerrilla forces and the fact that civilian support organizations are a part of the UW force, thorough coordination of targets selected for nuclear and conventional weapon attack is required. Provisions must be made to warn friendly elements of the population who may be endangered by these fires. e. Communications Coordination. Radio communication equipment with the guerrilla forces is normally limited. The tactical commander must provide the guerrilla force equipment with a voice capability which can link them to his headquarters. Visual recognition signals are selected to assist in linkup. Pyrotechnics and other required items not available to the guerrilla force should be provided by the conventional force. f. Employment Following Linkup. The unified commander, in coordination with US and allied officials, determines the disposition or further use of UW forces following linkup. Within this guidance, the tactical commander may employ recovered guerrilla forces. 7-19. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS a. Guerrilla units may be given the mission of securing drop and landing zones, seizing objectives within the airhead line; occupying reconnaissance and security positions, or delaying or harassing enemy movements toward the objective area. Concurrent with the landing of the airborne elements, guerrillas can furnish current intelligence data, provide guides, conduct reconnaissance and security missions, interdict approaches into the objective area, control lightly defended areas between separate airheads and dispersed units, attack enemy reserve units and installations, conduct diversionary attacks, and assist in controlling the civilian populace within the objective area. b. Precise timing of the airborne operation with the supporting guerrilla operations is essential. Premature commitment of guerrilla forces may nullify the surprise effect of the operation and, in turn, lead to their defeat. If committed late, the effects desired from the guerrilla force employment may not materialize. 7-20. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS a. Guerrilla forces may be used to interdict approaches into the area; to attack artillery positions and reserves; to destroy command posts, communication facilities, logistical installations, and airfields which can support the enemy; to temporarily seize helicopter landing areas; and to assist airborne and heliborne 7-15

operations which may be conducted in conjunct- ion with or complementary to the amphibious assault. b. If the selected beachhead is lightly defended or unoccupied, guerrilla units may seize and hold portions of the beachhead. Landing force planning must provide for early relief of guerrilla units. Plans for naval gunfire support to guerrilla forces must include provisions for the conduct and adjustment of fires. Naval gunfire liaison personnel, shore fire-control parties, and tactical air control parties should be provided as required. c. Guerrillas may be employed in a tactical cover and deception role to assist amphibious assaults. Guerrilla forces intensify operations in selected areas to deceive the enemy as to the exact location of the main landings. Air defense radar and coastal detection stations are targets for attack to reduce the enemy's early warning capability. A sudden increase in resistance activities or a shifting of such activities to other areas assists deception. d. Timing of the use of guerrilla forces in support of an amphibious operation is extremely important. Premature commitment alerts the enemy and may lead to the defeat of the guerrilla force. Late employment may not produce the desired effect. Section V. POST LINKUP OPERATIONS 7-21. GENERAL a. When the United States retains control of guerrilla forces, these forces may be further employed on missions in support of and under control of conventional combat forces. For this role, a period of retraining and reequipping is usually required prior to commitment to combat. b. In addition, US Army Special Forces-advised indigenous forces may be employed to augment conventional forces conducting combat operations or to conduct operations behind friendly lines. c. Until command relationships can be established with the appropriate command, Special Forces should remain with indigenous forces to help them adapt to becoming a combat unit operating in a strange environment under unknown higher commanders. Indigenous forces employed in support of conventional forces should be commanded by their own officers. 7-22. MISSIONS Missions which may be assigned to guerrilla, paramilitary, or irregular forces supporting conventional US units include:

7-16

a. Conventional Combat Operations. (1) Indigenous -forces may be employed to augment, relieve, or replace conventional units in the main battle area; e.g., to contain or destroy bypassed enemy units. (2) The strength, organization, leadership, training, equipment, background of personnel,, and extent of civilian support of indigenous forces affect their combat capability. Consequently, indigenous units may not be able to accomplish comparable missions of like-size conventional units. The tactical commander, therefore, must carefully consider their capabilities and take advantage of their light infantry characteristics and area knowledge. (3) Shortage of adequate voice communications equipment and transportation may severely limit the employment of indigenous forces on conventional combat operations. The tactical commander must overcome this disadvantage by providing them the necessary equipment. b. Reconnaissance. Familiarity with the terrain and people makes indigenous forces unique for reconnaissance missions. They may provide the principal sources of intelligence on dissident elements opposing friendly forces and can move in difficult terrain to locate enemy elements. They can detect enemy sympathizers in villages and towns and implement control measures in unfriendly areas. c. Counterguerrilla Operations. The experience and training of indigenous forces make them useful in counterguerrilla operations. They can patrol difficult terrain and gaps between tactical units, establish roadblocks and observation posts, screen flanks, and provide guides. Their knowledge of guerrilla techniques, the language, terrain, and population can be exploited by tactical commanders. When properly supported, indigenous forces may be given complete responsibility for counterguerrilla operations in selected areas. d. Rear Area Security. Indigenous forces may be used as security forces within the theater army area command (TAACOM). In assigning these forces to a rear area security role, their area knowledge should be the governing factor, and whenever possible, they should be employed on an area basis. They may guard lines of communications, supply depots, airfields, pipelines, rail yards, or port facilities; patrol terrain which contains bypassed enemy units or stragglers; assist in recovery of prisoners and stragglers, and in control of civilians and refugees; and police towns and cities. When provided with appropriate transportation, indigenous forces may be used as a mobile security force reserve. e. Civil Support. Because of their area knowledge and experience, indigenous forces may assist to restore the area to its normalstate. They can perform refugee collection and control duties, civil police duties, assist psychological operation campaigns in rear 7-17

areas, apprehendcollaborators and spies, recruit labor, and guard key installations and public buildings. f. Retrain Host Country Conventional Military Units. Special Forces may be used to retrain and reconstitute host country conventional military units which have suffered reversals in combat actions. The emphasis is to rapidly train unit cadres in leadership, operations, and combat tactics and techniques. 'This is a significant mission which may be assigned to Special Forces after completion of their involvement with resistance forces. ADVICE TO CONVENTIONAL FORCE COMMANDERS When employing guerrilla units following linkup: Know the guerrillas, their organization, concepts of operation, capabilities, and limitations. Insure that subordinate leaders appreciate the value of guerrilla forces and know how to use them. Anticipate the problems of providing administrative, logistical, and operational support to attached guerrilla units. Anticipate possible language establishing liaison.

and

political

problems

in

The value of guerrilla units is limited to those operations which are conducted in areas familiar to them. Maintain guerrilla unit integrity as much as possible. Work through existing channels of guerrilla command. Imposing a new organizational structure may destroy the responsiveness of the unit. Respect guerrilla ranks. Except in cases where the rank of a guerrilla officer is clearly out of order, give him the same consideration given regular officers of the same rank. Maintain guerrilla morale by awarding decorations and letters of commendation and by expressing appreciation whenever such action is justified. Do not make political commitments or promises to guerrilla units unless authorized by higher headquarters. Recognize when the value of guerrilla units is ended and promptly return them to the control of the unified commander or host country. Figure 7-2 7-18

Section VI. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 7-23. GENERAL Guerrilla units are normally inferior to organized enemy forces in strength, firepower, mobility, and communications. Therefore, guerrilla operations are primarily offensive; they do not undertake defensive operations unless forced or ordered to. Usually when the enemy attacks, guerrillas defend themselves by movement, dispersion, withdrawal, or diversions. Defensive operations are accompanied whenever possible by offensive actions against the enemy's flanks and rear. On this basis, Special Forces always plan offensive operations and security within the UWOA. 7-24. INDICATORS OF COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS a. Security of the UWOA requires guerrilla intelligence measures to identify indications of impending counterguerrilla action, population control measures, and guerrilla reaction to enemy counterguerrilla actions. Some activities and conditions which may indicate impending enemy counterguerrilla actions are: (1) Suitable weather. (2) New enemy commander. (3) Changes in battle situation elsewhere. (4) Arrival of new enemy units with special training. (5) Extension of enemy outposts, increased patrolling, and aerial reconnaissance. (6) Increased enemy intelligence effort. (7) Civilian pacification or control measures employed. (8) Increased PSYOP against guerrillas. b. Some ac activities, conditions, and measures which may be used to control the population of an area may include: (1) Mass registration. (2) Curfews (3) Intensive propaganda. (4) Compartmentalization, with cleared buffer zones. (5) Informer net. 7-19

(6) Party membership drives. (7) Land and housing reform. (8) Relocation of individuals, groups, and towns. (9) Rationing of food and goods. 7-25. DEFENSIVE TACTICS The existence or indication of counterguerrilla operations requires the Special Forces and guerrilla commanders to plan and use defensive tactics. Some of the defensive tactics applicable against counterguerrilla operations may include: a. Diversion Activities. A sudden increase in guerrilla activities or a shifting of such activities to other areas assists in diverting enemy attention. For example, intensified operations against enemy lines of communications and installations require him to divert troops from counterguerrilla operations to security roles. Full use of underground and auxiliary capabilities assists in creating diversions. b. Defense of Fixed Positions. The principles for a guerrilla defense of fixed positions are the same as those applicable to conventional forces except that there are few supporting fires and counterattacks are generally not practicable. In conjunction with their position defense, elements of the guerrilla force conduct raids, ambushes, and attacks against the enemy's lines of communication, flanks, reserve units, supporting arms, and installations. Routes of approach are mined and camouflaged snipers engage appropriate enemy targets. Diversionary actions by all elements of the resistance movement are intensified in adjacent areas. c. Delay and Harassment Activities. (1) The objective of delay and harassment tactics is to make the attack so expensive that the enemy eventually terminates his operations. Maximum use is made of the defensive characteristics of the terrain, mines and snipers are employed to harass the enemy, and ambushes are positioned to inflict maximum casualties and delay. (2) As the enemy overruns various strong points, the guerrillas withdraw to successive defensive positions to again delay and harass. When the situation permits, the guerrilla force attacks the enemy's flanks, rear, and lines of communication. If the enemy continues his offensive, the guerrilla forces should disengage and evacuate the area. Under no circumstances does the guerrilla force become so engaged that it loses its freedom of action and permits enemy forces to encircle and destroy it. 7-20

d. Withdrawal. (1) In preparing to meet enemy offensive action, the Special Forces and guerrilla commanders may decide to withdraw to another area not likely to be included in the enemy offensive. Key installations within a guerrilla base are moved to alternate bases, and essential records and supplies may be transferred to new locations; less essential items would be destroyed or cached in dispersed locations. If the commander receives positive intelligence about the enemy's plans for a major counterguerrilla operation, he may decide to evacuate his main base without delay and withdraw. (2) When faced with an enemy offensive of overwhelming strength, the commander may disperse his force, either in small units or as individuals, to avoid destruction. This course of action, however, renders the guerrilla organization ineffective for an undetermined period of time and therefore should not be taken unless absolutely necessary. 7-26. DEFENSIVE MEASURES THAT THE GUERRILLAS MAY EMPLOY In the process of selecting defensive tactics, Special Forces and guerrilla leaders must fully consider and evaluate available measures. While a total list of defensive measures is endless, measures to be considered should include: a. Having auxiliaries and underground increase counterintelligence activities. b. Initiating diversionary activities in other areas. c. Intensifying operations against lines of communication. d. Preparing to implement guerrilla base evacuation plan. e. Instituting delay and harassing tactics. f. Exploiting guerrillas' inherent advantages of fluidity and intimate knowledge of terrain. g. Preparing to initiate "breakout" operations (see para 7-27). h. Withdrawing to more favorable terrain. i. Increasing frequency of ambush operations. j. Preparing for the enemy's use of chemical and biological weapons. k. Establishing caches in potential withdrawal areas.

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l. Emphasizing passive air defense measures. m. Planning for employment of concentrated fires of automatic and semiautomatic weapons against helicopters and low-performance aircraft. n. Planning counteractions against enemy heliborne and airborne operations. o. Taking adequate communication security measures. p. As a last resort, implementing dispersal plan. This plan must include instructions covering interim conduct and ultimate reassembly. 7-27. GUERRILLA BREAKOUT OPERATIONS a. As discussed earlier, encirclement by counterguerrilla forces poses the greatest threat to guerrilla forces. The Special Forces and guerrilla commanders must be constantly on the alert for indications of an encirclement. When they receive indications that an encircling movement is in progress, the guerrillas immediately maneuver to escape while enemy lines are still thin and spread out and coordination between advancing units is not yet well established. If escape is not accomplished and the enemy completes his encirclement, the guerrilla force attempts a breakout. b. If an encirclement is a difficult operation, a breakout from encirclement is equally difficult. Unless the encircled guerrilla force has explicit orders to defend in place, the decision should be made to break out and the operation executed before the enemy is able to establish an organized containment. The need for quick decision making, however, should not lead to an attempted breakout without adequate planning. The plan should include consideration of the following factors (1) Area for the attack. The main attack should be launched against enemy weakness in a direction which will insure breakthrough in the shortest possible time. The direction of attack may be indicated by designating objectives and an axis of advance. Objectives are assigned to insure penetration of the encircling force and preservation of the gap created. (2) Time of attack. Since deception and secrecy are essential to a successful breakout, the Special Forces and guerrilla commanders may decide to attack during darkness or other periods of limited visibility. The effectiveness of enemy air must also be considered in selecting the time for the breakout. When the enemy has local air superiority, it may be necessary to conduct the breakout at night or when weather conditions reduce the effectiveness of his air. (3) Organization. An encircled guerrilla force is usually organized into four distinct tactical groups for the breakout. 7-22

(a) A rupture force--which may vary in sire from one-third to two-thirds of the total encircled force is assigned the mission of penetrating the enemy encirclement widening the gap, and holding the shoulders of the gap until all other encircled forces can move through. After all other encircled forces have passed through the penetrated area, the rupture force may be employed as a rear guard. (b) A reserve force--provides rear and flank security and may assist the rupture force by conducting diversionary attacks. When freedom of action is gained, this force may become the advance guard for further movement. (c) A rear guard--covers the withdrawal of other forces from the perimeter. It withdraws on order after all other units have cleared the perimeter. After passing through the penetrated area, they rejoin their parent units. (d) A main body—consisting of all guerrilla forces not assigned to one of the other three elements. (4) Deception. Effective deception may be achieved feints, diversionary attacks, or demonstrations. These designed to deceive the enemy as to the location of the If sufficient guerrilla forces are available, it may be break out at more than one point.

by employing measures are main attack. effective to

(5) Concentration of forces. Prior to the breakout., there must be a gradual change of emphasis from the defense of the perimeter to the formation of a strong breakout force. As the situation permits, every element that can be spared from the perimeter must be assembled for employment in the breakout. (6) Communication. Since secrecy is essential to the success of breakout operations, messengers should be used within the encircled unit. Radio and wire may be used, but transmissions must be closely guarded. (7) Logistics. (a) Plans must be made to relieve the guerrillas of all equipment and supplies not essential for the fighting during the breakout. Nonessential equipment and supplies will be destroyed or cached. (b) Once the planning is completed, the breakout is executed. Since secrecy and security are essential, a strict sequence of events for the operation must be followed. Guerrilla scouts are employed to locate a weak point in the enemy's line of encirclement along an axis of movement that will benefit the guerrillas following the breakout. Elements on the defensive perimeter which are to participate in the breakout as a part of the rupture force, reserve force, or main body 7-23

are released from their defense mission. These elements are assembled with their respective tactical groups at the latest practicable time before the breakout is to be initiated. (c) At the scheduled time of attack, the rupture force, supported by indirect fires (and tactical air when available), effects the penetration, widens the gap, and holds the shoulders of the penetration. The main body and reserve force then pass through the gap and continue the attack to the assigned objective. The rear guard withdraws on order and follows the reserve force through the gap. When all encircled forces have passed through the gap, the rupture force withdraws, prepared to fight a rear guard action. The guerrillas attempt to break contact with the enemy as rapidly as possible and proceed to mission support sites or alternate bases where they can prepare for future operations. Section VII. STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS 7-28. GENERAL a. Stay-behind operations involve the positioning of Special Forces operational elements within their proposed operational areas prior to enemy advances through, or enemy occupation of, general areas. This type of operation enables the Special Forces elements to: (1) Organize a nucleus of resistance forces, or (2) Pre-position themselves for employment in a unilateral role. b. Stay-behind operations should be considered when the civil populace indicates it will support stay-behind operations. 7-29. ADVANTAGES OF STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS a. Operations may be planned and rehearsed prior to hostilities. b. Less external support is required. c. e. Personnel are familiar with operational area. d. A high degree of security is possible. e. Previously established civilian contacts may be exploited. f. Caches of supplies and equipment can be established. g. Immediate intelligence is available.

7-24

7-30. DISADVANTAGES OF STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS a. Enemy troops are nearby during occupation of the operational areas. b. Movement and communications are greatly restricted. c. Special Forces members may be compromised by informers. 7-31. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS a. Stringent precautions must be taken to preserve security, particularly at refuge areas or at other safe sites to be used during the initial period of occupation. Information concerning locations and identities within the organization must be kept on a need-to-know basis. Contacts between the various elements involved in a staybehind operation are held to a minimum. b. Consideration should be given to pre-positioning personnel. This consists of placing highly trained and selected personnel in areas to function as intelligence agents and to establish and maintain contact with underground elements. When stay-behind operations are attempted, the Special Forces elements may be completely dependent on the indigenous organization for security, contacts required for expansion, and buildup of the effort. 7-32. ACTIVITIES Initially, stay-behind elements may be used for intelligence missions and for demolitions which the withdrawing force was unable to execute or which are contingent upon certain courses of enemy action. Subsequent activities begin at an appropriate time when civilian or military leaders call upon the population of the occupied area to continue resistance against the enemy. These subsequent activities include all forms of guerrilla warfare, subversion, and sabotage. Section VIII. THE RAID 7-33. PURPOSE. A raid is an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. It is used to: a. Destroy or damage fixed installations/facilities. b. Destroy or capture weapons, ammunition, equipment, and supplies. c. Eliminate or capture enemy personnel. 7-25

d. Liberate friendly personnel. e. Harass and demoralize the enemy. f. Distract attention from other operations. g. Force the enemy to deploy additional units to protect rear areas. 7-34. ORGANIZATION OF THE RAID FORCE The size of the raid force depends on the mission, the nature and location of the target, and the enemy situation. The raid force may vary from a few personnel attacking a checkpoint to a battalion attacking a large supply depot. Regardless of size, the raid force consists of four basic elements: command, assault, security, and support. a. Command Element. This element is normally composed of the raid force commander and personnel providing general support for the raid, such as medical aidmen, radio operations, and, if a fire support element is part of the raid, a forward observer. Command elements are not normally assigned specific duties with any element. The command element may be placed with any of the major elements of the raid force, and wherever the raid force commander may best influence and control the action. When personnel who normally comprise a command element perform specific duties with an element, they are assigned to that element, and no separate command element is organized. b. Assault Element. The assault element is organized as determined by the mission and, specifically, by what is needed to accomplish the major objectives of the raid. (1) If the raid objective is to attack and render unusable a critical element of a target system, such as a bridge or tunnel, it assaults and overcomes the key security functions; this is followed immediately by the special task party which places and detonates the demolition charges. (2) If the target is enemy personnel, it may conduct its attack with a high proportion of automatic weapons, covered by supporting fire from the support element. In most instances the assault element moves physically on or into the target; in other instances it is able to accomplish its task from a distance. c. Support Element. The support element of the raid force may be committed in diversionary or coordinated attacks at several points on the target to permit the assault element to gain access to the target. It also executes such complementary tasks as eliminating guards, breaching and removing obstacles to the objective, conducting 7-26

diversionary or holding actions, assisting where necessary by providing fire support, and acting as demolition teams to set charges to neutralize, destroy, or render elements of the target unusable. Normally, the support element covers the withdrawal of the assault element from the immediate area of the objective, withdrawing itself on order. d. Security Element. The security element supports the raid by securing rallying points, giving early warning of enemy approach, blocking avenues of approach into the objective area, preventing enemy escape from the objective area, and acting as the rear guard for the raid force. The size of the security element depends on the enemy's capability to intervene and disrupt the operations. (1) As the assault element moves into position, security elements keep the command group informed of all enemy activities, firing only if detected and on order from the command group. (2) Once the assault element has begun its action, the security element prevents enemy entry into or escape from the objective area. (3) As the raid force withdraws, the security element conducts a rear guard action designed to disrupt and ambush enemy movement and pursuit and to create confusion by leading the enemy away from the main force's avenue of withdrawal. 7-35. PREPARATION a. Planning Considerations. (1) The nature of the terrain and the combat efficiency of the raiding force must be considered. The first step in the selection of the target is based on its criticality, accessibility, vulnerability, and recuperability. The criticality and recuperability of various targets can be assessed prior to infiltration during the course of the area study and operational area intelligence study. Accessibility and vulnerability are situation dependent and these assessments must be supported by current intelligence. (2) Additionally, the Special Forces and resistance force commanders must consider any possible adverse effects on their units and the civilian populace as a result of the raid.' The objective is to diminish the enemy's military potential, but an improperly timed operation may provoke enemy counteraction for which resistance units and the populace are unprepared. Every precaution must be taken to insure that civilians are not needlessly subjected to harsh reprisals because of raid actions. An unsuccessful attack often may have disastrous effects on troop morale; successful operations, on the other hand, raise morale and increase the units' and their leaders' prestige in the eyes of the civilians, making them more willing to 7-27

provide support. The impact of successful raids can be exploited in detachment psychological and propaganda programs; before such action is taken, however, any possible unfavorable repercussions from the population and the enemy military forces must be considered. If a raid is unsuccessful, psychological operations will be required to lessen any adverse effects on the friendly indigenous force. (3) Although detailed, the plan for a raid must be simple and not depend on too many contingencies for success. Activities are planned so that the target installation is not alerted. This means that activities in the objective area will conform to normal patterns. Times and space are carefully considered--time is allowed for assembly and movement. All factors are considered to determine whether movement and attack should be made during daylight or darkness. Darkness naturally favors surprise and normally is the best time when the operation is simple and physical arrangement of the installation is known. Early dawn or dusk is favored when inadequate knowledge of the installation or other factors necessitates tight control of the operation. A withdrawal late in the day or at night makes close pursuit by the enemy more difficult. b. Intelligence. The raid force commander must have maximum intelligence of the target, of enemy forces capable of intervening, of the civilian population's attitude and support, and of the terrain to be traversed en route to and from the objective area; therefore, an intensive intelligence effort precedes the raid. Resistance force intelligence and reconnaissance elements conduct premission reconnaissance of the route to the target and of the target itself. In guerrilla operations, local auxiliary sources are exploited, and the auxiliaries may act as guides. Surveillance of the target begins early and continues up to the time of attack. The raid force commander exercises extreme caution to insure the secrecy of the impending operation; he carefully assigns missions to resistance force reconnaissance elements so that the local population will not become alerted and alarmed. c. Rehearsals of Participants. Realistic rehearsals for the operation are conducted by all participants; terrain similar to that found in the target area is used when available. Sand tables, sketches, photographs, and target mockups are used to assist in briefings. Contingency and emergency actions are practiced, and final rehearsals are conducted under conditions of visibility expected in the objective area. d. Final Inspection. The raid force commander conducts a final inspection of personnel and equipment before moving to the objective area. If' possible, weapons are test fired, faulty equipment is replaced, and the physical condition of each man is checked. Personal belongings are checked to insure that no incriminating documents are carried during the operation. This inspection assures the raid force 7-28

commander that his unit is equipped and ready for operation. 7-36. MOVEMENT Movement to the objective area is planned and conducted to allow the raid force to approach the target undetected. Movement may be over single or multiple routes. The preselected route or routes may terminate in or near one or more MSS's. Every effort is made to avoid contact with the enemy during movement. Upon reaching the designated rendezvous and MSS, security parties are deployed and final coordination takes place before moving to the attack position.

Figure 7-3 Movement to the objective. 7-37. ACTION IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA Special parties move to their positions and eliminate sentries, breach or remove obstacles, and execute other assigned tasks. The assault element quickly follows the special parties into, the target area. Once the objective of the raid has been accomplished, the assault element and special parties withdraw, covered by fire support elements with preselected fires. If the attack is unsuccessful, the action is terminated to prevent undue loss of personnel and the special parties withdraw according to plan. The assault and support elements die at one or more rallying points while the security elements cover the withdrawal according to plan. The assault element withdraws on signal or at a prearranged time.

7-29

Figure 7-4 Action in the objective area. 7-38. WITHDRAWAL a. Withdrawal is designed to achieve maximum deception of the enemy and minimum danger to the raid force. (1) The various elements of the raid force withdraw, on order, over predetermined routes to the base area, through a series of rallying points. (2) Should the enemy organize a close pursuit of the assault element, the security element assists by fire and movement, distracting the enemy, and slowing him down. (3) If other elements of the raid force are closely pursued by the many, they do not attempt to reach the initial rallying point; but, on their own initiative, they lead the enemy away from the remainder, of the force and attempt to lose him by evasive action in difficult terrain. (4) Specific instructions must be issued to the raiding force concerning such contingencies. Time-distance to be traveled; fire support and firepower, and the physical condition of the raiding force personnel will determine what course of action to follow. An 7-30

attempt may be made to reestablish contact with the main force at other rallying points, to continue to the base area as separate groups, to reach selected areas for evacuation, or, as a last resort, to hold up in a selected MSS until such time as relief can be effected by the main force or a local auxiliary element. (5) The raid force, or elements of it, may separate and proceed as small groups or individuals to evade close pursuit. b. Frequently in withdrawal operations, the raid force may disperse in smaller units, withdrawing in different directions and reassembling later at a predesignated place to conduct further operations. Elements of the raid force can conduct other operations, such as an ambush or pursuing the enemy force, during the withdrawal.

Figure 7-5 Withdrawal from the objective area. 7-39. LARGE RAIDS a. General. When a target is large and well guarded, a larger raid force is required to insure a successful attack. Large raids may involve using a battalion-size unit; and, though conduct is similar to that for smaller raids, additional problems must be considered. 7-31

b. Movement to Objective Area. Surprise is just as desirable as in a smaller raid, but it is usually harder to achieve. In operational areas, the number of troops to be assembled and deployed may require additional MSS's at a greater distance from the target to preserve secrecy; this will necessitate a longer move to the attack position. A large raid force usually moves by small components over multiple routes to the objective area.

Figure 7-6 Movement to the objective area—large raid force. c. Control. Another problem inherent in a large raid is that of control. Units without extensive radio communication equipment or units operating in an active EW environment will find coordination of widespread elements difficult to achieve. Pyrotechnics, audible signals, runners, or predesignated times may be used to coordinate action. In any event, even under optimum conditions massing of the raid force at the objective is extremely difficult. The resultant complexity of the plan and the possibility of overall failure if subordinate elements do not arrive on time must be carefully considered during the planning phase. d. Training. A high degree of training and discipline is required to execute a large raid. Extensive rehearsals assist in preparing the force for the mission. In particular, commanders and staffs must learn to use large numbers of troops as a cohesive fighting force. e. Fire Support. Additional fire support is usually required. Ira UWOA's this may mean secretly caching ammunition in MSS's over a 7-32

period of time before the raid. Guerrillas may each carry a mortar, recoilless rifle round, rocket or box of machinegun ammunition, and leave them at the MSS or firing position for fire support units. f. Timing. Timing is usually more difficult for a large raid. More time is required to move units, and the main action element needs more time to perform its mission. This requires stronger security elements to isolate the objective for longer periods. The time of the raid takes on increased importance because of the large numbers of personnel involved. Movement to the objective is usually accomplished during periods of low visibility; however, because of fire support coordination requirements and large numbers of personnel, the action may take place during daylight hours. g. Withdrawal. In a UWOA, withdrawal from a large raid usually is by smaller groups over multiple routes in order to deceive the enemy and dissipate his pursuit. Dispersed withdrawal also denies a lucrative target to enemy air and fire support elements. However, the raid force commander must consider the possibility of an alert and aggressive enemy defeating the dispersed elements of the force. All factors must be carefully weighed before deciding on how to conduct the withdrawal. Section IX. AMBUSHES 7-40. INTRODUCTION a. An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position upon a moving or temporarily halted target. It is one of the oldest and most effective types of military operations. b. Ambush may include assault to close with and decisively engage the target, or the attack may be by fire only. c. Ambush is highly effective in conventional operations and even more suitable and effective in guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations. (1) It is a favorite tactic of guerrilla forces because: (a) It does not require that ground be seized and held. (b) It enables small forces with limited weapons and equipment to harass or destroy larger, better armed forces. (2) It is an effective counterguerrilla measure because: (a) It forces the guerrillas to engage in decisive combat at unfavorable times and places. (b) It denies the guerrillas the freedom of movement on which their success so greatly depends. 7-33

(c) It deprives the guerrillas of weapons, ammunition, and equipment that is very difficult to replace. (d) The death or capture of "hard core" personnel greatly weakens the guerrilla force. 7-41. PURPOSE Ambushes are executed to reduce the enemy's overall combat effectiveness, to destroy, and to harass. a. Destruction is the primary purpose because loss of men killed or captured and loss of equipment and supplies destroyed or captured critically affects the enemy. The capture of equipment and supplies may assist our forces. b. Harassment, a secondary purpose, is also very important. Frequent ambushes force the enemy to divert men from other missions to guard convoys, troop movements, and carrying parties. When patrols fail to accomplish their missions because they are ambushed, the enemy is deprived of the valuable contributions these patrols would make to his combat effort. A series of successful ambushes causes the enemy to be less aggressive and more defensive minded. His men become apprehensive and overly cautious. They become reluctant to go on patrols, to move in convoys, or, to move in small groups. They seek to avoid night operations, are more subject to confusion and panic if ambushed, and, in general, decline in effectiveness. 7-42. TYPES OF AMBUSHES There are three types of ambush: point, area, and hasty. a. A point ambush is one where elements are deployed to support attack of a single killing zone. b. An area ambush is one where elements are deployed as multiple related point ambushes. c. A hasty ambush is an immediate action drill (appendix E). 7-43. DESCRIPTIVE TERMS/DISCUSSIONS OF AMBUSH OPERATIONS a. Ambush Site--The established.

terrain

on

which

a

point

ambush

is

b. Killing Zone--The portion of an ambush site where fires are concentrated to isolate, trap, and destroy the target. c. Ambush Force--The patrol, squad, platoon, or other unit which establishes an ambush.

7-34

d. Attack Force--The fire and maneuver portion of a point ambush. In a patrol, the assault and support elements are the attack force. e. Security Element--The early warning and/or security portion of a point ambush. In a patrol, the security element is the security force. f. "Rise From the Ground" Ambush--A point ambush in which the attack element is completely concealed in the "spider hole" type of covered foxholes. When the ambush is initiated, the assault element throws back the covers and "rises from the ground" to attack the target. This ambush is usually the "near" ambush described below. This ambush is appropriate in open terrain, seemingly void of good cover and concealment, and otherwise lacking the features considered desirable in a good ambush site. g. Near Ambush--A point ambush whose assault element is located within reasonable assaulting distance of the killing zone (50 meters is a guide figure). Close terrain, such as jungle and heavy woods, may require this positioning. It may also be appropriate in open terrain in a "rise from the ground" ambush. h. Far Ambush--A point ambush whose assault element is located beyond reasonable assaulting distance of the killing zone (beyond 50 meters is a guide figure). This location may be appropriate in open terrain offering good fields of fire or when attack is by fire only (harassing ambush). i. Harassing Ambush--An ambush in which attack is by fire only. j. Destruction Ambush--An ambush which includes assault to close with and decisively engage the target. k. Deliberate Ambush--An ambush planned as a specific action against a specific target. Detailed information of the target is required: size, nature, organization, armament, equipment, route of movement, and times the target will reach or pass certain points on its route. Deliberate ambushes are planned when: (1) Reliable information is received on the intended movement of a specific force. (2) Patrols, convoys, carrying parties, or similar forces establish patterns of size, time, and movement sufficient to perm it detailed planning for their ambush. l. Ambush of Opportunity--The ambush of a target of opportunity, often the action of a search and attack patrol. (1) When available information does not permit the detailed panning required for deliberate ambush, an ambush of opportunity is 7-35

planned.In his case, the ambush force plans and prepares for the ambush and attacks the first suitable target appearing. (2) A search and attack patrol, before departing, plans and rehearses the ambush of the types of targets it may encounter. It establishes and executes ambushes as opportunities arise. m. Line, L, Z, T, V, Triangle (Open and Closed), and Box--Ambush formations are discussed herein. 7-44. FUNDAMENTALS OF SUCCESSFUL AMBUSH Surprise, coordinated fires, and control are the basic elements essential to successful ambush. a. Surprise. Surprise must be achieved, otherwise the attack is not an ambush; it is surprise that distinguishes ambush from other forms of attack. It is surprise that allows the ambush force to seize and retain control of the situation. If complete surprise cannot be achieved, it must be so nearly complete that the target is not aware of the ambush until too late for effective reaction. Surprise is achieved by careful planning, preparation, and execution. Targets are attacked when, where, and in a manner for which they are least., prepared. b. Coordinated Fires. All weapons, including mines and demolitions, must be positioned, and all fires, including those of available artillery and mortars, must be coordinated to achieve (1) The isolation of the killing zone to prevent escape or reinforcement. (2) The surprise delivery of a large volume of highly concentrated fires into the killing zone. These fires must inflict maximum damage so that, when desired, the target can be speedily assaulted and completely destroyed. c. Control. Close control must be maintained during movement to, occupation of, and withdrawal from the ambush site. (1) The ambush commander must effectively control all elements. Control is most critical at the time of approach of the target. Control measures must provide for: (a) Early warning of target approach. (b) Withholding fire until the target has moved into the killing zone. (c) Opening fire at the proper time.

7-36

(d) Initiating appropriate prematurely detected.

actions

if

the

ambush

is

(e) Lifting or shifting supporting fires when the attack includes assault of the target. (f) Timely and orderly withdrawal to an easily recognized rallying point. (2) Personnel conducting the ambush must control themselves so that the ambush is not compromised. They must remain still and quiet while waiting for the target to appear. They may have to forego smoking, endure insect bits and thirst in silence, and resist sleeping, easing cramped muscles, and performing normal body functions. When the target approaches, they must not open fire before the signal is given. 7-45. POINT AMBUSH a. General. (1) A point ambush, whether independent or part of an area ambush, is positioned along the target's expected route of approach. Formation is important because, to a great extent, it determines whether a point ambush can deliver the heavy volume of highly concentrated fire necessary to isolate, trap, and destroy the target. (2) The formation to be used is determined by carefully considering possible formations and the advantages and disadvantages of each in relation to terrain, conditions of visibility, forces, weapons, and equipment; ease or difficulty of control; target to be attacked; and overall combat situation. (3) This manual discusses a few formations which have been developed for the deployment of point ambushes. Those discussed are identified by giving them names which correspond to the general pattern formed on the ground by deployment of the attack element. b. Point Ambush Formations. (1) Line. The attack element is deployed generally parallel to the target's route of movement (road, trail, stream). This positions the attack element parallel to the long axis of the killing zone and subjects the target to heavy flanking fire. The size of the target which can be trapped in the killing zone is limited by the area which the attack element can effectively cover with a heavy volume of highly concentrated fire. The target is trapped in the killing zone by natural obstacles, mines (Claymore, anti-vehicular, antipersonnel), demolitions, and direct and indirect fires (1, fig. 7-7). A disadvantage of the line formation is the chance that lateral dispersion of the target may be too great for effective coverage. 7-37

Line formation is appropriate in close terrain which restricts target maneuver and in open terrain where one flank is restricted by mines, demolition's, mantraps, or sharpened stakes. Similar obstacles can be placed between the attack element and the killing zone to provide protection from the target's counterambush measures. When a destruction ambush is deployed in this manner, access lanes are left so that the target can be assaulted (2, fig. 7--7). The line formation can be effectively used by a "rise from the ground" ambush in terrain seemingly unsuitable for ambush. An advantage of the line formation is its relative ease of control under all conditions of visibility.

Figure 7-7 Ambush formations.

7-38

Figure 7-7 – Continued. (2) The L. The L-shaped formation is a variation of the line formation. The long side of the attack element is parallel to the killing zone and delivers flanking fire. The short side of the attack element is at the end of, and at right angles to, the killing zone and delivers enfilading fire which interlocks with fire from the other leg. This formation is very flexible. It can be established on a straight stretch of a trail or stream (3, fig. 7-7), or at a sharp bend in a trail or stream (4, fig. 7-7). When appropriate, fire from the short leg can be shifted to parallel the long leg if the target attempts to assault or escape in the opposite direction. In addition, the short leg prevents escape in its direction and reinforcement from its direction (5, fig. 7-7).

7-39

Figure 7-7 – Continued

7-40

Figure 7-7 – Continued. (3) The Z. The Z-shaped formation is another variation of the line formation. The attack force is deployed as in the L formation, but with an additional side so that the formation resembles the letter Z. The additional side (6, fig. 7-7) may serve: (a) To engage a force attempting to relieve or reinforce the target. (b) To seal the end of the killing zone. (c) To restrict a flank.

7-41

Figure 7-7 – Continued. (4) The T. In the T-shaped formation the attack element is deployed across, and at right angles to, the target's route of movement so that it and the target form the letter T. This formation can be used day or night to establish a purely harassing ambush and at night to establish an ambush to interdict movement through open, hard-to-seal areas (such as rice paddies). (a) A small group of persons can use the T formation to harass, slow, and disorganize a larger force. When the lead elements of the target are engaged, they will normally attempt to maneuver right or left to close with the ambush. Mines, mantraps, and other obstacles placed to the flanks of the killing zone slow, the enemy's movements and permit the ambush force to deliver heavy fire and withdraw without becoming decisively engaged (7, fig. 7-7).

7-42

Figure 7-7 – Continued. (b) The T formation can be used to interdict small groups attempting night movement across open areas. For example, the attack element is deployed along a rice paddy dike with every second person facing in the opposite direction. The attack of a target approaching from either direction requires only that every second person shift to the opposite side of the dike. Each person fires only to his front and only when the target is at very close range. Attack is by fire only and each person keeps the target under fire as long as it remains on his front. If the target attempts to escape in either 7-43

direction along the dike, each than takes it under fire as it comes to his vicinity. The T formation is very effective at halting infiltration. But it has one chief disadvantage: there is a possibility that while spread out the ambush will engage a superior force. Use of this formation must, therefore, fit the local enemy situation (8, fig. 7-7).

Figure 7-7 – Continued. (5) The V. The V-shaped attack element is deployed along both sides of the target's route of movement so that it forms the letter V; care is taken to insure that neither group (or leg) fires into the other. This formation subjects the target; to both enfilading and interlocking fire. The V formation is best suited for fairly open terrain but can also be used in jungle. When established in jungle, the legs of the V close in as the head elements o f the target approach the apex of the V; they then open fire from close range. Here, even more than in open terrain, all movement and fire must: be carefully coordinated and controlled to insure that the fire of one leg does not endanger the other. The wider separation of elements makes this formation difficult to control and there are fewer sites that favor its use. Its main advantage is that it is difficult for the target to detect the ambush until well into the killing gone (g, 10, fig. 7-7).

7-44

Figure 7-7 – Continued.

7-45

(6) Triangle. This is a variation of the V formation and can be varied in three ways. (a) Closed triangle. (11, fig. 7-7). The attack element is deployed in three groups or parties, positioned so that they form a triangle (or closed V). An automatic weapon is placed at each point of the triangle, and positioned so that it can be shifted quickly to interlock with either of the others. Men are positioned so that their fields of fire overlap. Mortars may be positioned inside the triangle. When deployed in this manner, the triangle ambush becomes a small unit strongpoint which is used to interdict night movement through rice paddies and other open areas, when target approach is likely to be from any direction. The formation provides all-round security, and security parties are deployed only when they can he positioned so that, if detected by an approaching target, they will not compromise the ambush. Attack is by fire only, and the target is allowed to approach within close range before fire is opened.

Figure 7-7 – Continued. 7-46

1. Advantages. • Ease of control. • All-round security. • A target, approaching from any direction, can be brought under fire of at least two automatic weapons. 2. Disadvantages. • Requires an ambush force of platoon size or larger to reduce the danger of being overrun by an unexpectedly large target. fire.

• One or more legs of the triangle may come under enfilade

• Lack of dispersion, particularly at the points, increases danger from enemy mortar fire. (b) Open triangle (harassing ambush). This variation of the triangle ambush is designed to enable a small force to harass, slow, and inflict heavy casualties upon a larger force without itself being decisively engaged. The attack element is deployed in three parties, positioned so that each party becomes a corner of a triangle containing the killing zone. When the target enters the killing zone, the party to the target's front opens fire on the leading element. When the target counterattacks, the group withdraws and an assault party to the flank opens fire. When this party is attacked, the party to the opposite flank opens fire. This process is repeated until the target is pulled apart. Each party reoccupies its position, if possible, and continues to inflict the maximum damage possible without becoming decisively engaged (12, fig. 7-7). (c) Open triangle (destruction ambush). The attack element is again deployed in three parties, positioned so that each party is a point of the triangle, 200-300 meters apart. The killing zone is the area within the triangle. The target is allowed to enter the killing zone; the nearest party attacks by fire. As the target attempts to maneuver or withdraw, the other groups open fire. One or more assault parties, as directed, assault or maneuver to envelop or destroy the target (13, fig. 7-7). As a destruction ambush, this formation is suitable for platoon size or larger forces. A unit smaller than a platoon would be in too great a danger of being overrun.

7-47

Figure 7-7 – Continued.

7-48

Figure 7-7 – Continued. 1. Control, in assaulting or maneuvering, is very difficult. Very close coordination and controls are necessary to insure that assaulting or maneuvering assault parties are not fired on by another party. 7-49

2. The ambush site must be a fairly level, open area which provides (around its border) concealment for the ambush element (unless it is a "rise from the ground" ambush). (7) Box. This formation is similar in purpose to the open triangle ambush. The attack element is deployed in four parties, positioned so that each party becomes a corner of a square or rectangle containing the killing zone. It can be used for harassing or destruction ambush in the same manner as the two variations of the open triangle ambush (14, 15, fig. 7-7).

Figure 7-7 – Continued. 7-50

Figure 7-7 – Continued.

7-51

7-46. AREA AMBUSH a. Background. The origin of the type of ambush now called area ambush is not known. It was used by Hannibal against the Romans in the second century B.C. More recently, it was modified and perfected by the British Army in Malaya and, with several variations, used in Vietnam. The British found that point ambushes often failed to produce heavy casualties. When ambushed, the Communist guerrillas would immediately break contact and disperse along escape routes leading away from the killing zone. The British counteracted this tactic by blocking escape routes with point ambushes. They called these multiple related point ambushes the area ambush. b. Area Ambush (British Version). (1) The British Army version of the area ambush is as follows: (a) A point ambush is established at a site having several trails or other escape routes leading away from it. The site may be a water hole, an enemy campsite, a known rendezvous point, or along a frequently traveled trail. This site is the central killing zone. (b) Point ambushes are established along the trails or other escape routes leading away from the central killing zone. (c) The target, whether a single group or several groups approaching from different directions, is permitted to move to the central killing zone. Outlying ambushes do not attack (unless discovered). (d) The ambush is initiated when the target moves into the central killing zone. (e) When the target breaks contact and attempts to disperse, escaping portions are intercepted and destroyed by the outlying ambushes. (f) The multiple contacts achieve increased casualties, harassment, and confusion (1, fig. 7-8), (2) This version of the area ambush is best suited to counterguerrilla operations in terrain where movement is largely restricted to trails. It produces best results when established as a deliberate ambush.

7-52

Figure 7-8. Area ambush. (3) When there is not sufficient intelligence for a deliberate ambush, an area ambush of opportunity may be established. The outlying ambushes are permitted to attack targets approaching the central killing zone, if within their capability. If too large for the particular outlying ambush, the target is allowed to continue and is attacked in the central killing zone. c. Area Ambush (Baited Trap Version). (1) A variation of the area ambush is the "baited trap" version (2, fig. 7-8).

7-53

Figure 7-8 – Continued. (a) A central killing zone is established along the target's route of approach. (b) Point ambushes are established along the routes over which relieving or reinforcing units will have to approach. (c) The target in the central killing zone serves as "bait" to lure relieving or reinforcing units into the killing zones of the outlying ambushes. (d) The outlying point ambushes need not be strong enough to destroy their targets. They may be small harassing ambushes which delay, disorganize, and "eat away" the target by successive contacts. (2) This version can be varied by using a fixed installation as "bait" to lure relieving or reinforcing units into the killing zone of one or more of the outlying ambushes. The installation replaces the central killing zone and is attacked. The attack may intend to overcome the installation or may be only a ruse. (3) These two variations are best suited for situations where routes of approach for relieving or reinforcing units are limited to those favorable for ambush.

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(4) They are also best suited for use by guerrilla forces, rather than counterguerrilla forces. Both variations were extensively used by Communist guerrilla forces in Vietnam. 7-47. UNUSUAL AMBUSH TECHNIQUES a. General. The ambush techniques described above are so well known and widely used that they are considered "standard." Other, less well known, less frequently used techniques are considered "unusual." Two such techniques are described below. b. "Rise from the Ground" Ambush. (1) This point ambush is designed (1, fig. 7-g) to be established in open areas which lack the good cover and concealment., and other features normally desirable in a "good" ambush site. The attack element is deployed in the formation best suited to the overall situation. (a) The attack element is completely concealed in the "spider hole" type of covered foxhole. Soil is carefully removed and positions expertly camouflaged. (b) When the ambush is initiated, the attack element throws back the covers and literally "rises from the ground" to attack. (2) This ambush takes advantage of the tendency of patrols, and other units, to relax in areas which do not appear to favor ambush. (3) The chief disadvantage is that the ambush element is very vulnerable if prematurely detected.

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Figure 7-9. Unusual ambush techniques.

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c. Demolition Ambush. (1) Electrically detonated mines or demolition charges, or both, are planted in an area (2, fig. 7-9) over which a target is expected to pass. This may be a portion .of a road or trail, an open field, or any area which can be observed from a distance. Activating wires are run to a concealed observation point sufficiently distant to insure safety of the ambushers. (2) As large a force as desired or necessary can be used to mine the arms. Two men remain to initiate the ambush; others return to the unit. (3) When a target enters the mined area (killing zone) the two men remaining detonate the explosives and withdraw immediately to avoid detection and pursuit. d. Special Ambush Situations. (1) Columns protected by armor. Attacks against columns protected by armored vehicles depend on the type and location of armored vehicles in a column and the weapons of the ambush force. If possible, armored vehicles are destroyed or disabled by fire of antitank weapons, landmines, Molotov cocktails, or by throwing hand grenades into open hatches. An effort is made to immobilize armored vehicles at a point where they are unable to give protection to the rest of the convoy and where they will block the route of other, supporting vehicles.

Figure 7-9 – Continued. 7-57

(2) Ambush of trains. Moving trains may be subjected to harassing fire, but the most effective ambush is derailment. Derailment on a grade, at a sharp curve, or on a high bridge will cause most of the cars to overturn and result .in extensive casualties among the passengers. It is desirable to derail trains so that the wreckage remains on the tracks to delay traffic for long periods of time. Fire is directed on the exits of overturned coaches; and designated parties, armed with automatic weapons, rush forward to assault coaches or cars still standing. Other parties take supplies from freight yards and then set fire to the train. Rails are removed from the track at some distance from the ambush site in each direction to delay the arrival of reinforcements by train. In planning the ambush of a train, remember that the enemy may include armored railroad cars in the train for its protection and that important trains may be preceded by advance guard locomotives or inspection ears to check the track. (3) Ambush of waterway traffic. Waterway traffic, such as barges or ships, may be ambushed similar to a vehicular column. The ambush party may be able to mine the waterway and thus stop traffic. If mining is not feasible, fire delivered by recoilless weapons can damage or sink the craft. Fire should be directed at engine room spaces, the waterline, and the bridge. Recovery of supplies may be possible if the craft is beached on the banks of the waterway or grounded in shallow water. 7-48. AMBUSH PATROLS a. General. (1) An ambush patrol is a combat patrol whose mission is to establish and execute an ambush to(a) Harass a target. (b) Destroy a target. (c) Capture personnel or equipment. (d) Any combination of these. (2) An ambush patrol is planned and prepared in the same general manner as other patrols--by using Patrol Steps (Troop Leading Procedures). b. Planning and Preparation. Planning must first consider whether the ambush is to be a deliberate ambush or an ambush of opportunity. In a deliberate ambush the greater amount of target intelligence available permits planning for every course of action at the target. Planning for an ambush of opportunity must include tentative plans not only for the types of targets which may be ambushes, but for varying situations as well. In both, plans must be flexible enough to 7-58

allow modifying, as appropriate, at the ambush site. All plans must be rehearsed in detail. Planning must provide for the following: (1) Simplicity. Every person must thoroughly understand what he is to do at every stage of the operation. In ambush, more so than in other operations, failure of even one person to perform exactly as planned can cause failure. (2) Type of ambush. Type of ambush (point or area) affects organization, number of men required, equipment and communications required, and all other aspects of the patrol. (3) Deployment. Each possible formation must be considered for its advantages and disadvantages. (4) Manner of attack. Attack may be by fire only (harassing ambush) or may include assault of the target (destruction ambush). (5) Size of ambush force. The patrol is tailored for its mission. Two men may be adequate for an harassing ambush. A destruction ambush may require the entire unit (squad, platoon, company). (6) Organization. An ambush patrol is organized in the same manner as other combat patrols to include a patrol headquarters, an assault element, a support element, and a security element. The assault and support elements are the attack force; the security element is the security force. When appropriate, the attack force is further organized to provide a reserve force. When an ambush site is to be occupied for an extended period, double ambush forces may be organized. One ambush force occupies the site while the other rests, eats, and tends to personal needs at the objective rallying point or other concealed location. They alternate each 8 hours. If the waiting period is over 24 hours, three ambush forces are organized (fig. 710). (7) Equipment. The selection of accompanying equipment/ supplies is based on: (a) The mission. (b) The enemy threat. (c) The size of the resistance force. (d) The means of transportation. (e) The distance and terrain. (f) The weight and bulk of equipment.

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Figure 7-10 – Continued.

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(8) Routes. (a) A primary route is planned which will allow the patrol to enter the ambush site from the rear. The killing zone is not entered if entry can be avoided. If the killing zone must be entered to place-mines or explosives, great care must; be taken to remove any tracks and signs that might alert the target and compromise the ambush. If mines, mantraps, or explosives are to be placed on the far side, or if the appearance of the site from the target's viewpoint is to be checked, a wide detour around the killing zone is made. Here, too, great care must be taken to remove any traces which might reveal the ambush. (b) An alternate route from the ambush site is planned, as in other patrols. (9) Site. Maps and aerial photographs are used to analyze the terrain. When possible, an on-the-ground reconnaissance is made. As far as possible, so-called "ideal" ambush sites are avoided. An alert enemy is suspicious of these areas, avoids them if possible, and increases vigilance and security when they must be entered. Surprise is even more difficult to achieve in these areas. Instead, apparently unlikely sites are chosen when possible. Considering this, an ambush site must provide (a) Favorable fields of fire. (b) For occupation and preparation of concealed positions. (c) Canalization of the target into the killing zone. (d) Covered routes of withdrawal to enable the ambush force to break contact and avoid pursuit by effective fire. (10) Occupation of the site. As a general rule, the ambush force occupies the ambush site at the latest possible time permitted by the tactical situation and the amount of site preparation required. This not only reduces the risk of discovery but also reduces the time men must remain still and quiet in position. (11) Positions. The patrol moves into the ambush site from the rear ((8) above. Security elements are positioned first to prevent surprise while the ambush is being established. Automatic weapons are then positioned so that each can fire along the entire killing zone. If this is not possible, they are given overlapping sectors of fire so that the entire killing zone is covered. The patrol leader then selects his position, located where he can tell when to initiate the ambush. Riflemen and grenadiers are then placed to cover any dead space left by the automatic weapons. All weapons are assigned sectors of fire to 7-61

provide mutual support. The patrol leader sets a time by which positions are to be prepared. The degree of preparation depends on the time allowed. All men work at top speed during the allotted time. (12) Camouflage. Camouflage is of utmost importance. Each man must be hidden from the target. During preparation for the patrol, each man camouflages himself and his equipment and secures his equipment to prevent noise. At the ambush site, positions' are prepared with minimum change .in the natural appearance of the site. All debris resulting from preparation of positions is concealed. (13) Movement, noise, and light discipline. Movement is kept to a minimum and the number of men moving; at a time is closely controlled. Every man is as quiet as possible, especially a?: night. Light discipline is rigidly enforced at night. Smoking is forbidden at night and is closely controlled in the day. c. Execution. (1) Signals. Three signals, often four, are needed to execute the ambush. Audible and visual signals, such as whistles and pyrotechnics, must be changed often to avoid establishing patterns. Too frequently, use of the same signals may result, in their becoming known to the enemy. A target might recognize a signal and be able to react in time to avoid the full effects of an ambush. For example, if a white star cluster is habitually used to signal withdrawal in a night ambush, an alert enemy might fire one and cause premature withdrawal. (a) A signal by the security force to alert they patrol leader to the target's approach may be given by1. Arm-and-hand signals. 2. Radio, as a quiet voice message, by transmitting a prearranged number of taps, or by signaling with the push--to-talk switch. 3. Field telephone, when there is no danger that wire between positions will compromise the ambush. (b) A signal to initiate the ambush, given by the patrol leader or a designated individual, may be a shot or the detonation of mines or explosives. (c) A signal for lifting or shifting fires, if the target is to be assaulted may be given by voice; command, whistles, or pyrotechnics. All fire must stop immediately so that the assault; can be made before the target can react.

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(d) A signal for withdrawal may also be by voice command, whistles, or pyrotechnics. (2) Fire Discipline. This is a key part of the ambush. Fire must be withheld until the signal is given, then immediately delivered in the heaviest, most accurate volume possible. Properly timed and delivered fires contribute heavily to the achievement of surprise as well as to destruction. of the target. When the target is to be assaulted, the lifting or shifting of fires must be equally precise. Otherwise, the assault is delayed and the target has opportunity to recover and react. (3) Withdrawal to the Objective Rallying Point. (a) The objective rallying point is located far enough from the ambush site that it will not be overrun if the target attacks the ambush. Routes of withdrawal to the objective rallying point are reconnoitered. Situation permitting, each person walks the route he is to use and picks out checkpoints. When the ambush is to be executed at night, each person must be able to follow his route in the dark. (b) On signal, the patrol quickly but quietly withdraws to the objective rallying point, reorganizes, and begins its return march. (c) If the ambush was not successful and the patrol is pursued, withdrawal may be by bounds. The last group may arm mines, previously placed along the withdrawal route, to further delay pursuit. Section X. MINING AND SNIPING 7-49. GENERAL Mines, boobytraps, and snipers can be used to interdict enemy lines of communication and key areas. They may also be used to support raids and ambushes. 7-50. MINING Mining affords the Special Forces and resistance force commander a means of interdicting enemy routes of communication and key areas with little expenditure of manpower. Mines may be used in support of specific tactical operations or for general harassment of the enemy by emplacement along routes of enemy movement. They may be emplaced around installations to cause casualties, limit movement, and induce low morale among enemy troops. For detailed information on use and installation of mines, boobytraps, and other devices, see (C) FM 531. 7-63

7-51. SNIPING a. General. Sniping as an interdiction technique has a demoralizing effect on the enemy. A few personnel, well-trained in sniper operations and properly deployed, can cause numerous casualties, hinder or temporarily deny enemy use of certain routes or areas, and may require him to employ a disproportionate number of troops to rid the area of snipers. Detachment commanders and resistance force commanders selecting, training, and deploying snipers throughout their area must be completely familiar with their use, be able to train them properly, and plan for logistical support in acquiring special sniper equipment to make them effective in all types of operations. b. The Sniper. A sniper is an expert rifleman, physically and mentally hardened to endure long periods of loneliness and hardship. Ire must be able to: (1) Estimate ranges. (2) Search areas systematically. (3) Locate and identify sounds. (4) Use cover, concealment, and camouflage. (5) Use maps, sketches, aerial photographs, and the compass. (6) Recognize enemy personnel and equipment quickly. (7) Move without detection. (8) Endure long periods of waiting (patience). c. Missions. Snipers assigned areas of responsibility should have mission-type orders outlining priority targets that may include killing key enemy personnel such as patrol leaders, gunners of crewserved and automatic weapons, communication personnel, observers, and enemy snipers. In the absence of these priority targets, they may fire on any enemy personnel. Snipers may cover an area that has been reined to prevent removal or exploitation of the minefield. They may be used as part of a raid or ambush to stop enemy personnel escaping the area under attack. In addition to their sniping mission, they may collect information for intelligence sections of the area command or guerrilla units. In their constant search for targets, they become thoroughly familiar with the terrain, enemy actions, and movements, routes of communications, and other activities. d. Selection and Training. Detachment commanders and resistance force commanders select snipers from their outstanding guerrilla force personnel, specifically the rifleman in operational units. 7-64

Additional training should be given in maintenance and operation of electronic night firing devices, viewing devices such as telescopic sights, and other types of firing devices as the commanders deem necessary or as time permits. e. Planning for Their Use. Plans must be made to properly locate individual snipers or sniper teams. The use of snipers should be incorporated into the tactical plan of the area commander, and their use should be coordinated with individual guerrilla units and subsector commanders. When snipers are being employed in specific areas, all operations should be curtailed in that area or conducted on a limited basis. Special provisions must be made for the sniper's rest and recuperation after strenuous tours of duty. This may require a special unit, tightly controlled by the area command. f. Sniffer Teams. Snipers are best employed in pairs, particularly when operating from a stationary post. Remaining in one position for long periods of time, and the constant use of binoculars, places a heavy strain on one man. By working in pairs, snipers can alternate duties, thus keeping their post in continuous operation. One observes and estimates ranges, while the other fires. The first shot should be a hit. g. The Individual Sniper. The individual sniper is normally used when two might be detected. He can often cover a large area by moving from one firing position to another as often as required in the search for worthwhile targets and good fields of fire. Close coordination between sector and subsector commanders is required in these cases. h. Equipment. The individual sniper carries only the equipment and supplies needed to complete the mission within an estimated time. In some instances, he may have to rely on MSS's or caches to replenish supplies and equipment for either his operational role or his survival. The decision to release the location of these sites to the sniper or sniper teams rests with the area commander. The sniper may need, as a minimum, his weapon; binoculars; watch; compass; map; camouflaged clothing; telescope sight and, if available, infrared weapon sight or ametascope; and individual rations. Other equipment to support assigned missions should be obtained as required. 7-52. OBSTACLES Obstacles and expedient devices can be used to the fullest extent against many personnel to support security operations of base camps, installations, and facilities. a. Security of Base Operations. Guerrilla units and other resistance forces operating as military units normally establish base camps, installations, and facilities in remote areas not easily accessible to the enemy except for foot troops. Special Forces and resistance force commanders should support their inner security zone 7-65

by the use of expedient devices to interdict enemy foot patrols, and early warning nets to prevent penetration of security. Such devices can be used to fill voids or gaps between outpost, listening posts, and lookouts. Natural obstacles such as swamps, cliffs, and rivers are used to impede enemy movement. These obstacles should be considered when planning the employment of expedient devices. Consideration should be given to: (1) Heavy emplacement of antipersonnel obstacles versus antivehicle obstacles. (2) Installation of mine fields and barbed wire concealed in brush areas. (3) Utilizing impenetrable brush and nuisance items (i.e., sharpened stakes, nails, or other impaling devices). (4) Installing, in trails and in ravines, mantraps such as camouflaged pits with sharpened stakes or impaling devices in the bottom. (5) All types of boobytraps (see (C) FM 5-31). b. Raids and Ambushes. When supporting such operations, antipersonnel mines and anti-vehicle mines may be placed in ditches and on the sides of roads to prevent enemy personnel from escaping the killing zone of the objective. Such devices may be liberally strewn over routes into and out of the objective area. They act a s nuisance items to a reinforcing enemy unit. If friendly civilians in the area use the area of operation, they will be exposed to the danger. Tight control is required in employing expedient devices.

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CHAPTER 8 LOGISTICS Section I. INTRODUCTION 8-1. GENERAL a. Logistical support to UW forces includes the same functions as those of conventional forces (i.e., labor, maintenance, construction, hospitalization, evacuation, supply, transportation, and other services). UW forces located in operational areas usually depend on local sources for logistical support. The logistical support of UW forces is complicated by the problems of transporting supplies and equipment over or through territory under enemy control. This creates a requirement for clandestine delivery which limits the amount of external logistical support for UWOA's. b. Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) provides logistical support for Special Forces units located in the COMMZ. This support follows conventional logistical support procedures, and provision for it is included in existing unified command UW plans. The JUWC/JUWTF serves as the agency to prepare UW logistical support estimates. 8-2. RESISTANCE FORCE SUPPORT a. External logistical support is provided by TAACOM. It is coordinated by and processed through the SFOB/FOB. b. The logistical support to UW forces located in denied areas is usually limited to mission essential supplies. Normally, extensive transportation, maintenance, hospitalization and evacuation, construction, and other services to UWOA's cannot be furnished from external sources. The nature and extent of external logistical, support is largely dependent on the delivery means available. 8-3. SUPPLY OF OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS a. The quantity and types of supplies and equipment carried by Special Forces on infiltration (accompanying supply) are determined by: (1) Capabilities. (2) Responsiveness to friendly control. (3) Contacts existing with resistance forces. (4) Size of resistance forces. (5) Enemy capabilities. 8-1

(6) Method of infiltration (i.e., land, sea, or air). (7) Requirements for survival. (8) Available resources in the UWOA. b. Based on the above data, the SFOB establishes tentative supply levels for each operational area and predetermines a sequence and method of delivery. These supply levels are plans and may be altered by recommendation of the SF element based on the area assessment (made after infiltration). 8-4. RESISTANCE FORCE LOGISTICS a. There is no standard resistance force logistics system. Each system is developed to meet the specific needs and peculiarities of the situation. As resistance force requirement, and the local situation change, the logistics system must be modified accordingly 1,o insure optimum overall system effectiveness. b. A resistance force has two sources of logistical support.: (1) Internal -- the UWOA. (2) External -- the sponsor. Section II. INTERNAL SUPPORT 8-5. GENERAL a. The UWOA will normally provide the bulk of the required logistical support. Special Forces must convince the area command that all supplies will not be provided by the sponsor. The area command must develop an effective internal logistical system tailored to their specific needs and operations. b. In dealing with the civilian population, the area command must balance its support requirements against the need to gain and maintain civilian cooperation. Imposing excessive demands on the civilian populace may adversely affect this cooperation. This will limit tactical operations and increase reliance on external supply. c. Support for indigenous personnel is affected by three, primary considerations: (1) Geographical locations. The geographical location determines the type and extent of agriculture dominant in the area. To some extent it also influences the diet of the local population. In addition, it influences the type and amount of personal clothing and equipment required and life expectancy of these items. It also has a 8-2

bearing on diseases and noncombat injuries. The geography of an area and the enemy situation influence the type of targets to be attacked. (2) Size of the force. The size of the force to be supported is important. If local food procurement is adequate only for the present force, then food supply problems will limit the size of forces to be developed. Available information in the UWOA enables the Special Forces and resistance force commanders to forecast needs and plan appropriate procurement well in advance. Reasonably accurate experience factors to guide supply planning can be developed if detailed issue records are maintained. (3) Type of operations. Support for operations can range from minor (i.e., a rifle for one sniper) to very large (i.e., weapons, communications, food, medicine, etc., for a large raid on an enemy supply or troop installation). The type of operation which can be conducted depends directly upon the available support. Indirectly, the expected unavailability of logistics in the early phases will dictate small and relatively simple operations. 8-6. LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS When compared to a similar sized conventional force, a resistance force has less but more basic logistical requirements. These generally consist of: a. Necessities of Life. (1) Food. Most areas suitable for guerrilla base camps will have some natural foods such as berries, edible plants, and small game. These foods, however, are not sufficient to sustain the energy of active guerrillas, and high-calorie foods such as grains, sugar, and certain types of meats must be provided. (2) Clothing. Where radical climatic changes take place, seasonal changes of clothing are necessary. Waterproof clothing is desirable. A guerrilla depends largely on his feet for transportation; therefore, stout, well-fitting shoes are the most important clothing item. (3) Shelter. Shelters, such as natural or constructed caves, offer the best protection from both the elements and enemy observation. Sturdy, weatherproof buts can be constructed from boughs and branches, but they should be built under growing foliage for protection against air observation. b. Equipment for Operations. (1) Weapons. Captured enemy weapons provide the primary source of weapons resupply and replacement parts. In addition, facilities may be established to manufacture or repair weapons. Weapons 8-3

accountability by type and quantity must be established to determine they rate of ammunition consumption and resupply. (2) Ammunition. In the early stages of organization and development, a guerrilla force has minimal physical contact with the enemy, and ammunition requirements are limited. Since guerrillas rely on maximum use of automatic weapons, strict fire discipline must be imposed to conserve ammunition. Once committed to full-scale operations, ammunition consumption and resupply rates can be determined. A decentralized cache system should be used to control ammunition for tactical operations. (3) Demolitions. The amount of demolitions required depends on the types of missions to be accomplished in a given period of tie, The interdiction of complex target systems by multiple attacks at different locations throughout the UWOA requires vast amounts of explosives. Again, a decentralized control system of caches should be used to support these missions. c. Medical. Medical treatment is a strong morale factor. Basic medicines and supplies are required to treat sick and wounded guerrillas as well as the local populace. The most important medical supplies are preventive medicines such as antimalaria pills, sulfa and iodine powders, and various serums for protection against; disease. In addition, at least one first-aid kit should be supplied for each platoon-sized operational unit and a first-aid packet issued to each individual. d. Transportation. Transportation support of resistance forces is provided from local resources. In remote or underdeveloped areas, the primary means of transportation will be on foot or by animal. More sophisticated environments will normally have modern forms of transportation available. In most situations, transportation will be provided by the auxiliary on a mission basis; however, the guerrilla force may find it advantageous to acquire and operate its own transport system. All types and sources of available transportation should be considered. e. Storage. (1) The protected storage and cache of supplies and equipment play an important role in the area command logistical plan. Caches may be used to support current or future operations, or reserved far specified emergencies. Supplies in excess of current requirements are carefully packaged to prevent damage from exposure and then cached in a number of isolated locations known only to the commander and key personnel.

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(2) Caches are established and secured by both guerrilla and auxiliary units in friendly areas prior to their being overrun or in enemy-held areas after hostilities have commenced. They may be located in caves, swamps, forests, cemeteries, or lakes. Dispersed cache systems permit the guerrilla force to operate throughout the UWOA independent of their base areas. (3) Major considerations for caches are: (a) The probability that the cache will be needed. (b) The storage life of the items) involved. (c) The problems of providing adequate security for the cache. (4) Caches are not established haphazardly; they result from requirements generated to support specific operational missions. Caches should be located at planned or likely mission support sites (MMS's). An MSS is a temporary base used by personnel who are away from their base camp during an operation for periods in excess of 2 days. The MSS may provide food, shelter, medical support, ammunition, or demolitions. (5) The use of an MSS eliminates unnecessary movement of supplies and allows the indigenous force to move more rapidly to and from target sites. When selecting an MSS, consideration is given to cover and concealment, distance to the objective, distance to supply sources, and the presence of enemy security forces in the area. (6) Although transportation problems will be increased, security dictates that the DZ's and LZ's be a considerable distance from caches, MSS 's, and base camps. f. Maintenance and Repairs. Initially, basic maintenance and minor repair of equipment are primarily limited to operator maintenance. Materials are obtained from the local civilian economy or through combat operations against the enemy. As the movement expands, clandestine, makeshift ordnance and repair facilities are established. Necessary maintenance and repair items such as tools, small arms repair kits, replacement parts, and oil and cleaning materials are included in sponsor-provided supply packages. Careful consideration must be given to the introduction of special or sophisticated equipment which may complicate the maintenance system and require trained technicians. 8-7. LOGISTICS ORGANIZATION a. The area command plans, develops, operates, and controls the resistance force logistics system. Each element of the area command has a specific role in the logistics system. 8-5

(1) The guerrilla force. The logistics system's primary purpose is to provide support to guerrilla units. Usually guerrilla units are satellited on an auxiliary region and receive direct logistical support from auxiliary units within its operational area. In addition to support from the auxiliary, the guerrilla unit may take overt actions to satisfy its logistics requirements. (2) The auxiliary. Since members of- the auxiliary live a normal lifestyle, they are logistically self-sufficient. Normally, an auxiliary unit is assigned responsibility for providing direct logistical support to the guerrilla units) operating within its area of responsibility. Common auxiliary-guerrilla areas of responsibility simplify relationships by allowing direct coordination between the auxiliary and supported guerrilla units. (3) The underground. The underground's logistics role is largely one of self-support. This support normally provides for real or facsimile documentation such as identification and ration cards, money, safe living quarters, and special equipment or supplies. The underground may provide the area command with items not available from other sources--medicines, radios, photographic equipment and supplies, and repair items. b. As the indigenous force grows in size, subordinate units are assigned a sector or zone of operations, and they are responsible for establishing a separate procurement system for their sectors. This greatly reduces transportation needs since the supplies are procured near the consumer. This also improves security since the compromise or destruction of the procurement system in one sector will not destroy the entire procurement apparatus. Another advantage of this decentralized system is that it permits a more equitable distribution of the logistical burden on the civilian population. Movement of supplies between sectors is kept to a minimum, and names, storage sites; and caches are not passed from sector to sector. 8-8. SOURCES OF SUPPLY a. Offensive Operations and Battlefield Recovery. By conducting offensive operations against the enemy, the guerrilla force is able to satisfy many of its logistical requirements and at the same time deny the use of these supplies to the enemy. Capturing supplies from the enemy has the advantage of not alienating civilians. With adequate intelligence and proper planning, raids and ambushes are conducted against installations and convoys containing the items needed by the guerrilla force. Prior to an operation, each guerrilla is instructed to secure those priority materials required by the guerrilla force. In areas where conventional operations have been conducted, guerrillas can obtain certain quantities of supplies by collecting abandoned equipment.

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b. Purchase. Currency for support of operations may be provided from external or internal sources. Currency may be the money of the area or some suitable substitute such as gold or promissory notes.' Procurement through purchase is normally restricted to critical or scarce items not available through other forms of procurement. Care should be exercised to insure that the excessive injection of outside currency does not disrupt the local economy unless economic disruption is also a resistance force objective. General guidance on fiscal administration is contained in AR 37-1.03 and AR 37-103-1. c. Levy. To insure an equitable system for obtaining supplies from the local population, a levy system based on the ability of each family or group of families to contribute may be organized. This system is established and operated by the various auxiliary units. Such a system provides a means whereby the burden of supplying the guerrilla force is distributed equitably throughout the civilian population. The population can be told that payment will eventually be made for the supplies taken. Receipts may be given to individuals, or records of the transactions may be kept by the area command supply officer. In establishing the levy system, the commander must consider a number of obstacles which might affect procurement in his operational area. Among them (1) Chronic food shortages. (2) Enemy interference and/or competition for supplies. (3) Possible impact of combat actions, such as "scorched earth" policies and radioactive contamination. (4) Competition from rival guerrilla units. d. Barter. It may not be desirable for the area command to engage in outright barter with the civilian population because of possible adverse effects upon the levy system. However, in some eases it is mutually beneficial to exchange critical items, such as medical supplies for food, clothing, or services. e. Confiscation. Confiscation is a method which may be used to fulfill those requirements which cannot. be met by other methods of internal supply. Confiscation is often employed in cases where certain groups refuse to cooperate or are actively collaborating with the enemy. Naturally, confiscation tends to alienate the civilian population and, therefore, should be used only in emergencies or to punish collaborators. In all cases, confiscation must be strictly controlled to insure that it does not deteriorate into indiscriminate looting. f. Production. Guerrilla forces, who may be cut off from most civilian production facilities and support, often find it necessary to improvise their own field expedients; theft might actually have to 8-7

plant and raise sane of their own foodstuff and livestock. Based on the percentage of supplies available from external sources and those available internally, the area commander may consider establishing farms and even factories for the production and repair of unobtainable items. Section III. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 8-9. GENERAL a. Supply of the area command from external sources is normally limited to those essential logistical services which are not; readily available within the operational area. Usually this consists of arm, ammunition, demolitions, and communications equipment—the essentials to support combat operations. Under certain conditions, sponsor logistical support is expanded to include evacuation of the sick and wounded, food, clothing, and other essential survival items unavailable in the area. b. Supply is one means of external support to resistance forces within the UWOA. It is usually phased to enhance planning, delivery, and use. Figure 8-1 illustrates the relationship of these phases.

Figure 8-1 Phases of supply from external support. 8-8

8-10. PHASES OF SUPPLY a. Phase A - Accompanying Supply. These are the supplies which are taken into an operational area by Special Forces elements at the time of infiltration. Accompanying supplies are issued to the Special Forces elements in isolation at the SFOB. While undergoing mission preparation in isolation, the Special Forces element must prepare and rig their accompanying supply for delivery. The situation in the operational area (as determined from area study, available intelligence, assets, etc.) dictates the quantity and type of supplies and equipment to be included in the accompanying supply. The accompanying supply is delivered in conjunction with infiltration. The quantity and type of supplies and equipment in the accompanying supply are also influenced by: (1) Capabilities, responsiveness to friendly control, and size of resistance forces. (2) Enemy capabilities and situation. (3) Method of infiltration (i.e., land, air, or sea). (4) Requirements for survival. (5) Available resources in the UWOA. (6) Size and availability of reception committee. (7) Requirements for sustaining operations (for a given number of days) pending receipt of an automatic resupply. (8) Need for selected items of equipment (to partially equip a nucleus of the resistance force if a reception committee is expected). (9) Necessity for other items of equipment and supplies (to help establish rapport with resistance personnel). b. Phase B - Resupply. (1) These are preselected supplies (selected by the Special Forces element in isolation), which replenish or supplement consumed supplies (i.e., resupply). These forms of resupply are delivered after the infiltration of elements. Historically, these forms of resupply are called follow-up supplies because they follow the infiltration. Resupply is delivered automatically (on a time basis) or by contingency (something does or does not happen). (2) The SFOB (or FOB when appropriate) schedules the delivery of automatic and emergency resupply to deployed Special Forces elements. Preplanned automatic and emergency resupply provides the UW force with immediate supplies and equipment until on-call/routine resupply 8-9

procedures can be established. To facilitate handling and transportation within the UWOA, equipment and supplies are normally packed and rigged in appropriate aerial delivery containers which have a cargo capacity of 500 pounds or less. To allow rapid clearance of the DZ, the contents of each container are further packaged in man-portable units of approximately 50 pounds each. (a) Automatic resupply. 1. Planned before infiltration as to delivery time, location, contents, and the identification marking system and authentication. 2. Delivered automatically after successful infiltration and established radio contact unless cancelled, modified, or rescheduled by the deployed Special Forces element. 3. Replaces lost or damaged equipment items and augments equipment which could not be carried in on the initial infiltration. 4. Serves to reinforce US support of the resistance movement. (3) Fulfills the need for selected items of equipment (to equip a nucleus of the resistance force if a reception committee was not expected on infiltration). (a) Emergency resupply. 1. Planned before infiltration as to delivery time, provisional location to be confirmed, contents, and the identification marking system and authentication. 2. Initiated when radio contact has not been established between the deployed Special Forces element and the SFOB/FOB within a predesignated period of time after infiltration. 3. Initiated on the loss of communications between a deployed Special Forces element and the SFOB/FOB for a predetermined, consecutive number of scheduled radio contacts,. When the Special Forces element is forced into continuous movement;, emergency DZ's must be selected and reported at the first opportunity. If, during this situation, a predetermined number of radio contacts are missed, the resupply is delivered on the last reported DZ. 4. Contains mission-essential equipment/supplies to restore operational capability and survivability of the Special Forces element and indigenous assets. As a minimum, it should consist of communications equipment; homing beacons/devices; survival and medical supplies; and selected weapons, ammunition, and demolition items. 8-10

c. Phase C - On-Call/Routine. (1) When communications have been established between the SFOB/FOB and the Special Forces element, external supply begins as an on-call situation. The request for supplies, based on operational need, is made using an abbreviated code system as the catalog supply system (CSS) (usually contained in the CEOI). (2) These supplies consist of major equipment items which are not consumed at a predictable rate. They are held in readiness at theater army area command (TAACOM) depots or at the SFOB/FOB for immediate delivery on a specified mission request basis. (3) In determining the quantity to be requested, the rate of expansion of the resistance force, anticipated tempo of operations, and the capability to receive, transport, store, and secure the incoming supplies must be considered. (4) Special Forces elements may also anticipate (when in isolation) operational needs for supplies and equipment for their operational area. If these needs can be anticipated, supplies can be packed and rigged by the SFOB/FOB prior to infiltration. If these are code named, they can be expeditiously delivered to predetermined locations by code name request. (5) As the resistance movement grows, the need for external supply will normally outgrow the on-call basis of requesting supplies. d. As the guerrilla force develops and expands, its logistical requirements will increase to a point where the internal popular support base can no longer provide subsistence without creating hardships or lowering living standards of the populace. When this situation occurs logistical support must be obtained from an external source. This necessary dependence on the external source will require establishment of a routine supply system. 8-11. DELIVERY a. As a general rule, sponsor-provided supplies are delivered directly to the individual user. The situation may be such .that direct delivery to the user is not desirable or possible. In this case, supplies are delivered to a designated location and their contents distributed to the various users. Although this system takes much time and effort, it permits centralized control over sponsorprovided supplies and may be the preferred method. b. Initially, aerial delivery by parachute is the most common means of supply delivery to UWOA's. Free-drop techniques may be used for certain hardy items. Later, as UWOA's expand and come under some degree of friendly control, air landed supply missions are used. UWOA's adjacent to sea or water surfaces may be supplied by surface 8-11

ships or submarines. After linkup, supplies are delivered to resistance forces by conventional surface means, such as trucks and rail. Initial supply missions usually require secrecy of movement to protect the receiving UW force; therefore, single air or water craft missions conducted during periods of :low visibility are normally the rule. 8-12. ACCOUNTABILITY The Special Forces commander is responsible for all supplies and equipment delivered to the UWOA. It is essential that sensitive items such as weapons, ammunition, demolitions, radios, drugs, or special equipment be controlled. A Special Forces representative should be present at all deliveries of external supplies to insure positive control and accountability. The Special Forces commander should attempt to determine the quantities and location of sensitive items procured from other than the sponsor. This information will assist in effecting proper distribution, maintaining control, assessing the capabilities and limitations of the resistance force, and effecting demobilization or reorganization upon completion of the resistance mission. The judicious control and use of sponsor provided supplies and equipment can strengthen the detachment commander's ability to influence resistance operations. 8-13. CLASSES OF SUPPLY For planning and administrative purposes, military services divide supplies into general classes. These are: a. Class I – Subsistence. b. Class II – Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and tool kits, handtools, administrative and housekeeping supplies, and equipment. c. Class III – POL: petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquid and compressed gases, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicing and antifreeze compounds together with components and additives of such productions, and coal. d. Class IV – Construction. Construction materiels, to include installed equipment and all fortification/barrier materials. e. Class V – Ammunition. Ammunition of all types (including chemical, biological, radiological, and special weapons), bombs, rockets, propellants, and other associated items. f. Class VI – Personal demand items (nonmilitary sales items). g. Class VII – Major end items. A final combination of end products (e.g., launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops; vehicles) ready for intended use. 8-12

h. Class VIII – Medical materiel, including medical peculiar repair parts. i. Class IX – Repair parts (less medical-peculiar repair parts). All repair parts and components, to include kits, assemblies, and subassemblies, reparable and non-reparable, required for maintenance support of all equipment. j. Class X – Materiel to support nonmilitary programs (e.g., agricultural and economic development not included in classes I through 8-14. CATALOG SUPPLY SYSTEM Special Forces uses a brevity code system, known as the Catalog Supply System (CSS), to expedite on-call resupply requests, insure accurate identification of equipment/supply items, and minimize radio transmission time. To permit maximum user flexibility; the CSS identifies single major equipment items or several associated items by code words. It is catalogued by class of supplies and grouped in individual packaged items or several associated unit items packed together. The CSS is: a. Based on mission requirements, contingency plans, and standing operating procedures. b. Prepared under the staff supervision of the Special Forces group S4. c. Reproduced in miniature form for operational missions and published in the CEOI by the Special Forces group C E officer. 8-15. PACKING AND RIGGING The preparation of supplies and equipment for delivery to a UWOA is the responsibility of the SFOB support center. The packaging system is based on manportable packages weighing approximately 50 pounds. This facilitates transportation from the UWOA reception site by carrying parties. The following factors are also considered in preparing supplies for delivery: a. The mission delivery method, i.e., aircraft, surface ship, or submarine, determines the physical size of the package as well as the number of packages which can be transported. b. Each package is waterproofed. to permit above ground and limited underground/underwater cache. c. Each package is marked with a prearranged code to identify the contents. 8-13

d. An inventory list is included in each delivery container to aid in identifying lost or damaged material. e. Manportable packages are equipped with carrying straps or mounted on pack boards. f. Clothing, blankets, or other items which are useful may be used to pad sensitive items. g. Instructions, printed in the appropriate language, are packed with all equipment. h. Morale and barter items may be included in the packages. i. Ancillary supplies should be included with individual items, e.g., ammunition and cleaning equipment with weapons, batteries with flashlights. Additional ammunition may be included as an individual package. 8-16. REQUEST PROCEDURES a. The CSS is not secure by itself, but serves to reduce message length and transmission time when a variety of supplies are requested., Examples of a CSS used here are for illustrative purposes and brevity, and do plot provide any degree of security. The CEOI will prescribe those code designations for actual operational missions. b. Each broad classification of supply is listed in sequence by an assigned code letter designation: SECTION Chemical Demolitions and Mines Medical Weapons and Ammunition Quartermaster Signal Special

8-14

DESIGNATION ALPHA ALPHA through DELTA ZULU ECHO ALPHA through HOTEL ZULU INDIA ALPHA through LIMA ZULU MIKE ALPHA through PAPA ZULU QUEBEC ALPHA through TANGO ZULU UNIFORM ALPHA through WHISKEY ZULU XRAY ALPHA through ZULU ZULU

c. Some units and packages are followed by a numbered list showing the contents of the package or unit. The unit or package can be ordered complete, or any numbered item may be ordered separately. For example: (1) Six radio sets AN/PRC-77 are required. (2) Under Signal appears the code designation UNIFORM HOTEL. (3) Item 1 under Unit Data Contents reads "Two AN/PRC 77 complete." (4) Your request would read THREE UNIFORM HOTEL ONE indicating six radios are required. d. Items not listed in the CSS are requested by nomenclature in sufficient detail to insure thorough understanding at the SFOB. e. FM 101-10-3, Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data— Classified Data (U) (S), provides guidance concerning the types and amounts of rations, arms; and equipment suitable for guerrilla warfare operations. Special Forces planners should follow this guidance in developing a resistance force logistics system.

8-15

8-16

Section IV. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING SUPPLY SYSTEMS 8-17. GENERAL Special Forces detachment commanders must consider all of the different methods available for procuring supplies in formulating their supply systems. With proper planning and understanding of the methods for procuring supplies, the area command can fulfill much of its supply requirements. 8-18. AREAS OF CONSIDERATION In planning, consideration must be given to formulating a wellorganized procurement system which obtains its supplies from the best sources available. The Special Forces detachment commander and area commander should consider how much is required and its best use to support operations. Examples are: a. Ammunition. (1) How much ammunition is required? Considerations: (a) Guerrillas use less ammunition than conventional forces since guerrillas use hit-and-run tactics. (b) Guerrillas do not have the firepower of conventional forces although they do, and should, rely on maximum use of automatic weapons. (2) Can guerrillas be limited to the amount of ammunition they can expend in any one engagement? Considerations: (a) While rates of fire cannot be arbitrarily limited, strict fire discipline should be imposed so that supplies will not be wasted. (b) For each engagement, based on requirement, a basic load of ammo may be issued to each participant. (c) Resupply may be accomplished by establishing caches at preselected rallying points. These may be used as required in the event of heavy engagement during withdrawals. (3) Is there a rule-of-thumb for calculating the amount of ammunition required by guerrillas? Considerations: Amounts of ammunition may be calculated by assuming that: (a) No month will have more than 10 full combat days. (b) No more than one-third of the total force should 'be engaged constantly in actions in which ammunition is expended. 8-17

(4) How much ammunition may be expected to be lost during resupply operations? Considerations: (a) In the initial stages, losses in ammunition should run between 10 and 20 percent of the amount resupplied by aircraft. (b) In later stages as the guerrilla force's efficiency in conducting air operations increases, losses should be entirely eliminated. (c) With area supremacy, consideration should be given to air landing supplies to preclude any risk of loss. (5) Should more ammunition or explosives be requested in the initial stages of organization and development? Considerations: (a) Normally, in the initial stages, guerrilla operations avoid combat with conventional forces. (b) More explosives and less ammunition should be considered in the initial stage. (c) Interdiction operations to include attacks on bridges, power lanes, train derailment, and other such denial missions using demolitions will avoid physical contact with an enemy force. (6) How does weather affect Considerations:

supply

procurement?

(a) High winds causing rough seas can make resupply difficult by sea. (b) Rainy weather with limited visibility and low cloud cover could preclude resupply by air. (c) Peculiar weather conditions in certain areas may, require that ammunition be stockpiled. (d) Based on the above, ammunition caches—a decentralized system of controlling supplies—should be established to support operations. b. Weapons. (1) What is Considerations:

planned

regarding

lost

or

damaged

weapons?

(a) There is usually no replacement of weapons except for captured many weapons and those provided by the SFOB.

8-18

(b) Procedures may be set up to replace worn out gun barrels, provided armorer repair kits and personnel to train are available. (c) Simple weapon accountability procedures should be established. These would affect the ammo support requirements and requests. (2) (2) Can breakable Considerations:

parts

be

replaced

on

weapons?

(a) Breakable parts of weapons may be replaced at a set percentage to be coordinated at SFOB level. (b) Cannibalization of damaged weapons for replacement parts may be required. c. Explosives. (1) What is the basis for determining the amount of explosives to be requisitioned and to be allocated for each type operation? Considerations: Calculations on the amount of explosives required are made: (a) Depending on types of missions to be accomplished for a given period of time. (b) So that charges are sufficient to accomplish the mission. For example, an estimated 40 pounds of explosives may be required to destroy 1 mile of single-track railroad and one-third more for each mile of double track. (2) How much explosive can be expected to be lost or damaged during resupply operations? Considerations: (a) In the initial stages, losses run from 10 to 20 percent of quantities resupplied by air. (b) In later stages, as the guerrilla force's efficiency increases, there should be no losses. (c) See a(4)(c) above. (3) Are explosive reserves necessary for the same reasons as ammunition reserves? Considerations: (a) More explosives per man, or per unit, are necessary in the initial stages than later as discussed in paragraph a(5) above and chapter 5.

8-19

(b) Caches should be established on a decentralized control system. d. Individual Equipment. (1) What equipment Considerations:

should

receive

a

high

priority?

(a) Establishing priorities for individual equipment selected is a difficult task. Climatic conditions, topography, ethnic groups, and the state of morale of the guerrillas must, be examined to determine priorities. (b) Some items that may be considered a high priority are appropriate footgear, warm clothing, ponchos, first aid kits, safetyrazor kits, headgear, and guerrilla insignia. (c) Intermediate priority items may be uniforms, extreme weather clothing, sleeping gear, load bearing equipment, and canteens. (d) The lowest priority may be items such as eating utensils, gloves, sewing kits, extra shirts, and comfort items. (2) What is the basis for resupply? Considerations: Normally, 6 months after infiltration replacement can be expected for 1 pair of appropriate footgear, 2 or 3 pairs of woolen socks and 1 pair of trousers per guerrilla; 12 months after infiltration--1 pair of footgear, 2 or 3 pairs of woolen socks, and 1 uniform per guerrilla carp be expected. e. Medical Supplies. (1) What must Considerations:

be

planned

concerning

medical

supplies?

(a) Medical treatment is a strong morale factor with guerrillas. (b) Care of the sick and wounded should be emphasized and a first-aid kit should be issued to each individual. (c) Needs of the local population should be foreseen and basic medicines provided for them. (2) What is the basis for resupply? Considerations: Replacement medical supplies may be made on the following basis: 33 percent of basic issue after 6 months and 33 percent of total issue after 12 months in the operational area. f. Food Supplies. 8-20

(1) What must be planned regarding food supplies? Considerations: area.

(a) All staple foods may be supplied from the operational

(b) Salt and sugar are important items and should be supplied from the SFOB if they cannot be procured locally. (2) Are staple foods the only foodstuffs that are to be considered? Considerations: For morale and psychological effect, coffee and cigarettes should be provided occasionally or, if possible, regularly on a 2 pounds of coffee and three cartons of cigarettes per man per month. 8-19. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPPLY SYSTEMS a. The considerations discussed are not the only factors that the detachment and area commanders must take into consideration. Continuing area assessment may disclose other areas of concern not readily apparent at the time of initial infiltration. b. Considerations developed, and guidance received from the SFOB as to the percentage of logistical support that can be expected from external sources, will assist the area commander in formulating plans for the internal procurement of supplies. c. Based on the percentage of supplies available from external sources and those available internally, the area commander may consider the establishment of farms, or even factories, for the production and repair of unobtainable items.

8-21

8-22

CHAPTER 9 COMMUNICATIONS Section I. GENERAL 9-1. GENERAL The communication systems and techniques employed by Special Forces in unconventional warfare vary from conventional signal operations. Special Forces communications may range from supporting activities located within friendly territory to using clandestine systems and techniques between the SFOB and the deployed detachments in the UWOA (see (C) TC 31-20-5). 9-2. EXTENT AND TYPE OF COMMUNICATIONS a. Communications Within Friendly Territory. Communications required between the SFOB and other headquarters or activities in friendly territory generally are the same as those required by any headquarters of comparable size. Normally, facilities of the theater army area signal system are used as much as possible; however, when backup or special circuits are necessary, they are provided by radio or radio-teletype operated by the Special Forces group. Communications in this area present no unique operational or technical signal problems. (See (C) TC 31-20-5.) b. Communications To and From the UWOA. When an element is committed, the primary and often the only means of communications with the SFOB is by radio. Clandestine communication techniques are employed. Other methods, such as infiltration of couriers, exchange of messages during resupply, or existing communication facilities, may be used when practical. c. Communications Within the UWOA. (1) Communications within the UWOA generally progress from clandestine to conventional systems as the guerrilla movement gains strength. The extent and type of system depend on factors such as: (a) Size of the area, (b) Size of the guerrilla force, activities of the enemy and the guerrillas, (c) Technical proficiency of both the enemy and the guerrilla communication system, (d) The required speed of response to the orders of the area command. 9-1

(2) Any and all means which satisfy the requirement for communications and provide the required security are used. Certain clandestine communications systems may be used, but these should be tightly controlled by the commander (see FM 31-20). All the following are considered: (a) Messenger. (b) Radio. (c) Telephone. (d) Audible signals. (e) Visual signals. (f) Local communication systems. (g) Pigeons or trained animals. 9-3. COMMUNICATION MEANS a. Messenger. In the early developmental stages of a UWOA, messengers may be the only secure means of communication. Messenger (courier) service is organized using clandestine, nontechnical communication techniques. Because security remains a major consideration, communication means are dictated by the status of training and capability of the resistance force. b. Radio. Radio can provide instantaneous, generally reliable communications; but any radio transmission can be intercepted or jammed by an enemy. The advantage of its speed must be balanced against the probable loss of security. Under sane conditions, lowpowered, frequency-modulated radios operating in the VHF or UHF band can be used with little risk. Generally, the deciding factors for using radio are the nature of the message text and the probable enemy reaction time if the message is intercepted. For example, enemy reaction to last-minute control instructions during a raid or ambush would not be rapid enough to affect the operation. But the interception of plans or instructions involving future actions could result in disastrous compromise Within a UWOA the availability of radio equipment may be the governing factor. Maintenance, spare parts, and resupply of batteries are important considerations. The use of even the simplest radio requires training of operators and maintenance personnel. c. Telephone. In the early developmental stages of a UWOA, telephones may be used extensively, possibly between a security outpost and a base camp or during an ambush to warn of the approach of a convoy or train. When using a telephone under these conditions, a ground-return circuit can be used, allowing the telephones to be operated with a 9-2

single metallic conductor connecting them. A section of barbed wire fence, unused power line, unused telephone line, or one side of a railroad track already in place can be used as the conductor. The conductor must be insulated from the ground and the other terminal of the telephone must be connected to a good ground connection (fig. 9-1).

Figure 9-1 Expedient Ground return circuit. d. Audible Signals. Audible signals are useful for short distances. Church bells, vehicle horns, musical instruments, sirens, dogs barking, or voices may be used as audible signals. Quite often, audible signals can be planned so that 'the sound scans routine and is recognizable as a signal only to someone grained in the system.

9-3

e. Visual Signals. Visual signals are limited only by the equipment available. Normal actions are the guide for developing visual signals. Visual signals include: (1) Flashlight signals at night or sunlight; reflected from a mirror during daylight. The use of any flashing light requires some prearranged code. (2) A housewife hanging laundry on a clothesline in a predesignated pattern to serve as a warning; light, smoke, a fire; or a person walking over a given road at a specified time. (3) Flags used to transmit messages either by means of semaphore or wigwag. In semaphore two flags are used. The position of the flags designate a certain letter. Wigwags can be used to send a message by Morse code. The flag on one side of the body indicates a dash, on the other side a dot (see FM 21-60). f. Local Communication Systems. Many areas of the world have extensive, local communication systems. Without any special equipment, part or all of these systems may be used. When considering the use of the local communication systems, security must be considered. The local language or dialect must be used in apparently innocent conversation. g. Pigeons or Trained Animals. (1) Homing pigeons, obtained locally or from the SFOB, may be used for the rapid, secure transmission of messages within the operational area. Since they require a few days to become acquainted with the home loft area, they should be used only when the guerrilla base is relatively static. Extremely cold weather, limits the use of pigeons. (2) Locally-procured, trained animals (usually dogs) may also be used as a means of communication; dogs, however, are more susceptible to interception or diversion than homing pigeons. Section II. COMMUNICATION TRAINING 9-4. GENERAL Radio personnel assigned to Special Forces operational detachments face problems different from those of radio operator’s assigned to a conventional military unit. When committed to a UWOA, operators must be able to communicate over long distances using low-powered equipment with minimum loss of security. Technical assistance and maintenance support are not readily available. Messages are encrypted using per and pencil cryptographic systems. On progressing from clandestine to overt operations within the UWOA, machine crypto systems may be employed. The radio operators must also be prepared to 9-4

assist and advise the detachment commander on any communication problem with the area, including communication training of the resistance force. 9-5. CODE SPEED AND PROCEDURES A Special Forces radio operator must be able to transmit; and receive Morse code at the rate of 18 words per minute. He must be thoroughly familiar with radio-telegraph procedure as described in ACP-1248. Before infiltration, the actual radio-telegraph procedure (an SOP) to be used in the operational area is established. Sufficient time must be allocated for radio operators to become familiar with this specific procedure. Other members of the detachment must also be familiar with this procedure (usually taught by radio operators in isolation). 9-6. MAINTENANCE AND USE OF EQUIPMENT Normal maintenance support is not available within a UWOA. In the detachment deployed in a UWOA, any repair of signal equipment is done by the operator, assigned signal maintenance man, or when feasible, by friendly members of the local populace or resistance elements. Radio operator training includes sufficient theory and practice so that the operator can perform direct support, maintenance on the primary detachment radio set. He is sufficiently schooled in theory so that he can make sound recommendations on the use of enemy equipment captured within the operational area. 9-7. RADIO PROPAGATION The radio frequencies are determined before infiltration based on published radio frequency prediction charts and tables. Detailed information on selecting frequencies for long-range communications can be found in TM 11-666 and radio propagation charts procured from the US Army Strategic Communications Command, Communications Engineering Department, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613- These charts, published monthly, mast be requested for the particular area of operations. 9-8. MESSAGE WRITING a. The writer of a message must express his thoughts clearly and concisely. Additional transmission time caused by unnecessary message length gives the enemy a better opportunity for interception and radio direction-finding, and furnishes more traffic for analysis. b. The following basic rules are applied to all messages:

9-5

(1) Preparation. All outgoing messages to the SFOB are prepared or reviewed by the detachment commander or his executive officer before transmission. (2) Content. Write the message and then read it back:. First consider each portion. Can any portion be eliminated; many times the bulk of a message is used to say something already obvious by just sending the message. Does each portion tell the addressee something or could that whole sentence or thought be eliminated? Then consider whether the thought of the message is expressed as clearly and concisely as possible. (3) Writing. Print carefully to avoid any misunderstanding. An encrypted message may be made completely useless by one misunderstood letter. (4) Abbreviations. Use authorized abbreviations and only when they will not be misunderstood (see AR 310-50). (5) Punctuation. Do not punctuate unless necessary for clarity. Do not use the expression STOP in message. If punctuation is necessary, use authorized abbreviations such as QUES, CLN, PAREN, PD, CMM, PARA, and QUOTE-UNQUOTE. (6) Repetition. Repeat only to avoid errors, not for emphasis. For example, repeat unusual names to insure correct spelling. (7) Numbers. Numbers may be written as digits o r spelled out. When spelled out, they are expressed in words for each digit except in exact hundreds or thousands, when the word hundred or, thousand is used. Some cryptographic systems require the numbers to be encoded without spelling. As a general rule, numbers should be spelled out before encrypting. If the message is completely understood the first time it is transmitted, the result will be less time on the air. Example: 123.E is written as ONE TWO THREE POINT FOUR; 500 is written FIVE HUNDRED; and 20,000 as TWO ZERO THOUSAND. (8) Isolated letters. If necessary to use isolated letters, use the phonetic alphabet for each isolated letter. c. Codes are normally used for brevity. Extensive brevity codes can be developed by proper planning which can greatly enhance message brevity and clarity. Codes that may be employed by Special Forces detachments in their operations are: (1) The Catalog Supply System (CSS) which provides an operational detachment with a brevity code in which single or several associated logistics items may be requested on resupply operations.

9-6

(2) The Q and Z signals used by radio operators (ACP 131). (3) Operation codes CEOI. Section III. ANTENNAS 9-9. GENERAL Special Forces radio operators use field expedients to insure reliable communications. Because of rigid limitations on size and weight of equipment, the radio used by Special Forces is not, issued with a prefabricated antenna. Only antenna wire is issued. Although there is little the radio operator can do to increase the designed power output of his transmitter, he can maximize the propagation of his signal by use of an efficient antenna system. Antenna theory and construction are presented in FM 24-18 and TM 11-666. The Special Forces radio operator must understand the material covered in the manuals in order to provide long-range communications. Various types of antennas which can be used with Special Forces-issued radio equipment are shown in figures 9-3 through 9-10. a. Field Expedient Insulators. When constructing an antenna, it is important to insulate the antenna from its supports or from the ground. Often the radio operator must make use of whatever materials are available. Almost any kind of wire can be used when constructing an antenna. Although glass and porcelain may be the best materials for insulators, it is better to use a second best (such as wood) rather than none at all. The antenna diagrams shown in this manual cannot be understood without a basic knowledge of antenna theory. These diagrams picture antenna configurations which can be used in limited space with issued radio equipment (see fig. 9-2).

9-7

Figure 9-2 Expedient insulator. b. Quarter-Wavelength Antenna. The quarter-wavelength antenna is normally erected vertically. Its length (in feet) is computed by dividing 234 by the operating frequency in megahertz. It is omnidirectional, making it an ideal antenna for .a net; control station (NCS) when operating with different; teams and the exact team locations are not known. It can be used with any type of radio and is normally used when a groundwave is desired. In the case of standard FM radios it makes use of space waves (Line-of-sight). When a quarter-wavelength antenna is used, a good ground system is essential (fig. 9-3).

9-8

Figure 9-3 One-quarter-wavelength antenna (vertical). c. Half-Wave Doublet Antenna. A typical half-wave antenna is the doublet, or dipole antenna. It is constructed by using one-quarter wavelength wire for each side; this wire is fed in the center by coaxial cable or, as a field expedient, by twisted pair of field wire. It can be used with any type of radio and can be constructed in a horizontal or vertical plane. When in a horizontal position (fig. 9-4), it radiates broadside at a goo angle from the antenna. When it is constructed in a vertical plane, it has a radiation pattern of 360°. This antenna is superior to the quarter-wavelength antenna. When connecting this antenna to the radio set, one lead goes to the antenna binding post; the other goes to the ground binding post. No additional ground is necessary.

9-9

Figure 9-4 Half-wave doublet antenna. d. Slant-Wire Antenna. The slant-wire antenna as an efficient radiating system using only a single antenna support. Two pieces of wire, each one a quarter-wavelength long, are used to make up the antenna. One piece is slanted down from the antenna support at an angle of 300 to 600 and is connected to the antenna post on the transmitter. The other wire is used as a counterpoise lust above the ground and laid out from the transmitter away from the slanting wire. If the wire used as a counterpoise is not insulated, it must be insulated from the ground; the counterpoise is connected to the radio ground post. Maximum radiation occur, in the direction of the counterpoise (see fig, 9-5).

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Figure 9-5 Slant-wire antenna. e. Fourteen Percent Off-Center Fed Antenna. If no suitable transmission line such as coaxial cable or twisted pair is available, a suitable antenna can be constructed using; an antenna one-half wavelength long and feeding it with a single wire at a point 14 percent of a one-half wavelength, or the total length of the antenna. This antenna is suitable for use with radios such as the AN/GRC-109 and AN/GRC-87. Maximum radiation occurs at g0° from the antenna (see fig. 9-6). f. Indoor Antennas. There are times when a Special Forces radio operator must operate from inside a building. When this is necessary, a suitable antenna can still be constructed. Any of the antennas mentioned in this chapter can be used where there is space available inside the building. (1) If space is limited, a loop antenna may be constructed (fig. 9-7). This antenna is a full wavelength long and is fed directly in the center. It is limited to frequencies whose wavelengths will not exceed the dimensions of the room.

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Figure 9-6 Fourteen percent off-center fed antenna.

Figure 9-7 Full-wave square-loop antenna. 9-12

(2) For operation on lower frequencies, a half-wave square-loop antenna (fig. 9-8) may be used inside a building with excellent results if care is taken in constructing and tuning the antenna. When operating the AN/GRC-109, the indicator lamp of the antenna will not glow brightly with either the full-wave loop or the half-wave open loop. Although these antennas may be used indoors, best results are obtained when operating with an outdoor system.

Figure 9-8 Half-wave square-loop antenna.

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g. Other Antennas. It may be necessary to have patrols operating outside the normal range of FM radio sets. If so, an antenna system that will allow communications beyond the normal range of current radios can be constructed by using the jungle antenna (fig. 9-9) or the half-rhombic antenna (fig. 9-10). When operating on frequencies above 30 MHz, the transmission range can be increased by improved antennas. The use of any one these antennas should more than double the range of standard radio sets.

Figure 9-9 Jungle antenna. 9-14

Figure 9-10 Half-rhombic antenna.

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CHAPTER 10 MEDICAL Section I. INTRODUCTION 10-1. GENERAL a. The goals of medical operations in unconventional warfare are to conserve the fighting strength of the guerrilla forces and to assist in securing the support of the local populace for the US and resistance forces operating within the UWOA. Resistance medical support must be mobile, responsive, and effective in preventing disease and restoring the sick and wounded to duty. For the guerrilla, there is no safe "rear" area where he may take his casualties for treatment; wounded and ill personnel become a tactical rather than a logistical problem. The Special Forces commander will find that medical support is a major tactical consideration in all operations. b. The initial area assessment determines the actual extent of guerrilla medical training, availability of medical supplies and facilities, and the state of sanitation and health within the UWOA. On a continuing basis, the area assessment will include consideration of the diseases and local medical customs within the area of operations. Prior to offering medical assistance or acknowledgement o f a request for medical treatment, consideration should be given to .the customs and taboos of the ethnic group concerned and the medical support available. c. The first medical activity, after infiltration, may be the most effective means to establish rapport with resistance elements. Upon initial contact, the medic by his actions affords an almost; immediate entry into the less-than-hospitable environment in which Special Forces may find itself. Each medical act can be an effective presentation of credibility. The success of all future missions of the Special Forces element will depend on the rapport initially established with the resistance force. d. A broad range of medical support may be available in the UWOA. Within guerrilla base areas, treatment may initially be limited to rudimentary medical procedures such as first aid and personal hygiene. Historically, some guerrilla forces have developed highly organized and effective medical support units and installations. Their organizations have paralleled those of conventional forces and have included field hospitals located in inaccessible areas. They have recruited doctors, nurses, and technical personnel from the civilian population, and have obtained medical supplies from the local populace, from raids, and from external sources. In addition, facilities staffed by members of the auxiliary may be located where 10-1

the local population is sympathetic to the resistance movement and patients may be held in a convalescent status or may be given supportive care until they can be evacuated to more advanced treatment facilities. 10-2. TRAINING a. Medical training is important. The Special. Forces medical specialist must select and begin to train unit level medics at the earliest opportunity. He must develop training programs for all the different working skills that will be needed in the guerrilla medical system. All guerrilla members must be indoctrinated with they principles of "self-help and buddy aid." b. The guerrilla force must also be trained in preventive medicine procedures which include basic sanitation, personal hygiene, and individual protective measures. Specific attention wit:L be given to the use of drugs to suppress disease, immunizations, food and water sanitation, individual methods of protection against :insect, and snake bites, and the sanitary disposal of human wastes. 10-3. INTELLIGENCE Intelligence collection is an inherent capability of medical personnel. The activities of medical personnel in treating members of the local population and ministering to the sick and wounded, including PW's, provide many opportunities to collect combat intelligence; for example, information on the effects of the environmental improvement program, the Affects of propaganda on the populace; and information on weapons, equipment, medical supply, and morale. a. Medical Area Study/Area Assessment. (1) The deployment of small units to remote areas provides a unique opportunity to investigate the military disease problems of true area by using deployed personnel as "sentinel,." An appropriate battery of screening examinations has been devised for any given area which is administered before deployment to obtain baseline data. The same examinations, accomplished on the return from a mission;, serve the dual functions of detecting those individuals who have acquired disease requiring treatment, and the delineation of the major disease problems of the area. This effort requires the support of sophisticated medical laboratory facilities in rear areas. (2) Epidemiologic surveillance, conducted in this manner, serves two functions: (a) It provides the basis for recommending preventive measures to be taken by units to be deployed in these areas in the future. 10-2

(b) It brings to attention those disease problems of military importance which require further investigation within operational areas by teams of trained personnel in order to devise techniques for their prevention. b. Veterinary Information. (1) Collection and evaluation of veterinary medical information is an essential and integral part of the principal medical area assessment. The following information is of interest to the staff veterinarian of the Special Forces group in the accomplishment of such an assessment. (a) Animal diseases endemic to the area. (b) Animal diseases transmissible to man. (c) Agricultural production. (d) Methods of food procurement, processing, and preservation. (e) Nutritional status of the local population. (f) Food resources of animal origin. (2) Such information will be of value in planning during the buildup phase of unconventional warfare operations. 10-4. SUPPLY a. Prior planning to provide the minimum essential medical supplies and equipment for current, planned, and contingent operations is mandatory. Based on the area assessment, and as the development of the resistance force medical organization progresses, medical supplies are phased into the UWOA by the Special Forces element. Excess medical stocks should be maintained at the SFOB to expedite prompt resupply or delivery for unexpected requirements. Medical items are ordered through use of the Catalog Supply System. b. There should be minimum dependence on the local economy. Although it may be possible to purchase some medical supplies on the civilian economy, such items will probably be scarce and in great demand. The use/storage of medical supplies must be strictly controlled since they are potential black market items. Captured medical supplies should be returned to the guerrilla base for redistribution. 10-5. HOSPITALIZATION a. As the resistance movement expands, it may be more efficient from a medical standpoint to establish. a centralized system to provide advanced medical care. Small, isolated, and well-hidden 10-3

treatment and holding facilities should be established in relatively secure areas. These will, of necessity, impose tactical limitations on the commander. There must be alternate sites for all facilities. All facilities must be protected by a warning net. For hospital operations, the guerrilla will again depend on the auxiliary. Simple, battle-tested, basic surgical principles will be practiced. b. When necessary, the auxiliary and the underground may assist in the infiltration of civilian medical personnel and equipment into guerrilla base areas. Coercion may be applied to nonsympathetic medical personnel if their services are absolutely necessary. In some instances, the auxiliary may arrange hospitalization in widely scattered private homes where periodic visits can be made by medical personnel. As the UWOA expands, the services of civilian professional medical personnel and the medical facilities located in villages and towns within the UWOA may be available during certain hours, if not for complete and continued hospitalization. 10-6. EVACUATION a. Since evacuation within and from the UWOA is normally difficult, guerrilla commanders must rely on their own resources, as well as auxiliary and underground support in planning the evacuation of casualties. All plans must include instructions for emergency treatment and evacuation. b. Every effort is made to evacuate wounded personnel from the scene of action. Evacuation to forward aid stations must be rapid, because the presence of wounded severely limits the guerrillas' ability to clear the battlefield swiftly. The condition of wounded guerrillas, however, may preclude movement with the unit to the base. In this event, the wounded are hidden in a covered location and the local auxiliary unit is notified. The local auxiliary then cares for and hides the wounded until they can be returned to their own organizations. In no ease should a disabled patient be admitted to an evasion arid escape net. For such a net to function, it requires a high degree of compartmentalization and individual agent, ignorance as to its organization. A disabled man would not be able to negotiate each segment of the net by himself, and requiring assistance, he could compromise the whole net. c. The evacuation of dead from the acme of action is most important for security reasons. The identification of the dead by the enemy may jeopardize the safety of their families as well as that of their units. The bodies of those killed in action are evacuated, cached until they can be recovered for proper burial, or disposed of by whatever means is consistent with the customs of the local population.

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d. As the operational area develops and the overall situation favors the sponsor, evacuation of the sick and wounded to friendly areas may be feasible. This lightens the burden upon the meager facilities available to the area command and provides a higher standard of medical care for the patient. Whenever possible, wounded or sick Americans should be evacuated to a safe area for possible exfiltration from the UWOA. The same is true of key guerrilla and resistance leaders. Each case will have to be evaluated against the risk of compromising the overall resistance force mission. A strict; system of priorities for evacuation from the UWOA will be established by the SFOB., e. In some cases the local population may not be able to support the area command with qualified medical personnel. As the requirement for doctors and specialized personnel increases, the SFOB may have to provide a Special Forces medical team, over and above the operational element's organic medics, to establish and operate a Special Forces guerrilla hospital. 10-7. VETERINARY MEDICAL SUPPORT IN A UWOA a. Veterinary specialists normally will not accompany a detachment into the UWOA, but will support the deployed detachment with advisory assistance from the SFOB. Veterinary medical techniques applicable to Special Forces operations in the UW situation may be considered according to the phase of the operation. (1) During periods of garrison duty and field training, veterinary activities are directed toward the preparation of area medical studies and individual and unit training on the subject of: (a) Wholesomeness and sanitation of subsistence. (b) Care and management of pack animals. (c) Food inspection procedures. (d) Animal diseases transmissible to man. (e) Techniques for using animals for pack and transportation. (f) Survival techniques. (g) An initial area assessment to determine the extent of indigenous training, organization, and effectiveness of veterinary resources and availability of veterinary supplies and facilities. (2) Immediately before deployment, veterinary activities are directed toward: 10-5

(a) Briefings on the veterinary medical situation in areas of planned deployment to include endemic and potential epidemic animal diseases transmissible to man, and individual and small-unit measures for their prevention. (b) Briefings on diseases of animals in areas of planned deployment that may directly or indirectly influence the outcome of unit deployment. (3) During the buildup phase of unconventional warfare operations, veterinary activities will include area assessments which are designed to determine the veterinary requirements for support of combined US and resistance forces within the UWOA. Areas o f emphasis should include: (a) Rations and the nutritional requirements of resistance force personnel. (b) Animal diseases transmissible to man. (c) Availability of animals for transportation and evacuation. (d) Identification and location of sources of production and channels of supply of biological immunizing agents against those animal diseases peculiar to the UWOA. Third country sources of supply should be considered since some agents are not produced in the United States. (4) Programs based on the above information will usually be implemented as expansion of the resistance force occurs and will include: (a) The establishment of suitable facilities in which to receive, store, and issue rations. (b) The establishment of standards of acceptability for partisan-supplied foods. (c) Stockpiling US-supplied rations and the supervision of preparation of operational rations. (Composition of rations will be based on the previous assessment of nutritional requirements of guerrilla personnel.) (d) The establishment of preventive medicine procedures for the control of animal diseases and those animal diseases transmissible to man. (e) The procurement of pack animals. (f) Training for guerrilla personnel in: 10-6

1. Survival techniques to be used by individual and small, operational units. 2. The selection and preparation of indigenous foods. 3. The care and handling of pack animals. (g) Recommendations to appropriate resistance force commanders with respect to veterinary preventive measures which must be initiated and enforced to control endemic and potentially epidemic diseases of animals and those animal diseases transmissible to man. b. During the employment phase of unconventional warfare operations, veterinary activities will consist of continued evaluation of veterinary data and the formulation of plans to improve environmental sanitation, the provision of food supplies, and the control of animal diseases and diseases transmissible to man within the UWOA. Emphasis will be on providing assistance and technical information to deployed operational detachments. Emphasis should be placed on the importance of livestock to families in a transitional society. Because of this, maximum use of veterinary capabilities can be instrumental in favorably influencing the populace. c. During the demobilization phase, veterinary activities are redirected toward assisting the logistic effort in providing an adequate food supply for large numbers of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees. Secondary efforts are directed toward the control of animal diseases of public health significance. The major veterinary programs, formulated at theater level, will be directed at redevelopment of food production and processing. 10-8. THE SPECIAL FORCES GUERRILLA HOSPITAL a. General. A Special Forces guerrilla hospital is a medical treatment facility, or complex of facilities, providing in-patient medical support to guerrilla troops and other members of the resistance movement. The hospital is usually located in the UWOA it; supports. The guerrilla hospital will rarely, if ever, outwardly resemble a conventional hospital. The requirements for strict security, flexibility, and rapid mobility preclude visible comparison with conventional military or civilian medical facilities. Medical capabilities will vary from the primitive to the sophisticated depending on: (1) Mission of the unconventional warfare forces. (2) Availability of personnel, equipment and supplies; and facilities. (3) Enemy counterguerrilla activities. 10-7

(4) Training and experience of medical officers assigned to the guerrilla hospital facility. b. Staffing. The guerrilla's medical complement; will vary in number and type depending on the mission and the level of desired medical sophistication. Non-medical personnel must be attached to provide security, communications, and logistical support,. Personnel are obtained in one of three ways: (1) Solely from indigenous resistance forces. (2) Solely from the sponsoring power. (3) From both indigenous forces and the sponsoring power. c. Organization. (1) The organization must be tailored to meet the requirements of, and conditions within, the UWOA. However, two requirements must be met: (a) The assignment of fully qualified enlisted Special Forces medical specialists. The entire guerrilla hospital concept is predicated on the multiple capabilities of the Special Forces medical specialist. (b) The assignment of a minimum of two Special Forces qualified medical officers. (2) A guerrilla hospital consists of a number of sections. These sections are normally not all physically collocated, but may be widely dispersed. The sections include, but are not limited to: (a) Command and control section. Provides command over hospital personnel, supervision of hospital functions, possesses communications with the tactical commander exercising operational control, and provides hospital security. (b) Logistics section. Provides logistical support to include transportation and graves registration. (c) Sorting section. Establishes and maintains one or more sites which serve as staging areas for limited medical care and movement of patients and supplies to the treatment section. For security, these sites are the only geographic contact the guerrilla has with the guerrilla hospital. (d) Treatment section. Provides medical and surgical care as well as immediate postoperative care. 10-8

(e) Convalescent section. Establishes sites at which care is provided to guerrillas no longer requiring the more intensive support provided by the treatment section. Such sites increase the dispersion of patients. Depending on the condition of guerrillas placed in convalescent sites, guerrilla hospital personnel may not be required to continually staff the sites. (f) Outstaging section. Establishes a site or sites to which guerrillas may be transported once they have received maximum benefit from hospitalization. Such sites are basically unmanned geographic points used as drop-off locations from which patients may return to their units. d. Command Relationships. (1) The senior Special Forces tactical commander in the UWOA supported by the guerrilla hospital exercises operational control over the hospital. The hospital itself is normally commanded by the senior Special Forces medical officer assigned. (2) The guerrilla hospital is not; a Special Forces TOE organization. It is staffed by Special Forces medical personnel provided by the SFOB. Whenever possible, indigenous resistance forces must be used to augment the Special Forces staff to the maximum feasible extent. e. Employment. (1) The guerrilla hospital should be infiltrated early during the organization and buildup stages of a sponsored resistance movement. It must be ready for maximum operation upon the start of combat employment of guerrilla forces and continue to provide medical support until directed otherwise. (2) The decision to employ a guerrilla hospital is made by the SFOB based on the request and area assessment of the Special Forces commander in the UWOA. This assessment should include the availability of local medical facilities, supplies, and auxiliary forces for augmentation of the hospital staff. (3) After infiltration, the guerrilla hospital staff conducts a reconnaissance for possible hospital sites and coordinates the training of resistance members who will support hospital operations. The following factors must be considered: (a) Location. The guerrilla hospital should be located in the most secure area accessible to all guerrilla casualties in the supported UWOA. Preexisting structures may be used when feasible. Selection of locations must be made within the constraints of security, topography, distance, mobility, facilities, and enemy counterguerrilla activities. Normally, the guerrilla hospital will 10-9

not be collocated with the Special Forces or guerrilla operational base camps. Use of sanctuary nation territory should be considered. (b) Security. Strict security, measures must be implemented to protect the covert or clandestine nature of hospital operations. Adequate cover may be required for hospital personnel, especially in urban situations. Security compromises not only lead to apprehension of guerrilla hospital staff, patients, and. supplies, but may compromise members of the auxiliary, the underground, and the entire Special Forces operation. The hospital's treatment section is to be considered the hospital center. Individual’s staffing sorting sites should not be privy to the location of the treatment center. For example, patients in the sorting site will be transported to the treatment section only by permanent staff members of that section. (c) Communications. To maintain adequate medical. support and insure survival, rapid communications between the hospital commander and the Special Forces commander exercising operational control are essential. This facilitates the coordination of hospital movement, reception of casualties and supplies, requests for support, and dissemination of intelligence. Communication security is of utmost importance. (d) Supplies. Adequate medical supplies for initial hospital operation must accompany the Special Forces medical team upon infiltration. Prior plans must provide for automatic and on-call medical resupply. The maximum use of locally available supplies is advised. Coordination with indigenous resistance forces must be made to obtain rations for patients treated by the hospital. (4) The guerrilla hospital must be prepared to respond to any contingency. It must depend upon innovative approaches, field expedients, and local resources to accomplish its mission. Section II. DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL SUPPORT IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREAS 10-9. GENERAL During the buildup phase of unconventional warfare operations, an initial area assessment is conducted to determine the actual extent of guerrilla medical training, availability of medical supplies and facilities, and the state of sanitation and health within the UWOA. On a continuing basis, the area assessment will include consideration of the diseases and local medical customs within the area of operations. In certain areas of the world, the local population may not be receptive to Western medical practices and concepts. Before a medical program can be initiated in such an area, it will be necessary to persuade the populace to accept a medical program or to modify one to best fit the situation. 10-10

10-10. MEDICAL REQUIREMENT DURING THE BUILDUP PHASE a. Medical training is an important part, of the tactical training;, it must be instituted as early as possible. The SF medical specialist must select and begin to train unit-level medics at the earliest opportunity. He must develop training programs for a11 the different working skills that will be needed in the insurgent hospital system. He must indoctrinate all members of the fighting; force with the principles of "self-help and buddy aid." Guerrilla medical personnel need not function without backup, but may require assistance in organization. The partisans may have a military physician among their ranks. Civilian physicians may be sympathetic to the guerrilla cause and may render assistance in emergencies. Both should be fully utilized. Coercion may be applied to nonsympathetic medical personnel if their services are absolutely necessary. b. It is during the buildup phase that the guerrilla force is thoroughly indoctrinated not only in first aid and the care of the sick and wounded, but also in preventive medicine procedures which must be strictly enforced during active operations. This indoctrination will be directed toward first aid, basic sanitation, personal hygiene, and individual protective measures. Specific attention will be given to the use of drugs to suppress disease, immunizations, food and water sanitation, individual methods of protection against bites from insects and snakes, and the sanitary disposal of human wastes. Recommendations are made to individual commanders with respect to the measures to be enforced in all localities of the UWOA. The scope of they preventive medicine effort must be adequate to encompass the probable expansion of the guerrilla force, and must include requirements for the civilian population (i.e., the dependents of the guerrillas) as well as the guerrilla force itself. (1) The guerrilla force may comprise both foreign and local personnel. Differences in immunity to the endemic diseases will exist between ethnic groups. Certain preventive measures may be applicable to one group and not to the other. For instance, the use of chloroquineprimaquine for the prevention of malaria is not equally feasible in all populations. While it may be necessary to administer routine malaria prophylaxis to those recently introduced to 'the area, it may or may not be desirable to treat local resistance forces with the same drugs, e.g., primaquine may be poorly tolerated by the local personnel. Further, the members of the resistance force may exhibit diseases uncommon to US forces, such, as serious nutritional deficiencies and cases of active tuberculosis. (2) Rigorous preventive medicine and sanitation practices are necessities in the guerrilla camp. An outbreak of disease limits effectiveness and endangers security. Sanitary principles are also basic to the guerrilla medical civic action effort. 10-11

10-11. MEDICAL SUPPORT DURING EMPLOYMENT PHASE During the period of employment of the guerrilla force in active operations against the enemy, plans for the care of sick and wounded as well as preventive medicine activities must be directed toward the members of small, highly mobile, operational units which, will .be deployed throughout the UWOA. The operational order for every guerrilla mission must include plans for collecting points for the wounded and dead, as well as the location of aid stations and routes of evacuation from the area of engagement to clandestine treatment facilities. Preventive medicine techniques within the UWOA will be determined by local and immediate requirements. Plans must be made to meet problems such as epidemics. Prior to offering medical assistance or acknowledgement of a request for medical treatment, consideration should be given to the customs and taboos of the ethnic group concerned and the medical support available. Medical treatment given to dependents or civilians, in cases that the local midwife or "doctor" cannot handle, could be beyond the capabilities of the SF medic. 10-12. MEDICAL SUPPORT DURING DEMOBILIZATION PHASE a. The demobilization phase begins when linkup between friendly conventional forces and the guerrilla force is completed. Following linkup, the importance of clandestine and overt resistance forces in support of the theater military mission diminishes. This phase is characterized by social disorganization created by relocation and resettlement of large numbers of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees. Disorganization of civil government, the disruption of public utilities, and mass migrations all contribute to the potential for epidemics. The trained auxiliary and guerrilla force aidmen and hospital attendants, as well as local resistance force medical personnel, must be phased into the national health plan of the new government. Medical supplies and equipment must be collected, audited, and integrated into the overall plan. Medical facilities which, by the close of guerrilla activities, may be highly sophisticated, should be turned over to regional or governmental health agencies so they may continue to contribute to the national medical economy. b. The role of the preventive medicine section organic: to the Special Forces group now changes from one of support for the guerrillas, to one of assisting civil government and military civil affairs units to implement public health measures within the areas of guerrilla operations.

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CHAPTER 11 FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE Section I. INTRODUCTION 11-1. GENERAL a. Foreign internal defense is defined as participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JCS Pub 1) b. The Special Forces role in foreign internal defense is directed and undertaken within the framework of US security assistance programs under the following conditions: (1) When the mission is necessary because of a threat to US national interests. (2) When the threatened country is capable of using US assistance. (3) When the threatened country requests US assistance. 11-2. CONCEPT a. A Special Forces group may be augmented with highly specialized skills needed to assist a host country to develop internal defense; i.e., civil affairs, psychological operations, medical, military police, and engineer. A Special Forces group so augmented can provide mobile training teams (MTT's) to: (1) Train, advise, and assist host country: (a) Regular forces. (b) Paramilitary or irregular forces. (c) Government agencies. (2) Temporarily expand and complement US security assistance efforts. b. Special Forces foreign internal defense missions must support the host country's internal defense and internal development (IDAD) plans. Internal defense and internal development are defined as: (1) Internal defense – The full range of measures taken by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JCS Pub 1)

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(2) Internal development – Actions taken by a nation to promote its growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic, and social) that respond to the needs of its society. (JCS Pub 1) Section II. OPERATIONS 11-3. GENERAL Special Forces' conduct of foreign internal defense places major emphasis on interdiction operations and harassment of insurgent guerrilla units, training areas, and logistical installations. Major goals of these operations are to: a. Destroy and damage insurgent supply routes and depots. b. Capture insurgent equipment and key personnel. c. Create confusion and weaken insurgent morale. d. Force the insurgent to keep on the move. e. Fragment the insurgent force. f. Relieve villages of the insurgent threat. g. Deny the insurgent the support of the local populace. 11-4. TYPES OF OPERATIONS US Army Special Forces, in conjunction with host country forces, can conduct: a. Intelligence Operations. Military intelligence operations, in coordination with other host country government agencies, must be started as early as possible during an expected or actual insurgency. Intelligence provides the basis for all military operations. Of particular importance are intelligence operations devoted to neutralizing or destroying the effectiveness of the insurgent infrastructure. b. Psychological Operations. Since both government forces and insurgent forces need the support of the people to accomplish their programs, psychological operations are a major factor in IDAD operations. Military units plan and conduct PSYOP in consonance with national level guidance.

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c. Civil Affairs Operations. (1) Civil affairs operations include every activity of command concerned with relationships between the military, civil authorities, and the population. They range from the informal, day-to-day, community relations activities of individuals to the planned and organized operations of entire units. Military forces may perform specified functions of government or may exercise certain authority that is normally the responsibility of the local government. (2) One aspect of civil affairs is military civic action. To improve the image of the military with the civilian population, indigenous military forces can contribute to economic and social development by undertaking projects such as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation. US Army Special Forces may, at times, advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas. d. Populace and Resources Control Operations. Essential populace and resources control measures that conform to legal codes must be established and enforced justly and firmly. Basically police-type operations, they are designed to protect the populace and deny resources to the insurgent. Included are measures to deny infiltration of arms and equipment into the country. These operations may include population control measures such as documentation of individuals and families, curfews, and movement control. Resources may be controlled through rationing and price controls and also movement controls such as licensing and checkpoint operations. Controls should be limited to critical items and closely supervised and enforced in a wary that does not alienate the populace. e. Operations Against Insurgent Base Areas. These operations are designed to separate the insurgent force from its support, destroy facilities and forces, and interrupt training, rest, and reequipping. Operations against insurgent base areas are frequently conducted in conjunction with combat operations by regular forces. f. Operations Against Interior Infiltration Routes. Operations are conducted to deny or limit insurgent movement. Detection of enemy movement or the location of infiltration routes, crossing sites, and support facilities are followed by attack, ambush, or destruction, as appropriate. g. Remote Area Operations. (1) Operations may be undertaken in contested areas, or areas under insurgent control, populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups. The purpose of operations in these areas is to establish islands of popular support for the government. When government strength and authority are present, security and governmental services can be provided for the population. These areas are expanded into larger areas where the people can defend themselves and deny support to the insurgents. (2) Operations may also be conducted in unpopulated areas where insurgent forces have established training bases, mission support sites, A-3

rest areas, arms factories, sources of food, or major infiltration routes. The purpose of operations in these areas is to interdict the insurgent movement and destroy its support facilities. h. Urban Operations. One of the primary functions of Special Forces in urban areas is to assist the local government in neutralizing the insurgent political leadership and infrastructure. Intelligence and rapid response are keys in identifying, locating, and then apprehending the hard-core insurgent leaders. This is the first step in neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure and eliminates its centralized direction and control, creates disunity, and eventually destroys the insurgent underground apparatus. i. Border Operations. Border surveillance or control is usually a function of civilian-controlled police or paramilitary forces. When requirements exceed the capabilities of established border forces, paramilitary or irregular units advised by Special Forces may be directed to assume this responsibility or to reinforce existing border forces which are inadequate for the mission. Border operations serve to: (1) Separate insurgents from external support. (2) Separate insurgents from an external sanctuary. (3) Separate insurgents from support of the local population. (4) Destroy insurgent forces and facilities existing; in areas adjacent to the border. (5) Locate and establish surveillance on insurgent infiltration routes. (For a more detailed coverage of internal defense and internal development doctrine, see FM 100-20, Internal Defense and Development—US Army Doctrine.) Section III. INTELLIGENCE 11-5. INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS a. To accomplish assigned missions successfully, Special Forces elements require accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence. Collection, processing, and dissemination of information concerning all aspects of an area of operations susceptible to, or undergoing, an insurgency are vital Particularly important are those aspects of intelligence activities devoted to neutralizing or destroying the insurgent infrastructure and counterintelligence activities to protect the host country against espionage, subversion, and sabotage. Foreign internal defense (FID) missions depend on intelligence and counterintelligence due to the insurgent reliance on the populace for success. The populace is both a target for the insurgent and a source for intelligence, recruitment, and logistical support. The populace thus becomes a major consideration of A-4

intelligence in addition to the traditional ones of enemy, weather, and terrain. b. It may not be possible for Special Forces to obtain sufficient information through overt means from the populace. The release of information to Special Forces by the people could result; in retaliation by the insurgent, thereby destroying the usefulness of the people as informants. The commander must consider the use of clandestine intelligence and counterintelligence operational techniques. 11-6. AREA STUDY a. Preparation. Basically the same preparations are made for FID as for UW. However, the Special Forces element is required, because of the nature of the activities in FID, to make extensive studies of local customs, religious beliefs, languages, cultural backgrounds, and personalities. Special Forces need to exploit, to the maximum, local law enforcement agencies; security and intelligence elements and organizations; and interpreters, guides, and trackers. b. Preparation Methods. The SF element itself may desire to prepare the area studies; however, the basic difference in preparing the study for FID is that primary emphasis is placed on the study of propaganda appeals, symbols, and their uses and techniques of propaganda dissemination in support of all military operations. Gaining attention, understanding, and credibility among the people of the selected area is of primary consideration. Additionally, area handbooks dealing with the sociological, political, economic, and military aspects of the area are researched thoroughly to increase the background knowledge of Special Forces before commitment. c. Operational Area Intelligence. This information normally is provided by the US Military Advisor's staff and other elements of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Special Forces upon arrival in the host country. It covers specific areas of operation, targets, missions, military operations, civil affairs operations, organization and training of paramilitary forces and their employment, border operations, air operations, and other missions designed to solidify host country programs to gain the support of the populace in its fight against insurgency.

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Section IV. INFILTRATION TECHNIQUES 11-7. GENERAL Infiltration techniques employed in the conduct of operations will depend on assigned mission, number of personnel committed, and availability of suitable transportation. Consideration will be given to air infiltration that will include rappelling from helicopters, free-fall parachute operations, and the employment of both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft of the aviation company for air drops or air landings; water infiltration in areas contiguous to coastal areas; land infiltration, including longrange patrol actions; and stay-behind operations. Section V. COMMUNICATIONS 11-8. SYSTEMS AND TECHNIQUES In establishing an SFOB in an FID environment, the same signal considerations apply as in an unconventional warfare environment. Under the supervision of the Special Forces group signal officer, the signal company will establish the following communications, as directed: a. Installation, maintenance, and operation of an internal wire system for the SFOB. b. Termination of landline circuits from higher, adjacent, and lower headquarters. c. Entry into radio nets of higher and adjacent headquarters as required. d. Installation, maintenance, and operation cryptographic facility and communication center.

of

an

appropriate

e. Installation, operation, and maintenance of communications to subordinate units. 11-9. WIRE COMMUNICATIONS Long distance wire communications are not normally feasible in an FID environment. Local wire systems in established Special Forces camps are highly desirable to provide: a. Immediate contact with key personnel for radio-wire integration calls. b. Control and coordination of camp defenses. c. Intracamp administration and operations.

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d. Communications with observation posts. 11-10. TRAINING a. The reorganization of the Special Forces group communication structure to accomplish an FID mission requires that Special Forces personnel at all echelons be trained in the functioning of the signal communication systems. b. Signal training also will be required for the paramilitary forces that are established under control of the Special Forces operational elements. The Special Forces radio operators are we'll qualified to establish tactical communication systems within company-sized paramilitary units. Training will emphasize the following aspects of signal communications: (1) Radio installation. (2) Voice radio procedure. (3) Communication security. (4) Concept of communications. c. The type of signal equipment provided to the-paramilitary forces may be standard, obsolete, or current US military equipment or civilian procured equipment designed for use in the particular area concerned. The equipment should be simple to operate and maintain. d. Maintenance training beyond operator level should be conducted for selected indigenous personnel at a central location for the entire country or political subdivision. Section VI. POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL 11-11. GENERAL Their training and extensive study of their, operational areas enable Special Forces elements to determine the availability of war supporting materials for the local populace as well as for the insurgent force. The Special Forces element commander is able to advise his counterparts on resources control measures to deny the insurgent access to such materials. The commander must exploit all available means to help the local law enforcement agencies prevent essential resources from falling into the hands of the insurgent. The police and paramilitary forces in operational areas must be properly oriented and indoctrinated for this task.

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11-12. CONTROLS a. When establishing resources control, priorities must be assigned to items to be denied the insurgent. Restrictions on certain items may be injurious to the attitude of the populace, such as the control of fertilizer in a primarily agrarian area. Two methods that may be employed in controlling materials are price regulations and rationing. b. Additional controls must be put into effect for materials that can be used in medical treatment of insurgents and in manufacturing improvised explosives. Adequate control of these items will depend upon properly trained security personnel positioned at the production and distribution facilities for these sensitive items. (1) Physical security. Physical security could include checkpoints for searching personnel and vehicular and waterborne traffic entering and leaving installations, detection devices for certain items that react to electronic devices, clothing change points requiring personnel to shower and change clothes on entering or, leaving installations. (2) Personnel security. Personnel, security is more difficult. However, Special Forces personnel, working in close conjunction with local police and security elements, may instigate limited personnel security investigations to insure that personnel selected for work are reasonably clear of implications with known insurgent members. Additional procedures may be through the use of: (a) Informers. (b) Offers of rewards for information. (c) Erroneous information concerning activities. (d) Surveillance of after-duty-hour activities. (e) Curfews. c. The use of populace and resources control measures is sensitive and must be carefully planned and capable of enforcement. The need for restrictive measures must be made known to the people. Controls should be relaxed as the threat diminishes. Needless restrictions, violence, and oppression may further sway the populace to support of the insurgent. Activities of the local enforcement agencies must be closely coordinated with the spirit, intent, and techniques of other operational activities in the area.

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Section VII. FIELD ENGINEERING 11-13. GENERAL When supporting internal development operations, the SF element commander and the combat engineer specialist will place primary importance on those actions designed to win the willing and active cooperation, assistance, and support of the people. In remote areas where Special Forces elements will normally operate, only basic structures may exist and the construction of buildings may well be the assigned mission of the element. Extensive area studies conducted before commitment will reveal additional information on which to prepare plansand details of operation. In preparing for commitment, the engineer specialist will receive extensive retraining in the field of expedient engineering, such as: a. Road expedients. b. Expedient crossings and bridges. c. Land clearing for farming. d. Construction of lifting devices. e. Construction of simple sanitation projects. f. Use of tools and materials for simple engineering. g. Training and advising indigenous construction and combat engineering units in general construction tasks and in the preparation of defensive fortifications for security of the local villages. h. Water supply and irrigation. 11-14. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS Special Forces personnel should employ the technical skills and capabilities of engineer units of the host country forces, if available, for projects supporting internal development, programs. However, tyre Special Forces element must adhere to fundamentals and avoid the more advanced techniques and procedures, particularly those that are not compatible with local equipment, terrain, size of host forces, and mobility. Special Forces personnel must improvise when standard equipment is not available. An assessment and evaluation of units' and, local villagers' capability and availability will dictate projects to be, undertaken.

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Section VIII. MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS 11-15. GENERAL Medical requirements in FID differ in that medical activities are conducted openly, using existing medical organization and facilities. The medical organization should provide for training and operational assistance to military and paramilitary forces of the host country, with particular emphasis on the development of civic action programs. Civilian personnel selected from the community and called village health workers are trained, in cooperation with existing civilian health agencies and US AID missions, to improve health and sanitary conditions in local villages. They are trained in basic first aid and health and sanitation, either at centrally located medical training facilities or in the village. These indigenous personnel will carry out self-help programs in sanitation within the village under the supervision, and with the advice, of medical technical personnel organic to Special Forces. 11-16. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE IN FID a. In contrast to UW operations, the effort in FID is directed toward improvements in health and sanitation among indigenous; civilian populations. The general steps for implementing such programs are: (1) Establish liaison with existing health authorities„ (2) Accomplish an initial area assessment. (3) Attempt to secure the support of the village leaders. (4) Establish a training program for village health workers. (5) Establish health and sanitation measures based on priorities and the desires of the villagers. (6) Establish a roving village/hamlet sick call program. b. The success of FID at a village level requires tangibles evidence that the central government is responsible for efforts to improve the lot of the villager. Early liaison with appropriate local representatives of existing health agencies is, therefore, essential in order to achieve support, approval, and participation in plans for health programs to be implemented in the village. c. The success of health programs will depend largely upon the ability to motivate the villager to undertake changes in habits that have been practiced for generations. To accomplish this, knowledge of the social structure of the village and the local beliefs, customs, taboos, and mores is required. In many primitive societies the occurrence of disease is associated with visitations by evil spirits. The collection of this type information is part of the process of area assessment. Once some insight into these matters has been gained, an intelligent plan A-10

can usually be developed to attack basic health problems in the village. d. Efforts are then directed toward motivating and training local villagers to accomplish these objectives. Local support is usually best achieved through the village leaders or the village council or similar governing body, to include the unofficial leaders or opinion formers who, although not acting in an official capacity, exert great influence within the community. e. Training programs in basic health subjects must be initiated for individuals who can successfully use their knowledge to help the people help themselves toward better health. It is usually wise to permit the village council to select those who will undertake such training. The prestige associated by the villagers with this activity will usually result in the selection of individuals who are already in a position of influence within the community, thereby giving additional emphasis to the program. The subjects recommended for such training programs are: (1) Germs and parasites as causes of disease. (2) Food and water sanitation. (3) Personal hygiene. (4) Village sanitation, latrine, and bath facilities. (5) Pre- and post-natal care. (6) Nutrition and health. (7) Insect and rodent-borne disease control. f. Although initial emphasis is placed on enlisting the support of selected leaders and training village health workers, active participation by the villagers must be obtained in order to accomplish the goals of improving and maintaining village health. Some suggested projects for general village participation might include: (1) General village improvement teams. (2) Waste disposal inspection teams. (3) Food and water inspection teams. (4) Rodent and vector control teams.

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g. Priorities for programs are based upon the initial area assessment as well as upon the desires or "felt needs" of the community. In initiating programs, consider these basic rules: (1) Know the community and its leaders. (2) Do, not unnecessarily interfere with the people's customs. (3) Get the people to help themselves. (4) Keep programs simple and practical. (5) Build and maintain momentum. (6) Build trust. (7) Make it fun and convenient. (8) Plan for permanence. 11-17. VETERINARY PROCEDURES IN FID a. A major effort in veterinary support to assist in civic action programs is directed toward improving animal health in the host country. Host country veterinarians or veterinary organizations may be found at province or lower level. Assistance to the existing organization in terms of communications, transportation, supply, and security will often enable it to function effectively. Prevention of disease losses among animals is the most economical and fastest single means of increasing production. b. In rural areas, self-help programs will be directed toward increasing agricultural and livestock production in order to improve and increase food supplies. Such program's should be realistic and not overlook the development of protein food sources; for example, the raising of small animals and fowl and the cultivation of fish. c. Programs to establish high sanitary standards and provisions for quality control in food processing, storage, and handling can eventually provide opportunities for competition in world markets.

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APPENDIX A AREA STUDY GUIDE, AREA INTELLIGENCE STUDY GUIDE, AND BRIEFBACK GUIDE: Section I. AREA STUDY GUIDE The purpose of the area study guide is to provide a systematic means for compiling and retaining essential information to support operations. Although the basic outline is general in nature, it is flexible enough to permit detailed coverage of a given area. As time is made available for further study, various subjects should be subdivided and assigned to selected detachment members to produce a more detailed analysis of specified areas of interest. OUTLINE A-1. a.

POLITICAL FACTORS Occupying power.

(1) Number and status of nonnational personnel. (a) Number of nonnational personnel. (b) Status of nonnational personnel. (2) Their influence, organization, and mechanisms of control. (a) Influence. (b) Organization. (c) Mechanisms of control. b.

National government (indigenous).

(1) Government, international political orientation, and degree of popular support. (a) Government. (b) International political orientation. (c) Degree of popular support. (2) Attitudes and probable behavior of identifiable segments of the population toward the United States, its allies, and the enemy.

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(a) Toward the United States. (b) Toward its allies. (c) Toward the enemy. (3) National historical background. (a) Significant B.C. history. (b) Significant A.D. history. (c) Significant contemporary history. (d) Significant recent/current chronological event's. (4) Foreign dependence or alliances. (a) Foreign dependence. (b) Foreign alliances. (5) National capital and significant political, military, and economic concentrations. (a) National capital. (b) Significant political, military, and economic concentrations. 1. Political concentrations. 2. Military concentrations. 3. Economic concentrations. c.

Political parties/factions.

(1) If formed around individual leaders or based on established organizations. (2) If a single dominant party exists, is it nationalistic in origin or does it have foreign ties? (3) Major legal parties with their policies and goals. (4) Illegal or underground parties and their motivation. (5) Violent opposition factions within major political organizations.

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d.

Control and restrictions.

(1) Documentation. (2) Rationing. (3) Travel and movement restrictions. (4) Blackouts and curfews. (5) Political restrictions. (6) Religious restrictions. A-2.

ECONOMY

a.

Technological standards.

b.

Natural resources and degree of self-sufficiency.

(1) Natural resources. (2) Degree of self-sufficiency. c.

Financial structure and dependence on foreign aid.

(1) Financial structure. (2) Dependence on foreign aid. d.

Current value of money, wage scales.

(1) Current value of money. (2) Wage scales. e.

The extent and effect of the black market.

f.

Agriculture and domestic food supply.

(1) Agriculture. (2) Domestic food supply. g.

Industry and level of production.

(1) Industry. (2) Level of production. h.

Manufacture and demand for consumer goods.

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(1) Manufacture of consumer goods. (2) Demand for consumer goods. i.

Foreign and domestic trade and facilities.

(1) Foreign trade and facilities. (2) Domestic trade and facilities. j.

Fuels and power.

(1) Fuels. (2) dower. k.

Telecommunication and radio systems.

(1) Telecommunication system. (a) Telephone system. (b) Telegraph system. (c) Television system. (2) Radio system. (3) Microwave (telephone/radio) systems. (4) Satellite and laser systems. l.

Transportation adequacy by US standards.

(1) Railroads. (2) Highways. (3) Waterways. (4) Commercial air installations. m. The control and operation of industry, utilities, agriculture, and transportation. (1) Control and operation of industry. (2) Control and operation of utilities. (3) Control and operation of agriculture.

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(4) Control and operation of transportation. A-3.

GEOGRAPHY

(NOTE: Divide the country into its various definable subdivisions and analyze each subdivision using the following outline.) a. Subdivision (e.g., coastal plain, mountain plateau, or province/state, etc.). (1) Areas and dimensions. (2) Strategic location. (a) Neighboring countries and boundaries. (b) Natural defense including frontiers. (c) Points of entry and strategic routes. (3) Climate. Variations from the normal and the months in which they occur. Any extremes in climate that would affect operations. (a) Temperature. (b) Rainfall and snow. 1. Rainfall. 2. Snow. (c) Wind and visibility. 1. Wind. 2. Visibility. (d) Light data (BMNT, EENT, sunrise, sunset, moonrise, and moonset). (e) Seasonal effect of the weather on terrain and visibility. 1. Effect on terrain. 2. Effect on visibility. (4) Relief. (a) General direction of mountain ranges or ridge lines and whether hills and ridges are dissected. A-5

(b) General degree of slope. (c) Characteristics of valleys and plains. (d) Natural routes for, and natural obstacles to, crosscountry movement. 1. Routes for cross-country, movement. 2. Obstacles to cross-country movement. (e) Location of areas suitable for guerrilla bases, units, and other installations. (f) Potential landing and drop zones, and other reception sites. (5) Land use. Note any peculiarities, especially: (a) Former heavily forested areas subjected to widespread cutting or dissected bypaths and roads. (b) Pasture or waste land which has been reforested. (c) Former waste or pasture land that has been resettled and cultivated and is now being farmed. (d) Former rural countryside that has been depopulated and allowed to return to waste land. (e) Former swamp or marsh land that has been drained. (f) Former desert or waste land now irrigated and cultivated. (g) Lakes created by dams. (6) Drainage (general pattern). (a) Main rivers, direction of flow. (Characteristics of rivers and streams such as width, current, banks, depths, kinds of bottoms and obstacles, etc.) (b) Seasonal variation, such as dry beds and flash floods. (c) Large lakes or areas of many ponds or swamps (potential LZ's for amphibious aircraft). (7) Coast. Examine primarily for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply points.

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(a) Tides and waves. (b) Winds and current. (c) Beach footing. (d) Covered exit routes. (e) Quiet coves and shallow inlets or estuaries. (8) Geological basics. Types of soil and rock formations (include areas for potential LZ's for light aircraft). (9) Forests and other vegetation. (a) Natural and cultivated. (b) Types, characteristics, and significant variations from the norm at different elevations. (c) Cover or concealment to include density; seasonal variation. (10) Water. Ground surface; seasonal, potability. (11) Subsistence. (a) Seasonal or year-round. (b) Cultivated (vegetables, grains, fruits, and nuts). (c) Natural (berries, fruits, nuts, and herbs). (d) Wildlife (animals, fish, and fowl). b. Subsequent subdivision with annotated paragraphs as reflected above (where applicable). A-4.

CIVILIAN POPULACE

(NOTE: Particular attention should be given to those areas in a country where the local inhabitants have peculiarities, and are at considerable variance in one or more ways from the normal national way of life.) a.

Total and density.

(1) Total population: (2) Density per square kilometer/mile: b.

Basic racial stock and physical characteristics.

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(1) Types, features, dress, and habits. (2) Significant variations from the norm. c. Ethnic/religious groups. These groups should be analyzed only if of sufficient size, strength, and established bonds to constitute a dissident minority of some consequence. (NOTE: Delineate whether a national religion definitely shapes the actions and attitudes of the individual.) (1) Location or concentration. (2) Basis for discontent and motivation for change. (3) Opposition to majority or the political regime. (4) Any external or foreign ties of significance. d.

Attitudes. Toward the:

(1) Existing regime or occupying power. (2) Resistance movement. (3) United States and its allies. e.

Division between urban, rural, or nomadic groups.

(1) Large cities and population centers. date.

(a) Large cities including population. figures and census

(b) Identify large population centers by name or area dimensions, including population figures and census date. (2) Rural settlement patterns. (3) Areas and movement patterns of nomads or migratory workers/factions. f.

Standard of living levels.

(1) Primarily note the extremes away from average. (2) Class structure (degree of established social stratification and percentage of populace in each class). g.

Cultural (educational) levels.

(1) Primarily note the extremes away from average.

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(2) Class structure (degree of established social stratification and percentage of populace in each class). h.

Health and medical standards.

(1) General health and well-being. (2) Common diseases. (3) Standard of public health. (4) Medical facilities and personnel. (a) Medical facilities. (b) Medical personnel. (5) Potable water supply. (6) Sufficiency of medical supplies and equipment. i. Traditions and customs (particularly taboos). (Note wherever they are sufficiently strong and established that they may influence an individual's actions or attitude even during a war situation.) A-5.

ENEMY/NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

(NOTE: Conventional military forces (army, navy, and air force) and internal security forces (including border guards). Nonnational or occupying forces as well as national (indigenous) forces are analyzed using the following outline.) a.

National (indigenous) forces.

(1) Power potential statistics. (a) Area (square miles/kilometers): (b) Population: (c) Military service: Army Air Force years.

years, Navy

years,

(d) Total armed forces: (e) Gross national product or estimated GNP (date): (f) Defense expenditure (date): (2) Strategic nuclear forces.

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(a) Offensive. (b) Defensive. (3) Army. (a) Army total personnel strength: (b) Organization. 1. Total number of DIVISIONS by type (e.g., tank/armored, motorized/mechanized, infantry airborne, airmobile/assault/attack). 2. _Total number of BRIGADES/REGIMENTS (independent/separate) by type (e.g., same as in above example). 3. _Total number of SPECIAL TROOPS/UNITS/ORGANIZATIONS by type (e.g., commando, fusilier, ranger, special forces, etc.). 4. Major equipment inventory. a. Total number of TANKS by nomenclature (e.g., T-62, M-60A3, etc.). b. Total number of COMBAT INFANTRY VEHICLES by nomenclature (e.g., BMP, M-113, etc.). c. Total number of CANNON/MORTORS/MISSILES/ROCKETS SYSTEMS by nomenclature (e.g., 180mm Field Gun S-23, 155mm SP How M-109A1, etc.). d. _Total number of AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS by nomenclature (e.g., ZSU-23-4SP, SA-9, ROLAND II, etc.). (c) Total number of RESERVES. (4) Navy. (a) Navy total personnel strength: (b) Total number of MAJOR SYSTEMS by type (e.g., aircraft/helicopter carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, minesweepers, guided missile ships/boats, submarines, torpedo boats, patrol gunboats, etc.). (c) Total number of RESERVES. (5) Air Force.

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(a) Air Force total personnel strength: (b) Total aircraft strength: (c) Major aircraft types. 1. Total number of INTERCEPTORS by nomenclature (e.g., MiG-25, F-14, F-16, etc.). 2. Total number of FIGHTER BOMBERS .by nomenclature (e.g., MiG-23, MiG-21, F-4E, A-7D, etc.). 3. _Total number of BOMBERS by nomenclature (e.g.., I128, B-52; etc.). 4. Total number of TRANSPORTS by nomenclature (e.g., An24, C-141, etc.). 5. Total number of HELICOPTERS by nomenclature (e.g.., Mi-24, AH-1S, ete.). (d) Total number of RESERVES. (6) Marines. (a) Marine total personnel strength: (b) Organization (address as in Army above). (c) Total number of RESERVES. (7) Paramilitary forces (type and strength). (8) Morale, discipline, and political reliability. (9) Organization and basic deployment. (10) Uniforms and unit designations. (11) Ordinary and special insignia. (12) Overall control mechanism. (13) Chain of command and communication. (14) Leadership (officer corps). (15) Nonnational surveillance and control over indigenous security forces. (16) Training and doctrine.

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(17) Tactics (seasonal and terrain variations). (18) Equipment, transportation, and degree of mobility. (19) Logistics. (20) Effectiveness (any unusual capabilities or weaknesses). (21) Vulnerabilities in the internal security system. (22) Past and current reprisal actions. (23) Utilization and effectiveness of informers. (24) Influence on and relations with the local populace. (25) Psychological vulnerabilities. (26) Recent and current activities of the unit. (27) Counterguerrilla activities and capabilities with particular attention to reconnaissance units, special troops (airborne, mountain, ranger), rotary-wing or vertical-lift aviation unit, counterintelligence units, and units having a mass CBR delivery capability. (28) The location of all known guardposts or expected wartime security coverage for all types of installations, particularly along main lines of communication (LOC) (railways, highways, and telecommunication lines) and along electrical power and POL lines. (29) Exact location and description of the physical arrangement and particularly of the security arrangements of all forced labor or concentration camps and any potential PW inclosures. (30) All possible details, preferably by localities, of the types and effectiveness of internal security controls, including checkpoints, identification cards, passports, and travel permits. b. A-6. a.

Nonnational (occupying) forces (address same as 5a above). RESISTANCE MOVEMENT Guerrillas.

(1) Disposition, strength, and composition. (2) Organization, armament, and equipment. (3) Status of training, morale, and combat effectiveness. A-12

(4) Operations to date. (5) Cooperation and coordination between various existing groups. (6) General attitude toward the United States, the enemy, and various elements of the civilian populace. (7) Motivation of the various groups and their receptivity. (8) ($) Caliber of senior and subordinate leadership. (9) Health of the guerrillas. b.

Auxiliaries and the underground.

(1) Disposition, strength, and degree of organization. (2) General effectiveness and type of support. (3) Motivation and reliability. (4) Responsiveness to guerrilla or resistance leaders. (5) General attitude toward the United States, the enemy, and various guerrilla groups. c.

Logistical capability.

(1) Availability of food stocks and water to include any restrictions for reasons of health. (2) Agricultural capability. (3) Type and availability of transportation of all categories. (4) Types and location of civilian services available for manufacture and repair of equipment and clothing. (5) Supplies locally available to include type and amount. (6) Medical facilities to include personnel, medical supplies, and equipment. (7) Enemy supply sources accessible to the resistance., A-7.

TARGETS

(The objective in target selection is to inflict maximum damage on the enemy with minimum expenditures of men and material. Initially, the operational capabilities of a guerrilla force may be limited in the interdiction or destruction of enemy targets. The target area and specific points of attack must be studied, A-13

carefully analyzed, and priorities established. In general, targets are listed in order of priority in accordance with mission requirements.) a.

Railroads.

(1) Considerations in the selection of a particular lane: (a) Importance, both locally and generally. (b) Bypass possibilities. (c) Number of tracks and electrification. (2) Location of maintenance crews, reserve repair rails, and equipment. (3) Type of signal and switch equipment. (4) Vulnerable points: (a) Unguarded small bridges or culverts. (b) Cuts, fills, overhanging cliff's, or undercutting streams. (c) Key junctions or switching points. (d) Tunnels. (5) Security system. (NOTE: Targets listed below are divided into subsections generally as shown above. Differences in subsections are based on peculiarities of the particular target system.) b.

Telecommunications.

c.

POL.

d.

Electric power.

e.

Military storage and supply.

f.

Military headquarters and installations.

g.

Radar and electronic devices.

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h.

Highways.

i.

Inland waterways - canals.

j.

Seaports.

k.

Natural and synthetic gas lines.

l.

Industrial plants. Section II. AREA INTELLIGENCE STUDY GUIDE

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GENERAL

The following guide is designed to bring the essential elements of intelligence for the operational area into focus. Based on the area study guide, it narrows the factors that apply to a relatively small and specific area, refines the critical elements, and places them into proper perspective of an actual operation at a given time. A-9.

PURPOSE

To outline the development of detailed intelligence on an assigned UWOA to support the commitment of a Special Forces operational detachment. A-10.

FORMAT

a. Select from the area study guide those elements that are applicable to the situation and the assigned UWOA. b. Eliminate nonessential data and prepare a brief, concise summation of basic facts. c. Note serious gaps in data as processed in b above arid take immediate action to fill these gaps with the most current reliable information. d. Prepare or request graphics, large-scale sheets and special maps covering the assigned area, the latest photography and illustration or information sheets on targets in the area, town plans, sketches of installations, and air and hydrographic charts-related to the area. e. Assemble the material for ready reference. Then proceed to plot on maps or overlays, wherever feasible, the following: (1) Recommended initial locations of operational bases and alternate bases. (2) Primary and alternate DZ's, LZ's, or points for other forms of infiltration. A-15

(3) Possible direction and orientation points for infiltration vehicles (aircraft or 'goat); i.e., landmarks or reference points. (4) Routes from infiltration point to preselected bases with stopover sites. (5) Points for arranged or anticipated contacts with friendly elements. (6) Enemy forces known or anticipated, to include Location, strength, and capabilities. (7) Estimate of enemy operations or movements during the infiltration period. (8) Settlements or built-up areas in the vicinity of the infiltration point and tentative operational bases. (9) All railroads, highways, telecommunications, and other lines of communication in the UWOA. (10) All important enemy installations and facilities. (11) Significant terrain features. (12) Off-road routes and conditions (:depending on the season) for movement in all directions. (13) Distances between key points. (14) Recommended points of attack on assigned target system and selection of other potential target areas. f. As time permits, continue to collect; information and revise estimates in keeping with more current intelligence. Develop increasing details one through (14) above, with special emphasis on: (1) Local inhabitants: (a) Local traditions, customs, and dress. (b) Food, rationing, and currency„ (c) Attitudes toward the enemy regime, the United States, and for or against existing political ideologies. (d) Peculiarities or variances among individuals or small groups. (e) Resistance force group leadership and systems of control or influence employed.

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(2) Enemy—military forces and installations. (3) Other security forces and police. (a) Organizations, locations, and strengths. (b) Unit designations, insignia, and uniforms. (c) Areas covered and unit responsibilities. (d) Checkpoints, controls, and current documentation. (e) Patrols and mobile units. (4) Geographic features of the operational area in greater detail. (5) Approaching seasonal climatic changes and their effect upon weather and terrain. (6) Target categories and target areas in greater detail. Section III. BRIEFBACK GUIDE A-11. GENERAL a. Prior to its departure from the isolation area, each SFOD will be required to present a briefback. The purpose of this briefback is: (1) To provide the assembled staff an opportunity to evaluate the degree that the SFOD has absorbed all pertinent briefing data. (2) To insure the SFOD is properly prepared to accomplish its mission by allowing the SFOD commander to demonstrate that: (a) He understands his assigned mission. (b) He is familiar with the area of operation and all available intelligence. (c) He has made a detailed and workable plan of operation. (d) His detachment members are thoroughly familiar with all essential elements of the operation. b. To assist each SFOD in the presentation of its briefback, the following guide is a suggested order of presentation, with a suggested list of items that each SFOD member should cover. The final decision as to who gives a specific portion of the briefback is up to the detachment commander and will be based on the personality, appearance, staff capability, briefing ability, etc., of each SFOD staff member. A-17

c.

SFOD Commander.

(1) General description and location of the operational area (not a terrain analysis--very brief such as in what country and what general region). (2) Mission of the SFOD. (3) Concept of operations. (4) Staff organization of the SFOB and the plan for formulation and training of a combined/joint staff in the area of operations. d.

SFOD Executive Officer.

(1) Background on the area, to include: (a) Geography. (b) Sociological aspects. (c) Economics. (d) Religion. (e) Political situation. (f) Transportation nets. (g) Utilities and telecommunication nets. (2) History of resistance and guerrilla activities. e.

SFOD S2 or Assistants.

(1) Intelligence of the enemy to include: (a) Location of the enemy front limes, if applicable. (b) Description and location of enemy combat forces. (c) Description and location of enemy security and counterguerrilla forces. (d) Information concerning intelligence, security, and other auxiliary nets already established. (e) Target analysis (demolition requirements). f.

A-18

S3 or Assistants.

(1) Infiltration plan to include: (a) DZ and alternate DZ (LZ and alternate LZ for water infiltration). (b) Assembly plan. (c) Pertinent information concerning time o f loading, time of drops, stick assignments, etc. (2) Aircraft in-flight abort plans (or water en route abort plans), to include: (a) Time of flight. (b) Zones and assembly areas. (c) Action to be taken in the event of an abort. (3) Ground contact plan and alternate contact plan. (4) Contingent plan. (5) Estimate of present guerrilla situation, to include: (a) Composition and organization. (b) Level of training. (c) Availability of interpreters. (d) Strengths. (e) Weaknesses. (6) Plan for individual and unit training on a basic, advanced, and specialized basis. (7) Tentative plan for operations, to include E&E. g.

SFOD S1.

(1) Discipline, law, and order (SFOD). (2) Guerrilla processing, to include: (a) Oath of allegiance. (b) Guerrilla code. (c) Personnel data records.

A-19

(d) Photographs. (3) Administration of the guerrillas. (4) Prisoners of war. (5) Graves registration. (6) Morale and personal services (SFOD), to include: (a) Chaplain services. (b) Decorations and awards. (c) Mail. (d) Pay and allowance. (e) Comfort items. (7) Promotions, demotions, and assignments. (8) Reports to SFOB. (9) Demobilization procedures. (a) Recovery of equipment. (b) Pay and allowances. (c) Decorations and awards. (d) Postwar use of guerrilla forces. h.

SFOB S4 or Engineer SGT.

(1) Equipment to accompany SFOD in the infiltration (use of door bundles if used). (2) Emergency resupply. (3) Automatic resupply (time, location, recognition signal, equipment to be received, etc.). (4) Estimate of the guerrilla logistical requirements present and future. (5) Evaluation of auxiliary systems as pertains to logistical potential, to include: (a) Food.

A-20

(b) Weapons. (c) Demolitions. (d) Equipment. (6) Accounting for supplies and equipment. (7) Possible promises and contract stipulations to include agreements for obtaining supplies. i.

SFOD Medical Specialist.

(1) Evaluation of the medical situation in the area and possible medical problems. (2) Medical equipment accompanying SFOD in the infiltration. (3) Medical equipment in the automatic resupply. (4) Estimate of the medical potential of the area to include: (a) Hospitals. (b) Doctors. (c) Medical supplies. (5) Plans for the medical training of guerrilla and auxiliary personnel. j.

SFOD Radio Operator Supervisor.

(1) Existing facilities and communication nets in the area. (2) Communication plans and procedures. (3) Communication equipment accompanying SFOD in the infiltration. (4) Communication equipment in the automatic; and emergency resupply. k.

SFOD Commander.

(1) Linkup plans. (2) Assembly plan.

A-21

(a) Notification system. (b) Assembly plan. (c) Plan for movement to SFOB. (3) Entertain questions.

A-22

ANNEX A to Appendix A ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 1.

SOVIET ARMY

a. Notes on the Soviet Ground Forces (U), DIA (British Crown Copyright British Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS) publication), 1974 (CONFIDENTIAL). A concise readable synopsis of the Soviet Ground Forces. (Organization, Weapons, Equipment, Doctrine, Tactics.) b. Handbook on the Operations and Tactics of the Soviet Army (U), ACSI DA, Apr 75 (SECRET). A compendium of intelligence data on Soviet tactical ground and Air Force tactics and doctrine. (Organization, Doctrine, Tactics.) c. Radio Electronic Combat Capability (U), ACSI, DA, AST1731S-001-75, Jul 75 (SECRET). A discussion of the Soviet use of the principles of war in planning radio electronic combat (EW). (Organization, Doctrine, Tactics.) d. Soviet Ground Forces Organization Guide (U), DIA, DI-22096-75 (SECRET). Provides estimated tables of organization and equipment for the Soviet Army with emphasis upon the line divisions. Echelons covered are from front down to squad. (Organization, Weapons, Equipment.) e. The Soviet Intelligence Threat to the US Army (U), ACSI DA, Jun 75 (SECRET). Discusses the Soviet intelligence threat against the US Army. (Organization, Doctrine.) 2.

MIDEAST

a. Arab-Israeli Handbook (U), CIA, Sep 75 (SECRET). A discussion of the Mideast situation and developments with a look at the opposing forces involved. (Weapons, Equipment, Doctrine, Political.) b. Analysis of Combat Data - 73 Mid-East War (U), USACAC, Jul 74 (SECRET). An 8-volume report on material, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and-procedures used by both sides in the 73 Mideast War. 3.

PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

a. Notes on the Armed Forces of China (U), DIA (British Crown Copyright -British Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS) publication), 1972 (CONFIDENTIAL). A concise readable synopsis of the Armed Forces of the Peoples Republic of China. (Organization, Weapons, Equipment, Doctrine, Tactics.)

A-23

b. Handbook on the Chinese Communist Armed Forces (U), DIA, Apr 66 (SECRET). Describes the Chinese Communist military system, including ground forces, Navy, Air Force, and paramilitary forces. (Organization, Doctrine, Personnel and Training, Logistics, Weapons and Equipment.) c. A Type People's Republic of China Army - 1975-85 (U), USADC, Oct 70, ACN 15397, AD 511-742L (SECRET). Organization, doctrine, tactics and equipment are projected for the PRC army during the 1975-85 time period. 4.

NORTH KOREA

a. Handbook on the North Korean Armed Forces (U), DIA, AP220-3-13 (SECRET). Background information on North Korea, its people, and its armed forces. (Organization, Equipment, Weapons.) b. Intelligence Estimate 1-74, North Korea, G2 ((J), Eighth US Army, Apr 74 (SECRET). An intelligence estimate of the military capabilities and probable courses of action. Detailed information on tree North Korean army. (Organization, Equipment.) 5.

UNITED STATES

a. ST-157 FY 75 USA Infantry Reference Guide, Vol I, USA :Infantry School, 75. Designed to show the organization, personnel, and significant equipment contained in selected US Army Infantry, Mech Inf. Armor, Abn divisions. (Organization, Equipment, Weapons.) b. ST 17-1-1 Armor Reference Data, Volumes 1 & 2, US Army Armor School, 7. Reference handbook containing data on organization, details of equipment, and tables pertinent to armor operations. (Organization, Equipment, Weapons.) c. SIS 80030 - Characteristics of Infantry Weapons, USAICS, Mar 73. Lists US infantry weapons from small arms to tanks and reconnaissance vehicles to include basic nomenclature on each weapon. (Weapons.) d. Janes' Infantry Weapons - 1975, Danes' USA, 75. Detailed information on all types of infantry weapons used by armies of the world. (Weapons.) 6.

GENERAL

a. DIA Factbook - Communist World Forces (U), DDI-2680-13-75 (SECRET) (CONTROLLED DISSEM). An up-to-date summary of essential information on Communist military forces. (Disposition, Equipment, Weapons.)

A-24

b. Tactics of Soviet Ground Forces (DIA) (CONFIDENTIAL) DDI1100-123-75 (U). Soviet Tank Company Tactics (DIA) DDI-1120-12976. Military Operations of the Soviet Army - U-9AITAD Report No. 14-U-76 United States Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment.) c. DIA Military Intelligence Summary (U), AP-210-6 (Vol) V (Year) - INT (12 sections by geographic area SECRET). An assessment of the military capabilities of Free World and Communist countries. Summarizes information on ground, naval, air, missile, and paramilitary forces. It also evaluates governmental stability and the extent of insurgency and Communist influence. (Political, Organization, Geography.) d. DIA Register of Intelligence Publications and Scientific and Technical Intelligence Register (RIP/STIR), DS-733 T-74, 28 Jun 74. The RIP and the T have been combined into one publication. The RIP publication lists selected current general intelligence studies. The STIR portion primarily lists current DIA-approved scientific and technical products of the Department of Defense. e. National Basic Intelligence Factbook (U), CIA, Jul 75 (SECRET). A compilation of basic data on political entities worldwide. f. Register of Intelligence Products (FRIP) (U), FORSIG, Dec 'T5 (CONFIDENTIAL). An accession list of products available from the FORSCOM Intelligence Group. g. Register of Intelligence Publications (RIP), DDS-2600-3778 (SECRET). h.

Intelligence Users Guide, DDM-2600-397-78 (CONFIDENTIAL).

NOTE: Requisition through classified library or intelligence publication channels.

A-25

ANNEX B to Appendix A REFERENCES ARMY REGULATIONS (AR's) (C) 10-122 40-2 50-5 58-1 65-75 190-11 210-10 310-25 310-50 340-15 340-16 380-5 380-200 381-12 381-20 (C)530-1 (C)530-2 (C)530-3 (C)530-4

United States Army Security Agency (U) Army Medical Treatment Facilities General Administration Nuclear Surety Joint Procedures for Management of Administrative Use Motor Vehicles Unit Mail Service Physical Security of Weapons, Ammunition, and Explosives Administration Dictionary of United States Army Terms Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes Preparing Correspondence Safeguarding "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" Information Department of the Army Supplement to DOD 5200.1-R (DODISPR) Armed Forces Censorship Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army and Deliberate Security Violations US Army Counterintelligence (CI) Activities Operations Security (U) Communications Security (U) Electronic Security (U) Control of Compromising Emanations (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLETS (DA PAMS) 108-1 310-1 310-2 310-3 310-4

Index of Army Motion Pictures and Related Audio-Visual Aids Index of Administrative Publications Index of Blank Forms Index of Doctrinal Training and Organizational Publications Index of Technical Manuals, Technical Bulletins, Supply Manuals (types 7,8 & 9), Supply Bulletins, and Lubrication Orders

FIELD MANUALS (FM's) 3-1 19-30 21-6

A-26

Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) Support Physical, Security How to Prepare and Conduct Military Training

21-75 24-1 30-5 30-15 30-16 30-17 30-20 30-35 30-40 (C)31-20 (C)32-5 (S)32-10 100-5 100-26 101-5 101-31-1

Combat Training of they Individual Soldier and Patrolling Tactical Communications Doctrine Combat Intelligence Intelligence Interrogation Technical Intelligence Counterintelligence Operations Aerial Surveillance-Reconnaissance Field Army Military Intelligence Battalion, Aerial Reconnaissance Support. Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces Special Forces Operations (U) Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U) USASA in Support of Tactical Operations (U) Operations The Air-Ground Operations Systems Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure Staff Officers' Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment, Doctrine, and Procedures

TRAINING CIRCULARS (TC's) 6-4-1 6-4-2 24-2 30-3 30-4 30-11 30-19 30-21 30-23 30-24 30-25 30-26 30-28 30-79 30-102 31-20-1 (C)31-20-3 (C)31-20-5 100-1

The Threat The Threat - Organization, Tactics, & Equipment Communications-Electronics Operations Instructions Soviet Equipment Recognition Guide Motorized Rifle Regiment Army Tactical Weather The Division Intelligence System A Guide for Scenarios and Intelligence Plans Ground Surveillance Radars (GSR) Tactical Counterintelligence Ground Reconnaissance and Surveillance and the Tactical Surveillance Officer Remote Sensors (REMS) S2 Reference Guide OV-1 Mohawk Survivability The Motorized Rifle Company The Role of US Army Special Forces Special Forces Air and Maritime Operations (U) Special Forces Communications (U) OPSEC (Operations Security)

TO BE PUBLISHED 30-27

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield A-27

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS DOD 5200.I-R

Information Security Program Regulations

TRADOC BULLETINS 1 2 3 4 5 6

A-28

Range and Lethality of US and Soviet Anti Armor Weapons (C) Soviet ATGM's Capabilities and Counter measures (U) (C) Soviet RPG-7, Antitank Grenade Launcher (U) (C) Soviet ZSU-23-4; Capabilities and Countermeasures (U) Training with LAW Countersurveillance and Camouflage (U) Improving (C) Combined Arms Combat Effectiveness

ANNEX C to Appendix A GRAPHIC TRAINING AIDS The United States Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) is the proponent agency for the production of Department of the Army intelligence series graphic training aids (LTA's). These GTA's are developed to support intelligence training for all components of the Army and may be in the form of wall charts, posters, flip charts, Vu-Graph transparencies, or pocket cards. GTA charts (44 x 33 inches), cards, and similar training aids may be obtained from training aids centers. Transparencies (8 x 10 itches) and 35mm slides (2 x 2 inches) are available at audiovisual support centers. GTA's are of a particular value to brigades and smaller units where the more sophisticated training aids may not be available. USAICS desires to produce GTA's that will meet unit training needs and improve support to intelligence training in the field. Your recommendations for changes or additions to the intelligence series GTA's are solicited and should be forwarded to Commander, United Stages Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-IT, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613. GTA 30-1-9 30-1-10 30-1-11 30-1-12 30-i-13 30-1-14 30-1-16 30-1-17 30-1-18 30-1-19 30-1-20 30-1-21 30-1-22 30-1-23 30-3-7 30-3-8 30-3-10 30-3-11 30-3-13 30-3-14 30-3-15 30-3-16 30-3-17

TITLE Production of Intelligence Essential Elements of Information and Collection Plan Intelligence Cycle Combat Intelligence Journal, Workbook, and Situation Map Introduction to Intelligence Reports Military Intelligence Responsibilities for Surveillance and Reconnaissance Intelligence Officers Responsibility for Surveillance and Reconnaissance National Intelligence Community Analysis of the Area of Operation Interrogation Approach Techniques Order of Battle Elements Radar Surveillance Card and Plotter Soldier's Guide to Combat Intelligence Historical Development of Soviet Intelligence Soviet Ordnance Warsaw Treaty Organization Soviet Antitank Weapons North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Warsaw Pact and Nato Tank Recognition Guide Soviet Weapons Whiz Wheel Soviet Army and Navy Uniforms, Ranks and Insignia Intelligence Documents for Field Training

A-29

A-30

APPENDIX B AREA ASSESSMENT B-1.

IMMEDIATE--INITIAL ASSESSMENT

Initial assessment includes those items deemed essential to the operational detachment immediately following infiltration. These requirements must be satisfied as soon as possible after the detachment arrives in the operational area and should include: a.

Location and orientation.

b.

Detachment's physical condition.

c.

Overall security:

(1) Immediate area. (2) Attitude of the local populace. (3) Local enemy situation. d. B-2.

Status of the local resistance element:. SUBSEQUENT--PRINCIPAL ASSESSMENT

Principal assessment, a continuous operation, includes those collection efforts which support the continued planning and conduct of operations. It forms the basis for all of the detachment's subsequent activities in the operational area. a.

The Enemy.

(1) Disposition. (2) Composition, identification, and strength. (3) Organization, armament, and equipment. (4) Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness. (5) Operations: (a) Recent and current activities of the unit. (b) Counterguerrilla activities and capabilities with particular attention to reconnaissance units, special troops (airborne, mountain, ranger), rotary-wing or vertical-lift aviation units, counterintelligence units, and units having a mass CBR delivery capability. B-1

(6) Unit areas of responsibility. (7) Daily routine of the units. (a) Logistical support to include: (b) Installations and facilities. (c) Supply routes. (d) Methods of troop movement. (8) Past and current reprisal actions. b.

Security and Police Units.

(1) Dependability and reliability to the existing regime or the occupying power. (2) Disposition. (3) Composition, identification, and strength. (4) Organization, armament, and equipment. (5) Degree of training, morale, and efficiency. (6) Utilization and effectiveness of informers. (7) Influence on, and relations with, the local populace. (8) Security measures over public utilities and government installations. c.

Civil Government.

(1) Control and restrictions, such as: (a) Documentation. (b) Rationing. (c) Travel and movement restrictions. (d) Blackouts and curfews. (2) Current value of money, wage scales. (3) The extent and effect of the black market. (4) Political restrictions. B-2

(5) Religious restrictions. (6) The control and operation of industry, utilities, agriculture, and transportation. d.

Civilian Populace.

(1) Attitudes toward the existing regime or occupying power. (2) Attitudes toward the resistance movement. (3) Reaction to US support of the resistance. (4) Reaction to enemy activities in the country, specifically that portion in the UWOA. (5) General health and well being. e.

Potential Targets.

(1) Railroads. (2) Telecommunication. (3) POL. (4) Electric power. (5) Military storage and supply. (6) Military headquarters and installations. (7) Radar and electronic devices. (8) Highways. (9) Inland waterways and canals. (10) Seaports. (11) Natural and synthetic gas lines. (12) Industrial plants. (13) Key personalities. f.

Weather.

(1) Precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, visibility, and seasonal changes. B-3

(2) Wind speed and direction. (3) Light data (BMNT, SENT, sunrise, sunset;, moonrise, and moonset). g.

Terrain.

(1) Location of areas suitable for guerrilla bases, units, and other installations. (2) Potential landing and drop zones, and other reception sites. (3) Routes suitable for: (a) Guerrillas. (b) Enemy forces. (4) Barriers to movement. (5) The seasonal effect of the weather on terrain and visibility. h.

Resistance Movement.

(1) Guerrillas. (a) Disposition, strength, and composition. (b) Organization, armament, and equipment. (c) Status of training, morale, and combat effectiveness. (d) Operations to date. (e) Cooperation and coordination between various existing groups. (f) General attitude toward the United States, the enemy, and various elements of the civilian populace. (g) Motivation of the various groups and their receptivity. (h) Caliber of senior and subordinate leadership. (i) Health of guerrillas. (2) Auxiliaries and the underground. B-4

(a) Disposition, strength, and degree of organization. (b) General effectiveness, and type of support. (c) Motivation and reliability. (d) Responsiveness to guerrilla or resistance leaders. (e) General attitude toward the United States, the enemy, and various guerrilla groups. i.

Logistical Capability of the Area.

(1) Availability of food stocks and water to include any restrictions for reasons of health. (2) Agricultural capability. (3) Type and availability of transportation of all categories. (4) Types and location of civilian services available for manufacture and repair of equipment and clothing. (5) Supplies locally available to include type and amount. (6) Medical facilities to include personnel, medical supplies, and equipment. (7) Enemy supply sources accessible to the resistance. j.

Preventive Medicine.

(1) Weather. (a) Is the weather cold enough to put emphasis on causes, treatment, and prevention of cold weather injuries? (b) Is the weather hot enough to put emphasis on causes, treatment, and prevention of heat injuries? (2) Terrain. How does the terrain affect evacuation and medical resupply? (3) Indigenous personnel. (a) Physical characteristics. Describe endurance, ability to carry loads, and to perform other physical feats. B-5

(b) Dress. What symbolism is attached to various articles of clothing and jewelry, such as amulets, if any. (c) Attitudes. 1. What taboos and other psychological attributes are present in the society? 2. Describe rites and practices by witch doctors during illness. What do these rites symbolic? Does the practitioner use Western medicines? 3. How do indigenous personnel respond to events such as fear, happiness, anger, and sadness? (4) Housing. (a) Analyze physical layout of the community. (b) Determine infestation with ectoparasites and vermin. (5) Food. (a) Is food cultivated for consumption? What foods? (b) How do the seasons of your operational area influence diet? Does migration in search of food occur? (c) What foods provided by US personnel do the indigenous personnel prefer or reject? (d) What cash crops are raised? (6) Water supply, urban. What; kind of water treatment plants are used (if any)? (7) Water supply, rural. (a) What are the numbers and types of rural water supplies? (b) What treatment is given to water in rural areas? Give attitudes of the indigenous personnel toward standard US purification methods. (8) Sewage disposal (when applicable),, (a) What are the types and locations of sewage treatment plants? B-6

(b) In remote areas, what; system is used for disposal of human excrement, offal, and dead animals or humans? (c) What are the attitudes of the indigenous personnel to standard US methods, such as the use of latrines? (9) Epidemiology. What specific diseases in each of the three following major categories are present among the guerrillas, their dependents, or their animals? (10) Domestic animals. (a) What domestic animals are present? (b) Describe the normal forage. 1. Do owners supplement the food supply? What food supplements are given, if any? 2. Are animals penned, or allowed to roam? (c) Is any religious symbolism or taboo associated with animals ("sacred cows")? Are animals sacrificed for religious purposes? (d) Are local veterinarians available for animal treatment and ante- and post-mortem inspections of meats? What is their training? (11) Local fauna. Record species of birds, large and small mammals, reptiles, and arthropods present in the area. If names are unknown, describe (survival purposes). (12) Poisonous plants. Record those species which are known to be toxic to roan through contact with the skin, inhalation of smoke from burning vegetation, or through ingestion (survival).

B-7

B-8

APPENDIX C FIELD-EXPEDIENT PRINTING METHODS C-1. INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAKING AND USING THE SILK SCREEN a. Tools For the Job. Six items of equipment are necessary for printing in the field and make it possible to have printed matter available for use at any time anywhere. The field-expedient printer can carry these items along whenever he expects to do printing in the field; but a good workable substitute can be found for all of these items in the forests, swamps, and deserts of the world. The fieldexpedient printer can often do his job through the use of substitute items. The six essential tools for printing in the field are: (1) A silk screen. (2) A stencil. (3) Ink. (4) A stylus. (5) Paper. (6) A squeegee or ink roller. (a) The silk screen (fig. C-1) consists of a frame over which a piece of cloth is stretched. This frame is attached to a base to provide a flat working space. The cover is not necessary for printing but simply makes the silk screen easy to carry from one place to another.

Figure C-1 Silk screen with carrying case. C-1

(b) The stencil is a device which allows the ink to pass through the screen and onto the paper where it is needed anti blocks out the ink where it is not needed. (c) The ink used in silkscreen printing should be thick and have an oil base. Many kinds of ink can be used for printing in the field. (d) A stylus is a device used to etch the stencil. A pointed piece of wood or metal can be used for this purpose. (e) Paper, or a good substitute, is an essential item for printing in the field. Many good substitutes for paper have been found, but it is best to have a good supply of paper whenever possible. Often paper which has been used can be reused by the printer for a new mission. (f) The squeegee, or ink roller, is a tool used to spread the ink evenly and to force the ink through the stencil and onto the paper. b. Making a Silk Screen (fig. C-2). The field-expedient; printer can construct a silkscreen printing press by following the instructions below. Remember that the silkscreen and all of the other items mentioned can be made by using materials found in the field. A good serviceable silk screen can be made by using wooden pegs instead of nails, a rock instead of a hammer, a knife instead of a saw, and bamboo instead of pieces of wood for the frame. Three tools used for making a silk screen are: (1) A hammer or heavy object for driving tacks and small nails. (2) A knife for cutting the cloth and canvas hinge. (3) A saw or hatchet for cutting the wood. Materials for constructing the frame are: (a) 4 pieces of wood, 1 1/4 x ?./4 x 15 1/11 inches. (b) 4 pieces of wood, 1 1/4 x 3/4 x 21 inches. (c) Sixteen 1-inch nails. (d) Two 1 1/4-inch nails. (e) Nails must be very thin so they will not split the wood. It is best to use "soft" wood in making the frame. When you have made the frame, you are ready to attach the cloth. Many kinds of material can be used to make the C-2

screen. Silk cloth is a material which gives the best results, it is strong and can be cleaned and used many times. Parachute nylon or a cotton handkerchief will also serve in an emergency, even an undershirt can be used; however, remember that only finely woven cloth will allow a fine line to be printed. c. Directions for Attaching the Cloth to the Frame (fig. C-3). (1) Cut the piece of cloth so that it is several inches larger than the dimensions of the frame.

Figure C-2 Dimensions for construction of silk screen frame. (2) Soak the cloth in water so that it will shrink tightly over the frame when it dries. (3) Place the cloth over the wooden frame and place one tack in each corner as shown in A, figure C-3. Either small 1/4-inch tacks or staples can be used. You will need about 90 tacks or staples to attach the cloth securely. (4) Next, place a row of tacks along one side of the frame as shown in B, figure C-3. Ten evenly spaced tacks or staples will be enough. (5) Place a row of tacks along the opposite edge of the frame as shown in C, figure C-3. The cloth must be pulled tight before driving each of these 10 tacks. (6) Continue to drive the tacks around the inside as shown in D. This will give added strength to the screen. C-3

Figure C-3 Tacking cloth to underside of frame. d. Materials for Constructing the Base and Cover. (1) 4 pieces of wood, 1 x 1 x 17 inches. (2) 4 pieces of wood, 1 x 1 x 28 inches. (3) 2 pieces of cardboard or plywood, 19 x 28 inches. (4) 1 piece of canvas or heavy cloth, 2 x 28 inches. (5) Eight 1 1/4-inch nails. (6) One hundred forty 1 1/4-inch tacks. e. Directions for Making the Base and cover (fig. C-4). (1) The four pieces of cardboard or plywood is then placed over the wood frame and tacked around the edge with tacks. Space the tacks evenly 1 inch apart.

Figure C-4 Dimensions for construction of base and cover. C-4

f. The Hinge Nails. You are now ready to hinge. the silk screen to the base. Place the frame in the base with the cloth side down. The silk screen is now flat against the cardboard or plywood. The end of the silkscreen frame should be 1 1/2 inches from the end of the base. This will permit the frame to be raised. The two 1 1/4-inch nails are driven through the side of the base from the outside and into the end of the silkscreen frame. Figure C-1 shows where these hinge nails are placed. These two nails form a hinge which allows the screen to be raised and lowered. The final step in making your silk screen is the hinging of the base to the cover. This is done by using the 2- x 28inch'piece of canvas as a hinge. This piece of cloth is tacked along one side of the base and cover. You now have a carrying case for the silk screen, making the screen portable. g. The Ink to Be Used. Many different kinds of ink can be used for printing with the silk screen. Ink with an oil base, such as mimeograph ink, is best. Paint with an oil base is the best substitute or printer's ink can also be used. Ink that is used for silkscreen printing should be thick; oil base paints are almost the right thickness. A little practice with the silk screen will teach the printer what to look for in a good printing ink. The fieldexpedient printer can practice by using many kinds of ink and paints. In an emergency, berries or any stain producing material can be crushed and an ink substitute produced. h. How to Use the Stencil and Silk Screen. (1) The first step is to make sure that you have all six of your tools. They should be clean and in good working order, and you should have enough paper to finish the job. (2) Place the words, picture, or symbols on the stencil. If you are using the standard printing stencil, scratch the words onto the stencil with the pointed stylus. If you are using the cut-out stencil, remove the parts with a knife or sharp object. (3) Lift the silkscreen frame up from the base as in figure C-1. Place the stencil on the bottom of the screen. Tacks, tape, or glue can be used to hold the stencil in place. (4) Place a piece of paper on the base under the stencil. This piece of paper will protect the base from ink while you are preparing to print. (5) Lower the silk screen onto the base. Place enough ink on the silk to cover the screen. Use the squeegee to spread the ink evenly and to force the ink through the opening in the stencil. The squeegee must have a straight edge; another tool which will do the same job is a roller. A roller made of hard rubber is best for spreading the ink on the silk screen. A stiff brush is another tool which can be used. C-5

(6) You are now ready to print. Place the piece of paper to be printed on the base and lower the silk screen on top of the paper. Slide the squeegee firmly over the silk, forcing the ink through the stencil, lift the screen, remove the paper, and allow the paper to dry. If the printing is not dark enough, add more ink to the screen. (7) When the printing job is finished, remove the stencil and clean the screen and all other tools. Also, be sure that the squeegee is clean. C-2. INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAKING AND USING THE ROCKER-TYPE MIMEOGRAPH MACHINE a. General Instructions. Cover any smooth, curved surface with a heavy (thick), porous fabric. Saturate fabric with mimeograph ink. Cover ink pad with desired stencil and apply to appropriate paper with a rocker-type movement of the apparatus. b. Specific Instructions. A frame or base for this aid can be cheated, on the spot, by using many ordinary items. A wooden block, tin can, or glass bottle can be used as a frame. The machine can be made with crude tools; or, in some cases, the article may be used as it is. A frame may be made from a wooden block, using a chopping axe and a penknife. The surface can also be hollowed out to carry ink, styli, and stencil paper for supply purposes. Size can be increased by fastening a piece of sheet metal to the block. (1) A cover can be made using thick, porous material such as a coat, blanket, felt, or burlap; a cover also may be made of many layers of thin fabric. Wrap the fabric around the smooth, curved surface of the printing frame to make an inkpad. The pad can be held in position with tape, string, thumbtacks, or glue. (2) Saturate the pad with mimeograph ink. This ink: can be a composite of almost any grease and carbon scraped from a fireplace or grating. Color can be achieved by mixing pigments of color to the grease instead of carbon. Mimeograph ink, commercial grade, is a universal item and is available in any civilized country. Shoe polish, thinned with kerosene or other solvent, is generally available and usable. (3) Stencils can be made from thin, tough tissue or thin airmail paper by applying a coat of wax (paraffin) to one side. This wax can be rubbed on, then gently warmed to insure uniformity of thickness and penetration of the paper. Only partial penetration is desirable; not saturation. (4) For a stylus, you may use a ballpoint pen, a slender stick of hard wood, or even a heavy piece of wire with the ends rounded and smoothed enough to etch the wax without tearing the paper. The stylus is used to inscribe the desired message or to sketch on the wax coating of the paper. The paper is then applied to the inkpad with C-6

the wax next to the ink. Some of the ink will penetrate through the lines made by the stylus, thus "printing" the blank paper. The undisturbed wax prevents the ink from penetrating the paper in unwanted places. (5) If no mimeograph paper is available, substitute paper chosen for printing should be of quality equal to newsprint; but, almost any paper will suffice. C-3. INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAKING AND USING A GELATIN PRINTING DEVICE a. General Instructions. This reproduction method is more commonly known as the hectograph technique, a commercial technique used worldwide. All necessary materials are commercially known by the name "hectograph" and are available in several variations from gelatin plates to prepared plates which are fiber-backed, wrap-around models for machine use (Ditto). The Ditto machines are similar in appearance to mimeograph machines. Emergency or field conditions will probably dictate the use of the simple gelatin plate described below. b. Specific Instructions. Gelatin, the base for this technique, can be purchased as a hectograph product, made from gelatin powder produced by food concerns (such as Knox), or made by boiling the bones and skin of animals. (Pulverizing the bone will speed the boiling down process.) Enough gelatin powder should be added to make a semisolid plate. The warm, liquid gelatin is poured into a shallow, wide container or on a tabletop where it is allowed to cool and set. When properly prepared, it becomes a glass-smooth plate which feels like sponge rubber to the touch. This will be soft enough to absorb the ink but firm enough not to bleed the ink on the master copy. The addition of a little animal glue will toughen the plate and a little glycerin will keep it from drying out too quickly. The effects of these additions are in direct proportion to the quantity, used; both are desirable, but not absolutely necessary. Both should be added and well-mixed during the liquid stage of the gelatin. (1) The master copy is made on a good grade of smooth, tough, hard-finish paper. The material to be reproduced is typed or written using Hectographor Ditto carbon paper, ribbon, ink, or pencil; all are commercially available. In an emergency, trial and error testing will unveil numerous ink pencils (indelible), writing inks, and stamped inks that will reproduce. When the ink has been applied to the master copy, do not blot. If pencil is used, be sure that the copy is strong and uniform. (2) When the gelatin plate is set and ready for work, sponge the plate thoroughly with cold water and allow it to set for an additional minute or two. Using a sponge, remove all excess moisture and apply the master copy, face down, on the gelatin plate. Carefully smooth the copy to insure complete and uniform contact with prepared plate. Do not remove for at least 2 minutes. Lift one corner of the master for a gripping point and smoothly and carefully lift the C-7

master copy from the gelatin plate. The gelatin plate now bears a negative copy of the desired material and is ready to reproduce the copy. (3) Begin reproduction immediately after the master copy has been removed from the gelatin plate. Reproduction is accomplished by placing a blank sheet of smooth surface paper on the gelatin plate and smoothing it into total contact by using the hand (or a rubber roller, if available), then lifting the sheet from the gelatin surface. This is done rapidly to obtain as many copies as possible from one inking of the plate. One good inking of the plate may produce from 100 to 200 copies by this method, while a commercial Ditto machine may produce as many as 700 copies. To speed this process, one small corner of the sheet of reproduction paper is left free for gripping. This can be accomplished by permanently affixing a small piece of paper to the place on the gelatin plate where a corner of the reproduction paper would fall. This piece of paper acts as a guide and a buffer to keep that one corner of the reproduction paper from sticking. When removing the reproduction paper, lift the sheet by the loose corner; do not attempt to roll it away. The rolling action will cause the reproduction paper to curl as it dries. (4) After completing the reproduction job, sponge the gelatin plate thoroughly with cold water and allow it to set for 48 hours or until the ink has been assimilated by the gelatin. The plate is now ready to be used on a new and different job. The only way to shorten this time span is to dissolve the gelatin plate in hot water; boil off the superfluous water until the liquid is thickened to the desired consistency, and pour a new gelatin plate. Of course, two or more gelatin plates may be prepared to increase production capabilities.

C-8

APPENDIX D EXAMPLES OF MASTER TRAINING PROGRAM FOR RESISTANCE FORCES Section I. EXAMPLE OF MASTER TRAINING PROGRAM FOR A 10-DAY LEADERSHIP SCHOOL The master training program for the 10-day leadership school was developed to provide the indigenous leaders and potential leaders with a general knowledge of the subjects to be taught to all indigenous personnel. Primary emphasis is placed on the role of the leader or commander in order to prepare these leaders to supervise the activities of their subordinates. It is assumed that most of these personnel have had prior military service and, therefore, should already possess a basic knowledge of the subjects to be covered. Upon completion of the 10-day leadership school, the leaders will return to their units of work and train with their units, thus expanding their own knowledge of the subject covered. Following an example of a 10-day master training program for a leadership school for selected indigenous personnel. HOURS Subject Scope Day Night Total PE Map Reading and Compass Same general scope as in 30-day program. Include how 4 2 6 (4) to read scale and coordinates. Field Aid, Field Same general scope as in 30-day program. Emphasis on 4 4 (1) Sanitation, and Survival field sanitation and responsibility of commanders. Individual Tactical Same general scope as in 30-day program. Emphasis on 10 9 19 (16) Training (Day and Night) security of operational bases, movements, formations, control measures at night, and duties and responsibilities of commanders. Patrols, Small-Unit Same general scope as in 30-day program. Emphasis on 10 29 30 (25) Tactics, Raids, Ambushes planning, organization, preparation, command, (Day and Night) control, security, execution of patrols, ambushes and raids. Weapons (US and Foreign) Same general scope as in 30-day program. 8 2 10 (7) Familiarization firing. Primary emphasis on employment of weapons. Intelligence Same general scope as in 30-day program. Primary and 6 4 10 (8) counterintelligence. Night visions.

Air Operations

Same general scope as in 30-day program. Primary 6 8 14 (11) emphasis on selection and reporting of DZ's, organization of reception committee, duties and responsibilities of commanders. Demolition Familiarization with demolition procedures; 5 5 (3) demonstrating, planning, safety. Communications Communication means, available systems, 4 4 (2) communication security, simple cryptographic systems. Leadership Principles and Military leadership, traits, principles, 6 6 (4) Techniques indications, actions, and orders. Responsibilities and duties of the commander. Human behavior problem areas and problem-solving process. Selection of junior leaders. Span of control and chain of command. Combat leadership. Tactics and Operations Characteristics of guerrilla warfare, guerrilla 7 5 12 (9) operations, principles, capabilities, and limitations, organization of operational bases, security, civilian support, logistics, counterintelligence, combat employment, missions, tactical control measures, target selection, mission support site, and defensive measures. Responsibilities and duties of indigenous leaders. Total hours in master program 70 50 120 (90) Notes: 1. Identify those personnel whose leadership ability, knowledge, skill, or desire is below acceptable standards. 2. Upon completion of leadership school one additional day may be scheduled for coordinating and planning future operations. 3. A suggested arrangement of scheduling is as follows: 29 April - 4 May: Preparation for training and selection of leaders. 5 - 14 May: Leadership training. 16 May - 14 June: Troop training.

Section II. EXAMPLE OF A 30-DAY MASTER TRAINING PROGRAM Following is an example of a 30-day master training program which may be used as a basis for preparing individual master training programs for each separate indigenous unit. HOURS Subject Scope Day Night Total PE Map Familiarization and How to read a map, orientation of map with compass, 14 10 24 (20) Use of Compass how to locate oneself, determine azimuth, and day and night use of compass. First Aid, Field Basic treatment of wounds, prevention of infection 6 4 10 (7) simple bandaging, pressure points, prevention of shock, splints, litter construction, and use; field sanitation measures regarding water supply, waste disposal, and personal hygiene. Individual Tactical Camouflage, cover, concealment, movement, 26 9 45 (41) Training (Day and Night) observation, reporting, discipline, sounds, handto-hand combat, combat formations, night movement, night camouflage, preparation of equipment and clothing, night visions, sounds and observation, night security and formations, message writing, immediate action drills, and security of operational bases. Patrols, Small-Unit Planning, organization, preparation, formations, 26 44 70 (60) Tactics, Raids, Ambushes commands, control, security, communications and (Day and Night) reporting of patrols; objectives, target selection, organization of raid forces; reconnaissance and intelligence; planning, preparation, movement, deployment, conduct of raids, disengagement, and withdrawal of raiding forces; characteristics, definition, objectives of ambushes, selection of ambush sites, organization of ambush forces, phases of ambush operation, planning, preparation movement, deployment, execution, disengagement, and withdrawal of ambush forces. All subjects covered for both day and night operations.

Weapons (Foreign and US) Carbine, M1, SMG; AR; Pistol, .45: machineguns; foreign weapons to include care and cleaning, loading, aiming, stoppages, range firing; familiarization firing of all weapons; and day and night firing. Intelligence Security measures, how to obtain and report information, captured documents, and material; interrogation and handling of prisoners; and counterintelligence procedures. Air Operations Establishment of drop zone, marking and identification of DZ, security of DZ, receiving and transporting supplies and equipment. Demolitions Nonelectric and electric firing systems, calculation and placement of charges, rail and bridge destruction, boobytraps, and expedient devices. Squad Tests Review and exercise covering all instruction Platoon Tests Review and exercise covering all instruction Total hours in master training program

28

10

8

38

(32)

8

(5)

16

15

31

(25)

21

8

29

(24)

23 42 210

16 24 150

39 66 360

(37) (63) (314)

Notes: 1. Maximum number of trained, indigenous personnel will be used to assist in training others. Identify those personnel who may qualify as potential cadre or potential leaders. 2. Intelligence, compass, map familiarization, observing and reporting, tactical training of the individual, patrolling, weapons, demolitions, and field sanitation will be integrated whenever possible. 3. Classes to be broken down into platoon-size groups whenever possible. 4. Practical work exercise, demonstrations, and conferences to be used in lieu of lectures to the maximum extent possible. 5. Stress small-unit training (patrol, squad, and platoon). Develop teamwork and esprit de corps.

Section III. DATA CARD--PERSONNEL AND TRAINING RECORD The following is an example of a personnel data card that may, also serve as a training record. This simplifies and holds to a minimum the number of records that may be required to be maintained in an operational area. The type and amount of information to be recorded will vary with each operational area to include the degree of security to be afforded resistance personnel. 1.

Personnel Data:

a.

UWOA

FULL NAME

b.

RANK

c.

UNIT

d.

LAST CIVILIAN ADDRESS

e.

CIVILIAN OCCUPATION

f.

LANGUAGES

g.

SPECIAL SKILLS AND APTITUDES (CIVILIAN)

h.

FINANCIAL DATA:

DOB

SN POB

DATE OF ENLISTMENT

DATE

AMOUNT PAID

DATE

AMOUNT PAID

DATE

AMOUNT PAID

i.

LEFT THUMB PRINT

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

j.

PHOTOGRAPH

k.

DATE OF DISCHARGE OR DEMOBILIZATION

D-5

2.

Training Record:

a.

SUBJECTS

DATES

Basic Training

Advanced/specialist training:

b.

MOS specialties:

AREA OF DEGREE OF INTEREST PROFICIENCY

DEGREE OF WEAPON SKILL c.

D-6

Weapon qualifications:

d.

Combat operations:

e.

Awards and decorations:

f.

Wounds or injuries:

Type

Date

Disciplinary actions: Date

Offense

Type of Trial

Punishment

D-7

D-8

APPENDIX E IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS FOR FOOT PATROLS Section I. INTRODUCTION E-1.

GENERAL

a. A patrol may make contact with the enemy at any time. This is especially true in guerrilla operations. Contact may be by chance, by air observation or attack, or by ambush. It may beg visual only: the patrol sights the enemy but is undetected by him. In this case, the patrol leader can decide whether to make or avoid physical contact, basing his decision on the patrol's assigned mission and capability to successfully engage the potential target. b. When a patrol's assigned mission prohibits physical contact, except that necessary to accomplish the mission, its actions are defensive in nature. It avoids being seen by the enemy. Physical contact, if unavoidable, is broken as quickly as possible and the patrol, if still capable, continues its mission. c. When a patrol's assigned mission permits or requires it to seek or exploit opportunities for contact (as in the case of a search and attack patrol), its actions are offensive in nature and are immediate and positive. d. In foot patrolling, especially in guerrilla operations, contacts (visual or physical) are often unexpected, at very close ranges, and short in duration. Effective fire, or the threat of effective fire, often gives leaders little or no time to fully estimate situations and issue orders. In these situations, immediate action drills provide a means for swiftly initiating positive offensive or defensive action, as appropriate. E-2.

IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS

a. Immediate action drills are drills designed to provide swift and positive small unit reaction to enemy visual or physical contact. They are simple courses of action in which all men are so well trained that minimum signals or commands are required to initiate action. b.

Immediate action drills

(1) Can be designed, developed, and used by any unit, no matter how it is organized. (2) Are designed and developed as needed for the combat situation. E-1

(3) Can, in many cases, be initiated by any member of the (4) Can also be designed, developed, and used by mounted and airmobile units. c.

Immediate action drills are appropriate

(1) When ambushed, regardless of terrain. (2) When contact, including ambush, is at very close range and maneuver is restricted because of close terrain, such as mountains, jungle, or heavy woods. (3) When detection by air observation is a threat. (4) When under low level air attack. d. It is not feasible to attempt to design an immediate action drill to cover every possible situation. It is better to know one immediate action drill for each of a limited number of situations occurring in a combat area. E-3.

SIGNALS

a. Some immediate action drills, such as the counter-ambush immediate action drills described below, are initiated without signals or commands, as pre-arranged automatic reactions to enemy contact. Others, such as the chance contact immediate action drill, immediate assault, are initiated on silent (armand-hand) signals. When appropriate, standard silent signals are used; special silent; signals are developed for use-at other times. b. There are no standard silent signals for freeze, hasty ambush, and all clear. The standard silent signals for halt and enemy in sight (with direction indicated) require exaggerated arm motions which increase the danger of detection. c. The special silent signals shown in figure E-1 may beg used to halt a patrol in place, to indicate detection and direction of the enemy, to initiate the drills discussed here, and to indicate that all is clear. d. Units designing other immediate action drills should devise and use special silent signals only when there are not appropriate standard signals.

E-2

E-4.

SCOPE

a. This appendix describes seven immediate action drills: one for any situation requiring immediate halt, one for avoiding air observation, one for air attack, two for chance contact, and two for countering ambush. It is a guide to users in designing and developing immediate action drills appropriate to their situations. The drills and other actions described and discussed are examples which illustrate the application of principles; they are no more considered as standardized reactions which fit every situation. b. Normal small unit tactics and techniques are used in executing immediate action drills and are not discussed in detail.

Figure E-1 Special silent signals. E-3

Section II. EXAMPLE IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS E-5.

IMMEDIATE HALT DRILL

When the situation requires the immediate, in-place halt of the patrol, the immediate action drill freeze is used. This is the situation when the patrol detects the enemy but is undetected by him. The first man detecting the enemy (visually or otherwise) gives the special silent signal, FREEZE. Every man halts in place, weapon at the ready, and remains absolutely motionless and quiet until further signals or orders are given. E-6.

AIR OBSERVATION AND/OR ATTACK DRILLS

These drills are designed to reduce the danger, of detection by aircraft and casualties from low level air attack. a. Air Observation. When an aircraft, enemy or unidentified, which may detect the patrol, is heard or observed, the appropriate immediate action drill is FREEZE. The first man hearing or sighting such an aircraft signals FREEZE. Every man freezes in place until the patrol leader identifies the aircraft and gives further signals or orders. b. Air Attack. When an aircraft detects a patrol and makes a low level attack, the immediate action drill air attack is used. The first man sighting an attacking aircraft shouts "Aircraft; t; Front (Left, Rear, or Right)." Patrol moves quickly into line formation, well spread out, at right angles to the aircraft's direction of travel. As each man comes on line, he hits the ground, using available cover, and positions his body at right angles to the aircraft's direction of gravel, to present the shallowest target possible. (1) Between attacks (if the aircraft returns or if more than one aircraft attacks) men seek better cover. (2) Attacking aircraft are fired on only on command of the patrol leader. E-7.

CHANCE CONTACT DRILLS

a. Hasty Ambush. This immediate action drill is both a defensive measure used to avoid contact and an offensive measure to make contact. It may often be a subsequent action freeze. When special silent signal hasty ambush is given (by point, patrol leaders, or another authorized man), the entire patrol moves quickly to the right or left off line of movement, as indicated by signal, and takes up the best available concealed firing positions. The patrol leader initiates ambush by opening fire and shouting, "Fire." This insures initiation of the ambush if his weapon misfires. If the patrol is detected before this, the first man aware of detection initiates ambush by firing and shouting. E-4

(1) When used as a defensive measure to avoid contact, ambush is not initiated unless the patrol is detected. (2) When used as an offensive measure, the enemy is allowed to advance until he is in the most vulnerable position before the ambush is initiated. (3) An alternate means for initiating the ambush is to designate an individual (for example, point or last man) to open fire when a certain portion of the enemy reaches or passes him. b. Immediate Assault. This immediate action drill is used, defensively, to make and quickly break undesired but unavoidable contact (including ambush), and, offensively, to decisively engage the enemy (including ambush). When used in chance contact, men nearest the enemy open fire and shout, "Contact, Front (Right, Left, or Rear)." The patrol moves swiftly into line formation and assaults. (1) When used defensively, the assault is stopped if the enemy withdraws and contact is broken quickly. If the enemy stands fast, the assault is carried through enemy positions and movement is continued until contact is broken. (2) When used offensively, the enemy is decisively engaged. Any one attempting to escape is pursued and destroyed. E-8.

COUNTERAMBUSH DRILLS

When a patrol is ambushed, the immediate action drill used is determined by whether the ambush is near or far (see ch 7 for discussion of near and far ambushes). a. In a near ambush, the killing zone is under very heavy, highly concentrated, close-range fires. There is little time or space for men to maneuver or seek cover. The longer they remain in the killing zone, the more certain their destruction. Therefore, if attacked by a near ambush, react as-follows: (1) Men in the killing zone, without order or signal, immediately assault directly into the ambush position, occupy it, and continue the attack or break contact, as directed. This action moves them out of the killing zone, prevents other elements of the ambush from firing on them without firing on their own men, and provides positions from which other actions may be taken. (2) Men not in the killing zone maneuver, as directed, against the attack force and other elements of the ambush.

E-5

(3) The attack is continued to eliminate the ambush or to break contact as directed. b. In a far ambush, the killing zone is also under very heavy, highly concentrated fires, but from a greater range. This greater range provides men in the killing zone some space for maneuver and some opportunity to seek cover at a lesser risk of destruction. Therefore, if attacked by a far ambush, react as follows: (1) Men in the killing zone, without order or signal, immediately return fire, take the best available positions, and continue firing until directed otherwise. (2) Men not in the killing against the ambush force.

zone

maneuver,

as

directed,

(3) The attack is continued, as directed to eliminate the ambush or to break contact. c. In each situation, the success of the counter-ambush drill employed is dependent on the men being well trained in recognizing the nature of an ambush and well rehearsed in the proper reaction. E-9. TYPICAL SITUATIONS, APPROPRIATE IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS AND SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS In chance contact and in ambush, the immediate action drills that a patrol uses and the patrol's subsequent actions are determined largely by whether the assigned mission prohibits or permits contact (except that necessary to accomplish the mission). The immediate action drill FREEZE, however, can be used in either circumstance and not affect the assigned mission. a. Mission requires patrol to avoid contact, if possible, and to quickly break any contact made. (1) Situation. Patrol sees enemy approaching. Possibility appears good that enemy will not detect patrol. Enemy is so close that there is not time to establish a hasty ambush. (a) Immediate action drill. FREEZE. Patrol opens fire only if detected. (b) Subsequent action. If no contact, patrol continues after enemy passes. If contact is made, it is broken by assault or by clock system after initial fire, and patrol continues (1, .2, fig. E-2).

E-6

Figure E-2 Immediate action drills. (2) Situation. Patrol appears unavoidable.

sees

enemy

approaching.

(a) Immediate action drill. FREEZE, followed AMBUSH. Patrol executes ambush only if detected.

Contact by

HASTY

E-7

Figure E-2 Continued. (b) Subsequent action. If no contact, patrol continues after enemy passes. If ambush is executed, patrol assaults by fire only, withdraws quickly, and continues (3, 4, fig. E-2).

E-8

Figure E-2 Continued.

E-9

(3) Situation. Patrol and enemy detect each other at same time and at such close range that breaking by clock system or fire and maneuver is not appropriate. (a) Immediate action drill. IMMEDIATE ASSAULT, to enemy, if he withdraws; through enemy if he stands fast (5, 6, fig. E2). (b) Subsequent action.

Continue mission.

Figure E-2 Continued. E-10

Figure E-2 Continued.

(4) Situation. Patrol is ambushed (near ambush). (a) Immediate action drill. COUNTERAMBUSH. Men in killing zone assault attack force. Other men attack, as directed, to permit entire patrol to break contact (7,8, fig. E-2).

E-11

Figure E-2 Continued. (b) Subsequent action. Reorganize and continue mission. (5) Situation. Patrol is ambushed (far ambush). (a) Immediate action drill. COUNTERAMBUSH. Men in killing zone return fire, seek cover, continue firing. Other men attack, as directed, to permit patrol to break contact (9, 10, fig. E2). (b) Subsequent action. Reorganize and continue mission.

E-12

Figure E-2 Continued. b. Mission requires patrol to engage targets of opportunity and otherwise exploit opportunities to engage in decisive combat. (1) Situation. Patrol sees enemy approaching. Possibility appears good that enemy will not detect patrol. Enemy is so close that there is not time to establish a hasty ambush. (a) Immediate action drill. FREEZE.

E-13

(b) Subsequent action. Patrol allows enemy to advance as close as possible. Patrol leader opens fire when enemy is in most vulnerable position (any patrol member opens fire if detected). Patrol assaults with great violence and heavy fire; destroys enemy; pursues if appropriate (11, 12, fig. E-2).

Figure E-2 Continued.

E-14

(2) Situation. Patrol appears unavoidable.

sees

(a) Immediate AMBUSH.

drill.

action

enemy

approaching.

FREEZE,

followed

Contact by

HASTY

(b) Subsequent action. Patrol executes ambush when enemy is in most vulnerable position; assaults with great violence and heavy fire; destroys enemy; pursues if appropriate (13, 14, fig. E-2).

Figure E-2 Continued.

E-15

(3) Situation. Patrol and enemy detect each other at same time. (a) Immediate action drill. IMMEDIATE ASSAULT. (b) Subsequent action. Patrol continues assault until enemy is destroyed. Escaping enemy is pursued and destroyed (15,fig. E-2).

Figure E-2 Continued.

E-16

(4) Situation. Patrol is ambushed (near ambush). (a) Immediate action drill. COUNTERAMBUSH. Men in killing zone assault to destroy attack force. Other men attack, as directed, to eliminate ambush. (b) Subsequent action. destroyed (16, fig. E-2.)

Escaping

enemy

is

pursued

and

(5) Situation. Patrol is ambushed (far ambush). (a) Immediate action drill. COUNTERAMBUSH. Men in killing zone return fire, seek cover, continue firing. Other men attack, as directed, to enable men in killing zone to maneuver. All attack, as directed, to eliminate ambush. (b) Subsequent action. Escaping destroyed (17, 18, fig. E-2).

enemy

is

pursued

and

Figure E-2 Continued.

E-17

Figure E-2 Continued.

E-18

Figure E-2 Continued. c. Immediate mission.

action

drill

used

not

affected

by

assigned

(1) Situation. Aircraft (enemy or unidentified) which may observe patrol is sighted or heard. (a) Immediate action drill. FREEZE, initiated by first man sighting or hearing aircraft. (b) Subsequent action. As directed by patrol leader. (2) Situation. Enemy aircraft makes low level attack. (a) Immediate action drill. AIRCRAFT ATTACK, initiated by first man detecting aircraft approach. (b) Subsequent action. 1. Continue mission, if aircraft does not repeat attack. 2. Continue dispersion and seek more cover if aircraft returns or if more than one aircraft attacks (1y, fig. E-2).

E-19

Figure E-2 Continued. E-10.

USE OF IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS

a. Some immediate action drills may be used repeatedly with little danger that frequent use will enable the enemy to develop effective countermeasures. FREEZE and HASTY AMBUSH are in this category. The situations in which their use is appropriate do not lend themselves to easy conversion by the enemy into a baited trap. b. Habitual use of some immediate action drills can be very dangerous, however. For example, too frequent use of IMMEDIATE ASSAULT can lead the enemy to expose a small force to an apparently undetected patrol, causing the patrol to launch an IMMEDIATE ASSAULT into the massed fires of a larger, concealed force. This countermeasure has been very effectively used by the Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam. c. Any immediate action drill must be carefully studied to detect any potential dangers which may arise from frequent use. If these dangers cannot be eliminated, the drills must be varied to avoid setting patterns.

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APPENDIX F DEFENSE AGAINST AMBUSH Section I. GENERAL. F-1.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

a. This appendix provides the small unit leader guidance in developing and employing counterambush tactics and techniques. It discusses tactics and techniques which will assist dismounted units in avoiding, reducing vulnerability to, and countering ambushes. Much of the material is also applicable to mounted units. Material is presented as infantry company, platoon, squad, and patrol actions, but when modified for size, organization, and equipment, can be applied to any type unit. b. The tactics and techniques described are guides only. Each situation in combat must be resolved by intelligent application of principles and skillfull employment of techniques. F-2.

DEFENSE AGAINST AMBUSH

a. The very nature of ambush, ". . . a surprise attack from a concealed position," places an ambushed unit at a disadvantage. Obviously, the best defense is to avoid being ambushed, but this is not always possible. A unit must, therefore, take all possible measures to reduce its vulnerability to ambush—to reduce the damage it will sustain if ambushed. These are passive measures and must be supplemented by active measures to be taken to destroy or escape from an ambush. b. No single defensive measure, or combination of measures, will prevent or effectively counter all ambushes in all situations. Tile effectiveness of counterambush measures is directly related to the state of training of the troops and the leadership ability of the leaders. Section II. AVOIDING AND REDUCING VULNERABILITY TO AMBUSH F-3.

GENERAL

a. In avoiding ambush, dismounted units have an advantage over mounted units. They are less bound to roads, trails, and (as in armored units) the more obvious routes of movement. b. This advantage is lost, however, when—

F-1

(1) Terrain, such as heavy jungle, restricts or prohibits crosscountry movement. (2) The need for speed requires movement on roads, trails, or waterways. F-4.

SCOPE

This section discusses procedures to assist at dismounted unit to avoid ambush, reduce likelihood of being ambushed, and reduce damage sustained if ambushed. F-5.

PREPARING FOR MOVEMENT

a. Map. The leader studies a map of the terrain over which he will move his unit. He first checks the map's marginal data to determine reliability at the time the map was made. If reliability is not good, or if the map is old, he evaluates its reliability in Light of all other information he can obtain. For example, a 20-year old map may not show several nearby roads and trails; more recent; building and development in the area will not be shown. The leader considers the terrain in relation to all available information of known or suspected enemy positions and previous ambush sites. His map study includes evaluation of the terrain from the enemy's viewpoint. How could the enemy use this terrain? Where could the enemy position troops, installations, and ambushes? b. Aerial Reconnaissance. If possible, the leader makes an aerial reconnaissance. This enables him to compare the map and the terrain. He also obtains current and more complete information of roads, trails, and manmade objects, type and density of vegetation, and seasonal condition of streams. (1) Additional information. Aerial reconnaissance also reveals: (a) Movement, lack of movement, in an area (friendly, enemy, civilian). (b) Indications of enemy activity. For example: 1. Smoke. Smoke may indicate locations of campsites, patrols, or patrol bases. 2. Soil. Freshly dug soil may indicate positions or ambush sites. 3. Shadows. Shadows may aid in identifying objects. 4. Unusual objects. Unusual shapes, sizes, shadows, shades, or colors may indicate faulty camouflage.

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(2) Limitations. Despite its many advantages, aerial reconnaissance has limitations. (a) Strength of bridges cannot the determined. (b) Terrain surface may be misinterpreted. (c) Mines and boobytraps cannot be seen. (d) Presence of aircraft may warn enemy, c. Route Selection. The factors the leader considers are the same whether he is selecting his route or studying a route he has been directed to follow. (1) Cover and concealment. Cover and concealment are desirable, but a route with these features may obstruct movement. Terrain which provides a moving unit cover and concealment also provides the enemy increased opportunities for ambush. Identification of areas where ambushes may be concealed allows the Leader to develop plans for clearing these areas. (2) Observation and fields of fire. How the terrain affects observation and fields of fire available to the unit and to the enemy will influence the selection of and movement over a route, formations, rates of movement, and methods of control. (3) Key terrain. Key terrain is an earth feature that has a controlling effect on the surrounding terrain. It must be identified and actions planned accordingly. If, for example, a hill provides observation and fields of fire on any part of a route, the leader must plan for neutralizing enemy that may occupy the hill. (4) Obstacles. Obstacles may impede movement along a route or limit maneuver, but they may also limit enemy action. d. Current Intelligence. All available information is considered. This includes: (1) Known, suspected, and previous ambush sites. (2) Weather and light data. (3) Reports of units or patrols that have recently operated in the area. (4) Size, location, activity, and capabilities of guerrilla forces in the area. (5) Attitude of the civilian population; the extent to which they can be expected to cooperate or interfere.

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e. Counterintelligence. In counterguerrillaoperations,in particular, a key feature of preparing for movement is denying the enemy information. A unit is especially vulnerable to ambush if the enemy knows the unit is to move, what time it is to depart, where it is to go, the route it is to follow, and the weapons and equipment; it is to carry. The efforts made to deny or delay enemy acquisition of this information comprise the counterintelligence plan.As a minimum, the plan restricts dissemination of information. (1) Mission information is disseminated only on a need-to-know basis. This is especially important when the native personnel operating with the unit might possibly be planted informers. Once critical information is given, personnel are isolated so that nothing can be passed out. (2) If it is likely that the enemy, or enemy informers, will observe the departure of a unit, deception plans may be used. Two examples are shown in figure F-1.

Figure F-1 Examples of deception plans.

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Figure F-1 – Continued. f. Communications. The leader plans how he will communicate with elements of his unit; with artillery, air, or other supporting units; and with higher headquarters. On an extended move, it may be necessary to establish a radio relay and/or erect a field expedient antenna. An aircraft might be used to communicate with air or artillery support. g. Fire Support. Artillery and mortar fires are planned so they will deceive, harass, or destroy the enemy. They may be planned as scheduled or on-call fires. (1) Fires are planned: (a) On key terrain features along the route. These can serve as navigation aids or to deceive, harass, or destroy enemy on them.

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(b) On known enemy positions. (c) On known or suspected ambush sites. (d) On the flanks of identified danger areas. (e) Wherever a diversion appears desirable. For example, if the unit must pass near an identified enemy position, artillery or mortar fires on the position may distract the enemy's attention and permit the unit to pass undetected. (f) At intervals along the route, every 500 or 1,000 meters for example. With fires so planned, the unit is never far from a plotted concentration from which a shift can be quickly made. (2) Coordination with the supporting unit includes: (a) Route to be followed. (b) Scheduled and on-call fires. (c) Call signs and frequencies. (d) Checkpoints, phase lines, and other control measures. (e) Times of departure and return„ F-6. MOVEMENT a. Intelligence. The unit must provide its own intelligence support. Members must be alert to report information, and leaders must be able to evaluate the significance of this information in relation to the situation. (1) Obvious items from which intelligence may be gained are: (a) Signs of passage of groups, such as crushed grass, broken branches, footprints, cigarette butts, or other discarded trash. These may reveal identity, size, direction of travel, and time of passage. (b) Workers in fields. This may indicate absence of the enemy. (c) Apparently normal activities in villages. These may indicate absence of the enemy. (2) Less obvious items from which "negative information" may be gained are:

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(a) The absence of workers in fields. This may indicate that the enemy is near. (b) The absence of children in a village. This may indicate that they have been hidden to protect them from action which may be about to take place. (c) The absence of young men in a village. This indicates that the village is controlled b y the enemy. (3) A knowledge of enemy signaling devices is very helpful. Those listed below are some that have been used by Communist guerrillas in Vietnam. (a) A farm cart moving at night shows one lantern to indicate that no government troops are on the road or trail behind. Two lanterns means that government troops are close behind. (b) A worker in the fields stops to put on or take off his shirt. Either act can signal the approach of government troops. This is relayed by other informers. (c) A villager fishing in a rice paddy holds his pole out straight to signal all clear up at an angles to signal that troops are approaching. b. Security. Security is obtained through organization for movement, manner of movement, and by every man keeping alert at all times. (1) Organization for movement. (a) A two-man patrol can maintain security by organizing into a security team with sectors of responsibility as shown in figure F-2.

Figure F-2 Security in a two-man patrol. F-7

(b) A larger unit can use any standard formation (file, column, vee) and establish a reaction force. This reaction force can be separated from the main body so that it will not come under, the fires of an ambush of the main body, and can maneuver to destroy the ambush. (c) Any unit of squad size or larger, regardless of formation used, must have security forces to the front, flanks, and rear. A rifle company organized in this manner is shown in figure F-3.

Figure F-3 Security organization of a rifle company. (2) Manner of movement. A dismounted unit moves by the same methods as a motorized patrol—continuous movement, successive bounds, or alternate bounds. F-7. COUNTERAMBUSH IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS If ambushed, the unit reacts with the appropriate counterambush immediate action drill.

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APPENDIX G PATROL BASES G-1. GENERAL a. When a patrol is required to halt for an extended period it must take active and passive measures to provide maximum security. The most effective means is to select, occupy, and organize an area which, by its location and nature, provides passive security from enemy detection. An area so selected, occupied, and organized is termed a patrol base. b. Establishment of a patrol base is usually a part of the overall plan for a patrol's operation. In some circumstances, however, establishment of a patrol base may be an on-the-spot decision. c. The maximum length of time a patrol base may be occupied depends on the need for secrecy. In most situations, occupation should not exceed 24 hours except in an extreme emergency. In all situations, a patrol base is occupied the minimum time necessary to accomplish its purpose. The same patrol base is not usually eased again. (1) In guerrilla operations secrecy of the patrol base is mandatory. A patrol base is evacuated if discovery is even suspected. (2) In counterguerrilla operations, secrecy of the patrol base is always desirable, but is not always as essential as in guerrilla operations. The need for secrecy, and evacuation if discovered, depend on the degree of control the guerrilla force has of the area, their capability to react to the discovery of a patrol base, and their capability to adversely affect the patrol's operation. When the guerrilla force is relatively small and weak, secrecy of the patrol base may not be an essential counterguerrilla consideration; and if discovered, evacuation may not be required. In an area controlled by a large guerrilla force with a relatively high degree of combat capability, secrecy of the patrol base is mandatory; and if discovered, evacuation is usually required. G-2. PURPOSES a. Typical situations that require planning for the establishment of a patrol base include those where there will be: (1) A requirement to cease all movement to avoid detection.

G-1

(2) A requirement to hide the patrol during a lengthy, detailed reconnaissance of the objective area. (3) A need to prepare food, maintain weapons and equipment, and rest after extended movement. (4) A need to formulate a final plan and issue necessary orders prior to actions at the objective. (5) A requirement for reorganization after a patrol has infiltrated the enemy area in small groups (used in conjunction with a rendezvous point). (6) A need for a base from which to conduct several. consecutive or concurrent operations such as ambush, raid, reconnaissance, or surveillance patrols. b. Any unforeseen situation occurring during conduct of a patrol. could lead to an on-the-spot decision to establish a patrol base. G-3. SELECTION a. The location for a patrol base is usually selected by map reconnaissance during patrol planning. Selection may also be by aerial reconnaissance or may be based on prior knowledge of a suitable location. b. A patrol base established as the result of an on-the-spot decision may be the reconnaissance, securing, expansion, and organization of the area occupied during a security halt. c. A patrol base location selected by map or aerial reconnaissance or by prior knowledge of an area is tentative. Its suitability must be confirmed and it must be secured before occupation. d. Plans to establish a patrol base must include an alternate location, a rendezvous point, and a rallying point. (1) The alternate location is for uses if the initial location proves unsuitable or if the patrol is required to evacuate the initial location prematurely. In guerrilla operations, reconnaissance and surveillance of the alternate location until occupied or no longer needed are usually desirable. Reconnaissance and surveillance are not needed as much in counterguerrilla operations and are less likely to be possible or practical. (2) The rendezvous point is for use if the patrol evacuates the patrol base by exfiltration of groups. The rendezvous point will not have been reconnoitered. G-2

(3) The rallying point is for use if the patrol is dispersed from the patrol base. It is a point over which the patrol has previously passed, it has been found suitable, and it is known to all. G-4. CONSIDERATIONS. When planning for a patrol base, mission and both passive and active security measures must be considered. a. Mission. A patrol base must be located in the best place for the patrol to accomplish its mission. b. Passive Security Measures. (1) Select(a) Terrain which is considered of little tactical value. (b) Difficult terrain which will impede foot movement. (c) An area of dense vegetation, preferably bushes and trees that spread out close to the ground. (d) An area remote from human habitation. (e) An area near a water source. (2) Avoid(a) Known or suspected enemy positions. (b) Built-up areas. (c) Ridgelines and topographic crests, except as necessary for maintaining adequate communications. (d) Roads, trails, and natural lines of drift. drift.

(e) Wet areas, steep slopes, and small valleys which may be lines of c. Active Security Measures. Plan for— (1) Outpost and listening post systems covering avenues of approach into the area. (2) Communications with outposts and listening posts. (3) Defense of the patrol base, if required. (4) Withdrawal, if required, to include multiple withdrawal routes. G-3

(5) Ad alert plan. (6) Enforcement of camouflage, noise, and light discipline. (7) The conduct of necessary activities with minimum movement and noise. G-5. OCCUPATION AND OPERATION OF A PATROL BASE; A patrol base may be occupied in either of two ways: (1) by moving to the selected site and expanding into and organizing the area in the same manner as an on-the-spot establishment, or (2) by halting near the selected site and sending forward reconnaissance farces. The method used must be thoroughly planned and rehearsed. The establishment and use of patrol base drills in these methods will assist in the swift and efficient establishment of patrol bases. Occupation, using an example patrol base drill, and subsequent operation are described below (1, figure G-1).

Figure G-1 Patrol base establishment. G-4

a. Approach. (1) Patrol is halted at a suitable position within about 200 meters of the tentative patrol base location. (2) Close-in security is established. (3) Previously designated individuals (preferably leaders of patrol's major subdivisions) join patrol leader. b. Reconnaissance. (1) Patrol leader designates point of entry into patrol base location as 6 o'clock; assigns areas by clock system; designates center of base as patrol headquarters; moves to patrol headquarters. (2) Subordinate leaders reconnoiter assigned areas for suitability and return to patrol leader. (3) Two men are dispatched to bring patrol forward. c. Occupation (2, 3, figure G-1). (1) Patrol leaves line of march at right angles and enters base in single file, moving to center of base. Designated men remove signs of patrol's movement. (2) Each leader peels off his unit and leads it to the left flank of the unit sector. (3) Each unit occupies its portion of perimeter by moving clockwise to left flank of next sector. (4) Patrol leader checks perimeter by meeting each leader at left flank of his sector and moving clockwise. (5) Each leader reconnoiters forward of his sector by moving a designated distance out from the left flank of his sector, moving clockwise to tae right limit of his sector, and reentering at the right flank of his sector. He reports indications of enemy or civilians, suitable observation post and listening pests 'positions, rallying points, and withdrawal routes. (6) Patrol leader designates rallying points, positions for OPs and listening posts, and withdrawal routes. (7) Each unit puts out one two-man OP (day) and one three-man listening post (night) and establishes communications.

G-5

Figure G-1. Continued. G-6

Figure G-1. Continued.

G-7

d. Operation (figure G-2). (1) Security. (a) Only one point of entry and exit is used. It is camouflaged and guarded at all times. (b) Fires are built only when necessary and, as a general rule, only in daylight. Whether day or night, only necessary fires are built and they are kept as small as possible. Where terrain permits, fires are built in pits and, if built at night, are carefully covered and shielded. Building fires in pits reduces the danger of visual detection and facilitates extinguishing the fires and camouflaging the sites. The driest and hardest wood available is used (to reduce smoke). In most areas, the best time for building fires is when the air is thin and smoke dissipates quickly (usually around noon); early morning may be appropriate, however, in areas where there is ground fog. The risk of detection, because of lingering odor, must be weighed against the risk of detection due to visible smoke.

Figure G-2 Typical patrol base layout.

G-8

(c) Noisy tasks, such as cutting branches, are accomplished only at designated times, as early as possible after occupation but never at night nor during the quiet periods of early morning and late evening. When possible, noisy tasks are performed when other sounds will cover them, such as the sounds of aircraft, artillery, or distant battle noises. (d) Movement, both inside and outside the patrol base, is restricted to the minimum necessary. (e) Civilians who discover the location of tire patrol base are detained until the base is moved or until they can be evacuated to higher headquarters. Care is taken to prevent the detained civilians from learning about the base, its operation, and future plans. If necessary, they are tied and blindfolded and their ears are covered. (f) When sufficient personnel are available, OPs are manned by at least two individuals so they can alternate and insure alertness at all times. This also removes the need for traffic between the OP and the patrol base. (g) When sufficient personnel are available, listening posts are manned by at least two, preferably three, individuals so they too can alternate and remain alert. (h) A 1-hour stand-to is observed morning and evening: 30 minutes before and 30 minutes after light in the morning,, and 30 minutes before and 30 minutes after dark in the evening. This insures that every man is acclimated to changing light conditions, and is dressed, equipped, and ready for action. (i) Each man makes certain that, he knows the locations of men and positions to his flanks, front, and rear, and that he knows the times and routes of any expected movement within, into, and out of the patrol base. (2) Defense. Defensive measures are planned but a patrol base is usually defended only when evacuation is not; possible. (a) Elaborate firing positions Eire not constructed. (b) Camouflage and concealment are stressed. (c) Artillery and mortar fires may be planned, if available. Early warning devices may be placed on avenues of approach. If the base will definitely be defended, mines, trip flares, and boobytraps may be placed on avenues of approach and in areas which cannot be covered by fire. The value of these devices must be weighed against the fact that their discovery automatically compromises the patrol base.

G-9

(d) An alert plan is established. This includes plans for evacuation and defense. All members must know these plans and the signals or orders for their implementation. Plans for defending the base include pursuit and destruction of the attacking force. (3) Communications. Communications are established with higher headquarters, subordinate units, OPs, and listening posts. The system must provide for every man to be alerted quickly and quietly. (a) Radios are an excellent means, but must be carefully controlled. (b) Wire can be used within the patrol base if its bulk and weight and the time required to lay and pick up are not disadvantages. (c) Tug, or pull, wires may be used for signaling. They are quiet and reduce radio or telephone traffic. (d) Messengers may be used within the patrol base. (4) Maintenance. Weapons and equipment are cleaned and maintained as required. (5) Sanitation and personal hygiene. (a) In daylight, catholes outside the perimeter are used. The user must be guarded. (b) At night, catholes are located inside the perimeter. (c) Men wash, shave, and brush their teeth as needed, consistent with the situation (including availability of water). (d) Cans, food, and other trash are buried and the site is concealed. (6) Messing. Men eat at staggered times, as planned and controlled. Preparation of meals is planned, if required. (7) Water. Guarded water parties provide water. Lone individuals do not visit the water source. No more than two visits to the source are made in a 24-hour period. Use of water is controlled as closely as required. (8) Rest. Rest and sleep are permitted only after a11 work is done. Rest periods are staggered so that proper security is maintained. Consistent with work and security requirements, as much sleep and rest as possible are scheduled for each man.

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(9) Resupply. If the patrol is to be resupplied by air, the flight path, drop and/or landing zone, and cache are located so that neither the base nor possible objectives are compromised. (10) Planning and conduct of operations. (a) Details of operations planned must be made known to all men without assembling all at one time and thus endangering the security of the base. Rehearsals are limited to terrain models, with part of the patrol rehearsing while the remainder provides security. Weapons are not test fired. (b) If part of the patrol is absent on an operation, the perimeter is adjusted, if necessary, to insure security. (c) Orders are as brief as possible. Maximum practical use is made of fragmentary orders and references to SOPs. (11) Departure. (a) All signs of the patrol's presence are removed or concealed. This may prevent the enemy from learning of your presence in the area, prevent pursuit, or prevent the enemy from learning your methods for operating patrol bases. (b) If possible, night evacuation (in case of attack) is avoided. (c) When possible, the patrol evacuates as a unit.

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APPENDIX H COMBAT INTELLIGENCE AND TRACKING Section I. INTRODUCTION H-1. GENERAL a. In counterguerrilla operations, the success of a unit depends upon its finding and fixing the guerrilla. Unfortunately, the guerrilla cannot often be encountered unless he wants to make contact. As a result, the guerrilla often gains the initiative and can, to a certain extent, control the battle.To overcome this, problem, the, counterguerrilla unit must seek out, find, and fight the enemy in areas which he normally considers "safe." b. Combat intelligence is necessary to find the enemy force, his capabilities and vulnerabilities, and determine when and how, to engage him. This can be gained through tracking„ the importance of which cannot be underestimated. Tracking is necessary when searching for the guerrilla and when trying to maintain contact. c. In order to carry out successful, operations against the guerrilla, the small unit leader and individual members of patrols must have an appreciation for the collective roles that combat intelligence and tracking play. d. The purpose of this appendix is to emphasize the role of the patrol member and small unit leader in gathering intelligence. The subject of indicators will be covered in detail since they are indexes to enemy activity or the lack of it. Section II. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE IN A COUNTERGUERRILLA ENVIRONMENT H-2. ROLE OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE a. Combat intelligence is extremely important in a counterguerrilla environment because the enemy is normally more elusive and less frequently seen than he would be in the conventional situation. Combat intelligence collected by the members of patrols or the small unit leader is of utmost importance. These are the personnel who will have direct contact with the guerrilla, anal they must be properly trained to gain the most intelligence out of a small or chance contact. b. Combat intelligence, essential elements of information, methods of recording information, and methods of processing information are topics covered in FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence.

H-1

H-3. INDICATORS a. Many sources of information are available to the patrol member and the small unit leader. Sources present in both the conventional and counterguerrilla environment include enemy activity, prisoners of war, civilians, captured enemy materiel and documents, and recovered military personnel. However, due to the nature of guerrilla warfare, the patrol member and the small unit leader must rely heavily on small and sometimes seemingly unimportant details. These small details, or hints, are termed indicators. Indicators may be physical sign, such as footprints, feces, or campfire smoke, or just as easily the lack of these items. Indicators may also be the actions and reactions of people in a certain area. For example, the disappearance of military age youth or the sudden appearance of strange people in an area might indicate, to the observer, a change or increase of enemy activity indicators cannot be definitely defined since in the final sense they are any and all factors in a given area which aid the commander in evaluating the situation and making a decision. b. For the purpose of instruction, indicators can be categorized into two types: general indicators and specific indicators of value in a counterguerrilla environment. (1) General indicators might be caches, bicycle tracks, wildlife, debris, or the sixth sense. For example, from a cache of weapons or supplies one could learn of guerrilla strengths or shortages, or from whom or where his supplies come. Bicycle tracks along well used roads or trails may not be indicators; however, the same bicycle tracks into or out of a suspected base area, or along an infrequently used trail, might indicate an enemy supply route or access route. (2) Wildlife can be another indicator, or the lack o f wildlife in an area could tell the observant soldier something. Only lack of wildlife would not necessarily tell one anything, but when considered with other factors, it might become an important indicator. On the other hand, abundant wildlife in a particular area might indicate that the area is not frequented by large groups of men. (3) Debris is not often encountered in the guerrilla environment, because the guerrilla is very cautious of his movements and actions. As a result, any debris will probably be in small quantity. It will take a sharp eye to find it and a well-trained mind to interpret correctly or draw conclusions. Debris such as blood and bandages or feces would indicate the health, diet, and disposition of the enemy. It could also indicate the rate of movement and, of course, direction. (Simple debris and footprints reveal more information, and this information will be covered in greater detail in the tracking portion of this appendix.) H-2

to anti of the other five physical sense. It is a feeling or a premonition. c. There are other more specific indicators which apply to the counterguerrilla environment. These indicators deal mostly with the people's actions and the soldiers' actions with the people. These indicators are classified into three categories: indicators of an attack, indicators of a defense, and indicators of guerrilla control of an area. (1) Indicators of a possible guerrilla attack. (a) Systematic assassination of government officials. (b) Abduction of young men for training, indoctrination, and labor. (c) Increase of sabotage in a particular area. (d) Sudden absence of guerrilla activity and/or civilian population. (Also sudden increase of same.) (e) Shortage of a particular, type of supply, e.g., ammunition or medical supplies, frequently, indicates an attack on installations stocking such items. (f) Increased demonstrations by minority groups. (g) Increased propaganda in a certain area. (h) Local population will not associate with friendly troops. (i) Concentration of modes of mobility; i.e., boats and bicycles. (j) High rate of defection of local friendly forces. (k) Visits in villages by strange persons. (l) Disappearance of known insurgents, who normally spend all of their time in one particular area. (m) Low morale; guerrillas need to boost morale with a victory. (n) The occurrence of national and religious holidays and birthdays of the guerrilla or his sponsoring power and key leaders.

H-3

(o) Increased reconnaissance and radio traffic, demonstrations, feints, massing of forces, or change in location of headquarters, medical facilities, and other supporting forces. (2) Indicators of a possible guerrilla defense. (a) Detection of a high proportion of heavy weapons among guerrillas. (b) Establishment of combat or fortified villages. (c) An increase in kidnapping and the capture and retention of prisoners. (d) Gradual withdrawal of guerrillas from aggressive action against counterguerrilla force. (e) Supply ambushes designed to obtain arms and ammunition. (f) Presence of foottraps, spikes, and the like in the area. (g) Establishment of agricultural areas. area.

(h) Location of large, permanent-type field headquarters or training (i) Presence of infiltration routes in the area. This is a dual indicator of defense and control. (j) Roadblocks, canal blocks, occupation of good terrain, and stockage of supplies. (3) Indicators of possible guerrilla control of area. (a) Failure of village officials to take strong precautions against being kidnapped or murdered indicates a compromise might have been made with guerrilla force. (b) Refusal of local population to furnish intelligence to government forces. (c) Evidence of foodstuffs being stocked for, or delivered to, the guerrillas. (d) Inability of constituted government to collect taxes. (e) Cessation of guerrilla raids on inhabited areas. H-4

(f) New homes, fields, roads, trails, or canals in areas other than those controlled by the government. (g) Absence of people, but signs of inhabitation. (h) Imposition of taxes on landowners or operators. d. It must be remembered that these indicators are not fixed signposts which point the way to the enemy. They must be considered in view of all other gathered information. e. Indicators, combat intelligence, and tracking are all closely related. Indicators coupled with the physical signs found in tracking build strong combat intelligence. But it must never be forgotten that these two subjects are interrelated. Section III. TRACKING H-4. QUALITIES OF A TRACKER To qualify as a combat worthy tracker, certain traits and qualities must be developed and refined. A tracker must have patience. He must be able to proceed slowly, quietly, yet steadily while observing and interpreting available indicators. He must avoid using reckless speed that may cause him to overlook important, signs, lose the trail completely, or blunder into an enemy force. A good tracker must be persistent. He must have the ability and the desire to continue his mission even though indicators are scarce or conditions of weather or terrain are difficult. If he loses a trail, he must nave the determination and persistence to find it. He must be keenly observant. He must be able to see things that are not obvious at a glance (fig. H-1). He must have the ability to use his senses of smell and hearing to supplement his observation. A good tracker must also develop a sixth sense. He may often be led to inspect an area simply because it "does not look right." This ability often enables a tracker to regain a lose trail or discover new or additional indicators. An effective tracker must also know the enemy he is fighting. He cannot properly interpret the indicators he has found unless he has some knowledge of the enemy, his habits, equipment, or level of training. A good tracker must also have an, understanding of nature, a good memory, intelligence, and he must be physically able to accomplish his mission.

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Figure H-1 Area surveyed by tracker for indicators. H-5. CONCEPTS OF TRACKING a. As a tracker moves along the ground following a trail, he begins to build a picture in his mind of the enemy he is following. To do this, he asks himself such questions as: How many persons am I following? What is their state of training? How are they equipped? Are they healthy? What is their state of morale? Do they know they are being followed? To answer these questions, the tracker, uses, available indicators—anything that indicates a certain action gook place at a particular place and time. For instance, a footprint in soft sand is an excellent indicator. The tracker can determine that at a particular time a person walked on this spot. b. By comparing indicators, the tracker begins to get answers to his questions. If he finds a footprint and a scuff on a tree about waist high, for example, it may indicate that; an armed man passed this particular spot. c. There are six concepts that apply to tracking. They are— (1) Displacement. (2) Staining. (3) Weathering. (4) Littering. (5) Camouflage. H-6

(6) Interpretation and/or immediate use intelligence. d. Any indicator that the tracker discovers can be defined by one or more of the first five concepts. For the sixth concept, the tracker combines all indicators and interprets what he has seen to form a composite picture. He can then use this composite picture as on-the-spot intelligence. For example, indicators may point out that contact is imminent and extreme stealth may be required. H-6. DISPLACEMENT Displacement takes place when anything is moved from its original, position. A well-defined footprint in soft, moist ground is a good example of displacement. The shoe or foot of the individual that left the print displaced the soil by compression, thus leaving the indentation in the ground. By studying this indicator, the tracker can determine several important facts. The print left by worn footwear or by a barefooted person may indicate lack of proper equipment. H-7. ANALYZING FOOTPRINTS Footprints may indicate direction and rate of movement, number of persons in the moving party, whether or not heavy loads are being carried, sex of members of the party, and whether the members of the party realize that, they are being followed. If footprints are deep and the pace is long, rapid movement is apparent. Extremely long strides, deep prints with toe prints deeper than heel prints, indicate running. Prints can be counted to determine numbers. If the prints are deep, short, and widely spaced, with indications of scuffing or shuffling, a heavy load is being carried by the person who left the sprint. The sex of a member of the party being followed can be determined by studying the size and position of the footprints. Women tend to be pigeon-toed, while men walk with their feet straight ahead or pointed slightly to the outside. Prints left by women are usually smaller and the stride is shorter than that taken by men. If the party realizes that, they are being followed, an attempt to hide their tracks may be made. Persons walking backwards have a short, irregular stride. The prints have persons unnaturally deep toe. Soil will be kicked in the direction of movement. H-8. DETERMINING "KEY" PRINTS a. Since the last man in a file will normally leave the clearest footprints, his will be the key set of prints. A stick can be cut to match the length of the key print and notched to indicate width at the widest part of the sole. The tracker should study the angle o f the key print to the direction of march. Also he should look for an identifying mark or feature on the print, such as a worn or frayed part of footwear, to help him identify the key print. In case the trail becomes vague or obliterated, H-7

or the trail being followed merges with another, the tracker can use his stick measuring devices and with close study be able to identify the key print. This will aid him to stay on the trail of the group being followed. b. The box method can be used to count up to 18 persons. There are three ways the tracker can employ the box method. (1) The first and most accurate is to use the stride as a unit of measure. This is used when a key print can be determined (1, figure H-2). By identifying the key print on a trail and drawing a line from the heel of the foot across the trail or road, then moving forward to the opposite print made by the same person, and drawing a line through the instep, the tracker forms a box with the edges of the road or trail forming the sides and the lines he has drawn as the front and back. The tracker then counts every print inside the box to determine the number of persons in the party being followed. Any person walking normally would have stepped in the box at least one time. The key print should be counted as one. (2) The second way the tracker can employ the box method is the 18inch box (2, figure H-2). The 18-inch box is used when there is no key print distinguishable. In this method, the sides of the road, trail, or open area again form the sides of the box. This time, however, the tracker finds an average section of trail and marks off a cross section 18 inches in length. By counting each indentation in the box, the tracker can determine approximately how many persons used this particular trail. This system is not as accurate as the stride measurement. One can readily see that a person walking with a long stride may step completely over the 18 inch box. Another fault in this method is that a soldier may not have a measuring device with him. (3) The third way a tracker may use the box method is the 36 inch box. The 36-inch box is roughly the same as the 18-inch system. The tracker marks off a 36-inch cross section of the trail, counts the prints or indentations in the box, then divides by 2 to determine the number of persons that used the trail. This system has the same drawbacks as the 18inch box but may be useful under the right circumstances (3, fig. H-2). (The M16 rifle is 36 inches long and may be used as a measuring device.) H-9. OTHER SIGNS OF DISPLACEMENT Footprints are only one example of displacement,. Anything; that has been moved from its original position by a moving person is an example of displacement. a. Foliage, moss, vines, sticks, or rocks that are scuffed or snagged from their original place form valuable indicators. Clines can be dragged, dew droplets can be displaced from leaves, or stones and sticks may be H-8

Figure H-2. Box methods of determining number of footprints.

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turned over to indicate a different color underneath. Grass or other vegetation may be bent or broken in the direction of movement. b. Bits of clothing, threads, or dirt from boots can be displaced from a person's uniform and deposited on thorns, snags, or the ground. Thorns should be inspected for bits of clothing or other matter ripped from the uniform of the person being tracked. c. Wild animals and birds flushed from their natural habitat by the person being tracked are examples of displacement. Cries of birds excited by unnatural movement is an indicator. Tops of talc grass or brush moving on a windless day indicates that someone is moving the vegetation. d. Displacement can result from clearing a trail by either breaking or cutting one's way through heavy vegetation with a machete. These trails are obvious to the most inexperienced tracker. Some individuals may unconsciously, break additional branches as they move behind the person who is cutting. Displacement indicators can be made while stopping to rest with heavy loads. Prints made by the edges of boxes can help to identify the load carried. When loads are set down at a rest halt or campsite, grass and twigs may be crushed. A man sleeping will also flatten the vegetation. e. In almost any area, there will be insects and spiders. The observation of any changes in the normal life of these insects may indicate that someone has recently passed. Bees that are stirred up, ants that have had their holes covered by someone moving over them, or spiders that have had their webs torn down are valuable clues. Spiders often spin webs across open areas, trails, or roads to trap flying insects. If someone is careless and does not move under these webs, he is leaving an indicator to an observant tracker. f. If the party being followed attempts to use a streams to cover their trail, the trackers may still be able to follow successfully. Algae and other water plants may be displaced by slippery footing or by someone who walks carelessly. Rocks may be displaced from their original position, or turned over to indicate a lighter or darker color on the opposite side. The party entering or exiting the stream may create slide marks, footprints, or scuff bark off of roots or sticks. Normally a person or animal will seek the path of least resistance; therefore, when searching the stream for indications of departures, open areas along the banks may often yield results. H-10. STAINING Staining occurs when any substance from one organism or article is smeared or deposited on something else.

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a. The best example of staining is blood from a profusely bleeding wound. Blood signs often will be in the form of spatters o f drops. Blood indicators are not always on the ground. Blood can be smeared on leaves or twigs from a man's height to the ground. b. By studying the bloodstains left by a wounded individual, the tracker can determine: (1) The location of the wound on the individual. (a) If the blood seems to be dripping steadily, it probably came from a wound on the trunk. (b) If the blood appears to be slung to the front, rear, or to the sides, the wound is probably in an extremity. (c) Arterial wounds will appear to pour the blood at regular intervals as if it were poured from a pitcher. If the wound :is venous, the blood will pour steadily. (d) A wound in a lung will deposit bloodstains that are pink, bubbly, and frothy. (e) A bloodstain from a head wound will appear heavy, wet, and slimy, like gelatin. (f) Abdominal wounds often mix blood with digestive juices so that the deposit will have an odor and be light in color. (2) The seriousness of the wound and how far the individual can move unassisted. This process could lead the tracker to enemy bodies or further indications as to where they have been carried. H-11. OTHER EXAMPLES OF STAINING a. Staining can also occur when muddy footgear is dragged over grass, stones, and shrubs. Thus, staining and displacement combine to indicate movement and the direction taken. (1) Crushed leaves may stain rocky ground that; is too hard to leave footprints. (2) Roots, stones, and vines may be stained where leaves or berries are crushed on them by moving feet. b. In some instances it may be hard to determine the difference between staining and displacement. Both terms can be applied to some indicators. For example, water that has been muddied may indicate recent movement. The mud has been displaced and it is staining the water. Stones in streams may H-11

be stained by mud from footwear. Algae can be displaced from stones in streams and can stain other stones or the bank. c. Water collecting in footprints in swampy ground can be muddied if the tracks are recent. With time, however, the mud will settle and the water will clear. This can be used by the tracker to indicate time. Normally, the mud will clear in approximately 1 hour. This, of course, will vary with the terrain. H-12. WEATHERING Weather may either aid or hinder the tracker. It affects indicators in certain ways so that the tracker may determine their relative ages. Wind, snow, rain, or sunlight may, however, obliterate indicators entirely, thus hindering the tracker. a. By studying the effects of weather on indicators, the tracker can determine the age of the sign. For example, when bloodstains are fresh, they are bright red. Air and sunlight change blood first; to a deep 'ruby red color, then to a dark brown crust when the moisture evaporates. Scuff marks on trees or bushes darken with time, sap oozes, then hardens when it makes contact with the air. b. Footprints are greatly affected by weather. When a person's foot displaces soft, moist soil to form a print, moisture initially holds the edges of this print intact. As sunlight and air dry the edges of the print, small particles that were held in place by moisture fall into the print. By carefully studying this process, the tracker can determine the approximate age of the print. If particles are just beginning to fall into the print, the tracker should become a stalker. If the edges of the print are dried and crusty, the prints are probably at least an hour old. This will vary with terrain and should be taken as a general guide. H-13. HOW WEATHERING EFFECTS TRACKING a. Alight rain may round out the edges of the print. The tracker must remember when the last rain occurred in order to place these prints into a proper time frame. A heavy rain may erase all signs. b. Wind also affects tracks. Besides drying out the print, litter, sticks, or leaves may be blown into the print. By remembering wind activity, the tracker may guess the age of the tracks. For example, the tracker may think, "It is calm at the present, but the wind blew hard about an hour ago. These tracks have litter blown into them, so they must be over an hour old." The tracker must be sure, however, that the litter was blown into the print, and was not crushed into the print when it way made.

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c. Trails exiting streams may appear to have, been weathered by rain because of water running from clothing or equipment into the tracks. This is particularly true if the party exits the stream in a file. This will permit each person to deposit water into the tracks. The existence of a wet, apparently weathered trail slowly fading into a dry trail indicates the trail is fresh. d. Wind affects sounds and odors. If the wind is blowing from the direction of the trail the tracker is following, sounds and odors may be carried to him. If the wind is blowing in the same direction as the trail being followed, the tracker must be extremely cautious since the wind will carry his sounds towards the enemy. Wind direction can be determined by dropping a handful of dry dust or grass from shoulder height. By pointing in the same direction the wind is blowing, sounds can be localized by cupping the hands behind the ears and slowly turning. When the sounds are loudest, the tracker is facing the origin of the sound. e. In calm weather, when no wind is blowing, the air currents that may carry sounds to the tracker may be too light to feel. The tracker must remember that the air cools in the evening and moves downhill to the valleys. If a tracker is moving uphill late in the day or at night, air currents will probably be moving toward him, provided no other wind is blowing. As the sun warms the air in the valleys in the morning, it moves uphill. These factors should be considered when plotting routes for patrols or other operations. If a tracker or a commander can keep the wind in his face, sounds and odors will be carried to him from his objective or the party being tracked. f. The sun should also be considered by a tracker. It is difficult to shoot directly into the sun. If the tracker, has the sun at his back and the wind in his face, he has a slight advantage. g. The tracker should know and understand how the weather effects soil, vegetation, and other indicators in his area. He cannot properly determine the age of indicators until he understands the effects that weather has on trail signs (fig. H-3). H-14. LITTERING A poorly trained or poorly disciplined unit moving over a piece o f terrain is likely to leave a clear trail of litter. Gum or candy wrappers, ration cans, cigarette butts, remains of fires, or even piles of human feces are unmistakable signs of recent movement. Weathering must be taken into consideration when estimating the age of litter. Rain flattens or washes litter away, and turns paper into pulp. Ration cans, exposed to weather, will rust first at the exposed edge where it is opened. Rust then moves in toward the center. Again the tracker must use his memory to properly determine the age of litter. The last rain or strong wind can be the basis for a time frame. H-13

Figure H-3, Weather effects on footprints. H-14

H-15. CAMOUFLAGE TECHNIQUES USED TO CONFUSE TRACKERS Camouflage applies to tracking when the party being followed employs techniques to baffle the tracker or slow him down. Walking backwards to leave confusing prints, brushing out trails, moving over rocky ground or through streams are examples of techniques that can be employed to confuse the tracker. a. The party being followed may employ "most used" and "least used" routes to cover their movement. (1) Movement on lightly traveled sandy or soft trails is easily trailed. However, a guerrilla may attempt to confuse the tracker by moving on hard-surfaced, frequently traveled roads. He may even attempt to merge with the civilians. These routes should be examined carefully, because if a well-defined approach leads to the enemy, it will probably be mined, ambushed, or covered by snipers. (2) Least-used routes are taken in an attempt to confuse the tracker by avoiding all manmade trails or roads. These routes are normally magnetic azimuths between two points. The tracker can, however, by using the proper concepts, follow the party if he is experienced and persistent. b. The individual or party being followed may use several methods to minimize trail signs. Footwear wrapped with rags or soft-soled tennis shoes may make footprints more rounded on the edges and less distinct. The party may exit a stream in column or line; this reduces the chance of leaving a well-defined exit. c. A careful, observant tracker can, by studying signs, determine if an attempt is being made to confuses him. If individuals attempt-to throw off their tracker by walking backwards, their footprints will be deepened at the toe soil will be scuffed or dragged in the direction of movement. By following carefully, the tracker can normally find a turnaround point. d. A trail can be brushed out, but rarely without leaving signs. This technique should be easily recognized by the experienced tracker. e. If the trail leads across rocky or hard ground, the tracker should attempt to circle the area to pack up the exit trail. On rocky ground, moss or lichens growing on the stones could be displaced by even the most careful evader. If these methods fail, the tracker should return to the last visible indicators and then head in the direction of movement i4 everwidening circles until he again falls upon visible signs.

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f. Remember that an individual who attempts to hide his trail moves at a reduced speed. Therefore, an experienced tracker, who is not fooled by these attempts, gains time on the person being followed. H-16. INTERPRETATION OF IMMEDIATE USE INTELLIGENCE a. As stated before, as the tracker moves along, he asks himself certain questions. As he finds indicators treat answer these questions, he begins to form a picture of the enemy in his mind. The tracker must avoid reporting his interpretations as facts. He should report that he has seen indications of certain things instead of stating to the commander that these things actually exist. The commander may have additional sources of information available to assist him in his estimate of the enemy he is facing. b. There are many ways a tracker can make interpretations, as discussed above, relating to size of the party, sex, load, equipment, and many more things. Time frames can be determined by the effects of weathering on the indicators. H-17. ORGANIZATION OF A TRACKING TEAM a. A tracking team can be any size unit, whether it is a rifle company or a long-range reconnaissance patrol team. The point team of a large unit can be designated as a tracking team, or the tracking team can be a separate; distinct unit. There can be numerous organizations for a tracking team, as long as there is a leader, one or more trackers, and security is provided for the trackers. One type organization is to have the unit's best tracker, a bodyguard or security man, two other trackers, each with security, and a team commander with his radiotelephone operator. b. When moving in column, the best tracker should be in the lead followed by his security; the two other trackers on the flanks, each followed by their security; the commander where he can best control; and the radiotelephone operator, if one is used, either in the center or to the rear. When in file, the best tracker should lead, his security should follow. Next should come the commander, radiotelephone operator, then other trackers and security (fig. H-4).

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Figure H-4. Rifle squad employed as tracker team. H-18. SUMMARY a. A good tracker must be patient, persistent, determined, and physically fit. He must have the ability to see things that are not apparent at first glance. He should always be alert. These are the six concepts of tracking: displacement, staining, weathering, littering, camouflage, and interpretation of immediate use intelligence. Any indicator can be defined by one or more of these classifications. b. It should be mentioned that while the tracker is following a trail, it is possible for him to become the one being tracked. Constant attention to the concepts of tracking and the mistakes being made by the enemy should enable the tracker to move his unit more carefully than any other small unit leader. For example, he should be conscious of the way his unit exits a stream, crosses a trail, or moves cross country. The tracker should be security conscious at all times. c. While tracking, the tracker should also remember that if he and the party being followed are moving at the same speed, the gap will never be closed. The tracker should practice reading and interpreting trail signs so that while he tracks, time can be made up and he can gain on his enemy.

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H-18 ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1988 52—084/85009