Salafi Ulama in UMNO Political Convergen

        Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 36, Number 2, August 2014, pp. 206-231 (Article)

       DOI: 10.1353/csa.2014.0020 

For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/csa/summary/v036/36.2.mohamed-osman.html

Access provided by Nanyang Technological University (24 Nov 2014 22:40 GMT)

DOI: 10.1355/cs36-2 10.1355/cs36-2b b Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 36, No. 2 (2014), pp. 206–31 © 2014 ISEAS ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

DOI: 10.1355/cs36-2 10.1355/cs36-2b b Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 36, No. 2 (2014), pp. 206–31 © 2014 ISEAS ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency? MOHAMED NAWAB MOHAMED OSMAN 

The Salafi ulama (religious scholars) in Malaysia have seen their religious and political influence amplified over the last five years. Operating within a newly formed organization, the Pertubuhan Ilmuwan Malaysia (ILMU) and the newly augmented United Malays National Organization’s (UMNO) young ulama wing, Salafi scholars play a key role in providing Islamic legitimacy to the government and defending it against the opposition Islamist party, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). The decision by Salafi scholars to support the Malaysian government is striking given their hardline views on the implementation of Islamic laws and their opposition to democracy. This paper seeks to understand the reasons for the Salafi ulama’s support for UMNO. It argues that the Salafi ulama’s involvement in UMNO is due to a convergence of interest between the two groups and as part of a strategy by the Salafi ulama to expand their influence at both the state and societal levels. The paper examines the religious-political  positions of the Salafi ulama on issues such as the Islamic state, the implementation of Islamic laws and democratic political system, and argues that they are opposed to the current state of religious affairs and the political structure of the Malaysian state. Nevertheless, the ulama are working within UMNO to change the political system. For UMNO leaders, the Salafi ulama form an important group that could defend the party against religious attacks from PAS and provide the  party with greater religious credence. Keywords: Ulama, UMNO, Salafi, PAS and Islam.

M OHAMED N AWAB MOHAMED O SMAN  

is an Assistant Professor and Coordinator of the Malaysia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Blk S4, Nanyang Ave, Level B4 Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 639798; email: ismnawab@ntu. edu.sg. 206

Reproduced from Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs Vol. 36, No. 2 (August 2014) (Singapore: 2014) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at >

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?

207

The terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda in the United States on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent arrests of members of its Southeast Asian affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), have cast a negative light on the Salafi interpretation of Islam. Salafi ideology was alleged to have inspired JI members to carry out violent attacks against targets in the region. In Southeast Asia, Salafi scholars and groups came to be viewed with trepidation by governments because of their supposed ideological links with violent movements such as Laskar  Jihad and JI.1  In Malaysia, due to Salafi’s puritan interpretation of Shariah (Islamic laws), and its uncompromising attitude in seeking the implementation of these laws, it has been categorized as extremist by the country’s religious bureaucracy. Yet despite the Salafi’s hardline stance on religion, the group has made inroads within the government. In fact today a group of younger Salafi ulama form the bulwark of the ruling United Malays National Organization’s (UMNO) ulama wing (a wing comprising Muslim religious scholars). This seemingly contradictory position of the state vis-à-vis  the Salafi ulama is the subject of enquiry of this paper. This article argues that the Salafi ulama’s involvement in UMNO is due both to a convergence of interest with UMNO and as a strategy to expand its influence at both the state and societal levels. The aim of this paper is threefold. First, to examine the  beliefs of the Salafis and provide an historical background of the Salafi movement in Malaysia. Second, to identify key religious scholars with an inclination towards Salafism and examine their religious-political thinking and attitudes. In particular their views on issues such as the implementation of Islamic laws and Islamic governance in Malaysia is examined. Third, to analyse the factors that have encouraged Salafi ulama to render their support to UMNO and how the Salafi influence in UMNO is likely to affect future government policies related to Islam. The research for this paper is based mainly on primary sources including speeches by and interviews with Salafi ulama scholars. 2  This article contributes to the existing, but limited, scholarship on the contemporary Salafi movement in Malaysia. 3 Understanding Salafism

In most of Southeast Asia, the term Wahhabi is used interchangeably with Salafi. While the two groups are similar in most aspects of their religious adherence, there are also important differences  between the two. The Wahhabi orient orientation ation can be traced to the

208

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92), a fervent reader of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780–855), one of the founders of the four schools of jurisprudence that are dominant in Sunni Islam, and Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Al-Taimiyyah (1263–1328), a fourteenthcentury scholar known for his strict puritan interpretation of Islam.4  Al-Wahhab was perhaps best known for his role as the co-founder with Muhammad Ibn Saud (d 1765) of the first Saudi state, and who provided religious legitimacy to Ibn Saud’s struggle to form a unitary state on the Arabian Peninsula. In return for his efforts, he was awarded control over the Saudi religious establishment. 5 Al-Wahhab argued that many Muslims at that time had deviated from the teachings of their pious ancestors ( al-salaf al-salih) and adopted practices akin to the period of ignorance ( jahiliyyah ) which precedes Islam. In his view, these practices — such as the reverence of saints practised by Sufis and the doctrines espoused  by Shiite Islam — ran counter to the teachings of Islam. However However,, Al-Wahhab was less clear about where he stood on theological issues. While in theory he was against the tradition of taqlid   (blind imitation) of past practices of traditional scholars and advocated the establishment of ijtihad  (open   (open interpretation on religious matters), in practice he subscribed to the Hanbali School of jurisprudence which had a more literal reading of the Qur’an. 6  The religious teachings of Al-Wahhab received political support when Muhammad Ibnu Saud, chief of the prominent Ibn Saud tribe on the Arabian Peninsula, swore a traditional Muslim oath whereby he promised to work together with Al-Wahhab to establish a state run according to Islamic principles. By 1765, when the first Saudi kingdom was established, Al-Wahhab consolidated his position as the religious guide to the kingdom. The Wahhabis have thus been loyal to the Ibnu Saud led kingdom since its formation. Outside of the Saudi state, most Wahhabis have generally maintained a quietist position on political matters. 7 Nevertheless, some Wahhabis are privately opposed to the fact that many Muslim governments do not impose strict Islamic laws in their countries, even though they are unlikely to play an active role to change this. 8 Salafism can be traced to the 1920s reformist movement (Salafi) started by Sayyid Jamal-al-Din Al-Afghani (1839–97) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905). Both individuals were highly critical of the practice of blind imitation of the past and strict adherence to one particular school of jurisprudence. 9  They viewed the practices of Sufis with disdain and blamed many of the problems of the Muslim world on religious scholars. 10  One of Abduh’s students,

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?

209

Rashid Rida (1865–1935) merged reformist religious ideas with anti-colonialism, and was also responsible for transforming Salafism into a more conservative movement akin to Wahhabism. 11  In the religious realm, little separates the Salafis from the Wahhabis. However unlike the Wahhabis, who are generally Hanbalite in matters of jurisprudence, the Salafis reject all schools of jurisprudence arguing instead for individual ijtihad   on all matters related to jurisprudence. In the 1960s, Saudi King Faisal gave refuge to many Islamist figures from the Muslim Brotherhood movement as well as Muslim reformist scholars after they were forced to flee their countries following intense repression by Arab nationalist rulers. 12 The anti-establishment political ideas and cultures brought by political figures such as Muhammad Qutb (a key Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader and brother of Sayyid Qutb) and Saeed Hawa’ (a key Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader) encountered the strict Wahhabi Islamic doctrine resulting in some Muslim Brotherhood leaders and members adopting Wahhabi’s religious doctrines. On the other hand some Wahhabis began to subscribe to more active political positions, as described in the next section of this paper. As a result of this encounter, there was more convergence between the Salafi and Wahhabi Islamic ideologies. This is described by a legalistic interpretation of Islamic law that is inflexible and highly intolerant of differences as well as a rabid anti-Sufi and anti-Shiite position. Those who subscribe to the Salafi-Wahhabi ideology are often harsh in their criticism of other Muslims, even branding many of their co-religionists as infidels. 13 Another result of this encounter is the myriad of different positions on political engagement that began to emerge among Salafis. The first is the infamous Salafi-jihadi ideology represented  by Al-Qaeda. This ideology can be traced to the political position advocated by Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), a key ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 14 Qutb famously promoted the twin concept of hakimiyyah  (God’s sovereignty) and  jahiliyyah  (idolatrous condition) in which he argued that given the fact that most of the regimes  jahiliyyah iyyah , it is the duty in the Muslim world are in a state of  jahil of all Muslims to rebel using violence to uphold hakimiyyah.15 This ideology has been used to justify rebellions against various governments such as that by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Egypt and the terrorist actions of Al-Qaeda. The second political position of the Salafis emerged from interactions between the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabism. This political position is known as the al-Sahwa al-Islamiya   (Islamic Awakening). 16  The advocates

210

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

of this political position, commonly referred to as the Sahwas, include Saudi preachers Safir Al-Hawali and Salman Al-Ouda’. 17 The Sahwas stress the need to attain political power through nonviolent means, including election to public office. The El-Nour party in Egypt is an example of the Sahwa movement. The third position is known as the political quietist Salafism. Much like Wahhabism, these Salafis argue that it is forbidden for Muslims to participate in civil strife and that obedience to a Muslim ruler is religiously mandated. These Salafis tend to focus their attention on education and proselytization. 18  The leading scholars within this school of thought include Nasir Al-Din Al-Albani (1914–99) and Sheikh Abdul Aziz Bin Baz (1910–99). In this regard, being political quietist does not mean that these Salafis are apolitical. In fact, much like the other Salafis, they seek political power in the long run so as to implement their version of Islamic laws. In general the politically quietist Salafis are also supportive of the Saudi regime. It must be added that the boundaries between the three political positions are porous and that Salafis can move easily from one group to another. This could be seen from the example of the GIA which began as a Salafi-jihadi group but became quietist after signing a peace agreement with the Egyptian government in 2003 and quickly moved to form a political party following the collapse of the Hosni Mubarak regime in 2011. Similarly the Salafi movement in Indonesia, Laskar Jihad led by the preacher Jaafar Umar Thalib, was a politically quietist movement that quickly transformed itself into a Salafi-jihadist movement following the collapse of the Soeharto government in 1998. 19  While the two doctrines have some differences, as noted earlier, for the purposes of this paper, the term Salafi will be used since both Wahhabis and Salafis describe themselves as Salafis. Salafism in Malaysia

Salafism first arrived in the Malay states in the 1920s. Several Malay students studying in Cairo were influenced by the ideas of Al-Afghani and Abduh. 20  Upon returning to the Malay states, they  began propagating these ideas. The most important figure within this group was Sheikh Tahir Jalaluddin (1869–1956). He was an avid reader of the Al-Manar   journal published by Rida and was personally acquainted with him. He published a journal called

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?

211

Al-Imam, together with several reformist figures such as Sayyid Sheikh Al-Hady (1867–1934), which discussed issues of religious reform within the Malay world. 21  This reformist group, known collectively as the Kaum Muda, was opposed to many Sufi rituals within the Malay world which they perceived as contrary to Islamic teachings. They also advocated for the introduction of modern subjects into the education system and the emancipation of women in Malay society. 22  Several Kaum Muda figures also played important roles within the religious  bureaucracies in several Malay states. For instance, Sheikh Tahir Jalaluddin took up the position of Mufti of Perak and Haji Abbas Taha was a kadi   (Islamic judge) in Singapore. 23  Their involvement in state religious institutions was in line with their attempts to change the system. The Kaum Muda was opposed by both traditional leaders and religious scholars (known as the Kaum Tua) who viewed them as political and religious threats.24 The Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua conflict dominated much of the religious discourses in the early twentieth century. By the midtwentieth century, however, the discussions and debates had dissipated and the Kaum Muda had failed in their attempt to challenge the authority of the Kaum Tua. However, over the long term, the Kaum Muda’s impact on Malay society was felt in both the religious and political spheres. The Kaum Muda was successful in propagating their ideas in Perlis. The most important figure who promoted the Kaum Muda/Salafi ideas in Perlis was Haji Ahmad Muhammad, a Mecca educated religious scholar who was also Chairman of the Council for Islamic Religious Affairs and Malay Customs in the state.25  Haji Ahmad was active in promoting the ideas of the Salafis  by translating and publishing various books, treatises and journals discussing Salafi ideas. In the same vein, Haji Ahmad curtailed the ideas of the Kaum Tua forcing several  pondoks  (Islamic boarding schools) in Perlis to be closed. Several bureaucrats, such as Wan Ahmad Wan Daud who was personal secretary to Perlis’ Raja (king), and UMNO politicians such as Sheikh Ahmad Md Hashim, who was appointed Chief Minister of Perlis in 1959, were instrumental in the institutionalization of the Salafi thought within the state constitution. Unlike other states in Malaysia that listed the Shafie mazhab as the official school of jurisprudence, the constitution of Perlis asserts that there is to be no official school of jurisprudence that the state subscribes to. 26  This early influence on the state legislature has made Salafism the mainstream religious orientation in Perlis.

212

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

The second wave of Salafism arrived in the 1980s when a new breed of Malay religious scholars educated in Saudi Arabia returned to Malaysia. As part of its attempt to limit the influence of Iran following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Saudi Arabia began to exert its influence in the Muslim world. A key strategy used  by the Saudis was to offer scholar scholarships ships and financial assist assistance ance to Muslim students from around the world to study at Islamic universities which were dominated by Salafi scholars. Most of the scholars these students were exposed to were of the quietist variant such as Albani, Muhammad Ibn Al-Uthaymeen (1925–2001) and Saleh Al-Fawzan (b. 1933). 27  Beyond these Salafi scholars, many scholars from the Muslim Brotherhood were also present in Saudi Arabia. As mentioned earlier, these scholars included Muhammad Qutb and Said Hawwa’. As such, a segment of Malaysian students became more oriented towards the Muslim Brotherhood rather than the Salafis. A case in point is the current president of PAS, Hadi Awang who was strongly influenced  by Saeed Hawwa’ (1935–89) and was part of his personal usrah (study group). 28   By the 1980s, these Saudi-trained Malaysian students had returned to Malaysia and began propagating their ideas.29 Two main groups emerged from the Saudi alumni. The Muslim Brotherhood-oriented group joined PAS and began campaigning for the establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia. 30  The puritan Salafi-oriented group focused on teaching and preaching their doctrine. Due to the influence of the quietist Saudi Salafi scholars, these individuals stayed clear of politics. Among these Salafi scholars were Dr Sulaiman Nordin who taught at the National University of Malaysia, and Dr Abdullah Yassin who became a freelance preacher. Traditionally, all the Muftis of Perlis were of Salafi orientation. This is true for former Muftis such as Mat Jahaya Hussin and the current Mufti, Juanda Jaya. In 2010, several younger Salafi ulama formed Pertubuhan Ilmuwan Malaysia (Association of Malaysian Scholars, ILMU), an organization with the aim of upholding Islam and “freeing” Islamic teachings in Malaysia from deviant practices. The organization comprised both more senior Salafi scholars such as Sulaiman Noordin and Rasul Dahri as well as younger Salafi such as Fathul Bari Mat Jahaya, Fadhlan Osman and Ahmad Fauzan Yahya. Several of these ulama were also members of UMNO. 31  ILMU has focused on organizing Islamic classes and seminars as well as online engagements where they preach Salafi Islam and criticize other variants of Islam

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?

213

including Sufism and Shiism. The organization is also implicitly political and has used its various platforms to defend government policies and actions while criticizing any Islamic groups or parties opposed to the government. Salafism and the Malaysian State

The Malaysian government has attempted to impose a standard form of homogeneous Islam in the country. 32  In pursuit of this goal, the government’s religious bureaucracy, the Department of Islamic Development (Jabatan Kemajuaan Islam Malaysia, JAKIM), has issued  fatwas  (religious edicts) and statements declaring various Islamic sects to be deviant. 33  However, the federal nature of the Malaysian state, and the fact that matters pertaining to religion are under the purview of the Malay rulers, makes it difficult for the Malaysian government to achieve this homogeneity. In the case of the Salafis, several discussions were held to address the problems in the teachings of this sect. 34  While Malaysia’s highest religious authority, the National Fatwa Council of Malaysia, did not gazette the Wahhabis as a deviant sect, it has issued five different statements — in 1985, 1986, 1996, 1997 and 2003 — declaring Wahhabism as a sect that must be curtailed due to its divisive nature.35 In line with this position, several books by leading Wahhabi scholars have been banned in Malaysia. For example, in 2003 the Islamic Religious Councils of the state of Penang and Negeri Sembilan banned several works by Rasul Dahri. 36  In 2009, Salafis encountered another setback when a number of Salafi scholars, including Fathul Bari Mat Jahaya and Dr Azwira Abdul Aziz, were  banned from preaching in several states because they did not possess posses s 37 the necessary documentations to do so. The anti-Wahhabi/Salafi orientation of religious bureaucracies in Malaysia can be attributed to several factors. First, many of the religious scholars working in Malaysia’s religious bureaucracies are traditionalist in their orientation, and hence have no sympathy for Salafism which questions many aspects of their beliefs. 38 Second, most of Malaysia’s royal families continue to adhere to traditional Islam. For instance, members of the royal family in the state of Perak are adherents of the Naqshabandi-Haqqani Sufi brotherhood. 39   The Sufi brotherhood is known for its avowedly anti-Wahhabi stance, and sources within the brotherhood in Malaysia note that members of the royal family have initiated measures to limit the influence of the Salafis in Perak. 40

214

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

Third, the Salafis do not enjoy much political patronage due to their lack of connections to key politicians or religious bureaucrats. 41 Such patronage is crucial for the survival of minority sects in Malaysia. The UMNO-Salafi Religious Nexus

The anti-Wahhabi/Salafi sentiment within the Malaysian religious establishment has not prevented these scholars from being co-opted to form the young ulama wing within the party in June 2010. Sources within UMNO report that the inclusion of the Salafi ulama was proposed by several UMNO politicians such as Shahidan Kassim, former Chief Minister of Perlis and Reezal Marican, a key member of the youth wing of UMNO. 42  Shahidan Kassim, himself a Salafi, had proposed the inclusion of the Salafi ulama as an attempt to  buttress UMNO’s Islamic image. It was also argued that many of the ulama in PAS are of traditionalist (subscribing to the Shafie mazhab) or Sufi orientations. Hence, having a group of Salafis to counter their religious views can be beneficial to UMNO as it enhances the party’s Islamic credentials and improves its credibility with Malaysian Muslim voters. Salafi ulama can also use religious  based arguments to discredit PAS and its leaders. Likewise, Reezal and Khairy Jamaluddin, head of the youth wing of UMNO, were reported to be in favour of these ulama joining UMNO to bolster the party’s Islamic image. 43  However, this position was not necessarily supported by all UMNO members and leaders. Nakhaie Ahmad, one of the most senior ulama in UMNO, has been a strong critic of the Salafi ulama. 44   Nevertheless, the UMNO leadership still agreed to grant membership status to the Salafi ulama. In June 2010, several Salafi ulama submitted their membership forms to the President of UMNO, Prime Minister Najib Razak, in a highly publicized event attended by several UMNO leaders such as Shahidan Kassim. 45 The Salafi ulama were led by Dr Fadlan Othman, a lecturer at the Islamic studies faculty in the National University of Malaysia. Other prominent Salafi ulama including Ustaz Fathul Bari Mat Jahaya and Ahmad Fauzan Yahya were part of the group. Dr Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin, a former mufti of Perlis and perceived by many as a Salafi was conspicuously absent despite earlier reports suggesting that he had joined UMNO. Shortly after the event, several of the 40 ulama, including religious scholar, Mohd Hosni Mubarak, claimed that they had been misled into attending the event which

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?

215

was misrepresented as simply a meeting with Prime Minister Najib.46  This tarnished the image of the Salafi ulama as many in the opposition circles started questioning whether 40 ulama had joined the party. The Salafi ulama themselves did not attempt to address this allegation, which further strengthened the claim made  by Mohd Hosni that the number of those who actually joined UMNO was substantially smaller. As highlighted earlier, some members of this group also formed ILMU with the aim of striving for Islam in line with the Qur’an and the Ways of Prophet Muhammad. 47 The advisory committee of ILMU comprised a total of ten scholars including several older scholars such as Sulaiman Noordin and Azwira Aziz. It should be noted that a number of prominent Malaysian Salafi scholars such as Asri Sobri disagreed with the stance taken by fellow Salafi scholars and felt that involving oneself in a democratic system and joining a party whose ideology is nationalism transgresses Islamic teachings. 48 In terms of its activities, scholars from ILMU conduct religious classes for UMNO members and in the wider Malay-Muslim community, make regular media appearances and have published numerous books on religious and political issues. Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Religious and Political Positions

In line with the position of the quietist Salafis, such as Albani and Sheikh Rabee al-Madkhali (a prominent Saudi Salafi scholar), scholars in ILMU support the government of the day. 49  However, support for the government does not mean that ILMU members agree with every aspect of the current political, legal and economic system. A closer examination of their views on issues such as the promulgation of an Islamic state, the implementation of Islamic criminal law and the concept of democracy highlight disagreements with the current Malaysian political system. Malaysia as an Islamic State

ILMU scholars have argued that Malaysia is an Islamic state. In doing so, their benchmark is whether the Islamic prayer call can  be heard and whether political power is in the hands of Muslims. By using this yardstick, Fadlan Othman argued that Malaysia is an Islamic state. 50  Other Salafi ulamas such as Fathul Bari are more circumspect in their assessment of Malaysia’s Islamic credentials. He stressed that there are weaknesses in the implementation of

216

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

Islam within Malaysia. Nevertheless, such weaknesses can be rectified if the ulama work with the government to further enhance the role of Islam in the political system. These Salafi ulama are resolute in their defence of a Muslim-led government to remain in power in Malaysia. Citing Prophet Muhammad, who said that it is un-Islamic for a Muslim community to be led by more than one leader, Fathul Bari argued that Muslims in Malaysia cannot oppose the government since the current Prime Minister, Najib Razak, is a Muslim. Any act of opposition to his leadership must thus be viewed as un-Islamic. 51  Echoing Fathul Bari’s position, Rasul Dahri espoused that any attempt to challenge a Muslim ruler is treason. He stressed that during the leadership of the second Caliph of Islam, Umar Ibn Khattab, any opposition to the state was viewed as an act of treason punishable by death. 52  This underscored the severity of any opposition to the Malaysian government. Islamic Criminal Laws

A key criticism that has been leveled at the Salafi ulama over their support for UMNO is the latter’s purported rejection of the Islamic criminal law. 53  ILMU ulama have made it clear that they view Islamic criminal laws as being an integral part of Islam and therefore must be implemented. 54  However, these ulama felt that it was more essential for the government to ensure that core Islamic beliefs and principles take root within Malaysian society. The chairman of ILMU, Fadlan Othman, believes that it is more pertinent for Malaysia to take action against certain Islamic sects that are considered deviant. 55 Fadlan stressed that even if the justice system is Islamic, it will do little good to society if Muslims do not subscribe to the core beliefs of Islam. In 2012, the Salafi ulama made their stand clear on the hudud  issue.56  They wrote that the group supported the implementation of hudud   and that it is an integral part of Islamic law. 57  They were forced to issue a statement after the then President of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) stated his opposition to the implementation of hudud   in Malaysia.58  Fathul Bari remarked that the implementation of Islamic criminal laws comprising hudud , ta’azir   and qisas is an obligation for all Muslims. 59  However, he requested a meeting with the President of the MCA, Chua Soi Lek, to clarify the latter’s remark. Following the meeting, Chua backtracked from his statement explaining that he was opposed to the PAS

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?

217

version of the hudud   rather than hudud   itself.60  Chua himself had remained vague about how PAS’ hudud   differs from the hudud  as supposedly explained in traditional Islamic sources. Fathul Bari himself concurred with the statement noting that many aspects of PAS’ hudud   run contrary to Islamic teachings. In sum, it is clear that the religious scholars in ILMU support the implementation of Islamic criminal laws and their differences with PAS are over technical issues. 61 Democracy: An Un-Islamic System

The ILMU ulama’s attitude towards democracy is an important corollary of its relations to the Saudi Salafi scholars. Salafi scholars such as Al-Albani and Bin Baz have explicitly rejected democracy  because it challeng challenges es the Oneness of God. 62  Al-Albani had even prohibited his followers from voting or participating in elections. The fact that Salafi scholars in Malaysia use Al-Albani as a reference point begs the question of how they can justify their support for UMNO.63  The view of Rasul Dahri on this matter can shed some light on this seemingly contradictory position. He declared that democracy is an un-Islamic system that does not emanate from Islam.64  For him, ultimate sovereignty lies in God’s hands and not in the hands of the people, a core concept of democracy. Rasul added that democracy is a system created by the Jews to divide Muslims. Within the democratic system, there must always be a group that governs and another group that opposes which in essence will result in the division of Muslims. 65  However, in the Malaysian context, Rasul Dahri argued that the democratic system ensures that the government remains in the hands of Muslims. He argued that to strengthen the position of the Muslim community, Muslims in Malaysia must vote for UMNO. 66  This is to ensure that political power is not divided within the Muslim community resulting in non-Muslims usurping power. 67  In essence, Rasul Dahri views democracy as an un-Islamic concept but noted that democracy can be utilized to protect Malay political dominance. During a public seminar, Fathul Bari was questioned about his involvement with UMNO. While he admitted that democracy is not an Islamic concept, he justified his association with UMNO by arguing that it is a necessary evil to change the system from within and that ultimately he is working for an Islamic system to be implemented. 68 The views of Salafi scholars reveal that there is an attempt on their part to change the system from within. While most Salafis

218

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

agreed that the process of voting in an election is un-Islamic, it is essential in the struggle to establish an Islamic system in Malaysia. The Salafi Ulama and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS)

The Salafi ulama in UMNO have been emphatic in their opposition to PAS. Prior to understanding their opposition to PAS, it is important first to understand PAS’ PAS’ position towards Salafis. Many PAS members are from the northern Malay states where traditional Sufism remains predominant. 69  Nonetheless, there are many PAS members who were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood as well as those who are Shiites and a smaller number from Salafi backgrounds. These Salafis are, however, of the Sahwa orientation described earlier. 70 PAS itself has taken a non-denominational approach towards its membership. This view is best encapsulated by Hadi Awang, the President of PAS who is opposed to Salafi teachings due to their divisive nature but still considers Salafis to be part of mainstream Islam. This view is not shared by all of PAS’ leaders. Dr Harun Din, the deputy depu ty spiritual spirit ual leader leade r of PAS, PAS, holds avowedly av owedly anti-Salafi anti -Salafi views and has labelled its teachings extreme and deviant. 71 It is thus of little surprise that the Salafis are opposed to PAS’ religious position. In their criticism of PAS, ILMU members condemn several of the party’s key positions. First, PAS has been criticized for supposedly allowing Shiites to be members of the party. The deputy president of PAS, Mohamed Sabu, is often as accused by the Salafis as being Shiite. Hence, PAS is deemed to accept Shiites who are considered by Salafis as deviant. 72  Second, ILMU ulama deem PAS leaders with Sufi orientation as deviants who have ceased to be Muslims and therefore must be opposed. Most importantly, PAS’ interpretations of Islamic law are viewed as flawed, as it is heavily influenced by both Sufi and Shiite doctrines. Third, PAS has been denounced for dividing the Muslim community by opposing the government of the day which is comprised mainly of Muslims. By opposing UMNO, PAS leaders are believed to be committing treason against a Muslim government and therefore must be countered. Understanding the Salafi-UMNO Nexus

The decision by the Salafis and UMNO leaders to cooperate is driven by political expediency on both sides. For UMNO, there are three main reasons to explain its collaboration with Salafis. First,

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?

219

the formation of an ulama wing within the party comprising young, well-educated and sophisticated religious scholars has buttressed its religious standing with many Malaysian Muslims. This is especially crucial in its attempt to limit the onslaught by PAS against the party’s ethno-nationalist ideology. 73  Second, the Salafi ulama play an important role in using religiously driven arguments against PAS’ Islamic positions ranging from the emotive hudud   issue to the religious credibility of PAS leaders. For years, UMNO was dependent on scholars within the government’ government’ss religious bureaucracy to defend the government’s Islamic positions from PAS. Due to their civil service status, and thus beholden to the government, these scholars lacked credibility. Therefore the ILMU ulama fill a void within UMNO. ILMU scholars have played this role with aplomb. They follow every action and statement made by PAS and present a strong counter-argument. After the 2011 Ijtima’ Tarbawi (Religious Discourse Conference) organized by PAS Youth, which featured several speakers from HAMAS and the Muslim Brotherhood, ILMU members released a series of five videos on Youtube admonishing the Muslim Brotherhood as an un-Islamic movement inspired by the Freemasons. 74  Such a move is clearly aimed at attacking PAS for working with an organization that seeks to “destroy” Islam. Third, UMNO could now engage PAS at an equal level without feeling inferior. In 2012, a debate was held  between Nasruddin Tantawi, the then PAS Youth chief and Fathul Bari, a key leader of ILMU to discuss the issue of the Islamic state in Malaysia in which both individuals were equally knowledgeable on religious issues. 75  This attempt to posit an Islamic image is in line with UMNO’s quest to gain legitimacy, popularity and electoral support among Malay voters. This move is even more important following the disastrous performance by the National Front coalition (Barisan Nasional, BN) in the 2008 and 2013 elections. In the post-2013 political context, Malay votes are now key to UMNO’s survivability at the polls. For the Salafis, the move is aimed not only at protecting their precarious position by seeking political patronage but is also motivated by a drive to supplant its version of Islam at the official level. As highlighted earlier in this paper, the religious bureaucracy in Malaysia has issued several edicts calling for Salafi teachings to  be curbed. Nevertheless, even their involvement in UMNO did not safeguard them from persecution. Several ILMU leaders including Fathul Bari, Azwira Abdul Aziz, Sulaiman Noordin and Fadlan

220

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

Othman were banned from teaching in the state of Selangor by the state religious department because they lacked proper accreditation. Nevertheless, it is clear that the influence of the ulama has increased significantly within UMNO and the Malaysian state. In the 2013 election, Fathul Bari was fielded as UMNO’s candidate in the state seat of Sanglang in Perlis. While he lost by a very small margin of 121 votes, his performance was laudable especially given that the seat was considered a PAS stronghold. In the same year, Fathul Bari garnered the most number of votes in the contest for the UMNO Youth executive council, attesting to his growing influence within the party. 76 ILMU ulama have also been invited to address UMNO gatherings throughout the country. They are also featured regularly in the print media and on television on religious and political issues. Rasul Dahri, long banned from Malaysian television for his extreme views, was recently allowed to speak on a television programme. 77 At the religious policy level, recent decisions made by the ruling party to curb Shiite teachings could be attributed to lobbying by ILMU leaders to proscribe the sect. Sources within UMNO report that ILMU ulama are actively lobbying for several Sufi brotherhoods to be banned in Malaysia. 78  Most importantly, ILMU ulama have convinced some UMNO leaders to give Islam more focus within the national political landscape. Interestingly, awareness about hudud  and other aspects of Islamic law long associated with PAS’ agenda has increased significantly within UMNO partly due to lecture delivered by ILMU. The 2013 UMNO General Assembly meeting saw Prime Minister Najib demonstrate a new commitment to Islam including the announcement that the strengthening of Islam would  be one of the five areas of focus for UMNO. 79  It is unsurprising, therefore, that ILMU ulama has become more dominant in national politics and religious affairs. Defending the “Sovereignty” of Islam

ILMU ulama have taken a hardline stance in dealing with several issues affecting the country. Two key issues that ILMU focused on were the Bersih rallies and the Allah controversy. The Joint Action Committee for Electoral Reform — better known by its acronym Bersih (Clean) — was formed in 2005 with the objective of achieving free and fair elections. In 2007, Bersih organized its first demonstration. In 2010, Bersih was re-launched as a civil society movement, Bersih 2.0, and attempted to distance the movement

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?

221

from partisan interests. It was also announced that a second protest would be organized under the leadership of former President of the Malaysian Bar Council, Ambiga Sreenevasan. 80  The Malaysian government outlawed Bersih 2.0 on the grounds that the movement posed a security threat. Regardless of the ban, the protest went ahead as planned and an estimated 20,000 people attended. Prior to the second protest, ulama from ILMU held a series of talks and posted videos online to discourage Muslims from participating in Bersih 2.0. In dealing with the Bersih rallies, ILMU argued that demonstrations were not in line with Islamic teachings even if they were aimed at correcting unjust government policies. Citing Prophet Muhammad, Fadlan Othman explained that Islam has prescribed proper ways of correcting the government. 81  For instance, he noted that the government must be corrected behind closed doors. Additionally, he postulated that the Bersih rallies caused disturbances, inconvenienced others and caused divisions among Muslims, and therefore contravened Islamic teachings. Fathul Bari argued that it is indeed un-Islamic for Muslims to involve themselves in the rallies due to the fact that the leader of Bersih is a non-Muslim woman and Islam has stipulated clearly that leadership must be in the hands of Muslim men. ILMU’s position on the Bersih showed clearly how the Malaysian authorities seek to justify their repression of civil rights using Islamic rationalization. 82 At the same time, they validate tough actions taken  by the authorities against the demonstrator demonstratorss as necessary and in line with the need to defend the Muslim community. In essence, an oppositional act which was essentially secular was Islamized and aimed at blunting criticism from the opposition. ILMU has also taken a strong stance on the issue of apostasy. This highly emotive issue first surfaced in 1999 when Lina Joy, a Malay-Muslim woman, decided to convert to Christianity and applied to the Malaysian courts to have her conversion legally recognized.83  In 2007 the Malaysian High Court finally decided that only the Shariah court could legally recognize her right to leave Islam. In 2012, Nurul Izzah, a key opposition leader, noted that Islam does not forcefully impose its teachings on Muslims after she was asked whether freedom of religion also applies to Malays. 84 In commenting on this statement, Fathul Bari explained that Islam protects the rights of non-Muslims and forbids forced conversion to Islam. Nonetheless, he opined that there is no freedom of religion for a person who is Muslim. In fact, he stated that under Islamic law, the punishment for apostasy is death which he believed should

222

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

 be implemented in Malaysia. 85  Therefore, ILMU believes that the Malaysian government has taken the right stance in dealing with the Lina Joy case and that Muslim apostates in future should be subjected to the death penalty. An equally important issue that ILMU has been actively exploiting is the usage of the word Allah in Malay translations of the Bible. The ILMU ulama stated their explicit rejection of such practice in Malaysia. While acknowledging that the word has been used in the Arabic bible for years in the Middle East, Ahmad Fauzan, a member of ILMU argued that the word has never been used in the Malay Bible. Ahmad Fauzan then explained that it is an act of disrespect against Muslims in Malaysia for the word Allah to describe God within the context of the Christian belief of trinity. In a bizarre analysis of the issue, Fadlan Othman argued that the dispute was brought up by the Malaysian opposition, and in particular by the Democratic Action Party (DAP), to create “Christianophobia” among Muslims with the ultimate aim of driving a wedge between Muslims and Christians. 86  Fathul Bari used this issue to attack PAS for failing to defend the position of Islam and playing second fiddle to the DAP and People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, PKR) which are both trying to promote pluralism of religion.87 An analysis of the position forwarded by the ILMU ulama on the issues cited above indicates the symbiotic relationship between the ulama and the Malaysian government. Contentious issues are dealt with from an Islamic standpoint and hence enhancing the Islamic credentials of the Malaysian government. This is especially useful in countering the ideas of PAS. On the part of the ulama, they are able to gain a national platform to promote their ideology and indirectly push the government for a stricter implementation of Islamic laws. Malaysia: A Future Salafi State?

The increasing influence of the Salafi ulama has raised the question of whether Malaysia will adopt Salafi Islam as a state ideology. The co-options of the various Islamist parties by Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan and the National Islamic Front (Muslim Brotherhood) by Jaafar al-Numeiri in Sudan have seen an intensification of the Islamization process in those two countries. 88  In Pakistan, the ulama from the Deobandi Jamaat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) have infiltrated the political

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?

223

system and contributed to the radicalization of Pakistani society. 89 Dr Mahathir Mohamed’s Islamization drive in the 1980s and 1990s has also resulted in growing religious conservatism within Malaysian society. 90  As such, it is pertinent to consider what the likely impact of Salafi ulama will have on the Malaysian state and society in the long run. Already, the ulama’s influence is beginning to be felt, for example in the way the Malaysian state has dealt with Shiite Muslims.91  However, in the long-term the influence of the Salafi ulama is likely to be restricted for the following reasons. First, the Malaysian government is not dependent only on the Salafi ulama for its religious legitimacy. The mammoth national religious bureaucracy created by Mahathir continues to be utilized by UMNO to legitimize many of its policies. The ulama in the bureaucracy are generally of the traditional orientation. Second, Malaysia’s Constitution states clearly that Islamic affairs are the purview of the Malay rulers. Hence, UMNO politicians have little influence over the appointment of key office holder in important institutions such as the National Fatwa Council, the country’s highest Islamic legislative body. Among the current members of the council, only one, Dr Juanda  Jaya, the Mufti of Perlis, could be described as Salafi. The rest of the Council members’ religious views are more traditional. At the level of the state religious bureaucracy, many key appointments are also made by Malay rulers. Once again many of those appointed are from traditional backgrounds and opposed to the Salafi orientation. A case in point is the state of Perak where the Mufti issued an edict making it illegal for Salafi teachings to be propagated.92 This edict was supported by the Sultan of Perak. Third, it is highly unlikely that UMNO will allow ILMU to grow significantly. With the exception of Fathul Bari, none of the other ulama in ILMU have been appointed to key positions within UMNO or the government. Sources within UMNO report that they were aware of the possible problems that could arise from the Salafi’s legalistic interpretation of Islam. 93  ILMU will be utilized as an important counter to PAS, but will not be allowed to wield too much power or influence. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the nexus between UMNO and Salafi ulama will result in the Salafis gaining a larger audience due to the public platforms that UMNO has created for the group. Therefore in the long run, Salafi religious ideas might  become more popular in UMNO and the larger Muslim communi community ty in Malaysia.

224

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

Conclusion

The paper has examined the factors that have motivated Salafi ulama to collaborate with UMNO. The Salafi movement arrived in Malaysia through students studying in the Middle East. They  brou  br ough ghtt ba back ck th thee id idea eass of th thee Sa Sala lafi fiyy yyah ah pr prop opon onen ents ts su such ch as Afghani and Abduh. However, it was the second wave of Salafi ideas influenced by the Saudi Salafi scholars such as Albani and Bin Baz that have become dominant in Malaysia. This Salafi strand is of the politically quietist form and is focused on spreading the Salafi doctrine through education. It was in the late 2000s that the Salafis began to organize themselves politically in order to fill a religious void within UMNO. This move was spurred by various political and religious considerations including to shield themselves from attacks by the traditionalists within the government’s religious bureaucracy and to spread their religious doctrine. This decision might seem awkward given that the Salafi ulama reject democracy, views the Malaysian state as insufficiently Islamic and considers it obligatory for Malaysia to implement Islamic criminal laws. However, the decision to join UMNO has also allowed the Salafi ulama to play a key role in shaping policies on Islam in the country such as institutionalizing laws against the Shiites and Sufis as well as creating awareness of the need to implement rigid Islamic laws within the state. Fathul Bari has successfully positioned himself as a key member of UMNO Youth and has extended his influence in the country. On the part of UMNO, the Salafi’s ulama political involvement is in line with the party’s attempt to enhance its Islamic credentials and present itself as the bastion of true Islam in Malaysia especially in light of the political gains made by PAS. The Salafi ulama have played important roles in defending the government’s position on a range of different issues including in opposing anti-government demonstrations, curbing the rights of Muslims to leave Islam and encouraging the Muslim populace to vote for UMNO by invoking religious justifications. Regardless of the ulama’s role in influencing policies, the influence of these Salafi ulama is unlikely to increase within UMNO and Malaysian society as a whole and it is unlikely that it will define religious discourse within the country due to the presence of other religious forces within the government. The Salafi ulama in UMNO serves as another case study which attests to the fluidity in which the Salafi movement can

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?

225

move: from being politically quietist to politically active. This is part of a worldwide trend which has seen Salafi movements in Egypt, Libya, Syria and the Gulf states becoming politically active through the formation of political parties and organizations. In other parts of Southeast Asia, the Salafi movements are becoming more active politically. In Indonesia, the Salafis have actively opposed presidential candidate Joko Widodo who is deemed to be sympathetic to religious minorities in the country. They have also escalated their efforts to denigrate minority religious communities like the Shiites and Ahmadiyahs. In Singapore, Salafi scholars have started an online campaign against Shiism and Sufism. More recently, they launched a campaign against the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) community. The increasing politization of the Salafi movement is likely to continue within the next few years. In the Malaysian case, the political prospects of the Salafi ulama are likely to fizzle in the long run given that there are numerous forces in UMNO and the government that are opposed to them. The same cannot be said about the Salafi movement in other contexts which seems to be growing in influence and gaining political momentum. This is likely to change religious and political expressions in the Muslim World. NOTES 1

For more on Salafism in Indonesia, see Noorhaidi Hassan,  Laskar Jihad Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post New Order Indonesia  (New York: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 2010). For Salafism in Thailand see Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, Islam in Modern Thailand: Faith, Philanthropy and Politics  (London: Routledge, 2014).

2

Three interviews were conducted with the Salafi ulama in Kuala Lumpur in August 2011. Interviews were also conducted with several leaders of UMNO and PAS between August 2012 and April 2014.

3

For a sample of works on Islamism in Malaysia, see Joseph Liow, Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Farish Noor, Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the PanMalaysian Islamic Party, PAS: 1951–2003   (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2004); and Kamarulnizam Abdullah, The Politics of Islam in Contemporary Malaysia  (Bangi, Selangor: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2002).

4

One of the most comprehensiv comprehensivee studies of the Wahhabi movement is Natana Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad   (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007).

226

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

5

David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia   (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 10.

6

Stephane Lacroix, “Between Revolution and Apoliticalism Apoliticalism:: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism”, in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement , edited by Roel Meijer (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), p. 60.

7

Political quietism is a belief that Muslims should withdraw from politics to avoid anarchy or conflict. It stems from the argument put forth by classical Muslim scholars such as Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058–11), a renowned theologian who argued tyranny is preferred to anarchy. Abd Al-Aziz al-Fahad, “From Exclusivism to Accomodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism”, New York University Law Review   79, no. 2 (May 2004): 485–514.

8

Exceptions are the Taliban in Afghanistan and more recently Boko Haram in Nigeria.

9

Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani   (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 6–7.

10

For a study of Abduh’s ideas see Yvonne Haddad, “Muhammad Abduh”, in Pioneers of Islamic Revival , edited by Ali Rahnema (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 30–64.

11

Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action”, in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement , edited by Roel Meijer (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), p. 46.

12

 Jihad: ad: The Trail of Pol Politi itical cal Isl Islam am  (London: Belnapp, 2003), Giles Kepel,  Jih pp. 70–90.

13

Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 5.

14

Lacroix, “Between Revolution and Apolitical Apoliticalism”, ism”, op. cit., p. 48. For a critique of the Salafi-jihadi ideology, see Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and Women  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

15

Adnan A. Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism  (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2005), p. 220.

16

One of the most important works on the Sahwa movement is Stephane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia  (Harvard, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011).

17

Al-Hawali and Al-Ouda were both influenced by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood during their student days. Al-Hawali wrote his doctorate thesis under the supervision of Muslim Brotherhood leader, Muhammad Qutb. They formed a political opposition group, the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in 1993. This is the first Saudi Salafi opposition group in the kingdom accusing the government leaders and Saudi religious clergy of not doing enough to protect and accord rights to Muslims. The CDLR are generally opposed to the Salafi-jihadi strand of Salafism criticizing terrorism as an un-Islamic form of political action.

18

Stephane Lacroix, “Al-Albani’s Revolution Revolutionary ary Approach to Hadith”, ISIM Review 21 (Spring 2008): 6–7.

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency? 19

 

227

Hassan, Laskar Jihad , op. cit., p. 108.

20

Hafiz Zakariya, “From Cairo to the Straits Settlements: Modern Salafiyyah Reformist Ideas in Malay Peninsula”, Intellectual Discourse  15, issue 2 (2007): 131.

21

One of the most important works discussing the Kaum Muda movement is William Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism  (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1967), pp. 56–90. For more on the Al-Imam, see Abu Bakar Hamzah, Al-Imam: Its Role in Malay Society, 1905–1908 (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1991).

22

Ariffin Omar, Bangsa Melayu: Malay Concept of Democracy and Community 1945–1950  (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 14.

23

 

Roff, Origins of Malay Nationalism, op. cit., p. 75.

24

Ibid., p. 78.

25

Abdullah H., Abdul Rahman, Gerakan Islah di Perlis - Sejarah dan Pemikiran [Islah Movement in Perlis- History and Thoughts] (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1989).

26

Abdul Rahman Abdullah, Pemikiran Islam di Malaysia: Sejarah dan Aliran [Islamic Thought in Malaysia: History and Orientation] (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Pustaka dan Budaya, 1991), p. 260.

27

Mohammad Redzuan Othman and Md. Sidin Ahmad Ishak, The Malays in the Middle East (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 2000).

28

Hawwa’ was a key leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria who was forced to leave the country following state repression of the Brotherhood. He fled to  Jordan and Syria upon his release from prison in 1978. Author interview with Hadi Awang, Kampung Rusila, Terengganu, 12 January 2006.

29

For the impact of overseas students on the resurgence of Islam in Malaysia, see Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications, 1987) and Chandra Muzffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia  (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd., 1987).

30

For Malay politics prior to the Islamic resurgence in the 1980s, see John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays National Organisation and Party Islam  (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980).

31

Author interview with Dr Fadlan Othman, Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 2011.

32

Judith Nagata, The Re-flowering of Malaysian Islam: Modern Radicals and their Roots  (Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press, 1984), p. 120.

33

Hussein Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State?  (Singapore:   (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1993), p. 31.

34

One key problem associated with the term Wahhabism in Malaysia is the fact that this term is used to describe all Salafis and Wahhabis without any distinction. Hence, any edicts on Wahhabis are in fact applicable to Salafis as well.

35

Jabatan Kemajuaan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM, Malaysian Islamic Religious Department), Keputusan Muzakarah Fatwa Kebangsaan Siri 2 [Decisions Arising from National Fatwa Meeting Volume 2] (Kuala Lumpur: JAKIM, 2003).

228

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

36

See “Pengharaman Buku-Buku Tulisan Saudara Rasul Dahri Yang Telah Diperakui Haram” [The Banning of Rasul Dahri’s Writings which has been acknowledged as Deviant], available at .

37

Abdul Rahim Sabri, “JAIS tolak 7 penceramah Wahhabi” [JAIS rejects 7 Wahhabi scholars], available at .

38

Traditional Islam refers to an orthodox form of Islam which refers to the Qur’an, Hadith, religious decrees of classical Muslim scholars, rational thought and local cultures as sources of Islamic reference. Traditionalist Muslims are more tolerant of local customs, cultures and are often practitioners of Sufism. They are highly critical of Salafi doctrines. See Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, “Towards a History of Malaysian Ulama”, Southeast Asia Research  16, no. 1 (March 2008): 135.

39

Personal observation of the author at a Naqhshbandi-Haqqani event in Ipoh. Raja Ashman Shah, one of the princes of Perak, was appointed as the representative of the brotherhood in Malaysia. Also see the video “Closing Dua after 40th Day Tahlil for HRH Raja Ashman Shah by Mawlana Shaykh Hisham Kabbani”, 8 May 2012, available at .

75

“Debat Sinar Harian antara Ketua Pemuda Pas, Nasrudin Hassan Tantawi dan Pengerusi Jawatankuasa Kerja Sekretariat Ulama Muda Umno, Fathul Bari Mat Jahaya dengan tajuk ‘PRU13 - Orang Muda Pilih Siapa?’” [GE13- Who did the Young Choose?], available at .

76

Raziatul Hanum a Rajak, “Fathulbari dahului Exco Pemuda Umno” [Fathulbari Leads in UMNO Youth Exco Race], Sinar Harian, 13 October 2013.

77

Author interview with Fadhlan Othman, Kuala Lumpur, 17 August 2011.

78

Author interview with Dr Shamsuddin Moner, UMNO Member and General Manager YADIM, Jasin, 19 March 2014.

79

D. Kanyakumar Kanyakumari, i, “UMNO Assembly: Five Transformat ransformations ions Planned, says Najib”, The Star , 5 December 2013.

80

Kuek Ser Kuang Keng, “Reform of Face Rallies, Bersih 2.0 warns EC”, Malaysiakini, 11 November 2010, available at . i.com/news/147889>.

81

See the video “Demonstrasi BERSIH 2.0 - UFMO - Silap Pendalilan Hadith Halal” [BERSIH 2.0 Demonstrations-UFMO- The Mistake of Misinterpreting Hadith], available at . < http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TwcmcRJ188>.

82

Author interview with Fathul Bari, Kuala Lumpur, 17 August 2011.

83

For a detailed and insightful treatment of the issue, see Julian C. H. Lee, Islamization and Activism in Malaysia  (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 62–74.

84

Leven Woon, “Nurul Izzah backs religious freedom for all”, Free Malaysia Today , 3 November 2012, available at . -all/>.

Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?

231

85

Author interview with Fathul Bari, Kuala Lumpur, 10 May 2013.

86

See the video “Kalimah Allah: Lim Guan Eng Timbul ‘KRISTIANOF ‘KRISTIANOFOBIA OBIA’” ’” [The Usage of Allah: Lim Guan Eng Promoting Christianophobia], available at .

87

 

Ibid.

88

For the Islamization of Pakistan, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan  (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1994) and for Sudan, see J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989–2000  (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003).

89

See Amir Mir, Talibanisation of Pakistan  (New Delhi: Pentagon Security Press, 2010), pp. 1–17.

90

For the impact of Islamization on domestic policies, see Sven Alexander Schottmann, “The Pillars of ‘Mahathir’s Islam’: Mahathir Mohamad on BeingMuslim in the Modern World”, Asian Studies Review   35, issue 3 (2011): 355–72 and Maznah Mohamad, “The Ascendance of Bureaucratic Islam and the Secularization of the Sharia in Malaysia”, Pacific Affairs 83, no. 3 (2010): 505–24. For the impact on foreign policy, see Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy  (London:   (London: Routledge, 1998) and Johan Saravannamuttu, Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, The First Fifty Years: Alignment, Neutralism and Islamism   (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 234–75. For Islamist conservatism in Malaysia see Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid and Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail, “Islamist Conservatism and the Demise of Islam Hadhari in Malaysia”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations  25, issue 2 (2014): 159–80.

91

For an interesting analysis of Shiite repressio repression n in Malaysia, see Mohd Faizal Musa, “The Malaysian Shi’a: A Preliminary Study of Their History, Oppression, and Denied Rights”,  Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies  VI, no. 4 (2013): 411–63.

92

See Jabatan Mufti Perak (Perak Mufti Office), “Keputusan Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Fatwa Negeri Perak: Fatwa Mengenai Penegahan Menyebarkan Aliran dan Dakyah Wahabiah di Negeri Perak” [Decision by the Fatwa Committee of the State of Perak: Fatwa on Curbing the Spread and Teachings of Wahhabism in Perak], available at .

93

Author interview with an UMNO leader, Kuala Lumpur, 5 June 2013.