Special Proceedings Case Digest for Feb 6 2016

NATIVIDAD V. A. JARODA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao, and ANTONIO V. A . TAN, in his capacity as judicial administrator of intestate estate of Carlos Villa Abrille, Special Proc. No. 1391, Court of First Instance of Davao, respondents. G.R. No. L-28214. July 30, 1969. Asilo, Irish B. FACTS: Carlos Villa Abrille died intestate, leaving his surviving spouse, nine (9) children (among them petitioner, NatividadJaroda), and four (4) grandsons, among them respondent, Antonio V. A. Tan. The petitioner filed the instant case for the nullity of the two orders of the court appointing Tan as a special administrator. Pursuant to the first order, Tan filed a petition for the withdrawal of sums from PNB alleging that these sums were registered in the name of Abrille but that they actually belong to, and were held in trust for, the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, and alleging as reason for the withdrawal that it would be advantageous to the estate of Abrille. The petition was granted by the CFI. Pursuant to the second order, Tan executed, together with the other co- owners of the Juna Subdivision, a power of attorney appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to "sell (or) dispose upon terms and conditions as he deems wise". NatividadJaroda moved to nullify the two orders on the ground that the CFI abused its discretion amountinf lo lack jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI can allow the withdrawal of bank deposits and approve the power of attorney.

HELD: No. In the first place, said withdraw al is foreign to the powers and duties of a special administrator, which, as Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides, are to— "take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court." SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests PLM College of Law

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In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing of, the heirs of the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be viewed as a taking of possession and charge of the credits of the estate, and apparently within the powers and duties of a special administrator, but actually, said withdrawal is a waiver by the special administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, who were allegedly claiming the same as alleged by the administrator in his motion. The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased; they, therefore, belong prima facie to his estate after his death. Likewise, the order approving the power of attorney to sell the subdivision lots is void for want of notice and for approving an improper contract or transaction. An administrator is not permitted to deal with himself as an individual in any transaction concerning trust property. Tan came to be the agent or attorney-in-fact of two different principals: the court and the heirs of the deceased on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other, in managing and disposing of the lots of the subdivision. This dual agency of respondent Tan rendered him incapable of independent defense of the estate's interests against those of the majority co- owners.

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MEDINA VS. CA G.R. No. L-34760 Marco Angelo E. Balleser

Facts: Agustin Medina died intestate. He was the owner of a property known as ―BitukangManok‖. The said property was sold by Demetrio Encarnacion, then special administrator of Medina, to Rosalia Del Carmen, a daughter heir of the decedent. A deed of sale was executed, and was later approved and confirmed by Judge Augusto Amores of CFI Zambales. Uldarico Medina and Beda Gonzales opposed the sale claiming that they have an interest over the estate because certain heirs have already sold their shares and/or interest over the property. The opposition was denied. Gonzales’ appeal concerning the sale was still pending with the CA. The trial court later assigned its clerk of court, Atty. Pastor De Castro, Jr. as special administrator in lieu of Encarnacion. Later, Gonzales filed a motion to be appointed as regular administrator of the estate. The trial court granted the appointment of Gonzales but only as a special administrator. Del Carmen filed an urgent motion to revoke the appointment of Gonzales, and a petition for the appointment of a regular administrator. She proposed that Serafin Medina, heir and son and next of kin of the decedent, be appointed as he had no adverse interest in his favor and against the estate, and is qualified and competent. Both the motion and petition were denied by the trial court. The petitioners aver that Gonzales is now assuming the inconsistent positions of administering the estate, especially the BitukangManok property, and at the same time appealing from the order approving the sale of that property only for the purpose of enabling himself to buy and acquire that property to the loss and prejudice of the estate contrary to law. Gonzales denies such personal interest arguing that no evidence or pleading of record shows that he is interested in the acquisition of the property for himself. He further contended that having acquired the rights of the heirs, he has stepped into their shoes, hence his interest to protect the estate as administrator. Issue: Whether or not Beda Gonzales can be appointed as administrator of the estate. Ruling: The appointment of Gonzales as special administrator should be allowed to stand, insofar as taking care temporarily of the other properties of the estate are concerned, TO THE EXCLUSION of the BitukangManok Property, which the estate has sold to Rosalia Del Carmen, who is entitled to the enjoyment of said property as the vendee thereof.

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A person with an adverse conflicting interest is unsuitable for the trust reposed in an administrator of an estate. An administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is a quasi-trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the estate, and who should be indifferent between the estate and claimants of the property except to preserve it for due administration, and who should be removed when his interest conflicts with such right and duly. One is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind of hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. In the instant case, Gonzales personally opposed the sale of the BitukangManok Property made by his predecessor administrator, Encarnacion. The sale was approved but he appealed the same. A year after the approval, he was appointed special administrator of the estate. This created a clear conflict of interest that could cause grave damage and prejudice to the estate and subject it to unnecessary suits. He has been placed in an unduly favored position where he may use his position as special administrator to favor his personal interests as one interested in teh purchase of the property. Grave prejudice may thus be inflicted by him on petitioner Del Carmen as an heir as well as the other heirs such as petitioner Serafin Medina because of the further delay (13 years now) in their receiving their distributive shares of their father's estate (as against their co-heirs who have sold and assigned their rights and shares in the estate to Gonzales) as well as to Del Carmen as buyer because of Gonzales' interference with her enjoyment of the property paid for in full by her since 1970. It is noteworthy that the Court does not look with favor on such practice of clerks of court or other court employees being appointed as administrators of estates of decedents pending settlement before the probate court. The objectivity and impartiality of such clerks of court or other employees so appointed as administrators in discharging their regular functions may be easily compromised by extraneous considerations. Furthermore, because of the administrator's fees and compensation payable to them, it is not inconceivable that self-interest intrudes and consciously or unconsciously, obstacles are placed against the prompt settlement and termination of the proceedings in derogation of the primordial purpose of the law to strive to have the estate settled expeditiously and promptly so that the benefits that may flow therefrom may be immediately enjoyed by the decedent's heirs and beneficiaries. 14 Probate courts are therefore enjoined to desist from such practice of appointing their clerks of court or other court employees as administrators or receivers of estates or the like.

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In the Matter of the Petition To Approve The Will Of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY JR., petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LABANAN, respondents. G.R. No. L-39247. June 27, 1975 Faustino, Ma. Theresa G. FACTS: Leodegaria Julian died testate survived by her husband Felix Balanay Sr. and six children, disposing of her husband’s one half share, and providing that the properties should not be divided during her husband’s lifetime, but should remain intact and that legitimes should be paid in cash to be satisfied out of the fruits of the properties. Her son Felix Balanay Jr. filed a petition for the probate of her will. Felix Sr. initially opposed the probate for he was preterited, but later on conformed with the testamentary disposition and renounced his share in her estate in favor of their six children. The lower court gave effect to Felix Sr.’s conformity and appointed its clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent’s estate. When a purported lawyer for Felix Balanay Jr. came and filed a motion for leave of court to withdraw probate of the will, the CFI declared the will void and converted the testate proceedings into intestate proceedings and ordered the issuance of notice to creditors. Felix Balanay Jr. asked that the lower court reconsider alleging that the purported lawyer was terminated hence the withdrawal of the probate was unauthorized. Lower court denied the petition. ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void? HELD: No. The Court ruled that in view of certain unusual provisions in the will, which are of dubious legality and because of the motion to withdraw assumed to have been filed with authorization, the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity before formal validity can be established. The probate of the will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical consideration demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

But the probate court erred when it declared the will void and converted the proceedings from testate to intestate despite the fact that it gave effect on the conformity of the widower and his SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests PLM College of Law

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renunciation of his hereditary rights. The rule is that the invalidity of some of the dispositions will not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions unless it is presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. The statement of the testatrix claiming ownership of the southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law since her share as co-owner thereof was inchoate and proindiviso. Same is true with the provision that her properties be left undivided during her husband’s lifetime. However, these void provisions does nullify the entire will. Such may even be disregarded. But the surviving husband’s conformity had the effect of validating the partition in the will without prejudice to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. Hence, the lower court erred when it did not proceed with the probate. Except in extreme cases where the will on its face is intrinsically void it is the probate court’s duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will. The Court also noted two other errors of the lower court. It erred in issuing a notice to creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed, but only a special administrator appointed by the lower court. A notice to creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has been appointed. The Court also pointed out that the probate court’s appointment of its branch clerk of court as special administrator is not a salutary practice because it might engender the suspicion that the probate judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots in milking the decedent’s estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse in the course of his administration, the probate judge might find it hard to hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the administration of a decedent’s estate.

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PCIB V. ESCOLIN Gr Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974 Cellini Ruth G. Magabilin

FACTS: Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas, USA. During their marriage, they had acquired assests in the Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texas in the US. The both lived, worked and were domiciled in Iloilo City for around 50 years. Charles and Linnie Jane executed their respective wills conditioned that upon the death of the other, the one survived the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is given, devised and bequeathed to the brothers and sisters of Linnie. Linnie died first. Charles, special administrator, was allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged which was buying and selling personal and real properties and to perform acts which he had been doing. Charles was the appointed executor and upon motion in which he asserted that he was not only part owner of the properties but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie. Charles continued to annually submit to the court the statements of account of account of his administration. Charles died and respondent Magno was appointed as Administratix of both estates. PCIB was appointed as administrator of the estate of Charles. At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with each administrator acting together with the other, PCIB used to secure at the beginning the conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter and submitted the same to the court for approval as their joint acts so did Magno do likewise. But differences have arisen. PCIB conducted the business and acted as if all the properties appearing in the name of Charles belonged solely and only to his estate to the exclusion of brothers and sisters of Linnie. Magno also made expenditures on the premise that there is such an estate that actually correspond to the estate of Linnie. PCIB claims that Linnie’s estate has been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the orders of the lower court of May 27 and December 14, 1957 as well as its approval of the annual statement s of account of Charles and that, therefore, Mago had already ceased since then to have any estate to administer. Hence, it filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests PLM College of Law

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that the lower court’s orders allowing respondent mago to continue acting as administratix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceesings 1307 be set aside. On the other hand, Magno denies that the trial court’s orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant to be finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends that they were no more than the court’s general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in the due course of administration. ISSUE: WON Magno is the legal administratix of the estate of Linnie and be distributed among the latter’s siblings. HELD: Yes. SC overruled the contention of PCIB because it appears from the pertinent provisions of the will of Linnie that any portion of said share still existing and undisposed by her husband at the time of his death should go to brothers and sisters shareand share alike. The tenor of said orders furnish no basis for PCIB’s conclusion, and wat is more, at the time said orders were issued the proceedings had not yet reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made.Moreover, the interested parties were not duly notified that such disposition of the estate ould be done. At best, therefore, said orders merely allowed Hodges to dispose of portions of his inheritance I advance of final adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under Sec 2 of Rule 1009, there being no possible prejudice to third parties, inasmuch as Linnie had no creditors and all pertinent taxes have been paid.

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TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VENTURA vs. VENTURA G.R. No. L-26306, April 27, 1988

Marydale C. Manato

FACTS: Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include the appellees. In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate. In due course, said will was admitted to probate on January 14,1954. Gregorio Ventura died. Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters testamentary was issued in her favor.

On June 17,1960, she filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive. Said account of administration was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and by ExequielVictorio and Gregoria Ventura. Both oppositions assailed the veracity of the report as not reflecting the true income of the estate and the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses.

The grounds of aforesaid joint motions to remove the executrix Maria Ventura are: (1) that she is grossly incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious relations with the appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failed to comply with the Order of the Court of December 12, 1963, requiring her to file her accounts of administration for the years 1961 to 1963 ; and (5) that she is with permanent physical defect hindering her from efficiently performing her duties as an executrix.

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On October 5, 1965, the court a quo, finds that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the funds of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the matter of presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the estate. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.

HELD:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78,

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the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.

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TAYAG vs. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC. G.R. No. L-23145, November, 29, 1988

Marydale C. Manato FACTS: In March 1960, Idonah Perkins died in New York. She left behind properties here and abroad. One property she left behind were two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of stocks of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc (BCI). Said stock certificates were in the possession of the Country Trust Company of New York (CTC-NY). CTC-NY was the domiciliary administrator of the estate of Perkins (obviously in the USA). Meanwhile, in 1963, Renato Tayag was appointed as the ancillary administrator (of the properties of Perkins she left behind in the Philippines). A dispute arose between CTC-NY and Tayag as to who between them is entitled to possess the stock certificates. A case ensued and eventually, the trial court ordered CTC-NY to turn over the stock certificates to Tayag. CTC-NY refused. Tayag then filed with the court a petition to have said stock certificates be declared lost and to compel BCI to issue new stock certificates in replacement thereof. The trial court granted Tayag’s petition. BCI assailed said order as it averred that it cannot possibly issue new stock certificates because the two stock certificates declared lost are not actually lost; that the trial court as well Tayag acknowledged that the stock certificates exists and that they are with CTC-NY; that according to BCI’s by laws, it can only issue new stock certificates, in lieu of lost, stolen, or destroyed certificates of stocks, only after court of law has issued a final and executory order as to who really owns a certificate of stock. ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments of Benguet Consolidated, Inc. are correct. HELD: No. Benguet Consolidated is a corporation who owes its existence to Philippine laws. It has been given rights and privileges under the law. Corollary, it also has obligations under the law and one of those is to follow valid legal court orders. It is not immune from judicial control because it is domiciled here in the Philippines. BCI is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders. Further, to allow BCI’s opposition is to render the court order against CTC-NY a SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests PLM College of Law

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mere scrap of paper. It will leave Tayag without any remedy simply because CTC-NY, a foreign entity refuses to comply with a valid court order. The final recourse then is for our local courts to create a legal fiction such that the stock certificates in issue be declared lost even though in reality they exist in the hands of CTC-NY. This is valid. As held time and again, fictions which the law may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have played an important part in its development. Further still, the argument invoked by BCI that it can only issue new stock certificates in accordance with its bylaws is misplaced. It is worth noting that CTC-NY did not appeal the order of the court – it simply refused to turn over the stock certificates hence ownership can be said to have been settled in favor of estate of Perkins here. Also, assuming that there really is a conflict between BCI’s bylaws and the court order, what should prevail is the lawful court order. It would be highly irregular if court orders would yield to the bylaws of a corporation. Again, a corporation is not immune from judicial orders.

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CIRILO LIM vs BASILISA DIAZ-MILLAREZ G.R. No. L-17633 October 19, 1966 Aicel Joy J. Mayor FACTS: >Cirilo Lim, claiming to be a nephew of the late Jose Millarez who died intestate filed with the CFI a petition for his appointment as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased. It alleged that the deceased left no relatives such as descendants, ascendants or surviving spouse, except collaterals. >Basilisa Diaz-Millarez on the other hand, claiming to be a widow of the deceased, filed an opposition on two grounds: that the petitioner has an adverse interest in the estate; and that the properties of the estate are the subject matter of a litigation between her as plaintiff and Lim as defendant. > Both parties manifested the existence of a litigation between them over the properties of the estate. Hence, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the expediente. Lim, brought the case to the CA but that court has certified the appeal to the SC for the reason that there is no question of fact involved. > Meanwhile, the civil case between the parties which was also elevated to the CA wherein Basilisa sought to recover from Cirilo one-half of the total amount of P22,000 allegedly delivered to him by her and the deceased on various occasions and to declare her as the owner of ½ of the profits and gains derived therefrom, on the ground that Millarez and she used to live as husband and wife for about 23 years and as such she is entitled to ½ of the property held in common by them. > In answer, Lim alleged that the money he received from Millarez on various occasions was handed to one Tan Suaco for investment in the tobacco business. While the trial court, after hearing, ordered Lim to make an accounting of the P22,000 invested in the tobacco business to be submitted to court, the CA, on the other hand, remanded the case to the court a quo to render a judgment anew based on the admission of additional evidence as the court may consider material and relevant and based on the examination of the documentary evidence by a qualified certified public accountant. ISSUE: Whether or not Cirilo Lim can be appointed as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased Jose Millarez. HELD: No. The claim which Basilisa has against Cirilo in the civil case supposed to be now again pending in the trial court, is based on her declared right to one-half of the estate of the deceased. It cannot, therefore, be denied that Cirilo, as a relative of the deceased, has some interest adverse to that of Basilisa. Shown to have some liabilities to Basilisa and to the estate as a whole, Cirilo cannot compatibly perform the duties of an administrator. In this jurisdiction, one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse interest of SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests PLM College of Law

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some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL, ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTO DINDO GABRIEL, respondents. [G.R. No. 101512. August 7, 1992.] Meneses, Jasper A.

FACTS: Roberto Gabriel filed with the RTC Manila a petition for letters of administration alleging that he is the son of the decedent, Domingo Gabriel. Respondent identified the 8 petitioners as other heirs of the decedent. The petition was set and the order was published in a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. No opposition have been filed, thus respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Probate court issued an order appointing respondent as administrator of the intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel on a bond of P30,000.00. Petitioners filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters of administration and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors. Petitioners filed an "Opposition to the petition and Motion," alleging that (1) they were not duly informed by personal notice of the petition for administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, should be preferred over private respondent; (3) private respondent has a conflicting and/or adverse interest against the estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother; and (4) most of the properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by way of transfer of ownership to petitioners and should not be included in the value of the estate sought to be administered by private respondent. The probate court issued an order denying the opposition of petitioners. Likewise, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing that petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of preference in the appointment of administrator in the settlement of estate according to the Rules be set aside and that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abuse.

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HELD: NO. Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor. In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for thirty (30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration. In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause despite the mandatory tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors." On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be appointed since that is both legally permissible and sanctioned in practice. Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests PLM College of Law

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interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office. Under the circumstances obtaining herein, the Court deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel.

WILSON S. UY, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased JOSE K. C. UY, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANASTACIO C. RUFON, As Presiding Judge of Branch 52, of the Regional Trial Court, Sixth Judicial Region, sitting at Bacolod City, and JOHNNY K. H. UY, respondents. [G.R. No. 167979. March 16, 2006.] Meneses, Jasper A.

FACTS: Jose K.C. Uy (Deceased) died intestate and is survived by his spouse, SyIokIngUy, and his five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy, Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia, Lilen S. Uy and Wilson S. Uy (Petitioner). A special proceeding was instituted and Lilia was appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased. Petitioner moved to reconsider the order appointing Lilia with prayer that letters of administration be issued to him instead which was subsequently granted. Letters of administration were granted to petitioner. Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) filed a motion to intervene, praying that he be appointed as administrator of the estate in lieu of petitioner. He alleged that he is the brother and a creditor of the deceased, and has knowledge of the properties that should be included in the estate. The trial court initially denied private respondent's motion to intervene, but it reconsidered it and appointed private respondent as co-administrator of the estate. The trial court found that private respondent substantially complied with the order directing him to bring into the estate properties owned by or registered in the name of the deceased not subject of any adverse claim or controversy when he listed the alleged properties suspected to be concealed, embezzled or conveyed away by the persons named therein. Petitioner appealed to the CA by petition for certiorari which was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing private respondent as co-administrator to the estate of the deceased; and

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HELD: NO.In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the trial court. Instead of removing petitioner, it appointed private respondent, a creditor, as co-administrator since the estate was sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it alone. In fact, petitioner did not submit any report regarding the estate under his administration. A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. The practice of appointing coadministrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited. In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, this Court reaffirmed that jurisprudence allows the appointment of co-administrators under certain circumstances, to wit: Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office. Thus, petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot re-open the issue of the appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator is erroneous. In probate proceedings, considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in modifying or revoking its own orders as long as the proceedings are pending in the same court and timely applications or motions for such modifications or revocations are made by the interested parties. In the instant case, the estate of the deceased has not yet been settled and the case is still within the jurisdiction of the court. The foregoing discussion renders moot the second issue raised by petitioner.

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VILLAMOR V COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-41508 June 27, 1988 Perez, Princess Caressa V. Facts: Spouses Victor Cortes and Maria Castañeda had eight (8) children, namely: Rufino, Barbara, Florencio, Casimira, Brigida, Braulia, Margarita and Eugenia. Of the eight children, six died single and without issue. Barbara Cortes begot a son by the name of Eustaquio Cortes. Rufino Cortes, who died on June 12, 1909 left two alleged legitimate children, Ireneo Cortes Villamor and Paula Cortes Villamor. The last to die of the Cortes children was Eugenia Cortes. She died on January 8, 1931. Eustaquio Cortes, son of Barbara, married one SixtaCeniza. Born to them were five children, namely: Dionisio, Bartolome, Nicanor, Agapita and Amancia, all surnamed Cortes. All five remained unmarried and died without will nor forced heirs. Dionisio, Amancia and Agapita predeceased their father Eustaquio. Eustaquio died on October 20, 1932, survived by his spouse and two sons, Bartolome and Nicanor. Bartolome who was a Catholic priest, died on November 14, 1937. Nicanor Cortes, also known as Father Gabriel Maria Cortes, died as a monk of the Carthusian Order in Barcelona, Spain on August 28, 1969. He was the last of the direct descendants of the Barbara Cortes line. On the other hand, Paula Villamor, alleged daughter of Rufino Cortes, died single on January 29, 1967 and without issue. In a Special Proceedings for the settlement of Bartolome’estate, Fr. DiosdadoCamomot, a close friend of Bartolome, was named administrator. On September 27, 1938, Paula Cortes Villamor and Ireneo Cortes Villamor, claiming to be the legitimate children of Rufino Cortes, filed a petition for the administration of the estate of Rufino Cortes, under Special Proceedings No. 343-C. On April 14, 1948, Judge S. C. Moscoso approved the project of partition, and on September 30, 1948, the administrators delivered the seven parcels of land to Ireneo and Paula Villamor.

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On October 21, 1954, Fr. Cortes executed a power of attorney before the Vice-Consul of the Republic of the Philippines in Madrid, Spain, constituting and appointing Fr. DiosdadoCamomot as his attorney-in-fact. On May 16, 1962, Fr. Nicanor Cortes executed a Deed of Conveyance in favor of several persons wherein he conveyed ten parcels of land which included those received by his mother under the Project of Partition. In the complaint, respondent alleged inter alia that upon learning of the death of Fr. Nicanor Cortes, some of his nearest of kin who are his surviving first cousins, the Cenizas [all from the side of SixtaCeniza] initiated Special Proceedings No. 3062-R for the settlement of the estate of the deceased monk; that prior to and in the course of initiating said proceedings, the surviving first cousins came upon documents showing that Fr. Cortes during his absence from the Philippines to pursue a monastic life was deprived of his inheritance by fraud, stealth and stratagem perpetrated by Paula and IreneoVillamor Petitioners, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment and by the statute of limitations. Issue #2 : Whether or not the partition can be annulled on the ground of fraud Ruling: No In his testimony, Fr. DiosdadoCamomot declared categorically that he informed Fr. Nicanor Cortes about Special Proceedings No. 343 and that he sent him a copy of the project of partition. Highly significant is the fact that among the witnesses who testified before the trial court, it was only Fr. Camomot who had personal knowledge of the events leading to the execution of the project of partition. Notwithstanding, the trial court, instead of according great weight to his testimony, summarily brushed it aside and even reached the unwarranted conclusion that he was in collusion with Ireneo and Paula Villamor. The testimony of Fr. DiosdadoCamomot, however, is too detailed and straightforward to be a mere product of concoction or fabrication or a device to cover-up the collusion imputed to him by the trial court. Furthermore, said testimony is corroborated by other evidence on record that sustains its veracity. That he communicated with Fr. Nicanor Cortes was corroborated by RoureCeniza-Sanchez, a witness for therein plaintiffadministratrix Daniela CenizaUrot. She testified that being the administrator, it was Fr. Camomot who informed Fr. Nicanor Cortes about the properties of his parents. In the Deed of Conveyance dated May 9, 1962 executed by Fr. Nicanor Cortes, wherein he ceded and transferred ten [10] parcels of land in favor of several persons. The portions of Fr. Cortes' letters and Deed of Conveyance show beyond any iota of doubt that he was kept posted on the developments in the Philippines. He know that his mother received some lands as "share" and that Candelario had acquired lands. By reason of this circumstance, Fr. Nicanor Cortes is charged with knowledge of Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 as well as the Project of Petition.

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The period of prescription commenced to run from August 18, 1955. However, from said date up to his death on August 28, 1969, Fr. Nicanor Cortes remained silent and failed to assert his right. He even conveyed at least three lands which were among those apportioned to SixtaCeniza in the Project of Partition to several persons. Her predecessor-in-interest, Fr. Nicanor Cortes, not having filed any action for reconveyance within the prescriptive period provided by law, neither could private respondent do so now, for her right cannot rise higher than its source. Finally, it is well-settled that the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants not only a presumption that the party entitled to assert it, either had abandoned it or declined to assert it, but also casts doubt on the validity of the claim of ownership. Such neglect to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity. ISSUE #2: WHETHER OR NOT A STRANGER MAY BE APPOINTED AS ADMINISTRATOR

Ruling: Yes. The Court do not consider as "intriguing" the observation of the lower court and concurred in by the Court of Appeals that in both Special Proceedings in question, the administrators appointed were complete strangers to the decedents. There is nothing repulsive in this nor is this an indicium of fraud and collusion as found by the courts. Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the persons who can act as executors and administrators. It provides that in case the persons who have the preferential right to be appointed are not competent or are unwilling to serve, administration may be granted to such other person as the court may appoint.

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SILVERIO SR. V COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 109979. March 11, 1999] By: Perez, Princess Caressa V. Facts: In 1987, Beatriz Silverio died intestate, survived by her husband, Ricardo Silverio; sons, Edmundo, Edgardo and Ricardo, Jr., and daughters, Nelia and Ligaya. In 1990, Edgardo filed a Petition for Letters of Administration and Urgent Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator which the trial court granted in his favor. Ricardo, Sr. opposed the Petition for Letters of Administration, but he was declared to have waived his right to present evidence when he failed to appear and adduce evidence during the dates scheduled for its reception, hence, Edgardo was appointed as regular Administrator. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Ricardo, Sr. filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same for lack of merit. Before the Supreme Court, Ricardo, Sr. contended that he was denied due process of law when the respondent judge considered his failure to be present on the dates scheduled for reception of evidence on his behalf as a waiver of his right to adduce the same.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the order of preference in Rule 78, § 6 was violated. 2. Whether or not respondent court is not vested with the power to order the special administrator to sell real properties of the estate pending determination of the validity of the regular administrators

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held, citing the rulings in a long line of cases, that the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. In the case at bar and as appearing from the records, SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests PLM College of Law

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petitioners were amply afforded the opportunity to present his evidence which he, however, waived. The Court also found no ground to disregard the finding of the trial court and the appellate court on the competence of the decedents son, Edgardo S. Silverio, to act as administrator. His appointment as special, and later, as the regular administrator, was sanctioned by law. The observance of the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of a deceased person. However, when the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The determination of suitability rests on the sound judgment of the appointing court. Meanwhile, unsuitableness may consist of adverse interest of some kind, or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the appointment shall not be revoked on appeal

2. No. The respondent court is not vested with the power to order the special administrator to sell real properties of the estate pending determination of the validity of the regular administrators appointment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides: Powers and duties of special administrator. Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintains suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debt of the deceased unless so ordered by the court. With the exception of the case provided for in section 717 regarding the sale of the entire personalty or part thereof for the purpose of preserving the other property of the deceased, and of that provided for in section 720 with reference to the sale of realty acquired by the executor or administrator by virtue of the execution of a judgment or the foreclosure of a mortgage the legal provisions above referred to, only recognize as a ground for the court to authorize the sale of the estate of a deceased person subject to administration, the application of its proceeds to the payment of the debts or expenses of administration or the settlement of any legacy

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Vda. Dela Rosa V Heirs OfRustia GR. NO. 155733, [January, 27, 2006] Perez, Princess Charisma V. FACTS: The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado and Lucio Campo, both of whom were never married. Five other children were born to the couple who are full-blood siblings of Josefa and natural children of Felisa. Felisa also had another son with another man (Ramon Osorio) named Luis Delgado. Josefa Delgado died on September 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives. Sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. Petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as an unmarried woman. They never had any children but took into their home Guillermina and Nanie. They were never legally adopted but was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. Guillermina was alleged to be the illegitimate child of Guillermo with another woman. Luisa Delgado, the daughter of Luis Delgado filed the original letters of administration of the intestate estates of Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia. It was opposed by (1) sisters of Guillermo Rustia (2) heirs of Guillermo Rustia (3) the ampunampunan, GuillerminaRustia on the ground the Luisa Delgado and other claimants are barred from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado. GuillermaRustia filed a motion to intervene claiming that she was the only surviivng descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Motion was granted. Carlota Delgado substituted Luisa Delgado who died. RTC appointed Carlota Delgado as administratix of both estates. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the letters of administration is proper SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests PLM College of Law

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HELD: NO. An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator: Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of coadministrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here. It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. dede la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.

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IN RE: REYES V ARANZASO GR. NO. L-27657, [August 30, 1992] Perez, Princess Charisma V. FACTS: Juliana Reyes died intestate. The estate had only special administrators until GregoriaAranzanso who claims to be a first cousin of the decedent asked that she be appointed regular administrator. Her motion provoked counter motions, oppositions, replies, rebuttal and rejoinder which take up 120 pages of the printed record on appeal and which demonstrate the zeal of the various counsel in espousing their clients claims to the estate which as aforesaid is substantial. Motion for reconsideration was filed by oppositors. It was granted and declared that the oppositorsGregoriaAranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo Pasion and Pacita Pasion have no right to intervene in this intestate estate proceeding; The appointment of GregoriaAranzanso as regular administratrix pursuant to the order of this Court dated January 29, 1966 is revoked and she is ordered to render a final account of her administration within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court was justified in revoking the appointment of GregoriaAranzaso as the administrator of the intestate of estate of Julian Reyes HELD: NO. An administrator need not be an heir. He may be a stranger to the deceased. It stands to reason that the appellant having been appointed regular administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes may be removed from her office but only for a cause or causes provided by law. What is the law on removal? It is found in Rule 82, Section 2, of the Rules of Court which reads as follows: Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal.— If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests PLM College of Law

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or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person. It is obvious that the decision of this Court, cited in the appealed order, thatGregoriaAranzanso, among other persons, is without right to intervene as heir in the settlement of the estate in question is not one of the grounds provided by the Rules of Court. Let it be recalled that in G.R. No. L-23828, Paulina Santos, et al. vs. GregoriaAranzanso, et al., 123 Phil. 160 (1966), a collateral attack on the adoption of the two girls was not allowed The decision denied to GregoriaAranzanso the right to intervene in the settlement proceedings as an heir of Juliana Reyes. But an administrator does not have to be an heir. He can be a stranger to the deceased. In fact, in one of her motions Paulina Santos de Parreno proposed the appointment of the Philippine National Bank as special administrator. (Record on Appeal, pp. 144-146.) We hold that the intervention of GregoriaAranzanso in the settlement proceedings is not in the capacity of heir although she might be one if her direct attack on the adoption of the two girls should succeed. We have authorized such direct attack in G.R. No. L-26940. WHEREFORE, the order of June 20, 1966, removing GregoriaAranzanso as administrator is hereby set aside and she is reinstated as administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. Cost against the appellee.

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IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF BASIL GORDON BUTLER v MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO G.R. No. L-3677; 29 November 1951 QUIRANTE, Reynaldo Jr. B. Facts: Basil Gordon Butler (Butler), a former resident of the Philippines, died in Brooklyn, New York and the estate was duly probated in the Surrogate’s Court in the New York County, appointing James Ross, Sr, James Madison Ross, Jr. and EwaldSeph as executors. On 17 July 1947, the estate had been fully settled. The dispute arose when a clause in the will of the testator stated that all the remaining properties of Butler will be given to one Mercedes de Leon but, however, since she was of unsound mind, the former instructed the executor to handle the money in his discretion. Subsequently, the executor bought an annuity from the Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co. at its office in Toronto, Canada which, in turn, gave Mercedes monthly allowance through the Insurance Company’s Manila office. On 4 September 1948, de Leon presented the will of Butler for probate in the CFI Manila. Ada LoggeyGhezzi accepted the appointment as administrator while the Ross and Seph declined because the probate was already settled. In turn, the CFI Manila denied the petition for probate. Issue: WON the will of Butler can be probated in the Philippines. Held: No. Under the law, the general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or country. However, in this case, it is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money. The party whose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the company which holds the funds in its possession, the agency's intervention being limited to delivering to the annuitant the checks made out and issued from the home office. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch.

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Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it no longer forms part of butler's estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed completely into the hands of the company in virtue of a contract duly authorized and validly executed. Whether considered as a trust or as simple consideration for the company's assumed obligation, which it has been religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to the annuitant, the proceeds of the sale cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the company, except, upon the death of the annuitant; the residuary legatee may claim the remainder, if there be any. Neither the domiciliary or ancillary executor of Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor the annuitant has disposition of any of these funds beyond the amounts and except upon the conditions agreed upon in the contract for annuity. Therefore, the motion and appeal are utterly groundless and ill-advised. The appealed order therefore is affirmed with costs against the appellants.

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TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO v MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA G.R. No. L-21917 29 November 1966 QUIRANTE, Reynaldo Jr. B. Facts: In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz — hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Gurrea — and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her and came, with their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two (2) children. Having been informed by her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was residing in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the Philippines, in June, 1960; but, Carlos Gurrea refused to admit her to his residence in said municipality. Hence, she stayed with their son, Teodoro, in Bacolod City. Carlos Gurrea died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. Soon thereafter, or on April 24, 1962, Pijuan instituted probate of said will. Thereafter Pijuan was appointed special administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son, Teodoro, and one PilarGurrea, as an alleged illegitimate daughter of the deceased. The lower court denied the motion of Mrs. Gurrea for her appointment as administratrix. Hence, an appeal was made. Issue: WON Mrs. Gurrea, as an administrator, has a preferential right over Pijuan, as the named executor. Held: No, under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court said preference exists "if no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate." However, in this case, the deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests PLM College of Law

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special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court,5 and is not appealable. The appealed order therefore is affirmed with costs against the appellants. ALFREDO G. BALUYUT, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO, respondents. G.R. No. L-42088. May 7, 1976. Moses C. Rivera Facts: SoteroBaluyut died in Manila leaving an estate estimated to be no less than Two Million Pesos (2,000,000.00). Alfredo Baluyut filed a petition for letters of administration alleging that the Spouse who survived the deaceased (Encarnacion Lopez) was mentally incapacitated. The Court granted the petition of Alfredo and he was appointed Special Administrator. Thereafter, Mrs. Baluyut, filed an opposition to the appointment of Alfredo and raised the contention that she was unaware of the existence of a will and that the allegations of Alfredo are libelous. The Lower Court cancelled Alfredo’s appointment and held that Mrs. Baluyut was ―healthy and mentally qualified‖ based on her testimony on the witness stand. Alfredo filed for certiorari stating that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in cancelling his appointment and granting it to Mrs. Baluyut without proper proceedings. Issue: The issue is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix. Held: We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyutas surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of administration (Sec. 6[a], Rule 78, Rules of Court), it does not follow that she should be named as administratrix without conducting a fulldress hearing on her competency to discharge that trust. Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act as executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the will was executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position. Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests PLM College of Law

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WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975 appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix is set aside. The letters of administration granted to her are cancelled. The probate court is directed to conduct further proceedings in consonance with the guidelines delineated in this decision. Costs against respondent Mrs. Baluyut.

Matute v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-26751, L-26085, L-26106, [January 31, 1969] Ge Ann Francia S. Rosales Facts: On August 20, 1965, Carlos Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of both the petitioner and respondent, Matias Matute, filed in special proceeding (Settlement of the Matute estate), a petition praying for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his appointment in such capacity. Carlos alleged that Matias has neglected to render a true, just and complete account of his administration and that he is not only incompetent but also negligent in his management of the estate under his charge consisting of five haciendas. Matias interposed an opposition to the petition contesting that the allegations are without basis and false. It appears that during the reception of evidence conducted on December 29, 1965 by the probate court, Carlos S. Matute and the other heirs submitted their respective lists of exhibits in supportof their motion to oust Matias. On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a written objection to the admission of the movants’ exhibits on the ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or merephotostatic copies of supposed originals which never properly identified nor shown in court. Four days later, the Counsel for Matias filed with leave of Court a ―Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence‖ which avers that there is no sufficient evidence on record to justify and support the motions for the removal of the herein co-administrator Matias S. Matute. The probate court issued an order removing Matias S. Matute as co-administrator. Hence, thecertiorari. The respondent contends that the disputed order removing him as coadministrator is apatent nullity. Upon the other hand, the petitioner advances the reason in support of the order of removal that the probate judge accorded the respondent all the opportunity to adduce his evidence but the latter resorted to dilatory tactics such as filing a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence.

Issue: W/N there is proper removal of Matias as co-administrator of the estate.

Ruling: No, the removal of the administrator is the case at bar is a nullity.

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Ratio: In the settlement of an estate of a deceased person, the rule remains that the jurisdictional amount is determined by the total value of the estate, not by the value of the particular property or portion of the estate subject to administration, since the question of administration is merely incidents to the principal proceeding for the settlement and distribution of the whole estate. It is therefore indubitable that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of CA-G.R. 37039-R which involves an estate worth more than P200,000 although the subject matter of the case is merely the right to collect the monthly rentals due the estate in the sum of P5,000. In the case at bar, it is indubitable that the probate judge issued the controverted order removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the opportunity to adduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence. We are of the view that the above actuation of the probate judge constituted grave abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident order as a nullity. Even without the respondent's reservation, it was the bounden duty of the probate judge to schedule the presentation and reception of the respondent's evidence before disposing of the case on the merits because only the movants at that time had presented their evidence. This duty is projected into bolder relief if we consider, which we must, that the aforesaid motion is in form as well as in substance a demurrer to evidence allowed by Rule 35, Rules of Court, by virtue of which the defendant does not lose his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is denied. The application of Rule 35 in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by Section 2 of Rule 72, Rules of Court, which directs that in the "absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings."

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BAYANI VASQUEZ v. JUDGE SEVERO MALVAR A.M. No. 884-CFI. August 31, 1978 Samio, Christine Derrika P.

FACTS: This is a complaint filed against respondent Judge Malvar for serious misconduct in handling a special proceedings action. First, he gave verbal orders to the personnel of a rural bank to allow withdrawals from the decedent’s savings account, without notice to the adverse parties in the special proceedings and without any motion for withdrawal filed by any of the litigants. Also, despite motions of the parties for appointment of a regular administrator, he allowed his clerk of court to continue as a special administrator despite the ruling of the Supreme Court in a case disallowing this kind of action. Most of all, knowing that the parties-litigants in the special proceedings are not related to the deceased within the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line, he approved the amicable settlement without notifying the Provincial Fiscal or the Solicitor General to intervene in the case for the State, much less determine who the intestate heirs were. For these acts, the respondent judge was sought to be sanctioned. ISSUE: Whether or not the judged erred in not notifying the State where parties-litigant are not related to the deceased HELD: Yes. Where the parties-litigants in a special proceedings involving the estate of the deceased are not related to the decedent and the so-called heirs are not within the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line from the decedent, the trial judge should notify the Provincial Fiscal or the Solicitor General to intervene in the case for the State, for the State could be the only interstate heir with respect to one-half of the estate left by the deceased. The trial judge should first determine who are the interstate heirs of the decedent before approving the amicable settlement. This is his clear duty in order to protect the interest of the State regarding the payment of inheritance and estate taxes as well as a possible heir in intestacy. This will avoid multiplicity of suits, expenses and delay.

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PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP VS DUMLAO 206 SCRA 40 Ma. Loren W. Sanapo

FACTS: This case involves a petition for letters of administration which was challenged because according to the oppositor, the petition did not allege that the petitioner is an interested person and for that reason the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It contended that when you file a petition for intestacy, or the issuance of letters, you must state that you are an interested person because the opening sentence of section 2 of rule 79 of the rules of special proceedings dictates that ―a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person‖. According to the oppositor, failure to state that one is an interested person is tantamount to failure to state a jurisdictional fact. ISSUE: Whether or not an allegation that the petitioner is an interested person a jurisdictional fact which must be stated in the petition HELD: No, it is not a jurisdictional fact. A jurisdictional fact means that you must allege, among others: 1. The death of the testator; 2. The place of residence of the deceased at the time of his death; 3. The place, are, or territory where the probate court is sitting; 4. If he is inhabitant of the foreign country; and 5. His having left his estate in such country. The allegation that the petitioner seeking letters of administration is an interested person is not within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts. But also, we cannot deny that an allegation that a person is an interested person is also required and motion to dismiss will lie but not on ground of lack of jurisdiction but on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the proceeding.

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DALTON v. GIBERSON G.R. No. L-4113. June 30, 1952. Valiente, Micah Abijah B. FACTS: William R. Giberson was a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States, and a resident of Cebu. William died on August 6, 1943 in the concentration camp at the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila, Philippines. On February 10, 1949, Lela G. Dalton presented an application in the lower court calling for the legalization of a document which, it claims, is the holographic will of William, granted on April 29, 1920 in San Francisco, California. Spring Giberson, legitimate son of William, filed a motion requesting the dismissal of the request, claiming that, before a will made in a foreign country may be legalized in the Philippines, it must be demonstrated that the will had been previously legalized in California and that the request of Lela does not allege that the will had already been legalized in California. ISSUE: Whether or not a testament granted abroad is required to be previously legalized abroad before it can be legalized in the Philippines. HELD: NO. A person may dispose of its assets after his death by will. The granting of a will is a legal act which can be performed in the Philippines or abroad; if it is granted in a foreign country, it has to be in accordance with the laws of that country. This is a universally adopted rule. Article 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure, respecting the freedom of the testator to grant his will anywhere, provides that the will legalized in a foreign country in accordance with the laws of that country may also be legalized in the Philippines. This provision is substantive and creates the rights of the beneficiaries of the will since they are assured to have the same be legalized in the Philippines. Wills made outside of the Islands, if they can be legalized in the country in which they were granted, gives them cause of action for judicial order in compliance with the last will of the testator irrespective of the place of execution. Article 1 of Rule 78 does not prevent a person to legalize in the Philippines a testament granted in a foreign country, if it can be legalized according to the laws of that country. The will is not required to be previously legalized in that country. Therefore, Spring’s contention is untenable.

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PRUDENCIA CHUA TAN, ET AL., V LUCIA DEL ROSARIO, ADMINISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHUA TOCO G.R. No. L-35903 Maria Carina S.J. Villarica

Facts: Prudencia Chua Tan(Plaintiff) appealed the Judgment of CFI that dismissed their complaint and absolved Lucia Del Rosario. Prudencia alleged that CFI erred in the following: (a) in sustaining the defense of defendant of resjudicata on the ground that the case has already been decided by SC (in 1927, instituted by Benedicta Santa Juana (administratix of Chua Piaco) against Lucia del Rosario(administratix of Chua Toco)); (b) that the 20,000 php belonged to Chua Toco (he received it from his adoptive father Chua Piaco), that is belonged to Chua Piaco and Chua Toco; and (c) the ownership of 38, 559.30 php that was used to purchased the land in Antonio Rivera Street that was expropriated by Manila Railroad Company. Issue: Whether or not res judicata is present in this case Held: YES. Res judicata, estoppel by judgment: (a) That judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is a bar to any future suit between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action, so long as it remains unreversed; (b) A point which was actually and directly in issue in a former suit, and there juridicially passed upon and determined by a domestic court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be again drawn in question in any future action between the same parties or their privies, even when the causes of action in the two suits are wholly different. The SC held the following (1) there is no identity between the plaintiff in the former case and the plaintiffs in the present case, there is the relation of representation between them; (2) there is identity of cause of action; (3) there is identity of subject matter; and (4) there is identity of issue, upon which depends the granting or denial of the relief sought in each of said cases, and this issue has been impliedly decided in the former case. Therefore, all the elements ofres judicata in accordance with the aforecited legal provisions are present. In view of foregoing considerations we are of the opinion and so hold that a final judgment upon the merits rendered against the judicial administratrix of an intestate estate, as such, in a case where she is plaintiff and the administratrix of another intestate estate, as such is the defendant, SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests PLM College of Law

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in which she seeks to secure an accounting of funds alleged to have been delivered in trust by the deceased, represented by the plaintiff administratrix, to the other deceased, represented by the defendant administratrix, constitutes res judicata in another case where the heirs of the alleged donor are plaintiffs and the administratrix of the supposed trustee is defendant, and in which the partition of the same funds and the products thereof is sought between the heirs of both, under the same allegation of trust, the alleged trustee being the adopted child of the donor.

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