Search and Seizure Compiled Case Digest

7. Alvarez vs CFI GR. No. 45358 Facts: The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a moneylender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner’s store and residence at seven o’clock on the night and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, fortyeight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, the petitioner filed a motion praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any

other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. Motion granted. Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for the necessary investigation. Issue: 1. Whether or not the affidavit is valid for purposes in issuing a search warrant 2. Whether or not affidavit of witnesses is needed 3. Whether or not the constitutional mandate that the thing to be seized is particularly described is violated 4. Whether or not fishing evidence is valid Ruling: 1. The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused it appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the

deprivation subjected.

to

which

the

petitioner

was

2. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. 3. These provisions of the constitution are mandatory and must be strictly complied with but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather generally, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: “that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as moneylender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law.” Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear

that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did. 4. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself Other notes: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; SERVICE AT NIGHT. — Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavit that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavit insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night. ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES. — The Anti- Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first,

because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it referred not to the search warrant and the incidents thereof but to the institution of criminal proceedings for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.

8. Mata v. Bayona G.R. No. 50720 Facts: The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed) is challenged by petitioner for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on the application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant to the records of Criminal Case No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its

whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by respondent Judge on March 1, 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. 2 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to this Court, with the instant petition, praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to be invalid and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter. Issues: Whether or not the search warrant is valid. Held: No, it is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce". More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in

writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. The searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.

9. People v. Del Rosario G.R. No. 109633

Facts: Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Cavite City, Regional Trial Court Judge Arturo de Guia issued in the morning of September 4, 1991 a search warrant (Exh. T, p. 50, Rec. Crim. Case No. 237-91) authorizing the search and seizure of an "undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrocholoride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalias" in the premises of appellant's house located at 828 R. Basa St., San Roque, Cavite City. However, the search warrant was not implemented immediately due to the lack of police personnel to form the raiding team In the final briefing of the raiding team at the police station, it was agreed upon that PO1 Venerando Luna will buy shabu from appellant and after his return from appellant's house, the raiding team will implement the search warrant. A marked money consisting of a P100 bill was given by the Station Commander to PO1 Luna and entered in the police logbook. PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to appellant's house to implement the search warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del Rosario and appellant witnessed the search at appellant's house. SPO3 de la Cruz and PO3 Francisco found a black canister containing shabu, an aluminum foil, plastik .22 caliber atop the TV set, three used ammunition in a cup and three wallets. SPO1 Novero found inside a show box aluminum foils, napkins and a burner SPO3 de la Cruz turned over the wallet containing the marked money to PO3 Onrubio (p. 8, tsn., Jan. 7, 1992). At police station, the seized items were taped and initialed by SPO3 de la Cruz (p. 33, tsn., Jan. 7, 1992). The next day, SPO4 Pilapil, through PO1 Barbuco, forwarded to NBI Forensic Chemist Mary Ann Aranas for laboratory analysis the aluminum foilContaining suspected shabu bought by PO1

Luna from appellant in the buy-bus operation as well as the aluminum foils containing suspected marijuana which were confiscated by virtue of the search warrant. The findings of NBI Forensic Chemist Aranas disclosed that all the specimen submitted to her for laboratory analysis by SPO1 Pilapil, thru PO1 Barbuco, gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrocholoride Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper. Held: No. The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and seizure of ".. the described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia" (Exh. O, p. 50, original record). Thus, the raiding party was authorized to seize only shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The Constitution itself (Section 2, Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularly, in the search warrant. Neither may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, accused-appellant's arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible in evidence (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967]). The Constitution expressly ordains the exclusion in evidence of illegally seized articles. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.(Section 3 [2], Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines).With the exclusion in evidence of the illegally seized firearm, there is, therefore, a total absence of evidence to support the charge of illegal possession of firearm, against accused-appellant. The same way may be said of the charge of illegal possession of ammunition.

(CASE 10) G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents. Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols. Issue: Was Rolando was lawfully arrested? Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection

therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

2 CONDITIONS FOR VALID ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT *NOTE: Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrest without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few days after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished from custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetual.

Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based upon PROBABLE CAUSE, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar. As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers who arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been illmotivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural

(CASE 11) G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. EDISON SUCRO, accused-appellant. Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. Issues: (1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.

(2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible. Held: 1. Yes. Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warrantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. (U.S. v. Fortaleza) 2. YES. The act of Macabante, throwing of the marijuana and the admission, constitute that he just committed an illegal act which the police officer had personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitors Sucro’s nefarious activity. Police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities. Evidence admissible because the arrest is valid. (People vs Bati) *NOTE: It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification of the appellant. (People v. Khan) In this case identified Sucro was identified by Macabante.

(CASE 12) G.R. No. 95902 February 4, 1992 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. DON RODRIGUEZA, accused-appellant. Facts: Narcotics Command (NARCOM) agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and “a certain object wrapped in a plastic” later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200 for 100 grams. The agent went back to headquarters and made a report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and aplastic syringe among others. There was no authorization by any search warrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetual. Issue: Whether or not evidence obtained without a valid search warrant may be used to prosecute the accused. Held: No. 1. The court held that a buy bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer. In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released

appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody if the sale of marijuana did take place. It is decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the afforested purpose of a buy-bust operation. 2. The Narcom agents should have secured a valid search warrant prior the raid since they have already been conducting surveillance against the accused for quite some time already and the urgency of their cause of action cannot be justified in court. Hence the accused was acquitted. *NOTE: Motive of the NARCOM agents in prosecuting the accused was also revealed during the trial of the case. Rebuttal witnesses Gracita Bahillo, sister of appellant, and Hospicio Segovia, father of Samuel Segovia, testified that Sgt. Molinawe, who has since been reportedly dismissed from the service, asked for P10,000.00 from each of them in exchange for the liberty of the accused. This was never refuted in court.

19. Papa v. Mago FACTS: The Manila Police Department seized the goods owned by Mago which were inside the truck hired by Mago to Lanopa for transportation. It was seized because Alagao, the head of counter-intelligence unit, received a reliable information that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks. They conducted a surveillance at the gate and when the trucks left they went after the trucks and intercepted them and seized 9 bales of goods without a search warrant. Also the owner argues that the goods were illegally examined because they requested for it to not be examined. And even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they were imported illegally. After some time, a restraining order was issued

by Judge Jarencio from opening the 9 bales of goods, however, at the time it was received, some of the bales were already opend by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of Mago. ISSUE: Was the search conducted by the Bureu of Customs for the goods valid? HELD: Yes, they had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in this case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure

the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture. 20. Espano v. CA ANTECEDENT FACTS: Rodolfo Espano was convicted of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. He was found of 12 plastic bags containing crushed flowering tops and 5.5 grams of Marijuana. According to the policemen, they saw him selling something to another person in Manila, so they came to him and told them they were policemen and frisked him. They searched Espano and asked him if there were more so he said that there are others in his house. Indeed, they found more in his house. After that he was charged of possession of prohibited drugs. He also resulted positive in the drug test. But according to Espano, he was just sleeping in his house and was awakened because he was beiong handcuffed. He said that the policemen were originally looking for his brother-in-law but, when was not found, brought him to the station instead. He was not believed because the prosecution was found more credible and trustworthy. SEARCH AND SEIZURE FACTS: Petitioner contends that convicting him was a mistake because 1. The evidences seized were inadmissible 2. He should be presumed innocent till found guilty 3. he was denied the constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory process and 4. his conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant and not properly identified ISSUE: Was he properly convicted HELD: Yes, First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect. In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible than those of the defense must stand.Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any consideration. He simply contended that he was in his house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court has consistently held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its

commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be there. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioners residence, however, the same are inadmissible in evidence. 21. People v. Musa FACTS: There was an information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The informer gave instructions on to how they can reach Musa’s house and gave the description of Musa's appearance. Sgt. Ani tried to buy and was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. Because of that, a 'buy-bust' operation was planned for the next day. In this plan, Sgt. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. The NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money because it was given to his wife who has managed to escape. T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a ‘cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.’ They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it

and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest. ISSUE: Was the search and seizure of the ‘cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.’ valid? HELD: No, it was an unreasonable search and seizure and therefore cannot be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’ doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‘plain view’ of the object. In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object. Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. 29. Manalili vs Court of Appeals GR 113447, Oct. 9, 1997 Facts: At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said area. Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner. Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce

themselves and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated. The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis. Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence inadmissible as evidence. Held: The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any proceeding. The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the place to be searched. Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Terry vs. Ohio 392 US 1 Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous. Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a store window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (“Constitution”)? Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) held that it is a reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed. Dissent. Justice William Douglas (“J. Douglas”) dissented, reasoning that the majority’s holding would grant powers to officers to

authorize a search and seizure that even a magistrate would not possess. Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized an additional necessity of the reasonableness of the stop to investigate the crime. Justice Byron White (“J. White”) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized that the particular facts of the case, that there was suspicion of a violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk. Discussion. The facts of the case are important to understand the Supreme Court’s willingness to allow the search. The suspicious activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and if the officer’s suspicions were correct then he would be in a dangerous position to approach the men for questioning without searching them. The officer also did not detain the men for a long period of time to constitute an arrest without probable cause. The infringement on personal liberty of any "seizure" of a person can only be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment if we require the police to possess "probable cause" before they seize him. Only that line draws a meaningful distinction between an officer's mere inkling and the presence of facts within the officer's personal knowledge which would convince a reasonable man that the person seized has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a particular crime. "In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Until the Fourth Amendment, which is closely allied with the Fifth, is rewritten, the person and the effects of the individual are beyond the reach of all government agencies until there are reasonable grounds to believe (probable cause) that a criminal venture has been launched or is about to be launched. There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That

hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater