Section 2 Case Digests

Padilla vs CA G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997 Summary of the Case: One night, Enrique Manarang noticed the accused appellant’s car running fast. After a while, a screech of tires was heard and thus, made the officer run out and investigate. Not so long, the car continued to run, so a hot-pursuit took place. Manarang then radioed the incident to the Police. When the car was put to a stop, the driver rolled down the windows with his hands raised. The officers then noticed that it was the famous actor, Robin Padilla. While apprehended, because of the hit-and-run incident, the police saw the revolver tucked in the left waist of Robin. So, the police insisted that the gun be shown in the office if it was legal. The crowd had formed and Robin was shaking their hands and pointing to the police while saying “iyan kinuha ang baril ko”, as if it was in the movies. The gesture then revealed a magazine clip of a rifle which made the police suspect that there is a rifle inside the vehicle. Then the rifle was seen. The other firearms were voluntarily surrendered by Robin. Now, Robin’s defense was that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. Robin Padilla was arrested, tried, and convicted for illegal possession of firearms. He was in possession of a .357 caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson with 6 live ammunitions, One M-16 baby Armalite Rifle with ammunitions, One .380 Pietro Barreta with 8 live ammunitions, and six live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver. Facts: High-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla: “(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions; “(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazine with ammunitions; “(3)

One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and

“(4)

Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.”

Appellant voluntarily surrendered item no. 3. and a black bag containing two additional long magazines and one short magazine. PNP Chief Espino, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office issued a Certification which stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla. A second Certification stated that the three firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla. Issue: Whether or not his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule Held: No. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: “Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner’s vehicle figured in a hit and run – an offense committed in the “presence” of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that “presence” does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he “hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene.” As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner. Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner’s arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who , in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes. It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action. The exigent circumstances of – hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime – all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere “reasonable and articulable” suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner’s warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer. Besides, the policemen’s warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang’s report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer’s personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner’s Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner’s belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects. We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold. The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, are as follows: 1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence, 2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view”, the elements of which are: (a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c).

the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d).

“plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. 4. consented warrantless search, and 5. customs search. In conformity with respondent court’s observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner’s firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within “plain view” of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner’s waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver’s seat. Thus it has been held that: “(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti.” “Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant.” With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any purported defect. Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner’s grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a lawoffender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.

MALACAT vs. CA Facts: Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was searched by a group of policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging around Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with other Muslim-looking men. When the policemen approached the group of men, they scattered in all directions which prompted the police to give chase and petitioner was then apprehended and a search was made on his person. He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present petition wherein petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that the search made on him and the seizure of the hand grenade from him was an appropriate incident to his arrest and that it erred in admitting the hand grenade as evidence since it was admissible because it was a product of an unreasonable and illegal search. Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid. Held: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part: Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . . A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;34 and (6) a "stop and frisk.’ At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus: We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of

effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

PEOPLE vs MUSA Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musa’s house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a ‘cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.’ They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.

Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’ doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‘plain view’ of the object. In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object. Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of “drug paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the “plain view doctrine.” HELD: Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is

valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguit’s residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the “plain view doctrine,” the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguit’s person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.

PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN [163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988] Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.

Issue: Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal. Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BELEN MARIACOS GR NO. 188611 June 16 2010 FACTS: October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about the owner of the bag, but no one know. When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but on the women got away. DOCTRINES: ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH) 1. This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 2. This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. MALUM PROHIBITUM When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary. Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charge is malum prohibitum

People of the Philippines vs Rosa Aruta y Menguin Search and Seizure – Informer’s Tip In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named “Benjie” that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation. ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Aruta’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accusedappellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution. NOTES: When is a warrantless search allowed? 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence; 2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested. The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.

RULE 113, RULES OF COURT Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

RULE 126, RULES OF COURT Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. (b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with. (c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.

People v Malmstedt

198 SCRA 401 (1991)

Facts: In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada. At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, MountainProvince, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport. Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. ACCUSED’S DEFENSE During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.

The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt. Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.

Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be reversed.

Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee. The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant.

People vs Marti Case Digest FACTS: August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the “Manila Packing and Export Forwarders” carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect the packages. She refused and assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves. Before the delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the cellophane wrappers. The accused – appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegality of search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels. ISSUE: Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal? HELD: Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. RATIONALE: Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Mercado vs People’s Court. The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of state authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government without the latter transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty the same should not be admitted. FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS – Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the NBI agents made no search and seizure much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused / appellant. CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof BILL OF RIGHTS The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy, protection against whom, protection against the STATE.

People vs Bongcarawan G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002 Facts: The security officer of Super Ferry 5, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. Bongcarawan was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized items. NBI Forensic Chemist later confirmed the substance to be shabu. Accused was convicted of violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. Bongcarawan appealed, arguing that the Samsonite suitcase containing the shabu was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends that People v. Marti is not applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman. Issue: Whether the drug confiscated is admissible in evidence against accused. Held: As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti, [i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply. There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked. A violation of one’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be the basis for the recovery of damages under Article 32 in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil Code.

eople v. Lo Ho Wing (alias Peter Lo), Lim Cheng Huat (alias Antonio Lim) and Reynaldo Tia Reynaldo Tia, “a deep penetration agent” of the SOG, reported of his undercover activities on the suspected criminal syndicate led by Lo and Lim. Moreover, Tia informed his superiorregarding their return to the country. Upon arrival in the Philippines, Lo and Tia rode in onetaxi cab while Lim rode in another. They were pursued by the members of the NARCOM andwere stopped. With permission of Lo and Tia, a tin can of tea was taken out of the red travelbag and, upon examination by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory, contained metamphetamine.Petitioner contend that a warrant was needed. Facts: 1. The Special Operations Group received a tip from one of its informers about anorganized group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling ofcontraband goods and gunrunning. As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and “deep penetration agents” was carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was Reynaldo Tia. 2. Tia was introduced to Lim Cheng Huat (Antonio Lim) where the latter expressed adesire to hire a male travel companion for his business trips abroad. Tia offered hisservices and was hire. Together with Lim, Tia, in one of the meetings in China, wasintroduced to Lo Ho Wing (Peter Lo) whom tia found out to be the person he wasto accompany to China in lieu of Lim. 3. As “deep penetration agent,” Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the suspected criminal syndicate to Capt. Luisito Palmera, head ofOplan Sharon 887 – the group created in order to bus the suspected syndicate. Tiainformed Palmera of their return to the Philippines after they (Lo and Tia) left forHong Kong 4. Upon arrival in the Philippines, they were met by Lim. After Lim and Lo finishedtheir conversation, Lo hailed a taxicab. Lo and Tia boarded the taxicab while Limfollowed in another taxi cab. Meanwhile, the operatives of the NARCOM (NarcoticsCommand), having been notified by Palmera, stationed themselves in strategicplaces around the arrival area. Upon seeing Lo and Tia leave the airport, theoperatives followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the operativesovertook the taxicab ridden by Lo and Tia and cut into its path which forced the taxidriver to stop. The other tax cab carrying Lim, however, sped away but was latercaught on Retiro Street, Quezon City. 5. Going back to Lo and Tia, the operatives approached the taxicab and asked thedriver to open the baggage compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrievedfrom the back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives requested from Lo andTia permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the redtravel bag owned by Lo. A certain Sgt. Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried thelid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed it in the middle tofeel its contents. Some crystalline white powder resembling crushed aluminiumcame out of the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined itscontent more closely. He had the three travel bags opened for inspection. Fromthe red travel bag, 6 tin cans were found, including the one previously opened andnothing else was recovered from the other bags. 6. The tea bag contained metamphetamine after examination by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. One of metamphetamine’s derivatives is metamphetaminehydrochloride (shabu/poor man’s cocaine). 7. The three were charged with violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.8.

Lo contends that the search and seizure was illegal. He contends that the officersconcerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had beeninformed of the date and time of arrival of the accused at the NAIA well ahead oftime. Moreover, as claimed by Lo, the fact that the search and seizure in questionwere made on a moving vehicle does not automatically make the warrantlesssearch fall within the coverage of exceptions of the necessity of a valid warrant toeffect search. Ruling:1. The search and seizure supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. As setforth in Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, there are at least 3 well-recognizedexceptions, namely: (a) a search

incidental to an arrest, (b) a search of a movingvehicle, and (c) seizure of evidence in plain view. In the case at bar, there is a clearshowing that the search in question, having been made in a moving vehicle, doesnot need a valid warrant to effect search.2. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is notpracticable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out ofthe locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.