Sales Case Digest

Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, and Poncio Po ncio 69 SCRA 99 January 1976 FACTS: On January 27, 1955, respondent Jose Poncio executed a private memorandum of sale of his  parcel of land with improvements situated in San Juan, Rizal in favor of petitioner petitioner Rosario Carbonell who knew that the said property was at that time subject to a mortgage in favor of the Republic Savings Bank (RSB) for the sum of P1,500.00. Four days later, Poncio, in another   private memorandum, bound himself to sell the same property for an improved price to one Emma Infante for the sum of P2,357.52, P2,357.52 , with the latter still assuming the existing mortgage debt in favor of the RSB in the amount of P1,177.48. Thus, in February 2, Poncio executed a formal registerable deed of sale in her (Infante's) favor. So, when the first buyer Carbonell saw the seller  Poncio a few days afterwards, bringing the formal de ed of sale for the latter's signature and the  balance of the agreed cash payment, she was told that he could no longer proceed with formalizing the contract with her (Carbonell) because he had already formalized a sales contract in favor of Infante. To protect her legal rights as the first buyer, Carbonell registered on February 8, 1955 with the Register of Deeds her adverse claim as first buyer entitled to the property. Meanwhile, Infante, the second buyer, was able to register the sale in her favor only on February 12, 1955, so that the transfer certificate of title issued in her name carried the duly anno tated adverse claim of  Carbonell as the first buyer. The trial court declared the claim of the second buyer Infante to be superior to that of the first buyer Carbonell, a decision which the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, Court of App eals annulled and set aside its first decision and affirmed the trial court’s decision. ISSUE: Who has the superior right over the subject property? COURT RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the appellate app ellate court’s decision and declared the first buyer Carbonell to have the superior right over the subject property, relying on Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Unlike the first and third paragraphs of said Article 1544, which accord preference to the one who first takes possession in good faith of personal or real property, the second paragraph directs that ownership of immovable property should be recognized in favor of one "who in good faith first recorded" his right. Under the first and third paragraphs, good faith must characterize the  prior possession, while under the second paragraph, good faith must characterize the act of 

anterior registration. When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio on January 27, 1955, she was the only buyer thereof  and the title of Poncio was still in his name solely encumbered by bank mortgage duly annotated thereon. Carbonell was not aware - and she could not have been aware - of any sale to Infante as there was no such sale to Infante then. Hence, Carbonell's prior purchase of the land was made in good faith which did not cease after Poncio told her on January 31, 1955 of his second sale of the same lot to Infante. Carbonell wanted to meet Infante but the latter refused so to protect her legal rights, Carbonell registered her adverse claim on February 8, 1955. Under the circumstances, this recording of Carbonell’s adverse claim should be deemed to have been done in good faith and should emphasize Infante's bad faith when the latter registered her deed of sale 4 days later.

ROSARIO CARBONELL, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE PONCIO, EMMA INFANTE and RAMON INFANTE, respondents. G.R. No. L-29972 January 26, 1976 FACTS: Petitioner Carbonell lives in an adjoining lot owned by Respondent Poncio, latter’s lot is mortgaged in favor of Republic Savings Bank for P1,500. Petitioner and another Respondent (Infante) offered to buy the land owned by Poncio. Which Poncio, in his failure to pay the mortgaged agreed for the petitioner to buy the land including his house for P9.50 per square meter on the condition that from the purchase price would come the money to be paid to the bank. Both parties settled the arrears of the mortgaged amounting P247.26. However, Petitioner only have P200.00 as per respondent’s information that he only owes the same to the bank. Respondent then withdrew the deficit amount and was reimbursed by Carbonell the following day. The parties executed a document stipulating that, Poncio may still occupy the land sold by him to the petitioner and if after a year, he still can’t find a place to move, that he shall pay rent in favor  of the petitioner.

Subsequently, Poncio had told Carbonell that the former can no longer pursue with the sale for  he had given the land to Infante, to which he cannot withdraw even if he goes to jail. The said lot was fenced by Infante. Atty. Jose Garcia advised her to present an adverse claim over the land in question with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Poncio, admittedly sold the land to Infante when she improved her offer. With the information that the land was not yet registered, Atty. Garcia in favor of the petitioner   prepared an adverse claim over the property. Whereby upon registration of the same by Infante, the said adverse claim was noted in the Transfer Certificate of Title. Petitioner filed a second complaint, alleging that the sale between Poncio and Infante be declared null and void. Respondent’s allegation was that, Petitioner’s claim was unenforceable for lack of  written document. Trial Court ruled that the second sale was null and void. However, after re-trial, Trial Court reversed it’s decision ruling that the claim of the respondents were greater than that of the  petitioner. CA ruled in favor of petitioner, alleging that it has a superior right over the respondent. After a motion for reconsideration CA reversed its decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner have the superior right ove r the property. HELD: YES. Article 1544, New Civil Code, which is decisive of this case, recites: If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should movable  property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in  good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was  first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,  provided there is good faith (emphasis supplied). When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio on January 27, 1955, she was the only buyer thereof  and the title of Poncio was still in his name solely encumbered by bank mortgage duly annotated thereon. Carbonell was not aware — and she could not have been aware — of any sale of Infante

as there was no such sale to Infante then. Hence, Carbonell's prior purchase of the land was made in good faith. Her good faith subsisted and continued to exist when she recorded her adverse claim four (4) days prior to the registration of Infantes's deed of sale. Carbonell's good faith did not cease after Poncio told her on January 31, 1955 of his second sale of the same lot to Infante. Because of that information, Carbonell wanted an audience with Infante, which desire underscores Carbonell's good faith. With an aristocratic disdain unworthy of the good breeding of a good Christian and good neighbor, Infante snubbed Carbonell like a leper and refused to see her. So Carbonell did the next best thing to protect her right — she registered her adversed claim on February 8, 1955. Under the circumstances, this recording of her adverse claim should be deemed to have been done in good faith and should emphasize Infante's bad faith when she registered her deed of sale four (4) days later on February 12, 1955.

Dagupan Trading vs. Macam 14 SCRA 99 May 1965 FACTS: Sammy Maron and his seven brothers and sisters were pro-indiviso owners of a parcel of  unregistered land located in barrio Parayao, Binmaley, Pangasinan. In 1955, while their  application for registration of said land under Act No. 496 was pending, they executed, on June 19 and on September 21, two deeds of sale conveying the property to herein respondent Rustico Macam who thereafter took possession of the property and made substantial improvements upon it. On October 14, 1955, OCT No. 6942 covering the land was issued in the name of the Marons, free from all liens and encumbrances. On August 4, 1956, however, by virtue of a final judgment of the Municipal Court of Manila in a civil case in favor of Manila Trading and Supply Co. (Manila Trading) against Sammy Maron, levy was made upon whatever interest he had in the subject property. Thereafter, said interest was sold at public auction to the judgment creditor Manila Trading. The corresponding notice of  levy, certificate of sale and the sheriff's certificate of final sale in favor of Manila Trading  because nobody exercised the right of redemption - were duly registered, and on March 1, 1958, the latter sold all its rights and title in the property to herein petitioner Dagupan Trading Company (Dagupan Trading). On September 4, 1958, Dagupan Trading filed an action against Macam, praying that it be declared owner of one-eighth portion of the subject property. The CFI of Pangasinan dismissed the said complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. ISSUE:

Who has the superior right over the one-eight portion of the subject property? COURT RULING: The Supreme Court likewise affirmed both decisions of the lower courts. At the time of the levy, Sammy Maron already had no interest on the one-eight portion of the property he and his siblings have inherited because for a considerable time prior to the levy, said interest had already  been conveyed upon Macam "fully and irretrievably" - as the Court of Appeals held. Consequently, the subsequent levy made on the property for the purpose of satisfying the  judgment rendered against Sammy Maron in favor of the Manila Trading Company was void and of no effect. The unregistered sale and the consequent conveyance of title and ownership in favor Macam could not have been cancelled and rendered of no effect upon the subsequent issuance of the Torrens title over the entire parcel of land. Moreover, upon the execution of the deed of sale in his favor by Sammy Maron, Macam had immediately taken possession of the land conveyed as its new owner and introduced considerable improvements upon it himself. To deprive him, therefore, of the same by sheer force of technicality would be against both justice and equity.

MOISES OLIVARES and JUANITA T. OLIVARES, petitioners-appellants, vs.

THE HONORABLE CARLOS V. GONZALES as Judge of the Court of First Instance of  Iloilo (Branch VI), respondent and JACINTO TUVILLA, CEFERINO TUVILLA, and JUAN TUMABINI, respondents-appellees.  Mario Guarina III for petitioners-appellants.  Enrique Arguelles for respondents-appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: The Disputed Property is a piece of unregistered land located at Tigbauan, Iloilo Identified as Assessor's Lot No. 343. It was previously owned by respondents-appellees Jacinto Tuvilla and Ceferino Tuvilla (the Tuvillas, for short) both of Tigbauan, Iloilo. Sometime in 1955, the Tuvillas executed a "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" in favor of  respondent-appellee Juan Tumabini over the Disputed Property in consideration of the sum of  P1,350.00. The document was duly acknowledged before a Notary Public but was not recorded in the Registry of Property.

Sometime in 1959, the Tuvillas executed a "Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro" over the Disputed Property in favor of petitioners- appellants, Moises Olivares and Juanita T. Olivares (the Olivareses, for short). This document was acknowledged before a Notary Public and registered with the Registry of Deeds. In 1966, the Tuvillas also executed in favor of the Olivareses a "Deed of Absolute Sale" covering the Disputed Property. Petitioners-appellants have been in  possession of the Disputed Property since 1959. On October 11, 1967, respondent-appellee, Juan Tumabini filed Civil Case No. 7410 before Branch I of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo against the Tuvillas for the consolidation of  ownership over the Disputed Property by reason of the alleged failure of the Tuvillas to redeem the property from Tumabini (hereinafter referred to as the Consolidation Case). The Olivareses, however, were not included as parties to the said case. During the pre-trial of the Consolidation Case, counsel for the parties agreed to consider the  pacto de retro sale as one of equitable mortgage. Thus, the Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Tumabini in the amount of P 1,350.00, pursuant to which, the Court subsequently issued a Writ of Execution on October 23, 1968. On November 23, 1968, the Olivareses instituted Civil Case No. 7777 before Branch VI of the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, for Quieting of Title, against the Tuvillas, Juan Tumabini the Provincial Sheriff and Pyramid Surety (hereinafter, the Quieting of Title Case). The said Court issued a Restraining Order to stop the sale in the Consolidation Case (No. 7410) pending in Branch 1, but the said order was lifted on February 6, 1969. Subsequently, the Consolidation Case (No. 7410), the Disputed Property was sold at public auction and a Writ of Possession was issued in Tumabinis favor. Ho wever, the tenant of the Olivareses refused to surrender possession, prompting a citation for contempt. Action thereon was deferred, however, pending termination of Civil Case No. 7777. On July 7, 1970, in the Quieting of Title Case (No. 7777), the Trial Court issued an Order  dismissing said case, as follows: Acting upon the motion for dismissal of this case filed by Atty. Enrique Arguelles, counsel for the defendants, it appearing that the instant action has been filed since November 23, 1968 and up to this time plaintiffs failed to exert effort to have the defendants summoned, for failure to prosecute and lack of interest on the part of the plaintiffs for such unreasonable length of time, as prayed, let this case be dismissed  No reconsideration was sought nor any appeal taken by the Olivareses. On July 14, 1971, the same case was refiled, also in Branch VI, dock eted as Civil Case No. 8698 (the Refiled Case) which, however, was dismissed by the Court on September 6, 1971 "it appearing that Civil Case No. 7777 previously filed and dismissed by the Court embraces the same subject matter and the same party litigants as the case at bar."

On September 20, 1971, the Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Olivareses. Hence, this appeal by certiorari. The question posed is whether the dismissal of the Quieting of Title Case (No. 7777) "for failure to prosecute" barred the institution of a subsequent suit, Civil Case No. 8698, by the same  plaintiff against the same defendants on the same cause of action. Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court specifically provides: Sec. 3. Failure to prosecute. — If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of  the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court. Procedurally speaking, therefore, since the dismissal by the Trial Court was unqualified, it had the effect of an adjudication upon the merits. However, the equities of the case are with the Olivareses. The first sale with pacto de retro by the Tuvillas to Tumabini was unregistered; in contrast, the sale in favor of the Olivareses was duly recorded. The Consolidation Case (Case No. 7410) instituted by Tumabini against the Tuvillas for consolidation of his ownership did not include the Olivareses as parties defendants even though they were then in possession of the Disputed Property. Justice and eq uity demand, therefore, that their side be heard in the Refiled Case (No. 8698). Then, too, the contempt incident and the matter of the Writ of Possession in the Consolidation Case (No. 7410) were left unresolved pending the outcome of the Quieting of Title Case (No. 7777). In other words, it would be more in keeping with substantial justice if the controversy between the parties to be resolved on the merits rather than on a procedural technicality in the light of the express mandate of the Rules that they be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." The dismissal of actions is based on sound judicial discretion and such discretion "must be exercised wisely and prudently never capriciously, with a view to substantial  justice." For having failed to meet that standard it will have to be held that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion (see Tandoc vs. Tensuan, I, 50835, October 30, 1979, 93 SCRA 880). WHEREFORE, the questioned Order of dismissal, dated September 6, 1971, in Civil Case No. 8698, is hereby SET ASIDE and the said case REMANDED for prompt hearing and determination on the merits. This Decision shag be immediately exe cutory upon promulgation.  No costs. SO ORDERED. Cruz vs. Cabaña 129 SCRA 656 June 1984

FACTS: In June 1965, respondent Leodegaria Cabaña sold the subject property to respondent spouses Teofilo Legaspi and Iluminada Cabaña (spouses Legaspi) under their contract entitled “Bilihang Muling Mabibili” which stipulated that Cabaña can repurchase the land within one year from December 31, 1966. The said land was not repurchased, however, so the spouses Legaspi took   possession of the said property. Later, Cabaña requested that the land title be lent to her in order  to mortgage the property to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), to which the spouses Legaspi yielded. On October 21, 1968, Cabaña formally sold the land to spouses Legaspi by way of an absolute sale. The spouses Legaspi then attempted to register the deed of sale, but failed because they could not present the owner's duplicate of title which was still in the possession of the PNB as mortgage. Subsequently, they were able to register the document of sale on May 13, 1969 under Primary Entry No. 210113 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province. On November 29, 1968, Cabaña sold the same property to herein petitioner Abelardo Cruz (now deceased), who, in turn, tried to register the deed of sale on September 3, 1970. However, he was informed that Cabaña had already sold the property to the spouses Legaspi, so he was only able to register the land in his name on February 9, 1971. The CFI of Quezon Province declared the spouses Legaspi as the true and rightful owners of the subject property and the land title that Cruz had acquired as null and void. The Court of Appeals affirmed said de cision, but ordered Cabaña reimburse to Cruz's heirs the amounts of P2,352.50, which the late petitioner Abelardo Cruz paid to PNB to discharge the mortgage obligation of Cabaña in favor of said bank, and the amount of P3,397.50, representing the amount paid by said Abelardo Cruz to her as consideration of the sale with pacto de retro of the subject property. ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the subject property? COURT RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court with modification ordering and sentencing respondent Leodegaria Cabaña to reimburse and pay to petitioner's heirs the total sum of P5,750.00. There is no question that spouses Legaspi were the first buyers, first on June 1, 1965 under a sale with right of repurchase and later on October 21, 1968 under a deed of absolute sale and that they had taken possession of the land sold to them; that Abelardo Cruz was the second buyer  under a deed of sale dated November 29, 1968, which to ail indications, contrary to the text, was a sale with right of repurchase for ninety (90) days. There is no question, either, that spouses

Legaspi were the first and the only ones to be in possession of the subject property. The knowledge of the first sale Abelardo Cruz had gained defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer's rights) - from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession. The second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior registration as provided by law."

 Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, and Guevarra 171 SCRA 213 March 1989 FACTS: The deceased spouses Victorino and Crisanta dela Rosa (spouses dela Rosa) were registered owners of a parcel of land in Orani, Bataan, and covered by OCT No. 3778. On or about May 4, 1931, Victorino dela Rosa (widowed by then) sold one-half of the said property to Juliana Salazar for P95.00. This sale between him and Salazar, though evidenced by a document, was not registered. Nevertheless, Juliana Salazar constructed a house on the lot she purchased immediately after the sale. On March 10, 1964, petitioner spouses Diosdado Nuguid and Marqiueta Venegas (spouses Nuguid) caused the registration of a d ocument entitled "Kasulatan ng Partihan at Bilihan" (Kasulatan) dated June 6, 1961. In this document, Marciana dela Rosa, together with the heirs of Victorino and Crisanta dela Rosa, sold to spouses Nuguid the entire area of the property for the sum of P300.00. Subsequently, OCT No. 3778 was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Bataan, and TCT No. T-12782 was issued in the spouses Nuguid’s names. Private respondents claimed that the presented by spou ses Nuguid was forged. They also allegedly discovered the forged deed as well as the certificate of title in the name of the  petitioners much later, that is, on February 28, 1978, when respondents Amorita Guevarra and Teresita Guevarra thought of having the title of their grandmother Juliana Salazar, registered. On the other hand, spouse Nuguid assert that in the latter part of 1960, Nicolas dela Rosa, uncle of  respondent Marciana dela Rosa and grandfather of the other heirs-signatories, offered to sell the subject land to them. Apparently, Nicolas dela Rosa claimed that he had already purchased the shares of the heirs over the subject property as evidenced by a private document entitled "Kasunduan" (Kasunduan) dated August 31, 1955, and as a matter of fact, he had in his

 possession the original certificate of title covering the property in the name of the deceased Victorino and Crisanta dela Rosa. The CFI of Bataan dismissed the complaint filed by private respondents, but the Court of  Appeals reversed said decision and ordered the spouses Nuguid to execute a deed of  reconveyance in favor of herein respondents. ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the subject property? COURT RULING: The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the CFI of Bataan. The basis for the Court of  Appeals' conclusion that petitioners were buyers in bad faith is ambiguous because said court relied on the singular circumstance that the petitioners are from Orani, Bataan, and should have  personally known that the private respondents were the persons in actual possession. However, at the time of the purchase, the spouses Nuguid dealt with Pedro Guevarra and Pascuala Tolentino, the latter being the actual occupants. The respondents Guevarras, children of the said Pedro and Pascuala Guevarra, came into the picture only after their parents died. As for the respondent heirs of Victorino dela Rosa, their being in ac tual possession of any portion of the property was, likewise, simply presumed or taken for granted by the Court of Appeals. The private respondents cannot also honestly claim that they became aware of the spouses  Nuguid’s title only in 1978, because ever since the latter bought the property in 1961, the spouse  Nuguid have occupied the same openly, publicly, and continuously in the concept of owners, even building their house thereon. For seventeen years they were in peaceful possession, with the respondents Guevarras occupying less than one-half of the same property.

Radiowealth Finance Co. vs. Palileo 197 SCRA 245 May 1991 FACTS: In April 1970, defendant spouses Enrique Castro and Herminio R. Castro (spouse Castro) sold to herein respondent Manuelito Palileo a parcel of unregistered coconut land in Surigao del Norte. The sale is evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, but the deed was not registered in

the Registry of Property for unregistered lands in the province of Surigao del Norte. Since the execution of the deed of sale, Palileo who was then employed in Lianga, Surigao del Sur, exercised acts of ownership over the land through his mother Rafaela Palileo, as administratrix or overseer. Manuelito Palileo has continuously paid the real estate taxes on said land from 1971 until the present. In November 1976, the CFI of Manila rendered a judgment was rendered against defendant Enrique T. Castro to pay herein petitioner Radiowealth Finance Company (Radiowealth), the sum of P22,350.35 with interest rate of 16% per annum from November 2, 1975 until fully paid, and upon the finality of the judgment, a writ of execution was issued. The Provincial Sheriff  Marietta E. Eviota, through defendant Deputy Provincial Sheriff Leopoldo Risma, levied upon and finally sold at public auction the subject land that defendant Enrique Castro ha d sold to Palileo in 1970. The said Provincial Sheriff executed a certificate of sale was by the in favor of  Radiowealth as the only bidder, and upon expiration of the redemption period, she also executed a deed of final sale. Both documents were registered with the Registry of Deeds. Learning of what happened to the land, Palileo filed an action for recovery of the subject  property. The court a quo rendered a decision in favor of Palileo, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the subject property? COURT RULING: The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the appellate court’s decision on this case. There is no doubt that had the subject property been a registered land, this case would have been decided in favor of Radiowealth since it was the company that had its claim first recorded in the Registry of  Deeds for it is the act of registration that operates to co nvey and affect registered land. Therefore, a bonafide purchaser of a registered land at an execution sale acquires a good title as against a  prior transferee, if such transfer was unrecorded. However, a different set of rules applies in the case at bar which deals with a parcel of  unregistered land. Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is "without prejudice to a third party with a better right." The aforequoted phrase has been held by the Supreme Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one's favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Applying this principle, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the execution sale of the unregistered land in favor of 

 petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.

TAÑEDO V. CA (January 22, 1996) FACTS: Lazaro Tañedo executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Ricardo Tañedo and Teresita Barrera in which he conveyed a parcel of land which he will inherit. Upon the death of his father he executed an affidavit of conformity to reaffirm the said sale. He also executed another deed of  sale in favor of the spouses covering the parcel of land he already inherited. Ricardo registered the last deed of sale in the registry of deeds in their favor. Ricardo later learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children through a deed of sale.

ISSUE: WON the Tañedo spouses have a better right over the property against the children of Lazaro Tañedo.

HELD: Since a future inheritance generally cannot be a subject of a contract, the deed of sale and the affidavit of conformity made by Lazaro has no effect. The subject of dispute therefore is the deed of sale made by him in favor of spouses Tañedo and another to his children after he already legally acquired the property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of   petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all. Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private respondents never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property.