Safety in Process Plant in refinery sector
July 22, 2016 | Author: amitgoyal1972 | Category: N/A
Short Description
A presentation on Safety in Process Plant in refinery sector...
Description
PRESENTATION ON
SAFETY IN PROCESS PLANTS IN REFINERY SECTOR Organized by:
PetroFed
By Dhananjoy Ghosh GM (Operations), NRL
CONTENT
Unsafe Incidents in Indian Oil & Gas Industries
Commitment to Process Safety
Understand & Manage Risk
Safety Steps in Process Plant
Failure in Process Plants- Experiences
Conclusion
UNSAFE INCIDENTS IN OIL & GAS INDUSTRIES (2004-05 to 2008-09) FATALITY: TOTAL: 164 NOS. E&P-72, REFINER & GP-58, PIPELINES-10, MRKT-24. FIRE INCIDIENTS: TOTAL: 101 NOS. E&P-51, REFINERY &GP-22, PIPELINES-13, MRKT-15 IT IS SAID THAT TREND WAS SAME IN 09-10, RATHER ONE MAJOR FIRE & FATALITY OCCURRED IN JOYPUR KNOWN TO ALL.
(Ref: Analysis of major incidents in Oil & Gas Industries 2004-09 by OISD )
UNSAFE INCIDENTS IN OIL & GAS INDUSTRIES (2004-05 to 2008-09) TYPES OF FATALITIES IN REFINERY & GP SECTOR: -14 NOS DURING MAINTENANCE/PROJECT EXCUTION. -21 NOS. DURING WORKING IN HEIGHT. -7 NOS. DUE TO EXPOSURE OF TOXIC GAS. -16 NOS. DUE TO FIRE & OTHER INCIDENTS
EQUIP FAILURE & MISCREANT ACTS CAUSED 45% & HUMAN ERROR- 50% OF WHICH 67% WAS ON NON ADHERENCE TO SOP.
COMMITMENT TO PROCESS SAFETY TO CREATE GOOD RECORD OF LESS/NO UNSAFE INSIDENT, WE NEED COMMITMENT AS FOLLOWS: 1.
PROCESS SAFETY CULTURE: COMBINED ALL LEVELS IN THE ORGANIZATION CONTRIBUTE TO A CULTURE OF SAFETY.
2.
COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS: OISD STANDARDS ON DESIGN & LAYOUT, OPERATING PRACTICES, MAINTENANCE & INSPECTION, ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION, SAFETY & FIRE PROTECTION, ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENTS & FACILITIES, E&P ACTIVITIES, TRAINING & DEVELOPMENTS, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS.
3.
WORKFORCE INVOLVEMENT: SECTION GIVES GUIDANCE TO USE KNOWLEDGE OF PEOPLE CLOSE TO PROCESS.
COMMITMENT TO PROCESS SAFETY
4.
STAKEHOLDER OUTREACH: DEVELOP RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMUNITY AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS.
5.
PROCESS SAFETY COMPETENCY: MANAGE CHANGES PROPERLY & SEE RESOURCES & KNOWLEDGE ARE NOT LOST.
WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE RISK OF A PROCESS PLANT AND MANAGE THE RISK IN COMENSURATE OUR COMMITMENT TO PROCESS SAFETY AS MENTIONED ABOVE.
UNDERSTAND AND MANAGE RISK UNDERSTAND RISK: • •
PROCESS KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION & RISK ANALYSIS.
MANAGE RISK: • • • • • • • • •
STRICT ADHERENCE TO OPERATING PROCESURE. SAFE WORKING PRACTICES. ASSET INTEGRITY & RELIABILITY. CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT. TRAINING & PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE. MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE. OPERATIONAL READINESS. DAY TO DAY OPERATION. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT.
SAFETY STEPS IN PROCESS PLANT
TECHNOLOGY SELECTION:
- PROVEN TRACK RECORD OF SAFETY TO BE ENSURED.
RISK ASSESMENT STUDY: -
TO BE CARRIED OUT BY AUTHORISED AGENCY.
DESIGN & ENGINEERING STAGE: -
MAKE A CHECK LIST FOR HAZOP STUDY IN P&ID REVIEW. (INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM REFINING, JULY’09 MAY BE REFFERED AS A CAPSULE/READY RECKONER)
Contd-
SAFETY STEPS IN PROCESS PLANT -
REFER OISD STDS 106, 109, 111, 118, 163, 178 FOR PROCESS & INSTALLATION. RESPECTIVE ASME, NACE, API, ASTM, BIS, IBR GUIDELINES TO BE FOLLOWED FOR MECH. ENGG. POINT OF VIEW. 110, 113, 149, 173, 180 FOR ELECTRICAL POINT OF VIEW. 152 FOR INSTRUMENT POINT OF VIEW; PRESENTLY FOR MAXIMUM SAFETY, IEC 61511 WITH SIL RECOMMENDATION, IEC 60079, ANSI/ ISA-91.00.01-2001, ANSI/ ISA-TR99.00.012007, ANSI/ ISA-18.2-2007, ANSI/ ISA-61010-1 (82.02.01)-2004, ISA-TR84.00.07-2010, ISA-TR98.00.02-2007 SHOULD BE REFERRED MOST OF WHICH ARE ADVISED TO FOLLOW AS PER OISD 152. 166, 200, 196, 197 FOR ENVIRONMENT POINT OF VIEW.
SAFETY STEPS IN PROCESS PLANT
PROJECT EXECUTION: -
OISD STD 105, SP 70 (BIS) & NFPA CODES TO FOLLOW.
-
CERTIFIED OHSA AND QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN, PROVEN SAFETY TRACK RECORD TO BE ENSURED.
-
EXECUTION IN 5 FORMAT STAGES IS MUST.
-
SAFETY ORGANOGRAM TO BE ENSURED.
-
DAILY SAFETY PLAN TO BE FOCUSSED.
-
MANAGEMENT SAFETY REVIEW TO BE DONE.
SAFETY STEPS IN PROCESS PLANT
PLANT OPERATION: -
OPERATING & POCKET MANNUALS TO BE FOLLOWED.
-
CHECK LIST FOR START UP, SHUTDOWN, KNOWN EMERGENCY HANDLING TO BE AVAILABLE.
APPROVAL SYSTEM TO BE IN PLACE FOR BYPASSING INTERLOCK. -
ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATION, ILLUMINATION.
-
ADHERENCE TO WORK PERMIT SYSTEM.
-
CHECK LIST & OBSERVE CRITICAL EQUIPMENTS.
-
SAFETY TOUR OF UNITS AT COMBINED LEVELS.
-
MANAGEMENT SAFETY REVIEW TO BE IN PLACE.
-
PPE COMPLIANCE.
ANY SAFETY
SAFETY STEPS IN PROCESS PLANT
PLANT MAINTENANCE & INSPECTION: -
OISD STANDARDS FOR ROTARY & STATIONARY EQUIPMENTS TO BE FOLLOWED.
-
OISD STANDARD 153 TO BE FOLLOWED FOR INSTRUMENTS.
-
OISD STANDARDS 137, 147, 148 FOR ELECTRICAL TO BE FOLLOWED.
-
OISD STANDARS 164 FOR FIREPROOFING, AND 170 FOR PIPE RACKS & TRACKS TO BE FOLLWOED BY CIVIL MAINTENANCE.
-
MAKE SMALL CKECK LISTS FOR DAILY MONITORING OF CRITICAL EQUIPMENTS.
-
ADHERENCE TO WORK PERMIT SYSTEM. PPE COMPLIANCE.
-
REFER MSDS TO HANDLE CHEMICALS.
FAILURE IN PROCESS PLANT-EXPERIENCES FURNACE TUBE LEAK: IF ONLY SMOKY LEAKAGE, COIL PURGING STEAM CAN BE USED; FOR LQUID FIRE LEAK, NEVER USE COIL PURGING STEAM TILL BOX COOLED DOWN AFTER SHUTTING. FURNACE TUBE COKE UP: IGNORING HIGHER SKIN TEMP, AS PASS FLOW SHOWED HIGHER. WHEN BOTH SHOW HIGH VALUE, DOUBT FLOW NOT TEMP, WHEN BOTH SHOW LOW VALUE DOUBT TEMP NOT FLOW IN FURNACES. -
OIL INGRESS INTO COIL PURGING STEAM PASSING CHECK VALVE RESULTING IN OIL INGRESS INTO BURNER ATOMISING, PURGING STEAM AND BOX FIRING WITHOUT CONTROL.
-
BEFORE OPENING COIL PURGING STEAM ENSURE ITS PRESSURE IS HIGHER THAN COIL PRESSURE.
FAILURE IN PROCESS PLANT-EXPERIENCES FURNACE BOX EXPLOSION WHILE IGNITING BURNER: ENSURE PILOT GAS BURNER LIGHTING BEFORE MAIN INSTALL BLOCK AND BLEED IN FUEL GAS HEADER.
BURNER.
FIRE IN CLOUMN BOTTOM HEAVY FLIUD PUMP: USE SPRINKLER SYSTEM AS PER OISD GUIDELINES; INSTALL SHUTDOWN C/V AT PUMP SUCTION BUT AT A LONG DISTANCE FROM PUMP SUCTION. DON’T EXTINGUISH FROM CLOSE DISTANCE. FIRE IN LIGHT FLUID PUMP BY VAPOR CLOUD IGNITION: IN ANY FIRE , ISOLATING SOURCE IS MUST. ENSURE SAFETY SYSTEM IN MECH SEAL OF PUMP. OIL INGRESS IN STEAM CKT, AIR/OIL IN N2 CKT: DUE TO HOSE/TEMPORARY CONNECTION. ESTABLISH APPROVAL FOR THIS KIND OF ROUTINE
API PLAN
JOBS.
FAILURE IN PROCESS PLANT-EXPERIENCES RUPTURE IN VACUUM HEATER OUTLET THERMOWELL: INSTALL INCLINED INSTEAD OF 90 DEGREE WITH FLOW AND WITH RIGHT METULLARGY. AVOID AIR INGRESS THRO VAC. COLUMN BOTTOM LT: IF INSTALLED OUTSIDE, AVOID CORROSION THROUGH SCHEDULED INSPECTION. USE STEAM FLUSHING OF INSTRUMENT, IF NECESSARY. EXPLOSION IN HYDROGEN COMPRESSOR OR PIPELINE: DON’T TRY TO TIGHT THE LEAK; PURGE OUT WITH NITROGEN, THEN TIGHT. -
FOR UNIT COMMISSIONING, TO SAVE TIME, PRESSURISE SYSTEM IN MIX WITH 50% NITROGEN; IN SUCH CASE, FOR MINOR LEAK, TIGHTENING MAY BE CONSIDERED FOR APPROVAL.
FAILURE IN PROCESS PLANT-EXPERIENCES
TEMP EXCURSION IN HYDROCRACKER: ONLY ONE TEMP INDICATION WAS HIGH WHILE & DUBTED TO CHECK BY MAINTENANCE AS ALL OTHER INDICATIONS WERE OK. DELAY IN OPENING EMMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION VALVE DUE TO THIS CAUSED DAMAGE TO CATALYST AND REACTOR INTERNALS. REPLACING MANUAL OPERATED EMMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION VALVE BY AUTOMATIC EMMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION VALVE (ADC). BUT ADC FAILED IN TWO REFINERIES IN INDIA. CHECK PROVEN TRACK RECORD BEFORE CHANGING TO ADC.
FAILURE IN PROCESS PLANT-EXPERIENCES DAMAGE OF GRID PLATE IN CCR: DUE TO AIR INGRESS INTO NITROGEN CIRCUIT DUE TO NON AVAILABILITY OF BLOCK & BLEED ARRANGEMENT IN NITROGEN HEADER WITH OXYGEN ANALYSER FAILURE IN FCC PLANT: VARIOUS UNSAFE INCIDENCE/FIRE TOOK PLACE DUE TO NON ADEQUACY OF EMMERGENCY INTERLOCK SYSTEM. ESTABLISH UPDATED INTERLOCK SYSTEM COMMENSURATE WITH ASSIGNED SIL AS PER ISA.
CONCLUSION FROM THE FAILURE ANALYSIS DISCUSSED SO FAR, IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT MAJORITY INCIDENTS OCCURRED MOSTLY DUE TO HUMAN ERROR WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY OISD DATA ALSO AS DISCUSSED EARLIER. LET US BE DECIPLINED TO AVOID HUMAN ERROR AND LET SYSTEM IN PLACE. LET US LEARN FROM EVERY INVESTIGATION. WHEN WE LEAVE HOME FOR GOING TO PLANT, LET US THINK THAT OUR BELOVED ARE WAITING FOR US TO RETURN.
THANK YOU
View more...
Comments