Specpro Reviewer

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Atty. Demetrio Custodio REVIEWER By: Francisco C. Banguis Jr.

GENERAL PROVISIONS RULE 72. Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. — Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the following cases: (a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons; (b) Escheat; (c) Guardianship and custody of children; (d) Trustees; (e) Adoption; (f) Rescission and revocation of adoption; (g) Hospitalization of insane persons; (h) Habeas corpus; (i) Change of name; (j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations; (k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children; (l) Constitution of family home; (m) Declaration of absence and death; (n) Cancellation of correction of entries in the civil registry. Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

ACTION VS. SPECIAL PROCEEDING RIANO: Action A formal demand of one’s right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. Where a party-litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action.

Special Proceeding An application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.

No formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship. NOTE: Not limited to cases mentioned in Section 1 but includes cases the purpose of which is to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. UP LAW BOC: Action To protect or enforce a right or prevent or redress a wrong. Generally adversarial in nature, involves two or more parties.

Special Proceeding To establish a right, status or particular fact. Non-adversarial, may involve only one party.

Governed by ordinary rules supplemented by special rules. Courts of general jurisdiction. Initiated by pleading, and parties respond through an answer. Laws on pleadings applicable: filing of an answer, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party complaint.

Governed by special rules, supplemented by ordinary rules. Courts of limited jurisdiction. Initiated by petition, parties respond through an opposition. Laws on pleading generally not applicable.

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Pacific Banking vs. Court of Appeals 242 SCRA 493 Doctrine: Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship. Facts:  PB was placed under receivership by CB and was subsequently placed under liquidation with an appointed liquidator. CB then filed with RTC assistance for the liquidation then creditors filed their claims after.  In 1989, the Union filed a complaint in intervention seeking payment for their salaries etc. which the court granted.  However, in 1991, President Nanagas of PDIC was appointed by CB as liquidator. In this case, he asked for an MR and Clarification of the order. The judge modified the order but in effect denied the MR. He then filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion to submit Record on Appeal.  But the respondent judge disallowed the NOA for being filed late (after 15 days) and said that it has become final and executory. Execution granted in favor of Union.  Other private respondents likewise claimed payment for the shares of stocts amounting $2.5M and that they had preference. As a result, judge also directed liquidator to pay them.  Liquidator moved for MR but denied then he filed for a Notice of Appeal. But the judge ordered the same stricken off for having been filed without authority of CB and beyond 15 days. Ordered execution granting SHs or investors claim. CA 5th Division= Proceeding is SP for the Union so the period for appeal was 30 days. Hence, it was within and declared valid. CA 14th Division= For the SH/ investor’s claims, court said that liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Hence, 15 days only and the appeal was filed only on the 23rd day from the day of his receipt of the order appealed from. Issue: WON a petition for liquidation under Section 29 of RA No. 265 or Central Bank Act is an SP or OCA. (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS.) Held:  Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not

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pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person. What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets. Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest therein. This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the creditors. He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided by law. Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and the determination of their order of payment.

SC= Decisions appealed from are AFFIRMED. 2.

Heirs of Gabatan vs. CA and L. Pacana 581 SCRA 70 Doctrine: Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. Facts:  Respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of 1.1 ha of land inherited from her deceased mother. She said that the said land has not been returned to her mother despite demands and petitioners took possession of the same since then.  Petitioners denied and answered that respondent is not the rightful owner since she is not the daughter, and the alleged mther was survived by the siblings. Also said that they’ve been in actual, physical, open, continuous possession of property for more than 50 years. Moreover, the persons mentioned were merely caretakers and husband hence no interest over the same.

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Subsequently, they amended their answer and alleged that the disputed land was already covered by an OCT under them.

RTC= Favored respondent. Declared owner of property and reconvey the same to her. CA= Affirmed the RTC. Respondent’s claim of filiation was sufficiently established during the trial. Also affirmed the DOS in which Hermogena, mother of respondent, was identified as an heir. Also, no prescription since it couldn’t ripen into acquisitive prescription because Teofilo never held the property in the concept of an owner. Issue: WON a special proceeding was proper before the action for conveyance is granted. (YES.) Held:  The respondent’s main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime. Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.  In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action.  In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.  However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit: It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

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In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied) Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to

Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon. SC= Petition is GRANTED. 3.

Montaner vs. Sharia District Court, Liling 576 SCRA 746 Doctrine: The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Facts:  Petitioners (Luisa Kho and children) are the first family of the deceased Alejandro Montaner Sr. while respondents (Liling and daughter) are the second family.  Respondents filed a complaint for partition of the estate of the decedent and appointment of administrator. Petitioners filed an Answer with an MTD because Sharia court has no jurisdiction (Montaner was Roman Catholic), failed to pay correct docket fees, and filiation was barred by prescription. Sharia Court= Dismissed respondents complaint for partition. Montaner Sr was not a Muslim and jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution if the estate of deceased. Muslims. MR= Denied opposition of petitioners and granted MR of Liling despite lack of notice of hearing. Was deemed cured when petitioners were notified of the existence of the pleading hence took cognizance of the motion.

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Issue: WON the Sharia Court has jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased and that this was in the nature of special proceedings cognizable by such court. (YES.) Held:  Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim, such as the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent. These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.  We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to

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dismiss that Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant or result in having "a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem.28 Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction." The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss. In the case at bar, the Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact. Petitioners’ argument that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.

SC= Petition DENIED. SDC Orders AFFIRMED.

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS RULE 73. Venue and Process Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedents is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The

court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

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Section 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.

RTC= Denied petitioners MTD. The question of ownership is at issue hence ordinary civil action is proper. The relief establishing status of the plaintiffs was nowhere to be found.

Section 3. Process. — In the exercise of probate jurisdiction, Courts of First Instance may issue warrants and process necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses or to carry into effect theirs orders and judgments, and all other powers granted them by law. If a person does not perform an order or judgment rendered by a court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, it may issue a warrant for the apprehension and imprisonment of such person until he performs such order or judgment, or is released. Section 4. Presumption of death. — For purposes of settlement of his estate, a person shall be presumed dead if absent and unheard from for the periods fixed in the Civil Code. But if such person proves to be alive, he shall be entitled to the balance of his estate after payment of all his debts. The balance may be recovered by motion in the same proceeding.

JURISDICTION LIMITED TO ADJUDICATION AND SETTLEMENT OF PROPERTIES OF DECEASED 4.

Ramon Ching vs. Rodriguez, Joseph Cheng et al G.R. No. 192828, November 28, 2011 Doctrine: An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed. Facts:  Respondent filed a complaint for disinheritance and declaration of nullity of the DOS, etc. against petitioners. They alleged that petitioner killed their father (Antonio) and that he misrepresented himself when he declared that he was the son but in fact was only an adopted.  They prayed that he be disqualified from inheriting, nullify the TCTs involving 6 parcels of land issued in favor of him, declare the agreement and waiver null and void for being illegal, declare null the transfer of the shares of sticks of Po Wing for being illegally procured through falsification of signatures, declare null the affidavit of settlement of estate executed by petitioner, and declare null the DOS over three parcels sold to Asia Antlantic and Elena Tiu.  Petitioners filed with RTC an MTD for FS, LP, RJ and respondents not being real parties. But this was denied.

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Subsequently, respondents filed an Amended Complaint impleading Metrobank for a certain certificate worth P4M and be declared rightful owners over the same. RTC admitted the amended complaint. Then it issued a pre-trial order. Petitioners filed MTD over their amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction. This is because the suit partakes that of SP not as an ordinary civil action.

CA= Affirmed RTC. Nothing in the said complaint shows that the action of the private respondents should be threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing that their allegations were substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the alleged fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The private respondents also instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect them from the consequence of the fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him from disposing or alienating the subject properties, including the ₱4 Million deposit with Metrobank. MR= Denied. Issue: WON the RTC and CA erred in dismissing the MTD of petitioners on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for allegedly being a special proceeding rather than an ordinary civil action. (NO.) Held:  Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.  Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.  The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint, seeking the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's custody and the nullification of the instruments subject of the complaint, necessarily require the determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's heirs.  It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the pendency of the case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and not on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized that the respondents were parties to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver prayed to be nullified. Hence, even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that

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there was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonio’s estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction. In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court. The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.

SC= Petition DENIED. 5.

Natcher vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001 Doctrine: Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Facts:  Sps. Esguerra owned a 9K sq. meters land. When wife (Graciana) died, children and husband entered into an extrajudicial settlement of her esrare in which they divided the properties. Husband got 8/14 while children, 1/14 shares.  Subsequently, heirs subdivided among themselves the lands into several lots. Husband donated the same to children amounting to 4.8K square meters. He was left with only 447 sq. meteres property.  Morever, husbands property were further divided into two. First lot was sold to a third person while the second, he sought ownership over the same.  In 1980, husband married petitioner Natcher. During such marriage, Graciano sold the second lot to his wife and a new TCT was issued in her favor. Graciano died and left Natcher and children as heirs.  Children filed a complaint against Natcher alleging that she emplied fraud, misrepresentation and forgery when she

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acquired the second lot. As such, their legitimes were impaired. Natcher answered that she was legally married and that was a compulsory heir entitled as well. Also, Graciano has distributed to respondents their share and that they cannot anymore claim to his estate.

RTC= Favored petitioners. DOS invalid since no evidence of separation of property and that under NCC it was an invalid donation. However, may be an advanced inheritance for being a compulsory heir. CA= Reversed and Set Aside RTC Decision. RTC had no jurisdiction because it is within the Probate Court to decide the settlement of estate which is seen under special proceedings. Court should have just ruled the validity of the sale and leave the resolution in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. Issue: WON it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to decide the settlement of the estate through special proceedings. (YES.) Held:  Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.  In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".  Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.  A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate. SC= Petition Denied. CA AFFIRMED. 6.

In Re: In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Ruperta Palaganas G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011 Doctrine: But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad

produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country. Facts:  Ruperta, naturalized US citizen died but had a last will and testament executed in California designating her brother Sergio as executor for properties left in PH and US. Respondent Ernesto, another brother, filed with RTC a petition to probate the said will and for his appointment as administrator of her estate.  However, this was opposed by the nephews of Ruperta, Manuel and Benjamin contenting that it should be probated in the US where she executed it. Assuming it can, still invalid for being made under duress and without the testator’s full understanding. Ernesto is unqualified as well.  Other siblings visited PH, so Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition which it granted. RTC directed parties to submit memorandum on the issue of whether the will may be probated in PH. RTC= Admitted Ruperta’s will. Appointed Ernesto and issued Letters of Special Administration. Appealed with the argument that unprobated will executed by AM in the US cannot be probated for the first time in PH. CA= Affirmed the RTC. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Issue: WON a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in PH although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed. (YES.) Held:  In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.  Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.7The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.  In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate

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where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established. Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court. Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Ruperta’s will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testator’s state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial court’s directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Ruperta’s will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.

SC= Petition DENIED. CA AFFIRMED. 7.

Isabel and Douglas Jr. Portugal vs. Leonila PortugalBeltran G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005 Doctrine: The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased. Facts:  Jose (father) married Paz in 1942 and Isabel in 1948. Both of them had children, the former named Dougls Jr and the latter Leonila Aleli.  In 1968, the siblings of Portugal executed a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of their father over a 155 sq. m parcel of land in his favor.  ROD issued TCT in his favor married to Paz Lazo. Paz died, in 1984 and Portugal in 1985 intestate.  Issue arose when respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased person the said parcel of land. New TCT issued in her favor.  Hence, petitioners filed a complaint alleging that respondent is not related to the deceased, as such, not entitled to inherit. She also perjured herself when she made false representations in her affidavit of adjudication. RTC= Dismissed the case not based on the issues presented during pre-trial but for lack of cause of action on the ground that

petitioner’s status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate court and lack of jurisdiction over the case citing Yaptinchay case. The case is proper before special proceedings not in ordinary civil actions like this case. Hence, not being a probate court, no jurisdiction. CA= Affirmed RTC. Carino case not applicable in this case because main issue in that case was validity of marriage while here is the annulment of title to property. Status in this case have not been properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceedings. Issue: WON petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name. (NO.) Held:  In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.  Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.  It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.  In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit: 1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid; 2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.); 3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs; 4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint. SC= Petition GRANTED. CA SET ASIDE. 8.

Eduardo Agtarap vs. Sebastian Agtarap et al G.R. No. 177099, June 8, 2011 Doctrine: The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the

proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. Facts:  Petitioner Eduardo filed with RTC a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin.  He alleged that his father contracted two marriages (Lucia: Jesus, Milagros and Jose (Joseph grandson) and Caridad: Eduardo, Sebastian and Mercedes) during his lifetime. At the time of his death, he left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay city.  Joseph, grandson, had been leasing and improving the same. He also appropriated the P26K income per month since 1994.  Petitioner alleged that he should be appointed as special administrator, take possession and charge of the assets of the estate and declare him compulsory heir so that he is entitled of his share.  Sebastian, petitioner’s brother, admitted the allegations and conceded but the grandchildren of Joaquin from the first family opposed the same. They said that said properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of their deceased mom Lucia and father Joaquin. Also, the money used for the extensions and improvements was exclusively from them. They opposed the appointment because Eduardo not physically fit, minimal interest and does not possess the desire to earn. Joseph has the best interest in the properties. RTC= Appointed Eduardo and issued letters of administration. Subsequently, after opportunity to be heard, court ordered the partition of the properties in favor Eduardo. He was able to prove that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during the second marriage. He was able to render a true and just accounting of his administration from his date of assumption. MR= Favored respondents. Denied Eduardo and Sebastian and granted Joseph and Teresa. Declared that properties belonged to conjugal partnership of first family. Directed the modification of order of partition to reflect correct sharing of the heirs. CA= Dismissed the appeal. Sebastian and Eduardo had smaller shares as ordered by the court. MR= Denied. Issue: WON the determination of ownership of the subject real properties were within the jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court. (YES.) Held:  We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.  It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for judicial settlement of Joaquin’s estate, he alleged that the subject properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs state that the lots were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first marriage with Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were derived from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero casado con Emilia Muscat, y

el Segundo con Lucia Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta). When TCT No. 5239 was divided between Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368, consisting of 8,872 square meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577 (32184)22 issued on April 23, 1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta. SC-= Remanded to RTC for further proceedings insofar as the settlement of the estate of Joaquin is concerned. TESTATE VS. INTESTATE 9.

Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, Lourdes Cuenco 53 SCRA 360 Doctrine: It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will. Facts:  Senator Cuenco died and was survived by widow petitioner and children of the first marriage.  Respondent Lourdes Cuenco, one of the children of the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with CFI Cebu and alleged that Sen. Cuenco died intestate in Manila but resided in Cebu at time of his death, that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and QC. Court ordered the hearing and that due notice be given to all heirs and requisite publication be made.  This order was subjected to three modifications until the court issued an order stating that it is has not yet acquired jurisdiction because of the noncompliance of the requisite publication of the notice and hearing.  A week after, petitioner Rosa, wife from second marriage, filed with CFI QC for the probate of the will made by deceased Sen. Cuenco and issuance of letters of testamentary being the widow and executrix.  When she learned of the intestate proceeding in Cebu, she filed in Cebu an opposition and MTD as well as opposition for the appointment of administrator. Cebu court issued an order holding MTD until QC acts on the petition for probate.  Respondents filed in QC an Opposition and MTD opposing the probate and assailing jurisdiction in view that Cebu Court had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over such proceeding. Hence, this was an improper venue and there was lack of jurisdiction.

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QC court denied respondents’ MTD on the ground that testate proceedings precedes intestate. And that his residence at time of death was at QC. MR denied.

QC Court= Admitted the probate and appointed petitioner widow as executrix without bond as desired by testator. CA= Favored respondents and against petitioner. First proceeding was instituted in Cebu, follows that it excluded QC where Rosa filed the probation of the will. As such, petitioner Rosa should assert the same in Cebu. QC is enjoined. MR= Denied. Issue: WON CA erred in prohibiting QC from proceeding with the testate proceedings. (YES.) Held:  Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.  Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.  Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition. In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts — at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu

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court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be convertedinto a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile. It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court. Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final and cannot be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.

SC= CA reversed and prohibition dismissed. 10. Angela Rodriguez vs. Borja, Apolonia et al 17 SCRA 418 Doctrine: The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable. Facts:  Fr. Rodriguez died in Manila. He purportedly left a will and this was delivered before clerk of court of Bulacan by respondents Apolonia and Adelaida.  Petitioners Angela and Maria filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will. Before the court could act, the same was withdrawn by them.  Instead petitioners then filed before CFI Rizal a petition for the settlement of intestate estate of Fr. Rodriquez alleging that he resides in Paranaque, Rizal and they also prayed that Maria be appointed as Special Administratix.  Respondents Apolonia filed a petition for the probate of the will delivered by them.  Petitioners contends that since the intestate proceedings filed before CFI Rizal was filed 8AM while that of the respondents in CFI Bulacan at 11AM, latter has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.  Respondents averred that CFI Bulacan acquired jurisidiction upon delivery of the will and that such takes precedence over their claims.

CFI= Denied the MTD on the ground that a difference in few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other. In fact, petitioners already knew about the will and that this case before the court is just to prevent from exercising its jurisdiction. MR= Denied. Issue: WON CFI Bulacan acquired jurisdiction and MTD filed by petitioners be dismissed. (YES.) Held:  We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court.  The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.  But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the. Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case before us.  The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that: The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)  This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account.  There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the

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precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest. The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.

SC= Certiorari is DENIED. Petition dismissed. 11. Roberts vs. Leonidas 129 SCRA 33 Doctrine: The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases Facts:  Edward Grimm had two families. When he died, he was survived by the first family (Juanita and Ethel) and second family, Maxine as surviving wife, and Pete and Linda Grimm, children.  He executed two wills in San Francisco California. One disposed the PH estate which was described as conjugal properties while the other disposed estate outside PH.  In both, he favored second wife and children. Children of the first were given legitimes in the will disposing of the estate in PH.  However, the will disposing the estate outside PH, testator said that he did not make any provision for the children of the first family for the same has been given in the will with the estate found in PH.  Two wills and codicil were presented for probate in 3rd District of Utah and Mrs. Roberts were notified.  Maxine admitted that she received the notice of the intestate petition filed by Ethel. Months after, 3rd District of Utah admitted to probate the will and codicil.  Two weeks later, both parties (Maxine and Ethel) with knowledge of the intestate proceedings in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. o Stated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives of OH estate; Maxine retains ½ share of estate not less than $1.5M in Utah and Manila; children shall share equally the Net Distributable Estate  In the intestate proceeding, it was found out that when the parties sold the Palawan Project, it turned out that the buyer was incorporated by Ethel.  Acting on the project partition, without signature of Maxine, adjudicated Maxine 4/8 share of PH estate and 1/8 for the children.  Maxine filed a petition to annul partition approved by the intestate court and letters of administration revoked. That she be appointed as executrix and Ethel ordered to account for the properties received by them.  Maxine alleged that they were defrauded by Ethel and that the compromise in Utah was illegal. Intestate proceeding was invalid because he died testate.  Ethel filed MTD but this was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack of merit. She then filed certiorari before this Court that the testate proceedings be dismissed. Issue: WON a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court). (YES.)

Held:  We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.  A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).  The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.  Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case. SC= Petition DISMISSED. TRO dissolved. WHERE ESTATE SETTLED IF RESIDENT OR NON RESIDENT 12. Cayetano vs. Leonides 129 SCRA 522 Doctrine: If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. Facts:  Adoracion Campos died and left her father petitioner Hermogenes and respondent sisters as surviving heirs. Since father was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication the entire estate of the deceased daughter.  One of the sisters, Nenita Paguia filed a reprobate of the will of the deceased which was allegedly executed in US and for appointment as administratix of the estate. She alleged that deceased probated the will in US and that the original administrator Dr. Bargaza waived his appointment and that there is an urgent need to replace him.  An opposition of the will was filed by petitioner and declared that it was forgery. Even if it were true, it can’t apply because it would work injustice and injury to him.  But nevertheless, father confirmed the veracity of the will and filed MTD Opposition. An ex parte presentation of evidence was made.  Respondent judge probated the will and declared the same to be valid. The withdrawal was allegedly acknowledged by petitioner.  However, in 1979, petitioner filed a petition for relief and prayed that the order be set aside because the dismissal of the opposition was secured through fraudulent means. Such was inserted among the papers which he signed in connection

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with 2 Deeds of Conditional Sale. The lawyer was not even his counsel of record in the SP case. The judge dismissed his petition for failure to adduce evidence. Meanwhile, father died and left a will which was questioned by children and forced heirs. Because such appointed Polly Cayetano as the executrix of the will. As such, Cayetano filed a motion to substitute herself in the instant case which was granted. The respondent judge ruled that he had no jurisdiction because it should be Cavite Court.

Issue: WON the court had jurisdiction. (YES.) Held: Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984). SC= Certiorari and prohibition DISMISSED. 13. Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals 74 SCRA 189 Doctrine: In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. Facts:  Virgina Fule filed with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration for the property of Amado Garcia who died intestate. She also moved for her appointment as special administratix. Judge Malvar granted this.  An MR was filed by Preciosa Garcia for appointment was made without jurisdiction since no notice of the petition was made. As surviving spouse, she had preference in the appointment.  Subsequently, Preciosa filed a motion to remove Virginia because such appointment was obtained through misrepresentations, had adverse interest and unsuitable.  Notice of hearing was made then a supplemental petition for appointment of regular administrator was filed by Virginia which was opposed by Preciosa since CFI Laguna never was conferred jurisdiction.  Judge Malvar issued an order appointing Virginia despite MR of Preciosa. Then Preciosa moved to dismiss the petition and that she filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia. RTC Judge Malvar= Favored petitioner. CA= Reversed. MR= Denied. Issue: WON last residence was at QC not Calamba. (YES.)

Held:  Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."  On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna.  A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent. SC= Petition of Virginia Fule denied. JURISDICTION LIMITED TO ADJUDICATION AND SETTLEMENT OF PROPERTIES OF DECEASED 14. Uy vs. Dizon-Capulong 221 SCRA 87 Doctrine: Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle that when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to

be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administration proceedings. The trial court, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. The failure of respondent judge to apply this basic principle indicates a manifest disregard of well-known legal rules. Facts:  A certain Herminia Alvos filed with RTC Valenzuela a petition for the settlement of the estate of Ambrocio Pingco. Respondent judge appointed her as special administratix.  Counsel for Herminia requested to direct ROD of Valenzuela to freeze any transaction without the signature of Herminia since there was an alleged sale with late Ambrocio and Jose and Rizalina Uy which the court granted.  Counsel filed an urgent motion to cancel the titles under Jose P. Uy stating that the same was only reguistred in his name through fraud and signatures forged. Respondent judge granted the same and reinstatement of titles in the names of Sps Pingco and Paz Ramirez were issued.  Jose Uy filed with CA to annul the same and judge be restrained from proceeding. Meanwhile, titles reverted back to Sps. ambrocio and Paz Ramirez.  CA granted motion of Uy and set aside respondent judge’s order. Also enjoined from further proceedings. A probate court has no authority to y decide questions of the ownership of property, real or personal. The only purpose of the examination . . . is to elicit information or to secure evidence from the persons suspected of having possession or knowledge of the property of the deceased, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the property of the deceased. If after such examination there is good reason for believing that the person so examined has property in possession belonging to the estate, it is the duty of the administrator, by ordinary action, to recover the same. MR= Denied.  Meanwhile, respondent judge approved project partition submitted by Herminia. On motion of counsel, judge ordered that the titles in the name of Ambrocio be adjudicated to those mentioned in the approved partition.  The ex parte petition for the approval of the DOS was granted.  Meanwhile, SC affirmed CA that annulled and set aside order of respondent judge.  Judge disregarded this and still granted the ex parte petition for approval of the deed of absolute sale of properties. Despite such, judge again approved another deed.  Hence this petition by Sps. Jose and Rizalina Uy. Issue: WON respondent judge erred. (YES.) Held:  We are far from persuaded by respondent Judge. The charges against her are clearly meritorious and supported by the records. Hence, there is no need in fact for Us to conduct a formal investigation if only to determine her culpability as it is well documented. Her orders and those of the appellate courts display her open defiance of higher judicial authority.  In Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 pending before her sala, respondent Judge committed the following highly irregular and questionable acts indicative of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the public interest, to wit: (a) respondent Judge cancelled on mere motion of a party the titles of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina Cortes, who

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were not parties to the case, to the great prejudice of the latter; (b) respondent Judge issued two (2) orders which disregarded the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her disputed Order of 7 June 1989; 3 (c) respondent Judge issued another order authorizing the sale of the other properties previously titled in the complainant Jose P. Uy; (d) respondent Judge issued still two (2) more orders approving deeds of sale even after this Court had already affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989. These actuations of respondent Judge clearly stress her blatant disobedience to the lawful orders of superior courts and belie any claim that she rendered the erroneous orders in good faith as would excuse her from administrative liability. The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by her refusal to abide by the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989 which directed the cancellation of the titles of complainants. She was in fact specifically enjoined from proceeding against them, yet, despite this Decision, respondent Judge skill authorized the subsequent transfer or alienation to other persons of properties titled in the name of complainants to the detriment of the latter. This utter disrespect for the judgment of a higher court constitutes grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the public, the bench and the bar. The absence of a temporary restraining order or an order from the Court of Appeals to revert the titles to complainants is not sufficient justification for respondent Judge to issue subsequent orders contrary to the appellate court’s proscription. Certainly, respondent Judge is fully aware that the necessary consequence of the appellate court’s decision is to put back the complainants to their former status prior to the issuance of the annulled order. Consequently, the Order of 7 June 1989 being void and of no effect, the ownership of the properties subject of the settlement proceedings remains vested in complainants and will continue to be so until declared void in an appropriate proceeding, not in the intestate proceedings before respondent Judge. Thus, an order from the appellate court that will revert the titles to complainants is not necessary as it is already implied from its decision annulling the questioned cancellation.

SC= Judge Dizon Capulong guilty of gross ignorance and grave misconduct. Dismissed from the service with forfeiture. 15. Jimenez vs. Court of Appeals 184 SCRA 367 Doctrine: The provisional character of the inclusion in the inventory of a contested property was again reiterated in the following cases: Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, Junquera vs. Borromeo, Borromeo vs. Canonoy, Recto vs. de la Rosa. It has also been held that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar. Facts:  Lino had two families in which for the first (with Consolacion), he had four children and with the second (with Genoveva), seven children. In the first marriage, he acquired 5 parcels of land.  Lino died and consequently, Genoveva died. One of the children, Virginia, from the second family filed a petition before CFI Pangasinan praying to be appointed as administratrix for the properties of Lino and Genoveva. This included the children from the first family and the first wife.  However, grandchild of Lino from first family, Leonardo Jr. filed a motion for the exclusion of the other siblings of his

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father for the reason that they have already received their inheritance and that they are not the children of Genoveva and Lino. Virginia was appointed as administratix of the intestate estate if Lino and Genoveva, then had inventory in which she included the five parcels of land in issue. But this was opposed by the grandchild from the first family since this was already under his father’s siblings from the first family. Evidence was presented such as testimonial and documentary. Probate court excluded 5 parcels of land and MR was denied. CA dismissed the petition of Virginia to include the 5 parcels of land and the decision became final and executory. 2 years after, Virginia filed an amended complaint with RTC to recover the possession or ownership of the land and that respondents be ordered to render an accounting. Respondents moved for the dismissal on grounds of prescription and barred by prior judgment. RTC dismissed the case on the ground of res judicata. MR was denied as well. CA affirmed RTC.

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Issue: WON in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and whether res judicata exists as to bar petitioners’ present action for recovery of the lands at issue. (NO.) Held:  We reverse. Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the probate, court's findings are not conclusive being prima facie, 10 a separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land.  The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.  All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.  The provisional character of the inclusion in the inventory of a contested property was again reiterated in the following cases: Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, Junquera vs. Borromeo, Borromeo vs. Canonoy, Recto vs. de la Rosa. It has also been held that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. 18 This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.  Res judicata does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions. Specifically in S.P. No. 5346, the action was for the settlement of the intestate estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy while Civil Case No. 16111 was an action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. Moreover, while admittedly, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V in S.P. No. 5346 had jurisdiction, the same was merely limited jurisdiction. Any pronouncement by said court as to title is not conclusive and could still be attacked in a separate proceeding. Civil Case No. 16111, on the other hand. was lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII in the exercise of the court's general jurisdiction. It was, in fact, such "separate or

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ordinary proceedings" contemplated by the rules for a final determination of the issue of ownership of the disputed properties. To repeat, since the determination of the question of title to the subject properties in S.P. 5346 was merely provisional, petitioners are not barred from instituting the appropriate action in Civil Case No. 16111. Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents in their motion to dismiss do not appear to be indubitable.1âwphi1Res judicata has been shown here to be unavailable and the other grounds of prescription and laches pleaded by private respondents are seriously disputed. The allegation in the complaint is that the heirs of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr. (referring to private respondents,) forcibly intruded into and took possession of the disputed properties only in 1978, after the death of Genoveva Caolboy. Since the action for reconveyance was instituted in 1984, it would appear that the same has not yet prescribed or otherwise barred by laches. There are a number of factual issues raised by petitioners before the lower court which cannot be resolved without the presentation of evidence at a full-blown trial and which make the grounds for dismissal dubitable. Among others, the alleged admission made by petitioners' mother in the deed of sale is vehemently denied, as well as the fact itself of adjudication, there being no showing that the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson had been liquidated nor that a judicial or extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Lino Jimenez was undertaken whereby such adjudication could have been effected. The grounds stated in the motion to dismiss not being indubitable, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 16111.

SC= CA REVERSED and RTC is directed to proceed case in dispatch. 16. Pio Barreto vs. Court of Appeals 131 SCRA 606 Doctrine: Final and executory decisions, more so with those already executed, may no longer be amended except only to correct errors which are clerical in nature. They become the law of the case and are immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness. Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such judgments as well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Facts:  Respondent Honor Moslares instituted an action for annulment of sale with damages before RTC of Manila against the Testate Estate of Nicolai Drepin and petition Pio Barreto Realty Development Corporation.  She alleged that the Deed of Sale over 4 parcels executed in favor of Barreto Realty was null and void for the same was already sold to him by deceased.  Both agreed to have a Compromise agreement and this was approved by the Trial Court. Howver, subsequent disagreements arose on the question of who bought the properties first.  The agreement actually gave the parties options and priority in acquiring the lot by buying the same ahead of the other. Moslares claimed that he bough first because he delivered 2 checks in favor of Baretto for 3M and Drepin Estate for 1.35M.

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But petitionder denied receiving the check. Instead it claimed that it bought the properties ahead by tendering TRB manager’s check for 1M. But this was also refused by respondents. Baretto filed a motion before the trial court that it complied with its obligations under the agreement but that the offer was refused and prayed for execution to compel Moslares. Judge Laguio ordered for a writ of execution. The lawyer of the estate reacted and filed an urgent motion to hold the execution in abeyance for there was a pending court decision re ownership of the land in RTC Antipolo. Moslares filed an MR and Barreto moved to amend the order. Judge Laguio ruled on three motions. Denied the two motions of the Estate and affirmed ex parte motion of Barreto. Sheriff personally delivered the checks to Moslares as per order. Three years later, Moslares filed a Motion for Execution alleging that it bought the lots subject of the agreement. He asked Barreto to execute a deed of conveyance. The previous tender did not produce the effect since it was not legal tender. Respondent judge granted the motion and ordered Barreto to execute a deed of conveyance over the subject lots in favor of Moslares. MR by Barreto was granted and also declared that the issue of absolute owner has already been settled and now a closed matter. MR for Moslares was again granted so it favored Moslares invoking interest of justice and equity. Check was not valid and there was no payment in return. But judge ordered Moslares certain conditions. These conditions were not met. Barreto instead consigned their payment to clerk of court but judge failed to act on the motion as he was on vacation leave. Executive judge dela Rosa granted the prayer of Barreto realty and judge Laguio inhibited. But in the end, Judge Laguio favored Moslares and Barreto filed a petition for certiorari before CA assailing such order. CA dismissed the petition. MR also denied.

Issue: WON the CA erred in dimissing the certiorari when it concluded that petitioner did not pursue the fruitful and effective implementation of the writ. (YES.) Held:  It is not disputed, and in fact borne by the records, that petitioner bought the disputed lots of the Drepin Estate subject matter of the Compromise Agreement ahead of Moslares and that the checks issued in payment thereof were even personally delivered by the Deputy Sheriff of the RTCBr. 18, Manila, upon Order of respondent Judge dated 14 June 1990 after tender was refused by Moslares and the Drepin Estate. Respondent Moslares never raised the invalidity of the payment through checks either through a motion for reconsideration or a timely appeal. Hence, with the complete execution and satisfaction of the Decision dated 24 July 1986 which approved the Compromise Agreement, Civil Case No. 84-27008 became closed and terminated leaving nothing else to be done by the trial court with respect thereto. As petitioner correctly contended, the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that petitioner did not pursue the fruitful and effective implementation of the writ of execution in its favor. As already stated petitioner paid for the lots through the court-sanctioned procedure outlined above. There was no more need for the Drepin Estate, owner of the lots, to execute a deed of conveyance in petitioner's favor because it had already done so on 10 October 1980. In fact the disputed lots were already registered in petitioner's name under TCT Nos. 50539, 50540 and 50541 as a consequence thereof. That was also why in the penultimate paragraph of the Compromise Agreement it was provided that in the event respondent

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Moslares bought the lots ahead of petitioner Barretto Realty the latter, not the Drepin Estate, was to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance and deliver all the titles and pertinent papers to respondent Moslares. There was therefore nothing more to be done by way of fruitful and effective implementation. Clearly then respondent Judge Laguio no longer had any jurisdiction whatsoever to act on, much less grant, the motion for execution and supplement thereto filed by Moslares on 17 September 1993 or more than three (3) years later, claiming that he had already bought the lots. The fact that the check paid to him by Barretto Realty was never encashed should not be invoked against the latter. As already stated, Moslares never questioned the tender done three (3) years earlier. Besides, while delivery of a check produces the effect of payment only when it is encashed, the rule is otherwise if the debtor was prejudiced by the creditor's unreasonable delay in presentment. Acceptance of a check implies an undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for payment. If no such presentment was made, the drawer cannot be held liable irrespective of loss or injury sustained by the payee. Payment will be deemed effected and the obligation for which the check was given as conditional payment will be discharged.18 Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Laguio's Order dated 8 November 1993 which granted private respondent's motion for execution thus nullifying the 1990 sale in favor of petitioner after he had in effect approved such sale in his Order of 14 June 1990 and after such order had already become final and executory, amounted to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, for which reason, all further orders stemming therefrom are also null and void and without effect. The principle of laches does not attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction. The fact that petitioner invoked par. 3 of the Order of 11 February 1994 praying that its P1,000,000.00 check still in Moslares' possession be considered sufficient payment of the disputed lots, could not be cited against it. For one thing, petitioner from the very start had always consistently questioned and assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain respondent's motion for execution filed three (3) years after the case had in fact been executed. Secondly estoppel being an equitable doctrine cannot be invoked to perpetuate an injustice.

SC= CA REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Conveyance to Moslares void and Barreto declared absolute owner. 17. Ramos vs. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 635 Doctrine: Approval of the probate court of the conditional sale is not a conclusive determination of the intrinsic or extrinsic validity of the contract but a mere recognition of the rights of private respondent as an heir to dispose of her rights and interests over her inheritance even before partition. Probate jurisdiction of the former court of first instance or the present regional trial court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of wills of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceeding; A separate action may be the appropriate remedy; Approval of the conditional sale by the probate court was without prejudice to the filing of the proper action for consolidation of ownership and / or reformation of instrument in the proper court within the prescriptive period. probate court acting as a cadastral court acts with limited competence and has no jurisdiction over actions for consolidation of ownership, and

such action must have been filed in the former CFI, now in the regional trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. Facts:  Respondent Adelaida Ramos borrowed from her brother Oscar 5K and 9K in conection with her business transaction involving a recovery of a parcel of land. It was used to finance the trip to Hawaii. As security, she executed in favor of her brother 2 deeds of conditional sale of her rights for the lots registered under the name of their parents.  She failed to repurchase hence petitioner filed for consolidation and approval of the conditional sale before CFI Tarlac acting as cadastral court.  Probate Court ordered the approval as well as the cadastral court.  Respondents remained in possession until petitioner took possession thereof. Respondent filed with CFI for declaration of nullity the orders. Ground was that such were mere mortgages and were vitiated by fraud. This was opposed by petitioners and said that these were voluntarily executed.  Court rendered that these were REM and that plaintiffs ordered to solidarily pay defendants.  CA affirmed in all respects and MR was denied.

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Issue: WON the petition has merit. (NO.) Held:  With respect to the orders dated January 22, 1960 and April 18, 1960, issued by the Court below acting as a probate court and cadastral court, respectively, the same could not preclude the institution of the case now under review.  A reading of the order of the probate court will show that it is merely an approval of the deed of conditional sale dated May 27, 1959 executed by petitioner Adelaida Ramos in favor of petitioners. There is nothing in said order providing for the consolidation of ownership over the lots allegedly sold to petitioners nor was the issue of the validity of said contract discussed or resolved therein. "To give approval" means in its essential and most obvious meaning, to confirm, ratify, sanction or consent to some act or thing done by another. The approval of the probate court of the conditional sale is not a conclusive determination of the intrinsic or extrinsic validity of the contract but a mere recognition of the right of private respondent Adelaida Ramos as an heir, to dispose of her rights and interests over her inheritance even before partition. As held in Duran, et al., vs. Duran the approval by the settlement court of the assignment pendente lite, made by one heir in favor of the other during the course of the settlement proceedings, is not deemed final until the estate is closed and said order can still be vacated, hence the assigning heir remains an interested person in the proceeding even after said approval.  Moreover, the probate jurisdiction of the former court of first instance or the present regional trial court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. Subject to settled exceptions not present in this case, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceeding. The parties concerned may choose to bring a separate action as a matter of convenience in the preparation or presentation of evidence. Obviously, the approval by the probate court of the conditional sale was without prejudice to the filing of the proper action for consolidation of ownership and/or reformation of instrument in the proper court within the statutory period of prescription.

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The same jurisdictional flaw obtains in the order of consolidation issued by the cadastral court. The court of first instance or the regional trial court, acting as cadastral court, acts with limited competence. It has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action for consolidation of ownership, much less to issue an order to that effect, such action must have been filed in the former court of first instance, now in the regional trial court, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. That remedy, and the procedure therefor, is now governed by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court as a special civil action cognizable by the regional trial court in the exercise of original general jurisdiction. Antecedent thereto, Article 1607 of the Civil Code provided for consolidation as follows: In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with the provisions of article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly heard. Hence in Crisologo, et al. vs. Centeno, et al., we ruled that said Article 1607 contemplates a contentious proceeding wherein the vendor a retro must be named respondent in the caption and title of the petition for consolidation of ownership and duly summoned and heard. An order granting the vendee's petition for consolidation of ownership, without the vendor a retro being named as respondent, summoned and heard, is a patent nullity for want of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the latter. The questioned order of consolidation issued by the cadastral court, being void for lack of jurisdiction, is in contemplation of law non-existent and may be wholly disregarded. Such judgment may be assailed any time, either directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action or by resisting such judgment in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked. It is not necessary to take any step to vacate or avoid a void judgment; it may simply be ignored.

SC=Petition Denied. CA Affirmed. 18. Pastor vs. Court of Appeals 122 SCRA 885 Doctrine: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. Facts:  Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada.  Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS.  Thereafter, the probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will.  Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which included the properties subject of the legacy which

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were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The order was affirmed by CA and on petition for review, the SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the probate court after denying reconsideration. For two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all pleadings of both parties remained unacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was still pending in another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedent’s estate, of which Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada. Being “immediately executory”, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the probate court ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositor’s motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the CA a petition for certiorariand prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the probate court. However, said petition was denied as well as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: WON the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity. (NO.) Held:  The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will “with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.” It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties.  The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion

of the said Probate Order directed special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute. EXCEPTIONS 19. Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals 202 SCRA 106 Doctrine: We however find that the fifth or last issue to be meritorious and the same deserves Our careful consideration. In said issue, herein petitioner maintains that to proceed to execute the deed of absolute sale without the go-signal of the Probate Court is to be recreant to his sworn duty as administrator, as well as to render void his actuations done without the permission of the Probate Court. This contention is correct and is impressed with merit. Inasmuch as the owner-seller of the property was already deceased and there were proceedings in the Probate Court, it was incumbent for the Probate Court to first give authorization to the administrator of the estate to deliver titles of lots which had previously been sold. The decedent after all, might be considered the alter ego of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation. The private complainant had been duly instructed by the accused herein to file the proper petition or motion with the Probate Court for delivery of said title but said complainant for one reason or another, disregarded said instructions. If at all anybody should be blamed, it should be private complainant herself for her failure to obtain the needed authorization from the court. Indeed, questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased may be passed upon in the Probate Court, with consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons such as the herein private complainant. Facts:  Petitioner Trinidad filed with CFI an action for partition of 4 parcels of land claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, whose dad was Patricio, original owner of the land. Patricion died and left 4 parcels.  As the son of Inocentes, he claimed partition in equal shares with the siblings of his father, but they refused. The defendants alleged that he was not the son of their brother and that their brother was also single before his birth. Respondents said that they had not lived with him and that they’ve been in possession of since the death and never gave a share in the produce of the land. CA= Plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that he was the son of the late Inocentes. Respondents acquired ownership by acquisitive prescription. Issue: WON CA committed reversible error. (YES.) Held:  Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership, and because private respondents had been in possession — in the concept of owners — of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.  The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the coownership.43 Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a coowner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership.  In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was

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receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the coownership by private respondents was beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in their father's name. Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the coownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held: . . . Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the coownership. In the other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]). Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Rogue vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]). Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that petitioner's claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.

SC= Petition GRANTED. Decision and Resolution RESERVED and SET ASIDE. RTC Reinstated. 20. Valera vs. Inserto 202 SCRA 106 Doctrine: The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action/' but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the inventory. This function of resolving whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties. Facts:  Rafael Valera was granted leasehold rights over an 18 hectare fishpond in Iloilo by the government to last during his lifetime.  He transferred it by “fictitious sale” to his daughter Teresa to support her children with the agreement that when the children finishes schooling, the fishpond will be returned to him.  Valera and his spouse Consolacion Sarosa and their child Teresa died.  The heirs of Teresa – her husband Jose Garin and their children bought the fishpond from the government, acquiring title thereto.

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The administrators of the spouses Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa claim that the fishpond should be returned to the spouses’ estates. The Probate Court presided by Judge Adil held that there has been an implied trust created, therefore the fishpond should be restored to the estate of the spouses pursuant to Arts. 1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code. Pursuant thereto, he directed the sheriff to enforce reconveyance of the fishpond to the estate. The fishpond was leased by the Garin Heirs to Fabiana, who although willingly surrendered it to the sheriff, later filed a complaint-in-intervention. This was dismissed so he instituted a separate action for injunction and damages. Court of Appeals reversed (fishpond to be returned to Garin Heirs and their lessee Fabiana) saying that: (1) Probate Court had no jurisdiction; (2) that the Title of the Garin Heirs is a stronger claim that rebuts the presumption that the estate owns the fishpond; and (3) that assuming the Probate Court had competence to resolve ownership, a separate action has to be filed.

Issue: WON Probate Court had authority to order reconveyance of the fishpond. (NO.) Held:  The CFI (now RTC), acting as Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced. This is issue is not a jurisdictional, but procedural, involving a mode of practice which may be waived.  The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. It was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the inventory. This function of resolving whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.  Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely provisional, the fishpond cannot be the subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others.  A separate action must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property. SC= Decision of the CA AFFIRMED.

DEATH (FACT OR PRESUMED) IS JURISDICTIONAL 21. Lorenzo vs. Posadas G.R. No. L-43082, June 18, 1937 Doctrine: Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, we hold that a transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation. Facts:  Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable amount of real and personal properties. Proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the CFI of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate.  The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to nephew Matthew ten years after the two executors named in the will was appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee until he resigned and the plaintiff Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.  During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue (Posadas) assessed against the estate an inheritance tax, together with the penalties for deliquency in payment. Lorenzo paid said amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the same time that unless the amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought for its recovery. Posadas overruled Lorenzo’s protest and refused to refund the said amount. Plaintiff went to court. The CFI dismissed Lorenzo’s complaint and Posadas’ counterclaim. Both parties appealed to this court. Issue: When does the inheritance accrue? Should the inheritance be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of the testator’s death or on its value 10 years later? Held:  The tax is upon transmission or the transfer or devolution of property of a decedent, made effective by his death. It is in reality an excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed to, receive, or take property by or under a will or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative at or after death. Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date.  Based of the value of the estate at the time of the testator’s death - If death is the generating source from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of the decedent's death, regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any subsequent increase or decrease in value.  A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.