San Beda Crim 1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES WHO EXERCISES THESE GOV’T POWER cases: ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOC., INC VS MAYOR OF MANILA G.R. No. L-24693 Police Power – Due Process Clause On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition
but has reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague. POLICE POWER On the legislative organs of the government, whether national of local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied. May Courts Inquire Upon the Exercise of Police Power? In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts. Two types of Due Process Procedural Due Process: Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form
of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing. Substantive Due Process: Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY, G.R. NO. L-10572, December 21, 1915 ( 32 Phil 580) FACTS: The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valid exercise of police power in this case? HELD: Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. "The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." "The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection,
comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law." "It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction." "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare." "It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise." ACEBEDO OPTICAL Co. v. CA G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000 Police Power as exercised by LGUs, restrictions and qualifications Power of city mayor to grant/cancel/revoke business permits Granting of business permits vs. granting of permit to practice profession FACTS: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. Permit was therefor issued, subject to certain conditions like prohibition of putting up an optical clinic, examining and/or prescribing reading and similar optical glasses, etc. When it was found that petitioner violated these conditions, its business permit was cancelled. ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of special conditions by the public respondents were acts ultra vires RULING:
Police Power exercised by LGUs Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. This delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code xxx The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. Power of city mayor to grant business permits The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. It is provided for by law. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law. But can city mayor cancel business permits or impose special conditions? As aptly discussed by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions. Did the conditions or restrictions imposed amount to a confiscation of the business? Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the
issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession. In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in its employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners in Optometry. MMDA VS BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION Date: March 27, 2000 Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority Respondent: Bel Air Village Association Inc FACTS: MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. BelAir Village Association, Inc. is a non-stock, nonprofit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village. On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. BAVA was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. On January 2, 1996, BAVA instituted against petitioner before the RTC a civil case for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the
following day. After due hearing, the trial court denied the issuance of preliminary injunction. On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. ISSUE: WON the MMDA has authority to open Neptune Road to the public HELD: No Ratio: MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. IAC. From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of RA 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. The implementation of the MMDA’s plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local government units, national government agencies, accredited people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila. Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system," fix,
impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police power. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition, while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA
simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinancemaking power, much less police power. Misjuris Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. Jjlex In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. It ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMA’s power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila." The MMA’s governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power. Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA’s jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a
"review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly." When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter. It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA’s noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our people’s productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. ART. 3 Sec. 1 SCOPE OF PROTECTED LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY cases: DUNCAN ASSOC. OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO VS. GLAXO WELLCOME PHILS., INC. 438 SCRA 343 FACTS: Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to another department in a noncounterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months. Tecson Glaxo's
was initially products in
assigned to market the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao CityAgusan del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines SurCamarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid... ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid RULING: On Equal Protection Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and other confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied. It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and evenhanded manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee. On Constructive Dismissal Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion in rank, or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case. HELD: The challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of time. In the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with Betsy, but he never availed of any of them. "WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit."
TWO KINDS OF DUE PROCESS cases: BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO v. PALANCA G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918 JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale. FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a nonresident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action Whether or not due process of law was observed RULING: On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation. The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant. How Jurisdiction is Acquired Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person. Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. xxx It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem. On Due Process xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary. The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendant’s last known address constitute denial of due process? The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings. It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringed. SEC OF JUSTICE VS JUDGE RALPH LANTION
Due Process Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez. ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process. HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case against Jimenez refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one’s property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION 322 SCRA 160 (2000) Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC FACTS: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include: 1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US 2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television 4. False statement or entries 5. Election contribution in name of another The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds: 1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 —Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. 2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents. 3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. ISSUES: 1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing Yes. §2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation
directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 §14(1) & (2), as well as A3 §7—the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the
prospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result – the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent.
No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage.
The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present their side.
Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases: a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport). b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the respondent isn’t prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee) c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. 2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty? No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court. 3. WON there’s any conflict between private respondent’s basic due process rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty
Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from him—a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake is our government’s international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction.
administrative due process: cases: SERRANO VS NLRC / ISETANN FACTS: Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann Department Store as the head of Security Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, Isetann phased out its entire security section and engaged the services of an independent security agency. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal among others. Labor arbiter ruled in his favor as Isetann failed to establish that it had retrenched its security
section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner; that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting employees whose employment would be terminated. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered petitioner to be given separation pay. ISSUE: Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the private respondent to replace its current security section a valid ground for the dismissal of the employees classed under the latter. RULING: An employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees to promote economy and efficiency. Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. If termination of employment is not for any of the cause provided by law, it is illegal and the employee should be reinstated and paid backwages. To contend that even if the termination is for a just cause, the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages would be to amend Art 279 by adding another ground for considering dismissal illegal. If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the causes mentioned in Art 282, the in accordance with that article, he should not be reinstated but must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination without legal effect. ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law. HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are; (1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather,
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. MACIAS V. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioners are four members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental and Bulacan, and the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They are requesting that the respondent officials be prevented to implement RA 3040, an act that apportions representative districts in the country. They alleged that their respective provinces were discriminated because they were given less representation. Furthermore, they allege that RA 3040 is unconstitutional and void because: 1. It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members of the HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage 2. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the population 3. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. Respondents Comelec and Vicente Gella (National Treasurer) contend that they 1. were merely complying with their duties under the statute which they presume and allege to be constitutional 2. petitioners have no personality to bring such action ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to bring such action.
2. Whether or not the act conformed to the printed form and 3 day requirement. 3. Whether or not the act of apportionment is within the 3 year requirement. 4. Whether or not the apportionment of members of the HOR is valid. HELD: The petitioners as voters and as congressmen and governor of the aggrieved provinces have the personality to sue. The passage of the act did not conform to the printed-form and the 3 day requirement, and that there is no certificate of urgency from the President was received by the HO. The requirement that the apportionment must be done within 3 year following the last census is complied with. The apportionment of members of the HOR is not valid because it is not based on the number of inhabitants a province has. Some provinces were given more representation despite the inferior in number of inhabitants. The Court held that RA 3040 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS cases: UNITED STATES VS. LUIS TORIBIO Police Power Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All
property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.” CITY OF MANILA MAYOR ALFREDO LIM v. JUDGE LAGUIO & MTDC Facts: The petitioners seek to reverse the ruling of the ruling of the RTC regarding the unconstitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783 which is entitled- AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), contends that the City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels and that the Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected. The petitioners, on the other hand, argues that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" [Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code] and that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police powers [Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409]. Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. He also granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. Hence, the appeal by the petitioners. Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 7783 is constitutional Held: NO
There is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of itsthe judiciary virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees not even under the guiseof due process and equal protection of laws of police power. The petition is DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the ordinance void is AFFIRMED. YNOT VS. IAC G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: (1) notice; (2) hearing; exceptions SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: (1) public interest requires government interference; (2) reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose FACTS: Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court
sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaos amounted to arbitrary confiscation of property without due process of law RULING: Minimum Requirements of Due Process: Notice and Hearing The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword. Exceptions to Notice and Hearing This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may
be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. Due Process is a Restraint on Police Power The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number. First Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Interests of the Public Generally Require Interference
xxx we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. Second Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Reasonable Means Necessary for the Accomplishment of Purpose, not Unduly Oppressive Upon Individuals But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the
purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. EO 626-A is unconstitutional In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional. YNOT v. IAC Police Power – Not Validly Exercised There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. LUPANGO v. CA FACTS: PRC issued a resolution directing that no examinee for the CPA Board Exam shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the 3 days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. HELD: Such resolution is unreasonable. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. Administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations, as this will infringe n the examinees’ right to libery. Such resolution also violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. BALACUIT v. CFI FACTS: At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are reproduced below ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the theaters and they attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. ISSUE: Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City? RULING:
No, the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for theaters and other places of amusement has been expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its charter. However, the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Further, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare. Furthermore, there is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners WHEREFORE, a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
cases: INT'L. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. QUISUMBING [333 SCRA 13; G.R. NO. 128845; 1 JUN 2000] FACTS: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than localhires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. ISSUE:
Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause.
the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
RULING: The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to
Wherefore, the petition is given due course. The petition is hereby granted in part. The orders of the secretary of labor and employment dated June 10, 1996 and march 19, 1997, are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent school of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR No.147387 December 10,2003 FACTS: Before the court is a petition to declare as unconstitutional Sec.14 of RA 9006 (The fair election act) insofar as it expressly repeals Sec.67 of BP 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) filed by Farinas et al, minority members of the minority bloc in the HR. Impleaded as respondents are the Executive sec, Speaker of the House etal. ISSUE: 1. WON the effectivity clause which states “This Act shall take effect upon its approval” (Sec.16) is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution RULING: 1. An effectivity clause which provides that the law “shall take immediately upon its approval” is defective, but it does not render the entire law invalid, the law shall take effect fiftten days after its publication in the OG or newspaper of general circulation. In Tanada vs Tuvera, the court laid down the rule: “The clause, unless otherwise provided refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself”… Publication is indispensable in every case.. PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS G.R. NO. 132875-76, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives RULING: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized
by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accusedappellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY INC. VS ORMOC CITY ET AL “Equal Protection” FACTS: In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: “There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.” Though referred to as a “production tax”, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: “It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void.” And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection. HELD:
The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists RULING: The petition is bereft of merit. In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor. Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense."
TRILLANES IV VS. PIMENTEL G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. FACTS: Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP. A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied) The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention. Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident,"
proves that petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real. Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. ART. 3 Sec. 2 RIGHTS OF UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE cases: VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. ISSUE: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures RULING: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. PROBABLE CAUSE: (definition)
cases: HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995 FACTS: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation. ARGUMENTS: Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide 2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion
when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them 3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation 4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused. RULING: 1. NO. 2. NO. 3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard. 4. NO. REASONS: 1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. 2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them. 3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. 4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth,
the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis). With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. LIM, SR. VS JUDGE FELIX GR NOS. 95954-7 (FEBRUARY 19, 1991) FACTS: -On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. -An investigation of the incident then followed. -Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon
Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211. -After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating therein that: “. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy.” - Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations which in substance prayed that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment regarding the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as the determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall be issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause. - In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation.
- It should also be noted that the Lims also presented to the respondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them. -On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The judge wrote, “In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each information…” -Petitioners question the judgment of Judge Felix (statement immediately preceding this paragraph, italicized). ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. RULING: The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be necessary documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's
bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. Usually, this depends on the circumstances of each case. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion; after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. As mentioned in the facts (stated above), the Lims presented documents of recantations of the witnesses. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix) committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause. CONDUCT OF CHECK POINTS: cases: VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. ISSUE: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures RULING: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
therein. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO 234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994
FACTS: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was, the team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”.
Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s, an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper. Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.
MANALILI V. COURT OF APPEALS
280 SCRA 400 FACTS: Narcotics officers were doing surveillance and chanced upon the accused in a cemetery who seemed to be high on drugs. He tried to resist the police officers and upon inquiry, found that the accused was possessing what seemed to be crushed marijuana leaves. HELD: A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons. It has been held as one of the exceptions to the general rule against searches without warrant.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA 288 SCRA 626
G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie “Balweg”. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when
she was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented. The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972 ISSUE: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused. RULING: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s
bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested. The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence. RULE 113, RULES OF COURT Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. RULE 126, RULES OF COURT Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. (b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with. (c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge. A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. vs. SOLUTA FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she
saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn. Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops. As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights. RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so. ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one. The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of
individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure. Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35. DECISION: Denied. PACIS VS. PAMARAN G.R. No. L-23996 March 15, 1974 Doctrine: It is a well-settled principle that for violations of customs laws, a warrant issued by the Collector of Customs is conceded. It is not necessary, in these cases, that the warrants be issued by a judge, as what is required in the Constitution. FACTS: Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile, model 1957. It was brought into this country without the payment of customs duty and taxes, its original owner Donald James Hatch being tax-exempt. On June 25, 1964, respondent paid P311.00 for customs duty and taxes.
Petitioner Pacis, on July 22, 1964 received from the Administrator, General Affairs Administration of the Department of National Defense, a letter to the effect that the Land Transportation Commission reported that such automobile was a "hot car." By virtue thereof, petitioner, through his subordinates, looked into the records of his office and ascertained that the amount collectible on said car should be P2,500.00, more or less. Based on such discrepancy, petitioner instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and detention and thus the subject automobile was taken. Respondent requested for the withdrawal or dissolution of the warrant of seizure but petitioner denied it. Thereafter, respondent Santos filed a criminal complaint for usurpation of judicial functions with the City Fiscal of Manila. As the respondent Fiscal Pamaran was bent on proceeding with the charge against petitioner, an action for prohibition was filed with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitutional provision which states that only a judge could issue a search warrant applies to warrants issued in lieu of violations of customs laws. HELD: In a recent decision of this Court, Papa v. Mago, where the seizure of alleged smuggled goods was effected by a police officer without a search warrant, this Court, through Justice Zaldivar, stated: "Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a component court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace ... ." It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws." The plenitude of the competence vested in customs officials is thus undeniable. No such constitutional question then can possibly arise. So much is implicit from the very language of Section 2205 of the Tariff and Customs Code. It speaks for itself. It is not susceptible of any misinterpretation. The power of petitioner is thus manifest. It being undeniable then that the sole basis for an alleged criminal act performed by him was the performance of a duty according to law, there is not the slightest justification for respondent Assistant City Fiscal to continue with the preliminary investigation after his attention was duly called to the plain and explicit legal provision that did not suffer at all from any constitutional infirmity. WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition prayed for is granted and the successor of respondent Manuel R. Pamaran, now a criminal circuit court judge, or any one in the City Fiscal's Office of the City of Manila to whom the complaint against petitioner for usurpation of judicial functions arising out of the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention, subjectmatter of this litigation, has been assigned, is perpetually restrained from acting thereon except to dismiss the same. No costs. STOP AND FRISK RULE: cases:
Malacat vs. Court of Appeals GR 123595, 12 December 1997
FACTS: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western
Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with “their eyes moving very fast.” Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter’s “front waist line.” Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an “X” mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a “stop and frisk,” where a “warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest” and “whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information”; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of “stop and frisk.” HELD: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one “in flagrante delicto,” while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a “hot pursuit” arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk.” The concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid
in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the “stop-andfrisk” was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yu’s claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in Malacat’s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were “moving very fast” — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
“discovered” “inside the front waistline” of Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat’s rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution. WARRANTLESS ARREST cases: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (SUBJECT: DELEGATION OF QUASI JUDICIAL POWER; ESTOPPEL. FACTS: ON 18 MARCH 1986, ATTY. RAMIREZ AND ATTY. ABELLA, PCGG AGENTS, ISSUED A SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST THE RESTHOUS THE SOLE ISSUE PRESENTED IS WHETHER OR NOT THE MARCH 18, 1986 SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST PROPERTIES OF IMELDA IN LEYTE INCLUDING THE RESTHOUSE AT OLOT. THEIR ORDER WAS NOT SIGNED BY ANY PCGG COMMISSIONERS. ISSUE: IS THEIR ORDER VALID? RULING: NO. JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS MAY NOT BE DELEGATED. IN PCGG V. JUDGE PEÑA, THE COURT HELD THAT THE POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF THE PCGG AMOUNT TO THE EXERCISE OF QUASIJUDICIAL FUNCTIONS, AND THE EXERCISE OF SUCH FUNCTIONS CANNOT BE DELEGATED BY THE COMMISSION TO ITS REPRESENTATIVES OR SUBORDINATES OR TASK FORCES BECAUSE OF THE WELL ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE THAT JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS MAY NOT BE DELEGATED. PETITIONER REPUBLIC ARGUES THAT MRS. MARCOS SHOULD BE DEEMED ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE SEQUESTRATION OF HER OLOT RESTHOUSE BY HER ACTIONS IN REGARD TO THE SAME. BUT A VOID ORDER PRODUCES NO EFFECT AND CANNOT BE VALIDATED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL. FOR THE SAME REASON, THE COURT CANNOT ACCEPT PETITIONER’S VIEW THAT MRS. MARCOS SHOULD HAVE FIRST SOUGHT THE LIFTING OF THE SEQUESTRATION ORDER THROUGH A MOTION TO QUASH FILED WITH THE PCGG. BEING VOID, THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS THE POWER TO STRIKE IT DOWN ON SIGHT. RULING OF THE COURT: The Court’s Ruling Under Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution, an order of sequestration may only issue upon a showing “of a prima facie case” that the properties are ill-gotten wealth under Executive Orders 1 and 2. When a court nullifies an order of sequestration for having been issued without a prima facie case, the Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG but simply applies the law.  In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co, Inc. v. PCGG, the Court held that a prima facie factual foundation that the properties sequestered are “ill-gotten wealth” is required. The power to determine the existence of a prima facie case has been vested in the PCGG as an incident to its investigatory powers. The two-commissioner rule is obviously intended to assure a collegial determination of such fact.  Here, it is clear that the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the sequestration of the Olot Resthouse. The Republic presented no evidence before the Sandiganbayan that shows differently. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the two PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant such a prima facie finding. Parenthetically, the Republic’s supposed evidence does not show how the Marcoses acquired the sequestered property, what makes it “ill-gotten wealth,” and how former President Marcos intervened in its acquisition. Taking the foregoing view, the resolution of
the issue surrounding the character of the property sequestered – whether or not it could prima facie be considered ill-gotten – should be necessary. The issue in this case is not new. The facts are substantially identical to those in the case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Dio Island Resort, Inc.). There, the same Atty. Ramirez issued a sequestration order on April 14, 1986 against Dio Island Resort, Inc. and all its assets and properties which were thought to be part of the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. Alerted by a challenge to his action, the PCGG passed a resolution “to confirm, ratify and adopt as its own all the Writs of Sequestration” that Attys. Ramirez and Abella issued “to remove any doubt as to the validity and enforceability” of their writs. Still, the Court struck them down as void: It is indubitable that under no circumstances can a sequestration or freeze order be validly issued by one not a Commissioner of the PCGG. The invalidity of the sequestration order was made more apparent by the fact that Atty. Ramirez did not even have any specific authority to act on behalf of the Commission at the time he issued the said sequestration order. x x x Even assuming arguendo that Atty. Ramirez had been given prior authority by the PCGG to place Dio Island Resort under sequestration, nevertheless, the sequestration order he issued is still void since PCGG may not delegate its authority to sequester to its representatives and subordinates, and any such delegation is invalid and ineffective. Under Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2, PCGG is the sole entity primarily charged with the responsibility of recovering ill-gotten wealth. x x x The power to sequester, therefore, carries with it the corollary duty to make a preliminary determination of whether there is a reasonable basis for sequestering a property alleged to be ill-gotten. After a careful evaluation of the evidence adduced, the PCGG clearly has to
use its own judgment in determining the existence of a prima facie case. The absence of a prior determination by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for the sequestration order is, unavoidably, a fatal defect which rendered the sequestration of respondent corporation and its properties void ab initio. Being void ab initio, it is deemed non-existent, as though it had never been issued, The Court is maintaining its above ruling in this case. Although the two PCGG lawyers issued the sequestration order in this case on March 18, 1986, before the passage of Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules, such consideration is immaterial following our above ruling. In PCGG v. Judge Peña, the Court held that the powers, functions and duties of the PCGG amount to the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, and the exercise of such functions cannot be delegated by the Commission to its representatives or subordinates or task forces because of the well established principle that judicial or quasi-judicial powers may not be delegated. It is the Republic’s theory of course that Commissioner Daza’s letter, directing Attys. Ramirez and Abella to search and sequester all properties, documents, money and other assets of respondents, should be considered as the writ of sequestration while the order issued by Attys. Ramirez and Abella should be treated merely as an implementing order. But the letter did not have the tenor of a sequestration order covering specific properties that the lawyers were ordered to seize and hold for the PCGG. Actually, that letter is of the same kind issued to Attys. Ramirez and Abella in Dio Island Resort. Consequently, there is no reason to depart from the Court’s ruling in the latter case where it said: The invalidity of the sequestration order was made more apparent by the fact that Atty.
Ramirez did not even have any specific authority to act on behalf of the Commission at the time he issued the said sequestration order. Thus, the respondent Court noted: Contrary to plaintiff’s representation, nothing exists to support its contention that the Task Force had been given prior authority to place DIO under PCGG control. On the contrary, as the text of the above letters clearly show, Attys. Jose Tan Ramirez and Ben Abella, had acted on broad and non-specific powers: ‘By authority of the commission and the powers vested in it. x x x.’” Petitioner Republic argues that Mrs. Marcos should be deemed estopped from questioning the sequestration of her Olot Resthouse by her actions in regard to the same. But a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctrine of estoppel. For the same reason, the Court cannot accept petitioner’s view that Mrs. Marcos should have first sought the lifting of the sequestration order through a motion to quash filed with the PCGG. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight. Besides, the lifting of the sequestration order will not necessarily be fatal to the main case since it does not follow from such lifting that the sequestered properties are not ill-gotten wealth. Such lifting simply means that the government may not act as conservator or may not exercise administrative or housekeeping powers over the property.  Indeed, the Republic can be protected by a notice of lis pendens. WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit and AFFIRMS the challenged resolutions of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan dated February 28, 2002 and August 28, 2002 in Civil Case 0002, which granted respondent Imelda R. Marcos’ Motion to Quash the March 18, 1986 Sequestration Order covering the Olot Resthouse. Further, the Court DIRECTS the Register of Deeds of Leyte to immediately annotate a notice of lis pendens on the certificate of title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the
Republic of the Philippines’ claim over the same in Civil Case 0002 of the Sandiganbayan. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. PADILLA V. CA 129 S 558 (1990) Where in the complaint for Grave Coercion against the mayor and policemen, they were acquitted on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, such acquittal will not bar a civil case for damages arising from the demolition of petition¬er's market stalls. The acquittal on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasona¬ble doubt refers to the element of Grave Coercion and not to the fact of that the stalls were not demolished. Under the Rules of Court, the extinction of penal action carries with it the extinction of civil only if there is a declaration that facts from which civil may arise did not exist. Also, Art. 29 of the Civil Code does not state that civil liability can be recovered only in a separate civil action. The civil liability can be recovered either in the same or a separate action. The purpose of recovering in the same action is to dispense with the filing of another civil action where the same evidence is to be presented, and the unsettling implications of permitting reinsti¬tuttion of a separate civil action. However, a separate civil action is warranted when (1) addition¬al facts are to be established; (2) there is more evidence to be adduced; (3) there is full termina¬tion of the criminal case and a separate complaint would be more efficacious than a remand. Hence, CA did not err in awarding damages despite the acquittal. PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO 234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994 Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine
and its paraphernalia’s, an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper. Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s therein. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional. Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted. VALIDITY OF A WARRANT ISSUED BY THE JUDGE cases: PEOPLE v. TEE "rights of the accused to speedy trial" FACTS: The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. They further contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial procedure. ISSUE: Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the hearing of the case. RULING: The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not
violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused. PANGANDAMAN V. CASAR FACTS: The case originated in Lanao. The offended party was ambushed in Lanao, but he survived. Based on his description, there were around 50 persons who staged the ambush from both sides of the hill. However, he could not recognize anyone of the 50. But he filed a case against all 50 ambushers, all “JOHN DOES”. So the court issued a warrant of arrest against the 50 John Does. ISSUE:
W/N the warrant of arrest is valid? Can a court issue a warrant of arrest against an unknown accused? HELD: NO it is not valid. It is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a call of writs long prescribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as totally subversive of the liberty of the subject. Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized. The warrant as against unidentified subjects will be considered as null and void. EXAMINATION DEPOSITS
is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits. W]hile section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty.
cases: PNB VS. GANCAYCO G.R. No. L-18343 September 30, 1965 FACTS: Defendants Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank to produce at a hearing the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In declining to reveal its records, the plaintiff bank invoked Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405. On the other hand, the defendants cited Section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in support of their claim of authority,which allegedly provides an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits. ISSUE: Whether Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits. HELD: Yes. The truth is that these laws are so repugnant to each other than no reconciliation is possible. x x x. The only conclusion possible
MARQUEZ VS. DISIERTO G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001 FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager. The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405. ISSUE: Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405). HELD: No. We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified,
the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case