Sanidad V Comelec Digest

 

  Sanidad V. Comelec G.R. NO. L-446640 OCTOBER 12, 1976 FACTS:  On September 2, 1976, President Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a

national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the national assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvassing of votes in "barangays" applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite referendum-p lebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite referendum-plebiscit e on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly reveals their th eir desire to have such body abolished and replaced a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, submittedthru directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. which will be On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, commenced Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD No. 1031, insofar as it directs the CoE to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976. Sanidad contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case? 2. Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution? 3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?

 

  HELD: 

Is s ue 1  – J us tici abil bility ity of the the courts courts We cannot accept the view of the SolGen, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the  judgment of the clear Descarte Descartes s fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.

Is s ue 2  – Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the C ons tit titution? ution?  As earlier pointed out, the power to legislat legislate e is constitutio constitutionally nally consigned to the interim National Assembly the transition period. However, the initial t convening of d, that  Assembly is a matterduring fully addressed to the judgment of the incumben incumbent President. And, President. An in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President. Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution.

Is s ue 3 - Is the s ubm ubmis is s ion to the pe peopl ople e of the the proposed amendm amendment entss within the time frame al allow lowed ed therefor therefor a suffic s ufficient ient and and proper proper s ubm ubmis is s ion? It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states stat es that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."