SPEC CIV DIGESTS

SABILI vs COMELEC RULE 64 FACTS:

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a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, was filed in the SC, seeking to annul the Resolutions dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due course to and canceled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections

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When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months

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It’s undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.

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Private respondent filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification” against him before the COMELEC private respondent alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code

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both petitioner and respondent presented evidence as to prove their argument the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 2010 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that “all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation” in view of “the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material time.”

ISSUE: 1. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure? 2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials?

RULING:

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Petitioner claims that he did not receive notice of the said suspension of Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Thus, his right to due process was still violated. o the COMELEC claims that it has the power to suspend its own rules of procedure and invokes Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which gives it the power “to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices.” (SC AGREE) o The COMELEC’s Order did not affect the right of the parties to due process. They were still furnished a copy of the COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for perfecting an appeal. In fact, petitioner was able to timely lodge a Petition with this Court.

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petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELEC’s use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue of whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his residency qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation Petitioner bewails that the COMELEC required “more” evidence to show the change in his residence, notwithstanding the various pieces of evidence he presented and the fact that under the law, the quantum of evidence required in these cases is merely substantial evidence and not clear and convincing evidence o As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction o “grave abuse of discretion - capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;” the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility” (Mitra vs COMELEC) o under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. o Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction

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petitioner claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin and established his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, thereby making him qualified to run for Lipa City mayor o To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode.

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PETITION GRANTED

** Sec. 6. Promulgation. – The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of communication.” Let all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation.

[G. R. No. 156982. September 8, 2004] NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, FACTS: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.[1][6] ISSUE: Whether honoraria may be validly granted to the representatives of ex-officio members HELD: No. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members’ official representatives. The Constitution mandates the Commission on Audit to ensure that the funds and properties of the government are validly, efficiently and conscientiously used. Thus, Article IX-D of the Constitution ordains the COA to exercise exclusive and broad auditing powers over all government entities or trustees, without any exceptionSection 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law of the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. (2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, inexpensive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.Section 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. (Emphasis supplied). The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals

are prohibited from receiving. Neither can they claim good faith, given the express prohibition of the Constitution and the finality of our decision in Civil Liberties Union prior to their receipt of such allowances. WHEREFORE the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

PKSMMN versus Executive Secretary, GR 147036-37 FACTS:  

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These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain presidential decrees and executive orders of the martial law era relating to the raising and use of coco-levy funds In 1971, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 62601 that established a Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry through capital financing. . For this purpose, the law imposed a levy of P0.55 on the coconut farmer’s first domestic sale of every 100 kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt convertible into CIC shares of stock A year later or on November 14, 1974 President Marcos issued P.D. 582,8 creating a permanent fund called the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CID Fund) to channel for the ultimate direct benefit of coconut farmers part of the levies that they were already paying In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 75512 which approved the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmers to enable such bank to promptly and efficiently realize the industry’s credit policy On July 14, 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961,16 the Coconut Industry Code, which consolidated and codified existing laws relating to the coconut industry. In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) 312,25 establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to provide immediate income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a sustainable local market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313,30 which created an irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund). This aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut industry, and to other agrirelated programs On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313 on March 1, 2001 petitioner organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R. 147036-37 to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional. On April 24, 2001 the other sets of petitioner organizations and individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being unconstitutional.

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UCPB questions the propriety of the present petitions for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 on the ground that there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal or board or before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.37 UCPB insists that the Court exercises appellate jurisdiction with respect to issues of constitutionality or validity of laws and presidential orders

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ special civil actions of certiorari under Rule 65 constituted the proper remedy for their actions RULING: 

where there are serious allegations that a law has infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but the duty of the Court to look into such allegations and, when warranted, uphold the supremacy of the Constitution.39 Moreover, where the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, as in this case, the Court has the discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure

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The Court has to uphold petitioners’ right to institute these petitions. The petitioner organizations in these cases represent coconut farmers on whom the burden of the cocolevies attaches. It is also primarily for their benefit that the levies were imposed. The individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the petitions as taxpayers

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Atty. Marietta Zamoranos versus People of the Philippines FACTS: 

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These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before the RTC, Quezon City on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Shari’a Circuit District Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992 On December 20, 1989, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated Pacasum contracted a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004

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the Office of the City Prosecutor, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos’ motion for reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal complaint for Bigamy against Zamoranos Zamoranos’ second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied RTC renedered in favor of Zamoranos since they were muslim when they contracted marriage "In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so hold that this

Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for annulment of marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Shari’a Circuit Court that has the exclusive original jurisdiction." Upon motion of Pacasum, RTC reversed their decision On, Dec 21, 2009, Zamoranos filed a motion to quash the information/reconsideration which were both denied

Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of the December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC which the CA denied

ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos’ petition for certiorari? RULING:  A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary

remedy. As such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. The aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition for certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.  

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In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction We found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The Order dated December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos’] [M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and legal basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion\

certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

(3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law  The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal  it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law 

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certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice"; (d) to promote public welfare and public policy; and (e) when the cases "have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof." The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.