CYCLES OF VIOLENCE IN AFRICAN GEOLITICS: THE IMAGINED AND REAL ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA FROM CASE ANALYSIS.
KHULEKANI SIBANDA Research Department Gaborone Institute of Professional Studies, Gaborone Campus, Botswana
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Abstract This study is based on a few cases and aims at trying to evaluate the foreign policy of South Africa to try to find whether its behaviour on the foreign policy sphere is consistent with its espoused and declared ideals at its independence. It puts to test South Africa’s capacity for African and regional leadership on the political front. The cases used to arrive at tentative conclusions are the Libyan crisis, the Ivory Coast Crisis, the Zimbabwe crises, the Central African Republic crisis. Though there may be many other cases where South Africa is or was involved in Africa these few were used just to open a small window through which the foreign policy of South Africa might be viewed. The study concludes that South Africa’s foreign policy in its current form does not assist civilians on the continent and it has abdicated its ‘protection’ based foreign policy legacy crafted and left by Nelson R. Mandela the First South Africa President. Instead it props un undemocratic regimes on the continent.
1. Introduction The coming of South African independence brought hope, trepidation and uncertainty. There was hope because the South African problem especially concerning the oppressive rule by the supremacist racist Afrikaner regime, which had caused consternation throughout Africa and the world was finally over. There was trepidation and uncertainty because the African countries which had supported the liberation of South Africa did not know what to expect from the newly independent Southern African economic behemoth with its vast resources. This was more so because South Africa was considered way beyond its African peers in terms of economic development and most did not know whether South Africa would choose to play with the big brothers in the North or side with its African peers. South Africa had already been playing a crucial economic role in Africa (before its independence) especially as its economy employed Africans from virtually every nation on the continent (Bond 2000; Alden and Le Pere 2010). Some definitely looked forward to South Africa playing a key role in the African geo - political and social landscape – more like a big brother. However other African leaders may have felt that South Africa would steal the limelight from them (as they saw themselves as the fathers of African liberation). Indeed South Africa has been up to the task to an extent as Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, a South African citizen has taken over from Jean Ping as Head of the African Union (Fabricius 2014) and South Africa has intervened in crises in several African nations with mixed results. This exploratory 1
research tries to make a case analysis of South Africa’s successes and failures in its quest to assert itself as the African leader to provoke further critical dialogue not only on South Africa’s current role, but also its potential role. We can view the successes and failures of the post apartheid South Africa from the lenses of several cases in which she was involved in various ways. The cases are the DRC crisis, the Ivory Coast crisis, the Libyan Crisis, the crisis in Central African Republic, the Zimbabwean crisis and the creation and demolition of the SADC Tribunal. 1.2.
Background to the study
South Africa arguably the most developed country on the African continent with a GDP of 12105.55 (. South Africa has access to the sea (on three sides) more than any other African nation on mainland Africa, on the south, west and east. Most landlocked nations of Southern Africa (Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi) have historically depended on South Africa for routes to export their goods overseas. Swaziland and Lesotho are almost wholly dependent on South Africa. South Africa is endowed with rich terrestrial resources especially rich agricultural land, vast mineral resources and great aquatic endowments. In terms of physical infrastructure South Africa comes second to none in Africa. These factors emphasize South Africa’s economic and hegemonic importance. With its independence in 1991 the expectations from the new black government were more than before. However black South Africans remain poor as in the apartheid era as whites still control land and other key economic resources in South Africa. Nelson Mandela the South African leader of the ANC who had been imprisoned 27 years on Robben Island became the first president. Mandela’s view was that South Africa’s foreign policy should be based on ideals of human rights or ‘ubuntu’ for the African continent (Dudley 2013). Mandela’s humanistic policy of reconciliation was seen as a great example in terms of leadership and punctuated the great expectations of the African nations from this iconic example of humanity. Though Robert Mugabe was the first one to come up with the reconciliation model in 1980, the neophyte, Mandela’s made him look like a baby regarding that concept. However Mandela resigned leaving the country under the new helmsman, Thabo Mbeki, the son of Govan Mbeki, a former friend of Nelson Mandela in the struggle for the independence of South Africa. Thabo Mbeki himself was a liberation war leader within the ANC party. The ANC had close ties with other liberation movements such as Chama Chamapinduzi in Tanzania, FRELIMO in Mozambique, ZANU PF and ZAPU in Zimbabwe, UNIP in Zambia and other African states which supported ANC war efforts against the supremacist apartheid regime of the Afrikaners. Long after independence South Africa still puts those relationships first before ubuntu or human rights. This has seen South Africa propping undemocratic regimes in Africa in the name of Pan-Africanism. As a result when they came in from the cold they already had solid ties with most nations in Africa. Countries such as Libya, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, among others supported ANC with war materiel, personnel training and putting pressure on the United Nations to impose sanctions on South Africa during their anti-apartheid struggle. This assistance increased the expectation Frontline States had on South 2
Africa. Hence most countries watched expectantly to see the direction South Africa would take. Since Mandela did not stay in the seat of power for long the clear examples of issues with South African foreign policy start with Thabo Mbeki and on to Jacob Zuma, the current president of South Africa. South Africa has been on the forefront demanding the inclusion of the BRICS nations in the security council (obviously on the basis of its own interests). 1.3.
Statement of the problem
The problem is that there are so many problems on the African continent and South Africa has been expected to play a leadership role in their resolution. This is mainly because of the hype with which South Africa came into world politics. The South African foreign policy has been criticized for having caused problems or failed to approach problems realistically on the continent. The question is ‘Is South Africa living up to the continent’s expectations of a ‘big brother? 1.4.
Research objective
The objective this research is to find and analyse cases where South Africa got involved on the African continent and whether it has been successful in its quest to establish its position as a continental player and to deduce how far it has managed to resolve problems in Africa. The other objective is to find why South Africa is succeeding or failing in its African foreign policy. 2. Research methodology The case study method was adopted to arrive at conclusions. Secondary data including articles, Journals and newspaper article were used deduce findings. This was a qualitative research and the researcher’s opinions and views influenced the conclusions. Therefore other researchers who do not agree with the conclusions are challenged to present alternative views. Six cases which are analysed for outcomes (in which the South African government was involved) are Zimbabwe, Libya, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, and the SADC region (the case of the removal of the SADC Tribunal) Literature Review The point of South Africa’s perceived position is emphasized by one of Mbeki’s espoused goals for the South African government concerning Africa. According to Bond (2000) Mbeki saw South Africa having to play the role of “lending South African prestige and concrete assistance to alleviating the plight of the African continent” (Bond 2000). This statement from Mbeki shows how South Africa perceived its position and subsequent role on the African continent. This is especially seen in the use of the phrase “south African prestige”. It shows that South Africa considers itself superior than its peers on the continent. The ‘good news’ in the agenda is the pledge to offer ‘concrete assistance to alleviating the plight of the African continent’. This purported largesse obviously satisfied those hoping that South Africa would come in as Africa’s very own messiah especially the poor and downtrodden. Further the 3
statement goes on to refer to offering assistance. This completes the ‘big brother’ picture alluded to above. The fact that South Africa also aspired to get a permanent seat at the United Nations General Assembly also attests to her insatiable ambitions over-spilling from the African shield. Pursuant to these goals South Africa was involved in Libya (Rupiya, AFSAAP Conference 2011, Mabera and Dunne 2013; Ebrahim 2011; BuaNews-Xinhua 2011; Mlevu 2013; Adams 2013; de Kok and Snyman), Ivory Coast (Cooke 2010; Mabera and Dunne 2013; Dadson 2008; Rupiya; Lynch 2011; Mlevu 2013), Central African Republic (Oliver 2013; Lustig 2013; Allison 2014; Dudley 2013; Vircoulon 2013; Arief 2014; Mabera and Dunne 2013; Plogreen and Sayare 2013) and Zimbabwe (Rupiya; Mabera and Dunne 2013; Moyo 2002; Bell 2013; Bell 2014; Wild 2013; Matendere 2013;Hanso 2008; Kings 2002; Lee 2013; Scholtz and Ferreira 2011 ) 3. Results A search of the literature yielded the following information in areas where South Africa was involved; 4.1. Zimbabwe South Africa’s has played a key role in Zimbabwe’s political affairs but has failed to provide a permanent solution to its northern neighbour’s perennial problems since 2002. SA has assumed the leadership role in SADC. It has been on the vanguard of election monitoring in Zimbabwe. The opposition in Zimbabwe accepted SA’s mediation role as they saw it as neutral and looking at Mandela’s policy of ubuntu which Mbeki (and Zuma after him) professed to follow. In 2002 Mbeki sent two High court judges Dikgang Moseneke and Sisi Kampepe to monitor an election in Zimbabwe. Though the judges did what they were tasked to do the Mbeki government refused to make the contents of the report public because it was not in the public interest. Meanwhile the 2002 Zimbabwean election was marred by violence and their fairness was disputed, but Mbeki went on to declare them free and fair. However the Mail & Guardian, a South African newspaper in 2008 challenged the SA govt to make public the Zimbabwe election report as it was a democratic right of both Zimbabweans and the SADC region that the report’s contents be known (Mail& Guardian 2008). The SA governments of Both Mbeki and Zuma fought spirited battles, both in court and in the diplomatic front for the contents of the report to be kept secret by making successive appeals up to the SA Court of Appeal which finally awarded the Mail and Guardian the right to access the report in February 2013 (Lee 2013). The contents of the report showed that the Zimbabwean 2002 election was fundamentally flawed and thus could not be deemed free and fair – but too late. In 2008 after ZANU PF lost the election to the MDC there was a run-off with SA involved in the monitoring of the run-off. There was widespread violence allegedly perpetrated by ZANU PF and hundreds were murdered while many were tortured and seriously maimed. While Botswana, the head of the observer mission declared the run-off flawed due to violence, the South African government declared the result ‘free and fair’. This was despite the fact that some members of the SA monitoring 4
Mission had registered displeasure with the way the elections were handled. Mbeki then forced a unity government to be formed between the losing ZANU PF and the cowered MDC. The government failed to work and only produced mediocre results due to policy inconsistencies between the two parties in government. Before 2008 a cholera epidemic broke out in Zimbabwe and more than 4000 people died and yet Mbeki and his SA representative to the United Nations Dumisani Khumalo assured the UN that all was well in Zimbabwe when so many people were decimated by a preventable disease. During the time Mbeki infamously said ‘there is no crisis in Zimbabwe’. During this time many people fled to SA, Mbeki’s own country, but he still insisted that there was no crisis in Zimbabwe. The final nail on human rights coffin for the region was hammered home when the SADC Tribunal which was dismantled at Harare’s behest. The SADC Tribunal was a regional and international court created by SADC member states to settle any disputes among member states and protect civilians rights in the region. When Ian Campbell, a white farmer who was the target of farm expropriation won a case in 2007, the Zimbabwean government was incensed. Later on in 2008, a further 77 white farmers were granted leave by the Tribunal to intervene on the farm issue. and demanded that the court be dismantled and the SADC regional leaders agreed with this view. The beacon which had been created for the SADC region was extinguished with one blow. Instead of invoking her ‘right to protect’ mandate South Africa did not lift a finger, but from their silence they may rightly be seen as complicit. ANC self-interest could be seen in the whole scheme of things especially after Thabo’s thesis on ‘negating the Chiluba factor’ (Eddie cross 2009) whereby he sought to protect ANC from a fate similar to one suffered by Kenneth Kaunda when Frederick Chiluba’s Movement for Multi- Party Democracy took over from a liberation movement (United National Independence Party, [UNIP]) in Zambia. So from this scenario it seems it became Mbeki and ANC goal number one to protect ANC continued hegemony in South Africa by adopting a foreign policy whose aims were purporting to protect all the liberation movements in SADC especially Chama Chama Pinduzi in Tanzania, SWAPO in Namibia, FRELIMO in Mozambique and ZANU PF of Zimbabwe. Naturally in its new form the South African government’s hands are tied in as far as protecting civilians is concerned. Rather they stand to support the oppressor because of one common interest – survival in the political arena. Therefore it appears that South Africa (especially the ANC government) is encouraging more trouble for the region and beyond. 3.2.
Central African republic
South Africa intervened in the Central African Republic in 2012. The aims of the intervention have been given but they were conflicting and confusing, leaving the real motives to speculation – something which has done irreparable damage to the credibility of South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa. Zuma is said to have claimed that SA intervened in CAR to fulfil bi-lateral agreements (not through African Union structures) made with the then president, Mr Bozize circa 2007. According to Dudley 5
(2013) the agreement was that SA would provide ‘institutional capacity building’ to train the CAR security forces to counter the invasion of Bangui by the Seleka rebels, fighting against the government of Bozize. The explanation given by Maite Nkoana Mashabane, the South African Minister for foreign affairs and international cooperation was that SA had intervened in Bangui ‘to safeguard democracy and respect for human rights’. Was this in line with ubuntu? This confusion in explaining the rationale behind SA foreign policy dented the credibility of the South African government at home and abroad. According to Dudley some sectors in Africa suspected that the SA army had been deployed to Bangui to defend commercial interests of certain high ranking officials in the South African Government. Some analysts thought that South Africa did this as part of its ‘big brother’ strategy to forestall or prevent France’s hegemony in francophone Africa (Arieff 2014, Dudley 2013). Some analysts point to SA’s attempt to extend her influence in francophone Africa vis-a – vis France’s obvious interests in the region. Arieff alludes to SA’s intention to counter the presence of French forces in Bangui leading to the French who manned the airport denying SA troops access to the airport except for humanitarian reasons. Compared to South African troops, France’s 600 strong troops had a clear mandate – to protect the airport and to safeguard French citizens in CAR. There were speculations that SA was protecting its mining interests in CAR. Others say SA’s main aim was to whisk Bozize out of danger, just like they tried to do in Libya and Ivory Coast (with no success). They consistently want to save incumbent dictators. SA’s institutional capacity building, which Dudley (2013), refers to as top down shows a serious departure from Mandela’s declared foreign policy flagship – protection of human rights in Africa. The point, however, is that SA sided with Bozize (Vircoulon 2013) when every other nation in the region had given up on the dictator who was flaunting an agreement with the Seleka rebels. Other nations were present in CAR but chose not to take sides after weighing issues surrounding the conflict. The fact that although Sudanese, Ugandan, French and Chadian troops were also present SA failed to communicate with these nations so that there could be a coordinated response to the crisis in Bangui, choosing to take a very dangerous path of taking sides. This is explained by the fact that despite claiming that SA would act in conjunction with AU and UN Zuma send SA troops without AU go-ahead. However all did not end well with the deployment as the 5000 strong Seleka rebels advancing on Bangui killed 13 South African paratroopers and wounded 27 others, of the 200 paratroopers deployed by South Africa to Bangui. This incident caused people in South Africa and elsewhere to question the interests of the South African Government in CAR. This caused a ‘tail between the legs’ retreat of SA forces from Bangui. This scenario led to the world, especially Africa questioning the credibili ty of SA to solve Africa’s diplomatic and military issues. The SA troops mandate was confusing as they were not in any position to resist the advancing Seleka rebels sweeping towards Bangui. Dudley (2013) points out that if SA was concerned about 6
defeating the Seleka rebels they should have deployed more troops and more materiel to that effect. If they did not want that they should have withdrawn their troops when it was evident all was lost, at least to save the lives of their paratroopers and avoid having to answer questions from bereaved families of deceased soldiers. This puts a serious question mark on SA’s tactical capacity and responsiveness capability in the face of a crisis pointing to serious ineptitude o the part of the administration in Pretoria. 3.3.
Ivory Coast
South Africa also got involved in the Ivory Coast crisis pitting the incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo and the opposition leader Allessane Ouattarra. Long waited elections which had been continuously postponed by the incumbent Gbagbo were finally held and Gbagbo who lost the election refused to give way, sparking a crisis in which troops loyal to Outtarra stood their ground in another section of Abijan, the capital city. The facts were that the international community led by the United Nations, which had monitored the election was convinced Ouatarra had won clearly and could not tolerate Gbagbo’s brinkmanship. A standoff ensued and France increased its troops in Ivory Coast supporting Ouattara. ECOWAS led by Nigeria, supported the position of the international community led by the USA and the EU. Jean Ping the erstwhile chair of the AU supported Outtara as winner. Surprisingly, again, in this case South Africa supported Gbagbo despite his unpopularity with the international community and AU and his obvious recalcitrance. SA send its frigate the Drakensberg to Ivorian territorial waters baffling Nigeria, the regional super power and complicating things for the international community as it tried to unscramble the crisis. Lynch (2011) argues that the action by SA (show of force) was taken with no consultations with the regional body ECOWAS and was read as an attempt to interfere and thwart ECOWAS’s popular move to remove Gbagbo seen overwhelmingly as the culprit by ECOWAS. Lynch (2011) also pointed out that it seemed SA was competing for influence with Nigeria (in Nigeria’s turf) especially because of SA’s ambitions for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Mbeki and Zuma suggested a power sharing agreement like the fiasco Mbeki had negotiated in Zimbabwe, but Outtarra, the international community and ECOWAS did not see the Zimbabwean model as a solution here (Lynch 2011). As a result the efforts by Mbeki were rejected (Cooke 2010, Lynch 2011). The problem was that Mbeki had already squandered his credibility when SA, his country, had already made questionable partisan manoeuvres. However this action by SA complicated matters by encouraging Gbagbo’s unreasonable stubbornness thus making it harder for the international community to persuade Gbagbo to leave the seat of power peacefully. As a result of SA’s actions Gbagbo was greatly encouraged to resist handing over power to Alassanne Outtara. 3.4.
Libya
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South Africa’s foreign policy in Libya was somewhat ambivalent and it exposed serious weaknesses in the Foreign policy of South Africa. When the United Nations Security council passed resolution 1973 authorizing the enforcement of a no-fly zone in Libya by NATO, backed by United States logistical support South Africa went against the usual African Union tendency to support dictators in Africa at all costs by supporting resolution 1973. The ambivalence of South African foreign policy is shown on how it later tried to retract its support for resolution 1973 by insisting that the resolution was being abused to campaign for the ouster the dictator Colonel Muammar al Gaddafi. South Africa was not supporting the National Transitional Council and appeared to hope that Gaddafi would come to his senses and try to reason to retain power. South Africa took too long to read the signs that Gaddafi wad no longer a factor in Libyan politics. However the South African position was overtaken by events as the West African powerhouse, Nigeria and about 17 other nations announced their recognition of the National Transitional Council and removal of any support for Gaddafi. SA was preoccupied with issues of ‘territorial integrity’ and propping up Gaddafi – a policy to appease Gaddafi at the expense of the Libyan people’s right to protection against the violence unleashed on the people by Gaddafi loyalists As in Zimbabwe South Africa showed no concern for civilians. It acted without concern for ‘the right to protect’ as purported in Nelson Mandela’s vision for the South African foreign policy, South Africa was left with an egg in the face as a result of its foreign policy debacle in Libya. 4. Implications of South African foreign policy The four cases shown above provide a framework through which an analysis of the weaknesses of South Africa’s foreign policy can be done. The first problem is South Africa’s abject and consistent disregard for the sanctity of human life and of human rights. Thousands of lives were lost as Gbagbo fought Outarra in Abidjan while South Africa’s support made Gbagbo more recalcitrant. The whole thing was a mess and most critics see SA in the milieu, probably as a catalyst fomenting trouble in the Ivory Coast. South Africa proved to have a tendency of protecting dictators on the continent at the expense of civilians. As a result South Africa does not seem to follow Mandela’s foreign policy legacy of the ‘right to protect’ but has consistently supported the violations of civil rights with the attendant violence and loss of life as happened in Libya, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Central African Republic. South African watched and declared that there was ‘no crisis in Zimbabwe’ during Mbeki’s time when thousands of civilians were being terrorised and hundreds were killed, maimed and tortured by the unrepentant Zimbabwean government. The Zimbabwe issue clearly shows the ANC government’s duplicity and lack of credibility especially when thousands of people died of cholera due to the government’s lack of provision of basic services. Further in Zimbabwe South Africa did not lift a finger as white farmers were violently evicted from their farms with many losing their lives in the process. The spirited legal battle the ANC government fought to protect the contents of the 8
Kampempe report shows betrayal and untrustworthiness of the SA government and a tendency to condone violence by the mighty. Tendencies of the South African government to prop up violence were also shown in the South African ANC government’s support of renditions against Zimbabwean citizens who were subsequently murdered by security agents in Zimbabwe. The ANC government’s support for Zimbabwe’s call for the SADC tribunal to be dismantled clearly demonstrates that South Africa does not intend to use its power as a continental powerhouse to protect civilians on the continent but wants to be popular with the tyrants at the expense of Mandela’s legacy of the ‘right to protect.’ The case of Libya and Ivory coast also reinforce the SA government’s lack of appreciation of the violent tendencies by certain governments in Africa. In Zimbabwe South Africa is well known for its failure to safeguard free and fair elections (just as in the Ivory Coast). In 2008 the violence in the run-off after ZANU PF lost the elections proved the impotence of South Africa to show its fairness and leadership as many people were murdered and the ballots were commandeered by unknown “known’ people only to reappear under unclear circumstances. South Africa as the SADC leader endorsed the one man election after the MDC (opposition party) boycotted the elections after the violence became too much.
References
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Fihlani, P. Jacob Zuma: 13 South African soldiers killed in CAR. Available on http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21923624. [accessed 21/11/2014) Freeth, B. 2012. Racial Discrimination in Zimbabwe: A systematic program of abuse. SADC Tribunal Watch. Lee, G. 2013. SA president must hand over Zim report. Special Mail and Guardian Report. (Available [online] on:http://www.osisa.org/law/zimbabwe/sa -president-musthand-over-zim-report) (accessed 17/10/2014) Mabera, F. and Dunne, T. 2013. South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect. Asia – Pacific Centre for Responsibility to Protect. l.3(6.) Neethling, T. 2011. South africa, the african union and international intervention in libya: a critical appraisal. Presented at the 34th AFSAAP Conference Flinders University 2011 South Africa GDP growth rate 1993-2015. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/southafrica/gdp-growth.[online] (accessed 21/02/2015). Vircoulon, T. 2013. Failure Has Many Fathers: The Coup in the Central African Republic. (Available on http://thinkafricapress.com/central-african-republic/failurehas-many-fathers-coup-central-african-republic [accessed 15/10/2014] Zimbabwe Independent Newspaper. 2008. Mbeki ‘Ignored Judges’ On Zim’s 2002 Poll. (available on http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2008/05/12/mbeki-ignoredjudges-on-zims-2002-poll/ (accessed 18/10/2014)
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