Sanlakas Vs Executive Secretary

 

Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary Reyes 

[GR 159085, 3 February 2004]; also Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers/Member [GR 159103], Suplico, et al., vs. Macapagal-Arroy Macapagal-Arroyo, o, et al. [GR 159185]; Pimentel et al. vs. Romulo et al. [GR 159196] 

En Banc, Tinga (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 concurs in separate opinion to which 2 join, 2 file own separate opinions, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on leave Facts:

They came in the middle of the night. Armed

with high-powered ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of 27 July 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of  Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation 427 and General Order 4, both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. By the evening of 27 July 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long

 

negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on 1 August 2003, through Proclamation 435. In the interim, several petitions were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the validity of  Proclamation 427 and General Order 4. Issue:

Whether the petitions have been rendered moot

by the lifting of the declaration. Held:

NO. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General

that the issuance of Proclamation 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of “actual controversies.” Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is “capable of repetition yet evading review.” The present case is one such case. Once before, the President on 1 May 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation 38 and General Order 1. On that occasion, “‘an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons’

 

assaulted and attempted to break into Malacañang.” Petitions were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the validity of the President’s declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases precluded the Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration. To prevent similar questions from reemerging, the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the t he exercise of  the President’s calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding notwithstanding..