Schütz - 1951 - Making Music Tohether a Study in Social Relationship

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MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER: A Study in Social Relationship Author(s): ALFRED SCHÜTZ Source: Social Research, Vol. 18, No. 1 (MARCH 1951), pp. 76-97 Published by: The New School Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40969255 . Accessed: 18/10/2013 09:59 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER A Studyin Social Relationship

BY ALFRED SCHÜTZ i

lVlusic is a meaningful contextwhichis not bound to a conYet this contextcan be communischeme. meaningful ceptual cated. The processof communication betweencomposerand an individualperlistenernormallyrequiresan intermediary: former or a groupofcoperformers. Amongall theseparticipants thereprevailsocialrelations ofa highly structure. complicated of thisstructure is thepurposeof To analyzecertainelements thispaper. The discussion is notaimedat problemscommonly the realm of to the so-called ofmusic,although relegated sociology itisbelievedthatan investigation ofthesocialrelationships among theparticipants in themusicalprocessis a prerequisite forany researchin thisfield;noris it concerned witha phenomenology of musicalexperience,althoughsome elementary observations of the structure music will have to be made. The chief regarding of our analysisconsists in theparticular interest character of all socialinteractions connectedwiththemusicalprocess:theyare to theactoras wellas to theaddressee, doubtlessmeaningful but is notcapableof beingexpressed thismeaningstructure in conbut not ceptualterms;theyare foundedupon communication, a semantic used the communicator as a system by primarily upon andbyhispartner schemeofexpression as a schemeofinterpretation.1 For thisveryreasonit can be hopedthata studyof the connectedwiththemusicalprocessmaylead socialrelationships validformanyotherformsof socialintercourse, to someinsights i The systemof musicalnotation,as will be shown,has quite anotherfunction and a merelysecondaryone.

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perhapseven to illuminationof a certainaspect of the structure of social interactionas such that has not so far attractedfrom social scientiststhe attentionit deserves. This introductory statementrequiressomeclarification. When sociologistsspeak of social interactiontheyusually have in mind a set of interdependent actionsof severalhuman beings, mutuallyrelated by the meaningwhich the actor bestowsupon his actionand whichhe supposesto be understoodby his partner. To use Max Weber'sterminology, theseactionshave to be oriented in theircourse with referenceto one another. In studyingthe processof communicationas such,mostsociologistshave takenas a model eitherthe interplayof significative gesturesor language in thebroadestsenseof thisterm. G. H. Mead, forexample,finds thattwowrestlers communicatewitheach otherbya ' 'conversation of gestures"whichenables eitherof the participantsto anticipate the other'sbehaviorand to orienthis own behaviorby means of such anticipation.2 We may also say that two chess playerswho bothknowthefunctionalsignificance of each chessmanin general, as well as withinthe unique concreteconstellationat any given momentofa particulargame,communicatetheirthoughtsto each otherin termsof the "vocabulary"and "syntax"of the schemeof common to both of them,which expressionand interpretation is determinedby the body of the "rules of the game." In the case of ordinaryspeech or the use of writtensymbols,it is assumedthateach partnerinterpretshis own behavioras well as thatof theotherin conceptualtermswhichcan be translatedand conveyedto the other partnerby way of a common semantic system. In any of thesecases the existenceof a semanticsystem - be it the "conversationof significant gestures,"the "rules of the game," or "languageproper"- is simplypresupposedas somethinggiven fromtheoutsetand theproblemof "significance" remainsunquestioned. The reason for this is quite clear: In the social world into which we are born, language (in the broadest sense) is 2 G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago 1937) pp. 14, 63, 253 ff.

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admittedlythe paramount vehicle of communication;its conmake it the outceptual structureand its power of typification tool for the of standing conveying meaning. There is even a strongtendencyin contemporarythoughtto identifymeaning with its semanticexpressionand to consider language, speech, symbols,significantgestures,as the fundamentalcondition of social intercourseas such. Even Mead's highlyoriginalendeavor to explain the origin of language by an interplayof significant - his famous example of the dogfight - startsfrom the gestures suppositionthat a prelinguistic"conversation"of "attitudes"is possible. It is not necessaryto accept Mead's basic position of "social behaviorism"in order to admit that,as has so oftenhappened, he has seen a crucial problem more clearlythan others. Nevertheless,the solution he offersonly seeminglyremovesthe difficulties connectedwith the basic issue, namely,whetherthe communicativeprocess is really the foundationof all possible social relationships,or whether,on the contrary,all communication presupposesthe existenceof some kind of social interaction which, though it is an indispensablecondition of all possible does not enterthe communicativeprocessand is communication, not capable of beinggraspedby it. It is currently ratherfashionable to dismissproblemsof this kind with a haughtyreference to the question of the priorityof the chickenor the egg. Such an unfamiliarity an attitudenotonlyreflects withthephilosophical issue discussedby the Schoolmenunder the heading of priority, but also constitutesa self-madeobstacle to a serious analysisof the various problems of foundation importantespecially for the social sciences. As faras the questionunderscrutinyis concerned,the concrete researchesof many sociologistsand philosophershave aimed at certainformsof social intercoursewhich necessarilyprecede all communication.Wiese's "contact-situations," Scheler'sperceptual a alter to certain the extent of ego, theory Cooley'sconceptof the face-to-face Malinowski's of speech as relationship, interpretation within the situation determined social interaction, originating by

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Sartre'sbasic conceptof "lookingat the otherand being looked at by the other" (le regard),all these are just a few examples of the endeavor to investigatewhat might be called the "mutual tuning-inrelationship"upon which alone all communicationis founded. It is preciselythis mutual tuning-inrelationshipby whichthe "I" and the "Thou" are experiencedby both participantsas a "We" in vivid presence. Instead of enteringhere into the complicated philosophical analysisof thisproblem,3it maybe permissibleto referto a series of well-knownphenomena in the social world in which this social relationshipcomes to the foreground. precommunicative Mead's example of wrestlershas already been mentioned. It is typical for a set of similar interrelatedactivitiessuch as the relationshipbetweenpitcherand catcher,tennisplayers,fencers, and so on; we findthe same featuresin marchingtogether,dancing together,making love together,or making music together, and thislast-namedactivitywill serveas an example foranalysis in thefollowingpages. It is hoped thatthisanalysiswill in some measurecontributeto clarification of the structureof the mutual which originatesin the possibilityof living relationship, tuning-in togethersimultaneouslyin specificdimensionsof time. It is also hoped thatthestudyoftheparticularcommunicativesituation withinthe musical processwill shed some light on the nonconceptualaspectinvolvedin any kind of communication. n

Certain elementsof the social structureof the musical process were analyzedin one of the later writingsof the famousFrench sociologist,Maurice Halbwachs.4 The paper in questiondeserves special attentionbecause it was writtenas a kind of introduction to a major studyon the natureof time,whichwas unfortunately 3 Mead's Philosophyof the Present (Chicago 1932) is just one exampleof how of thiskind have to be carriedout and wheretheylead. investigations 4 Maurice Halbwachs,"La mémoirecollectivechez les musiciens,"in Revue philosophique(March-April1939) pp. 136-65.

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never completedowing to the author's tragicdeath in the concentrationcamp of Buchenwaldin July 1944.5 Halbwachs' basic position is well known. He assumed that all kinds of memoryare determinedby a social frameworkand that individual memorycannot be conceived of without the assumptionof a collective memoryfrom which all individual recollectionderives. This basic principle- which it is not our concernto criticizehere- was applied to the problemof musical communicationbecause the authorfeltthatthe verystructureof music- its developmentwithin the flux of time, its detachment - offersan fromanythingthat lasts,its realizationby re-creation excellentopportunityfor demonstratingthat there is no other a set of recollectionswithall theirshades possibilityof preserving and details except by recourse to the collective memory. In otherwords,Halbwachs was primarilyconcernedwith analyzing the social structureof music. Curiouslyenough,he divided the realm of music into two distinctparts: music as experiencedby the educated musicianand music as experiencedby the layman. With regard to the former,Halbwachs came to the conclusion thatit is firstof all the possibilityof translatingmusic into visual - that is, the systemof musical notation- which makes symbols transmission of music possible. To be sure,the signsof musical notationare not imagesof the sounds. They are, however,means of expressingin a conventionallanguageall the commandswhich the musicianmustobey if he wantsto reproducea piece of music properly. The conventionalcharacterof the signs of musical notation and their combinationconsistsin the fact that they have meaningmerelyby continuousreferenceto the group which inventedand adopted them. This group, the ' 'society'' of educated musicians,lives in a world exclusivelyfilled with sounds and is interestedin nothingelse but creatingor listeningto a combinationof sounds. Even the inventionof new combinations 5 Four chapters from the manuscript were published posthumously under the title, "Mémoire et société," in L'Année sociologique, 3rd Series, Vol. I (Paris 1949) pp. 11-197.

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of soundsis possibleonlywithinthe framework of the socially conditioned musicallanguage(which, forHalbwachs, wasidentical withthe systemof musicalnotation).The creativeact of the in the same world of sounds composeris merelya discovery thatis accessibleexclusively to the societyof musicians. It is because the of this precisely composeracceptsthe conventions moredeeplyinto themthan societyand becausehe penetrates othersthathe can makehis discoveries.The musicallanguage is not an instrument inventedafterward in orderto put down and to transmit to othermusicianswhatone of themhas sponinvented.On thecontrary, itis thisverylanguagewhich taneously createsmusic. This is roughlyHalbwachs'main argumentfor the social character ofthemusician's music. Yet thechildor themusically uneducated learns anthems, person nursery rhymes, popularsongs, dance or marchmelodiesby rote withoutany knowledgeof musicalnotation.How is thispossibleand howcan thiskindof be referredto the collective memoryfor sound combinations memory?Halbwachs'answeris thatthe layman'smemoryof musicaleventsis also foundedupon the collectivememorybut alwaysattachedto metamusical experiences.6The melodyof a - a social product - are is remembered because the words song remembered.As fordancesor marchesor otherpiecesof music dissociated fromwords,it is the rhythm of marching, dancing, that serves as the carrier of the musical recollection. speaking, Yet rhythm does not existin nature;it, too, is a resultof our livingin society.The insulatedindividualcould not discover forthisstatement rhythm.No evidenceisoffered (whichI believe tobe wrong)exceptreference to therhythmical character ofwork are of social songsand of our speech. Bothwordsand rhythms are thelayman'smusicalexperiences. originand so,consequently, Buttheyrefertoa worldin whichotherthanexclusively sonorous eventsexistand to a societynotexclusively interested in musical texture.So muchforHalbwachs. «This termis not used by Halbwachs,but probablyrenderswhat he meant.

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Interestingas Halbwachs' analysis is, it suffersfromvarious shortcomings.In thefirstplace,it seemsto me thatthedistinction betweena musician'smusicand musicaccessibleto the laymanis withoutany foundationin fact. But postponingthe discussion of this question and restrictingourselvesfor the time being to the provinceof music allegedlyaccessible only to the educated musician,the followingobjectionsto Halbwachs' theorymust be themusicalthoughtwithitscommunicaraised: (1) He identifies tion. (2) He identifiesmusical communicationwith musical languagewhichto him is the systemof musicalnotation. (3) He identifiesmusical notation with the social background of the musical process. In regardto the firstobjection,it is clear thatfromthe point of view of thecomposera musicalthoughtmaybe conceivedwithout any intentionof communication. This thoughtmay be a perfect piece of music,having its specificmeaning structure;it may be rememberedat will withoutbeing translatedinto actual sounds or into the visible formof notation. This is, of course, not a of themusicalprocess. It has been said thatRaphael particularity would have been one of the greatestpainterseven if he had been bornwithoutarms. In general,all kindsof mentalactivities meaningfuland capable of performedin fantasymaybe perfectly being mentallyreproducedwithinthe solitude of the individual consciousness. All our unexpressedthoughts,our day dreamsas well as projectsfor futureaction never carried out, show these features. But any kind of communicationbetweenman and his fellowman and therefore the communicationof musical thoughts presupposesan event or a series of events in the outer world which functions,on the one hand, as a schemeof expressionof the communicator'sthoughtand, on the otherhand, as a scheme of interpretationof such thoughtby the addressee. Musical to otherseitherby the mechanicsof thoughtscan be transmitted audible sound or by the symbolsof musical notation. It is hard to understandwhy Halbwachs regarded only the latteras the appropriateformof musical communication. Obvi-

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ously he took as a model of his analysisthe situationin which the composerhas to communicatehis musical idea to the performerbywayofa systemofvisiblesignsbeforethe performer can translatethese ideas into sounds to be grasped by the listener. But this procedurehas nothingto do with the particularitiesof musical communicationas such; it is a more or less technical question. We may perfectlywell understandan improvisation executed by one or several instrumentalists.Or we may, with Tovey,foreseea revolutionin the processof musical communication by means of the microscopicstudyof phonographicrecords. "There is nothingto preventthe individual productionof music directlyin termsof the phonographicneedle. That is to say,the will precomposer,untrammeledby the techniqueof instruments, scribeall producibletimbrein whateverpitchesand rhythmshe pleases, and will have no more direct cooperation with the craftsmanwho models the phonographicwave-lines,than the violinistmaywithStradivarius."7 Musical notationis, therefore, just one among severalvehicles of communicatingmusical thought. But musical notationis by no means identical with musical language. Its semanticsystem is of quite anotherkind than thatof ideograms,letters,or mathematicalor chemicalsymbols. The ideogramrefersimmediatelyto therepresentedconceptand so does the mathematicalor chemical symbol. The writtenword in our alphabeticlanguagesrefersto the sound of the spokenword and throughit as an intermediary to the concept it conveys. As stated above, the meaning of a musicalprocesscannotbe relatedto a conceptualscheme,and the particularfunctionof musical notation today as well as in its historicaldevelopmentreflectsthis situation. The musical sign is nothingbut instructionto the performerto produce by means of his voice or his instrumenta sound of a particular pitch and duration,givingin addition,at certainhistoricalperiods,suggestionsas to tempo,dynamics,and expression,or directionsas to the connectionwithothersounds (by such devices as ties,slurs, 7 Donald Francis Tovey, "Music," in British Encyclopaedia, 14th ed.

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and the like). All theseelementsof the tonal materialcan only be approximatelyprescribedand the way to obtain the indicated effectis leftto the performer. "The composer'sspecificindicationsare themselvesnot alwaysa partof his originalcreationbut ratherone musician'smessageto anotherabout it, a hint about how to secure in performancea convincingtransmissionof the work's feeling content without destroyingits emotional and intellectualcommunity,"saysa well-knowncomposerand critic.8 And the conductor,Furtwängler, is certainlyrightin statingthat the composer'stext "cannot give any indicationas to the really intendedvolume of a forte,the reallyintendedspeed of a tempo, since everyforteand everytempohas to be modifiedin practice in accordancewith the place of the performanceand the setting and the strengthof the performing group" and that "the expresa merelysymbolicvalue withrespect sion markshave intentionally to the whole workand are not intendedto be valid forthe single instrumentwhereforean 'ff'for the bassoon has quite another 9 meaning than for the trombone." Thus, all musicalnotationremainsof necessityvague and open and it is up to thereaderor performer to manifoldinterpretations in and to definetheapproximations. hints the score the to decipher These limitsvarywidelyin the course of the historicaldevelopment of musical culture. The more closely we approach the presentin the studyof the historyof music,the lowerthe level of and of listeners,and the general musical culture of performers the strongerthe tendencyof the composerto make his systemof notationas exact and preciseas possible,that is, to limit more freedomof interpretation.To be sure, and moretheperformer's all signsof musical notationare conventional;but, as has been shown,the systemof musical notationis more or less accidental to the processof musical communication. A social theoryof does not have to be foundedon the conventional musictherefore 8 VirgilThompson,The Art of JudgingMusic (New York 1948) p. 296. - eine musikalische 9 WilhelmFurtwängler, in Das Schicksalfrage," "Interpretation der Musik Atlantisbuch (Zurich 1934) pp. 609 ff.

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characterof the visual signsbut ratheron the sum total of what we have just called musical culture against the backgroundof which the reader's or performer'sinterpretationof these signs takesplace. m

To make this web of social relationshipscalled musical culture clearer,let us imagine a lonely performerof a piece of music sittingat his piano beforethe scoreof a sonataby a minormaster of the nineteenthcenturywhich,we assume,is entirelyunknown to him. Furthermore, we assumethatour piano playeris equally as a technician and sightreaderand thatconsequently proficient no mechanicalor otherexternalobstacle will hinder the fluxof his performance. Yet, having hardlymade these two assumptions,we hesitate. Are theyindeedcompatiblewitheach other? Can we reallymaintain thatthe sonata in question is entirelyunknownto our performer? He could not be an accomplishedtechnicianand sight readerwithouthavingattaineda certainlevel of musical culture enablinghim to read offhanda piece of musicof the typeof that beforehim. Consequently,although this particularsonata and perhapsall the otherworksof thisparticularcomposermightbe unknownto him,he will nevertheless have a well-foundedknowlof the of musical form called ' 'sonata within the edge type meaningofnineteenthcenturypiano music,"of thetypeof themes and harmoniesused in such compositionsof that period, of the expressionalcontentshe may expect to find in them- in sum, of the typical' 'style"in which music of this kind is writtenand in whichit has to be executed. Even beforestartingto play or to read the firstchordour musicianis referredto a more or less clearlyorganized,more or less coherent,more or less distinctset of his previousexperiences,which constitutein their totalitya kindof preknowledgeof the piece of musicat hand. To be sure, thispreknowledge refersmerelyto thetypeto whichthisindividual of music belongs and not to its particular and unique piece

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individuality. But the player's general preknowledgeof its typicalitybecomesthe schemeof referenceforhis interpretation of its particularity.This scheme of referencedetermines,in a generalway,the player'santicipationsof whathe mayor maynot findin thecompositionbeforehim. Such anticipationsare more or less empty;theymay be fulfilledand justifiedby the musical eventshe will experiencewhen he startsto play the sonata or theymay "explode" and be annihilated. In more general terms,the player approaching a so-called - in one's own unknownpiece of musicdoes so froma historically - determinedsituation,determinedby his case,autobiographically stockof musicalexperiencesat hand in so faras theyare typically relevantto the anticipatednovel experiencebeforehim.10 This stockof experiencesrefersindirectlyto all his past and present fellowmen whoseacts or thoughtshave contributedto the building up ofhis knowledge. This includeswhathe has learnedfrom his teachers,and his teachersfromtheir teachers;what he has taken in fromotherplayers'execution; and what he has approof the musical thoughtof the priated fromthe manifestations - as of knowlthe bulk of musical knowledge composer. Thus, edge in general- is socially derived. And within this socially derived knowledgethere stands out the knowledgetransmitted and authority fromthoseupon whomthe prestigeof authenticity has been bestowed,thatis, fromthegreatmastersamongthecomof theirwork. Musical posersand the acknowledgedinterpreters transmitted them is not knowledge by only sociallyderived; it is 10All thisis by no meanslimitedto the situationunderscrutiny.Indeed,our analysishas so farbeen merelyan applicationof Husserl'smasterful investigations of our experience.Accordingto him the factualworldis always intothestructure experiencedas a worldof preconstituted types. To embarkupon the importance of this discoveryby Husserl,especiallyfor the conceptof type,so fundamental for all social sciences,is not within the scope of the present paper. This theoryhas been touchedupon in Husserl'sIdeas: GeneralIntroductionto Pure Phenomenology, translated by W. R. BoyceGibson (London-NewYork 1931) § 47» P- *49»and nas been fuUydevelopedin his Erfahrungund Urteil(Prague 1939)PP- 35 ff-139-43»394-4O3-

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also sociallyapproved,11being regardedas authenticand thereforemorequalifiedto becomea patternforothersthanknowledge originatingelsewhere. IV

- the actual perIn the situationwe have chosen to investigate formanceof a piece of music the genesisof the stockof knowledge at hand withall its hidden social referencesis, so to speak, prehistoric. The web of sociallyderived and sociallyapproved knowledgeconstitutesmerely the setting for the main social relationshipinto which our piano player (and also any listener or mere readerof music) will enter: that with the composerof thesonatabeforehim. It is thegraspingof thecomposer'smusical thoughtand its interpretation by re-creationwhich stand in the centerof the player'sfieldof consciousnessor, to use a phenomenologicalterm,whichbecome "thematic"forhis ongoingactivity. This thematickernelstandsout againstthehorizonof preacquired knowledge,which knowledgefunctionsas a schemeof reference for the graspingof the composer'sthought. and interpretation It is now necessaryto describethe structureof thissocial relationbut beforeenteringinto ship betweencomposerand beholder,12 its analysisit mightbe well to forestalla possiblemisunderstanding. It is by no means our thesisthat a work of music (or of art in general) cannot be understoodexcept by referenceto its - biographicalor otherindividualauthoror to thecircumstances in which he created this particularwork. It is certainlynot a prerequisitefor the understandingof the musical contentof the so-calledMoonlightSonatato takecognizanceof thesillyanecdotes whichpopularbeliefattachesto thecreationof thiswork;it is not even indispensableto know that the sonata was composed by a man called Beethovenwho lived thenand thereand wentthrough 11With regard to the conceptsof socially derived and socially approved see my paper,"The Well-informed Citizen,"in Social Research,vol. knowledge, 13, no. 4 (December1946) pp. 463-78,especially475 ff. 12The term"beholder"shall include the player,listener,and readerof music.

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such and such personal experiences. Any work of art, once accomplished,existsas a meaningfulentityindependentof the personal life of its creator.13 The social relationshipbetween composerand beholder as it is understoodhere is established exclusivelyby the factthata beholderof a piece of music participates in and to a certainextentre-createsthe experiencesof the - let us suppose,anonymous - fellowman who createdthiswork not only as an expressionof his musical thoughtsbut with communicativeintent. - very For our purposes a piece of music may be defined14 indeed as a meaningfularrangementof roughlyand tentatively, tonesin innertime. It is the occurrencein innertime,Bergson's durée,whichis the veryformof existenceof music. The fluxof tones unrollingin inner time is an arrangementmeaningfulto both the composerand the beholder,because and in so far as it evokesin the streamof consciousnessparticipatingin it an interplay of recollections,retentions,protentions,and anticipations which interrelatethe successive elements. To be sure, the sequence of tones occurs in the irreversibledirectionof inner time,in the direction,as it were, fromthe firstbar to the last. But thisirreversiblefluxis not irretrievable.The composer,by the specificmeans of his art,15has arrangedit in such a way that 13This problemhas been discussedforthe realmof poetryby E. M. W. Tillyard book,The PersonalHeresy,a Controversy and C. S. Lewisin theirwittyand profound (London-NewYork 1939). 14An excellentsurveyof philosophicaltheoriesof musiccan be foundin Susanne in K. Langer,Philosophyin a New Key (Cambridge1942),Ch. 8, "On Significance Music,"and Ch. 9, "The Genesisof ArtisticImport,"althoughthe author'sown It may be summedup in the followingquotation: positionseemsunsatisfactory. "Music has all the earmarksof a truesymbolism, exceptone: the existenceof an idiom like an artificial limited It is a ... connotation. language,onlyeven assigned less successful; for music at its highest, though clearly a symbolic form, is an

not is itslifebut notassertion;expressiveness, unconsunvmated symbol.Articulation expression." 15borneor thesespecincmeansare essentialto any Kina or music,otnersDeiong melody,tonalharmony, technique merelyto a particularmusicalculture. Rhythm, of diminution,and the so-calledformsbased on what Tovey calls the larger and so on, are certainlycharacteristic such as Sonata,Rondo,Variations, harmony, of themusicalcultureof thenineteenth century.It maybe hoped thatintensified

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the consciousnessof the beholderis led to referwhat he actually hears to what he anticipateswill followand also to what he has just been hearingand what he has heard ever since this piece of music began. The hearer,therefore, listensto the ongoing flux of music,so to speak,not only in the directionfromthe firstto the last bar but simultaneouslyin a reversedirectionback to the firstone.16 It is essentialforour problemto gain a clearerunderstanding of thetimedimensionin whichmusicoccurs. It was statedabove that the inner time,the durée, is the veryformof existenceof music. Of course,playingan instrument,listeningto a record, readinga page of music- all theseare eventsoccurringin outer time,the time thatcan be measuredby metronomesand clocks, that is, the time that the musician "counts" in order to assure the correct"tempo." But to make clear why we considerinner time the verymediumwithinwhich the musical flowoccurs,let us imaginethat the slow and the fastmovementof a symphony each filla twelve-inch record. Our watchesshow thatthe playing of eitherrecordtakesabout threeand a half minutes. This is a fact which might possibly interest the program maker of a broadcastingstation. To the beholder it means nothing. To him it is not truethatthe timehe lived throughwhile listeningto the slow movementwas of "equal length" with that which he dedicatedto thefastone. While listeninghe lives in a dimension of time incomparablewith that which can be subdivided into homogeneousparts. The outer time is measurable; there are piecesofequal length;thereare minutesand hoursand the length of the grooveto be traversedby the needle of the recordplayer. There is no such yardstickfor the dimensionof inner time the listenerlives in; thereis no equalitybetweenits pieces, if pieces researchin the phenomenology of musicalexperiencewill shed some light upon the difficult of tones problemwhichof thesemeans of meaningfularrangement is essentialto musicin general,regardlessof what its particularhistoricalsetting maybe. io This insighthas been formulated in an unsurpassable wayby St. Augustinein Book XI, Ch. 38, of his Confessions.

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SOCIAL RESEARCH go therewere at all.17 It may come as a completesurpriseto him that the main theme of the second movementof Beethoven's PianoforteSonata in d-minor,Op. 31, No. 2, takesas much time in the mere clock sense- namely,one minute- as the last movementof the same sonataup to the end of the exposition.18 The precedingremarksserve to clarifythe particularsocial relationshipbetweencomposerand beholder. Althoughseparated by hundredsof years,the latter participateswith quasi simulwith taneityin theformer'sstreamofconsciousnessby performing him step by step the ongoingarticulationof his musical thought. The beholder,thus,is unitedwiththecomposerby a timedimension commonto both,whichis nothingotherthana derivedform ofthevividpresentsharedby thepartnersin a genuineface-to-face relation19 such as prevailsbetween speaker and listener. But is thisreconstruction of a vivid present,thisestablishment of a quasi simultaneity, specificto the relationshipbetween the streamof consciousnessof the composerand thatof the beholder? Can it not also be foundin therelationshipbetweenthe readerof a letterwith its writer,the studentof a scientificbook with its of the author,the high school boy who learns the demonstration rule of the hypotenusewith Pythagoras? Certainly,in all these cases the single phases of the author's articulatedthoughtare - thatis, stepby step- coperformed or reperformed polythetically and thus a of the both streamsof by quasi simultaneity recipient, book, forinstance, thoughttakesplace. The readerof a scientific builds up word by word the meaningof a sentence,sentenceby sentencethat of a paragraph,paragraphby paragraphthat of a 17We do not need the reference to the specificexperienceof listeningto music of innerand outertime. The hand theincommensurability in orderto understand of our watchmay run equally over half the dial, whetherwe wait beforethe door of a surgeonoperatingon a persondear to us or whetherwe are havinga facts. good timein congenialcompany. All theseare well-known is Donald FrancisTovey,Beethoven(London-NewYork 1945) p. 57. 19This term,hereand in the following is not used in the sensethat paragraphs, CharlesHortonCooleyused it in Social Organization(New York 1937)^ns- 3~5»*it in such a relationsharetimeand space while merelythattheparticipants signifies it lasts. An analysisof Cooley'sconceptcan be foundin my article,"The Homecomer,"in AmericanJournalof Sociology,vol. 50, no. 5 (March 1945) p. 37.

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MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER

91 thesepolythetic chapter. But once havingcoperformed stepsof theconceptualmeaningof thissentence(paragraph, constituting the chapter), readermaygraspthe outcomeof thisconstitutive process,the resulting conceptualmeaning,in a singleglance 20 as Husserlputsit thatis,independently ofthe monothetically, in which and which this has by polythetic steps meaning been constituted.In the same way I maygraspmonothetically the of the theorem without restartmeaning Pythagorean a2-j-b2=:c2, thesinglementaloperations ofderivingit stepby ingto perform from certain assured I and step premises, maydo so evenif I have howto demonstrate thetheorem. forgotten The meaningof a musicalwork,21 is essentially of a however, structure. It cannot be It polythetical graspedmonothetically. consistsin thearticulated occurrence in innertime, step-by-step in theverypolythetic constitutional itself. I maygivea process nameto a specific piece of music,callingit "MoonlightSonata" or "NinthSymphony"; I mayevensay,"Thesewerevariations with a finalein theformof a passacaglia,"or characterize, as certain notesare proneto do, theparticular moodor emotion program thispieceof musicis supposedto have evokedin me. But the musicalcontent itsverymeaning, can be graspedmerelyby itself, oneself in the thus reimmersing ongoingflux,by reproducing thearticulated musicaloccurrence as it unfoldsin polythetic steps in innertime,a processitselfbelonging to thedimension ofinner time. Anditwill"takeas muchtime"toreconstitute theworkin as to experience recollection it forthefirst time. In bothcasesI thequasi simultaneity haveto re-establish of mystreamof consciousnesswiththatof the composerdescribedhereinbefore.22 20Husserl,Ideas (citedabove) §§ 118, 119,pp. 334 ff. 21Also of othertime-objects such as dance or poetry(see footnote22). 22This thesisis simplya corollaryto the other - that the meaningcontext of musicis not relatedto a conceptualscheme. A poem, for instance,may also have a conceptualcontent,and this,of course,may be graspedmonothetically. I can tell in one or two sentencesthe storyof the ancientmariner,and in fact thisis donein theauthor'sgloss.But in so faras thepoeticalmeaningof Coleridge's - that is, in so far as it is - I can poem surpassesthe conceptualmeaning poetry onlybringit beforemymindby recitingor readingit frombeginningto end.

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SOCIAL RESEARCH 92 We have therefore the followingsituation: two seriesof events in innertime,one belongingto the streamof consciousnessof the composer,theotherto thestreamof consciousnessof thebeholder, are lived throughin simultaneity, whichsimultaneity is createdby the ongoingfluxof the musical process. It is the thesisof the presentpaper thatthissharingof theother'sfluxof experiencesin innertime,thislivingthrougha vivid presentin common,constituteswhat we called in our introductory paragraphsthe mutual tuning-inrelationship,the experienceof the "We," which is at thefoundationof all possiblecommunication. The peculiarityof the musical processof communicationconsistsin the essentially characterof thecommunicatedcontent,thatis to say,in polythetic the factthatboth the fluxof the musicaleventsand the activities by which they are communicated,belong to the dimension of inner time. This statementseems to hold good for any kind of music. There is, however,one kind of music- the polyphonic music of the westernworld- which has the magic power of realizingby its specificmusical means the possibilityof living simultaneouslyin two or more fluxesof events. In polyphonic writingeach voice has its particularmeaning; each representsa seriesof, so to speak, autarchicmusical events; but this flux is designedto roll on in simultaneitywith other series of musical events,not less autarchicin themselves,but coexistingwith the into a formerand combiningwiththemby thisverysimultaneity new meaningfularrangement.23 So far we have investigatedthe social relationshipbetween composerand beholder. What we have foundto be the outstand- that is, the sharing of ing featureof musical communication - holds good whetherthis the ongoingfluxof the musicalcontent or through processoccursmerelyin the beholder'srecollection,24 23See, for instance, the Brahms song, "Wir wandelten wir zwei zusammen," in the introductionof which the walking togetherof the two lovers is expressed by the specific musical means of a canon, or the same device used in the Credo of Bach's B-minor Mass for expressingthe mysteryof the Trinity ("Et in unum"). 24In this connection, one recalls Brahm's dictum: "If I want to listen to a fine performanceof 'Don Giovanni,' I light a good cigar and stretch out on my sofa."

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his reading the score,or with the help of audible sounds. To believe that the visible signsof musical notationare essentialto thisprocessis no more erroneousthan to assert,as even Husserl does, that a symphonyexists merelyin its performanceby an orchestra.To be sure,the participationin the processof musical communicationby means other than audible sounds requires eithera certainnaturalgiftor special trainingon the part of the beholder. It is the eminentsocial functionof the performer the singeror player of an instrument to be the intermediary betweencomposerand listener. By his re-creationof the musical processthe performer partakesin the streamof consciousnessof the composeras well as of the listener. He therebyenables the latterto becomeimmersedin theparticulararticulationof theflux of innertimewhichis the specificmeaningof the piece of music in question. It is of no greatimportancewhetherperformer and listenershare togethera vivid presentin face-to-face relation or whetherthroughthe interpositionof mechanical devices, such as records,only a quasi simultaneitybetween the streamof consciousnessof the mediatorand the listenerhas been established. The lattercase alwaysrefersto theformer.The difference between thetwoshowsmerelythattherelationshipbetweenperformer and audience is subject to all variationsof intensity,intimacy,and anonymity.This can be easily seen by imaginingthe audience as consistingof one single person,a small group of personsin a privateroom, a crowd fillinga big concerthall, or the entirely unknownlistenersof a radio performanceor a commerciallydistributedrecord. In all thesecircumstances and listener performer are "tuned-in"to one another,are living togetherthroughthe same flux,are growingolder togetherwhile the musical process lasts. This statementapplies not only to the fifteenor twenty minutesof measurableouter time required for the performance of this particularpiece of music, but primarilyto the coperformancein simultaneityof the polytheticsteps by which the musicalcontentarticulatesitselfin inner time. Since, however, as an act of communicationis based upon a series all performance

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SOCIAL RESEARCH 94 ofeventsin theouterworld- in our case thefluxofaudible sounds - it can be said thatthesocialrelationshipbetweenperformer and listeneris foundedupon the commonexperienceof living simultaneouslyin severaldimensionsof time. v The samesituation,thepluridimensionality oftimesimultaneously lived throughby man and fellowman, occursin the relationship betweentwo or more individualsmakingmusic together,which we are now preparedto investigate. If we accept Max Weber's famous definition,according to which a social relationshipis "the conduct of a pluralityof personswhich accordingto their subjectivemeaningare mutuallyconcernedwith each otherand orientedbyvirtueof thisfact,"thenboth therelationshipprevailand listenerand thatprevailingbetween ingbetweenintermediary fallunderthisdefinition.But thereis an important coperformers differencebetween them. The listener'scoperformingof the polytheticsteps in which the musical contentunfoldsis merely an internalactivity(althoughas an "action involvingthe action of othersand being orientedby themin its course" undoubtedly a social actionwithinWeber'sdefinition). The coperformers(let us say a soloistaccompaniedby a keyboardinstrument)have to executeactivitiesgearinginto the outerworldand thusoccurring in spatializedoutertime. Consequently,each coperformer's action is orientednotonlyby thecomposer'sthoughtand his relationship to the audience but also reciprocallyby the experiencesin inner and outertimeofhis fellowperformer.Technically,each of them findsin the music sheet before him only that portion of the musical contentwhich the composerhas assigned to his instrumentfortranslationinto sound. Each of themhas, therefore, to take into account what the otherhas to execute in simultaneity. He has not only to interprethis own part,whichas such remains but he has also to anticipatethe other necessarilyfragmentary, - part and, even more, of his- the other's player'sinterpretation the other'santicipationsof his own execution. Either'sfreedom

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the composer'sthoughtis restrainedby the freeof interpreting dom grantedto the other. Either has to foreseeby listeningto the other,by protentionsand anticipations,any turn the other's maytake and has to be preparedat any time to be interpretation leaderor follower. Both sharenot onlythe innerdurée in which the contentof the music played actualizes itself; each, simultaneously,sharesin vivid presentthe other'sstreamof consciousnessin immediacy.This is possiblebecausemakingmusictogether - inasmuchas the particioccursin a trueface-to-face relationship pantsare sharingnot only a sectionof time but also a sectorof space. The other'sfacialexpressions,his gesturesin handlinghis in shortall the activitiesof performing,gear into instrument, the outerworldand can be graspedby the partnerin immediacy. Even if performedwithoutcommunicativeintent,theseactivities are interpretedby him as indicationsof what the otheris going to do and therefore as suggestionsor even commandsforhis own behavior. Any chamber musician knows how disturbingan arrangementthat preventsthe coperformersfrom seeing each othercan be. Moreover,all the activitiesof performingoccur in outer time,the time which can be measuredby countingor the metronomeor the beat of the conductor'sbaton. The coperformers mayhaverecourseto thesedeviceswhenforone reasonor another the flux of inner time in which the musical content unfoldshas been interrupted. Such a close face-to-face relationshipcan be established in immediacyonlyamonga small numberof coperformers.Where a largernumberof executantsis required,one of them- a song leader, concertmaster,or continuo player- has to assume the leadership,that is, to establishwith each of the performersthe contact which they are unable to find with one another in immediacy. Or a nonexecutant,theconductor,has to assumethis function. He does so by action in the outer world, and his evocativegesturesinto which he translatesthe musical events the immediate goingon in innertime,replace foreach performer graspingof the expressiveactivitiesof all his coperformers.

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SOCIAL RESEARCH g6 Our analysisof makingmusic togetherhas been restrictedto what Halbwachs calls the musician's music. Yet there is in principle no differencebetween the performanceof a modern orchestraor chorus and people sittingaround a campfireand singingto the strummingof a guitar or a congregationsinging hymnsunder the leadership of the organ. And there is no differencein principle between the performanceof a string at a jam sessionof accomplished quartetand the improvisations jazz players. These examples simplygive additional supportto our thesisthatthesystemofmusicalnotationis merelya technical device and accidentalto the social relationshipprevailingamong the performers.This social relationshipis founded upon the dimensionsof time simultanepartakingin commonof different ouslylived throughby the participants. On the one hand, there is the innertimein which the fluxof the musicaleventsunfolds, in polytheticsteps re-creates a dimensionin whicheach performer the of themusicalthought (eventuallyanonymous)composerand by which he is also connectedwith the listener. On the other, makingmusictogetheris an eventin outertime,presupposingalso a face-to-face relationship,that is, a communityof space, and it is thisdimensionwhichunifiesthe fluxesof inner time and warinto a vivid present. rantstheirsynchronization VI

thatthe of thispaper,thehope was expressed At thebeginning in involved makingmusic analysisof the social relationship relaof thetuning-in to a clarification mightcontribute together as such. It appears tionshipand theprocessof communication a mutual thatall possiblecommunication tuning-in presupposes and theaddresseeof the betweenthecommunicator relationship is established Thisrelationship communication. bythereciprocal in innertime,byliving oftheother'sfluxofexperiences sharing thistogetherness vivid a byexperiencing together, present through doestheother'sconduct as a "We." Onlywithinthisexperience in on him- that is, tuned the to becomemeaningful partner

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the other'sbodyand its movementscan be and are interpretedas a field of expressionof events within his inner life. Yet not thatis interpretedby the partneras an expressionof everything an eventin theother'sinnerlifeis meantby theotherto express that is, to communicateto the partner such an event. Facial gait,posture,waysof handlingtoolsand instruments, expressions, withoutcommunicativeintent,are examplesof such a situation. The processof communicationproperis bound to an occurrence in the outer world,whichhas the structureof a seriesof events built up in outer time. This series of events is polythetically intendedby the communicatoras a scheme of expressionopen to adequate interpretation by the addressee. Its verypolythetic characterwarrantsthe simultanietyof the ongoing flux of the communicator'sexperiencesin inner time with the occurrences in the outerworld,as well as the simultaneity of thesepolythetic occurrencesin the outer world with the addressee'sinterpreting experiencesin innertime. Communicatingwithone anotherprethe simultaneouspartakingof the partnersin supposes,therefore, variousdimensionsof outerand inner time- in shortin growing oldertogether.This seemsto be valid forall kindsofcommunication, the essentiallypolytheticones as well as those conveying - thatis, thosein whichtheresultof meaningin conceptualterms the communicativeprocesscan be graspedmonothetically. It is hardly necessaryto point out that the remarksin the precedingparagraphreferto communicationwithin the face-toface relationship. It can, however,be shown that all the other formsofpossiblecommunicationcan be explainedas derivedfrom thisparamountsituation. But this,as well as the elaborationof the theoryof the tuning-inrelationship,must be reservedfor anotheroccasion.

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