Separate Opinion, Dissenting and Concurring Justice Puno
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nat. law...
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[Philosophy [Philosoph y of Law]
SEPARATE SEPARA TE OPINION OPINIO N PUNO, J ..::
While I concur in the result of the ponencia of Mr Mr.. Ju Justi stice ce Ca Carpi rpio, o, the rul ruling ing on wh wheth ether er or no nott pr priva ivate te respondent Dimaano could invoke her rights against unreasonable search and seizure and to the eclusion of evidence resulting resulting therefrom compels this humble opinion. !he ponenciastates that "#t$he correct issue is whether the %ill of &ights was operative during the interregnum from 'ebruar( )*, +-* #the da( Corazon C. /uino took her oath as 0residen 0resident$ t$ to March )1, +-* #immediate #immediatel( l( before the adoption of the 'reedom 3+4 Constitution$.2 !he ma5orit( holds that the %ill of &ights was not operative, thus private respondent Dimaano cannot invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the eclusionar( right as her house was searched searche d and her properties were seized during during the interregnum or on March 6, +-*. M( disagreement disagreement is not with the ruling that the %ill of &ights was not operative at that time, but with the conclusion that the private respo res pond ndent ent ha has s los lostt an and d ca cann nnot ot inv invoke oke th the e rig right ht ag agai ainst nst un unre reaso asona nable ble se sear arch ch an and d se seizu izure re an and d the eclusionar( eclusio nar( right. 7sing a different lens in viewing the problem at hand, I respectfull( submit that the crucial issue iss ue fo forr res resolu olutio tion n is wh whet ether her she ca can n inv invoke oke th these ese ri right ghts s in th the e ab abse sence nce of a con const stitu itutio tion n un under der the etraord etr aordinar inar( ( circ circumst umstanc ances es afte afterr the +-* 8D9 &evolution &evolution.. !he /ue /uestio stion n bogg boggles les the inte intellec llect, t, and is interesting, interesti ng, to sa( the least, perhaps even to those not half:interested half:interested in the law. law. %ut the /uestion of whether whether the 'ilipinos were bereft of fundamental rights during the one month interregnum is not as perpleing as the /uestion of whether the world was without a ;od in the three da(s that ;od the 9on descended into the dead before 6 Co Cons nsti titu tuti tion on,, in fo forc rce e pr prio iorr to 'e 'ebr brua uar( r( )6 )6:) :)?, ?, +-*. =onethe =onetheless, less, it is widel( accepted that under natural natural law, the right of revolution revolution is an inherent right of the people. !hus, we 5ustified the creation of a new legal order after the +-* 8D9 8D9 &evolution, viz @ “From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as ‘an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable.’ (. (. !lack, andbook andbo ok of "merican #onstitutional $aw %%, &th edition, ')*+ %t has been said that ‘the locus of positive lawmaking power lies with the people of the state’ and from there is derived ‘the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any e-isting form of government without regard to the e-isting constitution.’
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[Philosophy [Philosoph y of Law] (‘olitical /ights as olitical 0uestions, 1he arado- of $uther v. !orden’, '22 arvard $aw /eview '')3, ''44 5'6*7+8547
It is m( considered view that under this same natural law, private respondent Dimaano has a right against unreasonable unreaso nable search and seizure and to eclude evidence evidence obtained as a conse/uence of such illegal act. !o epla e plain in m( the thesis sis,, I wil willl fir first st la( down down th the e re relev levant ant law be befo fore re ap appl( pl(ing ing it to the fac facts ts of th the e cas case e at bar. !racking down the elusive elusive law that will govern the case at bar will will take us to the lab(rinths of philosoph( and histor(. !o be sure, the difficult( of the case at bar lies less in the application of the law, but more in finding find ing the app applica licable ble law. I sha shallll take up the challenge challenge even if the route take takes s neg negotia otiating ting,, but without without trespassing, on political and religious thickets.
II. Natural Law and Natural Rights
s earl( as the the ;reek civilizatio civilization, n, man has alluded alluded to a higher, higher, natural standard standard or law to which a state state and its laws must conform. 9ophocles unmistakabl( articulates this in his poignant literar( piece, Antigone. In this mid:fifth centur( thenian traged(, a civil war divided two brothers, one died defending !hebes, and the other, 0ol(neices, died attacking it. !he king forbade 0ol(neicesA burial, commanding instead that his bod( be left to be devoured b( beasts. %ut according to ;reek religious ideas, onl( a burial :even a token one with a handful of earth: could give repose to his soul. Moved b( piet(, 0ol(neicesA sister, ntigone, disobe(ed the command of the king and buried buried the bod(. bod(. 9he was arrested. arrested. %rought before before the king who asks asks her if she knew of his command and wh( she disobe(ed, ntigone replies@ “. . .1hese laws were not ordained of 9eus, "nd she who sits enthroned with gods below, :ustice, enacted not these human laws. ;or did % deem that thou, a mortal man, #ouldst by a breath annul and override 1he immutable unwritten laws of heaven. 1hey were not born today nor yesterday< 1hey die not< and none knoweth whence they sprang.85&7
ntigone ntigon e was condemned condemned to be buried buried alive alive for violating violating the the order of of the king. king. 3?4 ristotle also wrote in his Nicomachean Ethics @ "Bf political 5ustice part is natural, part legal natural, that which ever(where ever(where has the same force and does not eist b( peopleA peopleAs s thinking this or that legal, that which is originall( indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisonerAs ransom shall be mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, . . .2 3*4 ristotle states states that "#p$articular "#p$articular law is that which each communit( la(s down and applies to its own members@ this is partl( partl( written and partl( unwritten. unwritten. 7nivers 7niversal al law is the law of =ature. 'or there reall( is, as ever( one to some etent divines, a natural 5ustice and in5ustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other. It is this that 9ophoclesA ntigone ntigone clearl( means when she sa(s that the burial of 0ol(neices was a 5ust act in spite of the prohibition@ she means that it was 5ust b( nature.2 3>4 Eater, the &oman orator Cicero wrote of natural law in the first centur( %.C. in this wise@
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[Philosophy [Philosoph y of Law] (‘olitical /ights as olitical 0uestions, 1he arado- of $uther v. !orden’, '22 arvard $aw /eview '')3, ''44 5'6*7+8547
It is m( considered view that under this same natural law, private respondent Dimaano has a right against unreasonable unreaso nable search and seizure and to eclude evidence evidence obtained as a conse/uence of such illegal act. !o epla e plain in m( the thesis sis,, I wil willl fir first st la( down down th the e re relev levant ant law be befo fore re ap appl( pl(ing ing it to the fac facts ts of th the e cas case e at bar. !racking down the elusive elusive law that will govern the case at bar will will take us to the lab(rinths of philosoph( and histor(. !o be sure, the difficult( of the case at bar lies less in the application of the law, but more in finding find ing the app applica licable ble law. I sha shallll take up the challenge challenge even if the route take takes s neg negotia otiating ting,, but without without trespassing, on political and religious thickets.
II. Natural Law and Natural Rights
s earl( as the the ;reek civilizatio civilization, n, man has alluded alluded to a higher, higher, natural standard standard or law to which a state state and its laws must conform. 9ophocles unmistakabl( articulates this in his poignant literar( piece, Antigone. In this mid:fifth centur( thenian traged(, a civil war divided two brothers, one died defending !hebes, and the other, 0ol(neices, died attacking it. !he king forbade 0ol(neicesA burial, commanding instead that his bod( be left to be devoured b( beasts. %ut according to ;reek religious ideas, onl( a burial :even a token one with a handful of earth: could give repose to his soul. Moved b( piet(, 0ol(neicesA sister, ntigone, disobe(ed the command of the king and buried buried the bod(. bod(. 9he was arrested. arrested. %rought before before the king who asks asks her if she knew of his command and wh( she disobe(ed, ntigone replies@ “. . .1hese laws were not ordained of 9eus, "nd she who sits enthroned with gods below, :ustice, enacted not these human laws. ;or did % deem that thou, a mortal man, #ouldst by a breath annul and override 1he immutable unwritten laws of heaven. 1hey were not born today nor yesterday< 1hey die not< and none knoweth whence they sprang.85&7
ntigone ntigon e was condemned condemned to be buried buried alive alive for violating violating the the order of of the king. king. 3?4 ristotle also wrote in his Nicomachean Ethics @ "Bf political 5ustice part is natural, part legal natural, that which ever(where ever(where has the same force and does not eist b( peopleA peopleAs s thinking this or that legal, that which is originall( indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisonerAs ransom shall be mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, . . .2 3*4 ristotle states states that "#p$articular "#p$articular law is that which each communit( la(s down and applies to its own members@ this is partl( partl( written and partl( unwritten. unwritten. 7nivers 7niversal al law is the law of =ature. 'or there reall( is, as ever( one to some etent divines, a natural 5ustice and in5ustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other. It is this that 9ophoclesA ntigone ntigone clearl( means when she sa(s that the burial of 0ol(neices was a 5ust act in spite of the prohibition@ she means that it was 5ust b( nature.2 3>4 Eater, the &oman orator Cicero wrote of natural law in the first centur( %.C. in this wise@
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[Philosophy [Philosoph y of Law] “1rue law is right reason in agreement with nature< it is of universal application, unchang ing and everlasting< it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. "nd it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. %t is a sin to try to alter this law, law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible impossible to abolish it entirely. entirely. =e cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for for an e-pounder or interpreter of it. "nd there will not be different laws at /ome and at "thens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and at all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, >od, over us all, for he is the author of this law, law, its promulgator, promulgator, and its enforcing ?udge. =hoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and a nd by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment.8567
!his allusion to an eternal, higher, and universal natural law continues from classical anti/uit( to this da(. !he face of natural law, however, has changed throughout the classical, medieval, modern, and contemporar( periods of histor(. In the medieval times, shortl( after ++6, ;ratian published the Decretum, a collection and reconciliation of the canon laws in force, which distinguished between divine or natural law and human law. 9imilar to the writings of the earliest Church 'athers, he related this natural law to the Decalogue and to ChristAs commandment of love of oneAs neighbor. neighbor. "!he law of nature is that which is contain contained ed in the Eaw and the ;ospel, b( which ever(one is commanded to do unto others as he would wish to be done unto him, and is prohibited from doing unto others that which he would be unwilling to be done unto himself.2 34 !his natural law precedes in time and rank all things, such that statutes whether ecclesiastical or secular, if contrar( to law, were to be held null and void.3+F4 !he following centur( saw a shift from a natural law concept that was revelation:centered to a concept related to manAs reason and what was discoverable b( it, under the influence of ristotleAs writings which were coming to be known in the West. William of uerre uerre acknowledged acknowledged the human capacit( to recognize recognize good and evil and ;odAs will, will, and made reason the criterion of natural law. =atural law was thus id quod naturalis ratio sine omni deliberatione aut sine magna dictat esse faciendum or "that which natural reason, without much or even an( need of reflection, tells us what we must do.2 3++4 9i 9imi mila larl rl( (, le lea and nder er 3+)4 of +4 !hus, the merican Constitution ma( be understood as comprising three elements. 'irst, it creates the structure and authorit( of a republican form of government second, it provides a division of powers among the different parts of the national government and the checks and balances of these powers and third, it inhibits governmentAs power vis::vis the rights of individuals, rights eistent and potential, patent and latent. !hese three parts have one prime ob5ective@ to uphold the libert( of the people. 3>)4 %ut while the constitution guarantees and protects the fundamental rights of the people, it should be stressed that it does not create them. s held b( man( of the merican &evolution patriots, "liberties do not result from charters charters rather are in the nature of declarations of pre:eisting rights.2 3>64 John dams, one of the patriots, claimed that natural rights are founded "in the frame of human nature, rooted in the constitution of the intellect and moral world.2 3>14 !hus, it is said of natural rights vis::vis the constitution@ “. . . (t+hey e-ist before constitutions and independently of them. Constitutions enumerate such rights and provide against their deprivation or infringement, but do not create them. %t is supposed that all power, all rights, and all authority are vested in the people before they form or adopt a constitution. !y such an instrument, they create a government, and define and limit the powers which the constitution is to secure and the government respect. !ut they do not thereby invest the citiCens of the commonwealth with any natural rights that they did not before possess.85*37 (emphasis supplied+
constitution is described as follows@ “" #onstitution is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private rights< it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government< it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal and political freedom< it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed for their protection in the
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[Philosophy of Law] enjoyment of the rights and powers which they possessed before the Constitution was made , it is but the framework of the political government, and necessarily based upon the pree-isting condition of laws, rights, habits and modes of thought. 1here is nothing primitive in it< it is all derived from a known source. %t presupposes an organiCed society, law, order, propriety, personal freedom, a love of political liberty, and enough of cultivated intelligence to know how to guard against the encroachments of tyranny.85*B7 (emphasis supplied+
!hat EockeAs modern natural law and rights theor( was influential to those who framed and ratified the 7nited 9tates constitution and served as its theoretical foundation is undeniable. 3>>4 In a letter in which ;eorge Washington formall( submitted the Constitution to Congress in 9eptember +>->, he spoke of the difficulties of drafting the document in words borrowed from the standard eighteenth:centur( natural rights anal(sis@ “Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest . 1he magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the ob?ect to be obtained. %t is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved . . . .85*67 (emphasis supplied+
=atural law is thus to be understood not as a residual source of constitutional rights but instead, as the reasoning that implied the necessit( to sacrifice natural libert( to government in a written constitution. =atural law and natural rights were concepts that eplained and 5ustified written constitutions. 3>4 With the establishment of civil government and a constitution, there arises a conceptual distinction between natural rights and civil rights, difficult though to define their scope and delineation. It has been proposed that natural rights are those rights that "appertain to man in right of his eistence.2 3-F4 !hese were fundamental rights endowed b( ;od upon human beings, "all those rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not in5urious to the natural rights of others.2 3-+4 Bn the other hand, civil rights are those that "appertain to man in right of his being a member of societ(.2 3-)4 !hese rights, however, are derived from the natural rights of individuals since@ “@an did not enter into society to become worse off than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have those rights better secured. is natural rights are the foundation of all his rights.85647
Civil rights, in this sense, were those natural rights particularl( rights to securit( and protection which b( themselves, individuals could not safeguard, rather re/uiring the collective support of civil societ( and government. !hus, it is said@ “Dvery civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pree-isting in the individual, but to the en?oyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent.856&7
!he distinction between natural and civil rights is "between that class of natural rights which man retains after entering into societ(, and those which he throws into the common stock as a member of societ(.2 3-?4 !he natural rights retained b( the individuals after entering civil societ( were "all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind,23-*4 i.e., the rights to freedom of thought, to freedom of religious belief and to freedom of epression in its various forms. !he individual could eercise these rights without government assistance, but government has the role of protecting these natural rights from interference b( others and of desisting from itself infringing such rights. ;overnment should also enable individuals to eercise more effectivel( the natural rights the( had echanged for civil rights like the rights to securit( and protection : when the( entered into civil societ(. 3->4 9|Page
[Philosophy of Law] merican natural law scholars in the +>-Fs and earl( +>Fs occasionall( specified which rights were natural and which were not. Bn the Eockean assumption that the state of nature was a condition in which all humans were e/uall( free from sub5ugation to one another and had no common superior, merican scholars tended to agree that natural libert( was the freedom of individuals in the state of nature.3--4 Natural rightswere understood to be simpl( a portion of this undifferentiated natural libert( and were often broadl( categorized as the rights to life, libert(, and propert( or life, libert( and the pursuit of happiness. More specificall(, the( identified as natural rights the free eercise of religion, freedom of conscience, 3-4 freedom of speech and press, right to self:defense, right to bear arms, right to assemble and right to oneAs reputation. 3F4 In contrast, certain other rights, such as habeas corpus and 5ur( rights, do not eist in the state of nature , but eist onl( under the laws of civil government or the constitution because the( are essential for restraining government. 3+4 !he( are called civil rights not onl( in the sense that the( are protected b( constitutions or other laws, but also in the sense that the( are ac/uired rights which can onl( eist under civil government. 3)4 In his !onstitutional "a#$ %lack states that natural rights ma( be used to describe those rights which belong to man b( virtue of his nature and depend upon his personalit(. "4 !he merican Declaration of Independence of Jul( 1, +>>*, the revolutionar( manifesto of the thirteen newl(:independent states of merica that were formerl( colonies of %ritain, reads@ “=e hold these 1ruths to be selfevident, that all @en are created equal, that they are endowed by their #reator with certain inalienable Rights , that among these are $ife, $iberty, and the ursuit of appiness. 1hat to secure these /ights, >overnments are instituted among @en, deriving their ?ust owers from the #onsent of the >overned, that whenever any Form of >overnment becomes destructive of these Dnds, it is the /ight of the eople to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new >overnment, laying its Foundation on such rinciples, and organiCing its owers in such Form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Eafety and appiness.8567 (emphasis supplied+
* 3+F14 and are binding as international law upon governments subscribing to them. lthough admittedl(, there will be differences in interpreting particular statements of rights and freedoms in these 7nited =ations instruments "in the light of varied cultures and historical traditions, the basis of the covenants is a common agreement on the fundamental ob5ective of the dignit( and worth of the human person. 9uch agreement is implied in adherence to the #7nited =ations$ Charter and corresponds to the universal urge for freedom and dignit( which strives for epression, despite var(ing degrees of culture and civilization and despite the countervailing forces of repression and authoritarianism.2 3+F?4 4 we did not uphold lack of instruction as an ecuse for killing because we recognized the "offense of taking oneAs life being forbidden b( natural law and therefore within instinctive knowledge and feeling of ever( human being not deprived of reason.2 3++-4 In &o%il Oil Philiines, In". v. 'io"ares, et al. ,3++4 Chief Justice 'ernando acknowledged the influence of natural law in stressing that the element of a promise is the basis of contracts. In &anila &emorial Par( !emeter$, In". v. !ourt o# Aeals, et al. ,3+)F4 the Court invoked the doctrine of estoppel which we have repeatedl( pronounced is predicated on, and has its origin in e/uit(, which broadl( defined, is 5ustice according to natural law. In )u !on v. Iil, et al .,3+)+4 we recognized the application of natural law in maritime commerce. !he Court has also identified in several cases certain natural rights such as the right to libert(, 3+))4 the right of epatriation, 3+)64 the right of parents over their children which provides basis for a parentAs visitorial rights over his illegitimate children, 3+)14 and the right to the fruits of oneAs industr(. 3+)?4 In Simon, *r. et al. v. !ommission on +uman Rights, 3+)*4 the Court defined human rights, civil rights, and political rights. In doing so, we considered the 7nited =ations instruments to which the 0hilippines is a 13 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] signator(, namel( the 7D4 the ICC0& and the IC89C&. 9till, we observed that "human rights2 is so generic a term that at best, its definition is inconclusive. %ut the term "human rights2 is closel( identified to the "universall( accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generall( considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life,2 3+)-4 i.e., the individualAs social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. 3+)4 Bn the other hand, we defined civil rights as referring to@ “. . . those (rights+ that belong to every citiCen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all inhabitants, and are no t connected with the organiCation or administration of government. 1hey include the rights to property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Ar, as otherwise defined, civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citiCenship in a state or community. Euch term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.85'427
;uarantees against involuntar( servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt are also identified as civil rights. 3+6+4 !he CourtAs definition of civil rights was made in light of their distinction from political rights which refer to the right to participate, directl( or indirectl(, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis'a'vis the management of government. 3+6)4 !o distill whether or not the CourtAs reference to natural law and natural rights finds basis in a natural law tradition that has influenced 0hilippine law and government, we turn to 0hilippine constitutional law histor(.
. +istor$ o# the Philiine !onstitution and the ill o# Rights
During the 9panish colonization of the 0hilippines, 'ilipinos ardentl( fought for their fundamental rights. !he 0ropaganda Movement spearheaded b( our national hero Jose &izal, Marcelo 4 %( this time, the relations between the merican troops and the 'ilipino forces had become precarious as it became more evident that the mericans planned to sta(. In 9eptember +--, the &evolutionar( Congress was inaugurated whose primar( goal was to formulate and promulgate a Constitution. !he fruit of their efforts was the Malolos Constitution which, as admitted b( 'elipe Calderon who drafted it, was based on the constitutions of 9outh merican &epublics 3+6-4 while the %ill of &ights was substantiall( a cop( of the 9panish Constitution. 3+64 !he %ill of &ights included among others, freedom of religion, freedom from arbitrar( arrests and imprisonment, securit( of the domicile and of papers and effects against arbitrar( searches and seizures, inviolabilit( of correspondence, due process in criminal prosecutions, freedom of epression, freedom of association, and right of peaceful petition for the redress of grievances. Its rticle )- stated that "#t$he enumeration of the rights granted in this title does not impl( the prohibition of an( others not epressl( stated.2 3+1F4 !his suggests that natural law was the source of these rights. 3+1+4 !he Malolos Constitution was short:lived. It went into effect in Januar( +-, about two months before the ratification of the !reat( of 0aris transferring sovereignt( over the Islands to the 7nited 9tates. Within a month after the constitutionAs promulgation, war with the 7nited 9tates began and the &epublic survived for onl( about ten months. Bn March )6, +F+, merican forces captured guinaldo and a week later, he took his oath of allegiance to the 7nited 9tates. 3+1)4 In the earl( months of the war against the 7nited 9tates, merican 0resident McKinle( sent the 'irst 0hilippine Commission headed b( Jacob ;ould 9churman to assess the 0hilippine situation. Bn 'ebruar( ), +FF, in its report to the 0resident, the Commission stated that the -iliino eole wanted a%ove all a guarantee o# those #undamental human rights whi"h Ameri"ans hold to %e the natural and inaliena%le %irthright o# the individual %ut whi"h under Sanish domination in the Philiines had %een shame#ull$ invaded and ruthlessl$ tramled uon .23+164 #emphasis supplied$ In response to this, 0resident McKinle(, in his )nstruction of pril >, +FF to the 9econd 0hilippine Commission, provided an authorization and guide for the establishment of a civil government in the 0hilippines and stated that "#u$pon ever( division and branch of the government of the 0hilippines . . . must be imposed these inviolable rules . . .2 !hese "inviolable rules2 were almost literal reproductions of the 'irst to =inth and the !hirteenth mendment of the 7nited 9tates Constitution, with the addition of the prohibition of bills of attainder and e* post facto laws in rticle +, 9ection of said Constitution. !he "inviolable rules2 or %ill of &ights provided, among others, that no person shall be deprived of life, libert(, or propert( without due process of law that no person shall be twice put in 5eopard( for the same offense or be compelled to be a witness against himself that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceabl( assemble and petition the ;overnment for redress of grievances. 9cholars have characterized the )nstruction as the "Magna Charta of the 0hilippines2 and as a "worth( rival of the Eaws of the Indies.2 3+114 15 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] !he "inviolable rules2 of the )nstruction were re:enacted almost eactl( in the 0hilippine %ill of +F), 3+1?4 an act which temporaril( provided for the administration of the affairs of the civil government in the 0hilippine Islands, 3+1*4 and in the 0hilippine utonom( ct of ++*, 3+1>4 otherwise known as the Jones Eaw, which was an act to declare the purpose of the people of the 7nited 9tates as to the future of the 0hilippine Islands and to provide an autonomous government for it. 3+1-4 !hese three organic acts : the )nstruction, the 0hilippine %ill of +F), and the Jones Eaw : etended the guarantees of the merican %ill of &ights to the 0hilippines. In /ener v. United States,3+14 Justice Da( prescribed the methodolog( for appl(ing these "inviolable rules2 to the 0hilippines, viz @ "#t$hese principles were not taken from the 9panish law the( were carefull( collated from our own Constitution, and embod( almost verbatim the safeguards of that instrument for the protection of life and libert(.23+?F4 !hus, the inviola%le rules0 should %e alied in the sense whi"h has %een la"ed uon them in "onstruing the instrument #rom whi"h the$ were ta(en.0 3+?+4 #emphasis supplied$ !hereafter, the 0hilippine Independence Eaw, popularl( known as the !(dings:McDuffie Eaw of +61, was enacted. It guaranteed independence to the 0hilippines and authorized the drafting of a 0hilippine Constitution. !he law provided that the government should be republican in form and the Constitution to be drafted should contain a %ill of &ights. 3+?)4 !hus, the Constitutional Convention of +61 was convened. In drafting the Constitution, the Convention preferred to be generall( conservative on the belief that to be stable and permanent, the Constitution must be anchored on the eperience of the people, "providing for institutions which were the natural outgrowths of the national life.2 3+?64 s the people alread( had a political organization buttressed b( national traditions, the Constitution was to sanctif( these institutions tested b( time and the 'ilipino peopleAs eperience and to confirm the practical and substantial rights of the people. !hus, the institutions and philosoph( adopted in the Constitution drew substantiall( from the organic acts which had governed the 'ilipinos for more than thirt( (ears, more particularl( the Jones Eaw of ++*. In the absence of 0hilippine precedents, the Convention considered precedents of merican origin that might be suitable to our substantiall( merican political s(stem and to the 'ilipino ps(cholog( and traditions. 3+?14 !hus, in the words of Claro M. &ecto, 0resident of the Constitutional Convention, the +6? Constitution was "frankl( an imitation of the merican charter.2 3+??4 side from the heav( merican influence, the Constitution also bore traces of the Malolos Constitution, the ;erman Constitution, the Constitution of the &epublic of 9pain, the Meican Constitution, and the Constitutions of several 9outh merican countries, and the 8nglish unwritten constitution. !hough the !(dings:McDuffie law mandated a republican constitution and the inclusion of a %ill of &ights, with or without such mandate, the Constitution would have nevertheless been republican because the 'ilipinos were satisfied with their eperience of a republican government a %ill of &ights would have nonetheless been also included because the people had been accustomed to the role of a %ill of &ights in the past organic acts. 3+?*4 !he %ill of &ights in the +6? Constitution was reproduced largel( from the report of the ConventionAs committee on bill of rights. !he report was mostl( a cop( of the %ill of &ights in the Jones Eaw, which in turn was borrowed from the merican constitution. Bther provisions in the report drew from the Malolos Constitution and the constitutions of the &epublic of 9pain, Ital( and Japan. !here was a conscious effort to retain the phraseolog( of the well:known provisions of the Jones Eaw because of the 5urisprudence that had built around them. !he Convention insistentl( avoided including provisions in the %ill of &ights not tested in the 'ilipino eperience. 3+?>4 !hus, upon submission of its draft bill of rights to the 0resident of the Convention, the committee on bill of rights stated@ “"doption and adaptation have been the relatively facile work of your committee in the formulation of a bill or declaration of rights to be incorporated in the #onstitution of the hilippine %slands. ;o attempt has been made to incorporate new or radical changes. . .
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[Philosophy of Law] 1he enumeration of individual rights in the present organic law ("cts of #ongress of :uly ', '2), "ugust ), ''B+ is considered ample, comprehensive and precise enough to safeguard the rights and immunities of Filipino citiCens against abuses or encroachments of the >overnment, its powers or agents. . . @odifications or changes in phraseology have been avoided, wherever possible. This is because the principles must remain couched in a language epressive of their historical bac!ground, nature, etent and limitations, as construed and epounded by the great statesmen and jurists that have vitali"ed them.# 5'367 (emphasis supplied+
!he +6? Constitution was approved b( the Convention on 'ebruar( -, +6? and signed on 'ebruar( +, +6?. Bn March )6, +6?, 7nited 9tates 0resident &oosevelt affied his signature on the Constitution. %( an overwhelming ma5orit(, the 'ilipino voters ratified it on Ma( +1, +6?. 3+?4 !hen dawned the decade of the *Fs. !here grew a clamor to revise the +6? charter for it to be more responsive to the problems of the countr(, specificall( in the socio:economic arena and to the sources of threats to the securit( of the &epublic identified b( then 0resident Marcos. In +>F, delegates to the Constitution Convention were elected, and the( convened on June +, +>+. In their deliberations, "the spirit of moderation prevailed, and the . . . Constitution was hardl( notable for its novelt(, much less a radical departure from our constitutional tradition.2 3+*F4 Bur rights in the +6? Constitution were reaffirmed and the government to which we have been accustomed was instituted, albeit taking on a parliamentar( rather than presidential form. 3+*+4 !he %ill of &ights in the +>6 Constitution had minimal difference from its counterpart in the +6? Constitution. 0reviousl(, there were )+ paragraphs in one section, now there were twent(:three. !he two rights added were the recognition of the peopleAs right to access to official records and documents and the right to speed( disposition of cases. !o the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, a second paragraph was added that evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for an( purpose in an( proceeding. 3+*)4 !he +>6 Constitution went into effect on Januar( +>, +>6 and remained the fundamental law until 0resident Corazon /uino rose to power in defiance of the +>6 charter and upon the "direct eercise of the power of the 'ilipino people2 3+*64 in the 8D9 &evolution of 'ebruar( )6:)?, +-*. Bn 'ebruar( )?, +-*, she issued 0roclamation =o. + recognizing that "sovereignt( resides in the people and all government authorit( emanates from them2 and that she and Lice 0resident 9alvador Eaurel were "taking power in the name and b( the will of the 'ilipino people.2 3+*14!he old legal order, constitution and enactments alike, was overthrown b( the new administration. 3+*?4 month thenceforth, 0resident /uino issued 0roclamation =o. 6, "Declaring =ational 0olic( to Implement the &eforms Mandated b( the 0eople, 0rotecting their %asic &ights, dopting a 0rovisional Constitution, and 0roviding for an Brderl( !ransition to ;overnment under a =ew Constitution.2 !he 0rovisional Constitution, otherwise known as the "'reedom Constitution2 adopted certain provisions of the +>6 Constitution, including the %ill of &ights which was adopted in toto , and provided for the adoption of a new constitution within *F da(s from the date of 0roclamation =o. 6. 3+**4 0ursuant to the 'reedom Constitution, the +-* Constitutional Commission drafted the +-> Constitution which was ratified and became effective on 'ebruar( ), +->. 3+*>4 s in the +6? and +>6 Constitutions, it retained a republican s(stem of government, but emphasized and created more channels for the eercise of the sovereignt( of the people through recall, initiative, referendum and plebiscite. 3+*-4 %ecause of the wide: scale violation of human rights during the dictatorship, the +-> Constitution contains a %ill of &ights which more 5ealousl( safeguards the peopleAs "fundamental liberties in the essence of a constitutional democrac(2, in the words of ConCom delegate 'r. Joa/uin %ernas, 9.J. 3+*4 It declares in its state policies that "#t$he state 17 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] values the dignit( of ever( human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.2 3+>F4 In addition, it has a separate rticle on 9ocial Justice and ?4 Malcolm and Eaurel define it according to Justice MillerAs definition in his opus on the merican Constitution 3+>*4 published in +-6 as "the written instrument b( which the fundamental owers o# government are esta%lished, limited and de#ined , and b( which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful eercise for the %ene#it o# the %od$ oliti".23+>>4 !he constitution eists to assure that in the governmentAs discharge of its functions, the "dignit( that is the birthright of ever( human being is dul( safeguarded.2 3+>-4 Clearl( then, at the core of constitutionalism is a strong concern for individual rights 3+>4 as in the modern period natural law theories. Justice Eaurel as delegate to the +61 Constitutional Convention declared in a ma5or address before the Convention@ “1here is no constitution, worthy of the name, without a bill or declaration of rights. (%t is+ the palladium of the people’s liberties and immunities, so that their persons, homes, their peace, their livelihood, their h appiness and their freedom may be safe and secure from an ambitious ruler, an envious neighbor, or a grasping state.85'627
s Chairman of the Committee on the Declaration of &ights, he stated@ “1he history of the world is the history of man and his arduous struggle for liberty. . . . %t is the history of those brave and able souls who, in the ages that are past, have labored, fought and bled that the government of the lash that symbol of slavery and despotism might endure no more. %t is the history of those great selfsacrificing men who lived and suffered in an age of cruelty, pain and desolation, so that every man might stand, under the protection of great rights and privileges, the e$ual of every other man. 85'6'7
%eing substantiall( a cop( of the merican %ill of &ights, the histor( of our %ill of &ights dates back to the roots of the merican %ill of &ights. !he latter is a charter of the individualAs liberties and a limitation upon the 18 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] power of the state 3+-)4 which traces its roots to the 8nglish Magna Carta of +)+?, a first in 8nglish histor( for a written instrument to be secured from a sovereign ruler b( the bulk of the politicall( articulate communit( that intended to la( down binding rules of law that the ruler himself ma( not violate. "In Magna Carta is to be found the germ of the root principle that there are #undamental individual rights that the State 2sovereign though it is 2 ma$ not in#ringe .23+-64 #emphasis supplied$ In Sales v. Sandigan%a$an, et al. ,3+-14 /uoting Allado v. 'io(no ,3+-?4 this Court ruled that the %ill of &ights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights, viz @ “1he purpose of the !ill of /ights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of po litical power. 1his bundle of rights guarantees thepreservation of our natural rights which include personal liberty and security against invasion by the government or any of its branches or instrumentalities.85'6B7 (emphasis supplied+
We need, however, to fine tune this pronouncement of the Court, considering that certain rights in our %ill of &ights, for eample habeas corpus, have been identified not as a natural right, but a civil right created b( law. Eikewise, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures has been identified in Simon as a civil right, without epounding however what civil right meant therein : whether a natural right eisting before the constitution and protected b( it, thus ac/uiring the status of a civil right or a right created merel( b( law and non:eistent in the absence of law. !o understand the nature of the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the corollar( right to eclusion of evidence obtained therefrom, we turn a heedful e(e on the histor(, concept and purpose of these guarantees.
I3. +istor$ o# the 4uarantee against Unreasona%le Sear"h and Sei5ure and the Right to E1"lusion o# Illegall$ Sei5ed Eviden"e in the United States and in the Philiines
!he origin of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure in the 0hilippine constitutions can be traced back to hundreds of (ears ago in a land distant from the 0hilippines. =eedless to sa(, the right is well: entrenched in histor(. !he power to search in 8ngland was first used as an instrument to oppress ob5ectionable publications. 3+->4 =ot too long after the printing press was developed, seditious and libelous publications became a concern of the Crown, and a broad search and seizure power developed to suppress these publications. 3+--4 ;eneral warrants were regularl( issued that gave all kinds of people the power to enter and seize at their discretion under the authorit( of the Crown to enforce publication licensing statutes. 3+-4 In +*61, the ultimate ignomin( in the use of general warrants came when the earl( "great illuminar( of the common law,2 3+F4 and most influential of the CrownAs opponents, 3++4 9ir 8dward Coke, while on his death bed, was sub5ected to a ransacking search and the manuscripts of his )nstitutes were seized and carried awa( as seditious and libelous publications. 3+)4 !he power to issue general warrants and seize publications grew. !he( were also used to search for and seize smuggled goods. 3+64 !he developing common law tried to impose limits on the broad power to search to no avail. In his +istor of the ,leas of !ro#n , Chief Justice Constitution was drafted and ratified on 'ebruar( ), +->. 9ections ) and 6, rticle III thereof provide@ “Eection ). 1he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seiCures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e-cept upon probable cause to be determined personally by a ?udge after e-amination under oath or affirmation of 5the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seiCed.
Eection 4 ('+. 1he privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable e-cept upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. ()+ "ny evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.8
!he significant modification of 9ection ) is that probable cause ma( be determined onl( b( a 5udge and no longer b( "such other responsible officer as ma( be authorized b( law.2 !his was a reversion to the counterpart provision in the +6? Constitution. 23 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] 0arentheticall(, in the international arena, the 7D states followed the 6ee(s doctrine while 6F states did not. 3)?+4 !he Court reasoned@ “=e cannot brush aside the e-perience of Etates which deem the incidence of such conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy not by way of disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence. 1here are, moreover, reasons for e-cluding evidence unreasonably obtained b y the federal police which are less compelling in the case of police under Etate or local authority. 1he public opinion of a community can far more effectively be e-erted against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority pervasively e-erted throughout the country.85)3)7
!his difference in treatment on the federal and state level of evidence obtained illegall( resulted in the "silver platter2 doctrine. 9tate law enforcement agents would provide federal officers with illegall( seized evidence, which was then admissible in federal court because, as with illegall( seized evidence b( private citizens, federal officers were not implicated in obtaining it. !hus, it was said that state law enforcers served up the evidence in federal cases in "silver platter.2 !his pernicious practice was stopped with the 7nited 9tates 9upreme CourtAs +*F decision, El(ins v. United States.3)?64 !welve (ears after 6ol# , the 7nited 9tates 9upreme Court reversed 6ol# and incorporated the eclusionar( rule in the state s(stem in &a v. Ohio3)?14 because other means of controlling illegal police behavior had failed. 3)??4 We /uote at length the &aruling as it had a significant influence in the eclusionar( rule in 0hilippine 5urisdiction, viz @ “. . . 1oday we once again e-amine the =olf’s constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its doCen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. . . Eince the Fourth "mendment’s right to privacy has been declared enforceable against the Etates through the u e rocess #lause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of e-clusion as it is used against the Federal >overnment. =ere it otherwise, then ?ust as without the =eeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seiCures would be a ‘form of words’, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable
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[Philosophy of Law] human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual neus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court&s high regard as freedom )implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.& "t that time that the #ourt held in =olf that the amendment was applicable to the Etates through the ue rocess #lause, the cases of this court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth "mendment included the e-clusion of the evidence seiCed in violation of its provisions. Dven =olf ‘stoutly adhered’ to that proposition. 1he right to privacy, when conceded operatively enforceable against the Etates, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and en?oyment had always been deemed dependent under the !oyd, =eeks and Eilverthorne #ases. Therefore, in etending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches + state or federal + it was logically and constitutionally necessary that the eclusion doctrine + an essential part of the right to privacy + be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recogni"ed by the (olf case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by (olf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the eclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful sei"ure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. 3nly last year the Court itself recogni"ed that the purpose of the eclusionary rule )is to deter + to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only available way + by removing the incentive to disregard it.& (Dlkins v. Gnited Etates, 4B& GE at )'*+ ---
---
---
1he ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the Etate tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. (#f. @arcus v. Eearch =arrant of roperty, B $ ed )d post, p. '')*+ aving once recogniCed that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth "mendment is enforceable against the Etates, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. !ecause it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its ue rocess #lause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. 3ur decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice .85)3B7(emphasis supplied+
It is said that the eclusionar( rule has three purposes. !he ma5or and most often invoked is the deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures as stated in El(ins v. United States 3)?>4 and /uoted in &a@ "#t$he rule is calculated to prevent, not repair. Its purpose is to deter to compel respect for constitutional guarant( in the onl( effective available wa( b( removing the incentive to disregard it.2 3)?-4 9econd is the "imperative of 5udicial integrit(2, i.e., that the courts do not become "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution the( are sworn to uphold . . . b( permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. . . ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial . . . has the necessar( effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an application of the eclusionar( rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.23)?4 !hird is the more recent purpose pronounced b( some members of the 7nited 9tates 9upreme Court which is that "of assuring the people all potential victims of unlawful government conduct that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriousl( undermining popular trust in government.2 3)*F4 !he focus of concern here is not the police but the public. !his third purpose is implicit in the &a declaration that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence.2 3)*+4
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[Philosophy of Law] In 0hilippine 5urisdiction, the Court has likewise swung from one position to the other on the eclusionar( rule. In the +)F case of U$ /he$tin v. 3illareal ,3)*)4 the Court citing o$d, ruled that "seizure or compulsor( production of a manAs private papers to be used against him2 was tantamount to self:incrimination and was therefore "unreasonable search and seizure.2 !his was a proscription against "fishing epeditions.2 !he Court restrained the prosecution from using the books as evidence. 'ive (ears later or in +)?, we held in Peole v. !arlos 3)*64 that although the o$d and Silverthorne Lum%er !o. and Silverthorne v. United States3)*14 "ases are authorities for the doctrine that documents obtained b( illegal searches were inadmissible in evidence in criminal cases, 6ee(s modified this doctrine b( adding that the illegalit( of the search and seizure should have initiall( been directl( litigated and established b( a pre:trial motion for the return of the things seized. s this condition was not met, the illegalit( of the seizure was not deemed an obstacle to admissibilit(. !he sub5ect evidence was nevertheless ecluded, however, for being hearsa(. !hereafter, in +6), the Court did not uphold the defense of self:incrimination when "fraudulent books, invoices and records2 that had been seized were presented in evidence in Peole v. Ru%io. 3)*?4 !he Court gave three reasons@ #+$ the public has an interest in the proper regulation of the part(As books #)$ the books belonged to a corporation of which the part( was merel( a manager and #6$ the warrants were not issued to fish for evidence but to seize "instruments used in the violation of 3internal revenue4 laws2 and "to further prevent the perpetration of fraud.2 3)**4 !he eclusionar( rule applied in U$ /he$tin was reaffirmed seventeen (ears thence in the +6> case of Alvare5 v. !ourt o# -irst Instan"e 3)*>4 decided under the +6? Constitution. !he Court ruled that the seizure of books and documents for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the possessor thereof is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable and the presentation of evidence offensive of the provision against self:incrimination. t the close of the 9econd World War, however, the Court, in Alvero v. 'i5on ,3)*-4again admitted in evidence documents seized b( 7nited 9tates militar( officers without a search warrant in a prosecution b( the 0hilippine ;overnment for treason. !he Court reasoned that this was in accord with the Eaws and Customs of War and that the seizure was incidental to an arrest and thus legal. !he issue of self:incrimination was not addressed at all and instead, the Court pronounced that even if the seizure had been illegal, the evidence would nevertheless be admissible following 5urisprudence in the 7nited 9tates that evidence illegall( obtained b( state officers or private persons ma( be used b( federal officers. 3)*4 !hen came &on"ado v. Peole>s !ourt 3)>F4 in +1-. !he Court made a categorical declaration that "it is established doctrine in the 0hilippines that the admissibilit( of evidence is not affected b( the illegalit( of the means used for obtaining it.2 It condemned the "pernicious influence2 of o$d and totall( re5ected the doctrine in 6ee(s as "subversive of evidentiar( rules in 0hilippine 5urisdiction.2 !he ponenciadeclared that the prosecution of those guilt( of violating the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was ade/uate protection for the people. !hus it became settled 5urisprudence that illegall( obtained evidence was admissible if found to be relevant to the case 3)>+4 until the +*> landmark decision of Stonehill v. 'io(no3)>)4 which overturned the &on"ado rule. !he Court held in Stonehill, viz @ “. . . Gpon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the @oncado case must be abandoned. Eaid position was in line with the "merican common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely ‘because the constable has blundered,’ (eople v. efore, '&2 ;D 363+ upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seiCures is protected by means other than the e-clusion of evidence unlawfully obtained (=olf v. #olorado, 4 $.Dd. '*6)+, such as commonlaw action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant an d against those assisting in the
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[Philosophy of Law] e-ecution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seiCure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws. owever, most common law ?urisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the e-clusionary rule, realiCing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional in?unction against unreasonable searches and seiCures.85)*47
!he Court then /uoted the portion of the &a "ase which we have /uoted at length above in affirming that the e1"lusionar$ rule is art and ar"el o# the right against unreasona%le sear"hes and sei5ures. !he Stonehill ruling was incorporated in rticle 1, 9ection 1#)$ of the +>6 Constitution and carried over to rticle 6, 9ection 6#)$ of the +-> Constitution.
3. Ali"ation o# the Natural Law !ulled #rom +istor$ and Philosoh$: Are the Rights Against Unreasona%le Sear"h and Sei5ure and to the E1"lusion o# Illegall$ Sei5ed Eviden"e Natural Rights whi"h Private Resondent 'imaano !an Invo(e?
In answering this /uestion, Justice ;oldbergAs concurring opinion in the 4riswold "ase serves as a helpful guidepost to determine whether a right is so fundamental that the people cannot be deprived of it without undermining the tenets of civil societ( and government, viz @ “%n determining which rights are fundamental, ?udges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. /ather, they must look to the ‘traditions and 5collective7 conscience of our people’ to determine whether a principle is ‘so rooted 5there7 . . . as to be ranked as fundamental.’ (Enyder v. #om. of @assachusetts, )' G.E. *, '23 ('4&++. 1he inquiry is whether a right involved ‘is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and ?ustice which lie at the b ase of all our civil and political institutions.’ . . . owell v. Etate of "labama, )6* G.E. &3, B* ('4)+85)*&7 (emphasis supplied+
In deciding a case, invoking natural law as solel( a matter of the 5udgeAs personal preference, invites criticism that the decision is a performative contradiction and thus self:defeating. Critics would point out that while the decision invokes natural law that abhors arbitrariness, that same decision is tainted with what it abhors as it stands on the 5udgeAs sub5ective and arbitrar( choice of a school of legal thought. Just as one 5udge will fight tooth and nail to defend the natural law philosoph(, another 5udge will match his fervor in defending a contrar( philosoph( he espouses. >4 these rights cannot forever be /uelled, for like water seeking its own course and level, the( will find their place in the life of the individual and of the nation natural right, as part of nature, will take its own course. !hus, the 'ilipinos fought for and demanded these rights from the 9panish and merican colonizers, and in fairl( recent histor(, from an authoritarian ruler. !he( wrote these rights in stone in ever( constitution the( crafted starting from the +- Malolos Constitution. 9econd, although 'ilipinos have given democrac( its own 'ilipino face, it is undeniable that our political and legal institutions are merican in origin. !he 'ilipinos adopted the republican form of government that the mericans introduced and the %ill of &ights the( etended to our islands, and were the ke(stones that kept the bod( politic intact. !hese institutions sat well with the 'ilipinos who had long (earned for participation in government and were 5ealous of their fundamental and natural rights. 7ndergirding these institutions was the modern natural law theor( which stressed natural rights in free, independent and e/ual individuals who banded together to form government for the protection of their natural rights to life, libert( and propert(. !he sole purpose of government is to promote, protect and preserve these rights. nd when government not onl( defaults in its dut( but itself violates the ver( rights it was established to protect, it forfeits its authorit( to demand obedience of the governed and could be replaced with one to which the people consent. !he 'ilipino people eercised this highest of rights in the 8D9 &evolution of 'ebruar( +-*. I will not endeavor to identif( ever( natural right that the 'ilipinos fought for in 8D9. !he case at bar merel( calls us to determine whether two particular rights : the rights against unreasonable search and seizure and to the eclusion of evidence obtained therefrom : have the force and effect of natural rights which private respondent Dimaano can invoke against the government. I shall first deal with the right against unreasonable search and seizure. Bn 'ebruar( )?, +-*, the new president, Corazon /uino, issued 0roclamation =o. + where she declared that she and the vice president were taking power in the name and b( the will of the 'ilipino people and pledged "to do 5ustice to the numerous victims of human rights violations.2 3)>-4 It is implicit from this pledge that the new government recognized and respected human rights. !hus, at the time of the search on March 6, +-*, it ma( be asserted that the government had the dut(, b( its own pledge, to uphold human rights. !his presidential issuance was what came closest to a positive law guaranteeing human rights without enumerating them. =evertheless, even in the absence of a positive law granting private respondent Dimaano the right against unreasonable search and seizure at the time her house was raided, I respectfull( submit that she can invoke her natural right against unreasonable search and seizure. !he right against unreasonable search and seizure is a core right implicit in the natural right to life, libert( and propert(. Bur well:settled 5urisprudence that the right against unreasonable search and seizure protects the 32 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] peopleAs rights to securit( of person and propert(, to the sanctit( of the home, and to privac( is a recognition of this proposition. !he life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and propert( ma( be unreasonabl( violated b( a powerful ruler. &ather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the securit( of his person and propert(. !he ideal of securit( in life and propert( dates back even earlier than the modern philosophers and the merican and 'rench revolutions, but pervades the whole histor( of man. It touches ever( aspect of manAs eistence, thus it has been described, viz @ “1he right to personal security emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted en?oyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. %t includes the right to e-ist, and the right to en?oyment of life while e-isting, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the en?oyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.85)*7
!he individual in the state of nature surrendered a portion of his undifferentiated libert( and agreed to the establishment of a government to guarantee his natural rights, including the right to securit( of person and propert(, which he could not guarantee b( himself. 9imilarl(, the natural right to libert( includes the right of a person to decide whether to epress himself and communicate to the public or to keep his affairs to himself and en5o( his privac(. Justice Douglas reminds us of the indispensabilit( of privac( in the +a$den "ase, thus@ "!hose who wrote the %ill of &ights believed that ever( individual needs both to communicate with others and to keep his affairs to himself.2 natural right to libert( indubitabl( includes the freedom to determine when and how an individual will share the private part of his being and the etent of his sharing. nd when he chooses to epress himself, the natural right to libert( demands that he should be given the libert( to be trul( himself with his famil( in his home, his haven of refuge where he can "retreat from the cares and pressures, even at times the oppressiveness of the outside world,2 to borrow the memorable words of Chief Justice 'ernando. 'or trul(, the drapes of a manAs castle are but an etension of the drapes on his bod( that cover the essentials. In unreasonable searches and seizures, the pr(ing e(es and the invasive hands of the government prevent the individual from en5o(ing his freedom to keep to himself and to act undisturbed within his zone of privac(. 'inall(, indispensable to the natural right to propert( is the right to oneAs possessions. 0ropert( is a product of oneAs toil and might be considered an epression and etension of oneself. It is what an individual deems necessar( to the en5o(ment of his life. With unreasonable searches and seizures, oneAs propert( stands in danger of being rummaged through and taken awa(. In sum, as pointed out in 'e Los Re$es, persons are sub5ected to indignit( b( an unreasonable search and seizure because at bottom, it is a violation of a personAs natural right to life, libert( and propert(. It is this natural right which sets man apart from other beings, which gives him the dignit( of a human being. It is understandable wh( 'ilipinos demanded that ever( organic law in their histor( guarantee the protection of their natural right against unreasonable search and seizure and wh( the 7D6, and +-> Constitutions$ and embraced #the Instruction, 0hilippine %ill of +F), and Jones Eaw$ in the last centur( included a provision guaranteeing the peopleAs right against unreasonable search and seizure because the people ranked this right as fundamental and natural. Indeed, so fundamental and natural is this right that the demand for it spurred the merican revolution against the 8nglish Crown. It resulted in the Declaration of Independence and the subse/uent establishment of the merican Constitution about )FF (ears ago in +>-. revolution is staged onl( for the most fundamental of reasons : such as the violation of fundamental and natural rights : for prudence dictates that "governments long established should not be changed for light and transient reasons.2 3)-F4 Considering that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a natural right, the government cannot claim that private respondent Dimaano is not entitled to the right for the reason alone that there was no constitution granting the right at the time the search was conducted. !his right of the private respondent precedes the constitution, and does not depend on positive law. It is part of natural rights. violation of this right along with other rights stirred 'ilipinos to revolutions. It is the restoration of the 'ilipinosA natural rights that 5ustified the establishment of the /uino government and the writing of the +-> Constitution. I submit that even in the absence of a constitution, private respondent Dimaano had a fundamental and natural right against unreasonable search and seizure under natural law. We now come to the right to the eclusion of evidence illegall( seized. 'rom Stonehill /uoting &a, we can distill that the eclusionar( rule in both the 0hilippine and merican 5urisdictions is a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered libert(2 for it is a necessar( part of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, which in turn is "an essential part of the right to privac(2 that the Constitution protects. If the eclusionar( rule were not adopted, it would be to "grant the right #against unreasonable search and seizure$ but in realit( to withhold its privilege and en5o(ment.2 !hus, the inevitable conclusion is that the eclusionar( rule is likewise a natural right that private respondent Dimaano can invoke even in the absence of a constitution guaranteeing such right. !o be sure, the status of the eclusionar( right as a natural right is admittedl( not as indisputable as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures which is firml( supported b( philosoph( and deepl( entrenched in histor(. Bn a lower tier, arguments have been raised on the constitutional status of the eclusionar( right. 9ome assert, on the basis of United States v. !alandra ,3)-+4 that it is onl( a "5udiciall(:created remed( designed to safeguard 'ourth mendment rights generall( through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the part( aggrieved.2 3)-)4 long the same line, others contend that the right against unreasonable search and seizure merel( re/uires some effective remed(, and thus Congress ma( abolish or limit the eclusionar( right if it could replace it with other remedies of a comparable or greater deterrent effect. %ut these contentions have merit onl( if it is conceded that the eclusionar( rule is merel( an optional remed( for the purpose of deterrence. 3)-64 !hose who defend the constitutional status of the eclusionar( right, however, assert that there is nothing in 6ee(s that sa(s that it is a remed( 3)-14 or a manner of deterring police officers. 3)-?4 In &a, while the court discredited other means of enforcing the 'ourth mendment cited in 6ol#, the thrust of the opinion was broader. Justice Clarke opined that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence2 3)-*4 and held that "the eclusionar( rule is an essential part of both the 'ourth and 'ourteenth mendments.2 3)->4
34 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] 'ormulated in the /uinian concept of human law, the debate is whether the eclusionar( right is the first kind of human law which ma( be derived as a conclusion from the natural law precept that one should do no harm to another man, in the same wa( that conclusions are derived from scientific principles, in which case the eclusionar( right has force from natural law and does not depend on positive law for its creation or if it is the second kind of human law which is derived b( wa( of determination of natural law, in the same wa( that a carpenter determines the shape of a house, such that it is merel( a 5udiciall( or legislativel( chosen remed( or deterrent, in which case the right onl( has force insofar as positive law creates and protects it. In holding that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental and natural right, we were aided b( philosoph( and histor(. In the case of the eclusionar( right, philosoph( can also come to the eclusionar( rightAs aid, along the lines of Justice ClarkeAs proposition in the &a "ase that no man shall be convicted on unconstitutional evidence. 9imilarl(, the government shall not be allowed to convict a man on evidence obtained in violation of a natural right #against unreasonable search and seizure$ for the protection of which, government and the law were established. !o rule otherwise would be to sanction the brazen violation of natural rights and allow law enforcers to act with more temerit( than a thief in the night for the( can disturb oneAs privac(, trespass oneAs abode, and steal oneAs propert( with impunit(. !his, in turn, would erode the peopleAs trust in government. 7nlike in the right against unreasonable search and seizure, however, histor( cannot come to the aid of the eclusionar( right. Compared to the right against unreasonable search and seizure, the eclusionar( right is still in its infanc( stage in 0hilippine 5urisdiction, having been etched onl( in the +>6 Constitution after the +*> Stonehill ruling which finall( laid to rest the debate on whether illegall( seized evidence should be ecluded. In the 7nited 9tates, the eclusionar( rightAs genesis dates back onl( to the +--? o$d "ase on the federal level, and to the +*+ &a "ase in the state level. !he long period of non:recognition of the eclusionar( right has not caused an upheaval, much less a revolution, in both the 0hilippine and merican 5urisdictions. Eikewise, the 7D, +->. !he 0C;;As petition for forfeiture against &amas was filed on ugust +, +-> and was later amended to name the &epublic of the 0hilippines as plaintiff and to add private respondent Dimaano as co:defendant. 'ollowing the petitionerAs stance upheld b( the ma5orit( that the eclusionar( right is a creation of the Constitution, then it could be invoked as a constitutional right on or after the 'reedom Constitution took effect on March )?, +-* and later, when the +-> Constitution took effect on 'ebruar( ), +->.
3I. Eilogue
!he 'ilipino people have fought revolutions, b( the power of the pen, the strength of the sword and the might of pra(er to claim and reclaim their fundamental rights. !he( set these rights in stone in ever( constitution the( established. I cannot believe and so hold that the 'ilipinos during that one month from 'ebruar( )? to March )1, +-* were stripped naked of all their rights, including their natural rights as human beings. With the 35 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] etraordinar( circumstances before, during and after the 8D9 &evolution, the 'ilipinos simpl( found themselves without a constitution, but certainl( not without fundamental rights. In that brief one month, the( retrieved their liberties and en5o(ed them in their rawest essence, having 5ust been freed from the claws of an authoritarian regime. !he( walked through histor( with bare feet, unshod b( a constitution, but with an armor of rights guaranteed b( the philosoph( and histor( of their constitutional tradition. !hose natural rights inhere in man and need not be granted b( a piece of paper. !o reiterate, the right against unreasonable search and seizure which private respondent Dimaano invokes is among the sacred rights fought for b( the 'ilipinos in the +-* 8D9 &evolution. It will be a profanit( to den( her the right after the fight had been won. It does not matter whether she believed in the righteousness of the 8D9 &evolution or she contributed to its cause as an alleged all( of the dictator, for as a human being, she has a natural right to life, libert( and propert( which she can eercise regardless of eisting or non:eisting laws and irrespective of the will or lack of will of governments. I wish to stress that I am not making the dut( of the Court unbearabl( difficult b( taking it to task ever( time a right is claimed before it to determine whether it is a natural right which the government cannot diminish or defeat b( an( kind of positive law or action. !he Court need not alwa(s twice measure a law or action, first utilizing the constitution and second using natural law as a (ardstick. F$, pp. ?) and ?>.
31)4
&ice, C. supra, p. *-, citing /uinas, De &egimine 0rincipum #Bn the ;overnance of &ulers$ #;erald %. 0helan, transl., +6-$, %ook I, Chap. ), 1+.+. %ut /uinas was also cautious of the opportunit( for t(rann( of a king, thus he proposed that this power must be tempered, perhaps similar to the modern da( constitutional monarch(. #&ice, C. supra, pp. *-:*, citing /uinas, De &egimine 0rincipum #Bn the ;overnance of &ulers$ #;erald %. 0helan, transl., +6-$, %ook I, Chap. *, ?1.$ 3164
0atterson, C., !he Constitutional 0rinciples of !homas Jefferson #+?6$, p. 1>.
3114
Macpherson, C. 8ditorAs Introduction to J. EockeAs 9econd !reatise of ;overnment #+-F$, pp. :i.
31?4
Eocke, J., 9econd !reatise of ;overnment #ed. C.%. Macpherson, +-F$.
38 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] 31*4
)d., Ch. II, 9ec. 1 #ed. C.%. Macpherson, +-F$, p. -.
31>4
)d.
31-4
)d., Ch. II, 9ec. *, p. .
314
)d.
3?F4
Jones, !., supra, p. +)*.
3?+4
)d., pp. +)*:+)>.
3?)4
Eocke, J., supra, Ch II, 9ec. >, p. .
3?64
Jones, !., supra, p. +)>.
3?14
Eocke, J., supra, Ch II, 9ec. +6, p. Jones, !., supra, p. +)-.
3??4
)d., Ch LIII, 9ec. ?, p. ?).
3?*4
Jones, !., supra, p. +)-, citing J. Eocke, 9econd !reatise, Ch. , sect. +)6, p. 6?F.
3?>4
)d., p. +)-.
3?-4
Eocke, J., supra, Ch IN, 9ec. +)1, p. **.
3?4
Jones, !., supra, pp. +)-:+).
3*F4
F4
+4
%lack, )4
Kurland, 0. "!he !rue Wisdom of the %ill of &ights2, !he 7niversit( of Chicago Eaw &eview, vol. ?, no. + #Winter +)$, pp. >:-.
39 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] 3>64
14
)d., p. ??, citing %.'. Wright, Jr., "merican Interpretations of =atural Eaw2, merican 0olitical 9cience &eview, #ug. +)*$, ?)1 ff. 3>?4
%lack, *4
Watson, D., !he Constitution of the 7nited 9tates #++F$, vol. +, pp. +F-:+F, citing Coole(As Constitutional Eimitations, pp. *-:*. 3>>4
6$, p. +*.
3>-4
)d., p. ??, footnote +6), citing Eetter from ;eorge Washington to the 0resident of Congress, in + Documentar( 4
)d., p. ?*.
3-F4
Jones, !., supra, p. +1), citing !. 0aine, !he &ights of Man #+*$, p. F.
3-+4
)d.
3-)4
)d.
3-64
)d.
3-14
)d., p. +16, citing !. 0aine, !he &ights of Man #+*$, p. F.
3-?4
)d.
3-*4
)d.
3->4
)d.
3--4
$, p. 6)).
3-4
)d., p. +, citing J. Madison, Memorial and &emonstrance #ca June )F, +>-?$, in - !he 0apers of James Madison )-, ). 3F4
)d., pp. +:)F, citing J. Witherspoon, n nnotated 8dition of Eectures on Moral 0hilosoph( #Eecture N$ #Jack 9cott ed.+-)$, pp. +)):+)-. 3+4
)d., pp. )F:)+, citing J. Madison, 9peech in -$, in Creating the %ill of &ights #++$, p. -+. 3)4
)d., pp. )+:)).
364
%lack, 4
)d.
3-4
8strada v. Desierto, et al., 6?6 9C& 1?) #)FF+$, Concurring Bpinion of Justice Mendoza , p. ?1.
34
dA8ntreves, ., supra, p. ?+. 40 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] 3+FF4
Jones, !., supra, pp. ++1:++?.
3+F+4
)d., p. ++.
3+F)4
)d.
3+F64
Drost, 0., 9C& >?1 #+-$.
3+F?4
Moskowitz, M., .
3+F>4
)d., p. +*1.
3+F-4
;utierrez, Jr., - #+1F$.
3++*4
)d., p. ?-).
3++>4
+F* 9C& 6)? #+-+$.
3++-4
0eople v. gbot, supra, p. 666.
3++4
+1F 0hil +>+ #+*$.
3+)F4
611 9C& >* #)FFF$.
3+)+4
1+ 0hil. >>F #++*$.
3+))4
0eople v. de los 9antos, )FF 9C& 16+ #++$.
3+)64
&oa v. Insular Collector of Customs, )6 0hil. 6+? #++>$.
3+)14
9ilva v. Court of ppeals, et al. , )>? 9C& *F1 #+>$.
3+)?4
Bffshore Industries, Inc. v. =E&C, et al., +>> 9C& ?F #+-$, citing 0hilippine Movie 0ictures WorkersA ssociation v. 0remiere 0roductions, Inc., ) 0hil. -16 #+?6$. 3+)*4
)) 9C& ++> #+1$.
3+)>4
'ernando, 8., 0erspective on $, pp. +:), citing %orovsk( v. Commissioner of Immigration, et al., F 0hil. +F> #+?+$ Me5off v. Director of 41 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] 0risons, F 0hil. >F #+?+$ Chirskoff v. Commissioner of Immigration, et al., F 0hil. )?* #+?+$ ndreu v.Commissioner of Immigration, et al., F 0hil. 61> #+?+$. 3+)-4
9imon, Jr., et al. v. Commission on .
3+)4
)d., pp. +)*:+)>.
3+6F4
)d., pp. +6):+66, citing %lackAs Eaw Dictionar( #* th edition, +61$, p. +6)1 $, p. ?)1. 3+6+4
)d., pp. +6):+66, citing Malcolm, !he Constitutional Eaw of the 0hilippine Islands #) 1?>.
nd
ed., +)*$, pp. 16+:
3+6)4
)d., p. +66, citing %lackAs Eaw Dictionar( #* th edition, +61$, p. +6)? $, p. ?)1. 3+664
%ernas, J., +$, pp. ):6, citing C. Ma5ul, !he 0olitical and Constitutional Ideas of the 0hilippine &evolution #+?>$, pp. ):6. 3+614
)d., p. ), citing Ma5ul, supra, p. 6.
3+6?4
)d., pp. *:>, citing !. goncillo, Malolos@ !he Crisis of the &epublic #+*F$, p. + and Ma5ul, supra, p. ?, both authors citing de Le(ra, !he Constitution of %iak:na:%ato, + J. of the 0hil , citing !. goncillo, supra, pp. +:)F.
3+6>4
)d., p. -, citing Kalaw, !he Constitutional 0lan of the 0hilippine &evolution, I 0hil. E. J., )F1, )F* #++1$.
3+6-4
)d., p. ++, citing Kalaw, !he Memoirs of 'elipe Calderon #pts. +:)$, 1 0hil. &e v. 1)*, at 1>6 #++$.
3+64
)d., citing Malcolm, Constitutional Eaw of the 0hilippine Islands ++> #)
3+1F4
)d., pp. ++:+), citing 0lanes Constitucionales 0ara 'ilipinas #!. Kalaw ed. +61$, p. 6>.
3+1+4
)d., p. +), citing Ma5ul, supra, p. +>.
3+1)4
)d., p. +6.
3+164
)d., citing + &eport of the #9churman$ 0hilippine Commission #+FF$, pp. -1:?.
3+114
)d., pp. +6:+1, citing ;. Malcolm, Constitutional Eaw of the 0hilippine Islands #)
3+1?4
)d., p. +?.
nd
ed. +)*$.
nd
ed. +)*$, p. ))6.
3+1*4
;onzalez:Decano, ., !he 8clusionar( &ule and its &ationale #+>$, p. -.
3+1>4
%ernas, J., supra, p. +?.
3+1-4
;onzalez:Decano, ., supra, p. -.
3+14
++ 0hil. ** #+F1$.
3+?F4
)d., p. *).
3+?+4
)d.
3+?)4
%ernas, J., supra, p. +>.
3+?64
ruego, J., !he 'raming of the 0hilippine Constitution, vol. + #+6?$, p. 6. 42 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] 3+?14
)d., pp. 6:1.
3+??4
'ernando, 8., 0olitical Eaw #+?6$, p. 1).
3+?*4
ruego, supra, pp. 1:?.
3+?>4
)d., pp. 6:?, +1:+?+.
3+?-4
)d., pp. +1:+?F.
3+?4
'ernando, 8., supra, p. 1).
3+*F4
'ernando, 8., !he Constitution of the 0hilippines #+>1$, pp. 6:>.
3+*+4
)d., pp. *:>.
3+*)4
'ernando, 0erspective on $, pp. )1:)*. 3+*64
0roclamation =o. 6 #+-*$.
3+*14
0roclamation =o. + #+-*$.
3+*?4
Eetter of ssociate Justice &e(nato 9. 0uno, supra.
3+**4
Martin, &., Eaw and Jurisprudence on the 'reedom Constitution of the 0hilippines #+-*$, pp. +:?.
3+*>4
De Eeon v. 8sguerra, +?6 9C& *F) #+->$.
3+*-4
rticle N, 9ec. 6 and rticle NII, 9ec. 1 of the +-> Constitution.
3+*4
&ecords of the Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. *>1.
3+>F4
rticle II, 9ec. ++ of the +-> Constitution.
3+>+4
rticle NIII of the +-> Constitution 9imon, Jr. v. Commission on )4
'ernando, 8., !he %ill of &ights #) nd ed. +>)$, p. 6, citing Easki, !he 9tate in !heor( and 0ractice #+6?$, pp. 6?:6*. 3+>64
'ernando, 8. !he Constitution of the 0hilippines #+>1$, p. )F, citing 14
)d., p. )F.
3+>?4
)d., p. )+, citing + 9chwartz, Commentar( on the Constitution of the 7nited 9tates, !he 0owers of ;overnment #+*6$, pp. +:). 3+>*4
)d., p. )+, citing Eectures on the Constitution of the 7nited 9tates, p. *1.
3+>>4
)d., citing Malcolm and Eaurel, 0hilippine Constitutional Eaw #+6*$, p. *.
3+>-4
)d., p. 66.
3+>4
'ernando, 8., ;overnment 0owers and 6$, p. ?.
3+-F4
'ernando, 8. !he Constitution of the 0hilippines #+>1$, p. 61, citing III, 9. Eaurel, 0roceedings of the 0hilippine Constitutional Convention #+**$, p. 66?.
43 | P a g e
[Philosophy of Law] 3+-+4
)d., p. 61, citing III, 9. Eaurel, 0roceedings of the 0hilippine Constitutional Convention #+**$, p. *1-.
3+-)4
%lack, $, pp. ):6.
3+-14
;.&. =o. +16-F), =ovember +?, )FF+.
3+-?4
)6) 9C& +) #+1$.
3+-*4
9ales v. 9andiganba(an, et al., supra, p. +?, citing llado v. Diokno, )6) 9C& +) #+1$, pp. )F:)+F.
3+->4
79 >+> #+*+$ &oaden v. Kentuck(, 1+6 79 1* #+>6$ Easson, !he 1$, pp. *?-:*?. 3))4 It ma( be argued that the 'reedom Constitution had retroactive effect insofar as it provides that certain articles of the +>6 Constitution, including the %ill of &ights, "remain in force and effect.2 Conse/uentl(, as these articles were in force after the abrogation of the +>6 Constitution on 'ebruar( )?, +-* and before the adoption of the 'reedom Constitution on March )?, +-*, private respondent Dimaano can invoke the constitutionall( guaranteed right against unreasonable search and seizure and the eclusionar( right. =evertheless, this separate opinion addresses the /uestion of whether or not she can invoke these rights even if the 'reedom Constitution had no retroactive effect. 3)6F4 ?> #+**$ Camara v. Municipal Court of 9an 'rancisco, 6-> 79 ?)6 #+*>$. Bther citations omitted. 3)6+4 )d., citing Warden, Mar(land 0enitentiar( v. 79 )1 #+*>$ %erger v. =ew Oork, 6-- 79 1+ #+*>$ 9tone v. 0owell, 1)- 79 1*? #+>*$. Bther citations omitted. 3)6)4 Katz v. 7nited 9tates, 6- 79 61> #+*>$. Bther citations omitted. 3)664 6*? 79 ?F? #+*+$. 3)614 6- 79 61> #+*>$. 3)6?4 'ernando, 8., !he %ill of &ights #+>)$, pp. )+>:)+-. 3)6*4 6 0hil. 6-+ #+F1$. 3)6>4 7nited 9tates v. rceo, supra, pp. 6-1:6-?. 3)6-4 )F 0hil. 1*> #+++$. 3)64 7nited 9tates v. De Eos &e(es, et al., supra, p. 1>6. 3)1F4 'ernando, 8., !he Constitution of the 0hilippines #+>1$, p. *?). 3)1+4 )F 9C& 6-6 #+*>$. 3)1)4 9tonehill v. Diokno, supra, p. 6). 3)164 +F+ 9C& -* #+-F$. 3)114 0eople v. C'I, supra, pp. +FF:+F+. 3)1?4 Lalmonte v. %elmonte, +>F 9C& )?* #+-$, citing Morfe v. Mutuc, )) 9C& 1)1 #+*-$, pp. 111:11?. 3)1*4 Warden, Mar(land 0enitentiar( v. 79 )1 #+*>$, pp. 6)F:6)1. 3)1>4 6-+ 79 1> #+*?$. 3)1-4 ;riswold v. Connecticut, 6-+ 79 1> #+*?$, pp. 1-?:1-*. 3)14 !he 'ourteenth mendment provides in relevant part, viz@ 3))64
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[Philosophy of Law] "=o 9tate shall make or enforce an( law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 7nited 9tates nor shall an( 9tate deprive an( person of life, libert(, or propert( without due process of law nor den( to an( person within its 5urisdiction the e/ual protection of the laws.2 3)?F4 66- 79 )? #+1$. 3)?+4 Ducat, C., Constitutional Interpretation@ &ights of the Individual, vol. ) #)FFF$, pp. *1+:*1). 3)?)4 Wolf v. Colorado, supra, pp. 6+:6). 3)?64 6*1 79 )F* #+*F$. 3)?14 6*> 79 *16 #+*+$. 3)??4 Ducat, C., supra, pp. *1+:*1). 3)?*4 Mapp v. Bhio, supra, pp. *?1:**F. 3)?>4 6*1 79 )F* #+*F$. 3)?-4 )d., p. )+>. 3)?4 Ea'ave, W. 9earch and 9eizure@ !reatise in the 'ourth mendment, vol. + #) nd ed., +->$, pp. +*:+>, citing !err( v. Bhio, 6) 79 + #+*-$. 3)*F4 )d., p. +>, citing 7nited 9tates v. Calandra, 1+1 79 66- #+>1$, dissent. 3)*+4 )d. 3)*)4 1) 0hil. --* #+)F$. 3)*64 1> 0hil. *)* #+)?$. 3)*14 )?+ 79 6-? #++$. 3)*?4 ?> 0hil. 6-1 #+6)$. 3)**4 %ernas, J., !he +-> Constitution of the &epublic of the 0hilippines@ Commentar( #+*$, pp. +1:+?. 3)*>4 *1 0hil. 66 #+6>$. 3)*-4 >* 0hil. *6> #+1*$. 3)*4 %ernas, J., supra note )**, pp. +>:+-. 3)>F4 -F 0hil. + #+1-$, pp. +, 6:1. 3)>+4 Wong Q Eee v. Collector of Internal &evenue, et al., +F1 0hil. 1* #+?-$, citing Moncado v. 0eopleAs Court, - 0hil. + #+1-$ Medina v. Collector of Internal &evenue, ++F 0hil. +) #+*+$, citing Wong Q Eee, supra %ernas, J., supra note )**, pp. +-:+. 3)>)4 )F 9C& 6-6 #+*>$. 3)>64 9tonehill v. Diokno, supra, pp. 66:61. 3)>14 ;riswold v. Connecticut, supra, p. 16. 3)>?4 9ee =ote *?, supra. 3)>*4 0ascual, C., Introduction to Eegal 0hilosoph( #+-$, pp. )):)6. 3)>>4 9ee C. 0atterson, supra, p. ?). 3)>-4 0roclamation =o. + #+-*$. 3)>4 9andifer, D. and E. 9cheman, !he 'oundation of 'reedom #+**$, pp. 11:1?. 3)-F4 8strada v. Desierto, supra, p. ?1, citing the Declaration of Independence. !hat the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a natural human right ma( be inferred from the +1 case of 6ol# v. !olorado, where Justice 'rankfurter said@ "!he knock at the door, whether b( da( or night, as a prelude to a search, without authorit( of law but solel( on the authorit( of the police, did not need the "ommentar$ o# re"ent histor$ to %e "ondemned as in"onsistent with the "on"etion o# human rights enshrined in the histor$ and basic constitutional documents of the 8nglish:speaking peoples.2 3)-+4 1+1 79 66- #+>1$. 3)-)4 )d., p. 61-. 3)-64 Ea'ave, W., supra, p. )F. 47 | P a g e
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