Sankhya Karika Tatatva Koumudhi Ganaganatha Jha English Translation
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION, WITH THE
SANSKRIT TEXT, OF THE
/
TATTVA-KAUMUDI (SANKHYA) OF
VACHASPATI MISRA, BY
GANGlNlTHA
JHl, M. A.;
GOVERNMENT SCHOLAR
F.T.S.
N. W. P. (1888-90)
;
MEDALLIST OP THE UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD
MITEA MEDALLIST AND VIZIANAGRAM SCHOLAR (QUEEN
S
J
COLLEGE,
LIBRARIAN, RAJ DARBHANGA.
Published for the
BOMBAY TEEOSOPHICAL PUBLICATION "
BY
TOOKABAM TATYA,
F.T.S.
1896.
Price 2 Rupees.
FUND>\
BOMBAY: PKINTED AT THE
"
TATTVA-VIVECHAKA
5>
PRESg.
PREFACE. FOR Is
the
little
we know
of Vachaspati Misra
referred to the Sanskrit Introduction
;
wherein
the reader is
it
shown
that he was a Maithila Brahrnana and flourished somewhere
about the 9th Century A. D. For Udayanacharya the author of the "Parisuddi" on Vachaspati Misra s Tatparya-Tika," "
Lakshinana Sen of Bengal, of whose era we have just commenced the 8th century and at least a century must have elapsed before a work could flourished in the reign of king
;
deserve
the honor of a
commentary
the
at
hands
of
Udayanacharya.
I take this opportunity to thank my friend Balu Govindadasa of Benares, to whom I owe more than I can express,
who has been
chiefly
instrumental in
my
undertaking and
finishing not only of the present translation, but also of the Kavyaprakasa and the Nyaya -Muktavali, and some works on
Mimansa.
My
of
for his publication of the
Bombay
thanks are also due to Tookaram Tatya Esq. work, and also to the
proprietors of the
"
"
Theosophist
reprint of the translation
which
of
first
Madras
for allowing
appeared in the
of that excellent journal.
RAJ LIBRARY, DARBHANGA
:
}
V 1st July 1896.
)
GANGANATHA
a
columns
JHA.
OF CONTENTS.
LIST
PAG1.
-
Introduction
KARIKA 1
Senediction
2
Introduction to Karika I
3
4
Necessity of Scientific Enquiry Threefold Division of Pain
5 6
Reply
7
Auspiciousness of the beginning
9
1
Objection-Inquiry Superfluous
*
4
word II.
Objection- Adequacy Similarity of the Vedic with the Obvious means
16
Source of discriminative Knowledge...
13
14
KARIKA 17
18
19 20
4
Vedic means
of
15
12
2
...
2
Impurity, Decay and Excessiveness of the Vedic means ... The Impurity of animal slaughter in Sacrifice Nonpermanence and Excess of the results of Vedic rites Immortality from Vedic rites means long-durability ... Discriminative wisdom the only means Literal Interpretation of the Karika ...
10
11
xxxii
I.
...
KARIKA 8
xvii
...
5
...
...
6
...
...
6
...
...
7
...
7
7
8 8
III.
Fourfold Division of Categories The Productive (1)
The Productive-product (2) The Products (3) The non-product non-productive
9
9 9
10
f
21
10
(4)
KARIKA
IV.
10
22
The three kinds
23
Proof defined
24
The
three- foldness of proof Only three kinds of proof
...
25 26
The inclusion
...
of Proof
H
H
27
of all other proofs in the above-mentioned Necessity of enquiry into the different kinds of proof
28
The order
29
Specific definitions of the proofs
of
"
Perception,"
defined
...
12 12
12
Explanation
KARIKA UO
11
V. 12 ...
...
13
VI PAGE. 31
Insentience of Buddhi
32
13
33
Differentiation of w Perception from the other forms of proof Inference as a distinct form of proof ...
34
Inference defined
15
35
The three kinds of Inference The first Division of Inference The Negative a posteriori Inference The Affirmative a priori Inference Valid Testimony based on Inference
15
36 37
38 39
"
"
"
Self -evidence of Sruti
45 46
47 48 49
52
Analogy, included in Valid Testimony included in Inference "Apparent Inconsistency
...
"
"
16
...
19 19
...
...
...
20 21
"
"
18 18 18
...
"
included in
"
Negation
Perception in Inference
22
Probability Eumour discarded
22 VI.
22
Introduction
Nature
Knowledge Knowledge
of
Objection
Nature
of others
&c.,
through Inference
by Revelation
KARIKA 53
...
16
18
KARIKA 50 51
...
...
Differentiation of Valid Testimony from Inference Other kinds of proof set aside or included in above
"
14
17
Srutis and Puranas included in Valid Testimony Pretended Revelations
44
...
"
"
41
42
:
14
16
40
43
...
...
...
23 23
...
VII.
&c., being not amenable to the
senses, are
23
... ... ... ... non-existing ... 54,55 Different causes of non-perception of objects by the Senses 56 Non-perception of an object, no proof of non-existence
KARIKA
24
25 25
VIII. (
57
Objection-existence of Nature can be denied like that of skyflowers-started, and set aside there are effects bearing testimony :
to the existence of Nature
68
Such
effects
26
...
mentioned
,
KIRIKA
,
26
IX.
59
Different views with regard to the nature of an effect
60
Impossibility of the existence of Nature being proved in accord ance with the Vedanta and Bauddha tenets
27
61
Effect declared to be a
28
62
Bauddha view refuted Vedanta view refuted
63
permanent Entity ,
26
...
...
28 28
VII PAGE? 64
j
Yoga and Vaiseshika views criticised and the Sankhya view established the first argument in favour there of ... The second argument in favour of the effect being an entity The third argument ... ... ... ... ... ... The fourth argument ... The fifth argument ... ... Proofs of the non -difference of cause and effect ... The effect only a particular development of the cause Difference of purpose and action no ground of difference Objection based on the nature of the manifestation of the effect... ;
65
66
67 68
69
70 J
71
72 73
74 75
76
Objection set aside as being common to both theories Production of the cloth not identical with the cloth Necessity of causal operation Conclusion of the Karika
...
KARIKA
...
...
...
...
...
30
30 31 31 32r
33
33 34 34 34
35
77
Introduction to the consideration of the Manifested
The Manifested-as having a cause being non-eternal
...
29
X.
78 79 80
...
29
...
...
35 35
...
...
...
non-pervading...
...
...
...
...
35 35
81
active
35
82
multi-form
83
dependent
36 36 36 36 36
84
predicative
85
conjunct subordinate
86 87
,.
The contrary nature
...
...
...
...
...
...
KAKIKA
XI.
XI
3T
88
Introduction to Karika
89
Similarities
90
... being indiscriminative ... Objection based on the Bauddha idealism
(i)
91 92 93
94
37
Unmanifested
of the
between the Manifested and the Unmanifested
having the three constituent attributes
(ii)
(iii)
Insentient
(iv)
Productive
...
... ...
... ...
... ...
37 37
38 38
38
95
Similarity with Nature stated ... Dissimilarity of these from Spirit
96
Objection based on similarity of the Spirit with the Manifested
...
...
..,
...
38 38 39
KARIKA XH. 97 98
Introduction to the consideration of the Attributes
99
100
Character of the Attributes as love, aversion and stupefaction The functions of the Attributes
101
The methctf
39 40
Construction of the Karika
of operation of the attributes
...
40
40 42
Vlll
PAGE.
KARIKA
XIII.
102
Introduction to Karika XIII
103
104
Properties of Goodness Necessity of the properties of
105
Necessity of the properties of
106
Objection based on the impossibility of the co-operation of Attri butes of contradictory properties ... Necessity of postulating the three Attributes
107
"
"
"
"
Foulness
Darkness
"
...
...
42 42 43 43
"
43
44
KARIKA XIV. 108
Question of the Indiscreetness and other properties of the Attri butes
109
Proof of the existence of such properties Question of the Existence of Nature
110
...
45 45
...
46
KARIKA XV. 112
Why not accept the atomic theory Proofs of Nature s Existence (1)
113
(2)
114
Objection
,111
union of cause and
Separation and final re
48
effect
due to Energy ... These two reasons might rest with Buddhi. Eeply
Because Evolution :
47
...
1
initial
49
is
:
from Finiteness Because of homogenity
50
(3)
115
(4)
50
KARIKA XVI. 116
117 118
Operation through the Attributes By a blending of the Attributes Objection
:
How
diverse effects
?
119
,..
Keply
...
51
XVII.
Introduction to the Proofs of Spirit s Existence Because all composite objects are for other
Proofs (1)
123
f
s
...
purpose.
:
124
A different interpretation
125
(4)
126
127 128
Question of the number of the Spirit raised (1) From allotment of brith, death and the organs (2) Since Activity is not Simultaneous
129
(3)
52 52 63
54
(2)
55 55
of proof (3)
Because of the tendency of writers and sages towards Beatitude
KARIKA
51
produce ...
...
Objection and reply Because there must be supervision (3) Because there must be one to feel
121
122
51
...
can an attribute of uniform nature
KARIKA 120
...
55
XVIII.
Because the modifications of the Attributes are differert
56 57 57 ...
58
IX PAGE*
KARIKA XIX. 130
68
introduction to the consideration of Spirit s Properties in the Karika this
58
"
131
Explanation of the force of
132 133
... Necessity of so many Properties Absence of the attributes leads to Emancipation
134
Neutrality
"
58 59 59
KARIKA XX. 135
Objection
136
The
and Activity always coexistent by the objection must be a mistake
59
Intelligence
feeling referred to
...
60
KARIRA XXI. what
the need of union
137
Objection
138
Force of the Genetive in
139
The need of union explained The creation of Buddhi &c.,
140
is
"
Pradhanasya
Explained
61 61
KARIKA
XXII.
141
The Process
142
Process of the production of the Elements
of Creation.
61
...
KARIKA
Introduction to the "definition of Buddhi
144
Definition of
146 147 148
Buddhi explained Properties of Buddhi Virtue &c Four kinds of Dispassion Eight kinds of Power Reverse of the above qualities
62
XXIII.
143
145
60 60
?
"
62 ...
...
63 63
63 64 64
KARIKA XXIV. 149
Definition of Self-consciousness
65
150
Direct effects of Self -consciousness
65
KARIKA XXV. IB f Production of Senses 152
Objection
:
65
Purposelessness of Passions
;
and Reply thereto
...
66
KARIKA XXVI. 153
Sense defined
B
66
PAOE,
KARIKA XXVH. 154
Double nature of mind
155
Mind
156 157 158
Objection Why make mind a sense? and Reply thereto Whence the multifarious effects from Egoism ? ., Destiny also a modification of the Attributes
159
Functions of the ten sense
160
Reflection
defined
...
...
.,
*
...
:
67 67 68
...
68 68
KAEIKA XXVHI. 69
organs
KARIKA XXIX. of
Self-consciousness
Manas,
Ahankara and
of
Determination of Buddhi
common
161
The
162 163
Function of the organs (2) Gradual
164
With regard
five vital Airs
70 70
to all
KARIKA XXX. (1)
71
Instantaneous
71
objects function of the internal or gans independent of the external ones to
visible
71
KARIKA XXXI. 165 166 167
Objection
No
:
Functions permanent or otherwise
71
?
72
collision of the functions of the organs...
Objection motives
:
1
How
can insentient organs comprehend each others 72
Reply thereto
KARIKA XXXII, 73
169
Division of the organs introduced The thirteen organs and their functions
170
Objects of these functions
73
171 172
Sub-divisions of the organs introduced The three external organs
168
73
KARIKA XXXIII. c
..,.,,.,
74
...
74
173
The ten external organs
174
External organs operating at the present time, and the at all Times
175
Time not a
176
Objects of external organs introduced Specific and gross objects of the functions of intellectual organs
74 internal
<
74
75
distinct principle
KARIKA XXXIV. 177 178
explained do. Do.
75 75
organs of action
<
75
XI PAGK.
KARIKA XXXV. 179 ,The importance of the internal organs
76
KARIKA XXXVI. 180 181
Predominance of Buddhi The external organs as affections
77 77
of Attributes
KARIKA XXXVII. 182 183
Further grounds for the Superiority of Buddhi Objection: absence of Mukti Reply thereto
78
78,79
KARIKA XXXVIII.
186
The Subtile character of the Tanmatras The gross Elements produced out of the Tanmatras These are Specific because soothing terrific and deluding
187
Three sorts of Specific Objects
188
Subtile bodies are permanent
184 185
79
.
79 ...
79
KARIKA XXIX. 80 ...
80
...
KARIKA XL. 189
190
Astral body unconfined and permanent Two bodies unnecessary, and reply How does the Astral Body migrate ? Reply
191
Objection Question
192
Astral
:
at each Pralaya
194 195
82
XLI.
Existence of the Astral Body proved
KARIKA
83
XLII.
Reason and manner of the migration of the Astral Body Power of the Astral Body due to Nature
KARIKA
82
82
:
Body Dissolving
KARIKA 193
81 ...
...
84 84
XLIII.
Incidental and Essential Dispositions 11V*- Flesh, blood &c., related to the gross body
196
85
85
KARIKA XLIV. %
,
198
9
199
Consequences of the various means introduced Virtue leads to higher planes and vice, to lower
85
200
From
86
the reverse, the reverse
the threefold bondage
85
Xll
PAGE.
K A RIKA XLV 202
Absorption into Prakriti from Dispassion Transmigration from Passionate attachment
203
Non-impediment from Power
201
"87
...
...
...
87 87
KARIKA XL VI. 204 205
Error, Disability, Contentment Fifty Sub-divisions of
206
The Fifty forms
207
The Sub-divisions
208
Eight forms of Ignorance Eight forms of Egoism Ten forms of Attachment
and Perfection
88 88
KARIKA LXVH. of Error
89
KARIKA
209
210
of Error
XLVIII.
&c introduced
...
89 89
90 90
212
Eighteen forms of Jealously Eighteen forms of Abhinivesa
90
213
The
91
214
The twenty-eight forms
211
total
90
coming to sixty-two
KARIKA XLIX. 215
of Disability Eleven forms of disability, those of the sense organs
216
The seventeen forms
of disability of
KARIKA
91 91
Buddhi
91
L.
217 218
Nine forms of Contentment Four forms of internal Contentment
219 220
(l)Ambha
92
(2)Salila
92
221 222 223
(3)Ogha... (4) Vrishti
93
Five forms of external Contentment
93
224
(1)
225 226 227
(2)
228
(3)
(4) (5)
92 92
...
.
93
f
93
Para ...
Supara Parapara
...
...
,94 94
94 &*
Anuttamambha Uttamambha
KARIKA
LI.
Forms of Power introduced 230 The eight forms of Power
94
231
95
229
(l)Tara
Study...
95
Xlll
PAGE. 252 233 234
235 236 237 238
Word
(2) Sntara
(3) Taratara "(4)
Ramyaka
95
95
Reasoning Acquisition of Friends
KARIKA 239
95
...
Sadamudita Purity The three consequent on the suppression of three kinds of pain The first five forms otherwise explained Error &c. are hooks to the Powers (5)
95
96 96 96
LII.
97
240
Necessity of the Linga (InteHectual creation) Proofs of the above
97
241
Objection of reciprocality let aside
98
KARIKA 242
243
244 245
LIII.
Forms of the intellectual creation introduced The eight Divine sorts Five of the Lower Animals Mankind single
KARIKA
98 98
98
98
LIV.
246
Threefoldness of the intellectual creation introduced
99
247
Six Heavenly Regions
99
KARIKA 248
LV.
250
Creation productive of pain ... ... ... Imposition of pleasure and pain on Spirit due to Spirit s non-discrimination Do.
249
KARIKA Maker
251
Question of the
252
Creation due to Nature
253
Creation for another
...
99 100
100
LVI. 100
of the Universe introduced
101
s (Spirit s)
sake
...
101
i
KARIKA 254
incapacity of insentient
255
Objection instance oi the flow of milk
LVII.
Nature of creation
...
...
101
102
.Reply
255# View of a personal God overthrown 256 Freedom of the Sankhya theory from faults
1^2 103
*">
KARIKA 257
"
How for
Spirit s purpose
"2
258
Whence
103
Explained
KARIKA <{
LVIII.
LIX.
the cessation of the operations of Nature
"?
Explained.
103
XIV PAGE.
KARIKA LX. 259
"
Nature acts for no
KARIKA 260
No reappearance
of
.,.
compensation"...
rr)4
...
LXI.
Nature with regard to an emancipated Spirit
KARIKA
104
LXII. e
261
Objection: emancipation and bondage
262
Reply:
not possible to unmodi-
fying Spirit "No
...
Spirit
is
bound, nor migrates
KARIKA 263
"
&c."
105 105
...
LXIII.
Nature binds herself by seven forms
106
&c."
KARIKA LXIV. 264 265 266 267 268
"Truth"
explained
The purity
,.
wisdom explained Objection based on the eternal tendency The form of discriminative knowledge
...
107 107
...
107
of
"Completion
"of
to false
knowledge
107
the knowledge
108
KARIKA LXV. 269
Cause of the cessation of Nature
s
108
operation
KARIKA LXVI. though one set of objects has been enjoyed, others remain to be enjoyed" ...
270
Objection
271
Reply: "The Spirit having attained to wisdom, there to further action
"
is
"
KARIKA
110
LXVII.
272
Objection: The body dissolving on the attainment of wisdom, could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature ?
273
Body continues in obedience ous
to the
109
no motive
momentum imparted by
how 110 "
previ-
Karma
Ill
KARIKA LXVIH. 274
Final release of the Spirit
112
KARIKA LXIX. 275
The precedence
of Kapila
...
112
XV PAGE.
KARIKA LXX. 276
Importance of the Sankhya
113
doctrine
KARIKA LXXI. 277
"Arya"
113
explained
KARIKA LXXII. 278
The Treatise
is
a whole, not a part
...
113
ERRATA.
P. 26 J5
P.
Line
55
56 to the
3 for 1
"
unction
!J
left of line
"
(in rhetoric)
>J
IS
>J
read
"
(126),"
read W
"taste"
>J
INTRODUCTION. THE lucid writing of Vachaspati Misra does not stand in need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the cardinal doctrines of the
Sankhya Philosophy,
the hope
in
that a reading of this resume would prepare the mind of the student for the of the abstruse truths, in which the reception Tattvakaumudi abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for
most gratefully
alteration &c., will be
received.
To begin with, the Sankhya lays down a fourfold division of categories based on their respective causal and productive This division is into (I) Productive (2) Produc efficiency. tive
nor
and
Produced
(3)
Produced
(4)
Neither Productive
Produced. This classification includes
all the twenty-five
Prakriti or Nature
Tattwas, being the the Sclnkhyas allow of no other purely productive agency. The Productive and Produced are the other Principles Buddhi &c. These partake of the nature Principles
called
productive,
since
of both evolves
thus Buddhi Ahankara and
is
productive in as
it is
in as
much as much as
out of it
it
itself
produced The purely non-productive Princi sense-organs and the five elements.
evolves out of Prakriti. ples
are the
eleven
These are purely non-productive because none of these can give birth to a substance essentially different from them.
The Purusjha fact
it is
lu (Spirit) is neither productive nor produced. All accessories are the effects of
without attributes.
the three Gunas, and the Spirit isby its very nature free from these ^ind as such without any accessories.
Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn to tile consideration of the various principles separately. First of all then
we must examine the nature of
the all
-powerful creative agent of the Sankhyas or, more properly, the creative force of the Universe. Then first of all how is this force constituted?
a
It
is
naturally
made up of
the
three
XV111
Sattwa, Rajas, and Tamas and when the Pradh&na is natural state, lying dormant, these three attributes are
Gnnas in its
in
;
an equilibrium.
When occasion
presents jtself
i. e.
when the
Adrishta of the soul acts upon the Pradhana, the equilibrium is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the
The diversity of created objects thus rendered quite explicable. As already mentioned, all accessories are due to the predominance of one or other
various kinds of creations. is
of the three
Gnnas
the predominance of Sattwa giving rise in which that attribute predominates,
to the kind of creation
Without proceeding any further, we must stop to consider the nature and properties and the Modus operandi of these Gunas.
and
so forth.
The three
attributes
Sattwa, Rajas and
Tamas have
re
spectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delu sion; and have their operations characterised respectively by en
lightenment, activity and restraint and are so constituted that the one always operates in suppression of the other, and at the ;
same time depending upon this latter. To explain this con The universe would be in an unceasing trariety of properties round of
activity,
if
the only operating force were the Rajas
;
in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a restraining agency in the shape of the Tamoguna which by its
nature
is
dull
and passive.
The natures of the
different
objects of the universe are thus ascertained in accordance with the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if
there were no
enlightening agency in the shape of Sattwa, Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind force acting in a haphazard manner. Thus we have established the necessity of the three Attributes.
Here an objector comes forward and says How can the endowed as they are with mutually counteracting properties, cooperate and bring about such a grand and stupen dous structure as our Universe ? The reply is that it is a very common fact that two or more substances though mutually con attributes,
tradictory, do cooperate towards a single end
e.
g. the
wick
XIX oil both taken separately are as ranch against the action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together
and the
In the same manner, help to brighten the fire. though the Gauas are mutually counteractive, yet when com they
act
bined, they
towards a single end, supplying each other
s
deficiencies.
The necessity of postulating three supported by another reason.
We
different forces is further
see that in nature there are
three distinct properties All of pleasure, pain and dulness. other properties are reducible to these three heads. Again we find that these are properties so much opposed to one another that all could never be the effect of a single agency. Thus then
we must postulate three different forces or constituent elements of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three distinct properties. To these three constituents of Nature we
We
find in the Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas. give the names universe the above three properties, and as all the properties of the effect must be a direct resultant of a like property in its
cause, so
the
we
at once arrive at the conclusion that the cause of
Universe
the Pradhana
must be endowed with the
three Attributes.
So much
for the action of the
We
Gunas.
must now turn
our attention towards the all-important Prakriti stone of the
the
Key
Sankhya Philosophy.
What, then, is this Prakriti ? Does it stand for the Theistjc Or for the Bauddha Sensations ? Or does it corres to theVedantic "Maya" ? To all this we reply It is pond all these, and It is neither of these. It resembles the Vedantic in as asmuch it is the root one of the Universe, which is Maya asserted of Maya also though, as of an illussory world. But
God ?
"
"
the fact of
its being the root of the Universe is akin to that of the Sankhya-Prakriti. It is not the God. Since it is said to be without intelligence, a mere dead Matter equipped
with certain
potentialities
due to the Gunas.
In short,
the one rootless Root of the Universe (objective as well as subjective) endowed with the three Guiias and evolvPrakriti
is
XX ing through these, every kind of existence
Pnrusha
save of course, the
Spirit.
The next point that we have to consider is How do the Sankhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternality of this Prakrit!
? Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless root itself nnmanifested and yet manifesting all objective and subjective existence ? Proofs of this are given at length in
works on the Sankhya Philosophy, and it will not fee al But together out of place here to briefly sum them up. before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Sankhya doctrine of causality, the point on which rests the whole fabric all
then is the cause and how is it related to Cause is defined as a substance in which the effect subsists in a latent form. Thus then the effect must be said to be eternally existent primarily in a latent con
What
of Prakriti.
the effect
?
the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then commonly recognized as the effect. How to prove that the effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been
dition, in
newly produced by the cause
What
Firstly.
That
is
nonentity can never be made an entity which has never existed can never be
to say that into existence. brought is
?
What
remains to be done by the
operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect that is to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular cause.
And
this
from the
kind of manifestation we find in the production of oil different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto
lying latent. r
We
Secondly. always find that the effect is always in one or the other related to the cause. way Now, this relation
would not be possible
if the effect were a nonentity ; for a certainly nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of the effect with the cause were not necessary then every
effect
would be possible from every cause. Since in that would be no restrictive qualification which would
case there confine
the
effects.
Thus then
operation this
of particular
would lead
to
causes to particular
an absurdity.
XXI
we cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what .Thirdly. does this efficiency consist in ? It cannot be anything other than the existence in the cause of the
For the difference of
condition.
sand, lies merely in the fact that
not in the sand, that the
a latent
from only in the seeds and
seeds, it is
effect in
as cause of
oil,
oil subsists.
Fourthly. the effect is non-different from the cause ; and the latter being a entity, the latter must be so also. To
take an example, the cloth composing it. Because it
is
is
non-different from
neither
the threads
heavier than the latter,
is any other relation than that of inherence possible between the two and it is only between two different things
nor
;
that any other relation as that of conjunction &c., is possible. Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The difference of properties and actions cannot establish any
For though a single thread cannot do the action of cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection of threads and we see that what a single man cannot do, difference.
;
can be done very well by a number of them together e. g. a work can be which man cannot a single carry palanquin, ;
very well performed by a number of men together. Thus then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed cause and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect. ;
This identity of cause and effect
is declared by Sir William Hamilton also, who says when we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence, But what does constrained* to believe that it has a cause. the expression, that it has a cause, signify ? If we analyse "
our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we eannot^conceive any new existence to commence, therefore, all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance had
We
are utterly previously an existence under a prior form. unable to realise in thought the possibility of the complemeut of existence either increased or diminished. are unable
We
on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something or on the other something becoming nothing
XXH There effect is
is
and
thns conceived an absolute tautology between the its causes. We think the causes to contain all that
contained in the effect
was not contained
in the
;
the effect to contain nothing ^ which
causes."
XXXIX.
Lectures on Metaphysics
Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the the Sankhyas employ the fact in proving the existence of their Pradhana. The effect being only a develop cause,
ed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all existence its unmanifested condition in its cause. That
must have is
to
Self-Consciousness, which lies
say, the elements lie in
Now
we go on increasing the series we would be landed in a regressus ad infinitum. In order to avoid this we must postulate the existence of a principle which must be uncaused and which must be the final substrate of in Buddhi.
if
the undeveloped state of all other substances. Thus then we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature unmanifested, the final cause of all; and to this the Sankhyas give the names
"
Pradhana,"
"Prakrit!"
or
"
Avyakta."
Secondly we find that all the substances from Buddhi down limited and are the wards are development of some and this is Pradhana. further ultimate Principle
Pradhana we must and properties as well as those of its Effects
Having thus proved the Existence define its
of
;
see wherein lies the difference.
In order to do this we must of
the
Manifested
Principles
first
the
consider the properties Pradhana. effects of
These are caused and as a necessary consequence of this transitory, limited, mobile, many, dependent (on the activity of the Pradhana), made up of parts-, these are the characteris tics where the Pradhana differs from the Manifested Principles,
Buddhi and the rest. Pradhana is the uncaused must be eternal. And as
For,
as
already
explained, the and as such,
root of the Universe, all
Universe
is
the result of Its
XXlll
must be all-pervading as a necessary conse of this it is immoveable i. e. Cannot move, in the sense quence of goirfg from one place to another. And further, since it is, evolution, It
;
It is independent all-pervading it must be one. only on the activity of its own constituent Gunas.
depending
These are the points difference. Those of agreement are, that the Pradhana as well as the manifested principles are the resultants of the various actions of the three Gnnas.
Second
ly, since without intelligence, both must be without discrimi nation, since discrimination is the result of intelligence.
Thirdly both these present objects for the enjoyment of the Fourthly since they are without intelligence, they can Spirit.
never be the observers, they must always remain the observed, This is technical and requires some as such common.
and
explanation. Every object that is observed is so, not differently by different individuals, but are common objects of observa tion for all, and are common in that sense. Fifthly they are
the only Principle endowed with in without intelligence the Spirit. Sixthly they are prolific i. e. telligence being The Spirits are without this. endowed with evolving energy.
These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference be tween the Pradhana on one hand and its effects on the other.
Now we must consider the nature of the Spirits and see what the Sankhyas have to say as to their existence, number and But before we proceed with this, we must first properties. see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that
presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any princi For certainly Intelli ple that will supply the intelligence. cannot to the Buddhi for it is material, being gence belong
which is essentially non-intelligent, and what is absent in the cause cannot manifest itself in the effect. So we must have a distinct Principle of Intelligence.
the effect of Prakriti
*
Secondly.
we
see in our every day life that all that is the use of another, as a bed, a chair &A And before that all the principles from Prakriti
is for
corporeal we have seen
.
XXIV downwards are
bodied.
Though
this sounds a little absurd as
regards Prakriti, Buddhi and Ahanakra, yet we must not forget that the body of the apparently immaterial principles is
made up
of the three Gunas-which are as material as
any
such being the case, we must postulate the thing. existence of an unbodied or incorporeal principle. And this is Purusha, the Spirit, and as we have not yet had an Intelligent
And
principle,
And
we
attribute intelligence to this incorporeal
the Spirit
must be unbodied because
three Attributes, for whatever found to be bodied.
is
affected
it is
Spirit.
devoid of the
by the Gunas
is
We
have come across in daily life with the general proposition that whatever is naturally connected with Thirdly.
is supervised over by some and that all the principles from the we have also seen thing, Prakriti downwards are made up of the three Gunas, and as such necessarily, affected by pleasure, pain or delusion and so these must have a supervisor. And in order to escape a regressus ad infinitum this supervisor must be himself un touched by pleasure &c.; and as such must be something over and above Prakriti. And this is Purusha, the Spirit.
either pleasure, pain or delusion,
;
Prakriti and the rest are objects of enjoyment Fourthly. and as such they necessitate the existence of an enjoyer, who again must not be an object himself. And the enjoyer must be the intelligent principle. For a non-intelligent
;
principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the enjoyer. And this again must be something not made up of pleasure &c.
Which can never be the case with Buddhi and the rest. These made up as they are of pleasure, pain and delu
latter being
for that will involve sion, cannot be the enjoyer of these the absurdity of self-contradictory actions one made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be only pleased or pained ; ;
for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase of the constitution of Buddhi. And so we must have an
enjoyer over and above Prakriti and the rest. Spirit.
And
this is
XXV Fifthly
men
great
Now
and
lastly.
All systems of philosophy,
and
all
the
we find striving after final Release. of Prakriti or Buddhi. For these
of the past
this is not possible
latter ar e constituency made up of pain and as such can never be released from this. So the object of final Release must be
one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its con stituent element; and such a principle is the Spirit alone.
We
"have
thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct shape of Purusha, over and above the Prakriti.
principle in the
The next thing, we have to consider is What is this Purnsha ? How is it constituted ? What are its properties ? ^ What its aim ? arid finally, how and when does it attain final Release ? We must take each of these questions one by one.
What is Purusha
(1)
?
It
is
not the thinking principle, since Nor is it the determining
thinking belongs to the mind. that
principle since
of the Spirit still
it
the
The character
alloted to Buddhi.
none of these, It then is of these. It
is
necessary factor in all agent of all functions, mental
the
is
is
a very unique one.
is
principal
as
well as
organic. It is the agent who feels, thinks and wills. Without no functions would be possible, specially consciousness.
it
In short Spirit
is
the source of intelligence, and as such, the every function of the mind feeling,
necessary factor in intellecting
Ho^v
(2)
and is
willing.
this Spirit constituted ?
As a matter of
fact the
of intelligence pure and simple, and Spirit is free from every other qualification and encumbrance. is
What
are its properties ? These are thus enunciated : free from the three attributes, possessed of discriminative
(3) it is
constituted
faculties, non-objective, singular, intelligent and non-produc If the Spirit were not naturally free from the action of tive.
the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis would be Since pain constitutes the very nature of the Attri possible. butes and as
D
such can not possibly be separated from
it.
XXVI
And
thus no liberation being possible, there would be mo necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of
And again philosophy are devoted. equipped with discriminative faculties,
the Spirit were not could never attain to
if
it
the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical systems, which would thus become useless.
Next
as to the aims of the
It has
Spirit,
been laid down
Spirit mistakes the fluctuations of the Attributes and thus comes to be constituting Nature, to be His own
that
the
;
by pleasure, pain &c., which in reality do not affect him, under the influence of the different kinds of delusions the modifications of Buddhi. Now the one all-absorbing aim of every Spirit is the attainment of wisdom that would help affected
him
to
discriminate
between Himself and the fluctuations of
the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure and pain caused by these in their true light and be no longer affected by them.
The next question that presents itself to us is how does Pur usha attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipation? This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sankhya philosophy, when the Attribute of Goodness is paramount in one s constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist. The Purnsha then sees Nature and its constituents in their true light and finds out His mistake, and so shakes off all mistaken preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self, imposed bonds of Bnddhi, and finally retries from metempsycosis and attains final Beatitude.
Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakriti and Purusha, we must look a little into the details of the process of creation.
We the
have already said that Prakriti is the rootless Root of Universe. From this Prakriti emanates Buddhi, to
which the technical name of Mahat or the Great Principle is given. From this Buddhi proceeds Akankara or the princi From this again emanate the eleven senses ple of egoism. and the five subtle elements of sound, smell, taste, colour
XXVll
and touch. elements
And from these latter five, proceed the five gross Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Akasa.
Let us now examine the nature of these principles. First comes Buddhi. This is defined as the principle
in the scale
This term literally means ascertainment and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the determination that this is to be done by me." It would thus of adhyavasdya.
"
"
"
appear that the functions of this principle are the same as
But by Western psychologists to will. is not mere will. It is Will and In tellect combined. For in the opinion of the majority of Western psychologists specially of those belonging to the Intellect contemplates the circumstances Kantian School and provides the rule of conduct Will action for calling those attributed
the Sankhya Baddhi
"
:
controls the disposition harmony with the dictator of in The Sankhyas attribute both these functions to telligence." That Buddhi resembles will, is further their Buddhi. in
made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Saukhyas. These properties are Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. As we have said already will decides the course of action and such the virtuousness
as
belong to this principle
or
otherwise
alone.
Again we
of
must wisdom is
actions
find that
described as both restrictive and directive and so to attribute
the property of wisdom to Buddhi is to give it the dual character of Intellect and Will. Dispassion and Power again
must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course of action an$ in this too we find Buddhi cognate with In tellect and Will combined. The It
is
principle that we have to consider next is that of Egoism I are due. It principle to which all notions of the
th
"
"
corresponds with Kant s "apperception" and Hamilton s "selfthat is to say the notion of self in every form consciousness of consciousness: The idea that "/have the consciousness," "
;
As immediate effects of this principle of the eleven sense-organs and the five we have Egoism, "/
feel
subtle
&c."
elements.
The eleven
sense- organs
consist
of the
XXV111 the
intellectual (subjective) senses
five
the ear, the
eyes,
nose, the tongue, the skin, and the five of action (objective) the hands, the feet, speech, the yjZt excretory organ The eleventh sense is Manas, and that of generation. .
(mind). The five subtle taste, colour and sound.
elements are those of smell, touch From these latter again proceed the
gross elements Earth, Air, Water, Fire and Akasa and Before these have the subtle elements for their properties. five
;
proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the eleventh sense-organ, the mind or the reflective principle. Here first of all we must consider why we should call mind
a
sense
at
The
all ?
answer is not far to seek. The immediate effect of the princi
define sense as the
Sankhyay Egoism under the influence of the attribute of Goodness and this differentia we find in Manas as well as in the ten organs generally accepted as senses. Next let us consider
ple of
what
;
functions
the
are
of this
eleventh
sense
?
Manas
the only faculty that partakes of the nature of both kinds of senses the objective and the subjective. If it were not so, none of the senses would act, for it is only when
then
these
is
influenced
are
by
the
mind that
operation of the
towards their various objects. It would not be Act they quite accurate to say that the senses do not act. do, but these operations are not taken cognizance of by they act
the agent, and as such having
may
for all intents
they out action. called in
The function of
Sankkya
further explained first
and without
when we
first
principle
or
to be
is
with
technically This is
"thinking."
look upon an object the
connection therewith are all indefinite
qualifications
is
this
"reflection"
impressions in
actions purposeless,
their
and purposes, be said
(Rff^FT). This indefinite and vague and this definiteness
very soon rendered definite
impression and the different qualifications are* imparted to it by the This process follows so reflection (or thinking) of the Mind. that one can instantaneously scarcely mark the process ard thinks that the finite, just
first
;
impression he has had was
as he latterly comes to perceive
it.
-
all
along de
XXIX It need not be repeated that the mnltifariousness of creations is
due to the diverse actions of the Attributes.
The next question that is started is whence proceeds the action of the senses ? If their action were eternal then the creation would never cease.
If not eternal,
what
is
it
that
causes the operations to begin? The reply given is that all these organs have a certain sort of anxiety for the fulfilment of each
and this anxiety leads to the action of each is no external impetus save that of the pur discriminative wisdom and hence emancipation of the pose Purusha. If there were no action of the different emanations from Prakriti, the Spirit would be at a loss to discriminate between itself and the inanimate Prakriti. So we see that the only impetus from without is supplied to the senses by the purpose of the Spirit, and thenceforward they are led on in other
s
actions
of them.
;
There
their active path
by their own anxiety.
Altogether then
we
see that there
are
thirteen
organs
three internal, Buddhi, Ahankara and Manas, and the ten external the ten sense-organs. Of these the latter operate
only in the present time, whereas the former act with regard to the past, present and future. Of the external organs, the five subjective senses operate towards subtle as well as gross substances, whereas the objective ones only towards gross ones.
Of
the thirteen organs, the
palm of supremacy
is
given
to the internal ones, since these are applicable to all kinds of
substances
;
and another cause of supremacy we have already
viZn the one with regard to time. Of these internal organs again, the Buddhi is supreme, since the principles of
noted
Reflection operate towards their objects and then present these experiences to the Buddhi, which finally presents them with its own additions and alterations to the discriminat
Egoism and
Thus we find that Buddhi is the chief and brings about all his worldly enjoyment, finally leading to His discrimination of self from tbe emana tions of Prakriti, and thence to final liberation. Thus of all the is organs, Buddhi supreme.
ing eye of the Spirit.
agent of the Spirit ^
XXX Having thus described the organs, we turn onr attention towards the gross substances. These are of three kinds Of these the Subtle, Parent-born and the Great Elements. first is eternal, and the second and third and transient. fading This
of the Sankhyas resembles to a great the "Astral Body of Theosophical litera extent, believe, It is born before the visible body and lasts till the ture. Pralaya and till then it presents the astral body of the "subtle
body"
"
I
;
in all its reincarnations
Ego
were not
during that Kalpa.
If this
the actions of one incarnation could not act upon the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by so,
For the actions were done by the body and the organs of the former incarna tion and these dying with the Body, wherein would the the actions of one incarnation in another.
;
traces of the former actions be left
?
So we must postulate
the existence of a substrate in the form of the
"Linga-Sarira,"
equipped with subtile counterparts of all the sensory and motor organs. And thus then we shall have the Linga-Sarira imprinted with all the effects of the actions of one birth. And
body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent in it is but natural that the fruits of past actions should affect the Spirit though the Spirit cannot be affected, since
this
carnations,
;
he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he thinks all the affections of Buddhi to be his own. The LingaSa^rira thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so r
}
et so long as
as to bring out their
effects
in a future
This
incarnation.
the
substrate of the different organs Linga-Sarira again which are subtile in their nature, and as such could not subsist is
without a substratum. c
Let us now see how the Sankhyas treat of the idea of means and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit ascends to higher regions. By higher regions here is of course meant a more highly spiritual life. Vice leads the other way. Emancipation results from discriminative "
"
wisdom.
This wisdom
consists
of deep
insight
into
the
*
XXXI character of the Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent from which perception of the difference between the two results the Spirit s perception of
His own true nature, which
is
above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thral dom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and be
comes state,
and thereby attains to His proper one of pure uninterupted and unmixed intelli mere dispassion is gained a state of absorption into
free of the Attributes,
which
is
gence. By the subtler elements of Nature.
A
Spirit thus transformed
a time a state of unintelligent rest, and is bora enjoys the same restrictions and with the same bondage under again for
as before the absorption. If on the other hand, the Spirit is under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attri it is that it falls into the stingy darkness of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine are all labouring under this category. ray of wisdom.
bute of Passion, then
We
The Sankhyas have further entered into a very elaborate enunciation of the various manifestations of Buddhi dividing
them
into no less
than
fifty
forms.
These
are
made up of
kinds of obstruction, twenty-eight of incapacity ( result from the disability of the organs), nine of contentment and ing of Of these, again there are 62 forms of eight perfection. five
obstruction alone.
So
muc]?L
for
intellectual
creation.
The elemental
or
material creation comprises the eight kinds of divine celestial beings, the five of the lower animals, and one, the human kind. ^
The various grades of creation are attributed to the Thus the attribute
excess or otherwise of one of the attributes.
of Goodness predominates among the gods, that of Passion among men, and that of Darkness in all lower creation.
All this elaborate process of creation is began by Nature solely for the sake of the Spirit s emancipation from the miseries of metempsychosis miseries inevitable to Him when born in a ^
XXX11
human
Nature is described as a great benefactress, not of services from the Spirit, and working return any His emancipation ont of her own sweet will, till He body.
caring for for
her true character when She retries an actress who has played her part, and never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the Spirit to be His own. By His very nature He is free from all conies
to perceive
from the scene
;
like
much
internal fluctuations, in as
whose
as
He
effect these fluctuations are.
is
above the Attributes,
After the attainment of
discriminative wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition.
But the body continues previously imparted to
for a time on account of the it.
And
the attainment of
having put a stop to the operation virtue &c.
rebirth
the operation of which
the body
character,
and
falls,
attains
is
impulse
wisdom
of all such agents as a necessary cause of
and the Spirit regains His true absolute and eternal beatitude,
to
never to return to the cycles of metempsychosis.
THE TATTWA-KAUMUDI. [SANKHYA].
AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION*
Bed, White and and to the Unborn also Black, producing many children; and renounce Her on having to Ones Who have recourse Her, enjoyed the pleasures afforded by Her. (1).
KEVERENCE
to the
One Unborn,
To the Great Rishi Kapila, and his disciple Asuri, as also and Iswara-Kriskna, to these we bow in
to Panchasikha reverence.
(2).
In this world, that expounder audience,
K JnSL
UCti0n
t0
who
offers
listened to by the expositions of facts
is
whose knowledge is desired by them. Those, on the other hand, who expound undesired
doctrines, are given up by them, as mad men, or as men unacquainted with science and custom. And that science is
desirable which being known, leads to the attainment of the final end af man. Consequently, as the science to be (here after) explained supplies the
means
to the final goal, therefore,
the author introduces the desirability of the subject-matter
KARIK! There being
I.
world) an impediment caused by of pain, (there arises) a desire for
(in this
the three kinds ->
:
enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if (it be urged that) the enquiry is superfluous on account
2
[34]
[KARIKA
i.]
of (the existence of) obvious means, (we reply that because these (latter) are neither absolute it is) not so :
nor
final.
(3).
The subject-matter of science would not be enquired into (1) if there existed no pain in this world or ( 2 ) if tnon g h extant its removal were not desired or (3) even if desired, its 5
>
;
removal were impossible, such impossibility arising either from the eternal character of the pain, or from ignorance of the means of alleviating it or (4) notwithstanding the pos sibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of science did not ;
afford the adequate means ; or (5) lastly, if there and easier means elsewhere available.
(4).
were other
is no pain and that its removal is not universally desired, are opposed to facts.
Now, that there
With
kinds of pain."
this view {i is declared "There an caused the three impediment being by The three kinds of pain constitute (what is :
>
triad of pain." ordinarily called) the The nature-intrinsic (Adhyatmika), (2) "
And The
these are:
(1)
naturo-extrinsic
Of (Adhibhautika), and (3) The super-natural (Adhidaivika). these the naturo-intrinsic is two-fold, bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of the various humours, wind, and phlegm
and mental pain
due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-preception of particular objects. All these are called intrinsic on ac bile,
;
is
count of their admitting of internal remedies.
Pains submit
extrinsic, and super ting to external remedies are two-fold human. The extrinsic are caused by men, beasts, birds rep tiles and inanimate things and the superhuman ones owe their :
,
;
existence to the evil class of elementals.
influence
Thus the
of planets and the various fact that pain, a specific
modification of the attribute of Foulness (Rajas)
enced
is
experi
by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. "Impediment" (Abhighata) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the
3
[5]
[K. i.]
consciousness of disagreeableness caused by the three kinds of Thus then this idea pain residing in the internal organs. of disagreeableness constitutes the cause of the desire for the alleviation of pain. Though pain cannot be absolutely
prevented, yet
it is
as will be explained it concluded that (enquirey is going
possible to alleviate
Thus
it is
subsequently. into the to be made) "
"
(the three alleviating it refers to tat the particle Tadapaghatake
means of
"
kinds of pain). In the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordi nate factor in the preceding compound, yet it is mentally the more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to to the other and primary factor of the it in "
preference
compound). The means of alleviation, and none other, derivable from science, "
Objection:
(5).
On
of obvious remedies, suck That is to say : superfluous"
is
we grant the existence of the triad of pain, and also the desirability of its
e flU
of
are only those
account
enquiry Objection: inquiry
senc i
too,
^bvFS
means.
removal, as also the possibility thereof; we go farther, and grant that the means
Sastras are adequate to the removal. however, the present enquiry becomes super because we have easier obvious means for the removal
derivable from the
With fluous
all this, ;
of pain, and farther because of the difficult character of the means prescribed in the Sdstra a full knowledge of abstruse philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Says a popular
maxim
:
When
a
man
can find honey in the house, wherefore
should he go to the mountains ? So, when the object of desire has been attained, which wise man will make any further * Hundreds of easy remedies for bodily pain are attempts ?
down by eminent physicians for the mental pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the laid
;
such as women, desirable food and drink, objects of enjoyment dress and the like. Similarly of the extrinsic pains we have such as acquaintance with moral and political ep.sy remedies * Vide the
Nydya-latiM, in
loco.
4
[6-8]
[K. i.]
In the same manner, of superhuman troubles we have remedies in the shape of gems and charms, &c.
science, residence in safe places, &c.
Reply : Not
(6).
so
nor
Obvious Reply means are not abso-
"
:
Because
these
are
neither
absolute
Absoluteness (of the
final"
means)
;
:
.
consists in the certainty oi its eiiect
;
and
its
the finality consists in the non-recurrence r of
pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is de The universal noted by the expression "Ekdntatyantobhdvah. The upshot of the whole affix tasi has a genitive force here. "
is this
:
On
account of not observing the unfailing cure of the on the employment in the pre
different kinds of pain, even
manner of medicines, &c., mentioned before,- we predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby and similarly from the recurrence of the pain once cured, we infer scribed
;
non-permanence of the cure. Thus, though easily available, the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal Consequently, the present enquiry
of pain.
not super
is
fluous.
(7).
Though the mention of the word pain beginning
f ^rpatory
worS!
is
priate at the
(8).
auspicious
;
commencement of a
Objection
We
:
in the very
inauspicious, yet that of the means as leading to its removal
is
and
as such quite
appro
treatise.
grant the
inadequacy of obvious
means but we have others prescribed in the Yedas such as Jyotishtoma, &c. which ;
Vedic Objection nieans adequate to :
removal of pain.
Vedas.
And
these
,
l as ^
,
for a
,
,
thousand years
.
.,
a whole host of
these forming the Ritualistic portion of the means verily will remove the triad of pain
absolutely and finally. Declares the
S ruti
:
"Desiring
Heaven
one must perform sacrifices and Heaven is thus describedan the Bhattavartika "Pleasure, unmixed and nninterspersfed with pain, and attainable by pure longing for it, is what ^is :"
:
5
19] expressed by the word
[K. ii.]
Heaven thus
Heaven"
consists
in
pleasure, diametrically opposed to pain, which by its very existence extirpates all kinds of pain ; nor is this pleasure drank the Soma for, declares the Sfruti short-lived, "
:
We
[Atkarvasiras III]. And if the celestial were short-lived, how could there be immortality ? pleasure Hence the Vedic means for the removal of pain, which can be
and became
immortal"
4
gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a are easier than discriminative knowledge, which can year, be attained only by a long course of traditional study extend many lives. Thus then the proposed enquiry again
ing over
becomes superfluous,
Reply
;
KARIKA
The revealed
is like
II.
the obvious
;
since
it is
connect
ed with impurity, decay and excess. A method con consisting in descriminatrary to both is preferable, tive
knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested,
and the Knowing "
(9).
Anusrava
(Spirit).* "
is
that which
is
heard during
tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher, is
ifklihe
the
and
not done ( wr itten). Anusravika = relating to Anusrava or Veda, that which is known The list of religious rites laid down in the Vedas
obvtaf
therefrom.
both being equal to the obvious (means, mentioned before) inefficient the in and absolute removal of the final equally
is
;
triad of pain.
Anusravika
text uses the generic term Vedic" to be as taken ought implying only
Though the it
"
yet the ritualistic portion of it because descriminative knowledge also forms part of the Veda (which of course is not what the
("
"J,
;
author means). This
Says the
S ruti
"
:
The
Spirit
ought to be
embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle philosophy, according to which final emancipation is attainable not by religious rites, but by descriminative knowledge as explained by Kapila.
L*Kapila f
Rui-ika"
s
6
[1011]
[K.
known and descriminated from Primordial
Matter"
ii.]
(Brikadd-
ranyaka 2-4-5); (by so doing) "the agent does not return, yfca does not return (into this world)" (Chhdndogaya 8-15).
he
,
(10).
Eeason
above assertion is given; "since it is connected with impurity, decay and excess" The impurity lies in the fact of the Soma-
for the
im ure Because decaying and exces-
sacrifice, &c.,
being accompanied by animal-
slanghter, and the like. Says the revered Panchasikhacharya: It (the sin attendant upon slaughter) is slightly mixed, The slight mixture is that of destructible and bearable." "
the principal effect (Apurva, i.e. merit) of the Jyotisktoma, with the minor apurva, the cause of evil, due to (ftf., 7
animal-slaughter. The epithet destructible implies that the sin is removeable by certain expiatory rites ; but if some how, these are neglected, then at the time of the fructifica tion of the principal
Karma
(merit), the evil
element (demerit,
caused by the slaughter) also bears its fruits and as long as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with patience hence the epithet bearable. Experts (in rituals) ;
;
dangling in the nectar- tanks of Heaven attained to by a host of virtuous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of pain brought about by the element of evil (in the rituals). (11).
It cannot be
urged that the generic law "Kill not an ^ anim is set aside by the specific one, Kill the animal for the Aqnishtorfia,
The impurity
al,"
of animal-slaughter in
a sacrifice.established.
other
;
and
it
"
"
j i because they do not contradict each only when two laws are mutually con ,
is
,
,,
.
i
,
In the pre tradictory, that the stronger sets aside the weaker. sent instance, however, there is no contradiction, the two laws treating of two entirely different subjects. For the negative law "Kill not, &c.," only declares the capability of the slaugh
produce evil, and hence pain but it does not do away with the fact of its being necessary for the completion of th^ sacrifice and in the same manner, the following injunction Kill the animal, &c.," declares the necessity of animal-
ter to
;
;
"
7
[1214]
[K. ii.]
slaughter in the sacrifice, but does not negative the fact of its being productive of sin. Nor is there any contradiction between
the productivity of sin and the capability of helping the comple tion of a sacrifice. Animal-slaughter can produce sin in the
man, and at the same time, quite consistently help a
The
(12).
Non-permanexcess to apply to
shown
SUltS
belong really to the effect is
permanence
Heaven
of
whereas the
only,
lead to the attainment of the
one
s
and
)
but are
This Non-
constitutes the
magnificence
is
fact
01
Further, to the
entity.
are the
&c.,
Jyotishtoma,
what
;
from the
inferred
Heaven bein g a caused
action
attainment
non-permanence
.
Vedi
f
(
here attributed to the means.
and
ence
decay
properties excess
sacrifice.
means
&c.,
Vdjapeya,
kingdom of Heaven. This is spoken of. The greatness of
"excess"
a source of pain to another of lesser
magnificence.
In the passage
(13).
Drinking Soma, we became im
"
mortal"
a of Vedic
as^rTsutt action
is
only long-
immortality implies long-durabideclared elswhere: "Immortality
lii
^
is
durability
as
is
elemental
S rutii
till
(or
the final dissolution of all existence."
finite)
Hence
Neither by deeds, nor by children, nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone they got immortality" [Makd-
the
"
and again Swarga shines in a at a distance, which the ascetics alone
narayana Upanishad X. secluded valley enter.
ascetics with children, desiring Therefore those other learned Bishis, who
wealth, get death.
were above
all action,
With y
deJcr
i
;
actions did the
By
(14:).
"
5]
all this
m nTtTve i
wisdom. {
removing pain.
got
immortality."
in view,
it is
declared:
"
A
method
contrary to both is preferable consisting in descriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the
Unmanifested,
Tasmdt
A
refers
method,
to
and
the
Knowing"
the Vedic means
contrary to
the impure
of
Soma-
8
[1516] sacrifice, &c.,
[K. ii.J
bringing about excessive and short-lived results,
unmixed with evils due to animal-slaughter, pure, and leads to results non-excessive and everlasting as is clear from the S ruti precluding all return to metempychoThe sis for people possessing clescriminative knowledge. cannot on caused based the said a result being entity argument is
i. e.,
f
be urged as a ground for its non-permanence because this holds ;
only in the case of the effect being an entity in the present the removal of pain is a case, however, the consequence And such negation putting an end to negation, a non-entity. ;
causal efficiency, there can be no further effect, in the shape
of more pain. For it is a fact admitted on all hands that the causal activity lasts only till the attainment of deseriminative knowledge. This will be explained later on. (Kari-
ka LXVI.) The
(15).
meaning of the Karikd, however, is this: The means of removing pain, consisting in
literal
eaninS of
the descriminative knowledge of the Spirit,
ttwrari
as apart
from Matter,
is
different
from the
and hence is preferable. The Scriptural as it is authorised by the Veda and as such inasmuch good of capable removing pain to a certain extent. The descri minative knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is scriptural means,
is
also good. (16).
mintive
Of
these two, the latter
Question
^-
ledge.
:
"Whence
lede
is
superior,
does such descriminative
arise"?
Answer:
"From
knowledge of the Manifested, fested,
and
tJie
Knowing"
know
descriminative ike UnmaniKnowledge of
the Manifested precedes that of its cause, and from the fact of both of these (Mani fested and Unmanifested) being for another s purpose, we infer
the Unmanifested
;
the existence of the
Spirit.
Thus then we
find
that these
three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the ledge thereof. The upshot of the whole then is this of the
of Spirit
distinction knowledge from descriminative knowledge
from Matter
consisting in
know :
The ari
.e
meditation
[17
9
19J
[K.
m.]
and contemplation uninterruptedly and patiently practised for a long time, of the Manifested, &c., previously heard of in the S ruti and Purdnas, and then established by scientific
This will be explained in detail in Karika
reasoning.
Having thus decided Philosophy
(17).
Fourfold division of categories.
LXIV.
to be needful for
the enquirer, the author, with a view to commence the work, sets down, in brief, the
import of the system, in order to concentrate the attention of the enquirer.
KAHIKA
III.
Nature or Primordial Matter, the root of all, is not produced; the Great Principle ( Mahat, i. e., Buddhi) and the rest are seven, being both producer and pro "
and the sixteen are the produced neither the producer nor the produced." duced
;
;
Briefly, the objects treated of in the
Some
of
system are four-fold.
some merely products, and and others, neither tlie products, productive
them
others both
Spirit is
are merely productive,,
one nor the other. (18).
It being asked is
-What
is
the productive?
The answer
Nature or Primordial Matter
is
the root
of the Universe, an aggregate of effects of there is no root, or else we would be landed in ;
Matter
itself
an unwarranted regressus ad (19).
How many
infinitum.
are the objects that are
and products, and which ""
answer
is
both productive
these ? The The Great Principle and the
are
rest are both. As the Great Principle the cause of Self-consciousness (Ahankara) ^JBuddhi) being rs the effect of Nature ( Prakriti ), so is Self-consciousness
10
[2022]
[K. Hi.]
the cause of the five subtle Primary Elements (Tanmatras) together with the eleven sense-organs, and at the same time, the effect of the Great Principle; and so are the five- subtle
Primary Elements the cause of the grosser elements, Vril* (Akasa) and the rest, and at the same time, the effect of Selfconsciousness.
How many
(20).
are the productions, pure
what are they ?
The Products.
said
It is
ctions are sixteen
1
i.
and simple, and The produ "
the
e. t
five
gross
elements (earth, &c.) and the eleven sense-organs, these are mere products or modifications not productive. Though cow,
and so are curd and and seed respectively, yet these facts do not touch our position since trees, &c., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term Prakrit? stands and further, cows, trees, &c., do not differ from each other in their pot,
trees, &c., are modifications of earth,
sprout, of milk
;
;
essence, since they have, in
and
common, the
properties, grossness
perceptibility.
The form of that which
(21).
duct,^ now
is
neither productive nor pro The spirit is neither "
stated.
a product nor productive. be explained later on.
9
All this will
In order to prove the above statements, the different kinds of proof ought to be noticed. Nor s can there be a specific definition without a
(22).
*
general one.
*
Though
ears, as
I
Hence the
definition of
this translation of the
borrowed from a work on
have put
it in,
word Akasa
since I could not find
"
"
is
is
(Lytton
"
."
sure to
jar upon European The Coming Kace"), yet any other word in the English language connoted by the Sanskrit word Ak^,a.
fiction
expressive enough to denote all that Astral Light," Inane," Ether,"
proof in general -follows.
Space,"
the active character of the Sanskrit Akdsa..
&c.,
s
"
do not sufficiently represent
11
[2325]
[K. iv.]
KARIK! IV.
i
o
"
Perception,
Inference,
and Valid Testimony are
admitted to be the three kinds of proof necessary ; because they include all kinds of proof. It is by proof that a fact
(23)
.
is ascertained."
Here, first of all, we have to explain the word Pramdna,
which explanation would form Proof defined.
Proof, then,
is
its definition.
defined as that by which determined it thus becomes
right notion is the cause or means of all correct
;
This definitecognition. a mental condition free from the contact of all
right notion is that is either doubtful,
self-contradictory or unknown ; this to the human agent, and the result too belongs comprehension thereof is right notion; and that which leads to such right
notion
is
Proof.
all that leads to
memory, and the (24).
Thus the term Proof is differentiated from wrong notion, viz., doubt, misconception, like.
The author now to the
T of
rejects the different views with regard
number
~that
e three f0ldneSS ro of "
neither
is
of proofs
"
:
Of three
"
kinds,
of P roof there are three
more nor
less.
This
we
kinds >
shall
explain in detail after the specific definitions of the particular kinds of proofs. (25).
Now,
asked, which are the three kinds of proof ? The answer is Perception, Inference, and The above is an ex Valid Testimony. is what -of popularly known as position
it is
"
proof; and a philosophical system is expounded for the The cognitions people, since thereto is its province confined. of the great sages, though realities, do not, in any way, help t of the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of jiose 1/ere.
12
.[2629] (26). The all
We grant
Objection.
inclusion of other proofs in the
n0 ^ it
that the
^ian
^ ess
[K. Y,]
three
5
number of
proofs
is
but wherefore should
not be more than three?
The
different
schools do lay down others, as Analogy Since these three include all kinds Reply "
(Upamana), &c. This will be further explained of proof "
Now
(27).
an altogether
en e quiry into the differ)f
proot
different question is raised Why should the philosophic system enquire into the nature and kinds of proof, when it is
launched forth with the express purpose
of explaining the Prameya, (. is
.,
later on.
correct cognition)
ascertained only by
?
i. e.,
To
the
this it
subject-matter of proof Since a fact replied "
is
proofs"
[Siddhi= determination or ascertainment.] The order
of
Ex-
planation.
(29).
Now
,
The
The explanation of the Karika (28). follows the sense, not the order of the words.
on the occasion of the definition of the special kinds of proofs, the author of the Karika, de*
finitions
specific of,,
the
first
of
all,
defines
Perception,
since
it
all other Proofs,
Inference, &c., precedes which, therefore, are dependent upon it and further since there are no two opinions with regard to it. ;
V. is definite sense -cognition (/. #., cogni of particular objects through the senses) ; Infer ence is declared to be three-fold, and it is preceded "
Perception
tion
by (based upon) the knowledge
of the major premiss [asserting the invariable concomitance of the Linga (the Hetu, i. e., the characteristic mark, the middle
term,) with the Lingi (the Vyapaka or the Sadhya, i. e , the major term, in which the characteristic inheres] ani l r
13
[30-31]
[K. v.]
of the premiss [asserting the existence characteristic in the Paksha, or the minor term] ; and
the minor
Valid.
true revelation (S
is
Testimony
ruti)."
"
The mention of Perception is only the statement of the the remainder being the definition, by term to be defined which word is meant the differentiation (of the term defined) from things of the same class or species, as well as from "
:
those of other classes.
The
meaning (of the
cognition of particuiar objects obtain-
definition of Perception) be thus broken may up objects (Vishaya) are those that bind or connect the subject -^ (Visfiayi) with their own forms, ^. ., they
ed through thesenses.
mark
(30).
literal
:
dethe definite
"Perception"
fined as
,-,
out tne
belonging to us. are no objects (of sense) to us,
pleasure, &c.,
and the Gods. different objects,
The
su bj e ct subtle
;
such are earth,
Primary Elements
though they are so to Yogisis that which is Prativishaya applied to
i. e.,
the organs of sense.
Application here
is
close proximity, or direct communication, Prativishaya, thus meaning, the sense-organ applied to, or in communication
with, the object (perceived)
on
;
and the
definite cognition
based
"
is
This Prativishayadhyavasdyah" which is the result of an exercise of the or knowledge, cognition Intellectual Faculty (Buddhi), is defined as consisting in the this
(proximity)
preponderance therein, of the attribute of Goodness following on the subjugation of that of Darkness resulting from the proximity of the sense-organs to the objects of perception. This proximate existence (Vritti) is also called cognition. This is a Proof and right notion results from the apprehen sions of the sentient faculty by means thereof. ;
(31).
t
Intellect
JiSctfand
the re flection of the Spirit therein.
T
(
f the Intellect
(Buddhi), being a modification of, oremanation from, Nature (Prakriti, Primordial Matter),
is
insentient
;
and
so,
therefore,
And similarly cognitions, jar, &c. _ IMS * i the different modifications or productions are insentient. The Spirit pleasures, &c., are
its
.
,
14
[32-33] however,
(Parusha),
having no
[K. v.]
real
relation
with
these
This Spirit, being reflected the Intellect, appears to be actually affected by the cognitions and pleasures, &c., really belonging to the Intellect which pleasures, &c.,
is
sentient.
latter, therefore, are said
this
Through
Spirit.
in>
favour an intelligent entity, the intelligence of the
to
reflection in the
the non-intelligent Buddhi and its cognitions appear endued with intelligence. This will be further explained in Spirit,
Karika
XX.
(32).
In the definition, the mention of
definite cognition! a ^ doubtful knowledge, because the latter* is not definitely comprehended sets as
The above
tion
definidifferentiates
Perception from all other forms of cog-
^e
,
.
or well-defined,
and hence
"
saying
objects,"
is
uncertain.
their contraries, all
By non
prati* and thereby implying proximity of the sense-organs to the objects are excluded Inference," and Trustworthy Assertion." Thus * is a complete the definite cognition of particular objects entities,
are
excluded; as by saying "
"
definition of Perception, since it serves to distinguish of the same, as well as of different
all other things
The
u
it
from
classes
"
given by other philosophical Perception nor are neither defended, for fear of being systems impugned definition of
too prolix. (33). Inference
How is
can one, denying Inference as a proof,
esta-
Wished as a distinct
Materialist
be
viz.,
the
certain of the
ignorance, doubt or erroneousness of another man ? Since, these
ceptible to
our mortal eyes
;
are not per ignorance, &c. nor can any other method of
proof be applied to this case, since no other (than Perception) accepted as such (by the Materialist). And not knowing
is
the ignorance, &c., of others, and thus going about addressing people at random, one would be despised by the enquirers as a mad man. Consequently, (we assert) that the ignorance, &c., of others are inferred
as difference of
meaning
from such marks or
or speech, &c.
characteristic^,
Thus, however unwilfj-
15
[3435]
[K. v.]
ing, the Materialist is constrained to accept Inference as distinct method of proof.
And
(34).
finition
a
Inference following directly from Perception, its definition must follow close upon that of f
jJm, Jf
Perce P tion
;
tnere a g ain
general one, the author gives the latter
on account of the
being based on the
definition
particular
>
first
"
It is
preceded
the middle by (a notion of) the middle* and major terms; term being the Vyapya or pervaded, and the major term, the "
or pervader. the pervaded ( Vyapya) is that which to its natural own sphere, after the removal of all brought
Vyapaka is
and
dubious
Vyapya
mention of be
and that by which the The ( Vyapaka ). mark and the marked," both of which must
assumed
conditions
thus brought
is
"the
objects,
indicates
;
the pervader
in, is
objective or
substantive cognition.
Inference proceeds from the knowledge of smoke as the per vaded (the mark) and the fire as the pervader (the marked).
Lingi (the marked) must be twice construed in the definition, in order to imply the minor premiss [in which is stated the
minor term (the PakshcC), with the middle term Thus the general definition of Inference comes to -Inference is (a method of cognition) preceded by
relation of the (Hetti)~\.
be thus:
-
based on) the knowledge of the relations of the major minor (Paksha) and the middle (Hetu) terms with one another." [That is to say, Inference is the know (i. e.,
(Sdcl/iya), the
ledge derived from the major and the minor premises], (35).
^he author now sketches the
The three kinds of (i) The
Inference
The ! posteriori (Seshavat), and (3) The inference from the perception of spe(2)
divisions which have been laid down by other systems also "
is of three kinds" i. 0., the spedivisions of Inference are three-fold
Inference
c
^
The a r (A priori L[Purvavat the inference v ,, ~. c e of the eflect trom the cause, as or ram from .
-
..
the gathering of the clouds], (ii) The a the inference of the posteriori [Seshavat ause, from the effect, as of rain from rise in the river], and
f
"
Literally
the
mark and the
marked."
[36
16
38]
[K. V.]
Inference from the perception of species or class [Inference based on relations other than the causal, as of substantiality (iii)
from earthiness]. First of
(36).
dil
fi
Inference
of two kinds
The (1) and the Affirmative (Vita) (2) Negative (Avita)* That which is based on| affirma tive concomitance, is Vita and that based
all,
of ^nference.
is
:
;
on negative concomitance, the Avita.
Of these, Avita
(37).
The The a
is
Seska
Negative-
is
Inferential
posteriori In-
mainder
As
"
is
Seshavat (a posteriori or analytic). thafc which remains; and the
declaredf:
havino-
knowledge
for its object
The cause
is
called
this
re
Seshavat.
in question being excluded,
and
(the qualification) not found elsewhere, the idea of the remain
Examples of this Avita
Sutras.] tion,
is Parisesha."
[Vatsayana Bhashya on the Nyaya Inference, founded on nega will be given later on Karika IX].
ing (object)
(38).
The Vita
The AffirmativeThe a priori and that from the
two-fold (1) Purvavat (a priori or syntheand ( 2 ) rom the perception of species. Of these Purva is that whose obiect is J is
f
tic
per-
~u ji such as has the characteristics of i
ception of the
1
its
spe-
known; and the Inferential knowledge as from the exis of which this forms the object i^ Purvavat
6pecies -
cies
;
tence of smoke
inferred the existance of an individual fire in
is
the characteristics of the species
the mountain,
fire
hav
ing been previously perceived in the culinary hearth. The second kind of Vita the Inference based on the perception of the species
is
that
which has
its
object,
such as has c
*
The Vita has an
A
proposition for
its
major premiss
;
and the Avita, an
A
proposition, converted, per accidens.
sound has earth for f As for instance, in a proposed inference of the formthe possibility of sound being in earth being substrate, since it is a quality excluded on the ground of its never being concomitant with smell, the quality its
specific of earth
elsewhere,
;
and there being no
we have
asPariscsha,
possibility perceived, of sound residing the notion of sound, being a quality specific of Vril (AkAsd)
<
17
[30]
the characteristics of of this
kind are
all
[K. v.]
it3 species (previously) inferences with regard to
unknown the
;
sense-
organs^; because in all inferences of this kind, the existence of the cause of the perception of colour (i. e* vision) is inferred
being an effect (and as such neces Though the characteristics of instrumental
from the fact of sarily caused).
its
cause in general have been perceived in objects like axes, &c., yet those of the species of the particular kind of such causes the sense-organs which are inferred to exist as
causing the perception of colour, &c. are nowhere perceived. Nor are the individuals the particular sense-organs form 4
ing the class Sense, perceptible to our mortal eyes as are In this lies the difference between those of the class Fire. ;
the Purvavat (a priori) Inference and the Sdmdnyatodriskta, though they (Inference based on the perception of the species) ;
resemble each other, inasmuch as both are Vita (affirmative).
,
Here (in Sdmdnyatodriskta) driskta = darsd?ia, i. e., perception ; and Sdmdnyatak^ofSamanjs^ i. e., species or class; to Sdmanya is added the universal affix Tasi.* Thus then the term The Inference, consisting in the comprehension by means the individual of a species whose general characteristics are All this has been fully explained by us in the not known. and is not repeated here for Nydyavartika-tdtparyatika "
;"
fear of being too prolix.
(39).
Since the comprehension of the connection of words (in a sentence) is preceded by a process of inference with regard to the cause of action of the experienced youth directed, on hear
ing the words of the experienced director, and further, since the comprehension of the meaning of a word is due to the
knowledge of
therefore Valid Testimony, is denotation, preceded by, and based upon, Inference. Hence, after having defined Inference, the author next defines Valid Testimony.
*
its
Here, of course, having the force of the Genitive.
18
[4043]
[K. v.]
Valid Testimony is true revelation." Here the mention of Valid Testimony is merely a statement The definition of n n the rest terming 01 the term to be defined Trustworthy Asserin the turn, given the definition. True means proper explained. hence true revelation means proper "
V
/,
.
,
,
n
,
,
,
/,
;
;
,
Karika",
S rut?
revelation.
is
.
,
the comprehension of the meaning of a
sentence by means of the sentence.
(40).
This
is
self-evident.
It is true
;
since
all
apparent
discrepancies and doubts with regard
human.
are set
to
aside b ^ the fact of
its proceeding from the Veda, which is super Thus also the knowledge obtained from Smritis, ifc
Puranas, &c., which are founded on the Veda, becomes true.
To the primeval Kapila, Kalpa, we may
Smritis and Puranas included in *
Anta-Vachana
occurrences
in
the beginning of the
attribute the
of the S ruti studied in his
reminiscence
previous birth,
" <
previous day. And so did the revered conversation with Avatta, speak of his
of the
Jaigishavya, in
his
reminiscence of his births extending over such a long time as ten Mahakalpas By me, evolving through ten Mahakal"
:
pas,
&c."
(42).
true revelation, all pretended revelations such as those of Sakya, Bhikshu, c., have been set aside. The invalidity of
By saying
these systems is due to their making un reasonable assertions, to want of sufficient basis, to their mak ing statements contradictory to proofs, and lastly to their
being accepted only by Mlechchhas or other (43).
V distinguishes
Differentiation
Valid
of
Testimony
from Inference.
mean
people.
Valid Testimony from Inference. Tll Caning of a sentence is the Prameya sentence or (the fact to be proved): word is not its property and as such cou -,
"
"
,
,
,
;
not
be
its
mark
or predicate.
Nor does a
sentence, e
10
[4445]
[K. v.]
pressing a meaning, stand in need of the comprehension of the connection of the mark and the marked which are the neces
sary conditions of Inference
;
since the sentence of a
previously unknown, expresses the
meaning
new
poet,
sentences
of
touching unknown regions.*
poIuLedX
ht
systems shown to bo included in the three already defined.
thus defined proofs, as well as specifically, the other
Having
(44). P
generally
kinds of proofs, Analogy and the rest, , T T postulated by others, can be shown to be ,
,
-,
,
,
-
i
included in the above.
(45).
is exemplified as The gavaya, of ruminants analogous to the (a species
Analogy (Upamdnd)
&^
)
led e
is
like
tlie
P roclllced ty
Cow
tllis
-
But
kllOW-
tlie
statement
is
nothing
more than that produced by our "Valid The knowledge that the term gavaya
Testimony."
denotes some object resembling the cow, is also nothing more than Inference. The object with reference to which
experienced persons use a particular term, comes to be denoted by that term, in the absence of any other object (that could be so denoted), e.g., TJT^ (the class In the same manner experienced TJT.
ed by
asserted that
sembles the
"the
cow,"
cow
) is
denot
people having
object denoted by the term, gavaya re the term gavaya comes, to denote some
and this knowledge is purely In thing resembling the cow ferential, .The cognition of similarity of the perceived gavaya with the cow is the result of mere Perception; hence, ;
the cow being recalled to memory, the cognition of the gavaytfs* similarity thereto becomes perception, pure and simple. And it cannot be further urged that the similitudef *
Whereas Inference can belong only
to objects previously
known.
f This is levelled against the assertion of Mandana Misra in his Mimansa* mtkramani, that the object of analogy is not either the gavaya or the cow, Irjit the similarity of the one in the other, which cannot be said to be ameM:
tale
to perception.
/
20
[46] existing in the
cow
is
different
[K. v.]
from that in the gavaya
since
the similarity of one species with another consists in both of them having a common mode of the conjunction of their
common method of conjunction can be one only and this being perceived in the gavay must be the same in the cow also. Thus (we find) that nothing is left to be proved where Analogy could be applied to advantage. Hence Analogy is not a distinct Proof. various parts; and this ;
,
Similarly Apparent Inconsistency (Arthapatti) is not a distinct Proof. For the case of the
(46).
assumptiou of the living Chaitra being outside, when he is not found at home, is
JSSwrtfiSv to be included
shown
cited as
tency.
To
us,
A particular
Sankhyas,
an instance of Apparent Inconsis nothing more than Inference.
this is
non-pervading or finite, when not found in one place, must be in another. The major premiss in the form, that a finite object being in one place cannot be object being
is easily got at, with reference to our own bodies. Similarly the cognition of the external existence of an existing" object, is inferred, from the mark of its not being in the house ;
in another
and this process is purely Inferential. Chaitra s existence somewhere else cannot set aside the fact of his non-existence in the house and as such, non-existence in the house could, very ;
reasonably, be urged as a reason for his being outside. Nor does the fact of his non-existence in the house cutoff his exist
ence altogether
;
and consequently his entity could be said to For Chaitra s non-existence in the house
retain itself outside.
contradicts either his existence in toto, or merely his existence in the house. The former alternative cannot stand, the subjects
of the two propositions being different.* If you say that by the general assertion "he must be somewhere" (without any definite place *
It
same
is
only
being mentioned), any particular place
when two statements
subject, that they
present instance.
are
contradict each
even
dthe made, with regard to one and which is not the case in
other
;
tfi<
21
[47]
the house
may
be implied
;
[K. v.]
and as such the non-existence in
becomes uncertain; and thus there being co-objectivity between the two propositions noticed above, they would con we reply No: because the non-existence tradict each other, of Percep in the house having been ascertained by evidence cannot be set aside, on the ground tion in the present instance the house
:
of uncertainty, by the doubtful fact of his existence therein. It is not .proper to assert that his proved non-existence in the house, while overthrowing his uncertain existence therein, would set aside his existence in toto and set aside all doubt
Because Chaitra s existence in the (of his existence in space). house, being contradictory to his proved non-existence therein, is overthrown by this latter ; not so his existence in toto ; since this latter fact is altogether ence in the house. Thus it
disconnected with the non-exist
very proper to say that the
is
external existence of an entity of internal non-existence.
is
inferred from its characteristic
Hence the
assertion
that the
subject of Arthdpatti is the removal of contradiction after due consideration of the strength of two contradicting proofs is 1
between the parti ; for there is no real contradiction cular (the proof of non-existence in the house) and the general (that of mere existence). The other examples of Arthdpatti set aside
Hence similarly be shown to be included in Inference. established that Apparent Inconsistency (Arthapatti) is not a proof distinct from (Disjunctive) Inference.
may it is
Negation (AbMva) again is nothing more than mere Perception. The Negation of a jar Negation (Abhdva) js nothing more than a particular modificashownt^be includf tion oi the Earth characterised by ed in Perception. (its) absence. Since all existences, with the (47).
single exception of Consciousness or Intelligence {Chit Sakti)^ are momentarily undergoing modifications, all of which are
perceptible to the senses <
;
therefore there
is
no ground
left
un-
overed by Perception for which we should postulate a distinct Iroof in the shape of Negation (Abhdva).
22
[4850] \
(48).
bhl^lown included
(Sambham)-e.
"Probability"
of
in
to*
[K. vi.]
the
existence
of
g.,ihz knowledge
weights in
lesser
S reater ones is also an instance of InferThe heavier weight is known as not ence.
be"
Infer-
capable of existing without the lesser ones;
and
this fact leads to the belief in the existence
of the latter
in the former.
(49).
That
is
Rumour (Aitihya) discarded, as affording doubtful
testi-
by the Sankhyas whose lirst speaker is unknown, and j^ ^ is handed down by mere tradition3 e. g., a Yaksha resides in the Vata tree.
called
"Rumour"
(Aitihya),
?
This Rumour is not a proof since it is doubtful owing to the fact of the first speaker being unknown. "Valid Testimony," however, is that of which the speaker Thus the three-foldness of proofs is known to be veracious. ;
is
established.
(50). Thus have been defined severally the different kinds of proof, with a view to demonstrate the existence of the Ma?iiOf these, the fested, the Unmanifested and the Knowing. are perceptible in their true form, And similarly the a priori Inference with regard to the existence of fire in the mountain, could easily be arrived at through the mark of the smoke. Such
Manifested even to the
earth, &c.,
common ploughman.
being the case, a system of philosophy, propounded for the sake of these, loses much of its importance and necessary
Hence what is difficult to be got at (by ordinary should be explained by philosophy. Consequently methods) the cases of application of the different proofs are laid down.
character.
c
KARIKA VI.
Knowledge The j.ne
of app acases 01 application of the differ-
super sensuous objects through Inference the
of
,
7
.
Tj 7
toaris/ita.
ent proofs,
is
obtained 1
Sdmanya-
,. nl hat is not proved by thi
^ T71 -TTTI
W
is
,
proved by revelation.
/-,
23
[5153] (51).
from
[K. vl.] t
The
distinguishes the Samanyatodrishta Inference a priori. Through the Inference there arises knowledge of
particle
Perception
f
and
Samanyatodrishta Pradhdna* (Primordial Matter or Nature), and the Spirit both of which transcend the senses, and this knowledge is of Bucldhi reflected in Consciousness clue to the ^
operation
The above implies the appli Chaitanya (belonging to Spirit). cation of the Seshavat (Negative) Inference also. Inference alone Then, does the Samanyatodrishta ? If so, we shall the senses apply to all objects transcending have to deny the existence of the Great Principle (Mahat), in heaven, in the as also of Heaven, Destiny and the Gods
(52).
<fec.,
case of which the inference does not apply. and as a simple by this By this, "
"
"
Hence
it is
would
suffice to
said
<fr.,"
^
the give the required meaning, *to Seshavat (Negative) Inference.!
-Granted
(53). Objection tion of such objects as
all
must be taken as
this.
referring
But the non-percep-
sky-flowers, &c., leads to their being in the same way we might infer the as non-entities; accepted of Nature, and the rest (which are like skynon-existence flowers not amenable to perception). This being the case, why
* Henceforth Pradhana, Prakrit! or Avyakta be translated as Nature.
will, for the
sake of simplicity,
I difference of opinion among Commentators as to the explanait, Vachaspati Misra, as we Karika, especially the first half of we have a knowledge of supersensuous objects, have scan, explains it as i-ghta Inference. Gaudapada takes it the same way. the
f
There
is
.
tiftn of this
through
Sfaitdnyatodi
But NaruJyana Tirtha explains thus
"In
Siimdmjatali? the
aftix
*tas?
is
substituted for the genitive case-termination. Thus the meaning is that of all we have a knowledge from Per cation. objects amenable to the senses,
(generic) This last
is
the sense accepted by Davies in his
translation.
But the
former interpretation appears to be the more reasonable. Because it cannot be said that Inference does not apply to objects amenable to the senses. Davies, in a foot-note in loco, says that Shm&nyaJ "does not mean, &c." But he loses ;
si/Yht of the
fact
that
cilar kiinl of Inference.
"
Saint ft i/atodrishta
is
the technical
name
of a parti-
24
[54] *
[K. VIL]
have recourse to the various kinds of Inference
for the sake of
these latter?
The reply
is
KARIK! VII. "(Non-perception
from excessive distance,
arises)
extreme proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, absence of mind (inattention), subtlety (or minuteness), intervention (or the existence of some intermediate
predominance (of other intermixture with with other like barrier),
objects),
and from
objects."
(54). The non-perception" of the following Karika is to be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim "
of the
A
"
looking (back) of the
hird soaring
high, though existing, is yet not per ceived on account of extreme remoteness.
Extreme of objects, explained.
lion."*
(off)
must
also be taken
with
proximity (somipya) e. g., the non-per-. ception, through extreme nearness, of the
collyrium (anjana) in the eye. "
"
Destruction of organs"
From
absence
e. g.,
blindness, deafness, &c.
As
a person, under the of influence of (some very strong) desire, &c., does not perceive objects, even in bright daylight, though quite within the , range of his senses. "
From
may may
mind"
Minuteness"
concentrate
&.$ for
our mind
instance,
however,
much we
however attentively we look) we can never perceive atoms, though under our (i.
e.,
very eyes. "From
Intervention"
e.
g.,
one cannot see the
Qneen
behind the walls. * The maxim of the lion s (backward) glance, is generally used to mark the connection of a thing with what precedes and follows." [Vide. Jfyaya-Latika in loco, ]
25
[5556] V From subjugation or
[K.
suppression"
^-e.
cepticjn of the constellations, suppressed
the
g.,
vm.]
non-per-
by the brighter rays
of the sun. >
as one does not preceive intermixture* drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank. (55). The ^ in the Karika has a collective force, implying "From
even those not here mentioned; such as
non-production* of non-perception as one cannot perceive, in the milk, the curd, not yet produced therefrom.
is
also
among
the causes
The upshot of the whole then is, that the non-exist (56). ence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the for there is danger of the not being perceived Thus, for principle being unwarrantably stretched too far. instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, can fact
of
its
;
never be he said to be assured of the non-existence of the inmates, simply on the ground of his not seeing them. The fact is that it is only with reference to objects capable of being perceived on the occasion, that non-perception leads to
the inference of their non-existence, And this capability of teing perceived can never belong to Nature &c., (which are by their nature imperceptible) and as such it is not proper for ;
intelligent
men
to infer their non-existence
merely from their
non-perception or imperceptibility.
Question Which of the above mentioned causes (of nonperception) Applies in the case of Nature, &c. ? The reply is
KiRIKA VIII.
The The
jion- apprehension of this non-appre-
subtlety, since
ii:
effects by
not
4
similar,
its
is
due
to
its
non -existence
;
its
apprehended through These effects are the ^eat
Principle,
oQ
to
is
its effects.
which are
(Nature)
and the
rest
effects
and (some) dissimilar
(some
to Nature.
26
[5759] v
(57).
*>
Why
should
we
vm.]
[K.
not, continues the objector, attribute
the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as of the seventh kind of unction (in rhetoric)?
(
we do
,
The Author
"Not
replies.
due
to its non-existence"
Why ?.
apprehended through its effects" It refers to Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be mentioned later on, in Karika XVII. If we find direct "Because it is
perception inapplicable in the case of objects, whose existence ascertained by means of evidence other than that afforded
is
by perception itself, we at once infer the inapplicability to be due to incapacity* (and not to non-existence of the object
The seventh unction on the other hand, has not
itself). f
its
existence ascertained by any proof, and as such, the incapacity of perception cannot be urged in its case.
(58).
whose
Granted
all this,
infer that of
existence, you
Great Principle, and
"The
but which are the
Nature
the rest are the
?
effects
The reply
from is
effects"
This will be proved later on (Karik& XXII.) Next are mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in form, of these the comprehension of both of which is effects, with Nature to discriminative auxiliary dissimilar to Nature"
knowledge:
"Similar
This division will be further treated of in Karika
and
XXIII
et. seq.
Different views with regard to the
nature of .the (i).
effect.
The Bauddha
view of the effect an being entity arising from non-
From (the existence of) the * ^ /n n\ JT JT interred (that oi) the cause on this there is diversity of opinion. Thus J
(59). a?
*.
enect point
is
:
some philosophers
J
Bauddhas) assert of entity from noft-entity. (the
VedaT?ewof?he
the
whole
Others (the Vedantists) represent the whole-
series
of
effects being a
mere
*
P^^tion
On
the part of perception. is with reference to Nature, the existence of which is proved through its effects the proof being based on the general proposition The effects, Mahat, &c., are perceptible "Every effect must have a cause."
f This statement
these must have a cause, and this cause
ia
Nature.
27
[60] evolution from a sinpie real
The
J
entity.
non-entity
and
arising
JhTsInkhya view of the effect
being
an entity arising from an entity.
(60).
.
single
The impossibility
?S first
of
three
,.,
entity,
vm.]
a mere evolution from a
,
.
,.."
and
not a real entity in itf P nilos P hers ( the Set
Nayayikas) hold the production of noneni from ^^J- The Sankhyas lastly teach that from entity emanates entity.
%
Now, we cannot
of the existence
the
series of effects as
(3).
Nyaya
[K.
establish the existence
of Nature,
in accordance with the first three theories. .
J-he
Universe consists essentially of sound,
&c
which are
"
different
fications of pleasure, pain
and
forms and modi -
and delusion,
as such bears testimony to the charac
ter of Nature, which lies in its being constituted by goodness, Such being the case, if we assert the passion and darkness. from of non-entity (the Bauddha view) [we production entity
would land ourselves in an absurdity] viz., how could the cause, an undefinable (unreal) non-entity, consist of sound, and the rest which are different forms of pleasure, &c.? For, certainly we cannot, hold the identity of entity and non-entity (two opposites). Nor could the doctrine of the emanation of t
entity from entity (the Sankhya view) be upheld in accordance with the theory that the phenomena of sound, &c., are mere
a single entity (the Vedanta view). Nor could attribute we again phenomenality (or changeability) to the single in fact the notion of .such phenomenality (changeevolutions from
;
ableness) with regard to the unphenomenal (unchangeable) would be a mistake. Even in the theory of Kanada and Gautama, who maintain the production of non-entity from entity, $he
according to
existence
of
Nature cannot be proved is not identical with the
;
them, the cause
since, effect,
inasmuch as entity and non-entity are diagonally opposed to each other.* *
According to the Nayayikas the cause
is
an entity, the
effect
a
non
and since an entity and a non-entity cannot be identical, therefore entity th 1 cause and the effect cannot be identical. ;
28
[6163]
[K.IX.]
Hence, in order to establish the existence of Nature., first declares the effect to be an entity, (even prior
(61).
the author
to causal operation).
KARIKA IX.
The
effect is
an entity
(1) because a non-entity can never be brought into existence (2) ? because oi a (determinate) relation of ;
;
The five proof a of the effect being an
.
the cause
(with the
.
effect)
(3)
;
be
cause everything cannot be possible (by any and every means) ; (4) because a competent (cause) can do (only)
and (5) lastly, because competent non- different from the cause.
that for which the effect (62).
is
The
it is
effect is
The Bauddha view
;
an entity
that
is to say, it is
so
even
prior to the operation of the cause. Against this theory, the Nayayikas cannot urge the fault of the absurdity of the production of an
already existing object. Because though.the production of the sprout and the jar is consequent upon the destruction of the seed and the
of clay respectively, yet causal energy can only be attributed to an entity in the shape of the seed, and not to its destruction [a kind of negation, a non-entity]. Further if you assert the production of entity from non-entity,
lump
any time available, would give rise to the (absurd) possibility of any and every effect being produced at any and all times. All this has been explained by us in the
this latter, being at
Nydyavdrtikatatparyatikd. f>
(63).
The
belief in
The Vedfinta view met..
the
existence
of the
phenomenal
world cannot be said to be illusory unless we have some proof invalidating its .
,
existence.* * This is urged against the Veddnta evolution from a single real entity,
theory of the
effect
beingi an
29*
[6465]
[K. ix.] t
Now
(64).
remains the theory of Gautama and Kanada, with reference to which the author asserts f In SU PP rt ?** *$* is
vS^JtowSl* and
ticised;
the
VieW C8ta
"
*>%"
this
assertion,
"
bHsiSr
adduced
"
:
following proofs are Since a non-entity can
the
(1)
brought into existence" If the effect were a non-entity before the operation of the cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody. By even a
never be
If you assert artists blue can never be made yellow. and to be mere entity non-entity properties belonging to the then in that case, the qualified object (the jar) being non jar,
thousand
existent, no property could belong to it; and as nuch the entity the (property) remains in the same condition (L e., cannot be attributed to the jar). Nor can non-entity (as a quality) be
attributed to
nor cognate to too before
it,
For, how can non-entity belong to the jar when it is neither in any way related to it it ? Hence as after the causal operation, so
it.
(as a property)
the effect subsists.
Such being the
case, all that
remains to be done by the
the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing effect [i. #., its emanation from the cause wherein it has been
cause
is-
lying latent] , The manifestation of something existing before hand is a fact quite compatible with experience ; as of the oil from sesamum by pressure, of rice from paddy by thumping,
and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we have no instance of the manifestation of a non-entity for a ;
non-entity
is
(2)
never seen to be either manifested or produced.
For the following reason
also
does
the
effect
Because of a That is to effect." subsists of relation because the the effect holding between say, That is, the cause produces itself and its material cause. and (we all know) that the effect when in relation with it
subsist before the operation of the cause (determinate) relation of the cause with the
"
:
;
no relation with a non-existing effect must be an entity.
effect is
possible
;
hence the
30
[6667]
[K. ix.]
the objector but, continues (66). Granted all this wherefore is the effect not producible by causes unconnected therewith? We reply, that under such circumstances, ;
With
only non-entity would be produced. the author lays down
this reply in
view
:
"
(3)
everything cannot be
Since
-If
possible."
the effect
unconnected with the cause could be produced (by that cause), then every effect would arise from every cause (without restriction), there being no other limitation save that of unconnectedness (which any cause can have with reference to any effect.) But such is not the case. Hence a connected effect
only can be produced by a connected cause, and not an effect as by an unrelated one say the
unconnected
:
no relation of the cause, imbued with entity, with non-entity those holding the production of an un connected effect will land themselves in a regressus ad "
Sankhyas
There
is
;
injinitum"
Objection: Be it so : will always produce
But an
though un which it is related, and this too could be inferred from competency competent the presence of the effect, and as such we sail clear of the (67).
the
entity,
effect
for
;
regressus
Reply is
:
ad
infinitum.
(4)
"Since
competent"
a competent cause does that for which it does this then, asks our author,
Now
Capability or competency belonging to the cause imbued with the causal energy, apply to every effect or only to those to which the cause is competent? If the former/ then the
same confusion tion will arise
arises
how
;
if
the latter,
does
the
then the following ques
energy apply to non-entity ?
On
this point if it be asserted that the (causal) energy itfself is so constituted as to produce only certain effects, not others ;
then we ask
Is this
peculiarly
connected with the particular
constituted
effect or
not
?
energy of yours In the former
no relation being possible with a non-entity, the effect must be an entity in the latter, you have the same endless series of causes and effects. Hence it is reasonably declaredl case,
:
r
31
[6869] that (the effect
is
only* produce an
an entity)
"
because a competent cause can
tohich
effect Jor
[K.IX.]
it is competent"
i
For the following reason too is the effect an (5) ^ Since the effect is connate (non-different) with the
(68). entity
:
cause."
cause
is
and the The effect is not different from the cause an entity then how can the effect, non-different from ;
;
this latter, be a non-entity ?
The
(69).
proofs establishing the non-difference of cause and effect are the following (a) The cloth :
Proofs of the nondifference of cause
(
and
(its
an
.
..,
effect.
not different from the threads
effect) is
v
,
material
.
.,
cause), since
.
it is
a property
in the
[i. e.,
latter characteristically inhering since the cloth inheres in the threads constituting it].
An
object differing in its essence from another, can never inhere in it as the cow in the horse but the cloth is inherent ;
in the threads (b)
Owing
;
;
hence
it is
not different from
differ
not in essence
;
in its essence.
between the cloth
to the causal relation subsisting
and the thread, they
it
because the causal
between objects essentially different between jar and cloth. But between
relation can never subsist
from one another cloth
e.
g.
and threads we do
find the causal
relation
subsisting
;
hence they can never differ from one another, in essence, (c) For the following reason also, there is no difference between cloth and threads because of the absence of junction and non:
contiguity between the two.
We
see junction
taking place
between oHjects differing from one another, as between a pool and a tree ; the same with regard to non-contiguity, as between the Himavan and the Vindhya. In the instance before^is, however, there
and as such, no
reason
is
neither junction nor non-contiguity, (d) For the following
difference in essence,
too, cloth
and thread do not
differ in
essence
:
because
of the non-inclusion (in the particular effect) of any Bother) As a matter of effect different in weight (from the cause). fact,
an object differing in essence from another always has a
weight different from that of the latter
c.
g.
the lowering of
32
[70]
[K. ix.]
the balance caused by two palas*
a single pala. effects of the
But we
find
is
more than that caused by
no such difference
weight of the cloth and those
between ^the
the weight of non-different from of
the threads constituting it. Hence cloth is the threads. These are the proofs afforded by a process of negative inference [Avitdnumdna -see, Kdrika Y] establish
ing the non-difference (of cloth and threads in particular, and of cause and effect in general).
(70). The non-difference being thus established, (it is decided that) the cloth is only a particular development of the threads combining themselves in various ways and that the ;
from each other in essence. No essential difference can be proved on the ground of self-contradictory actions in themselves (i. e., the effects), (difference apprehended
two do not
differ
in) language, or the difference in action (of the cause
of the effect).f
and that Because these differences do not contradict
each other, when we see that they are brought about by the appearance and disappearance of particular conditions as for instance, the limbs of the tortoise disappear on entering its
body and appear again on emerging
from it but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either produced from, or destroyed by, the tortoise. In the same manner, jar, crown, ;
fec., which are only particular developments of clay, gold, &c., on emanating from these latter, are said to be produced and ;
*
A
particular weight.
f Self-contradictory actions in themselves. When the cloth is reduced to threads, we say the cloth is destroyed, and the threads are produced now destruction and production are diagonally opposed and as sdch cannot be predicated of the same thing at one and the same time but we do predicate production of the threads and destruction of the cloth at one and the sam ;
;
;
e
time.
"
So they
differ.
Difference apprehended in language Cloth is made of threads." Difference in action
as
when we
use such sentences as
Thus we see that cloth can cover an object which And .objects differing in their action must differ
certainly the threads cannot. in essence.
These three are the objections brought forward against the theory of the non-difference of cause
and
effect.
separately in the following lines.
Each
of these
is
considered and refuted
.
33
[71-72]
[K.rx.]
on entering them again (i. e., being changed into they .disappear and are said to be destroyed.
Nor again can a non-entity ever be produced destroyed The Bhagavadgita supporting the Bankhya view.
as says
;
clsty, &c.,)
an
or
entity-
Krishna-
the revered
is neither an exists dvaipayana: "There ... ^ ence of non-entity, nor non-existence or .
[Bhagavadgitd II 16]. As the from its own contracting and expand ing limbs, so also are jar, crown, &c., not different from (their material cause), clay, gold, &c. The assertion cloth is in (i. e,, entity"
tortoise is not different
"
made
of) threads," is as consistent trees in this forest."*
as the assertion
"Tilaka
Nor does difference of psopose and action establish (71.) difference in essence since a single substance can have mani fold functions, as the fire alone can burn, digest and give light. ;
Nor
of purpose and action a ground of diiference substances, for we see that this fixity varies in the
is fixity
among
;
substances themselves, bearer, in
taken singly or collectively as a bearers, can carry the palanquin ;
company with other
>
which he can never do when alone*
Similarly, the threads taken singly, yet do cover when
though unable to cover, when conjoined and thus having their existence as cloth manifested (i.
.,
having developed into cloth). Objection
(72).
An
objection,
based on the nature cstation
of the
^{ *
:
Granted
all
this.
But,
is
the
mani
festation or appearance itself an entity or a ., ., ... ,. non-entity, prior to the operation of the .
cause
?
If the latter, then
you admit the
of
If, however, non-entity. production have done with the then hold to former the alternative, you the see do not we for causal agency altogether ; necessity of
As the Tilaka trees, constituting the forest, are nothing besides the and yet we speak of the" Tilaka trees in the forest," so with the assertion with regard to the cloth and threads. *
forest itself;
5
34
[7375]
[K. ix.j
the causal operation when the effect already exists. If you assume the manifestation of the manifestation, you will be
landed on a regressus ad infinitum^ Hence the assertion, that the threads are made to have their existence as cloth is invalid.
manifested,
To
(73).
eP set~ aside^as
tion.
common
cause
;
both
to
if,
we make the following reply. Even on your own theory of the production of nonwhat is this production* ? entity, we ask
all this
An
entity or a non-entity ? If an entity, then have done with the agency of the however, you assert it to be a non-entity, you will
have to postulate the production of that production and so on ad infimtum[a,nd. such being the case, the fault of regressus
ad
infinitum you urged to both of us ;
common it
against us, loses
and consequently
its force,
since
it is
not fair to urge
it is
against one].*
(74). If, in order to avoid the regressus ad injinitum, you declare that the production is nothing more or less than the cloth itself
;
then the notion of cloth would coincide with
that of production and as such, on saying cloth, one should not add is produced (because it would be a useless repetition) ; nor could he say the cloth is destroyed ; because destruction ;
and production (denoted by (75).
Consequently,
production of the
cloth
cloth)
can never coexist.
we have only two must inhere in its mere
alternatives
either
in
its
:
the
material
existence (Sattd). In cause (the threads), or either case, the cloth cannot be produced without the operation of causes. Thus it is proved that the operation of the cause is
necessary for the manifestation of already existing effects. causes do you urge against us the common saying
(If
(produce) the forms of
then we reply that) the causes,
cloth"
because the?e have no relation with the forms of cloth and it is with actions that causes are not actions, only forms ;
are r elated *
;
or
els e
they lose their character.
This point has been discussed by S ankarachaTya, in his Bhfishya on the
Yedanta Sutras, under the aphorism
"
Sivapakshadosh&chcha"
35
[7681] Thus then
(76).
,
it is
[K. x.]
proved that the
effect is
an
entity.
(77)/ Having thus proved the effect to be an entity, a fact favourable to the doctrine of the existence of Nature, the author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the Manifested and the Unmanifested, a right comprehension of which appertains to discriminative knowledge ; and this is
done in order to show the character of Prakriti, whose is to be proved.
existence
X.
The Manifested has
nor pervading
Points of dissimibetween the Manifested and the
,.
larity
"
(78).
AH
is
(i.
:
it
is
neither eternal
(/. e. 9
universal)
;
ii
T
f*
mobile or
*?.,
i
\.
modifiable),
the reverse.
Hetumat
"
to
tions explained.
i. 0.,
what
having cause. is
the
cause of
dealt with later on (Karika
"Not
it is i
multiform, dependent, predicative (or conjunct and subordinate. The Un
the quaiifica-
(79).
/
active
characteristic),
manifested
a cause
Eternal"
i.
e.,
The question as what, will
be
XXII).
destructible, revolving [re
turning to the condition of its material cause*]. "
that is to say, the Manifested Not pervading (80). does not extond over all evolving or developing substances. "
pervaded by the cause but not vice versa, e. g., Consciousness (Buddhi) can never pervade Nature (Prakriti), and as such is non-pervading.
The
effect
"
(81). otc.,
is
Active
* Since
substance,
i. e.,
mobile.
Consciousness (Buddhi), they renounce certain
mobility inasmuch as they have hitherto occupied, and
have
bodies
"
the
occupy
others;
S&nkhyas do not admit of an utter annihilation of a
36
[8286]
as for the mobility of earth, &c.,
[K. x.] it is
too well
known
(82).
<
Since
"Multiform"
different individuals
shape of
need
to
an explanation.
;
Consciousness &c,,
earth, &c.,
too
differ in
are multiform in
the
jars, &c.
On its cause; though the effect is (83). "Dependent" non-different from its cause, yet the assertion of the relation of subserviency is based upon a difference conventionally as we say the Tilakas in the forest." "
accepted
;
"
(84).
Characteristic
Consciousness (Buddhi),
which cannot be
its
own
"
or predicative i. e., of Nature. &c., are characteristics of Nature,
characteristic,
though
it
can be so of
the Spirit (Purusha). "
Bearing in
"
Conjunct
(85).
and
itself the relation of
whole
Conjunction consists in approach preceded
by (i. *?., and connection with such after) non-approach approach of the whole to the part is what is connoted by conjunct as for instance, earth, &c., conjoin among themselves, and so do others. On the other hand, there is no conjunction of Nature (Prakriti) with Consciousness (Buddhi), since the two are connate (and as such there can be no nonparts.
;
"
;"
nor is there reciprocal conjunction among approach); Goodness, Foulness and Darkness, since there is no non-
approach among them [since they
all
conjointly inhere in
Nature], "
Subordinate Consciousness stands in need (86). the aid of Nature in the completion of the production of "
of its
Without this aid, Self-consciousness (Ahankara). being, by itself too weak, it could not be efficient to produce its effect. Similarly do Self-consciousness and the rest stand in effect,
need of similar aids in the production of their several effects. Thus, each and all stand in need of the perfecting hand 61
Hence
the Manifested, though efficient in the of its effects, is yet subordinate, inasmuch as it production stands in need of the aid of the Supreme Nature (the highest
Nature.
in the scale).
37
[8790]
[K. xi.] "
The
of the i. e., Unmanifested is the reverse That is to say the Uumanifested is uncaused, pervading, and inactive (immobile) though to "
(87).
Manifested. eternal,
Prakrit! does belong the action of evolution (or development,)
yet
can have
it
no
mobility
independent
single,
non-predicative, unconjunct, compact up of parts), and non-subservient (supreme).
sufficient),
made
(self-
(i. e.,
not
(88). Having thus explained the dissimilarities of the Manifested and the Unmanifested, the author now mentions the similarities between these, and the dissimilarity of both of these again from the Spirit:
KlRiKA XI.
The Manifested has the The
points
similarity
(Gunas), v
of
three constituent Attributes it is
>
between
i
the Manifested and Unmanifested the and those of dissimilarity of these from the soul
vp
common), non-intelinsentient) and productive. L Ine bpirit is the JNature.
generic
ligent (or c oo also is .
indescrimmatino;, obiectJ (or
.
i
reverse,
and yet also
/
(in
some
.
,
^
respects)
similar. "
Having
(89).
the three
constituent
Attributes"
That
is
to say, the Manifested is possessed of the three attributes of By this assertion are set aside all pleasure, psin and duluess.
.the theories attributing pleasure
and pain
to the Spirit.
*. Nature is not desIride&criminatwe" e., as (90). criminated from itself so too the Great Principle (Mahat or Bnddhi) being connate with Nature, cannot be descriminated "
;
c/rom
it.
tiveness: efficient
Or indescriminativeness may mean merely co-operanothing singly (among the Manifested) can be a cause for its effect it can be so only when in company
with others
;
;
and as such no
taken singly by
itself.
effect is possible
from any cause
38
.[9194] (91).
An
Some
....
Banddhas) assert that it is Idea (Viinana) alone that is denoted by . / the words pleasure, pain and dulnessv; and
(the Vijnana-Vadi
,
objection has-
ed onthe idealism
that there exists nothing besides
that could possess these (pleasures, &c.,) as
In opposition to this view fested The
idealistic objection set aside. "
Common"
persons.
If,
XL]
[K.
js
^
is
it is
down
laid
"
objective"
sav J
ft | s
and above)
Vijnana
its attributes.
that the
= perceptible). (
Mani That
so outside (and as such over N A
Vijnana,
and as such
it
is
perceived (simultaneously) by many however, these were nothing more or less than z.
<?.,
this latter being uncommon belonging to particular individuals), all would be so also elements Manifested for the
Vijnana, then in that case, (or
specifically
the
;
Vijnana of one person can never be perceived by another, owing to the imperceptibility of any intellect other than the s own. On the contrary, in the case of a Manifested substance (such as) the glances of a dancing girl, the attentiveness of many persons to that single object is quite a consistent
agent
which it could not be to mere Idea or Vijnana. fact,
"
(92).
if
Non-intelligent or
we were
to reduce
Insentient"
all
existence
Nature (Prakriti),
We
Consciousness (Buddhi), &c., are all non-intelligent. do not, like the Vainasikas (a scion of the Bauddhas) attribute intelligence to Buddhi.
Productive or Prolific" i. e., possessed of the of faculty producing or developing. The particular possessive affix (Main) is used in order to denote the constant character "
(93).
of the property of productiveness with regard to the Mani That is to say, these are ever accompanied by their several emanations or developments, whether similar or*, fested.
dissimilar.
So also is Nature (94). the Unmanifested Nature. "
is
"
i. e.,
That
is
as the Manifested to say,
is,
so
the properties
of the Manifested, just enumerated, belong to Nature also.
<
39
[95-97] The
(95). "
from the Spirit
dissimilarity of these
is
stated
is the Spirit.
Reverse (96),
[K.XI.]
Objection
.-Granted
this
all
But how can you
:
assert the Spirit to be the reverse
Objection-There
Manifested and the Unmanifested
are points of simi-
.
we
between
larity also
as the Tjnmanifest-
such as plurality
fested
We
"
reply
:
Yet also
The objection con8
im
0f
we ii
as
similarity
? "
that
is
to say,
though there are
are points of dissimilarity the form of non-possession of the of attributes (Gunas), and the rest.
&c., yet there
la
also, in
dS
f
when
points of similarity, such as uncausedness,
ceded to-there are as
;
.
between the s P irit and the Unmanifested such as Uncausedness, Eternality, &c., and also between the Spirit and the Mani
Manifested^ wdi
0i
see that there are points of
of the
similarity.
tn&(\.
The Manifested and the Unmanifested have been
(97).
described as having three Attributes .* Now the author names and describes these three Constituent Attributes :
* This
word Attribute requires some explanation.
It stands for the
Gunas
a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or as says Colebrooke These three qualities are not Primordial Matter
of the S^nkhyas
"
;
and enter into its composi remarks Nature or Primordial Matter described, in the system of Kapila as formed by the Gunas, which were
mere accidents tion."
is
On
of Nature, but are of its essence
this Davies very rightly
"
primarily in equilibrium, and so long as this state existed, there was no
emanation into separate forms of matter." And, as we shall see later on, the intert condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent predominance of the Attribute of Foulness (Rajas). Davies has rendered this important word GUIICL by Mode. I am afraid this is apt to mislead. For Mode, as understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, a quality which it may have or not, teitkout affecting its essence or existence." Now as we have seen the Guna of the Sankhyas is almost the reverse of "
it belongs to a substance as constituting its very essence. jnis I have perferred to translate Guna as Attribute using the latter term in the sense imparted to it specifically, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between
Mode By Attribute, I understand, that which the mind perceives of substance as constituting its essence. By Mode, I understand the affections of substances, &c.," (the italics are mine). G. J. Attribute and
"
:
>
40
[98100]
xn.]
[K.
KARIKA XII.
The Attributes
are of the nature
of. love,
and
They
stupefaction. .,,...
The character of the three Attributes
.
aversion,
are
.
aclapted
n
to illumination, activity,
and
restraint;
and they mutually subdue, and sup and produce each other and consort together (for
port,
one purpose). These are called Gunas (literally, subsidiary or second sake of others (the Spirits).
(98).
ary) because they exist for the The three Attributes will be
Karika. in the
And
same order
love, &c./ of this
"
u (as
Goodness,
Thus then, the attribute of Goodness
in
maxim
according to the
writers, the
among
named
common
of presight,
Karika are
&c.,"
next
the
order in
to be taken
in the next).
"
(love) being (a
form
of) pleasure, of pleasure ; form of) pain, the attribute of Apriti" (aversion) being (a Foulness (Rajas) is of the nature of pain and, lastly,.
(99).
<priti"
of the
is
nature
"
;
"
Vishdda"
Darkness is
is
is
being (a form of) stupefaction, the attribute of of the nature of stupefaction. The word Atmd
inserted in order to guard against the theory that pleasure nothing more than mere negation of pain, and vice versd.
Pleasure and pain are not negations of one another on the Thus are entities another. of one contrary, they independent means one whose existence (not non-existence) apritydtma" ;
"
consists in love or pleasure
"
;
viskdd&tma"
and
il
>
pritydtma
The fact of pleasure and pain being entities by themselves, and not mere negations of one If they werr mere another, is one of common experience. mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to that of tlr?
may
be similarly explained.
;
other.
(100).
Having thus described the nature of the Attributes, the author next lays down their several
Their functions.
funct i ns
"
They are adapted
to
illumina-
41
[101]
and
tion, activity ,
the
compound
accordance with
always and everywhere (Sattva) to action, if
Darkness at times
;
Here, too, the three members of same order as before.
restraint.""
are to be construed in the
(-Rajas), in
Foulness
[K. xii.]
be
its
would Goodness
active nature,
the
buoyant urging were not restrained by the sluggish by which restraint it operates only
it
(Tamas) Darkness
thus
becomes
(Tamas)
a
restraining
agency. (101).
laid down their functions, the author the method of their operation down lays Mutually subdue and support, and produce one another, and consort together" Vritti" be construed with each member of the compound.
Having thus "
their*!? oration**
"
(action) is to to explain,
The Attributes are Mutually subduing so constituted that when one is brought to play, by some external cause, it subdues the other e. g., Goodness attains
Now,
"
"
;
subdued Foulness and and do Passion Darkness, in their turn, Similarly
to its peaceful state only after having
Darkness.
attain to their respective terrible having subdued the other two. "Mutually supporting"
and stupid conditions
\_Any onydsrdyavrittaydh~\.
Though
this statement as not applicable here, in the sense of the
tainer
and
the contained,
after
con
support (Asraija) here is meant something on which depends the action of another as for instance, Goodness helps by its illuminative character, only yet
by
when helped by Foulness and Darkness through their respec tive properties of activity and restraint. [Or else Goodness itself, without the touch of Foulness, would remain inert, and never be moved to action.] In the same manner do Passion and Darkness help respectively by their activity and
by
i
restraint only
when supported by
the functions of the
other
That is to say, one can produce (its effects) only when resting on the other two., By production here is meant development or modification, which is always of the same character as the parent Attribute which latter, therefore, are uncaused there being no possibility of two.
"Producing
6
each
other"
42
[102103]
[K.
anything differing in essence therefrom being the cause
xm.] ;
nor
are they transient since they are never resolved into an esfeentially different cause. Consorting together" Thatisuto say mutual are they companions, not existing apart from one "
another.
^ has a
In support of the above, we ibutes) are mutual consorts ;
collective force.
have the following
"all
:
(attr
Goodness is the consort of Passion, Passion omnipresent of Goodness, both of these again of Darkness, which latter again of both, Goodness and Passion. The first conjunction
all
;
or separation of these has never been perceived/
(102).
It has
been said
"
to illumination activity,
Adapted,
Now it is explained what those are that are restraint" adapted, and wherefore are they so ? and
KlEIKA XIII. Goodness The butes
three
named
considered to be buoyant and illuminatAttriing ; Foulness is exciting and versa 1 is
^.i/i tile
and
T^I
i\
(mobile)
their nature explain-
;
enveloping. is
^
Darkness, sluggish and Their action, like a lamp,
for a (single) purpose.
(103).
Goodness alone
is
the masters of
considered, by
be buoyant and Sankhya philosophy, illuminating. Buoyancy as .opposed to is the property to which the sluggishness to
The properties
of
Goodness (Satwa).
.
ascension of objects
is clue
;
it is
rising flame of
to
-,
this
fire is
property that the In some cases,
due.
this property also brings about lateral as in the case of air. Thus, generally, buoyancy n^ay motion, be said, to be that property in the cause, which greatly helps its efficiency to
Illuminativeness.
its
particular effects sluggishness, on the other hand, would only dull the efficiency .,, , .. m1 of the cause. The illuminative character ;
,,
,*,
.
of Goodness has already been explained (Ktirika XII),
43
[104106]
Goodness and Darkness, being by themselves in active, stand in need of a force, exciting
(104).
ir^erU&Xf^Pouiness
[K. xin.]
acti-
(Rajas)
and ness.
this force is sup^eir causal operation excites them and which plied by Foulness, roases them from their natural passivity, and urges them on to the accomplishment ;
of their respective effects. Hence, Foulness is said to be This exciting character of Foulness is next account exciting. ed
for
This
"
(it
is
versatile"
also)
also
proves the
existence of Foulness as a particular Attribute, being necessary for the sake of action.
Foulness, in accordance with its versatility, would keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous
(105).
whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the sluggish and enveloping
"
ncss (Tama-s)
"
slug-
Attribute of Darkness, which thus limits the scope of its actions. Thus, in order to
be distinguished from the active Foulness, Darkness has been said to be the restrainer Darkness is sluggish and envelop "
ing"
The
particle
"
Darkness"
(106).
Eva
but with
The enquirer
Objection The Attributes of connatures tradictory
is "
to
be construed
Goodness
objects
:
and
"
not only with
Foulness
"
"
also.
Instead of co-operating for the Attributes, being
a single purpose,
endued as they are with contradictory properties, would counteract each other, like cannot co-operate. opposed wrestlers, (and thus there would be no effect emanating from them). The author replies Like a lamp, their action is for a single purpose." We have "
all
Reply- ^they can, like wick and in giving light.
oil,
phlegm
how
the wick and the
oil,
opposed to the action of co-operate, when in contact with lire, itself,
.
fire
for
and the various
observed
eac h by J
the single purpose of the body
humours
,
of giving light
wind,
bile,
though possessed of contradictory properties
;
and ,
co
operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body. Pre cisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though,
44
[107]
[K. xiii.]
possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate towards a single end the purpose (emancipation) of the will further This be Spirit. explained in Karika XXXI.
To
(107).
return to our original
Necessity of the three
pain ,-,
with
us to three different causes connate
themselves causes
spec-
respectively,
these
as
(and
we have postulated the
three Attri
These causes too must be multi
butes).
their
form, since, by
Pleasure,
j-//
<pos-
tuiating
and delusion
subject
and delusion, opposed to one another, lead
very nature, they are mutually supof the multiform character of these
As an example
pressive.
various causes of pleasure, pain and delusion, we may have the following beautiful, single girl, young, gentle :
A
a source of delight to her husband, because and virtuous, him she is born with her essence consisting in to with regard She pains her co-wives, because with regard to pleasure. is
born with her essence consisting in pain. And, girl stupefies another man who is unable to with regard to him, she has her essence in because at her, get All the different forms pleasure, &c., have been delusion.
them, she
is
lastly, the
same
explained by this single instance of a woman. In the above case, that which is the cause of pleasure, is the Goodness the cause 7 r ~ .
of pleasure: Foulness of pain, and Darkness of delusion.
.
.
7
Attribute of Goodness which
made up of
...
pleasure
;
the cause of delusion
is
essentially
the cause of pain
in
Jboulness, consisting
is
is
pain; and, lastly,
The
Darkness, consisting of delusion.
properties, pleasure, illuminativeness, and buoyancy (belong said ing to Goodness) cannot be sifhilarly J The properties of to be mutually opposed, and thus mcapeach of the Attri.
00
trt^tory/ld
^
they do not neces-
of
of causes for
able of co-existing in a single Attribute. As a matter of fact, we find them Actually
dUS
co-existing.
each
tiveness,
of
Hence,
pleasure,
and buoyancy,
illnmina-
being mutually
consistent, do not necessitate
the assump
tion of different causes (for each of them severally) as do pleasure, pain, and delusion which are mutually opposed, (and *
as such unable to co-he re
in
a
single
substratum).
In the
45
[108100]
[K. xiv.]
pain, versatility, and activity (properties of Foulness), as also delusion, sluggishness, and envelopingness
same manner,
(properties of Darkness), do not lead to the assumption of Thus the triad of Attributes is established. various causes.
(108).
As regards earth, &c., actually perceive the properties of indiscreetness, &c., as belonging to them.
Objection
Granted
:
all this.
we
how
But the
Attributes, Goodness, and the can never come within the range ot perceptible experience. And under such circumstances, how can we attribute to these latter, the properties of indiscreetAttributes,
proved
?
rest,
(enumerated above)
ness, objectivity, &c.,
To
?
we reply
this objection
KlRIKl
XIV.
Indiscreetness and the rest are proved from the exisTWO reasons for tence of the three Attributes, and from
SSSTJf^itS
the absence of these (the three Attri-
proved
butes) in the reverse (of indiscreetness,
&c.
i.
e.,
And
Purusha).
fested (Nature) too
is
the existence of the
Unmani-
established on the -ground of the
properties of the effect (the Manifested) being consequent
on those of the (109).
By
*
aioit$kitijtf*i
amchane"
and
"a
as
l
vivc&i"
dvi
9
these,
of
in the Karika, is to be understood
and eka
[Siddh&ntakaumudi
ckatva* respectively
(and not }/,((
cause.
"dveKayok":).
indiscreetness,
;
in "dv6kayordvivaekanaik-
?
iv
I
or else
It
&c.
9
it
would be
the reply
That
is
is
"
:
to say,
dvitva
9
"
dvckeshu"
(*)
How
being asked
the three Attributes"
denote
22]
do you prove
From the existwe have found
* For if the Jhe sum and compound were analysed into would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the dual, which is explained by making and stand for and ekat-oa making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending. "del"
"/Ivi"
"cka"
"/
#,"
"dvitva"
46
[110]
three Attributes.
common
experience, with regard to the material existence, that, whatperceptible ever consists oi pleasure, &c., is qualified
in First proof: From the existence of the
[K. xiv.]
.
by indiscreetness, &c. The affirmative rea soning, being explicit enough,
is
not stated in the Karika*
which only mentions the negative reasonFrom the absence of these in the ing these in the reverse reverse "that is to say, from the non-existence of the Attributes in the Spirit which is the reverse of indiscreetness, &c. Or again, we may have "
:
and
Unmanifested (both together) as the the of syllogism, and then we shall have subject (minor term) the reasoning "From the existence of the three Attributes" the Manifested
the
as a purely negative inference* (Avtta), there being no other case
minor term) where we could have the agreement of the reason (Middle term existence of the Attributes). (besides the
is again raised We grant all this but the existence of the properties in-
(110).
An
Question
How
Nature
objection is
proved to
exist?
To
we
this
Reply
:
reply
of
the the
being due to those of the cause.
*
cannot be proved before
discreetness, &c.,
the object possessing these properties (the
Unmanifested) has been proved to exist From the properties of the effect being due to
"
From
oerties
;
the properties
may
i "Q
of the
j i
cause"
^
The connection * -n
^
thus explained
:
>
All effects are
geen to possess properties similar to those of x their respective causes, as the cloth of the .
The syllogism has previously been explained
sure, &c., is indiscreet, as the perceptible
as
"
Whatever has plea and here
material substances
we hand
:"
the agreement (Anwaya) of the reason in the perceptible sub stances" whose connotation is different from that of the subject of the All things having pleasure, &c." Now what our author proposes syllogism, "
"
we might
All things besides the explain th e reasoning thus Manifested and the Unmanifested) are indiscreet, since thgy possess the three Attributes, and whatever is not indiscreet does not possess* *he three attributes." Thus in the latter syllogism we have for the minor
is
that
"
:
spirit (the
term Tile Manifested and the Un manifested which comprehend all cases where the reason (the presence of the three attributes) could be found for nothing besides the Manifested and the Unmanifested can be said to have ;
the three Attributes.
47
[Ill]
[K. xiv.]
Similarly we must admit that pleasure, &c., being properties of Consciousness (Mahat), &c., must be the threads.
outconje of similar properties subsisting in their cause. [And And thus we have this cause is no other than Nature.]
proved the existence of Nature, as possessed of the properties of pleasure, pain, and delusion.* "I
(111).
grant
all
this",
followers of
aJU?tt which discards manifested
the
Entity?"
manifested.
says the enquirer
Kanada
;
"but
(the Vaiseshikas)
the
and
Gantama (the Nayfiyikas) assert the production of the Manifested, Earth, and the rest ^rom tne binary compound downward
from homogeneous atoms, which too are The various properties in the effects owe their
existence to similar properties in
the primary atoms. t
And
*
And consequently Nature too is proved to have indiscreetness, &c., in accordance with the proposition laid down before whatever has pleasure, &c. has indiscreetness, &c, also." The reasoning may be rendered clearer by "
,
reducing [
<
to the form of
two Aristotelian syllogisms
:
Properties of the effect (Intellect) are properties of the cause (Nature). Pleasure, &c., are properties of the effect (Intellect). /. Pleasure, &c., are properties of the cause (Nature.)
And /
it
again
:
Whatever has pleasure, &c., has indiscreetness, &c. Nature has pleasure, &c., (as first proved). /. Nature has indiscreetness, &c.
f It will, I think, not be out of place here, to indicate, in brief, the atomic theory of Kan&da and Gautama, which may be thus summed up. In the beginning the^te existed only atoms of various substances (Earth, Water, Fire These .arid Air) besides, of course, Ak&sa, &c., which are in themselves eternal.
various atoms were respectively endued with four different sets of properties, By some agency or other mainly latterly perceived in their compounds. all homogeneous atoms combine, one ^Adrishta," the Unseen (Fate) with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary com
that of
pounds, and so on to the various objects of perception. These atoms are de clared to be without extension in space, or else they could not be permanen^t. But, as far as I know, no Nay^yika has even yet tried to show how two things devoid of extension, can combine a point which affords the strongest
handle
to
S ankarachurya
S tiriraka-TiMshya on
in
his
refutation
the Brakma-Svtras II
ii
of the atomic 12/17.
theory.
See
48
[112J
[K. xv.]
thus finding the production of the Manifested from the Manifested, quite explicable, what is the use of postulating an
Unmanifested, an Nature)
We
Entity
imperceptible
form
the
(in
of
?"
1
reply
KiRlKA XV.
From
the
we
Reply postulate
an
nature of specific objects, from homogeneity, from evolution being j v n due to active (causal) energy, from the
finite
must Un-
.
.
manifested Reality
Reasons given.
,
.
n
,
of
separation
-\
cause and
f^ effect,
-i
and
from the undividedness (resolution) of the whole uni verse.
(112).
Of
primary cause is the Un manifested (Nature). Because (1) There v v ^s separation of cause and effect, and re-
specific objects, the
"
First proof of the existence of Prakriti-
solution o feet, and re-union of tllewliale
OMwr
form)
Me
It has Karika (in IX) that subsists (in its unmanifested tke
Universe."
already been proved
"-"
the effect
in the cause
;
as the
limbs of the tortoise, coming out
body, are perceived as separate from the body, which again they enter and thus disappear (from view). In the same manner, the various objects, jar, &c., are perceived as of
its
different
these
(i.
from their causes, clay, &c., when they come out of are produced from them when they have their .,
existence, as
the jar manifested out of the
wherein they have with earth, &c., as
all
along inhered.)
effects of the
lump of
The same
is
primary elements,
clay,
the case
witli these
latter again as effects of Self-consciousness (Ahankara) ; with this latter again as that of Consciousness and lastly, with tfire last
a^ain as the
effect of the
Unmanifested, which
is
the final
cause. This separation, from the final cause (the Unmanifested), of the various effects either mediately (as with earth, &c.,) or immediately
(as
with
Consciousness)
related
to
it,
is
49
[113114]
[K. xv.].
what is meant by the separation of the cause and the effect. In the same manner, at every dissolution, the various grades of effects (1) Earth, &c., (2) The Primary Elements, (3) Selfand (4) Intellect lose themselves in their immediate causes (1) Primary plements (2) Self-consciousness, (3) Intellect and (4) the Unmanifested Nature. Thus we see that it is only a certain form of the cause which becomes imperceptible (at dissolution) as far as a consciousness respective
particular effect is concerned. Ascending in the same order as before, we find the various effects up to Will disappearing in their respective immediate causes up to the Final Un
and thus rendering these latter imperceptible, form of the cause which concerns each of them severally. Of this unmanifested, however there is no further receptacle and thus it becomes the receptacle and hence an aggregate of the unmanifested states of all the effects. This is what is meant by the re-union (in the final manifested
at least that
;
In Vaiswarupya t the
Unmanifested) of the whole Universe. affix
has a reflexive sense.
KZJ
"
(113). Second proof: cause Ecolutwn to
"
It is a Because Evolution is due to Energy. well-known fact that the Evolution of the "B*-
is
due to the active energy of the cause
no other than the existence therein of the
is
;
.
for certainly, no effect can arise from an inefficient cause. This latent energy in the
Energy."
cause
effect is
due
effect in its
unmanifested state since, on the hypothesis of the effect be ing an entity, there can be no other form of causal energy. The difference of sand from sesarnum the material cause of ;
oil
only in the fact that
lies
it is
only in the latter that
oil
exists in its unmanifested condition.
(114).
Objection
Objection: These
two reasons might rest
with
intellect.
:
Granted
fact
this
:
But the above two
>
..
.
assuming a further Unmanifested Reality
We
from the
all
reasons that you have urged might very well res t with the Will what is the use of ?
From Jiniteness" i. e. } reply: (3) of the effects being, in their very nature "
50
[115]
(In support of his ground, the author puts forth a
finite.
Beply
[K. xv.]
syllogism). The specific objects -nr-ii ^ ^ ^ tion, Will and the rest have an
Third proof
,
"From finiteness"
(of all manifested existence.)
"ques-
TT
Unmam-
Entity for their cause (i. e., they , , have a cause in which they exist in their .
,
state), since,
&c.,
objects, jar,
i
fes t e d
*
unmanifested
.
in
as
they are
commonly
.
.
,
finite, as jar, &c.
.
The
their
seen, have, for
.
,
finite
cause,
which inhere) the unmanifested (state of the we have already shown that the cause is no effects); than more the unmanifested condition of the effect. thing And under these circumstances, the cause of Will must be the Unmanifested which must be the final cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested
clay,
&c.,
(in
since
Reality.* (115).
"Because
of
Homogeneity
homogeneity"
in the similarity of different
Fourtbiproof
-Be-
cause of homogeneity."
tellect,
and the
rest
consists
objects.
In-
manifesting them-
.
selves
as
ascertainment, &c.
are seen to
be similarly related to pleasure, pain and delusion. And whatever is invariably connected with a certain form must have, for its cause (wherein it inheres), something which has that form for
its
constituent element. Thus
the specific objects, the
it is
decided that of
Unmanifested (Nature)
is
the cause. t
Having proved the existence of the Unmanifested, the author next states the method of its operation *
.
* its
Because the Unmanifested Nature (the cause of Will is not finite, as Consciousness and the rest are. And further, because, by so
effects,
doing we would have to postulate causes ad infinitum.
we have in the present case: Will and the rest are invariably f Thus connected, with pleasure, pain and delusion; and, as such, must have, for their cause, Nature wherein they all lie unmanifested prior to their tion;
and
this
Nature has, for
its
Evolu
Constituent Elements, the three Attributes
which respectively consist in pleasure, pain and delusion.
,
51
[116118]
[K.
KARIKA XVI.
The Unmanifested
is
the cause
;
it
the three Attributes
ky
modification, as water,
of the of the
receptacle
operates through
by blending and
difference
from
arising*
they are
as
Attributes,
on account the
variously
distributed.
At the time of cosmic dissolution, Operates, Attributes continue to be of three the
"
(116).
<j*c"
similar modifications.
Modified condition
forms a part of the nature of the Attri
and as such they can never, for a moment, remain inert. Thus at the time of dissolution, the Attributes operate through their respective forms of Goodness, Foulness and
butes
;
Darkness*.
Another method of operation
(117).
blending."
3
the
8
f
This
hoover,
bllfces
Attributes"
is
next stated
"
By
"
"
is
of the Attriblending not possible without the
relation of subserviency due to a diversity
this subserviency again is
among them, and among the Attri
which diversity again
butes
tructibility
(i. e.,
is not possible without desunless the Attributes are so constituted that
Thus the second method through development into Will &c.|
they suppress one another). operation
is
The enquirer
(118).
objection- ^How
can an Attribute of uniform nature bring diVelSe
aC ~
tnV?
we *
all
know how
This
evolution
is
is
How
objects
of
can diverse methods of an Attributes which
to
operation belong r j j have been declared i
We reply
"
By
the water falling
p i_ f to be of uniform nature ? A
modification
.
asiwter"
from the clouds, though
the state of equilibrium of the Attributes, during which
no
possible.
from Nature are due to the disturbance cf equili | The various evolutions brium among the Attributes, which rouses the hitherto dormant, evolving energy of Nature, whence issue forth the various manifestations Intellect and the rest.
52
[119120] naturally of
[K.
xvn.]
having one taste,* becomes sweet, bitter, into sonr, &c., according as it comes with different modifications of contact
itself,
,
such as cocoannt, wood-apple, &c. earth In the sam& manner, owing to the blending and the mntnal suppression of the Attributes, the Attributes occupying a subordinate position base themselves on the prominent one, and thus give rise to diverse forms of cosmic manifestations.
Hence
from
it is
down
laid
the receptacle
"
On
account of the difference arising
the various
of
Attributes."
Now the existence of the Spirit (Purusha) is laid (119). down, in opposition to those self-contented (Materialists) who accept as spirit either Nature or Intellect, or Self-conscious ness, or the sense-organs, or ( lastly
)
the elements.
KARIKi XVII. Since
composite (or compound) objects are another s use ; since the reverse
all
16
exwfnTe
exist)
of
there
since
(abstraction
must be superintendence
there
must be one
there
of
(that which possesses) the three Attributes with other properties (must
spm*!
since
;
foj*
is
a
of tbe
to
enjoy (experience tendency towards final Spirit
since
;
or feel)
;
and
beatitude
from material existence)
;i
therefore Spirit exists. The
spirit exists:
because
com-
all
pound
objects for another. "
(120).
are
<-<,
Spirit
A
exists,
r>
apart
from
-r>
*
-,
-i
Primordial
Matter (Nature) :--
Because all compound
objects (objects
made up
of
integral component parts) are for another s use" This when reduced to the syllogistic form, would stand reason, *
Sweet
according the Nayayikas.
53
[121]
[K. xvir.]
Nature, Intellect and the rest exist for another s use, because they are compounds, as chair, bed, &c., and these
thns
compound, inasmuch as they are made up of
latter are all
pleasure, pain and delusion.* 1
But, says the objector, the compound objects chair, &c., are seen to exist for other objects
(121).
The Objection: above reasoning
rMofcompounds not to an Elementary Spirit.
which too are compound, such as men s todies and not for the sake of Spirit as apart from Matter (the body). And as
^^
Nature, &c., being compounds, should only lead to the inference of another set of compound substances (for whose use they exist) and not to that of an
We
"
Elementary Non-compound Spirit (an "
reply
He ply Since of that which the possessm ust three Attributes
the
End-in-itself.")
Since the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes and other properties must exist" ,,
exist.
,
That
reve,
.
is
.
,
to
say,
if
\
from
_
,.
the fact
of
Nature, &c., being for another s use, we were to infer only another compound sub
stance, then in that case we would have to assume such compounds ad infinitum for even this latter compound must lead to another for whose use it will exist and this so on ad infinitum. and And when we to another, again can escape this regressus ad infinitum by postulating a V
f
object or wouid lead to compounds ad in-
;
not proper to the shape of com multiply unnecessary assumptions (in pounds ad infinitum). Nor can it be urged that multiplica tion of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by
reasonable
resting
ground,
it
is
certainly,
for in the above inference the application of the proofs instance ought to be extended only so far as existing it can be extended no for another s use concerned is ;
"
"
;
larther. *
And we have
This sounds rather absurd.
explained
in
the
Nyayavdrtika-
But we must not forget that
t eie
whole
emanations from Nature, whose constituent elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and set of material objects
delusion, respectively.
are mere
54
[122]
[K.
tdtparyatika* that if the complete identification of every phase of the cited instance were to be looked for in the sub ject in question, then there could be no reasoning by inference.! order to escape the regressus ad infinitum, the non-compound nature of Spirit, we find our accept selves constrained to attribute to it the properties of being
Thus then,
in
we
if
"
without the three
non-objectivi
discreetness,"
Attributes,"
"
"
ty
"
"
"
uncommonality
(subjectivity),
(i. e.,
specific character),
and (inability to produce). unprolificness intelligence are these For, invariably accompanied by that of properties which latter being absent in spirit, must lead compoundness, "
"
"
"
to the inference of the absence of the three Attributes, &c., as
when a certain individual is not a Brahmana, he can never be a Katha (a special class of Brahmans). Hence the author when he laid down that the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes, &c., must exist implied that this "
"
must be an in something which would be the reverse, an End-in-itself." And dependent Elementary Entity "
&c."
"
this is Spirit.
For the following reason also there must be a Because there Spirit apart from Matter mustbe superintendence." That is to say,
(122).
:
because the objects constituted by the three * of
This
is
a
Gautama)
commentary on the Nyayavartika (a gloss on the Nyayasutras of Udyotakara by Va"chaspati Misra. This work with the is generally counted as closing V;he epoch of supplanted by the modern system, introduced and
Parisuddhi of udayanacharya ancient Nyaya,
most
latterly
extensively
expounded
by
Gangesa
in
Upddhyaya,
Tattwa-
his
Chintamani. f
Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature,
which could be quite "
identical.
Even in the stock example
Fiery, because smoking, as the culinary hearth
between/he subject-matter the culinary hearth the
made by men, mountain.
&c.,
of the syllogism
fire is
is
of the Naiyayiif-^
we have
and the instance
for cooking food,
&c, whereas such
"
a dissimilarity cited.
Thus, in
and proceeding from a house
not the case with the
fire
in the
55
[123124]
[K. xvn.]
Attributes are such as necessitate the existence of a superin For, everything consisting in pleasure, pain and seen to be superintended over by something else delusion, 6. g. the chariot by the charioteer ; and Intellect and the to consist in pleasure, pain and delu rest have been
tendent.
is
proved
sion
;
visor
an
and this super Attributes and independent,
must have a
therefore, they
must be beyond* the three and this is
supervisor,
"
"
End-in-itself
Again the
(123).
Spirit.
to experience,
Because there must
"
Spirit exists
(or
because there must be one feel)"
That
to
is
say,
f us nas an id ea of pleasure and everv J one O to be lelt as agreeable as something pain
be one to feel.
.
and as such there must be some substance, the feelings themselves, to which they (feelings) can beyond be agreeable or otherwise. Feelings cannot be pleasurable to the Intellect (Buddhi), &c., for that would imply self-con or the reverse
;
inasmuch as the Intellect and the rest are Thus, integrally composed of pleasure, pain and delusion.f then, something else, independent of pleasure, &c., must be the agent who feels and this is Spirit.
tradictory actions,
Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of thus the Karika Bhogya (enjoyable) intermeans visible-, and the visibility of Buddhi
(124).
:
A
different of pretation
the
,
..
and the
above reason.
.
observer, there
,
beyond, Intellect, &c.,
,
.
.,
i
rest not being possible
and
i
without an
must be one outside of, and The visibility of Spirit.
this is
* Otherwise the supervisor also will stand in need of another, for the pre sence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure,
&c., which again will necessitate itself.
And
so
we
its
superintendence by something beyond
shall be landed in a rcgrcssus
ad infinitum.
f That is to say Intellect, as made up of pleasure, pain and dulness, can not be properly said to feel pleasure, &c., for that would imply the feeling of
pleasure by pleasure absurd.
;
or worse
still
by pain
;
and
vice versa,
which
is
56
[125] Intellect
being
and the
made up
rest
[K.
xvm.]
can be inferred from the fact of their
of pleasure, &c., as earlh, &c. t>
because there is a tendency Lastly, Spirit exists towards action for final beatitude" The fi^l beatitude, treated of in all the systems "
(125).
O f philosophy, and mentioned by the great sages of divine insight as the absolute and can never apply final alleviation of the three kinds of pain sages towards beati-
for, these have by their very nature, pain as one of their integral components, from which, therefore, they since a substance cannot be absolved can never be absolved
to Intellect, &c.
;
;
of something forming its constituting element. Thus then, there must be something independent of pleasure, &c., where -
from pain could be expunged. Consequently, as the various systems of philosophy have all along aimed at beatitude, therefore, there exists something beyond (pleasure, &c., and hence) Intellect and the rest and this is Spirit.
Having thus proved the existence of Spirit, the author next Is this spirit one (*) (manifesting itself) raises the question in all bodies, or many, being different in different bodies ?
And
in reply, he lays
down
the theory
of the
plurality
of
Spirits.
KiRIKA XVIII. t
Prom ra
-Bt ons!
allotment of birth, death, and the organs ; (2) from the non-simultaneity of actions fSpiritS
s
<
with different individuals); and
(3)
from the different modifications of c^e Attributes "
the plurality of Spirits
The plurality of Spirits *
is
is established"
As the Vedantin
asserts.
established.
How ?
,
[127128]
ft7
"
(127).
From
the,
the body the sense-organs, Self-conT-rr-n i ^ T , / ^ Will and sciousness, Feeling* (veaana)
death and
birth,
allotment of birth, death and the organs" Birth of the Spirit consists in its relation
w ith
allotment. <of
xvm.]
[K.
.
organs.
t
forming into an aggre This is what is meant by
all these latter
gate of a particular character. which does not mean modification
birth
since the
;
Spirit
is
And death too essentially unmodifiable (unchangeable). consists in the departure from the body, of the Spirit, which cannot be destroyed, since it is eternal. The "organs" are thirteen,
with
beginning of these
"allotment"*
the
births, &c.
The
Will. is
not
(diversified)
explicable on the the Spirit were one
hypothesis of the unity of Spirit. For, if (in all bodies), the birth, death, blindness or madness of one individual would lead to exactly the same The several allotment, however, becomes
with
the theory
the
Monist
ing
it
the
of
explain the the Spirit, as
to
For
different bodies, &c.
on another absurdity
in
effects
quite
plurality of Spirits. above difference by
conditioned
in
others.
consistent
Nor can attribut
contact
by
with
that case he would laud himself
that of attributing
birth
or
death in
which can accordance with the different parts of the body never be. For a woman is not said to be born or dead, by the mere development or derangement of certain portions of !
her body.
(128).
For the following reason
also, the Spirit is different
with different individuals is
"
:
Since activity
Action, in the form a function of the internal
not simultaneous" .
of endeavour,
is
still it is here attributed to the Spirit. If the Spirit organs were one, the activity of one man would lead to similar ;
activity in all other *
"
Vedana"
passage would
";
8
&c.
"body,"
In that case the
bodily, sensuous, mental, egoistic and but the translation given above is preferable: for
no cognition
"
through body,
<fcc.,
possible in the body alone, without the aid and so on with the rest.
is
<fcc.,
and thus the motion of one would
might b2 takei severally with
intellectual cognitions
mind,
;
be translated thus
certainly, there can bs
cognition
men
of
taken (the
singly.
No
sense-organs)
58
[129132] lead to that of all others
[K. xix.]
a palpable absurdity,
which
is
ex-,
plained away quite reasonably, on the hypothesis of plufality.
(129).
fJS*
*
Again, the Spirits are
fications of the Attributes
m
of the Attributes are differ-
Some
modi
because the
"
many
are
different"
persons abounding in the attribute of that
O f Goodness, represent aggregates
the gods and saints. 0. g. such are men, The rest abound
attribute
Others abound in Foulness
and these are the beasts. This diversity in the Attributes could not be explained if the Spirit of distribution were one. The hypothesis of plurality, however, makes it in
Darkness
quite explicable.
(130).
Having thus established the plurality of
Spirits the
author now states their properties a knowledge of which conducive to discriminative knowledge (wisdom)
is
:
KlRIKA XIX.
And
from that contrast (before that the Spirit
T
e
f
Pr pertieS
the so ui
And
"
forth)
follows
it
witness, and has final
emancipation, neutrality, and ceiving and
"
is
set
is
per
inactive.
connects the following properties of the Spirit with
its plurality.
(131).
If
it
And from this contrast," then it were said would refer to the various distribution of In the three Attributes, of the last Karika.
order to avoid this,
;
it
is
said is
"
and from
referred to
immediately preceding, whereas one not so immediate
subject, this
"
hence the that here refers to Karika
is
T
that,
<
C."
A
by the pronoun
denoted by tfaf
;
XL
r
Thus, then, the contrast of "having the three Attributes, &c.," connotes the Spirit s property of being with out the three Attributes, and being discriminative, non-
(132).
[133
5H
135J
[K. xix.j
Now, singular, intelligent and non-productive. of being a witness and perceptive are
Abjective,
the properties
so
many
accompaniments of intelligence ,. ,. o Since an mtellinon-objectivity.
necessary
The necessity of propertiej.
.
.,
-,
anc*
.
,
.
g eut being alone can be a spectator, and one can be a witness only when the as in daily life we find the objects have been shown to him two parties of a dispute showing and explaining their various objects and reasons to the witness similarly does the PraTheirinter-depcmd-
;
;
which latter, there becomes the witness. And again no object can be shown to one, himself an object and non-intelligent; and since the Spirit is both intelligent and non-objective, it becomes the loitness. For the same reasons, the Spirit is perceiving. kriti exhibit its creations before the Spirit,
fore,
Farther, the absence of the three Attributes leads to final emancipation by which is meant the final and absolute of and this property, as belonging to the spirit, removal pain
(133).
;
a necessary deduction from the fact of the soul being naturally without; the three Attributes, and hence without is
pleasure, pain or d illness.
From
the absence of Attributes, again, follows this latter property is such as cannot belong since neutrality either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling,. (134:).
;
only one who is devoid of both pleasure and pain, who can be called neutral also called Uddsina (indifferent).
It
is
Lastly, the property of inactivity is a necessary outcome of the properties of non-productiveness and discrimiuativeuess-
wisdom). The inactivity of the Spirit wisdom and non-productive character.
(
l>
(135).
life
Objection Intelligence and activity found coalways exist cut.
We
Objection:
we
think
m
then,
we
,1
.
-,
grant
first
.
,,
is
all this:
decide our
n
-
inferred
but in
from
its-
our daily
we duty and then n ".
,
T
the following strain I, who am an intelligent be in i?, wish to act. Thus, />
ly
rind intelligence
,
and activity co-
60
[136138] And
existent.
make
[K.
xx
xxi.]
Sankhya tenets which
this goes against the
intelligence devoid of activity and vice versa.
We
reply
:
KA.RIKA
XX.
Thus, from this union the unintelli-
Keply: The appa rent activity of the soul due to union with Buddhi, and the apparent intelligence of the latter due to union with Purusha.
gent Linga (Buddhi. &c..) appears as and from the activity of J
intelligent
;
m
the Attributes, the
indifferent
Spirit
appears as an (active) agent. Since (136). intelligence and activity have been proved to be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. The word Linga includes everything from the Mahat down to the primary elements to be described later on. The cause of the mistake is said to be the union or
proximity of the
Spirit
with
the
Linga,
(Buddhi and the rest). The rest is clear enough. Objection
(137).
You
:
union,
What
Objection is
the
need
of
$*c.
say that the feeling is due to But no union is possible with-
ou some need which, again, is not possible .,. without the relation of the helper and the
the
union?
How is this possible in accordance helped. with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with the Linga
?
In reply, the author lays down the grounds of need
KARIK!
For the
Spirit
s
XXI.
contemplation of Prakriti, and its Emancipation, the union of both
final
R e piy_The is
that
takes place, like that of the halt and , IP ,1 the blind and from this union pro
need
of
ITT
final
Emancipation.
;
ceeds creation. (138).
In
"
Pradhdnasya"
objective force, the
by Spirit of
the "
meaning being
Nature,"
genitive affix has the for the contemplation
thus implying the fact of Nature being
01
[139141] an object
something
be
to
XXIL]
[K.
But
enjoyed.
this enjoyalulity
is not possible without an enjoy er, whose becomes necessary, for that of Nature.
existence
thus
The author next lays down the ground of the For the Emancipation of Spirit s need The need explained. __ The while in connection (139).
7"
^ ^.^
g^
with the enjoyable Nature, believes the three kind of pains the constituents of Nature to be his own and from this ;
which can result only from wisdom discriminating between the Spirit and the three which wisdom thus becomes impossible without Attributes the knowledge; and hence the existence, of Nature. Thus then we find the Spirit standing in need of Nature, for his self-imposed bond he seeks liberation
Since the relation (of Spirit with Nature) is eternal, therefore, it is quite proper that the Spirit should be related to Nature for emancipation, though primarily, the
emancipation.
relation
was
for
enjoyment only. (140). Granted all this relation of Buddhi, &c.?
We The
"
reply necessity
of
the creation of Bud-
From
this
union proceeds
The
creation"
relation (of Spirit with Nature) cannot by itself suffice either for en jovment or eman..
.
cipation, if there under the rest
dhi, &c.
But whence the creation
j
11 j were no Buddhi and the T>
,1
circumstances the union about the creation, for the sake primarily of enjoyment, and finally, of emancipation. ;
itself brings
is now described KARIK! XXIL
The process of creation
From
Prakriti issues
The process of E-.iutionfromPraGtriti downwards.
Mahat
(or
Buddhi)
Mahat again
issues
(Aiiankara),
from
the set of sixteen
;
<fc.
Principle
;
Mahat
and
from
this
Self-consciousness
which from
sixteen, proceed the five gross elements. Prakriti is a (141). From Prakriti,
Unmanifested
;
proceeds
five of these
name
Ahankdm
of the will
be
02
[142143]
[H.
described later on, as also the set of sixteen,
made up
xxm.] of the
eleven sense-organs and the live primary elements. Oiit of these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respect Akasa, Earth, &c. ively the five gross ones
(142). The process production
of
Thus, from the primary element of sound proceeds Akasa, having sound as its characteristic of the property similarly from the mixture of ;
the
.
f,
,
,
,
,
and sound,
tne primary elements ot touch
elements.
proceeds Air, with sound and touch as its again, from the mixture of the
characteristic properties
;
primary elements of sound, touch and colour, proceeds Light, with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties ;
and from the mixture of the primary elements, of sound, touch, colour and taste, proceeds Water, with sound, touch, and lastly, colour, and taste as its characteristic properties from the mixture of the primary element of smell with ;
that of the last four, proceeds Earth, with all
the five for
its
characteristic properties.
(143). The Unmanifested Principle has been defined in general terms in Karika X, and specifically in Karika XIII ; the Manifested also has been generally defined in Karika ;
X
now the
the author defines
a particular
Manifested Principle
Baddhi XXIII.
Buddhi
the
is
determining
Principle u (Will)*
-____
;
P
?o;SS
when -
ItS
affected
Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power constitute its form (when afected by Goodness), and the reverse of "these
by Darkness.
v
i
.
*
Though there is some difference of opinion on this point, yet I am inclined to think that Adhyavasaya means * determining, and of all the faculties will appears to be the only determining principle in Man. Hence forth Bnddhi will be translated as Will, and the reader is requested to mark the same change in the foregoing pages,
[144140]
K. XXIIT.]
fiS
"
"
(144).
Biiddhi
difference
between
active a enfc
mines that
it is
is
and
no the
.Everyone, to be
>-
across
something
deputed to the work and, finally, deter and thus acts towards its accom
his duty,
This determination of the
plishment. stic
is
there
action
the
aml cause
( effect
when he comes done, thinks that he
Since
determination
is
property of Buddhi
duty
which appears
intelligence by contact with
the
is
as
the
charateri-
endited
if
of the
intelligence
with
Spirit.
Buddhi, again, is non-different from determination, which thus forms its definition, inasmuch as it serves to distinguish it from similar as well as dissimilar substances.
(145).
Having thus defined Buddhi, the author next states its properties, in order e
Buddhi-vFru,e,
wif
Dispassion and Power, and the reverse of these. <iom,
attainment of true
to. help
wisdom-"
Virtue,"
the &c.,
Virtue leads to (worldly) prosperity, as i_ i 1^1j.i as ^ we Super-physical bliss, that *
"
about
by the performance of sacrifices &c. leading to the former, and that due to the eight fold practice of Yoga leading to the latter. Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the difference between the Attributes (as brought
constituting Nature) and the of passion. 9
(146). The
This Dispassion
four kinds of
chspassion.
Spirit.
is
Dispassion
of four kinds
jna Vyatireka-Sanjna, and Vatikara-Sanjnd. .
absence
Yatamana-SanEkendriyd-Sanjnd The passion ua-
.
.
is
..
.
,.
residing in the mind, lead turally impure the different senses-organs to action. The effort to put a stop to this action of the senses is named Yatamdna-Sanjnd (li terally, effort).
When
this process of resistance is once
begun,
then passions will have been suppressed before others discrimination of these from those still operating is called When the senses have been disabled, then Vyatireka-Sanjna.
so;yie
;
"the
the passions that have been suppressed reside in the Cf. Jjhashy.i
uu Yogasutra
1
15.
mind
in
64
[147148] the form of mere anxiety
-and this
perceptible objects, tioned in the Veda, to the first
tVee
;
known
is
as
Ekendriyd*
anxiety towards all the ordinary ones as well as thoso men
The suppression of even
Sanjna.
xxm.]
[K.
is
this
and is superior called Vasikara-Sanjna been thus described by the revered
this has
Patanjali: "The dispassion named Vasikam-Sanjnya belongs to one who has no desire for either visible or Yedic objects.
*
[Yoga-Sutra
I.
15].
This
(147).
is
Dispassiou, a property of Buddhi. an also is a property of Buddhi j
The eight kinds
of
Power it
is
to
the *perfections Attenuation and the rest (Awma, are due."* Of these
this that
power.
<fec.)
Animd
(1)
which
(Lit
one
Atomic character) the
can
the densest
enter
is
the
property by such as
substances,
stones. (2) Laghimd (Buoyancy) is that to which is due the ability to traverse solar regions by means of the sun s rays. Garima (Gravity) leads to heaviness (3) and (4) Makima (Grandeur) causes supremacy. To (5) Approach is due the ability to touch the moon with the fingers. (6)
;
Fulfilment of desires is such as can enable one to dip into the earth as in water. (7) Vasitwa leads to the subordination of
Supremacy brings about mastery
all objects to the devotee.
over all objects.
(8) Infallibility
of purpose
is
such that
all
objects follow the course dictated by the will of the devotee. The decisions of ordinary mortals follow the course of events,
whereas those of a trained devotee precede them and dictate their course.
These four are the properties of Buddhi, partaking of Goodness. Those partaking of the attribute of Darkness are the reverse of these Sin viz.
(148).
of the
attribute
:
Ignorance, Passion and Weakness or Fallibility.
*
There
is
some confusion as
merated here, they appear nins have taken Vasitwa and Isltwa
to the ;
number
of
but they ought
as one.
As enu
these perfections. to
be eight only
:
hence
I
65
[149151] The author next
defines
[K.
Egoism
or
xxiv
xxv.]
Self-consciousness
(Ahttnkara).
KlniKA XXIV. The principle of AhankAra defined,
Egoism
is
self-consciousness
thence
;
the set proceeds a two-iold creation, of eleven and the five primary elements.
and this Self-con The object I have but myself has power over this "
sciousness
self-consciousness perceptible in snch ideas as
"Egoism is
(149).
is
observed and
and
"none
known,"
"I
that,"
exist,"
All this
&c.
is
"
the characteristic action
of the principle of Egoism, on which the Buddhi depends for its determinative function in such decisions as this is to be "
done by
me"
The different products of this effect are next stated Thence proceeds a two-fold creation" The forms of these
(150). "
are stated
creations
"
The
set
of eleven and
the five
primary
"
only these two creations proceed from the principle of Egoism. The eva excludes all other possible suppo elements
sitions.
Objection : Principle of kinds of creation proceed from a uni-
form Egoism?
We
nature,
how
We grant all
this
But the
:
Egoism being of one uniform can two different kinds of
.
,
*
L
*,
-^
inanimate (the elements) and en lightening (the senses) proceed therefrom? creation
/>
reply
KARIKA XXV.
The Reply
proceeds from the modified principle and partakes of the attrin r\ t mi bute ot (jroodiiess. ihe primary el e-
set of eleven
The differ-
cnce due to the di1
Ng Attribute?**
of Egoism, -,
^
ments are due ness
;
to the Attribute of
Dark
from Foulness proceed both.
senses, being light and enlightening, (151). are said to partake of Goodness, and as such proceed from modified Egoism. From Egoism as affected, on the other hand,
The eleven
9
66
[152153]
[K. xxvi.]
set of the primary elements. How so ? Because these elements partake of the Attribute of Darkness. That is to say Though the principle of Egoism is one and
by Darkness, proceed the
uniform, yet from the operation or suppression of various Attributes, it produces creations of diverse characters. This
(152).
is
.The
Objection purposelessness Passions.
of
When all the necessary effects objected to are brought about by the action of the attributes of Goodness and Darkness only, .,1,1 -, have done with the purposeless attribute ,
of Foulness.
We "
reply
From Foulness proceed
"
both
i.
e.,
the set of eleven as
well as the primary elements. Though there is nothing to be done exclusively by
nccesary for urging the other Attributes to action.
Foulness, Jyet it is a necessary factor, since the attributes ol Goodness and Darkness
and as such could not are both, by their very nature, inert do their own work unless urged to action by the active and mobile Rajas. Thus then, the efficacy of the attribute of Foulness lies in its character of supplying the motive force to the inert attributes of Goodness and Darkness. And thus ;
we
see that
it is
not altogether purposeless.
In order to describe the set of eleven the effects of Good the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.
ness
XXVI. The
The ten External Organs
the
Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin ; those
intellectual organs are,
of action are >
speech,
hand,
excretory organs, and
*
fee*,
the
the organ of
generation.
(1^3).
Sense
is
defined as the
immediate
effect
of the
principle of Egoism, as affected by the attribute of Goodness. These are two-fold intellectual,
and those of
action.
Both these are called
07
[154155]
[K.
xxvn.]
of the Spirit (senses) because they are characteristics The eye, named are senses The (Indra). "
:
eye is the sense for ear for perceiving the perceiving colour, the tongue flor perceiving sound, the nose for perceiving smell, These are the taste, and the skin for experiencing touch. The action of the organs of speech intellectual sense-organs. and the rest will be spoken of later on (Karika XXVII.) Functions
Of
#."
The eleventh sense-organs
these
is
the
next described
KARIK! XXVII.
Of these
of the (sense-organs) Mind (Manas) partakes nature of both (intellectual as well as
The eleventh sense
Mind denned.
t } lose
o f ac tion)
(or thinking)
a
sense-organ
since
has
it
:
it
is
principle,
the
reflecting
and
is
called
cognate properties.
Its
multifariousness, as well as its external forms, are due to the various specific modifications of the Attributes. "
uble natUre of
Among the eleven organs, Mind $*c" partakes of the nature of both i. e., it is an infcellectual or an of sensation, as well
Partakes,
(154).
mhid
as one of action, since the eye
and speech,
&c., operate on their respective objects only when influenced by
the principle of Manas. 9
(155).
The author next gives the
specific definition of It is the reflecting principle ig to sajs ig defined by reflection
Manas Mind The
defined.
That
thereof.
Mnd
It is the principle which supplies forms and qualifications to the abstract cognition of a certain object, which precedes the concrete and well-defined knowledge
reflecting cha-
invariably
"
"
As
(or
is laid
thought).
down by an ancient
writer
"
At
first,
one observes a certain object without qualifications, and latter ly intelligent people think of the object as belonging to a certain
G8
[156158]
[K.
XXVIL]
and having certain properties." It is a well-known fact that on first seeing* an object, the first cognition that one has
class
of
it,
resembles to a great degree the
Soon
and unqualified.
indefinite
cognition of a child
after this one learns to con
nect the object so observed, with its genus, property, &c. This latter cognition is said to be perception, which is a func
Manas (Mind), and as such serves to from similar and dissimilar objects, and thus
tion characteristic of it
distinguish serves as its definition.
Objection .-Granted all this:
(156). Oljection
:
make Mind when it has function of
Why
But we have seen that Egosim and Buddhi, having distinct func,.
.
,
own
a sense
tions ot their
distinct
same manner, we sense-organs not class Manas among o them either.
its
own?
The author
;
"
It
replies
is
are
not classed
among
in the
a
Why ?
sense-organ"
shall
Be
"
cause of its having cognate properties" This P r P erfc y mainly is the fact of its being an immediate
effect
^,^1^1
by Goodness is
which
the immediate effect of Egoism as affected by Goodness, and not that of being a characteristic of the Spirit for this latter pro* ;
the definition of a
,
,
,
.
.
,
.
and as such would also have to be classed
perty belongs to Egoism also
sense.
this latter
;
among sense-organs. Thus then "being the characteristic of the Spirit is only an explanation of the derivation of the term Indriya it cannot be said to form its denotation. ;
(157). Whence
It is
the multi.
fanous effects from Egoism.
asked
Whence such
Attributes"
(158).
effects
"It
t
The
.
.
difference in the effects
due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the tive principles of sound, &c.
Attributes.
multifarious
from the single principle of Egoism as affected by Goodness ? We reply is due to the specific modifications of the is
form of the opera
Destiny (adrishta) is also a modification of the We have the qualifying term External as "
presenting a comprehensible example, the sense of the
"
sen~
69
[159]
[K.
xxvin
xxix.j:
tence being As the external forms are the effects of the modifications of the Attributes, so are also the internal and
imperceptible ones.
Having thus described the forms 6f the eleven
(159).
sense-organs, the particular functions of the first ten are next stated.
KARIKA XXVIII.
The
function of the five senses, in respect to colour, &c., is mere observation or feeling ;
The functions of the external organs.
By
walking, excretion gratification are (the functions of) the other five.
^
speech,
"observation"
here
stract Otserration-.-the function of the five intellectual senses.
is
meant
perception
/ intellectual
(
the primary ab Nirvikalpa ) through
.
the ar&
Speeeh, handling, walking, excretions thesenses
handling,
^
Qf
senses.
Mer
fa e
"
Speech
L ,
.
organs
The
action.
ot
vocal
^
yc.,
of
organ
the is
located in the throat, the palate, &c., whose function is speech. The functions of the
cognitive (intellectual organs) are clear enough.*
The
functions of the three internal organs are next
stated.
XXIX. Of^he three Function
of
the
ijrtemai organs.
*
That
tions
P. ff.
sound
is
to say
the ear
and
the others,
(the
internal
organs) the functions are
constituted
by
cte ristics
these
;
their
respective
chara-
are peculiar to each.
they are denoted by their very names or by their defini
defined as the sense for perceiving (or comprehending) thus the function of the ear is perception of sound, and so with is
70
[160161]
The
common
function
xxx. j
to the organs consists in the five
Prana and the
vital airs
[K.
rest. c
"
(160).
The functions of the three are constituted by their That is to say* respective characteristics"
Reflection of Manas. Self-consciousness of
,
.
.
,.
.,
,
,.
Ahankara and \<if*rmifiat ion of Buddhi.
the property which serves as the distinguisliin? feature of each of the internal
tions
organs, also denotes their respective func of Buddhi, self-consciousness
;
determination
thus,
of Ahankdra and reflection of Manas.
The double character of the functions hased on the
(161).
common
fact of their heing specific or
are peculiar function"
The
"
The jive
"
fyc.
five vital airs,
.
,
vital airs, constitute
.
former j
"
These
common
an(| cease
)
Of
these
Apana
resides at the back, &c.,
Uddna
;
resides in the
Vydna
in
,
,
when the to exist when these the air called Prana
resides in the heart, the navel
the navel and the joints lastly,
the
.
since the latter
;
are absent.
(Breath or Life
,
,
.
vital airs
ternal organs.
and
next stated
The function of the three internal organs is the substance (of life, and hence) of the five
the common function of the three in-
that called
is
exist
and the
Samdna
toes ;
in the heart,
the throat, heart, &c. ; These are the five
skin.
airs.
The author now fourfold organs
(the
states the order of the functions of these
external organs and the three
internal
organs).
With regard The instantaneous
ofSso functions.
to visible
^OUr are
objects, the functions
sa id to
obj ectS)
^ e instantaneous, as
with regard to inthe func tions of the three
well a. gradual vigible
of the
;
71
[162165]
[K. xxx.]
(internal organs) are preceded
by that
(/. e.
the cognition
of some visible object.) "Instantaneous"
(162*).
Instantaneous with regard to visible ob-
"with
when one
e 9"
regard
to visible
sees in the
da*
objects"
means
by
of a flash of lightning, a tiger facing him,
and determination away from the place
his observation, reflection
are instantaneous and accordingly he runs at once.
(163).
With regard
S
to in-
the
objects,
ti0
4at
th e i
pendent of the
n,!::
ex-
then the conscious
;
me";
and he
on the other hand, organs operate without the
to invisible objects,
Denial
aid ot the external organs The function the three is preceded by that,i. e., the inof stantaneoiis as well as the gradual func tions
The functions of internal organs preceded by those of the external ones.
him
at
is
th visible
a person has
^
levelled
thief
With regard
(164).
11
advancing against run away from the place.
"the
finally decides to
light,
a faint cognition of a certain object; then he looks at it more steadily and ascertains that it is a thief with
bow and arrow
ness follows
dim
in
g.,
at first
Gradual with regard to visible ob-
his
e.
"Gradual"
of the
"
three
internal
organs
are
preceded by some perception of a visible T rn obJ ect smce Inference, lestiniony and the O ther methods of rproof operate orilv W!IPI UA r .
*
.
,.
>
_
J
.
they have lor their back ground some sort of external perception.
(165).
Granted
Objection:
Option: Func-
all
this:
But the functions
either of the four or of the
three
(organs) cannot depend on themselves alone ; for in th ? that case (these organs) must be either if permanent, then their funcions also or transient permanent would be permanent if transient, then the various functions lion.-*
permanent or
;
;
would combine most absurdly, there agency.
being no restrictive
72
[166167]
[K.
XXXI.
We
reply
:
They* thp
Reply Functions of the organs dufe to mutual impulse. Soul proposes the incen tive.
(the organs)
of their
performation
towards
operate
respective
functions.
due to mutual impulse.
purpos e
of
the
supplies
Spirit
motive; by nothing (else) caused to act.
is
The the
an organ
The subject of the first sentence is "organs." (166). A number of persons wielding different weapons, unite for suppressing a common enemy, the one holding a lance uses that alone, and so on, each using his own particular weapon. In the same manner one organ operates towards the fulfilment of another s purpose, which tends to help ita own. And since this movement towards action is the cause (and hence the regulating motive power) of the action of the organs, there cannot arise any absurd collision of the func tions.
(167).
Another objection beings,
The
can
lancers, &c., being sentient
each
comprehend
other
s
motives and can act towards the fulfilment gent organs understand each other s motives?
thereof.
n
,
The organs on the contrary, are i and as such can never act in ,
,
,
all m-sentient,
the same way as the lancers, &c., do (and hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question), Consequently the in-sentient organs must have an animate and intelligent supervisor over them, who is to understand their
end and urge them to action accordingly. The Spirit s purpose is the motive, by nothing We reply (else) can the organs be brought to aciT "
:
Kepiy-Soui spurpose urging them to action.
Since the purpose of the Spirit
is to urge . , \ organs to action, what is the need of postulating a supervisor ab extra ? This .
the
point will be further elucidated in Karika LVII. *
Davies restricts this to the internal organs the Karika should not apply to organs in general
;
but there as
the
is
no reason
Kaumudi
why
takes
it,
[
73
168170] (168).
It has "
to act
brought
organs
[K.
been declared that
The author next
"by
an organ
is
nothing
xxxn.j
states the division
of these
:
XXXII. ; they have variously the functions of seizing, retaining and The objects of these are manifesting.
Organs are of thirteen kinds
that which
tenfold,
is
be
to
seized,
retained or manifested.
The thirteen organs consist of the eleven senseorgans, Ahankara and Buddhi. An organ , The thirteen orls a particular kind of agent, and no agency gans the ten exter(169).
,
.
nai organs,
Manas,
js
possible
Ahank&ra and Bua-
.
,
without a function
;
hence the
author next states the various functions.
dhi*
They have the functions fa" The senses of action have the function of seizing that "
tionT/the semes^f action.
;
*oT jfaddhi^
and Ma"Manifestation
the
,
intellectual
of or-
to say, they extend their action to their
is
respective objects.
Buddhi, Ahankdra and
Manas retain impressions by their respective func ti ns
the life-breath, &c. (mentioned lastly, the intellectual (per
^
and
before) ceptive) organs manifest their respective objects. ;
(170).
Since every action must have an object, the objects of the above-mentioned functions are next
The objects of these functions, tenfold.
stated i
The
"
That which
*"
is to
be
seized"
frc.
i
objects to be acted upon by the thir teen organs are those that are to be seized,
retained and manifested.
By
seizure here
is
meant pervasion
The five senses of action extend over speech (or extension). and the rest and each of these being both human and super ;
human
these objects become tenfold. Similarly the object to be retained by the three internal organs is the body, which is
an aggregate of the five great elements, of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour. Each of these five being both human and superhuman, these objects also become 10 fivefold being
74
[171-174] tenfold.
;
human and superhuman,
the objects also
ttie sub-divisions of the thirteen
organs are next
these being both tenfold.
(171). stated
XXXIIL]
Similarly the objects of the five intellectual senses and each of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour
are five
become
[K.
:
KiKiKl XXXIII. Internal organs are three The organs numbered and the differbetween the
making .,
and the external
;
known
objects
rm
i
organs act at
and the internal at the
Sun poinTo^
ti
notedt
three divisions of time.
present
to the former
^
Ine external
tnree,
ten,
;
Manas, Akankara (172). The internal organs are three and Biiddhi, called internal because located inside the body. :
(173).
These
The external organs are ten
:
the ten sense-organs.
latter exhibit objects to the three internal
organs,
i. e.,
they supply the means for reflection, consciousness and determination of objects the intellectual senses functioning by means of observation, and the senses of action by means of their respective functions.
(174).
The author next
states a further point of difference
organs internal and external The external organs act at time present" / ,, is meant here the time By present and the imclosely following J [preceding ir
between
The
external
senses acting at time the interpresent nai with reference to all three divisions of time. ;
"
"
mediate present
thus then,
;
speech* also
The internal or belongs to the present. three divisions time" e. the idea that "there at the g., of gans has been rain," since the river has risen (for the past) ; "
"
there
is fire
in the mountain, since there .
*
..
.
is smoke"
(for the /
necessary for the case of speech, because no two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word could be uttered at the time present if by this word were meant the present
The
special qualification
is
moment only. This absurdity, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as included in it.
75
[175178] present)
;
cc
and
carrying their
lastly, eggs"
we
[K. xxxiv.]
we
shall have rain, since
see ants
(for the futnre).
Time, according to the Vaiseshikas, being one, cann t allow such divisions as past, present Time-not a distinct and future. Hence we must Jiave for the principle according
(175).
ant
e
yas.
specifications
and
future.
various
units, the
various
conditions
which we give the names, past, So the Stinkhyas do not admit of a to
or
present distinct
principle in the shape of Time.
The
(176).
author next
considers
of
the objects
the
external senses operating at time present
KABIKA XXXIV. The
Of jfchese,
intellectual
(those
the five intellectual senses
of sensation)
concern
objects
"
s P ecin c
sound the garding the ;
rest
re-
five
ob
jects of sense.
t i ve ).
YQ
^
as well as non-specific
spe ech
concerns
(collec-
sound
regard the five objects
the
;
(of sense,)
Of the
ten external senses, the five intellectual (177). ones concern specific as well as non-specific objects by :
and such objects are sound and specific here is meant gross the rest (the Tanmdtras), manifesting themselves as Earth, &c., (the elements) having the properties of calmness, turbu
and dulness. The non-specific objects are the primary elements. The particle Mdtra, in the word Tanmdtra, serves The senses of to distinguish these from the gross objects. lence
Yogis concern sound, &c., in their subtle as well as gross whereas the senses of ordinary men relate to sound,
states,
&c., in their gross
(1*?8).
forms only.
Similarly of the senses Speech concerns sound, in
of
action
(the
Motor
Senses). gross form, because is the cause of sound. Speech, however, can not be the Speech cause of the primary element of sound, which is the direct and as such has the effect of Self-consciousness its
(Ahankara)
;
as speech itself (which also being one of senses, proceeds directly from the principle of Self-consciousness.
same cause
76
[179] "
The
"
i.
rest,
e.,
excretory organs, senses, are all
&c.,
e.
xxxv
concern Jive
g. jar &c.,
made up
xxxvi.]
of action
the fonr other senses "
different objects,
[K.
the
because the
objects"
which are the objects
(tf
these
of the five primary elements of sound,
l
colour, &c.
the thirteen organs, some are said to be superior to for which are given reasons others,
Among
:
KiniKA
XXXV.
Since Buddhi with the other internal organs adverts to (comprehends) all objects (of sense),
these three are said to be
The superiority
of over exter-
intern il nai organs.
(principal ones),
the warders
and the
others
the
gates (secondary). (179). Gates
Warders,
i. e.,
i. e.,
chief ones.
such as are the external organs.
Since Buddhi, with Ahankara and Manas, apprehends (i. ., determines) all objects exhibited by the external organs, these latter are said to be gates (secondary organs), and Buddhi, with the other internal organs, the warders (chiefs).
Buddhi
the chief, not only in comparison with the external organs, but also with regard to the other external or gans,
is
Manas and Ahankdra.
To
this effect it is said:
KlRiKi XXXVI. These (the external organs together with Manas and AhanJcdra), characteristically
Bering from others
accounted
different
one another and being
modifications
of Attributes
resemble a lamp in action such) having present
first
it in its
enlightened the Spirit
entirety to Buddhi.
s
;
(and as purpose,
77
[180181] As the
(180). treasur ^r,
who
who
finally
officer collects
village
and
different heads of families
[K.
delivers
xxxvu.]
the rent from the
the collection to the
again, in his turn, carries it to the head-officer, it over to the king : so, in the same
makes
manner, the external organs, having operated ofi (observed) an object, present the observation to Manas, which reflects on (and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) presenting these qualified observations in turn to Ahankdra, which takes
it
specific cognizance of them, and finally delivers such personal Hence it is said: cognition to the head-officer, Buddhi. "
These having enlightened the Spirit s purpose present
it
to
Buddhi."
The external organs together with Manas and In spite of diverse Ahankdra, are various affections of Attrin modifications of butes L e Goodness, A tTributel yet thl internal organs coFoulness and Dulness, which though (181).
"
8
plrposflike
Sngto a lamp.
Essentially opposed to one another, are yet brought to co-operate for the supreme
as the wick, oil and fire, though purpose of the Spirit just the action of one another, yet join, under to variously opposed the form of a lamp, in removing darkness, and thus illumine ;
(manifest) the different colours. The same the Attributes such is the connection.
is
the
case
with
;
An
objection
is
why Objection Buddhi not make subordinate to the others
?
should
it
be said that the
other organs present their impressions to , 7 77 TTT1 Buddhi? Why should not we make it ,
,
.
-,-,
qu ^e the other way
:
Buddhi subordinate
,
to
We
Why
raised.
reply
Ahankara
?
:
KiRIKA XXXVII. R
a
P
i
y
:
Since
The
superiority of Buddhi accounted for, be-
the it is
it is
01
,1
and Matter.
Buddhi
Spirit
Bucldlii that accomplishes
enjoyment, and
again
the
stibtle
Nature
and
-\
bpirit S
di^rence Spirit
-?
that
exposes
between
78
[182183]
[K.
xxxvu.]
Since the purpose of the Spirit is the only in centive to the action of the organs, that organ is supreme over others which accomplishes that purpose direct}^ and
(182).
;
since
it is
Buddhi alone that does
it
this,
is
supreme.
Just
as the chief minister, being the direct agent of the king, is supreme over other officials. Buddhi assumes the form of
the Spirit through its proximity to it, and as such leads to the accomplishment of its purpose. Sensation consisting either of pleasure or pain, resides in Buddhi, which is (reflected) in the
and
Spirit
observation,
thus
leads
and
reflection
transferred to
to
its
Buddki through
of
the are
their various modifications
same manner, the functions of the senses
in the
As
objects
enjoyment.
consciousness
;
also coalesce
with the functional determination of Buddhi, as the forces of officials do with that of the master.
the subordinate
The objector asks:
(183).
If
Buddhi only
accomplish the Spirit
lT?f; the soul with pleasure, no Mukti, is possible.
it latterly Reply shows to the soul its distinction from :
Matter.
The The
objector difference will
being
caused,
end and thus would emancipation with ifc
cease
emancipation
is
s
We
possible
ft
afterwards . . , between Spirit
serves
to
enjoyment, then no the
exposes
:-
reply
difference
nr * and Nature. By exis meant here bringing about position Visinashti. the construction of Antaram ... * ^ *i of to that Odanapakam being similar i
.
T>
>>
;
7
retorts
:
Natm e saying, ,. ln time
the difference between Spirit and
being thus, according to your a caused one, must have an ,
;
.,
and thus
/,-.
.
.,
own end
-,-,
(the Spirit could never
attain to eternal Beatitude).
-
.
*
For Buddhi would continue help the Spirit to its enjoyment qf pleasure, and hence this latter could never attain to final beatitude which consist! in the total extinction of both pleasure and pain. Visinasliti itself has been explained as f expresses the difference," then the mention of Antaram would seem superfluous. But. it is not so ; it helps "
to intensify the
meaning
of the sentence.
79
[184-186]
We
reply
The
;
^ the
*
Buddhi
and the
;
only in exhibiting difference to the full view of the Spirit
who then
Buddhi only serving
has been everlasting
difference
function of
xxxvm.]
[K.
^lf
lies
recognises the fact that he him-
the con something distinct mobile and modifiable Nature. stitutionally
loul^vlew!
is
fy>m
(The distinction is not caused by Buddhi it the Spirit and Nature themselves). By this ;
as eternal as
is
also implied that emancipation is the sole purpose of the Spirit. The distinction of Spirit and Nature, however, is extremely subtle it is
and hard to be perceived.
The organs having been described, the author next descri bes objects, specific and non-specific :
KAKIKA XXXVIII.
The
primary elements are non-specific
five
these five The division of objects into specific and
ments
non-specific.
.
proceed the five gross
these
;
p
specific
(
from
;
are
said
they
are
latter
because
)
ele-
to
be
calm
(soothing), turbulent (terrific) and deluding. (184). The Tanmdtras sound and the rest are subtle and the character of calmness, &c., do not belong to these. The word Matra denotes the capability of these elements of
;
being enjoyed.
Having thus stated the
(185). objects
aro
described:
non-specific, the
these
"From
c."
From
specific
the five
<f
Tanmdtras, of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour proceed the five gross Elements Akasa, Air, Fire,
respectively
Waterand (186).
Earth.
we grant that these are thus produced but what about their specific character
Objection:
,
Specific
because
soothing, tern fie deluding.
and
^y e rep L ty J
.
u
Tj
t
^
specific^
Why because"^?/ are calm, turbulent and deluding. The first ^ has a causal ?
"
and the second a
^
;
?
collective signification.
80
[187188]
xxxix.]
[K.
elements, A kasa, &c., some have the Goodness predominating in them and these others accordingly are pleasing, enlightening and buoyant in and are aricl fickle Foulness, turbulent, painful predominate ;
Among
the gross
of
attribute
;
(
;
the rest predominating in Darkness are dull, confounded and These elements, thus visibly discriminated, are sluggish.
The primary elements on the contrary gross. cannot be similarly discriminated by ordinary people and as such they are said to be non-specific, i. e., subtle.
specific
i. e.,
;
The
sub-divisions of the specific objects are stated
:
KiKIKA XXXIX. Subtle
and such
(astral) bodies
parents, Je
d into:
elements,
(i) (
produced
3
form
the
Of
the
three these
gross of
sorts
the
subtle
Bodies are everlasting, and those duced of parents are perishable.
ents?
(187).
with
together
specific objects.
the
produced of
as are
"The
are specific objects
of three
sorts";
pro thes e
(1) Subtile bodies (which are not but are visible, only postulated in order to explain certain phenomena) (2) Those produced of parents, comprising the
three sorts are mentioned
:
;
and and Thus
sixfold Sheaths (Kosas). Among these latter, hair, blood flesh are produced from the mother and the veins, bones ;
marrow from the father then we have seen that
these six are the six
;
the subtile bodies
Kos as.
form the
first
kind
(
of specific objects bodies produced of parents, the second ; and the gross elements the third, objects like the jar, &c., ;
being included in the
(188). The
The
subtile bodies
arc permanent, those
produ&d
of parents
perishable.
last.
difference
between a subtile body and a body
produced of parents
is
bodies are permanent
and
f
OJ
parents \.
ending ash or
.
in dirt.
perishable"
f,.
,
.
(dissolving
stated
"
Sufctile
those
that
...
produced
is .,,
to ,.
sav .
,"
into) either liquid,
[189190]
si
The Astral body
[K. XL.]
is
described.
KiuiKA XL.
The mergent, The Astral Body unconfined
formed primepemknent, com-
subtle (astral) body, T
vall
^confined, posed of Buddlli and the rest >
>
is
pernia-
nent, and migrating, invested with dispo-
the primary *
sitions.
elements.
down
tO is
migrates,
.
enjoyment, and
without
is
invested
with dispositions.
When
(189).
the emanations first
Unconfined Permanent.
from Nature began, the
object to evolve
therefrom,
for
each
AJ -r Spirit individually, was the Astral Body. This body is unconfirmed^ inasmuch as it can
and
a
j
i
-j
n
i
i_-\
i
enter even a solid piece of stone. It is again permanent since it exists all along, from the first creation to the final
"*
"
;
dissolution.
composed of Buddhi and the rest, That is to say, it is an of Buddhi, Ahankara, the eleven senses and the aggregate and as such it is specific, being five primary elements
The Astral Body is down to the primary
"
elements"
;
endowed with the properties of calmness,
restlessness
and
dnlness.
(190). Objection
:
TTn-
necessariness of postainting two bodies, astral and gross.
,-111
*,
The word niyata
astral
body
is
astral bodies
is
Let this astral body
/
?
differently interpreted by Narayana Tirtba (in his takes it in the sense of "restricted,"/.^, an
He
and so there are distinct restricted to one particular Spirit to each Spirit. The interpretation of Gaudap:".ds closoly
resembles that of the Kaumudi.
;
There does not seem to be an;- special the though I am more indiael
ground for preferring either of the two, interpretation of the Kauttiudl-
11
:
:
sheaths
vS&nkhya-Chandrika)
Objection
be the only body the seat of enjoyment for th e spirit What is the need of the gross i ,1 the six comprised oi physical body
U
82
[191-192]
We
"
reply
:
Necessity of the physical body, be-
[
K
.
XL,]
It
migrates" i. e., the astral body invariably deserts the body and J it has lately * occupied,* r . .. another. again occupies (If it be asked) .
.
why "
is)
Jt do so ? ( we reply) (because it without enjoyment, that is to say,
does
"
because the astral body by itself without a corresponding gross physical body of six sheaths to afford the seat of enjoy ments, would be without any enjoyments, and therefore it migrates.
(191).
Transmigration is due to merit and demerit; and these have no connection with A i i / r tne Astral Body ( referring as they do
Objection
Objection:
How
,
can the Astral Body imgrate,bemg without dispositions
?
:
1
j
r>
reflecprimarily to Buddhi, and then by J to the tion, Spirit) then how can this .
latter migrate ?
We
"
reply
:
(because)
is
it
invested with
*
dispositions
The dispositions are merit and demerit, wisdom and ignorance, passion and endowed dispassion, power and weakness ;
with these primarily is the Buddhi, with which latter again the Astral Body is connected and as such the Astral Body ;
becomes mediately connected with the various dispositions, just as a piece of cloth is perfumed by contact with champaka, Thus then, being invested with dispositions, it flowers. becomes quite natural that the Astral Body should migrate. (If it is asked) why should not the Astral Bodylike Nature last even after the final
(192).
The Astral Body dissolving praiaya.
at
dissolution
each
?
We
reply .
mergent, solves (into
that
is
to say,
Nature
its
The mergent character of the Astral Body from the c
such, also).
fact of its being caused,
having
a
(i. e.,
(because because
it .
iu
is) ..
dis
immediate cause). is to be inferred
being caused, and, as must have an end
beginning in time, it
83
[103] Objection
We
:
Objections :~Why not attribute migration to hAiddhi, &c.
We
reply
?
all
grant senses ,
-,
?
XLL]
Bat why not attribute Bucldhi, Ahankara and the
this.
migration to
Have done with
,.
A
t>
i
j
the
unwarranted
i
postulation 01 an Astral Body. T>
:
XLL
KARIKA
As a
[K.
painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a stake, so neither does
Reply the Buddhi cannot rest without
the
LlHQa
(Buddlli,
&C.,)
supportless, without a
specific
substrate.
(193).
Subsist (body).
Buddhi, &c., are called Lingd, because they are the
means of
In cognition (Linganat, Jndpakdt, lingam)* between support of this the author puts forth a syllogism the ordinary physical death and re-birth, Buddhi and the rest :
have some sort of evolved body are
they
aggregates of the
their
for
receptacle, because like primary elements
five
;
their prototypes in the ordinary physical body. "
Without specific
bodies"
bodies. the Astral Body corthe roborated by
MahabhaTata.
i.
without subtle (astral)
.,
Testifying to this assertion,
we have
the
following (from the Mahabharata) : "Then Yama extracted from Satyavan s ] .
body, the thumb-sized body, which he had thus Here the mention of the subjugated." entrapped andj as "thumb-sized" extracted body implies the fact of its
having been the Astral Body, since Spirit could have been extracted. extract,
is
meant the Astral Body,
derivatively as
that
impossible that the in the above
it is
By Purusha,
which sleeps
explaining the word s&te) in the body
(lies
(puri).
Having thus proved the existence of the Astral Body, the author states the reason and method of its migration: *
The PaneJiikarana-cirarana explanation of the word is given. Cf.
Tatttoaek**driM-r-vr\xm a similar
84
[194-195]
XLII-XLIII.]
[K.
KARIKA XLII.
Formed
the
for
sake of the
Astral Keasons and man ner of the migration of the Astral Bod}.
Body
dramatic
s
Spirit
plays
its
purpose the parts
Kke
a
on account of the
actor,
connection of means and consequences, and by union with the predominant power of Nature.
Formed
(194).
for the Spirit s purpose
dramatic actor
plays like a
"by
the Astral
Body
connection with the means
merit, &c., and consequences, the occupation of different kinds of gross hodies, the effects of merit, &c. That is to say, as a dramatic actor, occpuying different stages, plays severally the
parts of Parasurama,
Yudhishthira, Vatsaraja so does the astral body, occupying various gross bodies, play the part of
man, brute or (195).
plant.
(If it
The capacity of the Astral Body is due to the power of Nature. .
asked) Whence this Astral Body ? We reply,
is
"
capability of the by union with the
predominant power of Nature" As is The various declared by the Puranas . due are to Nature s strange developments "
:
"
-
omnipotence."
by connection with means and conse the author therefore next describes these means and
It has just "
quences
;
consequences
been
"
said,
:
KARIRA XLI1I.
The
essential dispositions are innate ; the incidental such as merit, &c., are seen ones,
The means and conDharma,
(considered) to be appurtenant .,
sequences
& c.
organs
;
,
to the
. -,
,
the uterine germ, &c., belong
to the effect.*
_
.
* It
In the
pointed out that Davies has quite misunderstood this Ka rika place, he renders S&m-siddkikdk by transcendental", the very
may be firlt
reverse of
.
"
what
it
does mean.
Secondly
he renders
though in reality the compound means as explained by the J&inmudi as well as the Chandrikd. "
including
(
_
.
cause",
Karanasrayinak by <;
located in
organs"
85
[196199]
[K. XLIV.]
(196). Incidental = consequent brou g ht about affcer the mau s birth
i.
;
lcntal
f
dis
"
>
e. y
by
propitiating the gods, &c.
,
*
"
Essential dispositions are innate" e. g., it is declared that at the boo;! lining of the creation the revered 1
primeval sage Kapila emerged into exist ence, fully equipped with merit, wisdom, and power. Incidental dispositions, on the other dispassion that is to say, they are brought about by not are innate, hand, such effort merit, &c., are those belonging to personal ;
Valmiki and other Great Eishis. The
o posites of &c., simi-
ly explained.
same to
*s
be nn ^ er stood with regard
^
demerit, ignorance, passion and
weak
The agrregate formed of the uterine germ, flesh, blood, &c., of the child in the mother s
(197).
Flesh, blood, &c., related to the gross
W0 mb, body
;
related
is
to
the gross physical f
that
is
to
say,
states of the latter
;
they are particular as are also the child
hood, youth, &c., of the born man.
The
means and the consequences have been the respective consequences of the various are described.
(198).
explained
means
;
now
KARIK! XLIV.
By C the *
virtue
(is
e
vTiS means.
f
obtained) ascent to higher vice, descent to the lower
dom
(results) beatitude
;
by from wis-
planes ;
;
and bondage
from the reverse. "
(199). various
stai>
to
the
spheres (the ,Brahma,
the
By
ry
virtue,
Prajapatya and so
fa."
forth.)
i.
e.,
86
[200] "
Vice to lower.
"
By
vice,
[K. XLIV.]
#c." i.
to the lower planes
e.,
,
known
From wisdom,
as sutala, &c.
however, this
when, finds its fulfilled, "
The workings of Nature continue only
from
false
"
knowledge."
is
till
attained,
Nature
particular
As
is
Spirit
declared,
the attainment of
the reverse,
$*c."
i. e*
y
knowledge, results bondage. This bondage
(200).
From
ex
only so long as is not attained ;
work in connection with that and accordingly retires from him.
discriminative
&e
Nature ministers to
beatitude."
perience of the Spirit discriminative wisdom
is
and
Incidental 6
bouda g e
oflhe^bove, reTp^-
Personal.
that of those
:
The
Natural, natural
Materialists
who
contemplate on Nature as the Spirit with reference to such men, it is laid down in
tiveiy, contradictory S
is
of three kinds
also
;
11*
kinds Q f bondage*
The contemplators of the nnmanifested (Nature) continue (in the chain of metempsy end of chosis) till a hundred thousand years" [at the the Puranas
wisdom]. The incidental bondage who contemplate on the. various products of Nature the elements, the senses, Ahankdra and Buddhi.
which they attain is
of those
as Spirit,
"
:
With regard
to true
to these
the senses continue
it is
till
laid
down
"
:
Th e
ten Manvantaras
;
contemplators of those of the ele
ments, till a hundred Manvantaras those of Ahankara, till a thousand and lastly, those of the Buddhi havin g done away with all feverish excitement, continue till ten thousand ;
;
Manvantaras.
Those labouring under the incidental bondage
are (conventionally called) Videkas? is due to Ishtdpurta (actions done such as the digging of tanks, &c., cbne with the sole motive of personal gains hereafter). Thos6
The personal bondage
with
selfish motives,
performing such actions, having their minds influenced by desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as
such undergo bondage.
87
[201203]
[K. XLV.]
IURIKA XLV.
From
dispassion results
absorption* into Prakriti ; from passionate attachment, transmi-
*
vaSf
gration
ment
from
;
power,
desires
(of
and
;)
non-impedifrom the
reverse, the contrary. "
(201).
From dispassion
L Absorption into Prakriti frdnidispas-
meant
results absorption into
Those wll
Prakriti"
from passion, but are
are free
ignorant of the true nature of spirit, are absorbed into Nature. By Prakriti here are
Prakriti, Buddhi, AJiankdra, the
Elements, and the
senses. Those who meditate upon these as Spirit are absorbed into these (i. e. those mis taking the senses for the Spirit
become absorbed they rest there
(202). ,
II.
tion
the senses, and so on), that is to .say, in the course of time, they are born again.
in
till,
"From
Transrmgra-
from passionate
passionate attachment results
The epithet
.
;
(as is
migration"
the painimplies r because fnl character of metempsychosis "passionate"
has been previously described) passion
the source of pain.
(203).
"From
power,
III.
Non-impcdi-
ment from power.
/T
,
i.
non-impediment"
obstruction of desires. \
(Iswara)
"
A
non-
man
e.,
i
one who can do whatever he -\
-\
is
the
powerful -\
wishes." 1
* Davies takes the Hindu commentators to task, here, and remarks (the Sankhya) does not recognise any absorption of the subtle body into Hence the meaning is that by Nature, until the soul is entirely free :
the destruction of passion, the influence of the material world
is
"It
destroyed,
and the soul is independent, though not yet finally liberated." All this is quit * true but I don t see how this affects the position of the Hindu cpmmentators, who, at least Vachaspati Misra among them, do not assert the final absorption of the bodies into Nature all that they mean is that by dispassion, the soul or more properly, its seat, the astral body is absorbed into Nature and rests there till it is born again. It may be remarked that ;
;
this resting
is what, in theosophic parlance, enjoyed by the Individuality in Devachaiv
is
called
<;
tjhe
peaceful rest
88
[204-205] "
IV. Obstruction of desires
from weak-
From
"the
ness.
^e
[K. XLVI.]
reverse" i. e. i.
contrary"
,.
r.
form weakness,
the frequent obstruc-
e.,
-i
tion of desires.
With a view to describe collectively as well as individually, the eight properties of Buddhi virtue, vice, &c., in order to show which of these are to be practised, and which relinquish the author first describes ed, by those desiring emancipation them
collectively
:
KlMKl XLVI. This
is
an
intellectual
creation,
distinguished by
Error, Disablity, Contentment and Per-
cr^n^lST
1 ***<>*.
the
the hostile influence of
By
inequalities
different forms of this creation
of
the
become
attributes, fifty.
Pratyaya == That by which anything is known, i. e. y Buddhi. "Error" i. e., ignorance, is a proli. perty of Buddhi; so is also "disabUty" which Disability. in. Contentment, results from the incapacity J of the senseIV. Perfection. and Contentment organs. Perfection also (204).
are properties of
Of these,
Buddhi
as will be described later on.
the three former, error, disability and content ment include Virtue and the other six in-
edTu rotbovefout
(205).
leaving aside Wisincluded in Perfection.
tellectnal properties
dom which
is
;
These properties are next considered individually. The forms of these are fifty" If it is 0fthe asked: Whence these fifty forms? We "
above
IS fi%
reply inequalities
of
the
"from
attributes"
the
hostile
influence
of the (
The inequality may consist
strength of the one in comparison with the other two, or of two conjointly with that of the third. This inquality is assumed to be more or less in accordance with the requirements of particular cases ; and it leads to the either in the individual
89
[206208]
[K. XLVII.-- XLVIII.]
suppression of Attributes by one another the fifty forms of intellectual creation.
The
tifty
forms are next enumerated
thus giving rise to
:
KARIKA XLVII.
There are
twenty-eight of Disability, arising from the imperfecJ
tion of the organs 3
(206).
;
Contentment has
;
.
nine forms
so"
Error
forms of
five
5 forms of Error. 28 of Disability. 9 of Contentment, 8 of Perfection.
The forms*
passion, hatred and
of
;
and reriection
Error
attachment
are
to
eight.
ignorance,
egotism,
the
body: respectively called, obscurity (Tamos), delusion (Moha). extreme delusion (Mahamoha), gloom ( Tamisra), and utter darkness (Andha-
Egotism, &c., partake of the nature of Error ; tamisra). as a matter of fact, they are its products. certain though,
A
object being erroneously determined by Ignorance, Egotism
and the
rest,
attached to
partaking of the nature of Ignorance, become It is for this reason that the revered Varsha-
it.
ganya (Vytisa ?) declares Ignorance component parts.
to be
made up
of the five
(207). Now the author states the sub-divisions of the forms of error
five
:
KARIKA XLVIII.
Of Error
there are eight forms, as also of Delusion
sixty-two subdivisions
of^Error.
extreme Delusion
^
e ighteen-fold,
ten-fold
is
and so
is
;
;
Gloom
also utter
Darkness. " >
Of
ignorance-
eight forms.
* Abkinivcsa
(208). t jiere
Of Error
"
i. e.,
of Ignorance,
are eight forms"
is a technicality of Yoga Philosophy. It is defined by Patanjali {Yoga Sutra 11-9) as the "tenacity of life an attachment to the bqdy which relates the residue of one s former life,"
12
90
[209212]
[K. XLVIIL]
Ignorance of the form of Error consists in mistaking nonNature, Buddhi, Akankdm and. . , f the subtle elements, for Spirit ; and these spiritual things are eight in number, Error is said spiritual
Eight of Delusion.
non
.
.
to be eight-fold.
^ refers
The
(209).
the eight forms to Delusion.
The
gods having attained the eight occult powers, consider them selves to be immortal, and their powers also to be everlasting
;
of Egotism, and since this has the eight object, it is said to be eight-fold.
this is the error
Siddkis for
its
is ten-fold" By Extreme meant the attachment to the f Extreme objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest DehSon. which are ten-fold, each of the five being and hence having these for its either divine or otherwise is Extreme Delusion said to be ten-fold. object,
(210).
"Extreme
Delusion
Delusion
is
;
"
Gloom"
(211).
i. e. 9
"
Hatred,
objects of sense, fc (
Gloom
is
eighteen-fold."
The
sound, &c., are ten by
themselves the eight occult powers how-^ ever are not objects of sense by themselves, to the attainment of the various sensuous ;
but only as means
And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive, objects. their means the Powers too are retarded. The Powers, together with the objects of sense, make up eighteen, and these being the objects of Gloom or Hatred, make it eighteenfold.
(212).
"So
is
Utter
Darkness"
Attachment *****
f
to
life].
[Utter
Darkness =
The word
refers eighteen-fold-ness to Utter
"tathd"
Darkness.
The gods having attained the eight occult powers and enjoying their consequences objects
by
th/}
live in continual fear of these
the
ten
sensuous
being wrested from them
Kakshasas and this fear constitutes Abkinivesa, or and this latter having for its object the aforesaid
attachment
;
;
eighteen things the eight powers said to be eighteeu-fold.
and the ten objects
is
91
[213216]
[K. XLIX.]
Thus the five forms of Error, with their sub-divibecome sixty-two.
(213). siond
(214). Having thus described the five forms of Error, the author next states the twenty eight forms of Disability :
KARIK! XLIX.
The
eleven organs,* together with those of Buddhi, are pronounced to be
injuries of the
tadti&X.*
Disability; the injuries of Buddhi ( itself) are seventeen brought about
by the reversion of contentment and (215).
The
The Eleven
perfection.
injuries of the organs are mentioned as causes f so many injuries of Buddhi, and not
caused by injuries to
by themselves, independent forms of These Disability. injuries-" Deafness,
as,
leprosy, blindness, paralysis, paralysis of the hands, lameness,
dumbness, ajighratd
(failure of the sensibility of the olfactory
nerves), impotency, failure of the action of the bowels, and idiocy," consequent on the failure of the various sense-
organs, are the eleven kinds of intellectual disability, and these are mentioned together with those of Buddhi (itself) in
accordance with the theory of the non-difference of cause and effect.
(216).
Having thus described the
Seventeen caused
by the reversion
of
contentment of perfection. ,
disabilities of Buddhi, from those of the sense-organs, the ,. .,.,. , ^ , 7I ., disabilities of Buddhi itself are next stated With the injuries of Buddhi" If it be
arising ,
,,
.
,
,
,
_
111how
asked
J.-L
many
o
are these?
i
we
reply,
seventeen are the injuries of Buddhi" Wherefore ? by the reversion of contentment and perfection" Contentment being the disabilities caused by its reversion are nine-fold nine-fold, "
"
and similarly perfection being eight-fold, the disability caused by its reversion is eight-fold, thus making the also
;
seventeen intellectual disabilities proper.
92
[217220]
[K. L.]
The author next enumerates the nine forms of Contentment (217).
l
:
Nine forms of Contentment Nine forms
Ac-
of
ternal
relating
means ^
quiescence.
tf
The
T
e
five internal
^
intemal
luck
:
to
and
;
four in-
nature, five
ex
from objects of sense.
forms of Contentment belong to
who have
those
severally
me and
ternal, relating to abstinence
(218).
are set forth
ascertained that Spirit
is
form Nature, but still being illfor ms not make further attempts in do advised, the direction of meditation, &c., which are the means of discriminative wisdom and these forms are called internal^ differ ent
.
;
because they pre-suppose the difference of Atman and Prakriti. which are these? the reply is "relating It being asked
and
severally to nature^ means, time are nature &c.
The contentment called
(219).
luck" i.
whose names
.,
"prakriti"
consists in
the
on being told that discriminative wisdom is only a modification of Prakriti and, as such, would come to every one in the natural course of events, and there is no need of satisfaction of the
hankering after also called
(220).
it by meditation, Ambha.
&c.,
disciple
and
this
contentment
is
t
.
The second form of contentment arises from the wisdom could not following instruction :
II.
Salila.
because,
if it
,
,
.
j
.
,.
,.
be attained in the ordinary course of nuture; were so, then everybody would attain to wisdom,
because the course of nature for the forms of nature affects
alj,
Such wisdom could only be attained through asceticism and so thou must follow an ascetic life and give up all meditation, &c. The satisfaction arising from
individuals
equally. ;
the above instruction
is
called Salila.
93
[221224] The
(221).
third
form, called
[K..L.]
"Time,"
or Og/ta,
is
the
arising from the instruction that asceticism too cannot bring about Emancipation for all means await the proper Time for bring ing about their various consequences, and so when the Time satisfaction
;
has arrived, one s ends will be gained without undergoing the troubles of asceticism.
The fourth form
(222).
called
satisfaction
.
.
"Luck,"
arising
or
Vriskti, is the
from the following
:
Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from nature, nor from any other means (such as asceticism, &c.), nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by "
Thus it was through mere luck that the children of Madalasa when quite infants, obtained wisdom by their mother s instructions and thereby attained beatitude.
luck.
The external forms of Contentment are
(223).
^
five,
arising
fromfabstinence from sound, odour, &c. the five bJ ects f Sense These belon g to
eXtCrnal
foras.
those who are free from all attachment, but take the non-spirits Nature, &c,, to be Spirit. These forms are called external, because they pre-suppose the and these existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is ;
freedom from attachment.
The causes of this nonattachment being five, it is five-fold, and consequently so is the contentment resulting therefrom. The objects of sense being five,,the abstinence from these must also be five-fold.
come
after
Abstinence too
is
due to the preception of discrepancies in the
consisting mainly of earning, lives and so on. wasting, enjoying, killing saving,
process of sensuous enjoyment
To
^224).
explain
:
The means of acquiring wealth,
are invarably the sources of pain to the servants as is declared in the Who would ever be attracted towards service, service, &c.,
"
following
:
considering the pain caused by the insults to^ be suffered at the contentthe hands of the wardens of a vain monarch ? "
94
[225229]
[K. LI.]
ment
due
resulting from abstinence from objects of sense to the consideration of such troubles, is called Para.
(225).
And
then, the wealth being obtained, brings with it the further trouble of protecting it from
the
thieves,
king,
floods
and
the
fire
contentment due to abstience arising from such considerations is the second called Supdra. (226).
having been obtained and
the wealth
Thirdly,
safely hoarded, there arises the fear of its being spent this consideration gives rise to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment called
Pdrdpdra. (227). Fourthly, IV. AnuUam&mbtia.
when
becomes
one
accustomed
to
sensuous objects, his desires increase ; the .1 r i ini j.i about the /
i>
,
non-fulfilment of these brings
fourth, called Anuttamambha.
Lastly, there arises the notion that there can be no enjoyment (either in this world or the Uttam&mbha. n n 1V ,, i -,, other), without the cruel process of killing
(228). V.
\
*\
-
animals, and contentment due to the abstinence arising from the perception of the cruelty of the process, is the fifth called Uttamambha.
Thus the four external froms of contentment, together with make up the nine froms mentioned
the five internal ones, above.
(229). The author next secondary divisions of Power
describes
the
primary
and
:
KlRiKA
The -
eight Powers
The eight powers.
(i. e.,
LI.
means of acquiring them) are
reasoning,
oral
instruction, .
/
study,
V
three-fold suppression of pain, acquisi The three before mentioned tion of friends, and purity. (Error, &c.) are checks to these (Powers).
l
95
[230-235]
[K. LI.]
(230). The chief among those enumerated above is the threefold suppression of pain three-fold on account of the three-fojdness of the pains to be suppressed.
The o^her means mentioned, being means
to power only
through the three-fold suppression of pain, are culled seconda And these five are both causes and effects. Of these ry. study is only a cause. The three principal ones (suppression of pain) being only effects the rest are both cause and effect. The first, study, named Tdra, consists in compre (231). ;
hending the sense sciences
of the
psychological
by listening to the teachings of a
qualified teacher.
(232).
effect of this last, oral instruction, implies the
The
comprehension of the meaning * of instruc,. .^ a useful habit with writers,
(2) Sutara.
,
,
.
,
tions, it being
to imply the effect by the cause Siddhi called Sutara.
(233).
this constitutes the second
;
Reasoning consists in the investigatin of the meaning of scripture by a process of dialetics not tara contrary to the scriptures themselves. This strengthening the portion of the
consists in
investigation all doubts and objections with scripture by setting aside regard to it; this process is also called meditation by writers on the
Vedas, and the Power due to this (234). (4)
The fourth
Eamyaka
is
called Tdrdtara.
the acquisition of friends. Even though one has arrived at truth by the right process of reasoning yet he has no is
them over with Hence the acquisition of
faith in his conclusions until he has talked
his
a
teacher and follow-students.
qualified teacher
and follow-studeuts
Siddhi called Ramya/ta. (235). By dana here (5) Sadamudita.
*
is
meant purity
dom)-deriving the *
is
= to
purify.
said to be the fourth
(of discriminative wis-
word from the root
As
is
declared .by the
Davies remarks that the root is coined for the occasion." But I may refer the reader to the 8iddMnt-a-auiiiudf, Under the Sutra S&nyojaiUh (VI/4/68). "
96
[236238]
[K. LI.]
An unimpeded discriminatve knowledgePatanjali is the means to the suppression of pain." (Yoga-Sutra 1126). By unimpededness in the Sutra is meant purity, by which again is meant the process of placing discriminative wisdom on revered
"
:
a clear basis, 4 after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions mixed with different kinds of cravings or desires] This purity is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a .
long and uninterrupted course of practice (of the wisdom Thus the word dana includes (as a means to power) attained). Practice also.
This
is
the
fifth,
called Sadd-Mudita.
(236). The three primary means to Power are called, Pramoda Mudita and Modamdna. And these three with the last five are the eight
(237).
(means
to)
Power.
Others explain the distich thus The perception of truth without the instruction of others, :
t>>gW;
about purely by means of instruc-
tions received in past births
And
meant by uka. the tenets of the
that which
is
is
what
is
obtained by listening to
Sankhya Philosophy
as learnt
by
others, is
the second called Sdbda, because it follows merely from the study of the text. When the truth is learnt at a teacher s, in
the
company of folio w-students, it is said to be the known as study, because it is brought about by study.
third,
The
fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in contact with a friend who has already got it. Fifthly, gene rosity is said to be a is
means
to
wisdom, because true wisdom
imparted by the teacher, duly propitiated with gifts.
The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the learned to judge and we desist from pointing out the faults of others, because our duty lies only in elucidating the cardi ;
nal doctrines of the Sankhya Philosophy.
(238).
The
Buddhi arising from the reversion Power thus become seventeen in number.
Disabilities of
of Cootentment and
Of the different poritions known that Power is most
of intellectual creation, it is wellall. So the author next
desired by
mentions Error, Disability and Contentment as impediments
97
[239240] to
Power
The aforesaid
"
:
[K. LIL]
three are checks to
Power.
9
The
aforesaid three refers to Error, Disability and Contentment. And these are curbs to the different means of attaining Power,
because they retard their progress and thus being opposed to Power, the latter three are ever undesirable. ;
(239).
Objection:
Granted
But
all this.
it
has been laid
This pur the intellectual creation either fulfilled alone ; can be by pose ? have both or by the elemental alone. Why clown that the creation
The reply
is
is
for the Spirit s purpose.
:
KARIKA LIL
Without dispositions there would be no Linga (Element), and without the Linga there Necessity of twofold creation.
would be no development of
Wherefore proceeds a
tions.
disposi two-fold creation, the
personal (belonging to the body, astral and gross) and Intellectual.
(240). elements-;
Linga denotes the creation composed of the primary and disposition, the intellectual.
The meaning cannot manifest
of the Karika
is
that the elemental creation
itself for the fulfilment of the
without the intellectual creation
purpose of the
nor conversely is the latter capable of having its complete manifestation with out the elements. Hence the necessity of a two-fold creation. Spirit,
Again experience, the purpose of the in the absence of the
Jt
ob
of sense.
Necessity of intellectual
the
ere a-
Spirit, is not -possible
two bodies and the
Hence the
elemental creation. *
;
necessity of the
And
conversely ,the the sense-organscould never be complete without the three
meaus of experience
internal organs Manas Ahankara and Buddhi. Nor would these latter be what they are, if there were no dispositions, virtue, &c. And lastly, discriminative
13
98
[241245]
[K. LIII.]
the only means to emancipation, would not be without the above two kinds of creation. Whence possible the necessity of the double creation.
wisdom
The possible objection of reciprocal causality is explained away as being similar to that of the seed and the s P rout due to the fact due to of the creation having had no beginning f 7 in time ( bein eternal), and the creation of bodies and dispositions at the beginning
(241).
^"
^
plained as 11
creationT
of the present cycle is said to be due to the impulse of residual tendencies left by the bodies and (dispositions related to particular Spirits), in the previous cycle.
(242). The various forms of the intellectual creation hav ing been mentioned, the author next mentions those of the elemental creation :
KlRiKl LIU.
The divine The force
has
class
of eie-
mental creation.
eight
animals, five
^
;
the
varieties,
mankind
dags; thus briefly
is ig
lower
single
the
in
worl( j
of living beings. (243). The
The eight divine
varieties
Pajapatya, eight
Gandharva,
go
are the
Brahma, the
the
Aindra, the Paitra, the Yaksha, the Rakshasa and
the Paisacha.
(244)1 five of
The
the lower
animals.
(245). Mankind
lower animals are quadrupeds than (other deer), deer, birds, creeping things and the immovable (trees, &c.)
five varieties of
Mankind is single, not counting its sub-divisions Brahmanas &c., as separate, as the bodily
t
singta.
formation
men.
is
the
same
in all
classes
of
The author
(246).
,
of
tlife
[K. LIV
99
[246248] next
lays
down
the
LV.]
three-foldness
elemental creation based on the excess or
otherwise
of intelligence in the form of the higher, the middle the lower
and
:
KAIUKA LIV.
Among
the beings of the
plane Goodness among those of the
higher
predominates lower predominates Dulness; in the of the Attributes. middle reside those predominating in Foulness these constituting the whole Universe, from The
:
different divi-
WjbS Brahma
to the tuft of grass.
The Heavenly
(247).
Swah, Mahah,
Bhnvah,
regions
Jana, Tapas and Satya predominate in Goodness. Those consisting of the lower
Heavcnly
animals and trees, &c., are characterised by The regions of the earth consisting of the seven Dvipas (or continents,) and Oceans predominate in Foulness, inasmuch as they abound in pain and are given to actions, Dnlness.
or otherwise. righteous o
The whole "from
of the Universe
Brahma
to the tuft
is
summed up
the pharse
of grass."
Having thus described the
(248).
in
creation, the author
productiveness of pain, that would lead to means to Emancipation of the dispassion,*one
next describes
its
:
KARIKA LY. There Ttie
^ am
(in the
sources
"
of
world) does the Sentient Spirit experience pain, arising from decay and death, due to the non-discrimination
of the Spirit from the body, until it is released from its person (until the dissolution of the astral hody) where ;
fore pain
is
natural.
100
[249251]
corporeal beings there are many varieties of experi ence interspersed with pleasure and pain
Among
Pain of decay and
common
death, the
lot of all creatures. 1
be
"
&c.
insect,
LVL]
[K.
P.I
"
may common
being
;
ye t the pain of decay * and death is the common lot of all. The fear of cteath, I not cease to be
to
man
;
may
I continue to
well as to the smallest
as
and the cause of fear constituting pain, death
a
is
source of pain.*
of
(249). Buddhi
Pleasure and pain are the properties Objection: and as such how can these be said to belong to
;
the Spirit?
Reply
meaning One who sleeps in the astral body" and this latter bein S connected with Buddki and
name)
(the
:
"
"
Puruska"
literally
;
e
its properties,
leads to the idea of the Spirit
being connected with them.
(250).
Question
How
:
said to belong to the Spirit "
"
Reply
:
Due
non-discrimination of Spirit from The Spirit, not alive to its dis body."
to the
the
tinction
ations of the
can pain related to the body be
?
latter for its
from the body, mistakes the fluctu The srr in sflftRf^** may be
own.
taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit s pain the mean Until the body has ceased to be, the Spirit suffers ing being, "
pain."
(251).
The author next decides the question ofthe Maker
of the Universe
:
lUniKl
LV.I. ^
down
This creation from Buddhi The question as to the Maker oft he Uni-
ments,
is
verse decided.
T Fraknti. i
of ,
(
n^^
I he .
.
^
work /.
,
done
for
ele
specific
brought about by the m6din
fications
to the
the
emancipation
ol
is -.
each
* It may be worth noting here that Death in itself is not pain, it is only the fear (the fear of the unknown) that makes the thought of death so painful*
101
[252-254]
and thus
.Spirit,
ing ds
were
if it
for
is
[
another
for the sake of
s
sake,
K
.
LVI.]
though appear
Nature
herself.
*
The creation
(252).
brought about by Nature
neither produced by a God, jnor evolution from Brahman nor can
The different views of the cause of creation set aside.
is
;
,
TT
,
.
.
.
,
.
.
;
is it
it is
it
an
be said
.
Uncaused since, in this latter case, the Universe would be either an eternal to be
;
It cannot be said entity or eternal non-entity (an absurdity). to be evolved from Brahman (the Vedanta view), for there can
be no (material) modification of pure intelligence, Brahman, as postulated by Vedanta. Nor, again can creation be said to be
brought about by Nature under the guiding hand of a God for a God is naturally without action and, as such, cannot be the supervisor, just as an inactive carpenter cannot be said to ;
manipulate his
Granted that the creation is due to Objection Nature alone. But Nature is eternally Nature
(253).
:
Objection: activl,
tools.
no^emanc^
active
and aS SUch her Operations should and hence there would be no >
never cease
pation possible.
;
emancipation of any Spirit.
The creation appearing as if it were for Nature s own sa^e is really for the sake of anThe creation is for the spirit s the cookother A cook, having finished end and ceases with , ., , from the work the purification of similarly ing,- retires "
Reply
:
t
.
.
.
;
thcsc
Nature being urged to action
t
for the
eman
and cipation of the Spirit, brings about this emancipation thenceforth cease her operations with regard to the Spirits already liberated (and, thus emancipation is not impossible). ;
(254).
But it is only act towards can something sentient that
Objection
*
.-Granted
all
this.
"
N^ insentient* cannot act towards a definite end.
the fulfilment of
its
own
or of another
s
purpose and Nature being insentient cannot ;
act
m the
,
manner
she requires a sentient supervisor
described,; and, as such,
(over
her blind
force)
;
[255
102
255a]
[K. LVIT.]
the Spirit residing in the body cannot be snch a supervisor, because snch conditioned Spirits are ignorant of the character of Nature consequently there must be somfl other ""true
;
sentient
agent,
Nature
and
We
reply
superintending ab extra the operations of this we giv.e the name God.
*.o
:
KARIKA LVII.
As
the insentient
instance of an in-
$*$&&
^
milk flows out
for the
tne ca ^fj so ^ oes Nature
towards
the
emancipation
growth operate of the
nitc end.
Spirit.
(255).
It is a fact of observation that insentient
also act towards definite ends,
the nourishment
of
the
e.g.,
calf.
objects
the action of milk towards Similarly
Nature,
though
insentient, could act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.
(255a). Tne
view
It ,
ot
would not be right to urge that the production of the milk being due to the superintenda
Universal
Personal
ing car e of God, its action cannot afford a case parallel to the action of insentient
because all actions of an intelligent agent are due ; either to selfishness, or benevolence, neither of which can be
Nature
said to be the cause of the creation of the Universe, which, therefore, cannot be said to be due to the action of
an intel For the Lord of the God, ligent agent. being Universe, has all that he requires and, as such, He can have no selfish motive nor can His action be said to be due solely to pity for pity consists in a desire for the removal of others pains but before creation, Spirits were without bodies, and, as such, without pain, for the removal of which God s compassion And if the pain subsequent to crea^ would be moved. the cause of creation, then we should said to be tion were ;
;
;
be in the inextricable nooze of reciprocality the creation due to pity, and pity due to the creation. And again if God were moved to creation by pity, then he would create none :
103
[256258]
[K. LVIII..]
happy mortals. And if the diversity of pleasures be attributed to the past deeds of the individual Spirit, then what isi the necessity of postulating a supervisor ? And if you urge the incapability of mere Karma an unintelligent
,but
agent without a supervisor, towards creation, then we reply, that the creation of bodies, &c., being incapable of being produced by Karma, we may very easily say the same with regard to pleasure, &c., as well (and, pleasure, &C M will have to be attributed to God also).
The action of the non-intelligent Prakriti is due neither to selfishness nor to mere pity; None of the above to and thus in this case, none of the above objections apply the case of Nature. faults afe applicable> The ou]y motive of (256).
Nature
is
the purpose of
the
instance cited in the Karika
(257). It has been The author explains this
is
said
Thus therefore the
Spirit.
quite appropriate.
"as
if
for
own
its
purpose"
:
LVIII.
As
people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does
Unmamfested
the The
Spirit s
end
the motive of Nature.
ture) , c
act .
for
the
Principle
(Nav
emancipation of
.
the opirit. Desire
which is
is.
satisfied
on the attainment of the desired object because an end of action
the purpose of the agent only that which is desired. is
Th3 similarity Principle act for
is
pointed out
:
;
"So
does the Unmanifested 1
the
Emancipation of Spirit.
i
We grant that the purpose of the motive the to the action of Nature, but whence Spirit the cessation of her operations ? (258).
Objection
is
We
reply
:
:
104
[259260]
[K. LIX
LX.]
KARIKA LIX.
As
a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the spectators of the stage, ceases to
The cause of the cessation of Natiti-e s
dance, so does Nature cease to operate when she has made herself mani
fest to the Spirit.
The word
the place implies the spectators,? stage," the occupiers of the place. Having manifested herself i. e., her different modifications, sound, &c., as different from "
the Spirit.
(259).
Objection:
We
grant the action of Nature for
the Spirit s purpose. But she is sure to get some compensa tion for her pains from the Spirit just as a servant does from his gratified master and as such the motive of Nature ;
cannot be said to be purely
We
reply
altruistic.
:
KARIK! LX. Generous Nature, endowed with attributes, causes ^J manifold means, without benefit to Nature expects no compensation.
herself, the
good of the
Spirit,
devoid of attributes, and as such ungrateful.
who
is
(
As a
qualified servant accomplishes the good of his un* qualified master, through purely unselfish motives, without benefit to himself; so does generous Nature, endowed with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good
any
in return to herself.
motives
is
Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature^
established.
(260). Objection: We grant all this But a dancing girl having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it :
[K. LXI
105
2G2]
[261
would .again, if so desired by the spectators ; similarly act eVen after having manifested herself to Spirit.
We
%eply
LXIL]
Nature
:
IURIKA LXI.
Nothing
more modest than Nature
is
:
such
my
is
Once aware of having been opinion. _ seen, she does not again expose herselt
The reason why Nature does not re-
.
.
vert to her actions.
,
.
to the
view
.
ot the spirit.
modesty here is meant delicacy (of manners), the to the Purusha s view. As a wellinability to suffer exposure with her cast the to tmvisible bred lady Sun, down, having eyes her body uncovered by chance, happening to be seen by a stranger, tries to hide herself in such a way as not to be seen
By
even more modest than such a lady so Nature again having once been seen by the Purusha, will is no case show ;
herself again.
But Purusha, being Let-this be so. (261). Objection: devoid of Attributes and Modifications, how is his emancipa For emancipation consists in the removal of bondage and bondage being only another name for the karmic residua imbued with dispositions and troubles, it is not possible And as the Purusha is devoid to the unmodifying Purusha. which latter is only another of action it can have no migration tion possible
?
;
name
for
death.
the creation
is
Hence
a meaningless assertion that
it is
for the purpose of
Purusha.
The author meets the above objection by accepting
it
:
KARIK! LXII. Verily no Spirit * I
Bondage
and
lease in reality ply to Nature.
(262).
14
or
bound, it
is
emancipated, or Nature alone which is
migrates has many receptacles, that or is released, or migrates. ;
re*
ap-
No
emancipated.
is
is
bound,
.
Spirit is bound not any migrates nor is any Nature alone, having many receptacles (bodily ;
;
106
[263]
[K. LXIII
forms of being), is bound, migrates and is released. migration and release are ascribed to the Spirit, in
manner though
and victory are attributed
as defeat
actually occurring to his soldiers
Bondage, the same the king, it is the
to
because
;
LXIV.]
part in the undertaking, the effects of In the same accrue to the king. or loss
servants that take
which
gain
manner, experience and
release, though really belonging to are attributed to the Spirit, on account of the nonNature, discrimination of Spirit from Nature. Thus the objection
above urged loses
all its force.
(263). Objection: We understand that bondage, migra and release, are ascribed to the Spirit but of what good are these to Nature ?
tion
;
We
reply
:
LXIII.
Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven forms sne causes deliverance for the Nature binds and 5
" S h
S elf
ow^
of he r
developments.
^efit
of thb
Spirit,
by
means of
Qne f
orm>
Nature binds herself by means of seven forms ( i. e. dispositions) all the properties of Buddhi, save discriminative wisdom. For the benefit of the Spirit she releases herself by herself, by means of one form, viz., discriminative wisdom. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience "
"
or emancipation of the
Objection
Thus
:
it is
We that
The form and characterofdiscriminative
wisdom.
same Spirit. __ ____ all this.
by the
practice
attained,
which
,,.-,,
is
do not
obtained that) exist."
"
I
:
then
?
of truth, is
wisdom
complete,
is
inconT
ana hence) pure, means of wnicn the
(and
trovertible,
absolute idea
(
What KABIK! LXIV.
grant
(by
am
not,
naught
is
mine, and
I
[2G4 ,
107
267]
The word
(264).
cc
"
trnth
[K. LXIV.]
indicates the
knowledge thereof.
of practice of truth, in the manner described above, a through long course of repeated, uninterrupted and respectful exercise of true knowledge, the wisdom manifesting the dis
By means
* of Spirit from Matter, is attained. All exercise brings about the knowledge of its object, so in the present case the exercise being one of truth results in the cognition
tinction
that
It is for this reason of its leading to truth
thereof.
knowledge (265).
is
the
called pure. "
incontrovertible
Doubt and
taken).
unmistwo im-
"
Why pure ? Because
(or
error are the
P urities of knowledge and the above knowledge being free from these is said to ;
be pure. Doubt consists in thinking a decided fact to be undecided ; and as such it is only a form of error. Thus by hence incontrovertible" the absence of both doubt and saying, "
contradiction
is
implied
;
absence being due also to the
this
fact of the exercise belonging to truth. .
We grant all this, but the eternal Objection : (266). tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its inevitable effect, the
miseries
of metempsychosis,
of which
thus there would be no end.
In reply to the above, with
it is
declared
"
Absolute" i.e.,
unmixed
Though tendency towards
error.
error
ca P ab] e of removal by means of true wisdom, though this has a
is
eternal
vefc
ifc
is
>
beginning in time. For partiality towards truth is natural to No Buddhi, as declare also outsiders (here, the Bauddhas) amount of contradiction can set aside the flawless (knowledge "
:
of) the
character of objects,
(287).
for
such
is
the
The form of the cognition is stated naught is mine, and I do not f
thG
not
action
partiality
:
/ am
exist.
of
not,
I am
merel y precludes the. possibility of from the Spirit. As is declared
108
[268269] (by grammarians),
"The
root
As
[K. LXV.]
together with
Bku and
Kri,
signify action in general." Hence all actions, external as well as determination, self-consciousness, refection, internal,
observation, &c., are
all
And
precluded from the Spirit.
since there is^no action of the Spirit, there arises the idea that here implies agency, such as in am not." give," "I
"I"
"I
and no such agency can belong to the Spirit, And from this follows the idea that "naught is mine" For it is only an agent that can have any possession and hence the preclusion of action implies "
I
&c. ;
eat,"
who
is
without any action.
;
that of possession as well.
Or we may
The interpret the three forms in another way. I am the Spirit, not I do not exist," means that and because non-productive I have no action productive and since without action, I am not I can have no sentence
"
"
"
"
;"
"
;
"
possessions,
(268).
might be
hence
"
naught
mine.
is
"
: Even after such a knowledge, there something yet unknown, which would lead to re
Objection left
birth.
We
It is complete" i. e., there is nothing left un the attainment of such knowledge as the above. "
reply
:
known after Hence there
is
no re-birth.
Question (269). ledge of truth ?
We
reply
:
What
is
accomplished
by
this
know
:
KARIKA LXV. Possessed of this knowledge, The cause cessation of
operation.
of
the
Nature
s
pure, at leisure
Spirit, as
and
at
a
spectator,
ease,
beholds .
.
JNature,
which has now reverted from
..
the seven
,,
torms
her primitive state) after her prolific fruition has ceased, under the force of true wisdom. (to
The two things for the production of which Nature had begun action were experience and the perception of truth ; and
109
[270]
when
[K. LXVI.]
these two have been accomplished there is nothing left and hence Nature ceases from prolfic activity.
to be done, "
Undfer the force (of true ivisdom)" The seven forms are all due to erroneous knowledge. Dispassion,
Virtue, &c.
who have
through mere contentment, is due to knowledge. And this erroneous knowledge is removed by its contradictory true knowledge. And thus
too, of those
it
erroneous
the cause, erroneous knowledge, being removed, its effects, the seven forms are also removed, and hence from these
Nature k<
At
desists. "
ease,
i.
e. 9
Inactive
"
;
Pure
"
i. e.,
Unmixed with
the
impurities of Buddhi, due to the Attributes, though to the last moment the Spirit continues to be in contact with the
Attribute of Goodness
wisdom would be (270).
or else no (perception,
;
and hence no)
possible.
Objection
:
Let this be
so.
We
have nothing to
say against your statement as to Nature desisting from pro But the production has been said to be due to the ductions. connection (of Spirit and Matter) and this connection is only and the capability to experience con ;
a form of capability
;
stitutes the intelligence of the Spirit, as the capacity of being the object of experience constitutes the non-intelligence and objectivity of Nature and these two capabilities can never be ;
and you cannot urge that they cease, because there is nothing left to be done, for though one set of objects has been experienced by the Spirit, there are others of the same kind still to be experienced. (Thus no emancipation is said to
cease
;
possible).
We
reply
:
LXVI. "She
NO
has been seen
birth
attainment
dom,
for
of
after wis-
want
of
by
retires
n fh pr er
"
;
says the one and so I have been seen," says the me,"
ni1rq ancl
though there it
affords
fn
ppncpc cease
act or>t
T1*pnpf
>
is still
no motive towards further
their conjunction,
creation.
110
[271272]
[K. LXVI.]
So long as nature has not manifested truth, she bring about the enjoyment of the various objects of sense but she cannot do this after she has once ^brought (271).
may
;
For experience is due to wisdom. erroneous knowledge, and when this latter, the cause, has ceased under the force of wisdom, there can be no enjoyment about discriminative
;
not possible in the absence of the seed. The Spirit mistakes the various objects of sense the modifica tions of Nature to belong to himself. And discriminative
just as the sprout
is
wisdom
also is a modification of Nature, and as such is taken the When however such by Spirit to belong to himself. wisdom has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit
with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to feel. Nor is the Spirit by himself capable of bringing about discriminative wisdom, which is a development* of Nature. And the Spirit who has cannot accept any purpose as his own.
attained to wisdom,
And
and emancipation being the purpose of the Spirit, supply the motive to the operations of Nature ; but when these two have ceased to be the purpose of the further, experience
With this view it is Spirit, they cease to be motives also. motive is that which declared There is no motive, &c." and this is not moves Nature to act towards creation
A
"
;
possible,
when
there
is
no purpose of the
Spirit.
We grant all this. But no sooner (272). Objection would wisdom be attained than the body would dissolve and then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature (as distinct :
;
from, himself) ?
If
it
be asserted that emancipation does not
follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account of the unspent residuum of Karma then we ask, how is
residuum destroyed ? If by mere fruition (i 6., by experi ence), then you tacitly imply the inability of wisdom alone to this
.
bring about emancipation.
And
hence the assertion
th^it
emancipation follows from a knowledge of the distinction between the Manifested, the Un manifested, and the Spirit "
"
* Because N.atnre.
wisdom
is
a property of Bucldhi
which
is
an emanation from
111*
[>73]
[K.LXVIL]
becomes meaningless. And the hope too that emancipation would be obtained on the destruction of the residua of Karma, 1
by
meai>$
is
of experience extending to a limitless period of time
too sanguine ever to be realised.
To
this
we reply
:
LXVII.
By
the attainment of perfect wisdom, the
Reason why the body does not dissolve immediately on the attainment of wisdom.
rest
energy
;
become
Virtue and
devoid of causal
yet the Spirit remains awhile
s wheel invested with body, as a potter r continues to revolve by the force of
the impulse previously imparted to
it.
The unlimited residua of Karma
(273).
prolificness destroyed
also having their by the force of true knowledge, they do
not lead to any further experience. The seeds of action produce sprouts only on the ground of Buddki, damp with the waters
The ground, however, becomes barren by having its dampness of pain dried up by the extreme heat of true wisdom, and hence the Karmic seeds cease to sprout forth into experi ence. With this view it is said Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy" Even when wisdom has been of pain.
"
body continues for a while, on account of the previous impulse just as even after the action of the potter has ceased, the wheel continues to revolve on account of the attained, the
;
momentum imparted having exhausted
to
it.
In due time, however, the impulse In the continuance of the
itself it stops.
body, the impulse is supplied by virtue and vice whose fruition has already commenced, as is declared by S ruti Other "
(actions) having been destroyed by -itself experience, the soul and "The delay is only so long as beatitude attains beatitude "
is*
not
[Chhandogya VI, i, 2]. This impulse (or a peculiar one, in which all illusion ha* been and in consequence of this impulse, the Spirit re
attained"
impression)
is
destroyed mains awhile invested with the body. ;
[K. LXVIII
112
[274275]
LXTX.]
the Spirit remains* invested with body by some sort of impulse, when will be his final release?
(274).
We
Question
reply
.-Let
this be so
:
if
:
LXVIII.
When
the separation of the informed Spirit from his corporeal frame f-at length takes place.
f\T
Final beatitude.
and Nature ceases it,
then
is final
to act in respect to
and absolute emancipation accomplished.
The prolificness of those actions, whose fruition has not commenced, being destroyed, and those also whose fruition has commenced, having been spent by experience, Nature has her purpose fulfilled, and hence ceases with respect to that particular Spirit, who thus obtains absolute tion of the triad of pain. .
(275).
and eternal cessa
doctrine has been proved by reasoning, the precedence of it,
Though the
yet in order to inspire respect towards the great Eishi is stated :
KARIKA LXIX. This abstruse knowledge adapted to the emancipa tion of the Spirit, wherein the origin Duration, and dissolution of beings are
pounded by "
"
considered, has been thoroughly the great Rishi.
Abstruse" i. e.,
By
ex
hard to be grasped by dull-brained people.
the great Rishi
"
i. e.,
by Kapila.
The feeling of reverence thus roused is strengthened by Wherein are considered, basing the doctrines on the Veda: i. e., in which fc.," knowledge (i. e., for the sake of which "
knowledge).* Veda.
These, origin &c.,
As
in
are also considered in the
Charmani dvipinam
hanti.
113
[276278]
LXX
[K.
LXXII.
We
Let this be so: shall respect the direct sayings (275). of the great Rishi (Kapila) wherefore should we pay attention to the assertions made by Isvarakrislma ? ;
We reply
:
-LXX
LXXI.
This supreme, purifying (doctrine) the sage imparted to Asuri, who taught it to Panchasikha, rtanCe f the
ky
ce.
whom
was extensively
the science
propagated.
Handed down by
tradition
of pupils,
it
has been
compendiously written in Arya metre by the noble-
minded
I svarakrishiia
who
has thoroughly investigated
the truth. Purifying, purifying of the triad of pain.
Supreme, "
(277).
i. e.,
chief
the Spirit from all sins, the
among
all
cause
purifying doctrines.
Arya = that which has arrived
at truth
;
one whose
intellect is such is called Aryamati."
This
(278).
because
section
science it
is
a
whole in
itself,
treats of all branches of
not a
knowledge
mere
:
KARIKA LXXII.
The
subjects that are treated of in the seventy distiches are those of the complete science
offence*
7
t0pics
comprising sixty topics, illustrative
1
1
tales,
exclusive
and omitting
of
con-
troversies.
The sixty topics are thus laid down in the Rdja-Vdrtika The existence of Prakriti (Karika XIV) 2 its
:
singleness Distinctiveness (of Spirit from ;
(XIV) 3 Objectiveness (XI) ;4 ;
Matter) (XI)
;
5 Subserviency (of Matter
to
Spirit)
(XVII)
;
114 6 Plurality (of spirits) (XVIII) 7 Disjunction (of Spirit, from Matter in the end) (XX) 8 Conjunction (of Spirit and Matter in the beginning) (XXI) 9 Relation of subserviency (of ;
;
;
Matter with Spirit) (XIX)
10 Inactivity (of the Spirit) (XIX) ; these are the ten radical categories.. ( In addition to these) are ;
(XL VII), nine of contentment (L), and these, twenty-eight of disability of the organs (XLIX) the the with make sorts of sixty eight power up (LI), together
the five kinds of error
;
"
topics."
All these sixty topics are treated of in the above which therefore form a complete science and
seventy distiches, cannot be said to
Of the above
be only a portion thereof.
(ten radical categories)
and subordination relate to Nature
;
,
singleness, objectivity,
distinctness, inactivity
and
and
existence, disjunction, and conjunction plurality to Spirit to both and existence of the relation of subserviency relates ;
;
to gross bodies also
May
this
.
work of Vachaspati Misra, the Tattva-Kaumudt
(the Moonlight of Truth), continue to please (cause to bloom) the clear (lily-like) hearts of good men !
Thus ends the Tattva-Kaumudi of Vachaspati Misra.
ALPHABETICAL INDEX. PAGE.
Abhinivesa
(Tenacity
of
Life)
90
[212]
Ahankara
(
Self -Consciousness )
Asmita (Egoism) [209]
90
Astral
81
1
Body [189]
Attachment (Raga) Avidya (Ignorance) Avisesha
Proofs
modus operandi of
[208]
89
Prakriti
operation of the insen
79
Prakriti s
46
Proofs
or Pra-
of, [200] ...
Relations of [60]
...
Creation-author of [241]
Purusha
a
of
60 consideration of [30]
10
62
Enunciated
11
27
Purusha
(Spirit)
[25]
consideration of
52
[119-125]
Purusha
98
Intellectual [206]
89
Sense
Production of pain [248].
99
Senses
Process of [141]
61
characteristics
58 organs [153] object of the [176] relative
75
predominance [179]
76
91
Siddhis (Powers) [229]
23
Time
Gunas
40
Visesha (specific) [185]
42
Vyaktaand Avyakta
92
Jealousy [217]
Manas (mind}
consideration
[155]
Means and Consequences
[196]
94 75
[175]
between
79 differences
35
[77]
67
Vyakta and Avyakta agreement between,
84
Wisdom
of
66 ...
Effect an Entity [62-76]
...
of [130-
134]
Disability [214]
Character of the [103]
13
defined [22-23]
Elemental [242]
(attributes) [97-101]
...
86
98
...
51
101
want
[138]
92
[217]
[116].
tient, [254]
gross )
of, [110]
Bondage three kinds Buddhi (will) [143] Contentment
103
ties of [258]
[210]
Avyakta (Unmanifested) kriti
cessation of the activi
Prakriti
[184]
2
24
of [54-56] Prakriti
90
( Non-specific,
70
causes of incapacity
Perception 65
[149]
PAGE,
Organs the three internal [160] Pain three kinds of [4]
points of [88]
production of [264]
...
37
...
107
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(g) 242
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