Self-Defense (Cases in Full Text)

 

 

 Self-Defense as a Ground Ground for Acquittal in Crimi Criminal nal Cases CONTENTS

THE UNITED STATES vs. AH CHONG........................................................... ................................................................................................. ......................................2 THE UNITED STATES vs. DAMIAN SANTA ANA and DOROTEA RAMOS ...................................11 NORMAN LACSON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINE S ................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................13 13 NORBERTO MASIPEQUINA and JOVENCIO ALAMPAYAN vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES............................................................. ...........................................................................19 ..............19 SPO2 LOLITO T. NACNAC vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES .......................................................25 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTINA SAMSON ................................................................... ...................................................................31 31 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO OLARBE y BALIHANGO .......................................37 .......................................37 PRUDENCIO GANAL, JR. Y BADAJOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES....................................44 PHILIPPINES....................................44

 

THE UNITED STATES vs. AH CHONG G.R. No. L-5272

March 19, 1910  

CARSON, J.:   The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the t he testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding surroundin g the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct: The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho muchacho.. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room. On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperate desperately ly wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds. There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection. The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left

 

the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man. The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings. No reasonable explanation explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber. Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day. The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced sentenced to six years and one day presidio day  presidio mayor , the minimum penalty prescribed by law.  At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted admitted that he killed killed his roommate, roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.  Article 8 of the Penal Penal Code provides that —  The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability: xxx

xxx

xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances: (1) Illegal aggressio aggression. n. (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding notwithstandin g defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts whereabou ts and deliver the first blow.

 

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge. The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. vs. S.,  S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. vs. Power,  Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. vs. People,  People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. vs. State,  State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. vs. Rogers,  Rogers, 7 Met., 500.) The general proposition proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, misdemeano r, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.

 

 Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows: Penal Code Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.  Acts and omissions omissions punished punished by law are always always presumed presumed to be voluntarily voluntarily unless the the contrary shall appear.  An person voluntarily voluntarily committing committing a crime or or misdemeanor misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit. The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, a  free, intelligent intelligent,, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con "con malicia," malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.) Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no by crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon Viada are more apparent than real. Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says: In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that that where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)  And to the same same effect are various various decisions of the supreme court court of Spain, as, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language: It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.  And again in its sentence of March March 16, 1892, 1892, wherein it held held that "considering "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellan appellantt in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence." negligence."  And to the same same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made made use of the following following language: . . . Considering that the moral element element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.

 

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes and misdemeano misdemeanors rs therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows: He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision to prision correcciona correccionall in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime. He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence negligenc e shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees. In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81. The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper. The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated contemplate d therein, in the absence of malice m alice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor. The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approxima approximate te in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without  justifiable excuse. excuse. In one case it was said to mean, mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful."  And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily ordinarily in a statute statute it means "not "not merely `voluntarily' `voluntarily' but with with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.) But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine: In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —  There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosoph philosophical ical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our

 

legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —  Legal maxims. maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus as Actus non facit facit reum nisi mens sit rea, rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —  Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And —  In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.) Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.) But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignoran Ignorantia tia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.) Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they

 

appear to him." (Reg. vs. vs. Thurborn,  Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. vs. Anderson,  Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. vs. Lamb,  Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. vs. P.,  P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. vs. Cohen,  Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. P. vs. Miles,  Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. vs. S.,  S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligen negligence ce fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted. If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.) The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly undoubted ly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumptio presumption n established in article 1 of the code, that the "act " act punished by law" law" was committed "voluntarily." Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said: If the party killing had reasonable reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.) In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:  A, in the peaceable peaceable pursuit pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rushing rapidly rapidly toward him, him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder with  powder only, only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify terrify A.  A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the

 

essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasona reasonable ble grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.) To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III.ofWhen it is without shown that the accused was sitting atthe his fire, hearth, night, company only his wife, other light than reflected from andatthat the in man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal il legal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and considerin considering g that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the not arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) . QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing distinguishin g immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsib responsibility ility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The

 

criminal branch of the Audiencia  of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the the Audiencia of accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor , etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.) QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)  A careful examination examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us us that the defendant defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstance circumstances, s, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge. The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. oficio. So ordered.

 

THE UNITED STATES vs. DAMIAN SANTA ANA and DOROTEA RAMOS G.R. No. L-7020

March 15, 1912

TRENT, J. : Damian Santa Ana and Dorotea Ramos, husband and wife, were charged in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal with the crime of lesiones menos graves. graves. Damian was acquitted and his wife found guilty as charged and sentenced to one month and one day of arresto mayor , to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P42, to the correspondin corresponding g subsidiary imprisonment in the case of insolvency, and to the payment of one-half the costs of the cause. She appealed. The appellant admits having inflicted upon the complainin complaining g party, Antonio Santos, certain wounds with a bolo bolo.. As a result of these wounds, Santos was incapacitated for the performance of his ordinary duties as a laborer for the period of twelve days. The witnesses for the prosecution, including including the complaining party, testified to the effect that on the night in question  Antonio Santos Santos was seated near a tienda tienda when  when Dorotea Ramos came near and stated to him that she desired to talk with him about certain matters. Santos declined to accede to this request on the ground, as he stated, that Dorotea's husband might be jealous of him and he did not want to be caught talking with her in the streets at night; that on his refusal to comply with her request, Dorotea approached him and suddenly drew a bolo bolo from  from under her apparel where it was concealed and inflicted the wounds. On the other hand, the appellant and her witnesses testify that as the appellant was going from tienda for her house to a certain tienda  for the purpose of making a small purchase, she was met by  Antonio Santos Santos in a dark place, place, somewhat somewhat isolated from any any buildings, and and that Santos immediately caught her by the arm and began to drag her off the street into an uninhabited place for the purpose of forcibly having illicit relations with her. The result was that the testimony given by the prosecution was irreconcilable with that given on behalf of the appellant. The trial court, after a careful examination of the testimony, made the following finding of facts: The testimony of the woman herself is the more acceptable, which is to the effect that the accused Antonio Santos, upon seeing her near an isolated place, caught her by the arm, tried to drag her to an obscure spot there to take advantage of her, and that, in order to defend herself, it was necessary to wound the said Santos with the bolo bolo that  that she carried. We think the trial reached a of proper conclusion to how the trouble occurred; occurred; but we cannot agree withcourt his application the law to these as facts.  Article 8 of the Penal Penal Code Code reads: The following are exempt from criminal liability: xxx

xxx

xxx

4. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur: (1) Unlawful aggressio aggression; n; (2) Reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it; (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

 

In the judgment appealed from, the first and third of these circumstances were found in favor of the appellant, but the court said that under the testimony, and taking into consideration the fact that the appellant, who is one of the most vigorous Filipinas, and Santos not being physically one of the strongest men, it was not reasonably necessary for the appellant to have used her bolo bolo to  to repel the attack which was made m ade upon her by Santos; that she could have escaped the consequences consequence s of this act by calling for help. Both the appellant and the offended party were married. The appellant was going along the street attending to her own business, when she was attacked by Santos. He caught her by the arm and was forcibly taking her to a dark place, off the street, for the purpose, as we have said, of having illicit relations with her. She most seriously objected and sought, by means of her own physical strength, to release herself, but Santos persisted in his attempt. It was then that the appellant used her bolo bolo.. She used it for the protection of her honor, and to repel this brutal attack which was made upon her. Santos knew that the appellant was a married woman and living happily with her husband. He also knew that if he ever could have carnal relations with her, it must be by force. So he deliberately planned to commit one of the most heinous crimes known to our criminal law; and when he received the blows inflicted by the appellant with her bolo bolo which  which she carried, he was then carrying out his fiendish design or plan. Such injuries are not by any means greater than he deserved, and the appellant was perfectly justified, under the facts and circumstances, in using any kind of a weapon at her command which was necessary to repel this attack, and to continue using it until she was able to free herself from Santos' clutches. When a man becomes so debased as to lose every instinct of manhood and engages himself in the commission of so serious a crime, he certainly takes his life and liberty in his own hands, and if he loses the latter or receives serious personal injuries, injuries, his loss is no greater than he deserves. The appellant is therefore entitled to an absolute acquittal upon the ground of self-defense. The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the appellant ordered released from custody forthwith, with costs de oficio. oficio.

 

NORMAN LACSON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-46485 November 2l, 1979

FERNANDEZ, J.:   This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,  Appeals, 1 promulgated on  April 26, 1977, 1977, affirming the the judgment of the Court of First Instance Instance of Bulacan Bulacan Branch VIII, in Criminal Case No. 0429-V, entitled "People "People of the Philippin Philippines es vs. Norman Lacson" Lacson" convicting the accused, petitioner herein, herein, of the crime of frustrated homicide penalized under Art. 249, in connection with Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, but declaring him entitled to the privileged litigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense considering considering that two of the three requisites mentioned in Art. 11, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code are present, namely, unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocatio provocation n on the part of the person defending himself and, taking into consideration the provisions provisions of Art. 13, No. 1 and Art. 69, both of the said Revised Penal Code, imposed upon him a straight penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months of arresto mayor, and ordered the said accused to indemnify the offended party, Jimmy Pitalio, in the amount of P500.00, and to pay the costs of the suit.  suit. 2  The petitioner was originally charged under two (2) informations. In Criminal Case No. 0429V, 3 he was accused of frustrated homicide for having shot one Jimmy Pitalio on January 23, V,  1972 in the municipality of Valenzuela, province of Bulacan. The petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 0430-V  0430-V 4 with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition for having in his possession a Commanche Chief Caliber .22 Magnum revolver revolver which was not licensed in his name. This was the same gun he used in shooting Jimmy Pitalio. The two criminal cases were tried jointly. Thereafter the trial court rendered judgment judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 0430-V and convicting said petitioner of the crime of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 0429-V.  5  0429-V. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:  court: 6   ASSIGNMENT  ASSIGNME NT OF ERRORS  ERRORS  I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT ARMED WHEN HE ATTACKED APPELLANT. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO REASONABLE NECESSITY OF THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY APPELLANT TO DEFEND HIMSELF. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF LEGITIMATE SELF- DEFENSES."

 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in toto  toto 7 and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said decision in a resolution dated June 20, 1977.  1977. 8  The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors:  errors: 9   ASSIGNMENT  ASSIGNME NT OF ERRORS  ERRORS  I RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT ARMED WITH A KNIFE WHEN HE ATTACKED THE PETITIONER. II RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER TO PRESENT AS WITNESSES HIS MAID, HIS HELPER  AND HIS WIFE TO CORROBORATE CORROBORATE HIS TESTIMONY TESTIMONY RENDERS RENDERS THE DEFENSE VERSION UNWORTHY OF CREDENCE. III RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BECAUSE THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT ARMED WITH A KNIFE WHEN HE  ATTACKED THE THE PETITIONER, PETITIONER, THERE WAS WAS NO REASONABLE REASONABLE NECESSITY FOR THE LATTER TO USE HIS WIFE'S GUN TO DEFEND HIMSELF AND HIS WIFE. IV  ASSUMING FOR FOR THE SAKE SAKE OF ARGUMENT ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER PETITIONER CANNOT CANNOT CLAIM COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE, RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES ONLY AND NOT FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE. The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are:  are: 10  Norman Lacson, Jimmy Pitalio, Carlos Tan and Enrique Masacote were neighbors in General Tiburcio de Leon, Valenzuela, Bulacan. At about noon on January 23, 1972, Carlos Tan invited Masacote and Pitalio to the birthday party of his son in their house. While they were eating and drinking in the yard, Tan told Pitalio that the laborers of Lacson were leaving their work. Tan also asked Pitalio to find out whether the latter could get the balance of his unpaid wages from Lacson. Pitalio went to Lacson's residence, kicked open the gate of appellant appellant's 's residence, and forced his way inside the yard. Appellant and his wife had just arrived and were alighting from their car when Pitalio, under the influence of liquor, confronted Mrs. Lacson and asked her to produce their truck driver named Serafica, saying- 'Pag hindi mo siya hinarap sa akin ay may mangyayari.'  Appellant remonstrated remonstrated with Pitalio to abide abide by the law. This enraged enraged Pitalio who who replied: 'Ano ang batas, ito ang batas!' Taking the Magnum. 22 caliber pistol of his wife from her handbag the appellant appellant then fired it once at chest.

 

Thereafter Mrs. Lacson brought Pitalio to the hospital. There Pitalio's gunshot wound was treated and operated on (Exhibit 'A'). Pitalio's confinement in the Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital lasted from January 23 to February 2, 1972. The medical certificate issued unto him stated that his injury would incapacitate him for more than thirty (30) days. In its analysis of the evidence for the prosecution petition and for the defense, the trial court found that:  that: 11  Jimmy Pitalio, on the witness stand, admitted that at the time of the incident he had drunk beer in the house of Carlos Tan but being drunk. The Court believes, however, that at the tune he was under the influence of liquor so much so that although he knew that the balance of his salary which was a measly Pl.00 in amount was due to him from the driver, he pressed Mrs. Lacson for the nonpayment and as a matter of fact, according to him, he told Mrs. Lacson 'Never mind, Mrs. Lacson, alam kong ginigipit ninyo ako.' Again, the fact that Jimmy Pitalio was known as a person of bad character in the locality is shown by the uncontradicted uncontradi cted testimony of the accused who testified that Carlos Tan and Masacote warned him about Jimmy Pitalio and, by the fact that Jimmy Pitalio was convicted of serious physical injuries against his own uncle (Exhibit 4), and likewise by the fact that he admitted having stoned the house of accused Norman Lacson together with other companions. The petitioner invoked self-defense. self-defense. His evidence is that jimmy Pitalio attacked him with a knife, and in order to prevent or repel the aggression he took the gun of his wife from her handbag and shot at the offended party. The trial court rejected petitioner's theory of complete selfdefense. However, lt ruled that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the offended party, Jimmy Pitalio, stating thus:  thus: 12  Considering, therefore, the fact that at the time of the incident the offended party, Considering, Jimmy Pitalio, was drunk and considering his bad character, the Court believes, therefore, that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Jimmy Pitalio. It was Jimmy Pitalio who provoked the incident by going in a drunken condition to the house of the accused The fact that Pitalio was of a violent temperament, strong and aggressive, previously convicted of serious physical injuries against his own uncle, plus the fact that he entered the residence of the accused in this case, makes the Court conclude that there was unlawful aggression aggression on the part of the offended party in this case. The trial court held that there was no reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the unlawful aggression aggression but found that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused because:  because: 13  That there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in this case is very clear because it was Jimmy Pitalio who himself provoked the incident by accusing the wife of the accused of depriving him of his wages. The Court therefore finds that although there was no reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the first requisite of unlawful aggression was present, as well as the third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not he is entitled to acquittal on the ground of complete self-defense. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the offended party and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the petitioner. Both said courts, however, found the use of the gun by the petitioner as an

 

unreasonable ble means to repel the unlawful aggression of the offended party, Jimmy Pitalio, unreasona apparently on the belief that the latter did not have any weapon. The petitioner testified that the offended party was armed with a "knife like" knife when he confronted Mrs. La and the accused. The trial court found that when the petitioner remonstrated with Pitalio to abide by the law, Pitalio was enraged and replied " Ano ang batas, batas, ito ang batas batas! " Implicit in this statement of Pitalio is that he was referring to something as "ito "ito ang batas. batas. " This statement of Pitalio tends to corroborate the testimony of the petitioner that the offended party was armed with a "kris-like" knife. The trial did not state to what Pitalio, the offended party, referred when he said "... ito ang batas! batas! " before he was fired at by the petitioner. The statement could not have simply referred to the fists of the offended party. It is contrary to normal human behavior for the petitioner to have taken the pistol of his wife from her handbag and fired at Pitalio if Pitalio have any weapon at all. The only logical conclusion is that had a knife when he said " Ano  Ano ang batas batas!" !" The phrase "into ang batas " could only have referred to a weapon. In People vs. Boholst-Ca Boholst-Caballero, ballero,  14 this Court said. In cases such as the one now before Us where there are directly conflicting versions of the incident object of the accusation the Court in its search for the truth perforce has to look for some facts or circumstances which can be used as valuable aids in evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony, for after all the element of probabili probability ty is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence, so much so that when a court as a judicial fact-finder pronounces judgment judgment that a set of facts constitute the true happening it does so not of its own personal knowledge but as the result of an evaluating process of the probability or improbability improbab ility of a fact sought to be proved. Considering the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that Jimmy Pitalio, the offended party, was drunk at the time he was shot; that Pitalio was known as a person of bad character in the locality; that Pitalio had been convicted of serious physical injuries committed against his own uncle; that on a previous occasion, Pitalio admitted having stoned the house of petitioner, Norman Lacson; Lacson; and the fact that Pitalio had intruded into the residence of the accused, the use by the petitioner of a gun as the only available weapon to repel the aggression cannot be considered as an unreasonable means of defending himself and his wife from the offended party. This Court explained the meaning of reasonable means employed thus: That there is reasonable necessity of the means employed by herein appellant to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression cannot seriously be disputed. 'Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability commensura bility between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, equivalence, in the consideratio consideration n of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof d 's not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury ... As WE stated in the case of People vs. Lara, in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the consequences. consequences.15  In the instant case, there was an imminent danger of the lives of the petitioner and of his wife from the unlawful attack of an enraged, drunken, drunken, and armed Pitalio. The gun in the bag of his

 

wife, who was. beside him, afforded the petitioner the only reasonab reasonable le means to ward off the attack. The petitioner is entitled to acquittal on the ground of complete self-defense. It is no longer necessary to discuss the other errors assigned by him. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the information in C Case No. N o. 0429-V of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, with costs de oficio. oficio. SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

NORBERTO MASIPEQUINA and JOVENCIO ALAMPAYAN  vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF T THE HE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-51206 August 25, 1989

CORTES, J.:   The extent to which respondi responding ng peace officers may defend themselves in the face of an attack by the person sought to be apprehended is the subject of this petition for review. Petitioners Patrolmen Norberto Mesipequina and Jovencio Alampayan, who were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of San Isidro, Bohol, were charged with the crime of homicide for the death of Leopoldo Potane. They were convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of from seven (7) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as temporal as maximum, and to  jointly and severally severally indemnify indemnify the heirs of of the deceased deceased Leopoldo Potane Potane in the the amount of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.0 (P12,000.00). 0). On appeal, the Solicitor General joined the petitioners petitioners in their prayer for acquittal on the theory that petitioners are exempt from liability because they had acted in self-defense when they shot and killed Leopoldo Potane. But, just the same, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but modified m odified the penalty of imprisonment to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor  as  as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as temporal  as maximum. Before this Court both the petitioners and the Solicitor General reassert that petitioners should be acquitted because they acted in lawful self-defense. There is no dispute about the following facts, which were quoted by the Court of Appeals from the Solicitor General's presentation. xxx In the afternoon of December 21, 1976, Barangay Capt. Nicolas Potane of Barrio  Abehilan San Isidro, Bohol and Bohol his father, father,ofPedro Potane Potane requested assistance requested from the Police Sub-station Commander San Isidro in apprehending Leopoldo Potane, son of Pedro Potane and elder brother of Nicolas, who has begun to show signs of recurring insanity. Since his arrival from Mindanao in 1974, Leopoldo had been acting queerly and at times violent. On December 18, 1975, Leopoldo chased the wife of Nicolas with a bolo and almost hacked her. He always carried a bolo, and had threatened his own wife, daughter, brothers, and even his parents with death. Fearing for their safety, they transferred temporarily to the Home Economics building of the barrio school and left Leopoldo alone in the house of his father. Nicolas Potane and his immediate relatives wanted Leopoldo to be examined and treated by the Provincial Health Officer for his mental ailment (pp. 19-22, 26-32. t.s.n., Nov. 15, 1976; Exhs. C, C-1 to C-5-A, Folder of Exhibits).   lâwphî1.ñèt

Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan, the former armed with a 38 cal. revolver and the latter with the Thompson submachine submachine gun, were ordered by the sub-station commander to arrest Leopoldo. Before proceeding to the house where Leopoldo was, the policemen passed the store of a certain

 

Ismael Balumia where they had a conference with Barrio Captain Nicolas Potane; his father, Pedro Potane; his mother, Marganta Potane and others. In said store a  joint affidavit (Exhs. (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2, Folder of Exhibits), Exhibits), was prepared prepared and signed signed by Nicolas Potane, Pedro Potane, Margarita Potane, Clara Potane, Francisca Potane, and Emilia Potane, wife of Leopoldo, authorizing the 'peace officer of the San Isidro Police Dept. 'to apprehend Leopoldo Potane who was about to run amok.' The document further stated that if Leopoldo would resist as he is armed with a weapon, the policemen 'have the right to shoot him but not to kill him ... but if such does not permit, if he resist(s) arrest they have the right to resort to any manner to prevent the fearful outcome from his running amok' and 'if he would be killed by the police officers on account of his resistance, we, the parents, brother and sisters, and wife would take no action if something untoward would occur. (pp. 4-8, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1976). Thereafter, the two policemen, accompanied by several persons, among whom was Nicolas Potane, went to the house of Pedro Potane where Leopoldo was. Upon arrival thereat, Pat. Masipequina, a childhood friend of Leopoldo, called Leopoldo and urged him to come out. He also asked Leopoldo for a drink, but Leopoldo refused to go down the house. Pat. Masipequina then informed Leopoldo that his father and brother had reported that he (Leopoldo) had chased his sister-in-law with a bolo and their officer-in-charge sent him to investigate the report. He told Leopoldo to come down so that they could talk. Leopoldo instead told him to come up (pp. 10-11, t.s.n., Ibid).   lâwphî1.ñèt

Pat. Masipequina went up the house followed by Nicolas Potane with a petromax lamp. Patrolman Jovencio Alampayan and the rest stayed in the yard Although in the yard, Patrolman Alampayan could see what was going on inside the house because it was a single storey house and had an elevation of only 4 feet (p. 56, t.s.n., Dec. 6, 1976). Nicolas stayed on the door landing while Masipequina entered the sala and was about to sit down on a rocking chair when Leopoldo suddenly emerged from an adjacent room and rushed at him swinging a bolo. Masipequina pushed the rocking chair towards Leopoldo. Leopoldo hit Masipequina Masipequin a on the bridge of the nose (p. 23, t.s.n., Ibid). As the latter retracted, he lost his balance and was hit on the right side of his face. At this juncture, Masipequina Masipequin a drew his revolver and fired three shots. One shot misfired but the other two hit Leopoldo on the chest. Leopoldo continued continued to advance towards him. He pushed the rocking chair at Leopoldo and ran out of the house shouting for help. Leopoldo ran after him. Pat. Masipequina jumped from the house and landed on the ground. In the process he hit his shin on a piece of stone. Leopoldo also jumped to the ground and continued to pursue Masipequina. As Leopoldo poised to hack Pat. Masipequina, Pat. Alampayan fired his gun hitting Leopoldo once at the thigh (pp. 25-26, Id., pp. 40, 71, t.s.n., Dec. D ec. 6, 1976). xxx [CA Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 9-11]. Leopoldo Potane died some thirty (30) minutes later while being brought to the health center for treatment. The issue is readily apparent: whether or not, given the undisputed facts, petitioner Masipequina had acted in lawful self-defense. (Petitioner Alampayan's Alampayan's conviction for the crime charged hinges on that of Masipequin Masipequina a as the trial court had found that the two conspired to kill Leopoldo Potane, as alleged in the information.).

 

The trial court, however, rejected the defense raised by petitioner. The following reasons, which were cited by the trial court, were adopted and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals: . . . (1) the fact that the accused persisted in their attempts to arrest and/or pick up the victim for almost two (2) hours, culminating in the tragedy at around nine o'clock that evening; (2) the fact that the victim suffered three gunshot wounds, two of which were over the heart and admittedly fatal, and the third on the left thigh which was not fatal but sufficient to cripple him; (3) the fact that all three gunshot wounds borebeen evidence of gunpowder signs, i s indicative is and had conclusive of having inflicted at close range; (4)which the fact that the victim a 2-inch lacerated wound on his forehead and another lacerated wound on his right leg which have not been sufficiently explained but are also indicative of having been inflicted by blunt instruments, like a flashlight or the butts of a revolver or a submachine gun; and (5) the fact that the alleged injuries of accused Masipequina Masipequina could not, by any stretch of imagination, be inflicted by a bolo allegedly wielded by the victim, since they are quite superficial in degree, located in the most improbable places and may even have been self-inflicted to  justify a subsequent subsequent claim of self-defense. xxx [Rollo, p. 20.]

"The on self-defense embodied in any system in the world finds justification man'slaw natural instinct to protect, repel, and penal save his person andcivilized rights from impending danger in and peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being." [People v. Boholst-Caballero, G.R. No. L-23249 November 25,1974,61 SCRA 180, 1 85.] In our jurisdiction it is found in Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:  ART. 11. Justifying circumstance ci rcumstances s. — The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided the following circumstances concur: First. Unlawful aggression aggression;; Second. Reasonable Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. xxx It is settled jurisprudence jurisprudence that he who invokes the exempting circumstance of self-defense must prove it during the trial [U.S. v. Coronel, 30 Phil. 112 (1915)]. He must prove the elements enumerated in Article 11 by clear and convincing evidence, the reason being that since he had admitted having killed or wounded another, which is an act punishable by law, he shall be liable thereof unless he establishes a lawful defense [People v. Boholst-Caballero, supra supra]. ]. Thus, the determination determinatio n of whether or not all the three elements are present in the case. 1. That there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased Leopoldo Potane is evident from the established facts. Leopoldo Potane, who had showed signs of mental illness and had threatened his immediate relatives with a bolo, suddenly and without provocation attacked with a bolo Masipequina, whom he (Leopoldo Potane) has asked to go inside the house.

 

2. That there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by Masipequina to prevent or repel Leopoldo Potane's attack is also supported by the evidence. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784 (1922), where a policeman trying to quell a In the leading case of U.S. v. Mojica, disturbance shot with his revolver and fatally wounded a man who attacked him with a knife, the Court laid down the following rule:  A police officer, officer, in the performance performance of his duty, must stand his ground ground and cannot, likehis a private individual, take refuge flight; histherefore duty requires him to overcome opponent. The force which hein may exert differs somewhat from that which may ordinarily be offered in self-defense. Bearing this in mind, we do not think that the appellant in using his revolver against the deceased can be said to have employed unnecessary force. The deceased attacked him with a deadly weapon; he might, perhaps, have saved himself by running away, but this his duty forbade. Was he to allow himself to be stabbed before using his arms? It may, perhaps, be argued that the appellant might have used his club, but a policeman policeman's 's club is not a very effective weapon as against a drawn knife and a police officer is not required to afford a person attacking him the opportunity for a fair and equal struggle. (State vs. Phillips, 119 Iowa, 652; 67 L.R.A. 292; North Carolina vs. Gosnell, 74 Fed., 734; Boykin vs. People, 22 Colo., 496; 45 Pac., 419; Adams vs. State, 72 Ga., 85.) And if it was necessar necessary y for the appellant to use his revolver, he could hardly, under the circumstances, be expected to take deliberate and careful aim so as to strike a point less vulnerable than the body of his adversary. (U.S. vs. Mack 8 Phil., 701; U.S. v. Domen 37 Phil., 57.) [Id [Id., ., p. 787]. Tested by this standard, the means employed by Masipequina Masipequina in repelling the attack were, under the circumstances, both reasonable and necessary. He initially tried to defend himself by pushing the rocking chair toward Leopoldo Potane but when that proved futile and he (Masipeq (Masipequina) uina) was caught in a very precariou precarious s position, i.e., his back was on the floor and Leopold Leopoldo o Potane kept flailing at him with the bolo, he had no other choice but to use his revolver to defend himself against the attack. Under the circumstances, there was no opportunity for Masipequina to carefully take aim. He just discharged his weapon at the deceased in the hope that such would save him from any further injury or death. It must also be borne in mind that the rule is that the reasonable necessity necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent the attack depends upon the imminent danger of injury, not on the harm actually done to the accused [U.S. v. Paras, 9 Phil. 367 (1907)]. Thus, that Masipequina escaped serious injuries does not necessarily imply that the means he used to repel the attack were unreasonable unreasonable and excessive. The fact remains that the act of Leopoldo Potane of attacking Masipequina Masipequin a with a bolo was a very real danger to his life that the latter had to repel the best way he can. That the gunshot wounds he inflicted on Leopoldo Potane proved to be fatal does not make the means he employed any less reasonabl reasonable e under the circumstance circumstances. s. 3. Then, the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Masipequina is too plain to even doubt. He, together with Patrolman Alampayan had been tasked by his superior to apprehend Leopoldo Potane upon complaint of his own father and brother. Thus, petitioners herein, when they went to apprehend apprehen d the deceased, were in the performance of their official duties as peace officers. And when they reached the house where Leopoldo Potane was hiding, Masipequina tried to coax Leopoldo Potane into coming out of the house, but the latter would not. It was only when Leopoldo Potane asked Masipequina, who was his childhood friend, to enter the house that he did, followed by Nicolas Potane. Masipequina was about to take a seat, definitely a nonprovocative act, when he was suddenly attacked by Leopoldo Potane with a bolo.  As consistently argued argued by the the Solicitor General General before before the Court of Appeals Appeals and this Court, all the elements of self defense are present in the instant case:

 

... (a) [T]here was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which was a real and imminent threat to the life of Pat. Masipequina. The victim was brandish brandishing ing a bolo which he did use in fact to hit the latter; (b) The use of his revolver to repel the aggression was a reasonable necessity. His life already exposed to danger in the face of a continuous assault, it is likely that had he not shot the victim, he would have been killed, considering the deranged mind of the aggressor. Moreover, after he shot the victim, he ran away to avoid being hit farther (sic), an act obviously inconsistent with a deliberate intent to kill; (c) Pat. Masipequina did not provoke the victim into attacking him. In fact, before he went inside the house, he asked Leopoldo to come out to talk things over. He even asked for a drink. It was only when the victim himself asked Pat. Masipequina to go up the house that the latter entered the sala. xxx [Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Respondent People's Brief, p. 12; Rollo, p. 115]. We also hasten to add that, as in the case of  People   People v. Boholst-Caballero, supra, supra, we accord special significance to the wounds inflicted on the deceased in finding that the elements of selfdefense had been established.  According to Dr. Dr. Julieta Melicor, Melicor, who conducted conducted the postmortem postmortem examination examination on the body body of the deceased, theand trajectory of the two chest indicate that the person who September fired the shots was in a lying lower position while thewounds deceased was then standing [TSN, 2, 1976, pp. 5-6, 10]. This corroborate corroborates s petitioner Masipequina's Masipequina's testimony that he had his back to the floor when he fired at the victim who was attacking him with a bolo. The fact that the wounds bore traces of gunpowder, indicating the proximity between the person who fired the shot and the deceased, also support Masipequina's testimony.  After the elements elements of self-defense self-defense had been established established to exculpate exculpate petitioners petitioners from the charge of homicide, the next question that arises, albeit only incidentally, is whether or not Alampayan could be separately convicted of the lesser offense of less serious or slight physical injuries for the gunshot wound he inflicted on Leopoldo Potane's thigh.  Again, we refer refer to Article 11 of of the Revised Penal Penal Code, which which provides:  ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability: xxx 3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. m otive. xxx Thus, the elements of defense of stranger are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

 

1. In the instant case, that there was unlawful aggression aggression on the part of Leopoldo Potane had been adequately established, as discussed earlier with regard to the circumstance of self-defense self-defense.. 2. Then, that the means employed by Alampayan in trying to prevent Leopoldo Potane from further attacking Masipequina with a bolo were reasonable is clearly evident, as Alampayan only shot at Leopoldo Potane's thigh to prevent him from further pursuing Masipequina Masipequina who was trying to escape Leopoldo Potane's attack. 3. Finally, that Alampayan was not motivated by any evil motive is shown by the fact that he, together with Masipequin Masipequina, a, only proceeded to the place where the incident happened to look for Leopoldo Potane because they had been ordered by their substation commander to apprehend Leopoldo Potane who had shown signs of mental derangement and had threatened his relatives with a bolo. In short, the two policemen were in the performance of their official and lawful duties. This, the performance of duties, brings to fore another circumstance circumstance that would justify  Alampayan's  Alampayan 's wounding of of Leopoldo Potane, Potane, for the same same Article 11 of the the Revised Penal Penal Code exempts from liability [a]ny person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office" [Art. 11, par. 5]. Thus, in one case, the Court acquitted the accused police officers even if their acts constituted the crimes of discharge of firearm and lesiones graves and graves  and menos graves, graves, inflicted upon persons facing criminal charges who were trying to resist arrest, because the accused officers were in the performance of their official duties [U.S. v. Resaba, 1 Phil. 311 (1902)]. Finally, the small lacerated wounds on Leopoldo Potane's forehead and right leg, which the trial court and the Court of Appeals found suspicious, suspicious, can be explained by the fact that Leopoldo Potane dropped to the ground after he was shot on the thigh by Alampayan. There is nothing on the record to support the conclusion that the wounds were inflicted by a flashlight or gun butt. In fine, this Court, on the basis of the same facts found by the Court of Appeals, has arrived at a different conclusion. Principally, Principally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision after concluding that one of the elements of self-defense, i.e., reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack, was lacking. However, after a careful consideration of the undisputed facts and the rule on self-defense by police officers enunciated in Mojica Mojica,, this Court is convinced that said element had been established and that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it rejected petitioners' defense and affirmed the trial court's  judgment of conviction. conviction. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTE WHEREFORE, GRANTED D and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED. Petitioners Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan are  ACQUITTED of the the crime charged. charged. SO ORDERED.

 

SPO2 LOLITO T. NACNAC vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 191913

March 21, 2012

VELASCO, JR., J.:   Every circumstance favoring the accused’s innocence innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged. If the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused’s right to be freed; it is, even more, the court’s constitutional constitutional duty to acquit 1 him..   him This treats of the Motion for Reconsideration Reconsideration of Our Resolution dated August 25, 2010, affirming 2 the July 20, 2009 Decision Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 30907 entitled People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Lolito T. Nacnac. The CA affirmed the May 23, 2007 Judgmentt3 in Criminal Case No. 10750-14 of the Regional Judgmen R egional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 in Laoag City, which convicted petitioner of homicide. The Facts  An Information charged the the accused as follows: follows: That on or about February 20, 2003, in Dingras, Ilocos Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused SPO2 Lolito I. Nacnac, a public officer, being then a member of the Philippine National Police, assigned with the Dingras Police Station, Dingras, Ilocos Norte, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, shoot one SPO1 Doddie Espejo with a gun resulting into the latter’s death. death.4   A reverse trial ensued ensued upon upon the claim of self-defense self-defense by the accused. accused. As summarized summarized by CA, CA,5 the shooting incident happened as follows: The victim, SPO1 Doddie Espejo[,] had a history of violent aggression and drunkenness. drunkenness. He once attacked a former superior, P/Insp. Laurel Gayya, for no apparent reason. On the day of his death, he visited a cock house for merriment. He was shot by accused-ap accused-appellant pellant [petitioner] on February 20, 2003 at around 10:00 p.m. at the Dingras Police Station, Dingras, Ilocos Norte. On that fateful night of February 20, 2003, accused-appellant, accused-appellant, the victim and a number of other police officers were on duty. Their shift started at 8:00 in the morning of the same day, to end at 8:00 the next morning. Accused-appellant, Accused-appellant, being the highest ranking officer during the shift, was designated the officer-of-the-day. Shortly before 10:00 in the evening, the victim, together with then SPO1 Eduardo Basilio, took the patrol tricycle from the station grounds. When accusedappellant saw this, he stopped the victim and his colleague from using the tricycle. The victim told accused-appellant accused-appellant that he (the victim) needed it to go to Laoag City to settle a previous disagreement disagreeme nt with a security of a local bar.  Accused-appellant still refused.  Accused-appellant refused. He told the victim victim that he is needed needed at the station station and, at any rate, he should stay at the station because he was drunk. This was not received well by the victim. He told accused-appellant in Ilocano: "Iyot ni inam kapi" (Coitus of your mother, cousin!). The victim alighted from the tricycle. SPO1 Eduardo Basilio did the same, went inside the office, and left the accused-appellant and the victim alone. The victim took a few steps and drew his .45 caliber gun which was tucked in a holster on the right side of his chest. Accused-appellant then fired his M-16 armalite upward as a warning shot. Undaunted, the victim still drew his gun.

 

 Accused-appellant then shot the victim on the head, which caused the latter’s instantaneous  Accused-appellant death. Accused-appellan Accused-appellantt later surrendere surrendered d to the station’s Chief of Police.  Police.  The RTC Ruling The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged. The RTC held that the claim of selfdefense by the accused was unavailing due to the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The dispositive portion of the RTC Judgment reads: WHEREFORE, the accused SPO2 Lolito Nacnac is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of WHEREFORE, the crime of homicide. Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court hereby sentences him to an indetermina indeterminate te penalty ranging from EIGHT YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased (1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, (2) P100,000.00 as actual damages, (3) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (4) P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Costs against the accused. accused.6  The CA Ruling On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. It held that the essential and primary element of unlawful aggression was lacking. It gave credence to the finding of the trial court that no one else saw the victim drawing his weapon and pointing it at accused Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Lolito T. Nacnac. The fallo of the CA Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSE WHEREFORE, D ISMISSED D for lack of merit and the challenged Judgment Judgment 7 dated May 23, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 10750-14 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. TOTO.   On August 25, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution, denying Nacnac’s Nacnac’s petition for review for failure to sufficiently show that the CA C A committed any reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  jurisdiction.  On October 11, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court’s Resolution Court’s Resolution dated August 25, 2010. On March 21, 2012, this Court granted the Motion and reinstated the petition. Petitioner raises the following issues: 1. [Whether the CA erroneously held that] the victim’s drawing of his his handgun or pointing it at the petitioner is not sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression based on existing  jurisprudence.  jurispruden ce. 2. [Whether the CA incorrectly appreciated the photo] showing the victim holding his handgun in a peculiar manner despite the fact that no expert witness was presented to testify thereto x x x. 3. [Whether petitioner] has met the second and third requisites of self-defense x x x. x .8  Petitioner argues that he did not receive a just and fair judgment based on the following: (1) the trial court did not resort to expert testimony and wrongly interpreted a photograph; (2) the trial court ignored the evidence proving unlawful aggression aggression by the victim; (3) the trial court ignored the two gun reports and two empty shells found at the crime scene which support the claim that petitioner fired a warning shot; and (4) the trial court failed to appreciate petitioner’s act of self defense. Petitioner also claims that the CA gravely erred in not giving proper weight and due consideration to the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its Comment Comment9 dated April 27, 2011, the OSG avers that petitioner is entitled to an acquittal, or at the very least, not one but two mitigating circumstances.

 

Our Ruling We revisit Our ruling in the instant case. The Revised Penal Code provides the requisites for a valid self-defense claim:  ART. 11. Justifying Justifying circumstances. ––The  ––The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances circumstances concur: First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable Reasonable necessity of the means m eans employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful Aggression Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. We explained explained,, "Without unlawful aggression, aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated appreciated,, even if the other elements are present." present."10 It would "presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person ––  ––not not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude ––  ––but but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. x x x There is aggressio aggression n in contemplation of the law only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative." speculative."11   As We held: Even the cocking of a rifle without aiming the firearm at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude that one’s life was in imminent danger. Hence, Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts showing the commencement commenceme nt of actual and material m aterial unlawful aggression. aggression.12  The following exchange showing actual and material unlawful aggression transpired during the examination of petitioner :13   Atty. Lazo: At any rate, rate, when you again again prevented prevented them from getting getting the tricycle tricycle telling them again that they should not get the tricycle, what happened next?  Accused: When police officer Basilio alighted alighted from the tricycle tricycle SPO1 Espejo also alighted alighted sir. Q What did Doddie Espejo do when he alighted from the tricycle?  A I saw him hold his firearm tucked tucked on his right right waist. (witness demonstrating demonstrating by placing his his right hand at his right sideways). And he was left handed, sir. Q And what happened next?  A When I saw him him holding his his firearm that was the the time I fired a warning warning shot, sir. sir. Q And when you fired [a] warning shot, what happened next?

 

 A He drew his firearm, firearm, sir. Q When he drew his firearm, what did you do?  A When he drew drew his firearm firearm I shot him [on] his head head once, sir. xxxx  Atty. Cajigal: Q By the way, what kind of firearm did the victim draw from his waist?  A Cal. 45, sir. Q What firearm did you use in defending yourself?  A M-16 armalite, armalite, sir. xxxx Q Alright, you mean to tell the Honorable Court then that at the time that you pointed or squeezed the trigger of your gun the cal. 45 was already pointed at you?  A Yes, sir. Q Did you ever observe if he squeezed the trigger but the gun [was] already pointed at you?  A He just pointed pointed his firearm firearm at me, sir. Q Who first pointed his firearm, the victim pointed his firearm at you before you pointed your firearm at him?  A The victim, sir. Q In short, it was the victim whose gun was first pointed at you?  A Yes, sir. Q And that was the time when you raised your armalite and also pointed the same at him is that right?  A Yes, that was the time that I shot him, him, sir. (Emphasis (Emphasis supplied.)  According to the the trial court, petitioner’s petitioner’s claim claim that the victim pointed pointed his gun at petitioner was was a mere afterthought. It ruled that petitioner’s sworn statement and direct testimony as well as the testimonies of SPO1 Eduardo Basilio and SPO2 Roosevelt Ballesteros only established that the victim drew his gun. The trial court went on to differentiate the act of drawing a gun and pointing it at a target. It held that the mere act of drawing a gun cannot be considered unlawful aggression. In denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed the trial court’s findings and further held that petitioner had fuller control of his physical and mental faculties in view of the victim’s drunken state. It concluded that the likelihood of the victim committing unlawful aggression in "his inebriated state" was "very slim." slim."14 

 

We disagree. The characterization as a mere afterthought of petitioner’s testimony on the presence of unlawful aggression is not supported by the records. The following circumstances negate a conviction for the killing of the victim: (1) The drunken state of the victim; (2) The victim was also a police officer who was professiona professionally lly trained at shooting; (3) The warning shot fired by petitioner was ignored by the victim; (4) A lawful order by petitioner was ignored by the victim; and (5) The victim was known for his combative and drunken behavior.  As testified by the victim’s victim’s companion, companion, SPO1 Basilio, Basilio, petitioner petitioner ordered him him and the victim victim not to leave because they were on duty. SPO1 Basilio also confirmed that the victim was inebriated and had uttered invectives in response to petitioner’s lawful order .15  Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court, there is a difference between the act of drawing one’s gun and the act of pointing one’s gun at a target. The former cannot be said to be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. In People v. Borreros Borreros,,16 We ruled that "for unlawful aggression to be attendant, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. Unlawful aggression requires an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude x x x. Here, the act of the [deceased] of allegedly drawing a gun from his waist cannot be categorized as unlawful aggression. Such act did not put in real peril the life or personal safety of appellant." The facts surrounding the instant case must, however, be differentiated from current  jurisprudence  jurispruden ce on unlawful unlawful aggression. The The victim here was a trained police police officer. He was was inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order in order to settle a score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning shot fired by a fellow police officer, his superior, was left unheeded as he reached for his own firearm and pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore, justified in defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient colleague. Even if We were to disbelieve the claim that the victim pointed his firearm at petitioner, there would still be a finding of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. We quote with approval the OSG’s argument argument17 on this point:  A police officer is trained to shoot shoot quickly and accurately. A police police officer cannot cannot earn his badge badge unless he can prove to his trainors that he can shoot out of the holster quickly and accurately x x x. Given this factual backdrop, there is reasonable basis to presume that the appellant indeed felt his life was actually threatened. threatened. Facing an armed police officer like himself, who at that time, was standing a mere five meters from the appellant, the [latter] knew that he has to be quick on the draw. It is worth emphasizing that the victim, being a policeman himself, is presumed to be quick in firing. Hence, it now becomes reasonably certain that in this specific case, it would have been fatal for the appellant to have waited for SPO1 Espejo to point his gun before the appellant fires back. Reasonable Means Employed To successfully invoke self-defense, another requisite is that the means employed by the accused must be reasonably commensurate commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to 18 be averted. averted.  

 

Supporting petitioner’s petitioner’s claim of self -defense -defense is the lone gunshot wound suffered by the victim.  The nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered considered as important indicia. indicia.19 In People v. Catbagan, Catbagan,20 We aptly held: 1âwphi1

The means employed by the person invoking self-defense is reasonable if equivalent to the means of attack used by the original aggressor. aggressor. Whether or not the means of self-defense is reasonable depends depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of the person who invokes self-defense; and also the place and the occasion of the assault. In the instant case, the lone wound inflicted on the victim supports the argument that petitioner feared for his life and only shot the victim to defend himself. The lone gunshot was a reasonable means chosen by petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of the armed victim, his drunken state, disobedience disobedience of an unlawful order, and failure to stand down despite a warning shot. Lack of Sufficient Provocation The last requisite for self-defense to be appreciated is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself or herself. As gleaned from the findings of the trial court, petitioner gave the victim a lawful order and fired a warning shot before shooting the armed and drunk victim. Absent from the shooting incident was any evidence on petitioner sufficiently provoking the victim prior to the shooting.  All told, We are are convinced that that petitioner was was only defending defending himself on the the night he shot shot his fellow police officer. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. appeal.21 This rule is binding except where the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, misapprehended, or 22 misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance. substance.  As earlier pointed pointed out, the trial trial court did not consider certain facts and circumstances circumstances that materially affect the outcome of the instant case. We must, therefore, acquit petitioner. Given the peculiar circumstances of this case, We find that the prosecution was unable to establish beyond reasonable reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner. Even the OSG shares this view in its Comment appealing for his acquittal. WHEREFORE, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated July 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 30907 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner SPO2 Lolito T. Nacnac is ACQUITTED of homicide on reasonab reasonable le doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to immediately RELEASE petitioner from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause, and to INFORM this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision of the date petitioner was actually released from confinement. SO ORDERED.

 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTINA C RISTINA SAMSON G.R. No. 214883

September 02, 2015

MENDOZA, J. :   For review in this appeal is the May 6, 2014 Decision1 of the Court of2 Appeals (CA (CA)) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05832, which affirmed the September 27, 2012 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City (RTC (RTC)) in Criminal Case No. 12285, convicting accused-appellant Cristina Samson (Cristina (Cristina)) for parricide committed against her husband, Gerry Delmar (Gerry (Gerry), ), and perpetua. sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Antecedents  Antecedents   On August 14, 2002, Cristina was charged with the crime of Parricide, defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC ( RPC). ). The Information articulates the following criminal charges, viz:chanRoble viz:chanRoblesvirtualLa svirtualLawlibrary wlibrary That on or about the 27th day of June, 2002 in Tarlac City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to kill her husband Gerry Delmar, with whom she was united in lawful wedlock, armed herself with a deadly weapon, a knife, and stabbed said Gerry Delmar on his chest, which resulted to his death. CONTRARY TO LAW.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary When arraigned almost four (4) years later, Cristina entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the parties agreeing to a reverse trial on account of her invocation of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. self -defense. Version of the Defense  Defense  The version of Cristina appears in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant4 as follows:chanRoblesvirtual follows:chanRo blesvirtualLawlibrary Lawlibrary On June 27, 2002, CRISTINA SAMSON (Cristina) was in their house watching television together with her children when her husband, Gerry Delmar (Gerry), who was drunk at that time, arrived. Gerry asked Cristina if she had cooked food already but the latter answered in the negative because she had no money to buy food. Gerry scolded and uttered words against her, and then slapped her. TheyGerry had an for about ten (10) minutes when Cristina's arrived and pacified them. leftaltercation but after thirty (30) minutes, he returned. He pointed father a knife at Cristina's neck. The latter begged Gerry not to hurt her and to pity their children if something happens to her. Gerry continued pointing the knife and told Cristina to stop talking or otherwise, he will put a hole in her neck. Then, Gerry slapped Cristina's Cristina's face twice. While Gerry was still holding the knife, Cristina pushed him and he fell on the ground. She took the knife which Gerry was holding and begged him not to come near her. She was holding the knife near her chest pointed at Gerry when he suddenly grabbed her and that was the time that the knife went in contact with his chest. When she saw her husband bloodied, she shouted for help and her father (Rodolfo Samson) and brother (Allan (Allan Samson) came and brought Gerry to the hospital. Her relatives told her that Gerry died in the hospital. (TSN, September 6, 2006, pp. 14-27) On June 27, 2002, ALLAN SAMSON (Allan) was at home watching television with his father. He heard yelling and shouting from the house of his sister Cristina and brother-in-law Gerry. Since it was just ordinary for him to hear his sister and brother-in-law fight, he and his father just ignored it. After fifteen (15) minutes of listening to their quarrel, they heard Cristina cry for help. Upon hearing this, he immediately went to the house of his sister and saw her holding Gerry and she requested him and his father to bring Gerry to the hospital. They called a tricycle and he,

 

together with his father, brought Gerry to Talon General Hospital. The doctor, however, declared that Gerry was already dead. Then, the tanod arrives and Allan instructed the tanod to call the siblings and relatives of Gerry. When the relatives arrived, they went home. (TSN, November 18, 2006, pp. 4-6)5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Version of the Prosecutio Prosecution n  In its Brief for the Appellee,6 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG (OSG)) provided the following as its Counter-State Counter-Statement ment of Facts:chanRob Facts:chanRoblesvirtualL lesvirtualLawlibrary awlibrary On January 25, 1994, appellant Cristina Samson and victim Jerry Delmar were married. They were blessed with two (2) daughters namely Christine and Cherrie Lou. The couple lived in their own house which is just adjacent to the house of appellant's family. The union of the two was never a peaceful one. Constant quarrels filled their household and occurred in front of their children and other relatives. On June 27, 2002, appellant and the victim had one of their usual fights. As testified by appellant herself, she and her two children were watching television television in their home when the victim arrived drunk. Victim asked for his dinner but appellan appellantt was not able to cook food which led to the fight. Christine, the youngest daughter of the appellant and the victim, narrated that she witnessed the fight between her parents, that as the fight escalated, appellant was able to get hold of the knife which was placed on the roof and stabbed the victim. The victim fell on the ground and crawled until he reached the door. Cristine remembered that people arrived in their home, helped the victim board a tricycle and brought him to the hospital. Appellant, on the other hand, ran out and went to her father and asked for money and left. That was the last night that Christine and Cherry Lou saw their mother.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The Ruling of the RTC  RTC  In its September 27, 2012 Decision, the RTC found the proffered self-defense of Cristina to be untenable. In its view, there was no longer any threat to her life before she stabbed her husband Gerry. Though there was an existent danger as there was an altercation before the stabbing incident, the imminence of such danger ceased when, as admitted by her, Gerry already put down the knife. The RTC even concluded that it was she who provoked him when she suddenly pushed him to the ground. She then took the knife and told him not to come near her. When he grabbed her, she stabbed him. After she took hold of the knife, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would necessitate the need to kill Gerry.8 Thus, the decretal portion of the RTC decision reads in this wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrar wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary y WHEREFORE,, finding accused CRISTINA SAMSON guilty WHEREFORE SAMSON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, accused CRISTINA SAMSON is SAMSON is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of "Reclusion Perpetua" pursuant to R.A. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines).  Accused is also ordered to indemnify indemnify the heirs heirs of the victim, Christine Christine S. Delmar and Cherrie Cherrie Lo S. Delmar the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages damages and costs of suit. SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The Ruling of the CA  CA  The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It stated that although there could have been an unlawful aggression at the start when Gerry repeatedly slapped Cristina and held a knife at her throat, it already disappeared disappeared when he put down the knife. According to the CA, it was this precise act that gave Cristina the opportunity to push her husband and gain control of the knife. Moreover, the fact that she fled and evaded arrest for four (4) years contradicted her claim of innocence.10 The CA disposed as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary WHEREFORE,, the Decision WHEREFORE Decision dated  dated September 27, 2012 of the RTC, Branch 65, Tarlac City in Criminal Case No. 12285, finding accused-app accused-appellant ellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua and perpetua and to pay damages and the cost of suit,

 

is AFFIRMED  AFFIRMED.. is SO ORDERED.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Hence, this appeal.cha appeal.chanrobleslaw nrobleslaw ISSUE   ISSUE The sole issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether or not the CA erred in not appreciating the  justifying circumstance circumstance of self-defense self-defense in favor of Cristina. Let it be underscored that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review and it it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.12 Considering that what is at stake here is no less than the liberty of the accused, this Court has meticulously and thoroughly reviewed and examined the records of the case and finds that there is merit in her appeal. There appears to be a conflict between the testimony of Cristina and her daughter, Christine Delmar (Christine (Christine). ). Cristina claimed that she got the knife from her husband who fell down after she pushed him. After taking possession of the deadly weapon, she told her husband not to come near her. She was holding the knife near her chest and pointed towards him when he suddenly grabbed her and that was the time that the knife went in contact with her husband's chest. Christine, however, perceived perceived it differently. dif ferently. According According to her, she witnessed the fight between her parents. She narrated that as the fight escalated, her mother was able to get hold of a knife, which was inserted in the roof, and used it in stabbing her father. Both the RTC and the CA believed the version of Cristina, but both were of the view that before she stabbed her husband, there was no more imminent danger to her life. For said reason, her fatal stabbing of her husband was not justified.chan justified.chanrobleslaw robleslaw The Court's Court's Ruling Ruling   Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance, implies the admission by the accused Self-defense, that he committed the criminal act. Generall Generally, y, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent. When the accused, however, admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon him to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.13 Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.14  To invoke self-defense, in order to escape criminal liability, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the second paragraph paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC, viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.15  Presence of Unlawful Aggression even if Aggressor was Disarmed  Disarmed   Among the requisites requisites of self-defense, self-defense, the most most important that that needs to be proved proved by the accused, for it to prosper, is the element of unlawful aggression. It must be proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense self-defense..16 When the Court speaks of unlawful aggression, it is an actual physical assault, or at a threat to victim inflict real imminent injury, person. is an unlawful aggression onleast the part of the when he puts the life,upon limb,aor right ofThere the person invoking self-defense in actual or imminent danger. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a

 

weapon. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. It must be continuous, otherwise, it does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense.17  The question now is: was there unlawful aggression aggression when Cristina killed her husband? The Court answers in the affirmative. The Court hesitates to share the observation of the RTC and the CA that Cristina failed to discharge the burden of proving that unlawful aggression was present when she killed her husband. Contrary to the conclusion of the CA that Gerry's aggression had already ceased when he was disarmed, it is the Court's view that the aggression still continued. Her perceived peril to her life continued and persisted until she put an end to it. It must be noted that after she was able to take hold of the knife from her husband, he did not stand down but, instead, continued to move towards her despite her plea that he should not come nearer. He grabbed her by the arm which could have precipitated her well-grounded belief that her life was still in danger if he would be able to wrest the weapon from her. It was not farfetched to presume that, being stronger, he could have easily overpowered her and eventually killed her.  A similar situation situation was presented presented in the case case of People v. Rabandaban18 (  (Rabandaban Rabandaban), ), wherein the Court ruled that despite the fact that the accused succeeded in wresting the bolo from his wife, he was still justified in using the weapon against her because his life was still in danger. The Court explained:ch explained:chanRoblesvir anRoblesvirtualLawlibr tualLawlibrary ary xxx Whe When n appellant appellant got possession of the bolo  he already must have been in a precarious condition because of his wounds, one of which was described by the sanitary inspector as "fatal" since the large intestine came out of it. An it. An d appel ap pel lan lant, t, w e thin th ink, k, w as j us usti ti fi ed in i n b eli elievi eving ng th at his wi fe wanted wanted to fini sh him of f because, because, accordi accordi ng to the evidence, she struggled to regain possession of the bolo after he had succeeded succeeded in wresting it fro m her. With the aggressor still uns ubdued and showing determination determination to f ight to t he finish, it would have been bee n fol ly on the part of appellant, appellant, who mus t already already have been been los ing strength due to loss o f blood, to th row away the bolo and and thus give his adversary a chance to pick it up and again again use it aga against inst h im. im. Having  Having the right to protect his life, appellant was not in duty bound to expose himself to such a contingency.19  [Emphases Supplied] Rabandaban,, the victim, instead of running away from the accused husband after the bolo was In Rabandaban wrested from her, continued to struggle with him to regain possession of the bolo. This fact, together with her husband husband's 's compromised condition, being already badly wounded, justified him in finally neutralizing his wife who was then determined determined in putting an end to his life. In the case at bench, the unlawful aggression would have ceased if he just walked away from the scene considering that Cristina had gained the upper hand, being the one in possession of the knife. Instead, Gerry chose to ignore her plea not to come near her and continued moving towards her without regard to his safety despite the fact that the knife was pointed towards his direction. In both Rabandaban Rabandaban and  and the present case, the victims, despite having been disarmed, still posed a threat to the lives of the accused. The danger to their lives persisted leaving leaving them with no other choice but to defend themselves lest they be the ones to be victimized. In that situation, Cristina had reasons to believe that her life was still in danger. It is to be noted that before she was able to take hold of the weapon, her husband held the same knife and pointed it at her throat. So when he, who was taller and stronger, approached her and grabbed her the arm, it wasget instinctive herand to take thegood extreme precautio precautionary nary stabbing him by before he could back thefor knife make his earlier threat of measure putting a by hole in her throat.

 

  Contrary to the trial court's assessment, she did not show aggression towards her husband when she pushed him after he pointed the knife away from her. She was, in fact, manifesting a passive attitude towards him when she just stood her ground, with the knife in hand, asking him not to come near her.20  It would have been a different story if Gerry, after dropping the knife, walked away and Cristina still went after him. If that were the case, she could not assert self-defense self-defense.. She was no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation for the earlier aggressiothat aggression. n. Retaliation isby inconsistent self-defense and in fact belies it. In retaliation, the aggression was begun the injuredwith party already ceased when the accused attacked him; while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.21  Now that unlawful aggression has already been established, established, it is well to consider the other two requisites in order to determine whether the self-defense is complete or incomplete incomplete.. Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed Employed   The requisite of reasonable necessity of the means employed is met if the person invoking selfdefense used a weapon or a manner equivalent to the means of attack used by the aggressor. The reasonable necessity of the self-defense utilized by an accused is to defend himself "depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of the person who invokes selfdefense; and also the place and the occasion of the assault."22 Moreover, the nature and location of wounds are considered important indicators whether whether or not to disprove a plea of selfdefense.23  In the case at bench, the lone stab wound w ound located on the victim's chest supports the argument that Cristina feared for her life and this fear impelled her to defend it by stabbing him. It was a reasonable means means chosen by her in view of the attending circumstances, to wit: that her stronger husband, who had earlier pointed the said knife to her throat, approached her and grabbed her arm, despite her plea that he refrain from coming near her; and that she had no other available means or any less deadly weapon to repel the threat other than the knife in her hand. She did not have the time or sufficient tranquillity of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. In predicaments like this, human nature does not act upon the processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation.24 When it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction that act or to mitigate 25 his liability. cralawred Moreover, the factby that Gerry was no longer does not negateused the reasonableness of the means employed Cristina. Perfect equalityarmed between the weapon by the one defending himself and that of the aggressor is not required.26 What the law requires is a rational equivalence,, in the considerat equivalence consideration ion of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the accused is exposed, and the instinct more than reason, that moves or impels his defense; and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such injury. 27  Lack of Sufficient Provocation  Provocation  The last requisite to be considered is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The Court cannot sustain the trial court's observation that it was Cristina who provoked her husband when she suddenly pushed him. Her shoving him cannot be considered a sufficient provocation proportionate proportionate to the act of aggression.28 She merely capitalized on a window of opportunity, when her husband removed the knife away from her throat, to save herself from what she had perceived to be a danger to her life. li fe. Anybody, in her situation would have acted in the same reasonable way.

 

Flight as an Indication of Guilt or Non-guilt  Non-guilt  The CA took the fact of Cristina's flight and evasion of arrest for four (4) years against her. To the appellate court, it belied her claim of innocence. Under the attendant circumstances, the Court cannot subscribe to that view. Generally, flight, in the absence of a credible explanation, explanation, would be a circumstance from which 29 an guilt mightto bedefend established, a truly innocent person would normally grasp the firstinference availableof opportunity himselffor and assert his innocence.  It has been held, however, that non-flight may not be construed as an indication of innocence either. There is no law or dictum holding that staying put is proof of innocence, for the Court is not blind to the cunning ways of a wolf which, after a kill, may feign innocence and choose not to flee.30 In Cristina's case, she explained that she took flight for fear of her safety because of possible retaliation from her husband's siblings.31 The Court finds such reason for her choice to flee acceptable. She did not hide from the law but from those who would possibly do her harm.

The RTC and the CA might have some hesitation in accepting her explanation for her choice of action. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, circumstances, a cloud of uncertainty lingers. In such a case, it is the duty of the Court to resolve the doubt in favor of the accused. Considering that Cristina was justified in killing her husband under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, she should be exonerated of the crime charged charged.. For the same reason, the Court finds no act or omission from which a civil liability may arise. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED WHEREFORE, GRANTED.. The May 6, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05832, is REVERSED REVERSED and  and SET ASIDE. ASIDE. The accused-a accused-appellant, ppellant, Cristina Samson, is ACQUITTED is ACQUITTED of  of the crime charged. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superinte Superintendent, ndent, Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong Mandaluyon g City. The Superintendent is DIRECTED DIRECTED to  to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless she is being lawfully held for another cause and to report the action she has taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision. SO ORDERED.  ORDERED. 

 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO OLARBE y BALIHANGO G.R. No. 227421

July 23, 2018

BERSAMIN, J.:   The accused who shows by clear and convincing evidence evidence that the death of the victim arose from the need for self-preservation in the face of the victim's deadly unlawful aggression, and there was a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the same, is entitled to acquittal on the ground of self-defense in the absence of any indication of his having provoked such unlawful aggression. In self-defense and defense of stranger, the circumstances as the accused perceived them at the time of the incident, not as others perceived them, should be the bases for determinin determining g the merits of the plea. The Case  Case  For the killing of the late Romeo Arca, accused Rodolfo Olarbe y Balihango (Olarbe) was charged with and convicted of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, in Santa Cruz, Laguna through the judgment rendered on August 13, 2014 in Criminal Case No. SC12274.  1  12274. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction on March 22, 2016. 2016 .2   An tec tecedent edent s   The information charged Olarbe with murder, viz.: viz.:   That on or about May 7, 2006 at about 12:00 o'clock midnight, at Sitio Pananim, Municipality of Luisiana, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery treachery and with the use of a rifle (airgun) converted converted to caliber .22 and a bolo, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot and hack one ROMEO ARCA with the said weapons, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound and hacking wounds on the different parts of his body which resulted to (sic) his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs. CONTRARY TO LAW LAW..3  The CA recounted the factual and procedural background of the case in its assailed decision thusly:  Arraigned, OLARBE initially  Arraigned, initially pled not guilty guilty to the crime charged. Upon Upon re-arraignment, re-arraignment, OLARBE OLARBE pleaded guilty but subsequently withdrew withdrew his plea of guilt and manifested for the presentation of his defense. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution's diegesis of the case is synthesized as follows: On 8 May 2006 at around 12:30 o'clock midnight, OLARBE voluntarily surrendered to police officers SPO2 Vivencio Aliazas, PO3 Ricardo Cruz and PO1 William Cortez at the Police Station of Luisiana, Laguna. OLARBE informed them that he happened to have killed Romeo Arca (Arca) in Sitio Pananim, Luisiana, Luisiana, Laguna. Forthwith, OLARBE was booked, arrested and detained at the police station. Thereafter, the police officers proceeded to the crime scene and

 

found the lifeless body of Arca with several wounds and the bolo used by OLARBE in killing him. The Death Certificate revealed Certificate revealed that Area's antecedent cause of death was gunshot wounds and his immediate cause of death was hacked wounds. For his part, OLARBE invoked self-defense and avowed – avowed –   For his part, OLARBE invoked self-defense and avowed – avowed – On  On the fateful incident, he and his wife Juliet were sleeping in their house in Barangay Barangay San  San Antonio, Sitio Pananim, Luisiana, Laguna. Suddenly they were awakened by the sound of a gunshot and shouting from Arca who appeared to be drunk. Arca pagpapatayin was holding a ko riflekayo." (an "airgun to aentered calibre .22) shouted "mga the putang ina ninyo, kayo. Then,converted Arca forcibly their and house and aimed gun at them. OLARBE immediately grabbed the gun from him and they grappled for its possession. OLARBE managed to wrest the gun away from Arca. In a jiff, OLARBE shot Arca causing the latter to lean sideward ("napahilig"). ("napahilig"). Nevertheless,  Nevertheless, Arca managed to get his bolo bolo from  from his waist and continued to attack them. OLARBE grabbed the bolo bolo and  and in their struggle for its possession, they reached the outer portion of the house. OLARBE was able to wrestle the bolo bolo and  and instantly, he hacked Arca. After the killing incident, OLARBE voluntarily voluntarily 4 surrendered to the police authorities. authorities.   Judgment o f the RTC  RTC  Rejecting Olarbe's pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger, the RTC pronounced him guilty of murder as charged. It observed that the initial unlawful aggression by Arca had ceased when Olarbe shot him in the head and caused him to "lean sideward." It disbelieved Olarbe's insistence that Arca implausible had still been able toing grab his bolo and bolo  andbyassault Olarbe's spouse for being consider considering that Arca had then been hit incommon-law the head. It held thattherewith Olarbe's testimony that he had wrested the bolo bolo from  from Arca after grappling for its control, and had then hacked him with it was improbable .and. pot in accord with the natural order of things because. the injury in the head had already weakened and subdued Arca; and that the killing was treacherous because Olarbe had hacked the then unarmed and weakened victim. The dispositive portion of the judgment of the RTC reads: WHEREFORE, this court finds that herein accused was unable to prove the justifying WHEREFORE, circumstance of self-defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part and further, he employed treachery when he killed the victim Romeo Arca. Thus, this Court finds the accused Rodolfo Olarbe y Balihango GUILTY GUILTY of  of "Murder". On other hand, that herein accused voluntarily surrendered to Romeo the police authorities of the the Municipal Policefinding Station of Luisiana, Laguna immediate immediately ly after killing Arca, he is entitled to the said mitigating circumstance. The accused Rodolfo Olarbe y Balihango is thereby hereby sentenced to the minimum penalty of imprisonment for the crime of murder, which is a period of TWENTY (20) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY TO RECLUSION PERPETUA. The accused Rodolfo Olarbe y Balihango is also hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of Romeo  Arca the following: following: Civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00;  ₱75,000.00;  Moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00;  ₱50,000.00;    Actual damages damages in the following following amounts – amounts –  ₱1,000.00 as expenses for church services from the Iglesia Filipina Independiente; the amount of ₱1,200.00 for expenses incurred in Jeralyn's Flower Shop; the amount of ₱20,000.00 paid to Mancenido Funeral Service; fees paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Luisiana in the amount of ₱150.00; and, the amount of ₱15,000.00 paid for the burial lot; and,

 

Exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 ₱30,000.00..  SO ORDERED. ORDERED.5  Decision De cision of t he CA  CA  On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Olarbe because the factual findings of the RTC were consistent with the evidence on record and accorded with human experience; and becausetreachery had attended the killing. The fallo of fallo of the assailed decision reads: WHEREFORE,  the Appeal WHEREFORE, the  Appeal is  is hereby DENIED. DENIED. The  The Judgment Judgment dated  dated 13 August 2014 of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. SC-12274, is AFFIRMED is AFFIRMED wi th MODIFICATION MODIFICATION in  in that accused-appellant accused-appellant Rodolfo Olarbe is ORDERED ORDERED  to pay temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. ₱25,000.00 . He is further ORDERED ORDERED to  to pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on annum on the civil indemnity, moral, exemplary and temperate damages awarded from the finality of this judgment until fully paid. SO ORDERED. ORDERED.6  Hence, this appeal. The accused and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) have separately separately manifested that they would no longer be filing supplemental briefs in this appeal; and prayed that their respective briefs filed in the CA should be considered.  considered. 7  Issue   Issue In his appellant's brief filed in the CA, Olarbe submitted that it waserroneous to reject his pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger because he had killed Arca to save himself and his common-law wife from the latter's unlawful aggression; that his use of the victim's gun and bolo bolo to  to repel or stop the unlawful aggression was necessary and reasonable; and that the killing was consequently legally justified. The OSG countered that it was Olarbe who had mounted the unlawful aggression aggression against Arca; and that the latter had been defenseless when Olarbe hacked him to death. Ruling of th e Court Court   The appeal has merit.  An accused who who pleads any any justifying circumstance circumstance in Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code admits Code  admits to the commission of acts that show the commission of a crime. It thus becomes his burden to prove the justifying circumstance with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, his conviction for the crime charged follows.  follows. 8  In order for Olarbe to exonerate himself on the ground of self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1, 1,9 of the Revised Penal Code, he Code, he must establish the following facts, namely: (1) unlawful aggression aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. 10

Olarbe also invoked defense of stranger under Article 11, paragraph 3Defense ,  of theof Revised Penal Code because Code  because Arca was likewise attacking his common-law spouse. 3, stranger requires clear and convincing evidence evidence to prove the following, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression by

 

the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the 'means to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.  motive.  11  The indispensable requisite requisite for either of these justifying circumstances is that the victim must have mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused or the stranger. Without such unlawful aggression, aggression, the accused is not entitled to the justifying circumstance.  circumstance. 12 The essence of the unlawful aggression indispensable indispensable in self-defense or defense of stranger has been fully discussed in People v. Nugas,  Nugas, 13 thus: Unlawful aggression aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test test f or t he presence of unlawful aggression un der the circu mstances is whether the aggression aggression fro m the victi m put in rea reall peril the life or personal safety of the person def ending hims elf; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary th rea reatt . Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. Unlawful aggression aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it mustand not positively consist in strong a mere(like threatening must it be merely must be offensive aiming aattitude, revolvernor at another with intentimaginary, to shoot orbut opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful u nlawful aggression aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied accompanied by an angry countenan countenance, ce, or like aiming to throw a pot. Let us now revisit the events of that fateful night of May 7, 2006. Arca, armed with the rifle (described as an airgun converted into a caliber .22) and the bolo, bolo, went  went to the house of Olarbe towards midnight. The latter and his household were already slumbering, but were roused from bed because Arca fired his gun and was loudly shouting, Mga putang ina ninyo, pagpapata pagpapatayin yin ko kayo.. Thereafter, Arca forcibly entered Olarbe's house. Olarbe managed kayo managed to grab the gun of Arca, and they struggled for control of it. Upon wresting the gun from Arca, Olarbe fired at him, causing him to totter. But Arca next took out the bolo bolo from  from his waist and charged at Olarbe's common-law spouse. This forced Olarbe to fight for possession of the bolo, bolo, and  and upon seizing the bolo, bolo, he hacked Arca with it.  Area's death was certified to have been due to the gunshot gunshot on the head and hacking wounds. T1 he CA noted the following injuries, aside from the gunshot wound in the head, namely: • Lacerated wound on the forehead;  forehead;  • Lacerated wound, front rib area;  area;  • Lacerated wound on the left le ft upper quadrant; • Lacerated wound on the left lower quadrant;  quadrant;  • Lacerated wound on the occipital area  area  • Two (2) hacking wounds posterior of neck; and  and  • Hacking wound on lumbar area. area.  14 

 

Only Olarbe's account of the incident existed in the records, but instead of giving weight to the account, the RTC and the CA rejected his pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger based on their common holding that Arca had been weakened from being hit on the head; and concluded that consequently consequently Arca could not have charged with his bolo. bolo.   The CA's rejection of Olarbe's pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger was unwarranted. unwarranted. To start with, there was no credible showing that the shot to the head had rendered Arca too weak to draw the bolo bolo and  and to carry on with his aggression in the manner described by Olarbe. The conclusion of the RTC and the CA thereon was obviously speculative. Secondly, the State did not demonstrate that the shot from the airgun converted to .22 caliber fired at close range sufficed to disable Arca from further attacking with his bolo. bolo. Without  Without such demonstration, the R TC and the CA clearly indulged in pure speculation. speculation. Thirdly, nothing in the record indicated  Arca's physical condition condition at the time time of the incident. incident. How could the CA then reliably reliably conclude that he could not have mounted the bolo bolo assault?  assault? And, lastly, to rule out any further aggression by  Arca with his bolo bolo after  after the shot in the head was again speculative. speculative. On the other hand, our substantial judicial experience experience instructs that an armed person boldly seeking to assault others like Arca - would have enough adrenaline to enable him to persist on his assault despite sustaining a wound that might otherwise be disabling. To us, Olarbe's account of what did happen on that fateful night was highly plausible. At the minimum, the details and sequence of the events therein described conformed to human experience and the natural course of things. Armed with both the gun and the bolo, bolo, Acra  Acra not only disturbed Olarbe's peace butwas physically invad invaded of latter's at midnight. Given that the aggressioll' by Arca unprovoked unprovoke d ed on the the sanctity part of Olarbe, andhome with no other person disputing the latter's account, we should easily see and understan understand d why Olarbe would feel that his and his commonlaw spouse's lives had been put in extreme peril. In addition, Olarbe's conduct following the killing of Arca - of voluntarily surrendering surrendering himself to the police authorities immediately after the killing (i.e., (i.e., at  at around 12:30 o'clock in the early morning of May 8, 2006), and reporting his participation participation in the killing of Arca to the police authorities - bolstered his pleas of having acted in legitimate self-defense and legitimate defense of his common-la common-law w spouse. Such conduct manifested innocence. To disbelieve Olarbe's account is to give primacy to surmise and speculation. That is not how courts of law whose bounden and sworn duty is to dispense justice should sit in judgment in a criminal trial. Judges should assiduously sift the records, carefully analyze the evidence, and reach conclusions that are natural and reasonable. Did Olarbe clearly and convincing convincingly ly establish the justifying circumstances invoked? We find that Arca committed continuous and persistent unlawful aggression against Olarbe and his common-law spouse that lasted from the moment he forcibly barged into the house and brandished his gun until he assaulted Olarbe's common-law spouse with the bolo. bolo. Such  Such armed assault was not a mere m ere threatening act. Olarbe was justified in believing his and his common-law spouse's lives to be in extreme danger from Arca who had just fired his gun in anger outside their home and whose threats to kill could not be considered idle in the light of his having forced himself upon their home. The imminent threat to life was positively strong enough to induce Olarbe to act promptly to repel the unlawful and unprovoked aggression. aggression. For Olarbe to hesitate to act as he had done would have cost him his own life. Area's being dispossessed dispossessed of his gun did not terminate the aggression, for, although he had been hit on the head, he quickly reached for the bolo bolo and  and turned his assault towards Olarbe's common-law spouse. Olarbe was again forced to struggle for control of the bolo. bolo. The  The swiftness of the action heightened Olarbe's sense that the danger to their lives was present and imminent.

 

In judging pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger, the courts should not demand that the accused conduct himself with the poise of a person not under imminent threat of fatal harm. He had no time to reflect and to reason out his responses. He had to be quick, and his responses should be commensurate to the imminent harm. This is the only way to judge him, for the law of nature - the foundation of the privilege to use all reasonable means to repel an aggression that endangers one's own life and the lives of others - did not require him to use unerring judgment when he had the reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily injury.  injury. 15 The test is whether his subjective belief as to the imminence and 16

seriousness danger was reasonable or not,  not,  andright the of reasonableness of life his in belief viewed from of histhe standpoint at the time he acted.  acted.  17  The a person to take self-must be defense arises from his belief in the necessity for doing so; and his belief and the reasonableness reasonablen ess thereof are to be judged in the light of the circumstances as they then appeared to him, not in the light of circumstances ci rcumstances as they would appear appear to others or based on the belief that others may or might entertain as to the nature and imminence of the danger and the necessity to kill. kill.18  The remaining elements of the justifying circumstances were likewise established. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the unlawful aggression does not mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make comparisons that can easily be made in the calmness of reason. The law requires rational necessity, not indispensable need. In each particular case, it is necessary to judge the relative necessity, whether more or less imperative, in. accordance with the rules of rational logic. The accused may be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether or not he employed rational rational means to repel the aggression. aggression.  19  In determining the reasonable necessity necessity of the means employed, the courts may also look .at and consider the number of wounds inflicted. A large number of wounds inflicted on the victim can indicate a determined effort effort on the part of the accused a ccused to kill the victim and may belie the reasonableness of the means adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor .20 Here, however, although Arca sustained several wounds, the majority of the wounds were lacerations whose nature and extent were not explained. The lack of explanations has denied us the means to fairly adjudge the reasonableness of the means adopted by Olarbe to prevent or repel Area's unlawful aggressio aggression. n. Accordingly, to rule out reasonable necessity of the means adopted by Olarbe solely on the basis of the number of wounds would be unfair to him. In any event, we have to mention that the rule of reasonable necessity necessity is not ironclad in its application, but is dependent upon the established circumstances circumstances of each particular case. The courts ought to remember that a person who is assaulted has neither the time nor the sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. For, in in emergencies emergencie s of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to hold the actor not responsible in law for the consequence consequences s.21 Verily, the law requires rational equivalence, equivalence, not material commensurability, viz.: viz.:   It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability commensura bility between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in equivalence,  in the consideration of which will enter the principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to whi ch the person attacked is exposed, and and the inst inct, more than the reason, rea son, that mov es or imp els the defense, defense, and the proporti onatene onateness ss t hereof does not depend depe nd upon th e harm harm done, but rests upon the immin ent danger danger of such i njury .22 [Bold underscoring underscorin g supplied for emphasis] Lastly, the absence of any showing that Olarbe had provoked Arca, or that he had been induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive has been equally palpable. We deem to be

 

established, therefore, that the third elements of the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of stranger were present. With Olarbe being entitled to the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a stranger, his acquittal follows. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES WHEREFORE, REVERSES and  and SETS SETS  ASIDE the  ASIDE the decision promulgated on March 22, 2016 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07112; ACQUITS accused 07112; ACQUITS  accused RODOLFO RODOLFO  OLARBE OLARBE  y  BALIHANGO BALIHANGO on  on the grounds of SELFDEFENSE and DEFENSE  and DEFENSE DEFENSE  OF OF  A   A  STRANGER STRANGER;; DECLARES DECLARES him  him NOT NOT  CIVILLY CIVILLY  LIABLE LIABLE to  to the heirs of the late Romeo Arca; and DIRECTS DIRECTS his  his IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE  RELEASE RELEASE  FROM FROM  CONFINEMENT CONFINEMENT unless  unless he is otherwise legally confined for another cause. Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Director, Bureau of Corrections, in Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation.  The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED TO REPORT the REPORT  the action taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this decision. 1âwphi1

SO ORDERED.  ORDERED. 

 

PRUDENCIO GANAL, JR. Y BADAJOS  vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 248130

December 02, 2020 2020  

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:   The Case  Case  This Petition for Review assails the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 41105 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Prudencio Ganal, Jr. y Badajos": 1) Decision1 dated March 27, 2019, affirming the trial court's conviction of petitioner for homicide but mitigated by passion and obfuscation and voluntary surrender; and 2) Resolution2 dated July 2, 2019, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Facts  Facts   The Charge  Charge  By Information dated July 5, 2013, Prudencio Ganal, Jr. (petitioner) was charged with homicide for the death of Julwin Alvarez (Julwin), thus: That on or about May 20, 2013 in the Municipality of Baggao, Province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused PRUDENCIO GANAL GANAL y Badajos armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously feloniously attack, assault and shoot JULWIN ALVAREZ Y JAVIER thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death. CONTRARY TO LAW.3 The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Tuguegarao City. On arraignment, arraignmen t, petitioner pleaded "not guilty".4 Proceedings Proceeding s before the Trial Court Petitioner admitted the killing but invoked self-defense and defense of relative. Hence, the order of trial was reversed. Defense's Version:  Version:   The testimonies of Barangay Captain Sherwin Mallo, Mario Ubina (Ubina), Florante Orden Castillo, Jr. (Castillo), Prudencio Ganal, Sr. (Ganal, Sr.), Erlinda Ganal, PO3 Erick Marcelino (PO3 Marcelino) and petitioner petitioner showed that about 7 o'clock in the evening of May 20, 2013, Castillo and Ubina were drinking Ginebra Kuatro Cantos in petitioner's house in Santor, Baggao, Cagayan. By 9:30 o'clock in the evening, petitioner's neighbor Angelo Follante Follante (Angelo), arrived uninvited and insisted to join the drinking session. Petitioner refused because Angelo was already very drunk. Angelo then challenged petitioner petitioner to a fight but the latter advised him to just go home. Angelo got enraged and picked up stones to throw at petitioner but Ubina was quick to take the stones away. Petitioner eventually prevailed on Angelo and the latter left. Petitioner and his companions then resumed drinking.5

 

Thirty (30) minutes later, stones were hurled at the roofs of the adjacent houses of petitioner and his father, Ganal, Sr. Ganal, Sr. went out to check and saw Angelo together with his uncle Julwin - the deceased. The two were w ere in the middle of the road near the front gate. Ganal, Sr. approached and asked them to go home because his wife was suffering from hypertension and should not be disturbed. Julwin replied that he did not care if Ganal, Sr.'s wife died, he would kill all of them, including petitioner. petitioner. Ganal, Sr. tried to pacify the two, assuring them that they would settle whatever problem they had the following day.6 Julwin, then holding palm-sized stones in both hands, managed to push open the gate. As Ganal, Sr. tried to pull back the gate, Julwin hit him with a stone in the chest. Ganal, Sr. fell on the plant box made of hollow blocks and passed out.7 Petitioner, from the main door of his house, saw what happened. Julwin, who had a knife tucked in his waistband and holding two (2) stones, advanced towards him. Petitioner thus rushed inside his house, got his gun, and fired a warning shot into the air. Ganal, Sr. this time had regained consciousness and hid near the gate. Angelo ran away but Julwin continued advancing towards him. When Julwin was about two (2) to three (3) meters away from him, petitioner thought that the victim was intent on killing him. Petitioner fired at Julwin, who in turn, pointed a finger at him, threatening to kill everyone inside the house. Afraid that Julwin would make good on his threat, petitioner fired all the rounds in his gun. Julwin fell within a meter from petitioner's door.8 Petitioner borrowed the cellphone of his mother Erlinda Ganal and called the Baggao Police Station. He asked assistance from PO3 Marcelino and committed to surrender himself. When the police officers arrived, petitioner admitted he killed Julwin, turned over his gun, and voluntarily surrendered.9 The Prosecution' Prosecution' s Version  Version   In the evening of May 20, 2013, feast day of the patron saint of Santor, Baggao, Cagayan,  Angelo dropped dropped by petitioner's petitioner's house. On his way to petitioner's petitioner's house, house, Angelo had had in his pockets stones, around 2 inches in diameter, for driving away dogs along the way. When petitioner saw the stones, he ordered Angelo to surrender them and went to get his gun. Petitioner showed the gun to Angelo Angelo and told the latter to go home if he did not want any trouble.10 Instead of going home, Angelo went to Julwin's house. He saw Julwin sitting on a rocking chair outside the house. After telling Julwin what happened, Angelo momentarily went inside the house but when he returned outside, Julwin was nowhere to be found. Angelo went out to look for Julwin and saw the latter walking toward petitioner petitioner's 's house Suddenly, and go through the slightly opened gate. Thereafter, petitioner and Julwin had a confrontation. petitioner shot Julwin in the chest. Angelo ran away in fear and heard three (3) more shots. Petitioner followed him so he ran to the house of one Gilbert Narag. Angelo later went back to Julwin's house when he heard that the latter's body was brought there by the police. The post mortem examination showed that Julwin died due to "severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds and lacerations."11  Amelia Alvarez, Alvarez, Julwin's wife, wife, claimed that she she incurred P114,000.0 P114,000.00 0 for the wake and and burial, P24,000.00 of which was for the funeral service as evidenced by the Contract of Service issued i ssued by St. Claire Funeral Homes. The remaining P90,000.00 was spent on groceries, pigs, tomb construction, transportation transportation and funeral mass, which were not duly receipted. Julwin was a security guard at Candice Grocery in Tuguegarao City with a monthly salary of P5,000.00 until he resigned in December 2012. He also farmed corn on land less than a hectare in size with two (2) croppings. If lucky, his harvest was around 70-100 cavans, otherwise, otherwise, it was less than 70 cavans.12 The Trial Trial Court's Ruling Ruling  

 

By Judgment13 dated December 19, 2017, the trial court found petitioner guilty of homicide. It did not give credence to petitioner's claim of self-defense on the ground that the force he employed was not commensurate to Julwin's supposed unlawful aggression. The nature and number of wounds (5 bullet wounds and 2 laceration lacerations) s) revealed petitioner's intent to kill. More, there was no incomplete self-defense because petitioner petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence that there was unlawful aggression on Julwin's part. Nor did it give credence to petitioner's claim of defense of property because the force employed by petitioner was not reasonably necessary. Petitioner could not also avail of defense of uncontrollable fear because he to show thatout Julwin's actuations reduced petitioner to a mere instrument devoid of freewas willunable and acting merely of compulsion.14 The trial court credited petitioner "passion and obfuscation" and "voluntary surrender" surrender" but not "vindication of a grave offense," imposed the corresponding penalty, and granted civil indemnity and damages.15 Thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused PRUDENCIO GANAL y Badajos, WHEREFORE, Jr. GUILTY GUILTY beyond  beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it hereby sentences him: 1. To suffer an indetermin indeterminate ate prison sentence ranging from six (6) years prision correccional maximum correccional  maximum as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor  medium  medium as maximum; and 2. To pay the heirs of Julwin Alvarez y Javier the amounts of: a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity; b. P50,000.00 as moral damages and, c. P25,000.00 as temperate damages. SO ORDERED. ORDERED.16 16 Proceedings Proceedin gs Before the Court of Appeals On appeal, petitioner faulted the trial court for rendering the verdict of conviction. In the main, he argued that the three (3) justifying circumstances of self-defense, defense of ascendant, and lawful defense of property rights should have been appreciated. Julwin was unlawfully aggressive towards his father, Ganal, Sr., pushing his way through the gate while carrying palmsized stones in his hands and having a knife tucked in his waistband. Despite firing a warning shot, Julwin still continued advancing towards him while threatening to kill everyone in the house. The exempting circumstance of uncontrollable uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury can also be appreciated in his favor. In the alternative, incomplete incomplete self-defense may also be considered.17 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Assistant Solicitor General Diana CastañedaDe Vera and Associate Solicitor Alexis Joseph Noble, essentially countered that there was no unlawful aggression on Julwin's part and the means employed by petitioner to repel the imagined attack was not reasonable and commensurate commensurate to the supposed threat.18 The Ruling Ruling of th e Court Court o f Appeals  Appeals   By its assailed Decision19 dated March 27, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed in full. Petitioner sought reconsideration, reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied through its assailed Resolution20 dated July 2, 2019.

 

The Present Petition Petitioner seeks to reverse, via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the verdict of conviction for homicide rendered against against him by the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. He faults the courts below for disregarding the alleged clear evidence that it was Julwin who initiated the unlawful aggression when he smashed a large stone on his father's chest and shouted he would kill petitioner and his family. He asserts that he only shot Julwin when, even after his warning shot, the latter persisted in attacking him and his family. Thus, he insists that the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of relatives should be appreciated in his favor. Ruling   Ruling We acquit. Petitioner invokes the first and second justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, viz viz.: .:  ARTICLE 11. Justifying Justifying Circumstances. Circumstances. - The following following do not incur incur any criminal criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur: First. Unlawful aggression aggression;; Second. Reasonable Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocatio provocation n was given by the person attacked, that the one making m aking defense had no part therein. We note that petitioner's primary invocation is self-defense and his claim of defense of relative should be deemed subsumed therein. As it was, petitioner witnessed up close how Julwin threw stones ontofather the roofs of his and his father's houses, his way theshouted gate, knocked petitioner's unconsciou unconscious, s, hitting the latter with pushed a large stone onthrough the chest, threats that he would kill petitione petitionerr and his family, and advanced toward petitioner petitioner even after petitioner had already fired a warning shot. Clearly, petitioner was immediately put on the defensive when Julwin started disturbing the peace peace of his home and posing a risk to his safety and that of his family. To successfully claim self-defense, an accused must satisfactorily prove these elements: (1) unlawful aggression; aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; i t; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending defending himself or herself.21 The first element, unlawful aggression, is present here. People v. Nugas22 explains the nature of unlawful aggression, thus: Unlawful aggression aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. unlawful there canunder be nothe justified killing in is defense of oneself. The test forWithout the presence ofaggression, unlawful aggression circumstances whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person

 

defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. Unlawful aggression aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with w ith physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied accompanied by an angry countenan countenance, ce, or like aiming to throw a pot. (Emphasis supplied)  Actual or material material unlawful unlawful aggression contemplates contemplates the the offensive act of using physical force or or weapon which positively determines determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Here, Julwin committed a series of offensive acts that patently revealed his intent to harm petitioner. The test is whether the aggression from the victim puts in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself or herself; the peril must not be an imagined threat. Here, the attendant circumstances indubitably speak of the real and palpable peril posed by Julwin on the lives and limbs of petitioner and his father. The peril was certainly far from fiction or imaginary. Stones were hurled at the roofs of the adjacent houses of petitioner and his father, Ganal, Sr. Ganal, Sr. went out to check and saw Angelo in the company of his uncle Julwin - the deceased. The two were in the middle of the road near the front gate. Ganal, Sr. approached and asked them to go home because his wife was suffering from hypertension and should not be disturbed. Julwin replied that he did not care if Ganal, Sr.'s wife died, he would kill all of them, including petitioner. Ganal, Sr. tried to pacify the two, assuring them that they would settle whatever problem they had the following day.23 Julwin, then holding palm-sized stones in both hands, managed to push open the gate. As Ganal, Sr. tried to pull back the gate, Julwin hit him with a stone on the chest. Ganal, Sr. fell on the plant box made of hollow blocks and passed out.24 Petitioner, from the main door of his house, saw what happened. Julwin, who had a knife tucked in his waistband holding twogun, (2) stones, started to advance toward him. Petitioner thus rushed inside hisand house, got his and fired a warning shot into the air. Ganal, Sr. this time had regained consciousness and hid near the gate. Angelo ran away but Julwin just continued moving closer and closer to petitioner who then was constrained to shoot him once. But still Julwin did not retreat. He just kept moving closer, this time even threatening to kill everyone inside petitioner's house. Responding Responding to the situation, petitioner then used up all the four (4) bullets on Julwin who, as a result, fell dead just within a meter from petitioner's door.25 The third element of self-defense, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself or herself, is also present here.26 In fact, both the prosecution and defense were one in saying that it was Julwin who went to petitioner's house and instigated the incident.  As for the second second element, reasonable reasonable necessity necessity of the means means employed, we disagree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and hold that the same is likewise present. People v. Olarbe27 extensively discussed how courts may determine the reasonable necessity necessity of the means employed:

 

In judging pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger, the courts should not demand that the accused conduct himself with the poise of a person not under imminent threat of fatal harm. He had no time to reflect and to reason out his responses. He had to be quick, and his responses should be commensurate to the imminent harm. This is the only way to judge him, for the law of nature - the foundation of the privilege to use all reasonable means to repel an aggression that endangers one's own life and the lives of others - did not require him to use unerring judgment when he had the reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily injury. The test is whether his subjective belief as to the imminence and seriousness danger was reasonable or not,The andright the of reasonableness reasonable of life his in belief must be viewed from of histhe standpoint at the time he acted. a person ness to take self -defense self-defense arises from his belief in the necessity for doing so; and his belief and the reasonableness thereof are to be judged in the light of the circumstances as they then appeared to him, not in the light of circumstances as they would appear to others or based on the belief that others may or might entertain as to the nature and imminence of the danger and the necessity to kill. The remaining elements of the justifying circumstances were likewise established. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the unlawful aggression does not mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make comparisons that can easily be made in the calmness of reason. The law requires rational necessity, not indispensable need. In each particular case, it is necessary to judge the relative necessity, whether more or less imperative, in accordance with the rules of rational logic. The accused may be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether or not he employed rational rational means to repel the aggression aggression.. In determining the reasonable necessity necessity of the means employed, the courts may also look at and consider the number of wounds inflicted. A large number of wounds inflicted on the victim can indicate a determined effort effort on the part of the accused to kill ki ll the victim and may belie the reasonableness reasonablen ess of the means adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor. x x x The courts ought to remember that a person who is assaulted has neither the time nor the sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. For, in in emergencies emergencie s of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to hold the actor not responsible in law for the consequence consequences. s. Verily, the law requires rational equivalence, not material commensurability, viz viz.: .: It is settled that reasonable necessity means does not materialis rational commensurability commensura bility between the meansofofthe attack andemployed defense.  What theimply law requires equivalence,, in the considerat equivalence consideration ion of which will enter the principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. (Emphasis supplied) ℒ  α  αw    ρ hi৷  

Here, though petitioner inflicted five (5) bullet wounds and two (2) lacerations on Julwin, the number of wounds alone should not automatically lead to the conclusion that there was a determined effort on petitioner's part to kill the victim. Petitioner was overcome by the instinct of self-preservation self-preservati on on seeing that Julwin brashly entered into his property and even knocked his father unconscious for getting in the way. Julwin was determined to inflict injury on petitioner - he brought two (2) large stones and knife for the purpose. Faced by a determined and prepared foe, petitioner, who was simply drinking with his friends, suddenly found himself in a situation where he had to defend himself and his family from serious harm or even death. Notably, petitioner first tried to simply scare off Julwin by firing a warning shot. Julwin was unfazed and still continued to advance toward him with malevolent intent. And

 

even after petitioner shot Julwin, the latter did not even falter but instead threatened to kill petitioner and his family. How does one react to such a terrifying situation? Petitioner Petitioner must have thought that his actions were so futile because Julwin was still standing there and shouting threats. Petitioner, at that instant, must have felt he had to end it once and for all - kill or be killed. So, he shot Julwin four (4) more times until the latter fell just a meter away from him. To repeat "the right of a person to take life in self-defense arises from his belief in the necessity for doing so; and his belief and the reasonableness reasonableness thereof are to be judged in the light of the circumstances as they then appeared to him, not in i n the light of circumstances as they would appear to others basedand on the that to others imminence of theor danger the belief necessity kill." may or might entertain as to the nature and Indeed, petitioner must be exonerated for he had acted only in self-defense.  ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED  ACCORDINGLY, GRANTED.. The assailed Decision dated March 27, 2019 and Resolution dated July 2, 2019 in CA-G.R. CR NO. 41105 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED REVERSED and  and SET ASIDE. ASIDE. Petitioner PRUDENCIO GANAL, JR. is ACQUITTED is ACQUITTED of  of HOMICIDE on ground of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. SO ORDERED.  ORDERED.