Sales Case Digest
G.R. No. L-26872 July 25, 1975
VILLONCO REALTY COMPANY vs. BORMAHECO, INC.
Villonco Realty Company returned the two checks and filed the complaint for specific performance against Bormaheco
Spouses Cervantes are the owners of lots 3, 15 and 16 located in Makati, Rizal
The lots were mortgaged to DBP.
Cervantes is the president of Bormaheco, Inc., a dealer and importer of industrial and agricultural machinery.
The entire lots are occupied by the building, machinery and equipment of Bormaheco, Inc. and are adjacent to the property of Villonco Realty
there were negotiations for the sale of the said lots
In the course of the negotiations Villoncos conferred with Cervantes in his office to discuss the price and terms of the sale. Later, Cervantes "went to see Villonco for the same reason until some agreement" was arrived at.
A check for P100,000 was received by Cervantes.
Twenty-six days after the signing of the contract of sale, Cervantes returned the earnest money with interest. Cervantes cited as an excuse the circumstance that "despite the lapse of 45 days from February 12, 1964 there is no certainty yet”
Villonco Realty refused to accept the letter and the checks of Bormaheco, Inc. Cervantes sent them by registered mail.
Cervantes’ reply to Miss Tagle's letter: alleged that the forty-five day period had already expired and the sale had not been consummated. Cervantes said that his letter was a "manifestation that we are no longer interested to sell" the Buendia Avenue property
WON there was a perfected contract of sale.
HELD: "By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determining thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional" (Art. 1458, Civil Code). "The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts" (Art. 1475) "Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law" (Art. 1315, Civil Code). "Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer" (Art. 1319, Civil Code). "An acceptance may be express or implied" (Art. 1320, Civil Code).
Bormaheco's acceptance of Villonco’s offer to purchase the Buendia Avenue property, as shown in Villonco's letter dated March 4, 1964 indubitably proves that there was a meeting of minds upon the subject matter and consideration of the sale. Therefore, on that date the sale was perfected.
Not only that Bormaheco's acceptance of the part payment of one hundred ,thousand pesos shows that
the sale was conditionally consummated or partly executed subject to the purchase by Bormaheco, Inc. of the Punta property. The non consummation of that purchase would be a negative resolutory condition (Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao, 43 Phil. 873).
Bormaheco, Inc. and the Cervantes spouses contend that the sale was not perfected because Cervantes allegedly qualified his acceptance of Villonco's revised offer and, therefore, his acceptance amounted to a counter-offer which Villonco Realty Company should accept but no such acceptance was ever transmitted to Bormaheco, Inc. which, therefore, could withdraw its offer. That contention is not well-taken. It should be stressed that there is no evidence as to what changes were made by Cervantes in Villonco's revised offer. And there is no evidence that Villonco Realty Company did not assent to the supposed changes and that such assent was never made known to Cervantes. What the record reveals is that the broker, acted as intermediary between the parties. It is safe to assume that the alleged changes or qualifications made by Cervantes were approved by Villonco Realty Company and that such approval was duly communicated to Cervantes or Bormaheco, Inc. by the broker as shown by the fact that Villonco Realty Company paid, and Bormaheco, Inc. accepted, the sum of P100,000 as earnest money or down payment. That crucial fact implies that Cervantes was aware that Villonco Realty Company had accepted the modifications which he had made in Villonco's counter-offer. Had Villonco Realty Company not assented to those insertions and annotations, then it would have stopped payment on its check for P100,000. The fact that Villonco Realty Company allowed its check to be cashed by Bormaheco, Inc. signifies that the company was in conformity with the changes made by Cervantes and that Bormaheco, Inc. was aware of that conformity. Had those insertions not been binding, then Bormaheco, Inc. would not have paid interest at the rate of ten percent per annum, on the earnest money of P100,000. The trial court ruled that the forty-five-day period was merely an estimate or a forecast of how long it would take Bormaheco, Inc. to acquire the Nassco property and it was not "a condition or a deadline set for the defendant corporation to decide whether or not to go through with the sale of its Buendia property".
G.R. No. 109125 December 2, 1994 ANG YU ASUNCION, ARTHUR GO AND KEH TIONG vs. CA and BUEN REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
plaintiffs are tenants or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by defendants described in Binondo, Manila
that they have occupied said spaces since 1935 and have been religiously paying the rental and complying with all the conditions of the lease contract
that on several occasions defendants informed plaintiffs that they are offering to sell the premises and are giving them priority to acquire the same
that during the negotiations, Bobby Cu Unjieng offered a price of P6-million while plaintiffs made a counter offer of P5-million
that plaintiffs thereafter asked the defendants to put their offer in writing to which request defendants acceded
that in reply to defendant's letter, plaintiffs wrote them asking that they specify the terms and conditions of the offer to sell
that when plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter with the same request
that since defendants failed to specify the terms and conditions of the offer to sell and because of information received that defendants were about to sell the property, plaintiffs were compelled to file the complaint to compel defendants to sell the property to them.
WON there was a contract of sale.
The stage of consummation begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the contract culminating in the extinguishment thereof.
Until the contract is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation.
In sales, particularly, to which the topic for discussion about the case at bench belongs, the contract is perfected when a person, called the seller, obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to another, called the buyer, over which the latter agrees.(Art 1458)
When the sale is not absolute but conditional, such as in a "Contract to Sell" where invariably the ownership of the thing sold is retained until the fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition (normally, the full payment of the purchase price), the breach of the condition will prevent the obligation to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. 2 In Dignos vs. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 375), we have said that, although denominated a "Deed of Conditional Sale," a sale is still absolute where the contract is devoid of any proviso that title is reserved or the right to unilaterally rescind is stipulated, e.g., until or unless the price is paid. Ownership will then be transferred to the buyer upon actual or constructive delivery (e.g., by the execution of a public document) of the property sold. Where the condition is imposed upon the perfection of the contract itself, the failure of the condition would prevent such perfection. 3 If the condition is imposed on the obligation of a party which is not fulfilled, the other party may either waive the condition or refuse to proceed with the sale (Art. 1545, Civil Code). 4
An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do (Art. 1156, Civil Code). The obligation is constituted upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof, viz: (a) The vinculum juris or juridical tie which is the efficient cause established by the various sources of obligations (law, contracts, quasicontracts, delicts and quasi-delicts); (b) the object which is the prestation or conduct; required to be observed (to give, to do or not to do); and (c) the subject-persons who, viewed from the demandability of the obligation, are the active (obligee) and the passive (obligor) subjects.
Among the sources of an obligation is a contract (Art. 1157, Civil Code), which is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service (Art. 1305, Civil Code). A contract undergoes various stages that include its negotiation or preparation, its perfection and, finally, its consummation.
Negotiation covers the period from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time the contract is concluded (perfected).
The perfection of the contract takes place upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof.
A contract which is consensual as to perfection is so established upon a mere meeting of minds, i.e., the concurrence of offer and acceptance, on the object and on the cause thereof.
A contract which requires, in addition to the above, the delivery of the object of the agreement, as in a pledge or commodatum, is commonly referred to as a real contract.
An unconditional mutual promise to buy and sell, as long as the object is made determinate and the price is fixed, can be obligatory on the parties, and compliance therewith may accordingly be exacted. 5
A negotiation is formally initiated by an offer. An imperfect promise (policitacion) is merely an offer. Public advertisements or solicitations and the like are ordinarily construed as mere invitations to make offers or only as proposals. These relations, until a contract is perfected, are not considered binding commitments. Thus, at any time prior to the perfection of the contract, either negotiating party may stop the negotiation.
In a solemn contract, compliance with certain formalities prescribed by law, such as in a donation of real property, is essential in order to make the act valid, the prescribed form being thereby an essential element thereof.
In the law on sales, the so-called "right of first refusal" is an innovative juridical relation. Needless to point out, it cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Neither can the right of first refusal, understood in its normal concept, per se be brought within the purview of an option under the second paragraph of Article 1479, aforequoted, or possibly of an offer under Article 1319 9 of the same Code. An option or an offer would require, among other things, 10 a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract. In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right, however, would be dependent not only on the grantor's eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto, it can at best be so described as merely belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts (since the essential elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite and inconclusive) but by, among other laws of general application, the pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code on human conduct. Even on the premise that such right of first refusal has been decreed under a final judgment, like here, its breach cannot justify correspondingly an issuance of a writ of execution under a judgment that merely recognizes its existence, nor would it sanction an action for specific performance without thereby negating the indispensable element of consensuality in the perfection of contracts. 11 It is not to say, however, that the right of first refusal would be inconsequential for, such as already intimated above, an unjustified disregard thereof, given, for instance, the circumstances expressed in Article 19 12 of the Civil Code, can warrant a recovery for damages. The final judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41058, it must be stressed, has merely accorded a "right of first refusal" in favor of petitioners. The consequence of such a declaration entails no more than what has heretofore been said. In fine, if, as it is here so conveyed to us, petitioners are aggrieved by the failure of private respondents to honor the right of first refusal, the remedy is not a writ of execution on the judgment, since there is none to execute, but an action for damages in a proper forum for the purpose.
[G.R. No. 133638. April 15, 2005] PERPETUA VDA. DE APE vs. CA and GENOROSA CAWIT VDA. DE LUMAYNO
Cleopas Ape was the registered owner of a parcel in Negros Occidental
Upon Cleopas Apes death sometime in 1950, the property passed on to his wife, Maria Ondoy, and their eleven (11) children
Generosa Cawit de Lumayno (private respondent herein), joined by her husband instituted a case for Specific Performance of a Deed of Sale with Damages against petitioner herein
It was alleged in the complaint that private respondent and entered into a contract of sale of land under which for a consideration of P5,000.00,
Fortunato agreed to sell his share in the lot to private respondent.
The agreement was contained in a receipt prepared by private respondents son-in-law
As private respondent wanted to register the claimed sale transaction, she supposedly demanded that Fortunato execute the corresponding deed of sale and to receive the balance of the consideration.
However, Fortunato unjustifiably refused to heed her demands. Private respondent, therefore, prayed that Fortunato be ordered to execute and deliver to her a sufficient and registrable deed of sale involving his one-eleventh (1/11) share or participation in lot, to pay P5,000.00 in damages; P500.00 reimbursement for litigation expenses as well as additional P500.00 for every appeal made; P2,000.00 for attorneys fees; and to pay the costs
Fortunato and petitioner denied the material allegations of the complaint and claimed that Fortunato never sold his share in Lot No. 2319 to private respondent and that his signature appearing on the purported receipt was forged.
alienation. This assurance would not exist if the notice should be given by the buyer.
(the lot was leased to the respondents)
The interpretation was somehow modified in the case of De Conejero, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al wherein it was pointed out that Article 1623 does not prescribe a particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner thus, as long as the redemptioner was notified in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the redemption period starts to run. This view was reiterated in Etcuban v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., Cabrera v. Villanueva, Garcia, et al. v. Calaliman, et al.,  Distrito, et al. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.,  and Mariano, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.
However, in the case of Salatandol v. Retes, wherein the plaintiffs were not furnished any written notice of sale or a copy thereof by the vendor, this Court again referred to the principle enunciated in the case of Butte. As observed by Justice Vicente Mendoza, such reversion is only sound, thus: Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requiring that the written notification should come from the vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other person. There is, therefore, no room for construction. Indeed, the principal difference between Art. 1524 of the former Civil Code and Art. 1623 of the present one is that the former did not specify who must give the notice, whereas the present one expressly says the notice must be given by the vendor. Effect must be given to this change in statutory language.
WON Fortunato was furnished with a written notice of sale of the shares of his co-owners as required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code
WON the receipt signed by Fortunato proves the existence of a contract of sale between him and private respondent.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Article 1623 of the Civil Code provides: The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
Despite the plain language of the law, this Court has, over the years, been tasked to interpret the written notice requirement of the above-quoted provision. In the case Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., we declared that In considering whether or not the offer to redeem was timely, we think that the notice given by the vendee (buyer) should not be taken into account. The text of Article 1623 clearly and expressly prescribes that the thirty days for making the redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by the vendor. Under the old law (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1524), it was immaterial who gave the notice; so long as the redeeming co-owner learned of the alienation in favor of the stranger, the redemption period began to run. It is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that method must be deemed exclusive. The reasons for requiring that the notice should be given by the seller, and not by the buyer, are easily divined. The seller of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners that under the law must be notified of the sale. Also, the notice by the seller removes all doubts as to fact of the sale, its perfection; and its validity, the notice being a reaffirmation thereof, so that the party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the
In this case, the records are bereft of any indication that Fortunato was given any written notice of prospective or consummated sale of the portions of Lot No. 2319 by the vendors or would-be vendors. The thirty (30)-day redemption period under the law, therefore, has not commenced to run. Despite this, however, we still rule that petitioner could no longer invoke her right to redeem from private respondent for the exercise of this right presupposes the existence of a co-ownership at the time the conveyance is made by a co-owner and when it is demanded by the other co-owner or co-owners. The regime of co-ownership exists when ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. By the nature of a co-ownership, a co-owner cannot point to specific portion of the property owned in common as his own because his share therein remains intangible. As legal redemption is intended to minimize co-ownership, once the property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the
community ceases to exist and there is no more reason to sustain any right of legal redemption.
In this case, records reveal that although Lot No. 2319 has not yet been formally subdivided, still, the particular portions belonging to the heirs of Cleopas Ape had already been ascertained and they in fact took possession of their respective parts.
A contract of sale is a consensual contract, thus, it is perfected by mere consent of the parties. It is born from the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the sale and upon the price. Upon its perfection, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, that is, the vendee may compel the transfer of the ownership and to deliver the object of the sale while the vendor may demand the vendee to pay the thing sold. For there to be a perfected contract of sale, however, the following elements must be present: consent, object, and price in money or its equivalent.
In the case of Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, et al.,  we explained the element of consent, to wit: The essence of consent is the agreement of the parties on the terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. It is the concurrence of the minds of the parties on the object and the cause which constitutes the contract. The area of agreement must extend to all points that the parties deem material or there is no consent at all.
To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (b) it should be free and (c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence; spontaneity by fraud.
In sum, we hold that petitioner is no longer entitled to the right of redemption under Article 1632 of the Civil Code as Lot No. 2319 had long been partitioned among its co-owners. This Court likewise annuls the contract of sale between Fortunato and private respondent on the ground of vitiated consent. (Fortunato was illiterate, they made him sign the English contract without help etc)
[G.R. No. 134219. June 08, 2005] SPOUSES TORCUATOR vs. SPOUSES BERNABE FACTS:
The subject of this action is Lot in Muntinlupa, MetroManila The lower court found that the above parcel of land was purchased by the spouses Salvador from the developers of Ayala Alabang subject: (a) that the lot buyer shall deposit with Ayala Corporation a cash bond- 17k which shall be refunded to him if he builds a residence thereon within two (2) years of purchase, otherwise the deposit shall be forfeited, (b) architectural plans for any improvement shall be approved by Ayala Corporation, and (c) no lot may be resold by the buyer unless a residential house has been constructed thereon (Ayala Corporation keeps the Torrens Title in their possession). the Salvadors sold the parcel of land to the Spouses Bernabe the Salvadors concomitantly executed a special power of attorney authorizing the Bernabes to construct a residential house on the lot and to transfer the title of the property in their names. The Bernabes, on the other hand, without making any improvement, contracted to sell the parcel of land to the Spouses Torcuator The Torcuators thereafter had the plans of their house prepared and offered to pay the Bernabes for the land upon delivery of the sale contract. For one reason or another, the deed of sale was never consummated nor was payment on the said sale ever effected. Subseuqently, the Bernabes sold the subject land to Leonardo Angeles, a brother-in-law. The document however is not notarized. As a result, the Torcuators commenced the instant action against the Bernabes and Salvadors for Specific Performance or Rescission with Damages.
ISSUE: WON there was a contract of sale. HELD: The differences between a contract to sell and a contract of sale are well-settled in jurisprudence. in a contract of sale, title passes to the buyer upon delivery of the thing sold, in a contract to sell, ownership is reserved in the seller and is not to pass until the full payment of the purchase price is made. In the first case, non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition; in the second case, full payment is a positive suspensive condition. In the first case, the vendor has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the land sold until and unless the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside. In the second case, however, the title remains in the vendor if the vendee does not comply with the condition precedent of making payment at the time specified in the contract. In other words, in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass to the buyer until full payment of the price or the fulfillment of some other conditions either of which is a future and uncertain event the non-happening of which is not a
breach, casual or serious, but simply an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. We have carefully examined the agreement between the parties and are far from persuaded that it was a contract of sale. the deed of sale would have been issued only upon full payment of the purchase price, among other things. Petitioner Mario Torcuator acknowledged this fact when he testified that the deed of sale and original special power of attorney were only to be delivered upon full payment of the purchase price. As correctly observed by the trial court, the Salvadors did not execute a deed of sale in favor of petitioners, and instead executed a special power of attorney authorizing the Bernabes to sell the property on their behalf, in order to afford the latter a measure of protection that would guarantee full payment of the purchase price before any deed of sale in favor of petitioners was executed. Mere sending of a letter by the vendee expressing the intention to pay without the accompanying payment is not considered a valid tender of payment. Consignation of the amount due in court is essential in order to extinguish the obligation to pay and oblige the vendor to convey title Hence, absent a valid tender of payment and consignation, petitioners are deemed to have failed to discharge their obligation to pay. The term Statute of Frauds is descriptive of statutes which require certain classes of contracts, such as agreements for the sale of real property, to be in writing. It does not deprive the parties the right to contract with respect to the matters therein involved, but merely regulates the formalities of the contract necessary to render it enforceable. The purpose of the statute is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending for their evidence on the unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged. The written note or memorandum, as contemplated by Article 1403 of the Civil Code, should embody the essentials of the contract Denied.Costs against petitioner.
Coronel executed a document entitled Receipt of Down Payment in favor of Alcaraz
(from the deceased father’s to Romulo’s - 50k dp; balance be paid upon transfer from Romulo to Alcaraz)
Alcaraz paid the 50k
the property originally registered in the name of the Coronels father was transferred in their names under
the Coronels sold the property to intervenor-appellant Catalina B. Mabanag for P1,580,000.00 after the latter has paid 300k
For this reason, Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract with Alzaraz depositing the down payment paid by the latter
Alcaraz filed a complaint for a specific performance against the Coronels
Catalina caused the annotation of a notice of adverse claim covering the same property with the Registry of Deeds
the Coronels executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of Catalina
a new title over the subject property was issued in the name of Catalina
ISSUE: WON there was a contract of sale.
Art. 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
While, it is the position of private respondents that the Receipt of Down Payment embodied a perfected contract of sale, which perforce, they seek to enforce by means of an action for specific performance, petitioners on their part insist that what the document signified was a mere executory contract to sell, subject to certain suspensive conditions, and because of the
[G.R. No. 103577. October 7, 1996] ROMULO A. CORONEL vs. CA and ALCARAZ et al.
absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz, who left for the United States of America, said contract could not possibly ripen into a contract of absolute sale.
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere consent.
The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following:
a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; b) Determinate subject matter; and c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.
Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a Contract of Sale because the first essential element is lacking.
In a contract to sell, the prospective seller explicitly reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer, meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to transfer ownership of the property subject of the contract to sell until the happening of an event, which for present purposes we shall take as the full payment of the purchase price. What the seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill his promise to sell the subject property when the entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him. In other words the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus, ownership is retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer.
Stated positively, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of the purchase price, the prospective sellers obligation to sell the subject property by entering into a contract of sale with the prospective buyer becomes demandable as provided in Article 1479 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally demandable.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissor of the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
A contract to sell as defined hereinabove, may not even be considered as a conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale until the fulfillment of a suspensive condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur. If the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the contract of sale is completely abated However, if the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby perfected, such that if there had already been previous delivery of the property subject of the sale to the buyer, ownership thereto automatically transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further act having to be performed by the seller.
In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of the purchase price, ownership will not automatically transfer to the buyer although the property may have been previously delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale. It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a conditional contract of sale specially in cases where the subject property is sold by the owner not to the party the seller contracted with, but to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a contract to sell, there being no previous sale of the property, a third person buying such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the full payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property. There is no double sale in such case. Title to
the property will transfer to the buyer after registration because there is no defect in the owner-sellers title per se, but the latter, of course, may be sued for damages by the intending buyer. In a conditional contract of sale, however, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, the sale becomes absolute and this will definitely affect the sellers title thereto. In fact, if there had been previous delivery of the subject property, the sellers ownership or title to the property is automatically transferred to the buyer such that, the seller will no longer have any title to transfer to any third person. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, such second buyer of the property who may have had actual or constructive knowledge of such defect in the sellers title, or at least was charged with the obligation to discover such defect, cannot be a registrant in good faith. Such second buyer cannot defeat the first buyers title. In case a title is issued to the second buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance of the property subject of the sale.
sale pertained to the sellers themselves (the certificate of title was not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase price. Under the established facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may safely presume that, had the certificate of title been in the names of petitioners-sellers at that time, there would have been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have been executed and consummated right there and then. What is clearly established by the plain language of the subject document is that when the said Receipt of Down Payment was prepared and signed by petitioners Romulo A. Coronel,et. al., the parties had agreed to a conditional contract of sale, consummation of which is subject only to the successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name of petitioners father, Constancio P. Coronel, to their names. Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
“Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog, Quezon City, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos purchase price of our inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No. 1199627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total amount of P1,240,000.00.” without any reservation of title until full payment of the entire purchase price, the natural and ordinary idea conveyed is that they sold their property. When the Receipt of Down payment is considered in its entirety, it becomes more manifest that there was a clear intent on the part of petitioners to transfer title to the buyer, but since the transfer certificate of title was still in the name of petitioners father, they could not fully effect such transfer although the buyer was then willing and able to immediately pay the purchase price. Therefore, petitioners-sellers undertook upon receipt of the down payment from private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz, to cause the issuance of a new certificate of title in their names from that of their father, after which, they promised to present said title, now in their names, to the latter and to execute the deed of absolute sale whereupon, the latter shall, in turn, pay the entire balance of the purchase price. The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the circumstance which prevented the parties from entering into an absolute contract of
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts. Art. 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.
Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P. Alcaraz was in the United States of America, we cannot justify petitioners-sellers act of unilaterally and extrajudicially rescinding the contract of sale, there being no express stipulation authorizing the sellers to extrajudicially rescind the contract of sale.
Moreover, petitioners are estopped from raising the alleged absence of Ramona because although the evidence on record shows that the sale was in the name of Ramona as the buyer, the sellers had been dealing with Concepcion, Ramonas mother, who had acted for and in behalf of her daughter, if not also in her own behalf.
petitioners never questioned Concepcion’s authority to represent Ramona when they accepted her personal check. Neither did they raise any objection as regards payment being effected by a third person. Accordingly, as far as petitioners are concerned, the physical
absence of Ramona is not a ground to rescind the contract of sale
Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something, incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfill his obligation, delay by the other begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
There is thus neither factual nor legal basis to rescind the contract of sale between petitioners and respondents.
With the foregoing conclusions, the sale to the other petitioner, Catalina B. Mabanag, gave rise to a case of double sale where Article 1544 of the Civil Code will apply, to wit:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
the second contract of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City giving rise to the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Catalina.Thus, the second paragraph of Article 1544 shall apply.
The above-cited provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to the buyer, the exceptions being: (a) when the second buyer, in good faith, registers the sale ahead of the first buyer, and (b) should there be no inscription by either of the two buyers, when the second buyer, in good faith, acquires possession of the property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the second buyer satisfies these requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to him to the prejudice of the first buyer.
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since knowledge taints his registration with bad faith.
As clearly borne out by the evidence in this case, petitioner Mabanag could not have in good faith, registered the sale because as early as February 22, 1985, a notice of lis pendens had been annotated on the transfer certificate of title in the names of petitioners, whereas petitioner Mabanag registered the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At the time of registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew that the same property had already been previously sold to private respondents, or, at least, she was charged with knowledge that a previous buyer is claiming title to the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her eyes to the defect in petitioners title to the property at the time of the registration of the property.
[G.R. No. 122544. January 28, 1999] REGINA P. DIZON, AMPARO D. BARTOLOME, FIDELINA D. BALZA, ESTER ABAD DIZON and JOSEPH ANTHONY DIZON, RAYMUND A. DIZON, GERARD A. DIZON, and JOSE A. DIZON, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and OVERLAND EXPRESS LINES, INC., respondents. [G.R. No. 124741. January 28, 1999] REGINA P. DIZON, AMPARO D. BARTOLOME, FIDELINA D. BALZA, ESTER ABAD DIZON and JOSEPH ANTHONY DIZON, RAYMUND A. DIZON, GERARD A. DIZON, and JOSE A. DIZON, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, and OVERLAND EXPRESS LINES, INC., respondents.
private respondent Overland Express Lines, Inc. (lessee) entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with petitioners (lessors) involving a parcel of land situated at
corner MacArthur Highway and South "H" Street, Diliman, Quezon City.
The term of the lease was for one year commencing from May 16, 1974 up to May 15, 1975. During this period, private respondent was granted an option to purchase for the amount of P3,000.00 per square meter. Thereafter, the lease shall be on a per month basis with a monthly rental of P3,000.00. For failure of private respondent to pay the increased rental of P8,000.00 per month effective June 1976, petitioners filed an action for ejectment. Court ordered respondent to vacate the leased premises.
Private respondent filed a certiorari petition praying for the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the enforcement of said judgment and dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction of the City Court. – denied
private respondent then filed an action for Specific Performance and Fixing of Period for Obligation with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order pending hearing on the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to compel the execution of a deed of sale pursuant to the option to purchase and the receipt of the partial payment, and to fix the period to pay the balance
CA: there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties on the leased premises and that pursuant to the option to buy agreement, private respondent had acquired the rights of a vendee in a contract of sale. It opined that the payment by private respondent of 300k as partial payment for the leased property, which petitioners accepted (through Alice A. Dizon) and for which an official receipt was issued, was the operative act that gave rise to a perfected contract of sale, and that for failure of petitioners to deny receipt thereof, private respondent can therefore assume that Alice A. Dizon, acting as agent of petitioners, was authorized by them to receive the money in their behalf. The Court of Appeals went further by stating that in fact, what was entered into was a "conditional contract of sale" wherein ownership over the leased property shall not pass to the private respondent until it has fully paid the purchase price. Since private respondent did not consign to the court the balance of the purchase price and continued to occupy the subject premises, it had the obligation to pay the amount of P1,700.00 in monthly rentals until full payment of the purchase price.
G. R. NO. 124741:
Petitioners filed with respondent Court of Appeals a motion to remand the records of the ejectment case
First. Petitioners have established a right to evict private respondent from the subject premises for non-payment of rentals.
Admittedly, no definite period beyond the one-year term of lease was agreed upon by petitioners and private respondent. However, since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of lease is considered to be from month to month in accordance with Article 1687 of the New Civil Code. Where the rentals are paid monthly, the lease, even if verbal may be deemed to be on a monthly basis, expiring at the end of every month pursuant to Article 1687, in relation to Article 1673 of the Civil Code. In such case, a demand to vacate is not even necessary for judicial action after the expiration of every month.
When private respondent failed to pay the increased rental of P8,000.00 per month in June 1976, the petitioners had a cause of action to institute an ejectment suit against the former with the then City Court. In this regard, the City Court (now MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the ejectment suit.
Second. Having failed to exercise the option within the stipulated one-year period, private respondent cannot enforce its option to purchase anymore. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the right to exercise the option still subsists at the time private respondent tendered the amount on June 20, 1975, the suit for specific performance to enforce the option to purchase was filed only on October 7, 1985 or more than ten (10) years after accrual of the cause of action as provided under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code.
In this case, there was a contract of lease for one (1) year with option to purchase. The contract of lease expired without the private respondent, as lessee, purchasing the property but remained in possession thereof. Hence, there was an implicit renewal of the contract of lease on a monthly basis. The other terms of the original contract of lease which are revived in the implied new lease under Article 1670 of the New Civil Code are only those terms which are germane to the lessees right of continued enjoyment of the property leased.
Therefore, an implied new lease does not ipso facto carry with it any implied revival of private respondent's option to purchase (as lessee thereof) the leased premises. The provision entitling the lessee the option to purchase the leased premises is not deemed incorporated in the impliedly renewed contract because it is alien to the possession of the lessee. Private respondent’s right to exercise the option to purchase expired with the termination of the original contract of lease for one year.
Third. There was no perfected contract of sale between petitioners and private respondent. Private respondent argued that it delivered the check of P300,000.00 to Alice A. Dizon
Under Article 1475 of the New Civil Code, the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts. Thus, the elements of a contract of sale are consent, object, and price in money or its equivalent. It bears stressing that the absence of any of these essential elements negates the existence of a perfected contract of sale. Sale is a consensual contract and he who alleges it must show its existence by competent proof.
G.R. No. 166862 December 20, 2006 MANILA METAL CONTAINER CORPORATION vs.PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK FACTS: Petitioner was the owner of a parcel of land located in Mandaluyong To secure a 900k loan it had obtained from respondent PNB, petitioner executed a real estate mortgage over the lot. Respondent PNB later granted petitioner a new credit accommodation of 1M petitioner executed an Amendment 4 of Real Estate Mortgage over its property. petitioner secured another loan of 635k from respondent PNB, payable in quarterly installments of P32,650.00, plus interests and other charges.5 PNB filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and sought to have the property sold at public auction After due notice and publication, the property was sold at public auction where respondent PNB was declared the winning bidder for 1m. The Certificate of Sale7 issued in its favor was registered with the Office of the Register of Thus, the period to redeem the property was to expire on February 17, 1984. Petitioner sent a letter dated August 25, 1983 to respondent PNB, requesting that it be granted an
extension of time to redeem/repurchase the property. – partial redemption. – not granted Since petitioner failed to redeem the property, the Register of Deeds cancelled the old tct and issued a new title in favor of respondent PNB. 13 Petitioner's offers had not yet been acted upon by respondent PNB. Meanwhile, the Special Assets Management Department (SAMD) had prepared a statement of account, and as of June 25, 1984 petitioner's obligation amounted to P1,574,560.47. This included the bid price of P1,056,924.50, interest, advances of insurance premiums, advances on realty taxes, registration expenses, miscellaneous expenses and publication cost.14 When apprised of the statement of account, petitioner remitted P725,000.00 to respondent PNB as "deposit to repurchase," and Official Receipt No. 978191 was issued to it. In the meantime, the SAMD recommended to the management of respondent PNB that petitioner be allowed to repurchase the property PNB management informed petitioner that it was rejecting the offer and the recommendation of the SAMD. It was suggested that petitioner purchase the property for P2,660,000.00, its minimum market value. Respondent PNB gave petitioner until December 15, 1984 to act on the proposal; otherwise, its P725,000.00 deposit would be returned and the property would be sold to other interested buyers. 16 petitioner filed a complaint against respondent PNB for "Annulment of Mortgage and Mortgage Foreclosure, Delivery of Title, or Specific Performance with Damages."
ISSUE: WON petitioner and respondent PNB had entered into a perfected contract for petitioner to repurchase the property from respondent. HELD: The ruling of the appellate court that there was no perfected contract of sale between the parties on June 4, 1985 is correct. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. 41 Under Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, there is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1) Consent of the contracting parties; (2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3) Cause of the obligation which is established. Contracts are perfected by mere consent which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.42 Once perfected, they bind other contracting parties and the obligations arising therefrom have the form of law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith. The parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.43 By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.44 The absence of any of the essential elements will negate the existence of a perfected contract of sale. As the Court ruled in Boston Bank of the Philippines v. Manalo:45 A definite agreement as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to sell personal or real property because it seriously affects the rights and obligations of the parties. Price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fixing of the price can never be left to the decision of one of the contracting parties. But a price fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by the other, gives rise to a perfected sale.46 A contract of sale is consensual in nature and is perfected upon mere meeting of the minds. When there is merely an offer by one party without acceptance of the other, there is no contract. 47 When the contract of sale is not perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation between the parties.48 In San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. v. Huang,49 the Court ruled that the stages of a contract of sale are as follows: (1) negotiation, covering the period from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time the contract is perfected; (2) perfection, which takes place upon the concurrence of the essential elements of the sale which are the meeting of the minds of the parties as to the object of the contract and upon the price; and (3) consummation, which begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the contract of sale, culminating in the extinguishment thereof. A negotiation is formally initiated by an offer, which, however, must be certain.50 At any time prior to the perfection of the contract, either negotiating party may stop the negotiation. At this stage, the offer may be withdrawn; the withdrawal is effective immediately after its manifestation. To convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the offer; it must be plain, unequivocal, unconditional and without variance of any sort from the proposal. In Adelfa Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,51 the Court ruled that: x x x The rule is that except where a formal acceptance is so required, although the
acceptance must be affirmatively and clearly made and must be evidenced by some acts or conduct communicated to the offeror, it may be shown by acts, conduct, or words of the accepting party that clearly manifest a present intention or determination to accept the offer to buy or sell. Thus, acceptance may be shown by the acts, conduct, or words of a party recognizing the existence of the contract of sale.52 A qualified acceptance or one that involves a new proposal constitutes a counter-offer and a rejection of the original offer. A counter-offer is considered in law, a rejection of the original offer and an attempt to end the negotiation between the parties on a different basis.53 Consequently, when something is desired which is not exactly what is proposed in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to guarantee consent because any modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls the offer.54 The acceptance must be identical in all respects with that of the offer so as to produce consent or meeting of the minds. In this case, petitioner had until February 17, 1984 within which to redeem the property. However, since it lacked the resources, it requested for more time to redeem/repurchase the property under such terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties. The statement of account prepared by the SAMD stating that the net claim of respondent as of June 25, 1984 wasP1,574,560.47 cannot be considered an unqualified acceptance to petitioner's offer to purchase the property. The statement is but a computation of the amount which petitioner was obliged to pay in case respondent would later agree to sell the property, including interests, advances on insurance premium, advances on realty taxes, publication cost, registration expenses and miscellaneous expenses. Thus, the P725,000.00 was merely a deposit to be applied as part of the purchase price of the property, in the event that respondent would approve the recommendation of SAMD for respondent to accept petitioner's offer to purchase the property for P1,574,560.47. Unless and until the respondent accepted the offer on these terms, no perfected contract of sale would arise. Absent proof of the concurrence of all the essential elements of a contract of sale, the giving of earnest money cannot establish the existence of a perfected contract of sale.63