Shell in Nigeria

 

Case Study #20

A case study published by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs

Shel hell in Ni Niger eriia: Corporate Soci cia al Res Resp ponsibility and the O goni Crisis by Bronwen Manby 

 

C ase Study Study Ser Series Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs

This case study study is one of a serie seriess commissioned commissioned and edited edited b y t he Ca rnegie rnegie Council on Ethics and Int ernationa l Affairs. The purpose of each case study is to address competing moral claims in the conduct of international affairs in a format useful to college and university teachers. Case studies encourage students to think and argue analytically about ethical dilemmas. In addition, they promote interdisciplinary thinking about decision making and international politics. This emphasis on decision making makes the most of the human element in politics—the real-life choices and conflicting values of the actors involved in the case. Each case presents relevant facts and circumstances pertaining to a specific subject area and relates them to an overarching ethical principle. Case studies set the parameters for classroom debate. Avoiding academic jargon whenever possible, they are accessible to an undergraduate audience but useful to all students of international affairs. At the back of each case a number of suggestions for organizing classroom discussion are offered, as well as a list of related readings on the case topic. The case studies studies seri series es is is part of the C arnegie Council’s ongoing Educa tion a nd Studies programs. Foremost a n educational institution, the Carnegie Council is committed to the development of new scholarship and pedagogical tools in the field of ethics and international affairs. For additional copies of this case, contact the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University. For further information about Carnegie Council case studies, contact Lotta Hagman, program associate, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 170 E. 64th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021-7496; telephone 212.838.4120; fax 212.752.2432; e-mail [email protected]; or visit our web site: www.cceia.org.

 

SHELL IN NIGERIA: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSABILITY AND THE OGONI CRISIS

Bronwen Manby  Case Study for the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs

COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL Do Not Duplicate - This is a Copyrighted Material for Classroom Use. It is available only through the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. (Phone) 202-965-5735 (Fax) 202-965-5811

On November 10, 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa, a well-known Nigerian author and spokesperson for the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), was hanged in Port Harcourt, in the heart of the oil-producing region of southeast Nigeria, together with eight other Ogoni activists all involved in protests against the oil industry. The The “ O goni Nine” had b ee een n tried tried and convicted convicted by a special special tribunal a ppointed by the military government, whose procedures blatantly violated international standards of due process. The international outcry was immediate, even from governments not known for an activist stance on human rights. Britain’s C onservat onservat ive Prime M inister inister John Ma jor referre referred d to the eexecu xecutions tions as “ judici judicial al murder.” C ommonw ealth head head s of government, whose biannual summit was taking place at the time of the executions, suspended Nigeria from membership membe rship of the usually usually uncontro versial versial club of sta tes sharing sharing a British colonial heritage. O ther sanctions followed from the European Union, United States, and United Nations, including bans on selling weapons to Nigeria and on granting visas to members of the Nigerian government. Activists’ calls for an oil embargo on Nigeria, heavily dependent on its petroleum resources, were, however, resisted. The Saro Saro -Wiw a case brought into the internationa l headlines a debat e over over the role played by the oil multinat ionals in N igeria igeria t hat had already been been ra ging for several several y ears. Even Even before the execu executions, tions, the oil industry had been criticized for its alleged support for successive military governments that had annulled programs of transition to civilian rule and cracked down on protest against the oil industry. Shell in particular, the largest producer in Nigeria, had been targeted for attack by MOSOP, in a campaign that successfully closed down Shell’s production in Ogoniland—a small proportion of its Nigerian total—in 1993. In turn, Shell was blamed both locally and internationally as the government first brutally suppressed protests by MOSOP, and finally tried and execute executed d t he core of the orga nization’ s le lead ad ership. ership. In a w orld w he here re transnational transnational corporations often often have reve revenue nue and capital that d w arfs that of the w orld’s smaller states, the concept that companies have responsibilities to the community at large other than to make money has ga ined ined increasing curre currency. ncy. H ow eve ever, r, internationa l law , the fra mework of princ principle ipless deve develope loped d o ver the last few centuries to govern relations between states, is only just beginning to address the behavior of nonstate actors such as transnationals. Consumers, activists, and concerned shareholders have begun to put pressure on the major transnationals to pay more than lip service to ideas of good corporate citizenship, calling for international regulation of corporate activities. Public concern in the developed world over the activities of multinationals in developing countries has focused on two main areas: labor conditions in the apparel industry; and the environmental, development, and human rights consequences of oil and mining operations in poor countries. During the 1990s, Nike, PhillipsVan H eu euse sen, n, Shell, Shell, British Petroleum, Mo bil, R io Tinto Tinto Z inc (RT (RTZ Z ), and others all fa ced ced public criticism criticism of their activities in developing countries. Human rights and environmental activists alleged that wages and working conditions in the garment industry’s factories in the developing world were unacceptable, and that the companies working in the extractive sector applied lower environmental standards than they did in Europe or North America Ame rica a nd w ere complicit in human rights viola tions committ ed by t he ssec ecurity urity fo rces rces of t he countrie countriess w here they operated, abuses often committed against those protesting the companies’ own activities. The response response of Shell to the att acks on its record in Nigeria fo rms an interes interesting ting study of the w ay in w hich 1

 

one transnational corporation has reacted to the challenge of demands that it take on responsabilities beyond maximizing profit. Initially brushing off the idea that issues of sustainable development and human rights were of any concern to an oil company, Shell went on to become something of a sectoral leader in developing policies of corporate social responsibility. TH E OIL IND USTRY USTRY IN N IG ERIA Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa Africa and the eighth eighth la rges rgestt in t he wo rld. Th Thee first discove discovery ry o f commer cial quantities of oil in Nigeria was in 1956; by the end of the century the country produced approximately two million milli on b arrels per per da y o f crude oil. Th Thee discovery discovery of oil tra nsformed Nigeria’s political economy, a nd since the 1970s oil has provided approximately 90 percent of foreign-exchange earnings, and 80 percent of federal revenue. Nigeria also has huge reserves of natural gas yet to be fully exploited. As in the case case of many other “ petropetro-states states,” ,” the windfa ll income income from oil has prove proved d in ma ny w ays to be a curse rather than a blessing. Instead of turning Nigeria into one of the most prosperous states on the African continent, its na tural res resources ources have enriched enriched a small minority w hile the vast ma jority ha ve become become incre increasingly asingly impoverished: with a per capita gross national product of only US$260 a year, Nigeria is one of the poorest countries in the world. At the same time, the struggle among the elite to gain access to the profits of the oil boom was a factor in sustaining the rule of successive military governments that ran Nigeria for all but ten of the years between independance in 1960 and the inauguration of civilian president Olusegub Obasanjo (himself a former military ruler) in May 1999. Under military rule, power and money became ever more concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer people. Politics became an exercise in orgazined corruption--a corruption perhaps most specta specta cularly demonstrat ed aro und the oil industry itself, itself, w here large commiss commissions ions and pe perr centage cuts contracts enabled individual soldiers and politicians to amass huge fortunes, while the majority sank deeper into poverty. Anger among ordinary Nigerians at this poverty in the midst of wealth has been exacerbated by the lack of cohesive sense of national identity, and by southern resentment over northern control of the army, and hence the federal government and o il revenue revenues, s, for most o f the years since since independan ce. The bo unda riesof the ter ritory now known as Nigeria were first defined in 1907. Nigeria was brought under the government in 1914 by the amalgamation of two British colonial protectorates. Although the country was in theory ruled as a single unit, unit, in pra ctice the northern and southern parts of the country w ere ad ministe ministered red by t he Britis British h a s distinct entities with little attempt at coordination. Only in 1954, six years before independance, did Nigeria became a true federation with a central government and three consituent components with a large degree of autonomy in all other ma tters: Northern, Weste Western rn and Eastern Regions. Regions. In each of t he hese se three reg regions, ions, a majority ethnic group constituted about two-thirds of the population, the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the west, and the Igbo in the east; east; t he remaining remaining third w as ma de up of various minority groups, groups, of w hich the there re may be 250 or more in Nigeria. The peoples living in the oil-producing communities of the southeast largely belong to these minority ethnicities, ethnicities, and they speak speak a diverse diverse range of langua ges and dia le lects cts from a t least five major lan guage groups. Since indepe independa nda nce the three three original regions have been broken dow n into an increasing increasing number of states, in an attempt to satisfy minority demands for recognition (36 in total as the civilian government took office in 1999). But this fragmentation of goverment has been, paradoxically, paralled by increasing centralization in practice , as individual states have become less and less viable without federal financial support and oil revenue reve nuess have suppl supplant ant ed all ot hers as t he founda tion o f t he Nigerian Nigerian economy. economy. According to the Nigerian constitution, all mineraks, oil, and gas belong to the Nigerian federal government, which negotiates the terms of oil production with international oil companies. Most exploration and production activities in Nigeria are carried out by European and U.S. oil companies operating joint ventures in which the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the state oil company, owns 55 or 60 percent, S

The 1999 constitution provided for a substantial increase of funding to the delta, with a 13 percent allocation of revenue on a derivation basis (up from 2 percent derivation, plus 3 percent for the development of oil-producing communities and 1 percent to respond to ecological problems caused by oil production, under the formula in operation immediately prior to the handover of power). By the end 1

of 1999, the new fo rmula had yet to be a pplied pplied in practice. practice. 2 Saro-Wiwa’s best-known novel internationally is  Soz  Soza aboy: A N ove ovell in R otte otten n Engli E nglish sh, an account of the Nigerian civil war of 1966 to 1970 written in the voice of a young soldier from the delta. In Nigeria, he was best known as the writer of Basi and Company: A  M ode odern rn A fr ican Folk ta tale le, a story of Lagos life that was turned into a serial on Nigerian television.

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haps 6,000 square kilometers are mangrove forest, the rest freshwater swamp, dryland forest areas now largely cleared cleared f or a griculture griculture,, a nd coa stal b arrier island island s. In this sensitive sensitive environment, environment, the oil compa nie niess operating in Nigeria maintain that their activities are conducted to the highest environmental standards; but Nigerian environmental laws, though in most respects comparable to their international equivalents, are poorly monitored a nd enforced. There There are surpris surprisingly ingly few good -q uality independent independent scientific scientific da ta on t he overall overall o r longterm effects effects of hyd roca rbon po llution on t he delta, delta, yet ava ilable evidence evidence does indicate that oil-le oil-led d d evelopment evelopment in general general ha s seriously seriously dama ged the environment environment and the livelihood livelihood o f ma ny of those living living in the oil-produc oil-produc ing communities, and that poor environmental standards in relation to oil spills, gas flaring, and the construction of roads and canals have contributed to these problems. Compensation for damage caused by the oil industry is inadequate, and—in the absence of a properly functioning court system—there is no effective recourse to an independent arbiter to determine the value of the damaged property. The oil companies state that many spills are caused by sabotage, and, in accordance w ith Nigerian Nigerian la w , they pay no compensation compensation in such cases cases;; but the de determi termination nation t hat sabota ge has occ occurre urred d is largely left in their own hands, increasing the chances that spills caused by corrosion will be misattributed to criminal da mage. At the same same time, time, in an area of Nigeria Nigeria w he here re there there is is a great need need for culti cultivable vable and hab itable land, land is expropriated expropriated for oil production under law s that allow no effec effective tive due p proce rocess ss pr protecti otections ons for landholders and o nly inadequa te compensation compensation fo r the loss of live livelihood lihood of those affecte affected. d. Al Although though the amount of la nd used used fo r oil production is small by comparison w ith the total a rea rea of the Niger Delta, the effect effect on individual landholders can be devastating. Such compensation as is paid seldom reaches those who have suffered most. While the minority ethnic groups living in the oil-producing communities of the Niger Delta have faced the ad verse verse eeffects ffects of oil extra ction, they ha ve in ge general neral also f ailed to gain f rom t he money generated. generated. D espite espite the vast wealth produced from the oil found under the delta, the region remains poorer than the national average; and though in the north o f N igeria igeria poverty is more eextreme, xtreme, the divisions divisions betw betw een een rich and poor a re more obvious in the areas w here gas fla res light up the night sky. The The “ derivation principl principle” e” in the fede federal ral b udget, under which a share of the revenue generated from oil had been paid to the states where the oil was produced, was Although though other structures have been been creat reduced reduc ed to insignificant insignificant levels, levels, and only pa rtially restored in 1999. 1 Al ed to b ring development development to t he delta delta , these in practice have largely been a means fo r enric enrichment hment of t hose admin istering them rather than a mechanism for poverty alleviation. Neverthele Neve rtheless ss,, o il production itself itself a nd o il-ba il-ba sed sed industrial expansion have tra nsformed the local economy, and some in the oil-producing communities have benefited greatly from oil production. Those with full-time employment in the oil industry are paid high wages for skilled work, but they are a well-paid minority surrounded by a mass of un- or under-employed; most oil workers do not come from the oil-producing communities in any event. Contractors to the oil industry, often traditional leaders or those with close links to the administrations of the oil-producing states, also have the potential to make large amounts of money, often increased by the widescale corruption surrounding the award of contracts for construction and other oil industry projects—from which those in the oil companies in charge of the choice of contractor also benefit. Development spending by the oil companies has also brought schools, clinics, and other infrastructure to remote parts of the country that might otherwise be far more marginalized by the Nigerian government; but many of these these projects projects are inappropria te for the needs needs of the communities communities w here they are sited. O thers, thers, b ecause ecause of incompetence incompetence or corruption, are never never completed completed o r shodd ily carried out . In any event, event, development development spendspending by the oil companies has only reached significant levels since protests began to threaten oil production. Although a minority of politicians, traditional leaders, and contractors have become rich on the spoils of oil, and hence support the oil industry’s activities, the great majority of people from the minority ethnic groups of the oil-producing areas have remained impoverished, sometimes as a direct result of environmental damage Ken Saro-Wi Saro-Wiw w a, “ My Story,” text of stateme statement nt to the Civil Disturbance Disturbancess Tribunal, Tribunal, reprinte reprinted d in O goni: T ri als a and nd Travails Travails (Lagos: Civil Liberties Organisation, 1996), p.42B43. 4 SPDC, Nigeria Brief: The Ogoni Issue (Lagos: SPDC, January 1995). 5 Ken Saro-Wiwa, G enocide nocide in N igeria: T he O goni T rage ragedy  dy (Port Ha rcourt: Saros, 1992) 1992),, p. 81. 6 O ne le lead ad ing jurist jurist concluded: “ The jjudgement udgement of the T Tribunal ribunal is not merely w rong, illogical o r perverse. perverse. It is dow nright dishonest. 3

The Tribunal consistently advanced arguments which no experienced lawyer could possibly believe to be logical or just. I believe that the Tribunal first dec decide ided d on its verdicts verdicts and then sought for arguments to justify justify them. No barrel w as too deep deep to be sc scraped.” raped.” Michael Bir Birnbaum nbaum Q.C ., A T rave ravesty sty o off L aw and and Justice Justice:: A n Analysis o off the Judgme Judgment in th the e C as ase e of K en Sa Saro-W ro-W iw iwa a and O the thers rs (London: Article 19, D ece ecember mber 1995), p. 2.

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caused by oil production; at the same time, the potential benefits of links to the oil industry have exacerbated conflicts within and among the oil-producing communities, and violent clashes between competing interest groups have become increasingly common.

T he Ogoni Cri C ris sis and and Shell In 1990, leaders of the Ogoni ethnic group founded the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, of which Ken Saro-Wiwa, an internationally known author, became the eloquent and effective spokesperson. 2 MOSOP, a coalition of pre-existing Ogoni organizations, such as the Federation of Ogoni Women’s Associations, the Conference of Ogoni Traditional Rulers, and the National Union of Ogoni Students, was the first really successful effort to organize people in the oil-producing areas specifically to highlight their grievances in relation to oil production on a national and international stage. As such, the organization directly threatened the founda tions of the Nigerian military government, government, w hich unleashed unleashed a violent violent a nd rep repres ressive sive response response.. The Ogoni are a small ethnic group of about half a million people who mostly live in a compact territory of dry land cleared for farming less than one hour by road from Port Harcourt, the main city in the oil-producing region. SPDC and its joint venture partners have five major fields in Ogoniland dating from the 1960s and 1970s, each with its own flowstation (where gas is separated and flared from the oil collected from different individual w ells ells and the oil pumped pumped on to terminals for export). In 1993 the tota l production potentia l from SPDC’s Ogoni fields was roughly 28,000 barrels a day, approximately 3 percent of SPDC’s overall production at that time. Chevron Nigeria Ltd also operated in Ogoniland until 1993, but on a smaller scale. As in other parts of the oil-producing regions, the environment in Ogoniland has been damaged by oil production, though the extent of the da mage is subject subject to dispute and no ind ep epende endent, nt, scientific, scientific, and comprehensive comprehensive study ha s been been carried out. Ken Saro-Wiw Saro-Wiw a ma intained that t he environment environment in Ogoniland ha d been been “ comple completely tely devasta devasta ted by three decades of reckless oil exploitation or ecological warfare by Shell.” 3 Shell, on the other hand, stated: “ Al Alle legat gat ions of environmental environmental devastat ion in Ogo ni, and else elsew w here in our operating area, a re ssimply imply not true.” 4 In Augus Augustt 1990, MO SOP a dopted an “ O goni Bill Bill of R ights,” ights,” w hic hich h listed listed the grievance grievancess of the Ogoni people and d emanded “ political autono my to part icipat icipat e in the af fa irs of the Rep Republic ublic as a distinct and sep separa ara te unit,” includi including ng “ the right right to t he control control and use use of a fair proportion of O goni economic economic res resource ourcess for O goni development.” deve lopment.” M O SOP’ s political political demands w ere ta rgeted rgeted a t the Nigerian Nigerian federal government, government, but it a lso 5 accused accuse d Shell Shell of “ full responsi responsibility bility for the genocide genocide of the O goni.” In October 1990, 1990, MO SOP sent sent the Ogoni Bill of Rights to then–military then–military head of sta te G ene eneral ral Ibra him Bab angida , but receive received d no response response.. In D ecembe ecemberr 1992, 199 2, M OSO P sent sent its demands demands to Shell, Shell, Chevron, Chevron, a nd NN PC , together together w ith an ultimatum that they they pay back royaltiess and compensation royaltie compensation w ithin ithin 30 da ys or q uit Ogoniland. On Ja nuary 4, 4, 1993, 1993, a da te afterwa afterwa rds known known a s “ Ogoni Day,” MO SOP he held ld a mass rally rally in Ogoni Ogoniland land attended by tens of thousands of people. Mobilization continued during the year, and MOSOP delegations met both with officers representing the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida, and, following the annulment of June 1993 elections that were to have led to the installation of a civilian government, with the interim government of Ernest Shonekan. Saro-Wiwa used the media effectively to spotlight the MOSOP case, and traveled abroad soliciting assistance from the international environmental movement and others. MOSOP’s official policy was one of nonviolent protest, and most demonstrations were disciplined; however, there were also disturbing allegations of harassment of those who did not agree with MOSOP’s views, especially by its youth wing. Shell withdrew its staff from Ogoniland in January 1993 and ceased production at its facilities there in mid-1993, citing intimidation and attacks on its staff. This demonstration of organized political opposition to both government and oil companies provoked a military crackdown in Ogoniland. Ken Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP leaders were detained several times during 1993. 1993. Following a new military coup in November November 1993, 1993, w hich p placed laced G eneral eneral Sani Abacha in pow er, this repression repre ssion became more severe severe.. The The Rivers Sta Sta te Interna l Security Security Task Force, a milita ry unit , w as creat ed in 7 8

Shell International Limited letter to Human Rights Watch, January 13, 1995. Shell International Limited letter to Human Rights Watch, November 5, 1996.

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“ Clear Thinki Thinking ng in Troubled Troubled Time Times,” s,” SPDC Pres Presss Rele Release, ase, O ctober 31, 1995. “ Stateme Statement nt by Mr Brian Anderson, Anderson, Ma naging Director, She Shell ll Petrol Petroleu eum m D eve evelopme lopment nt C ompany o f N ige igeria ria Limited,” Limited,” SPDC Press Press Release, November 8, 1995. 11 “ Execution of Ke Ken n Saro-W Saro-Wiwa iwa and H is Co -Defendant s,” SPDC P res resss Release Release,, November 14, 1995. 10

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January 1994 specifically to deal with the Ogoni crisis. Human rights groups documented detentions, harassment, and extrajudicial executions of MOSOP activists, as well as security force involvement in promoting viole lent nt cla she shess betw ee een n the O goni a nd neighboring ethnic groups. In May 1994, four prominent Ogoni leaders were brutally murdered by a mob of youths. These men had been associated with a faction of MOSOP that had differed with Saro-Wiwa on the organization’s tactics and strategy and had been regarded by some in MOSOP as government collaborators. Ken Saro-Wiwa and several other Ogoni activists were immediately arrested on charges of murder and incitement to murder, despite a lack of credible evidence to connect them to the deaths. Sixteen members of the MOSOP leadership were put on trial, and nine, including Ken Saro-Wiwa, were eventually convicted and sentenced to death by a special tribunal established for the case, whose procedures blatantly violated international standards of due process. Without the right to an appeal, the Ogoni Nine were executed on November 10, 1995. 6 Twenty other former activists in MOSOP, who were detained at various times in 1994 and 1995, were charged with murder in connection with the May 1994 killings and held in Port Harcourt prison, in deteriorating health, until September 1998. Dozens of other Ogonis were held in detention without charge for periods ranging f rom a few hours or da ys to several several mo nths. M any other leadership leadership figure figuress fle fled d into exile. exile. N everthele evertheless ss,, protests protes ts continued continued a t a low er pitch, pitch, and O goni activists continued continued to orga nize eve events nts to coincide w ith Ja nuary 4, Ogoni Day, and November 10, the anniversary of the executions. Only with the death of General Abacha in June 1998 was the level of repression in Ogoniland reduced and MOSOP once again able to organize freely. D uring the height height of t he Ogoni crisis, crisis, MO SOP a nd other local activists regularly regularly ma de allegat allegat ions that Shell Shell colluded with the military, even after the company ceased production in Ogoniland. A document alleged to be a leaked leaked internal internal government government memora memora ndum from M ay 1994 sta sta ted that “ ruthless ruthless mili milita ta ry operations” w ere ere needed for oil production to resume, and that the oil companies should be pressured to be contribute toward the cost. The The government government claimed claimed tha t this document w as a forgery; Shell Shell also ra ised ised q ue uestions stions abo ut its authenticity and disassociated itself from the contents. The head of the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force several times publicly claimed to be acting so that Shell’s oil production could resume, complaining to three detained environmental environmental a ctivists ctivists tha t he had been been “ risking risking his life life and tha t o f his soldiers soldiers to prot ect ect Shel Shelll installations.” C ommunity members rep reported orted tha t the Task Task Force coerce coerced d individuals to sign sta sta tements tements “ inviting” Shell She ll to return. Former O goni members of the She Shell ll “ supernumerary supernumerary police” (members (members of the N igerian igerian police force permanently attached to Shell facilities and paid for by Shell, under a system common to all the oil companies)) claimed panies claimed tha t t hey w ere involve involved d in d eliberately eliberately creat creat ing conflict betw ee een n diff ere erent nt gro ups of people people,, a nd in intimidating and harassing protesters during the height of the MOSOP protests in 1993 and 1994; Ogoni detaineess also a lleged detainee lleged tha t they w ere detained a nd b eaten by Shell polic policee during the same pe period. riod. Shell denied all such allegations, and distanced itself from statements by government or security officials calling for repressi repressive ve response responsess to prot ests, ests, w hile stat ing: “ O ur C hief Exe Executive cutive in in N igeria igeria ha s repeatedly—both repeatedly—both publicly and privately—expressed our concerns over the violence and heavy handedness both sides on the Ogoni issue have displayed from time to time, and is doing what he can to counsel the authorities not to do any thing w hich w ill tend tend t o increase the likelihood likelihood o f violence either either to persons or property.” 7 Shell also denied any collusion with the authorities. However, Shell later admitted having made direct payments to the Nigerian security se curity forces, on at le least ast o ne occasion in 1993. 1993. Loca l groups alleged alleged that such pay pay ments were—and were—and remain— a routine practice among oil companies in Nigeria. The company made no public protests in relation to individual cases in which security forces carried out human rights violations at Shell facilities. In early 1996, new spaper investigations investigations revealed revealed tha t Shell had recently recently b ee een n in negotiat ion fo r the import

“ If w e’re investing investing in Nige Nigeria ria you ha ve the right to know w hy,” advertiseme advertisement nt on behalf of Shell placed in the G ua uardian rdian (London), November 17, 1995. 13 “ Exec Execution ution of Ken SaroSaro-Wi Wiw w a and H is Co-Defe Co-Defendants,” ndants,” SPDC Press Press Rele Release, ase, Novembe Novemberr 14, 1995; “ Shell Shell Reaffirms Support Support for H uman R ights and Fair T Trial,” rial,” She Shell ll Inte Internat rnat ional Limited Pres Presss Rel Release ease,, Ja nuary 30, 1996. 14 “ Fair T Trials rials for the Ogo ni 19,” Shell Shell Internationa Internationa l Limite Limited d Press Re Rele lease, ase, Ma y 17, 1996. 15 She Shell ll Petroleum Petroleum Development Development Co mpany of N igeria Limi Limited, ted, “ PAG E [Public [Public Affa Affa irs, Go vernment and the E Environment] nvironment] F Fact act Bo ok 1993,” unpublished unpublished internal do cument ((Lago Lago s, 1993) 1993),, section section 6.6; Shell Pe Petroleum troleum Development Compa ny of N igeria Limite Limited, d, People and the Environment: Annual Report 1998 (Lagos: SPDC, May 1999), p.5. Other oil companies operating in Nigeria also have community 12

development pro grams w hich have similarly increased in value in recent development recent yea rs; Shel Shell’s l’s remains the biggest program . 16 Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited, People and the Environment: Annual Report 1998 (Lagos: SPDC, May 1999), pp.15–16. 17 MOSOP Press Release, November 10, 1998.

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of arms for use by the Nigerian police. In response to these allegations, Shell stated that it had in the past imported side arms on b ehalf of t he Nigerian Nigerian police force force,, fo r use by Shell “ supernumerary supernumerary police” police” aga inst gengeneral crime. The last purchase of weapons by Shell was said to be of 107 hand guns, 15 years before. But court papers filed filed in La gos in July 1995 revealed revealed that Shell Shell had as la te as Februa Februa ry 1995 bee been n negotiat ing for th e pu purr chase of weapons for the Nigerian police. Shell acknowledged that it had conducted these negotiations but stated that none of the purchases purchases had b ee een n concluded. concluded. H ow ever, ever, the company stated: “ [We] [We] cannot give an undertaking not to provide weapons in the future, as, due to the deteriorating security situation in Nigeria, we may want to see the weapons currently used by the Police who protect Shell people and property upgraded.” 8 Shell came under great public pressure, both inside and outside Nigeria, to intervene on behalf of the accused during the trial and fo llowing the conviction conviction of the O goni Nine.” Nine.” Initially, S She hell ll sta sta ted that it w ould be “ da ngerous and w rong” for Shell to “ intervene intervene and use its perceive perceived d ’influence’ to have the jjudgement udgement overturned,” stat ing that “ a comm ercial ercial orga nisation like Shell Shell canno t a nd must never never interfere w ith the le legal gal processes processes of a ny 9 sovereign sovere ign sta te.” She Shell ll called called on “ those who currently currently a dvocat e public public conde condemnat mnat ion and press pressure ure . . . t o refle reflect ct 10 on the possible results of their actions. . . . What is needed from all parties is quiet diplomacy.” Nevertheless, as pressure mounted, CAJ Herkströter, the president of the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, one of the parent companies of t he Roya l D utch/She Shell ll group of compa nies nies that ow ns S SPD PD C of N igeria, igeria, sent a pe personal rsonal letter letter to G en eneral eral Abacha on N ovember ovember 9, 1995, pleading for commutation of t he de death ath sentenc sentencees aga inst inst Ken Saro-W Saro-Wiw iw a and his co-accused on humanitarian grounds. At the same time, Shell explicitly denied that this intervention was a “ comment comment on the proce proceeedings of the tribunal,” re restating stating that “ as a multinationa l company . . . to interfere interfere in 11 such suc h processe processes, s, w hether hether political or legal, in any country w ould be w rong.” Following the executions of the Ogoni Nine, SPDC announced, on December 15, 1995, that the construction contract for the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project, of which Shell is a 25.6 percent shareholder, had been signed—a diplomatic coup for the Nigerian government. In an advertisement placed in many newspapers, Shell defended this decision: Some say we should pull out. And we understand why. But if we do so now, the project will collapse. Maybe forever. So let’s be clear about who we’d be hurting. Not the present Nigerian government, if that’s the intention. . . . The people of the Niger Delta would certainly suffer— the thousands who will work on the project, and thousands more who will benefit in the local economy. . . . Whatever you think of the Nigerian situation today, we know you wouldn’t want us to hurt the Nigerian people. people. O r jeopa jeopa rdise their their future. 1 2 Despite such statements, Shell faced mounting pressure from campaigns to boycott its products in Europe and the United States. At the same time, calls for the adoption of an international embargo on Nigerian oil, in order to force the military government to step down, also threatened Shell’s Nigerian operations. Apparently realizing that its image had been damaged by statements asserting that human rights concerns are not for business to get involved with (though its share price never wavered), the company adjusted its public position. In early 1996 the company affirmed on several occasions its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, while continuing to state that it could not comment on particular cases. 1 3 In May 1996, in response to concerns about the trial facing 19 (later 20) more Ogonis before the same civil disturbances spe special cial tribunal that sentenc sentenced ed Saro-W Saro-Wiw a, Shell Shell stated: “ The Nigerian Nigerian G overnment overnment ha s a duty to investigate the murder of the four Ogoni leaders. And if those investigations lead to the arrest and trial of suspects, then no-one has the right to oppose due legal process. But trials must be fair. And they must be seen to be fair.” 1 4 Shell She ll resumed resumed funding of development development projects projects in O goniland , including the refurbishment refurbishment o f a hospital a nd a training scheme for Ogoni youths. Shell’s development spending in Nigeria generally also increased: SPDC’s community development budget was US$330,000 in 1989, but rose to US$43 million by 1998. 1 5 In 1998 the

In February 1995, the British government gave Shell a license to dispose of its Brent Spar platform by dumping it in the Atlantic Ocean . G ree reenpeace, npeace, among ot her environmenta environmenta l groups, led led a EuropeEurope-w w ide ccampa ampa ign aga inst this decis decision, ion, leading to significant con18

sumer boyco tts of Shell products in Germa ny in part icular. In June 1995, She sumer Shell ll announced tha t it ha d revers reversed ed its decision decision to dump th e platform, though not until January 1998 wa s its final final fate decided: decided: to be re reuse used d to exte extend nd a quay at Stavanger in Norw ay. Further Further in inforformation available from a nd . 19 Ro yal D utch/Shell Shell G roup o f C ompa nies, nies, Stat eme ement nt o f G eneral eneral Business Principle Principles, s, 1997.

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company also held the first o f a serie seriess of planned w orkshops to d iscuss iscuss eenvironmental nvironmental a nd d eve evelopment lopment issue issuess in relat relat ion to its Nigerian operations w ith community repres representatives entatives and ot her interes interested ted parties. In M ay 1999, Shell She ll sta sta ted that it had engaged in “ meetings meetings and consul consulta ta tions . . . with a ra nge of O goni groups and o rganizat ions” w ith the objective objective of building “ trust and understanding as a ba sis for a ddress ddressing ing ssubstantive ubstantive issue issuess of development and environmental management. . . [but that] the company has no plans to resume oil production in O goni in the short short t erm.” 1 6 Local environmenta environmenta l and human rights groups asse asserted, rted, how ever, ever, tha t in practice there had been no change in Shell’s behavior on the ground, despite public statements of a change of heart. MOSOP remained opposed to the reopening of Shell’s production in Ogoniland, stating on the third anniversary of Ken Saro-W Saro-Wiwa iwa ’s eexec xecution ution that the comp company any should “ cl cleean up or clear clear out” by O goni Da y, Ja nuary 4, 2000. 1 7 Despite the inauguration of a civilian government in Nigeria on May 29, 1999, direct talks between Shell and MOSOP to resolve the complaints over Shell’s activities had yet to take place by the end of the year.

Shell’s Inte Internal Re Revi vie ew Following the international focus on its Nigerian holdings in 1995, and the simultaneous furor over the company’ s plans to dispose of its Nort h Sea Sea Brent Spar platf orm b y d umping it in deep deep ocean, t he Roya l D utch/Shell Shell group of companies—of companies—of w hich the ultimate holding compa nies nies are the U.K .-ba .-ba sed sed Shell T Transport ransport and Trad ing PLC (40 percent) and the Netherlands-based Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (60 percent)—undertook a major review of its position on issues of human rights and sustainable development, including an extensive internal and external external consulta consulta tion o n the content of the group’s Statement of G eneral eneral Business Business Principle Principles. s. 1 8 In M arch 1997 the group adopt ed a new Sta tement tement of G eneral eneral Busines Businesss Principle Principles, s, w hich re recognized cognized five “ area s of responsibility,” responsibility,” to shareholders, to customers, customers, to employees employees,, to t hose w ith w hom they do business, business, and t o society. As regard s their their re responsibilities sponsibilities to society, Shell compa nies a re now commit ted “ to cond uct business business as responsible res ponsible corpora corpora te members members of society, society, to observe the law law s of the countries iin n w hich they operate, t o express express support for fundamental human rights in line with the legitimate role of business and to give proper regard to health, safety and the environment consistent with their commitment to contribute to sustainable development.” 1 9 This was the first time that the group had included a general commitment to human rights principles or sus susta ta inable development development in such a document. At the 1997 sharehold ers meetings meetings of t he Dutch a nd Br itish parent com pa nies of t he Roy a l Dut ch/Shell Shell group, the company published the first annual report on the operations of SPDC looking at issues of environmental stand ard s and huma n rights, and t he first first group-wide report report on health, safety, a nd the environment. environment. The The group’s management also said that it agreed in principle with a policy of external verification of environmental informa tion b ut rejected rejected this approa ch for the time being. being. At t he same time Shel Shelll too k steps to integrate its com com-mitment to “ express express supp support ort fo r funda mental human rights” into its inte internal rnal ma nagement procedures procedures,, requiring directors of Shell group companies to make annual statements to Shell headquarters indicating that they have complied complied w ith the requirements requirements of the Statement of G eneral eneral B usiness usiness Principle Principles, s, in the same wa y tha t they have to make sta sta tements tements of compliance w ith financial a nd other standa rds. Shell Shell also produced produced a “ mana gement gement primer” prime r” on huma n rights issue issuess for distribution t hroughout the group. At its 1998 a nnual sha reholders reholders meeting, meeting, She Shell ll Internationa l published published it s first social res responsibili ponsibility ty report, “ Prof its and Principle Principles— s—D D oes There H ave to Be a Cho ice ice?” ?” It “ des describes cribes how w e, the people, people, companies and businesses business es tha t ma ke up the Roy a l Dut ch/Shel Shelll G roup, a re striving striving t o live up to o ur responsibilities responsibilities—fina —fina ncial, social a nd environmental.” The re report port exa mined the company’ s pe performa rforma nce unde underr its new business business principle principles, s, and considered considered the case of Nigeria, Nigeria, r ep epeating eating many o f its previous previous sta sta tements. tements. “ Shell’s Shell’s approach” to the “ issues issues and d ile ilemmas” mmas” surroundin surroundingg human rights w as stated as follows: We support support t he Universal Universal D eclara eclara tion of H uman Rights, a nd ha ve made specific specific re refere ference nce to it in our Business Principles. This is what we have done to ensure we act in the best possible way when confronted with human rights issues.

M ilton Frie Friedma dma n, “ The Social Social Responsibility of Busine Business ss Is to Increase Its Profits,” N ew York Y ork T ime imess Magazine Magazine, September 13, 1970. This famous article is reprinted in a number of books on business ethics, including, for example, Thomas I. White, B usine usiness ss E thics: A Phi losophica losophicall R ead ade er  (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall Humanities, 1993). 20

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• We speak speak out in defence defence of huma n rights when w e feel feel it is jjustifie ustified d to d o so. • We included specific specific reference referencess to huma n rights in our Business Business Principles w hen they were updated in 1997. This followed widespread consultation with many different interest groups, including those defending human rights. • We engage in discussion on human rights issues issues when makin g business business decisions. • We have establishe established d a regular dialogue with groups which defe defend nd human rights. • We ar e setting up Social R esponsibility esponsibility M a na gement Systems Systems designed designed to he help lp in the impleimplementation of our Business Principles, and therefore our stated support for human rights. • We are developing developing aw areness areness training and ma nagement procedures procedures to help re resolve solve human rights dilemmas when they arise. This includes a guide to human rights for managers. In its 1999 1999 report, report, “ People, People, Pla net & Profits: An Act Act of C ommitment,” the second second on issues issues surrounding surrounding susta inable deve developme lopment, nt, Shell Shell des describe cribed d the “ Susta Susta inable Devel Development opment Ma nagement nagement Framew ork” it ha d d ev evel eloped oped since since the pre previous vious year and indicated that the company company w as developing developing a set of “ ke keyy performa performa nce indicators” on these issues to enable stakeholders to compare the relative performance of companies in relation to environmental and social indicators as well as financial ones. None of the other oil companies operating joint ventures with the Nigerian government has engaged in a similar simi lar examinat ion o f t heir heir respons responsee to issues issues surrounding corpora te social resp responsibility onsibility gene generally rally or human rights issues specifically. Internationally, BP-Amoco—which has itself faced fierce criticism of the security arrangements for its facilities in Colombia, targeted by guerrilla forces fighting against the government—is the only oil company that has engaged with the issues to a similar extent. None of the U.S. companies or other European companies, including U.S.-based Mobil, Chevron, and Texaco, French Elf, and Italian Agip, which operate joint ventures in Nigeria, have begun to think along the same lines. Chevron’s Nigerian subsidiary, which allowed its boats and helicopters to be used by the Nigerian military on at least two occasions in 1998 and 1999 in operations a gainst una rmed protesters protesters or villagers, has begun to f ace public pressu pressure re to ensure ensure that it is not complicit complicit in future human rights violat ions. As of la te 1999, 1999, how eve ever, r, the company continued to ma inta in tha t it ha d no responsibili responsibility ty o r role in relation relation to huma n rights issue issues. s. It did, how eve ever, r, a nnounce iincre ncreased ased development deve lopment spending spending in the communities w here it o perated in N igeria. igeria.

T he Debate on Corporate Corporate Social Responsibil biliity In 1970, freefree-market market economist economist M ilton Friedma Friedma n w rote tha t “ the one and only social res responsibili ponsibility ty of busi20 ness” nes s” is to increase its profits. Whi While le this view view is less less prevalent prevalent to da y tha n it w as 30 years a go, ma ny business business leaders and economists still take the view that the best way for companies to promote social development in a particular country is simply by increasing the overall level of economic activity through trade and investment. In this view, the manner in which the revenue generated is administered, the environmental standards that are tolerated, or respect for human rights in the country generally are simply irrelevant, and regard for them may even be harmful to the company’s main business—and also, in the long run, to the social development of the country itself. If the same standards are applied to developing countries as to the developed world, they will never catch up: even below-market wages and dangerous conditions of work for third-world employees can be justified as being better than no job at all. Shareholders could justifiably complain if directors paid attention to anything that might impact negatively on the financial bottom line. Increasingly, however, this attitude is changing, as companies have come under pressure from consumers and activists worried about the effects of the globalization of the economy on the poor people of the world, but also a s company directors have themselve themselvess come to see tha t w ider is issue suess of socia l deve development lopment can a ffect their ow n operations. The The new new buzz phra se is the “ triple bott om line” line” of economic, soc social, ial, a nd environmental environmental out comes. A good corporate reputation is increasingly seen as a valuable asset in attracting customers and recruiting employees employees.. G ood community relatio ns promoted by properly administered administered developme development nt progra ms can, just like good labor relations, minimize shut-downs caused by protests about the way the company operates. For example, the U.S. government gave extensive diplomatic backing to the Enron Corporation in the face of substantial criticisms of a major project the energy company was undertaking in India. See T he E nron Cor Corpora poration: tion: C orporate C omplicity omplicity in H um uma an Rig R ig hts V iola iolations tions (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999). 21

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Although low wages and low environmental standards can be useful to a company in the short term, activists and some managers and economists argue that a company will make more money in the long term in a country marked by good governance, the rule of law, low levels of corruption, an educated population, and the sort of stable political and economic framework that is only achieved when a government is accountable to its own people. Studies have found no correlation between foreign direct investment in itself and respect for human rights in the developing world; in Nigeria, it seems that the presence of the oil multinationals may rather have strengthene stre ngthened d t he hold on pow er of success successive ive military military regimes regimes that violated huma n rights a nd sto le the mone moneyy supposed to promote development. Companies therefore have an interest in taking positive steps to promote social development development and minimize negative negative eenvironmental nvironmental effec effects, ts, a s w ell ell a s to max imize profits. International law, historically focused on relations between states, is also adapting to the new climate. Human rights groups and others have long argued that states have an obligation not only to respect human rights themsel themselves ves but a lso to enforce human rights law aga inst private acto rs, including companies. companies. The incre increas as ing power of transnationa l corporations within the global economy economy has brought w ith it a corresponding corresponding aw areness of the need for an international regime that places direct responsibilities on these companies. When the global resources of a transnational corporation are substantially larger than those of the country where it is operating, the government of that country may not be in a position to enforce international, or even domestic, law against the company at all; especially when the company often receives the diplomatic support of the firstw orld state w he here re it it ha s its ccorporate orporate he headq adq uarters. uarters. 2 1 As far back as 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the founding document of international human rights law , called called on “ ev every ery individual individual and every organ of society” society” to promot e res respe pect ct for human rights. In the 1970s, 1970s, at t he height height of discus discussion sion about the establishment establishment of a “ new internationa l economic economic order,” tw o other documents adopted by international bodies explicitly referred to companies. In 1977 the International Labor Organization (ILO), a tripartite organization with representatives of governments, business, and labor having access to its decision-making organs as members of national delegations, adopted a Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, which committed all parties concerned conce rned by the declara declara tion to “ respe respect ct the Universal Universal D eclara eclara tion of H uman R ights and the corresponding corresponding International Covenants adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations as well as the Constitution of the International Labor Organization and its principles according to which freedom of expression and association a re es esse sential ntial to sustained progress.” progress.” In 1976 the Orga nizat ion for Economic Co operation a nd D eve evelopment lopment (OECD ) ad opted a D eclara eclara tion a nd G uideline uideliness on Inte Internat rnat ional Investment Investment for M ultinationa l Enterpris Enterprises es,, though this document, applicable only a mong the rich ssta ta tes of t he OEC D , ma de no expl explicit icit refere reference nce to huma n rights or social responsibility. The U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, established in 1974, also deveeloped dev loped over many years a dra ft U .N. Cod e of C onduct on Transnational Transnational C orporations, finally submitte submitted d in 1990, which provides provides that “ tra nsnationa l corporations shall respe respect ct human rights and f unda mental freedoms freedoms in the countries countries in w hich they they operate.” The code code w as never never forma lly ado pted by the United Na tions, because of opposition from rich countries to some of its provisions, especially those relating to treatment of transnationals by host countries. Efforts to place direct responsibilities on transnational corporations at the international level picked up in the late 1990s. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of M inorities inorities decided decided in 1998 to esta esta blish a w orking group on the relationship betw betw ee een n human rights and the activities of transnational corporations. The World Bank, often involved in financing large infrastructure projects projects in w hich transna tiona l corpora tions are involved, set set up a w orking group to deve develop lop guidelines guidelines on best international practice for investment in the oil sector. Various branches of the U.S. government have taken steps to impose obligations on U.S. businesses operating abroad with respect to human rights, as well as, more commonly, economic objectives. The most significant legislative initiative in this regard was the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986, since repealed, designed to limit investment in South Africa under the apartheid regime. In 1996 the United States passed legislation, partially modeled on the CAAA, giving the president authority to prohibit new investment by U .S. citizens citizens or companies in Burma (Mya nmar ) if if the Burmese Burmese military military government government physically ha rmed, rearrested, or exiled opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, or committed large-scale oppression against the political opposition. In Ma y 1995, Preside President nt C linton announced a set of “ model busi busines nesss principl principles es,” ,” a volunta ry code of ethics to be used used by U.S.-based multinationa l companies, companies, w hich supports supports respe respect ct for f undamenta l human a nd labo r rights, though w ithout sufficient sufficient deta il to give cl clear ear guidance. The The Reverend Reverend Leon Leon Sulli Sullivan, van, aut hor of the “ Sullivan Sullivan Principles” Principles” on U.S. investment investment in South South Africa before the C AAA AAA came into force, put forw ard a new  10

 

set of “ G loba l Sullivan set Sullivan Principles Principles”” in Februa Februa ry 1999; this voluntary code commits those companies that signe signed d it to a se sett of somew hat vague principle principles, s, inc including luding “ supp support ort fo r universal universal human rights.” Within the European European Union, the European Parliament Committee on Development and Cooperation adopted a report in December 1998 proposing the establishment of an independently monitored E.U. code of conduct for multinationals. Although these initiatives have yet to place legally binding responsibilities on transnational corporations in relation to issues of social responsibility, it seems that it will be only a matter of time before they do so— though r esistance esistance can b e eexpecte xpected d fr om t he busine business ss sector. sector. In t he meant meant ime, at le least ast some companies are find ing it to be in their interests to take their own initiatives to address these questions. While environmental and human rights a ctivists ctivists ha ve given given a gua rded w elcome elcome to these efforts, they note tha t sta tements tements of intent intent a re not w orth the paper they they a re written on w ithout strategies strategies to ensure ensure the their ir impl impleme ementat ntat ion, and w ithout independent auditing of environmental and human rights performance. No oil company, including Shell, has yet allowed such an audit. Meanwhile, by the end of 1999 overall relations between Shell and the oil-producing communities of the Niger Delta (not only the Ogoni) had, if anything, worsened since the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, despite Shell’s efforts to improve community relations, in particular by increasing development spending and professionalizing the management of its development projects. Although much of this deterioration could be attributed to the government’s failure to respond to the demands of the peoples in the delta, rather than to Shell’s own activities, the continuing problems also illustrate the difficulty of putting the fine words of the Statement of G eneral eneral Business Business Principles Principles into pra ctice. ctice.

Discussion

D iscussion iscussion I ss ssue ue 1: Do companies have a responsibility to do more than maximize profits and returns to shareholders? If they do, how far does it extend? Does it include the provision of good wages and working conditions for employees; maintenance of the highest environmental standards; development spending in communities where they operate; concern over the manner in which the government to which they pay tax and other revenues spends the money; actions to ensure that their own security guards do not abuse people with whom they come in contact and that those who object nonviolently to their activities are not victimized by the government? Are these responsibilities greater if a company is one of a dominant few in the country where it is operating?

D iscussion iscussion I ss ssue ue 2: D o co mpanies have res responsibili ponsibilities ties in re relatio latio n to ab uses uses by government government security security forces in countries where they operate? What What if a buses buses are concentra concentra ted in a region w here they domina te the local local economy? What if t hey have called for security force protection, for example against protesters at their facilities? If they do have responsibilities, does it extend to making private representations to the government? Public representations? Insisting on screening security officers posted to their facilities to ensure that abusive individuals are not included? O ffering le legal gal o r other a ssistance ssistance to the victims? Taking Taking steps to a void o r defuse ssituations ituations w here similar similar ab uses could occur in future?

D iscussion iscussion I ss ssue ue 3: Should companies withdraw from countries ruled by military dictatorships or where serious human rights violations are systematic and widespread?

D iscussion iscussion I ss ssue ue 4: Is it permis permissi sible ble for companies to t ake adva ntage of the absence absence of o r fa ilu ilure re to enforce local law s on pay and conditions, the environment, compensation, and the like? Or should companies follow best international prac-

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tice in their operations, whatever local laws may be, so that the standards they follow are the same all over the world?

D iscussion iscussion I ss ssue ue 5: If a government states that it has the right to set its own priorities and that, in its case, rapid industrial development is more importa importa nt tha n environme environmenta nta l protection, should outsiders res respe pect ct tha t view? D oes the type of government make a difference? If it is a democracy, should the interests of citizens affected by environmental da mage outw eigh eigh those of t he people people bene benefiting fiting fro m development, development, or vice vers versa? a?

D iscussion iscussion I ss ssue ue 6:

Should there be an international legal regime governing the rights and responsibilities of transnational corporations? What should it include? Who should monitor and enforce compliance?

Further Reading T he O goni goni C ri sis and and the the N iger iger D elt lta a H uman R ights Wat Wat ch, “ The O goni Crisis: A C ase-Study ase-Study of M ilitary R epress epression ion in S Southeastern outheastern Nigeria” Nigeria” : A Human Rights Watch Short Report (New York: Human Rights Watch, July 1995). Human Rights Watch, T he Pr i ce of O il: C orporate orporate R esponsibili sponsibility ty and and H uma uman Rig R ights hts V iolations iolations in N ig ige er ia’ ia’ss

O il Pr P r od oduc ucing ing C omm ommunities unities (New York: Human Rights Watch, February 1999), available at . Michael Birnbaum Q.C., Fundam Fundamental ntal R i ghts D enied: nied: R epo porr t of the T r ial of K en Sar Sar o-Wiw o-W iwa a and and O ther ther s (London: Article 19, June 1995), and Michael Birnbaum Q.C.,  A T ravesty ravesty of La L aw and and Jus Justice tice:: A n Analys Analysis is of  the Judgment Judgment in the Ca C ase of K en Sar Sar o-W i wa and and O ther ther s (London: Article 19, December 1995). Amnesty International, N ige ig eria ri a: T heO goni Tr T r ials and D ete tention ntionss (London: Amne Amnesty sty Int ernationa l, September September 1995). 1995). Statements

and

reports from Shell are available and .

on

the

Shell

web

sites

,

A summary summary of a World Ba nk report report on the environment environment of the Niger Delta is availa ble at .

I nter nter nati nationa onall L aw  The U.N. Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development is available at . The O ECD G uideline uideliness for Multina tiona l Ente Enterprise rprisess are availa ble at . The ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy is available at .

G ener ner al book book s and and ar ar ticle ti cless on N i geri a, on the oil i ndustr ndustry, y, and on corpor corpora ate r esponsibi sponsibilility: ty:

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Tom Forrest, Poli Politics tics and and Eco E conom nomic ic D evelop velopm ment in N i geria geri a (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1995). Terry Lynn Karl, T he P ar adox of P le lenty: nty: O i l B ooms ooms and and Petr Petro-Sta o-State tess (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Johannesburg: October 1998), Volume Four (Institutional and Special Hearings), chapter two (Business and Labour), available at x.htm> [a discussion of the role of business in supporting the apartheid government]. C hristopher hristopher L. Avery, Avery, “ Business Business and H uman R ights in in a T Time ime of C hange,” paper prese presented nted to the Co lloquium on the Liability of Multinational C orporations Under International International La w , o rganized rganized b y Erasmus Univ Univeersi rsity ty in Rotterdam, May 1999, available at . Ba rba ra A. Fre Frey, y, “ The Legal Legal a nd Ethical Responsibilitie Responsibilitiess of T Transna ransna tiona l Co rporat ions in the Protection of Internation Inte rnational al H uman Rights,” Rights,”  M inneso innesota ta Journa Journall o off G loba lobal Tra Tr ade 6, (1997), p.153.

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Author’s Biography Br Bronwe onwen Manb Manby is a researcher in the Africa Division of Human Rights Watch, where she is responsible for the w ork of the organization on N igeria igeria a nd South Africa, Africa, a s w ell as ad vocacy w ork on o the therr African African countrie countries. s. She is the autho r of the H uman R ights Wat Wat ch book-length book-length report “ The Price of Oil: C orpora te Res Responsibility ponsibility and H uman R ights Violations Violations in in Nigeria’s Nigeria’s O il Producing Producing Co mmuni mmunitie ties.” s.” She has a B.A. in Modern H is istory tory from Oxford University, and an M.A. in International Affairs from Columbia University.

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