Rule 67 Compiled Digests Rules of Court

NPC vs. Spouses Samar GR NO. 197329 DATE: September 8, 2014 DOCTRINE: Just compensation for the property must be based on its value at the time of the taking of said property, not at the time of the filing of the complaint. PETITIONER: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION RESPONDENT: LUIS SAMAR and MAGDALENA SAMAR FACTS: Civil Case No. IR-2243 Sometime in 1990, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed Civil Case No. IR-2243 with the RTC, seeking to expropriate respondent spouses Luis and Magdalena Samar's 1,020-square meter lot — covered by Tax Declaration No. 30573 and situated in San Jose (Baras), Nabua, Camarines Sur — which NPC needed for the construction of a transmission line. In an August 29, 1990 Order, the RTC directed the issuance of a Writ of Condemnation in favor of NPC. Accordingly, NPC entered the subject lot and constructed its transmission line, denominated as Tower No. 83. However, on July 12, 1994, the trial court issued another Order dismissing Civil Case No. IR-2243 without prejudice for failure to prosecute – because after almost three (3) years since the said order was issued, the Committee has not met nor deliberated on said matter and the parties in this case have not exerted efforts in pursuing their claims despite so long a time. Civil Case No. IR-2678 On December 5, 1994, respondents filed with the same trial court a Complaint, 7 docketed as Civil Case No. IR-2678, for compensation and damages against NPC relative to the subject lot which NPC took over but for which it failed to pay just compensation on account of the dismissal of Civil Case No. IR-2243. The complaint prayed, among others, that the defendant compensate the plaintiff of [sic] the lot they are now occupying in accordance with the current market value existing in the place. After conducting their appraisal, the commissioners submitted their individual reports. Atty. Wenifredo Pornillos, commissioner for the respondents, recommended a valuation within the range of P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per square meter. Lorenzo C. Orense, commissioner for NPC, did not set an amount, although he stated that the lot should be valued at the prevailing

market prices of agricultural, and not residential, lands within the area. The court representative, Esteban D. Colarina, proposed a P1,100.00 per square meter valuation. On February 21, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision pegging the value of the subject lot at P1,000.00 per square meter and the CA, on NPC’s appeal, affirmed the same. Further, the CA held that in the resolution of Civil Case No. IR-2678, the principles and rules of procedure in eminent domain cases — under Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court — cannot apply; thus, the rule that just compensation shall be computed from the time of the taking or filing of the expropriation case is inapplicable, since the case is not one for expropriation. Instead, Civil Case No. IR-2678 should be treated as a simple case for the recovery of damages. Finally, the CA held that the trial court properly exercised its judicial function of ascertaining the fair market value of the property as just compensation. NPC thus instituted the instant Petition. ISSUE: WON Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court should apply to Civil Case No. IR-2678; therefore, just compensation should be based not on 1995 market values, but on those prevailing on the date of taking or the filing of the expropriation case in 1990 HELD: YES. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that: Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government. However, if the government takes possession before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that 'upon the rendition of the order of

expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.' However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable . . . . In this case, Records show that sometime in 1990, NPC filed an expropriation case docketed as Civil Case No. IR-2243. However, in an Order dated July 12, 1994, the expropriation case was dismissed by the RTC for failure of NPC to prosecute. Subsequently, or on December 5, 1994, respondents filed Civil Case No. IR-2678 which is a complaint for compensation and recovery of damages. Considering the dismissal of the expropriation case for failure of the NPC to prosecute, it is as if no expropriation suit was filed. Hence, pursuant to the above-quoted ruling, NPC is deemed "to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation." Nevertheless, just compensation for the property must be based on its value at the time of the taking of said property, not at the time of the filing of the complaint. Consequently, the RTC should have fixed the value of the property at the time NPC took possession of the same in 1990, and not at the time of the filing of the complaint for compensation and damages in 1994 or its fair market value in 1995.

Rule 67 no. 2 NAPOCOR v. Spouses Cruz, G.R. No. 165386, July 29, 2013 Petitioners: National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR)

Respondents: SPOUSES SALVADOR and NENITA CRUZ et al Facts : An expropriation proceeding was commenced by NAPOCOR against respondents Spouses Salvador and Nenita Cruz and several individuals who are the owners of individual lots located in Del Monte Park Subdivision, Dulong Bayan, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The complaint filed primarily sought the determination of just compensation due the respondents after the negotiations for the purchase of the lots failed. RTC ordered the Bulacan Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) "to review and submit an updated appraisal report on the properties to be acquired by Napocor in order 'to judicially guide the Court in fixing the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants." In the meantime, the RTC allowed Napocor to take possession of the lots, after Napocor deposited an amount equivalent to their assessed value pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. After considering the PAC's report, the RTC issued an order fixing the just compensation at P3,000.00 per square meter. Napocor appealed to CA. It assailed the appointment of the PAC, claiming that its appointment was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It also alleged that the determination of the amount of just compensation was without basis. CA affirmed with modification. It upheld the appointment of the PAC and the recommendation to set the just compensation at P2,200.00 per square meter, but removed the additional P800.00 that the RTC imposed. Its motion for reconsideration of the CA decision was denied. Hence NAPOCOR filed this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Napocor asserts that the appointment of the PAC as commissioners was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, specifically, Section 5. It contends that Rule 67 requires the trial court to appoint three persons, and not a committee like the PAC. The members of the PAC also did not subscribe to an oath which is required under Section 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Napocor further alleges that the CA erred in disregarding the compromise agreement it entered into with the respondents. The respondents, on the other hand, assert that Napocor's allegations are unmeritorious. They claim that the appointment of the PAC constituted substantial compliance with Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, since the PAC was composed of three members (the provincial assessor, the provincial engineer, and the provincial treasurer) who are government officials without interest in the outcome of the litigation, and who are competent to evaluate and assess valuation of the properties. Issue: Whether or not the appointment of the PAC contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

as

commissioners was

Held: NO. In this case, the Court finds that the appointment of the PAC as commissioners substantially complies with Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It is immaterial that the RTC appointed a committee instead of three persons to act as commissioners, since the PAC is composed of three members — the Provincial Assessor, the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer. Considering their positions, we find each member of the PAC competent to perform the duty required of them, i.e., to appraise the valuation of the affected lots. As correctly found by the CA, they "are government officials entrusted with the updating and time-to-time determination of currently assessed, as well as, market value of properties within their jurisdiction." The mere fact that they are government officials does not disqualify them as disinterested persons, as the provincial government has no significant interest in the case. If Napocor found the appointment of the PAC to be objectionable, it should have filed its objections early on and not belatedly raise them in its appeal with the CA. We find nothing in the records indicating that Napocor seasonably objected to the appointment of the PAC or to any aspect in the order of appointment. Instead, Napocor belatedly raised its objections only in its appeal with the CA. For its failure to comply with the Rules, we consider Napocor to have waived its objections against any supposed irregularity in the appointment of the PAC. If Napocor had any objections on the amount of just compensation fixed in the commissioners' report, its remedy was to file its objections within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice of the report. However, as with the objections to the appointment of the PAC, Napocor failed to make a timely objection to the report of the commissioners and raised them only before the CA It appears to us that Napocor has demonstrated a pattern of procrastination in this case. We note that not only did it belatedly file its objections to the appointment of the PAC and to the commissioners' report; it also failed to submit copies of the compromise agreement with the CA despite the numerous extensions it requested. Significantly, the execution of the compromise agreement, by itself, did not enjoin the CA from resolving the appeal. By its terms and as found out by the CA, the compromise agreement required the approval of the CA for it to take effect. Thus, Napocor can no longer assail the CA's authority to resolve the appeal after it consistently failed to furnish the CA a copy of the agreement.

RULE 67 NO. 3 REPUBLIC v. SAMSON-TATAD GR NO. 187677 April 17, 2013

PETITIONER: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH),

RESPONDENT: HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, and SPOUSES WILLIAM AND REBECCA GENATO,

FACTS: Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by DPWH, filed a Complaint for the expropriation of several parcels of land affected by the construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue Flyover. Private respondents, Spouses Genato, are the registered owners of a piece of land. During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter from Engr.Gatan, reporting that the subject property was "government land and that the title of the respondent is of dubious origin and of fabrication as it encroached or overlapped on a government property. As a result, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint seeking to limit the coverage of the proceedings. Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to have the subject property "declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting claims.” The RTC admitted petitioner’s Amended Complaint, deferred the release to respondents the amount of (P18,400,000) deposited in the bank, equivalent to the current zonal valuation of the land, and declared the property as the subject of conflicting claims.

While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the subject property actually belonged to the Government, private respondents interposed objections saying that petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence, as it constituted a collateral attack on the validity of their TCT. The RTC then required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Upon receipt of the Memoranda, the trial court issued an Order stating that the issue of the validity of the TCT can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction but it was denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the motion was also denied. Hence, the instant Petition.

ISSUE Whether or not petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity of respondents’ title.

HELD We rule that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to just compensation. Thus, such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be construed as final and binding on the parties. By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. Here, the attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as an "attack." It must be emphasized that the objective of the case is to appropriate private property, and the contest on private respondents' title arose only as an incident to the issue of whom should be rightly compensated.

The Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari and the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The assailed Decision and Resolution the CA and RTC are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs. MELBA TAN TE, respondent. [G.R. No. 169263. September 21, 2011.]

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: Manila City Mayor Joselito L. Atienza approved Ordinance No. 7951 — an expropriation measure authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or expropriation real property along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets where low-cost housing units could be built and then awarded to bona fide residents. The covered property measures 1,425 square meters, and includes the 475-square-meter lot owned by respondent Melba Tan Te. Respondent had acquired the property from the heirs of Emerlinda Dimayuga Reyes in 1996, and back then it was being occupied by families whose leasehold rights had long expired even prior to said sale. In 1998, respondent had sought before MTC the ejectment case. The favorable ruling in that case evaded execution; hence, the court, despite opposition of the City of Manila, issued a Writ of Demolition at respondent's instance. The City of Manila had instituted an expropriation case thereof. RTC dismissed the first compliant upon motion by Melba for failure to show that an ordinance authorized the expropriation and non-compliance with the provisions of Republic Act 7279. On November 16, 2000, petitioner filed this second Complaint for expropriation before the RTC, attaching a copy of Ordinance No. 7951 and it had already offered to buy the property from Melba, which the latter failed to retrieve from the post office despite notice. The city was thereby compelled to file the complaint, after depositing in trust with the Land Bank of the Philippines P1,000,000.00 in cash, representing the just compensation required by law. Melba, instead of filing, filed a motion to dismiss, and raised the

following grounds: Ordinance No. 7951 was an invalid ordinance because it violated a rule against taking private property without just compensation; that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279; and that she qualified as a small property owner and, hence, exempt from the operation of R.A. No. 7279, the subject lot being the only piece of realty that she owned. RTC: Petitioner moved that it be allowed to enter the property, but before it could be resolved, the trial court issued its June 13, 2001 Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court held that while petitioner had deposited with the bank the alleged P1M cash in trust for respondent, petitioner nevertheless did not submit any certification from the City Treasurer's Office of the amount needed to justly compensate respondent for her property. Second, it emphasized that the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 are mandatory in character, yet petitioner had failed to show that it exacted compliance with them prior to the commencement of this suit. Lastly, it conceded that respondent had no other real property except the subject lot which, considering its total area, should well be considered a small property exempted by law from expropriation. In view of the dismissal of the complaint, petitioner's motion to enter was rendered moot and academic. CA: dismissed the same finding no merit. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The trial court's dismissal of its complaint was premature, and it faults the CA for having failed to note that by such dismissal it has been denied an opportunity to show previous compliance with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 as well as to establish that respondent actually owns other realty apart from the subject property. Whether or not it had complied with the law is a matter best treated in a full-blown trial rather than in a motion to dismiss.

ISSUES: 1. WON socialized housing falls within the confines of public use. 2. WON petitioner that by virtue of its power of eminent domain included in its charter is not bound by the provisions of Republic Act 7279

HELD: 1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled in Sumulong v. Guerrero, citing the earlier case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes: The public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. . . . The constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be divided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. . . . Specifically, urban renewal or development and the construction of low-cost housing are recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. . . . The 1987 Constitution [provides]: The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all. (Article II, Section 9) The State shall, by law and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program for urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. . . . In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners. (Article XIII, Section 9) Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who

need it, all at once. Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the mushrooming of crowded makeshift dwellings is a worldwide development particularly in developing countries. So basic and urgent are housing problems that the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the "International Year of Shelter for the Homeless" "to focus the attention of the international community on those problems." The General Assembly is seriously concerned that, despite the efforts of Governments at the national and local levels and of international organizations, the driving conditions of the majority of the people in slums and squatter areas and rural settlements, especially in developing countries, continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute terms." [G.A. Res. 37/221, Yearbook of the United Nations 1982, Vol. 36, p. 1043-4] 2. Congress passed R.A. No. 7279, to provide a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program as well as access to land and housing by the underprivileged and homeless citizens; uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas by making available decent housing at affordable cost; optimize the use and productivity of land and urban resources; reduce urban dysfunctions which affect public health, safety and ecology; and improve the capability of local governments in undertaking urban development and housing programs and projects, among others. Accordingly, all city and municipal governments are mandated to inventory all lands and improvements within their respective locality and identify lands which may be utilized for socialized housing and as resettlement sites for acquisition and disposition to qualified beneficiaries. Section 10 thereof authorizes local government units to exercise the power of eminent domain to carry out the objectives of the law, but subject to the conditions stated therein and in Section 9. DELICANO v. PECHATEN CORPORATION G.R. 191251 September 7, 2011 FACTS: Respondent Pechaten Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of land (property) located at 852 Vicente Cruz Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent and Teodoro Alberto, Honorata Salmorin, Aquilina Hizon, and Dalmacia Meneses entered into a two-year lease contract involving the property. Subsequently, the lessees executed a waiver of their rights or interest in the lease contract in favor of Virgilio Meneses.

When the lease contract expired, respondent offered Virgilio Meneses to renew the lease agreement or purchase the property. Virgilio Meneses ignored the offer and failed to pay monthly rentals for the property starting July 1995. On 6 October 1999, respondent sent a demand letter to Virgilio Meneses to vacate the property and pay the accrued rent of P141,032 or reasonable compensation for the use of the property. When Virgilio Meneses refused, respondent filed with the MeTC a case for unlawful detainer with damages against Virgilio Meneses. The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. On appeal, judgment was affirmed by the RTC. Meanwhile, the City of Manila filed on 12 August 2004 a complaint for expropriation against respondent involving the property. Thereafter, RTC issued a Writ of Possession and Order of Expropriation in favor of the City of Manila. Upon the death of Virgilio Meneses, he was substituted by his heirs, who are the petitioners in this case. In view of the Orders of the RTC involving the property in the expropriation case, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration in the RTC of its Decision in the unlawful detainer case. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case, alleging that the case was rendered moot by virtue of the Writ of Possession issued by the RTC in the expropriation case involving the property. The RTC then modified its decision and set aside the order to vacate the subject property for being moot and academic. Respondent appealed the unlawful detainer case to the CA, to no avail. Furthermore, petitioners stated that the City of Manila had already turned over the property to them. Respondent opposed the motion, alleging that the Order of Expropriation is the subject of appeal before the Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the expropriation of the property pursuant to City Ordinance No. 7984 was intended for the sole benefit of the family of Virgilio Meneses. Thus, the CA dismissed the complaint for eminent domain. The City of Manila did not appeal the Decision, which became final and executor. Respondent alleged that the decision of the CA in the expropriation case, which became final and executor, is a supervening event which warrants the reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in this unlawful detainer case. ISSUE: Whether petitioners are still entitled to retain possession over the subject property despite the dismissal of the expropriation case HELD: NO. Considering that the Decision of the Court of Appeals-Special Sixth Division reversing the judgment of expropriation already became final and executory, it is only proper that respondent should be restored to its

rightful possession of the property in accordance with Section 11, Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure: Sec. 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. – The right of the plaintiff to enter upon the property of the defendant and appropriate the same to public use or purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from judgment. But if the appellate court determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be rendered ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant of the possession of the property, and to determine the damages which the defendant sustained and may recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff. NPC v. YCLA Sugar Development Corp. GR NO.: 193936 DATE: December 11, 2013 PETITIONER: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION RESPONDENT: YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government owned and controlled corporation created for the purpose of undertaking the development of hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. YCLA Sugar Development Corporation (YCLA) is the registered owner of three parcels of land situated in Puerto Galera. In order to complete its 69 KV CalapanMamburao Island Grid Project in Puerto Galera, NPC had to construct transmission lines that would traverse several private properties, including the said parcels of land owned by YCLA. Accordingly, on December 2, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint for expropriation with the RTC against YCLA and several other individuals. On April 30, 1999, the parties moved, inter alia, for the constitution of a Board of Commissioners to be appointed by the RTC to determine the reasonable amount of just compensation to be paid by the NPC. Thus, the RTC issued an order terminating the pre-trial conference and directing the constitution of a Board of Commissioners, which would submit a report and recommendation as to the reasonable amount of just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. The Board of Commissioners submitted its Report, which fixed the amount of just compensation of the subject properties at P500.00 per sq m. YCLA objected to the amount recommended by the Board of Commissioners, claiming that the amount of just compensation should be fixed at P900.00 per sq m considering the improvements in their properties. Trial on the determination of the reasonable amount of just compensation ensued after NPC’s comment to YCLA’s written affirmation. Consequently, YCLA filed a motion asking the RTC to direct the Board of Commissioners to conduct an ocular inspection

over the subject properties and, thereafter, amend/revise the Board of Commissioner’s Report dated May 2, 2001. YCLA’s motion was granted by the RTC. On September 15, 2003, the Board of Commissioners submitted its second Report, which fixed the just compensation of the subject properties at P1,000.00 per sq m, justified by its location on a strategic place and the consequential damages to the whole properties of the defendants because the plaintiff occupied the front portion along the highway. The RTC rendered a Decision, which adopted the report and recommendation of the BoC, and directs NPC to pay YCLA the total amount of P5,786,000 representing the value of the expropriated lands owned by the said defendant and its 26 molave trees which were cut down to make way for the NPC’s project, with legal interest from the time the plaintiff had actually took possession of the subject properties on 19 April 1999 until full payment has been made. Unperturbed, NPC appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in relying on the recommendation of the BoC as regards the amount of just compensation. NPC claimed that the amount of P1,000.00 per sq m recommended by the BoC as the reasonable amount of just compensation, which was adopted by the RTC, is too excessive considering that the subject properties were barren and undeveloped agricultural lands at the time it instituted the action for expropriation. The CA rendered the Decision which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. The CA held that the RTC’s determination of the amount of just compensation was reasonable notwithstanding that it was merely based on the Report submitted by the BoC. The RTC pointed out that there was no showing that the said Report was tainted with irregularity, fraud or bias. Nevertheless, the CA modified the award rendered by the RTC, by fixing the amount of just compensation to P900.00 per sq m instead of P1,000.00 per sq m, since YCLA only sought an award of P900.00 per sq m as just compensation for the subject properties in the proceedings before the RTC. ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC and the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just compensation of the subject properties. HELD: Partly meritorious. In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual

taking by the government. It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. In this case, in arriving at the amount of just compensation, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on the BoC’s Report dated September 15, 2003, which, in turn, was arrived at after conducting an ocular inspection of the subject properties on August 27, 2003. However, the BoC’s recommendation as to the amount of just compensation was based on the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003. What escaped the attention of the lower courts is that the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003 cannot be used to determine the amount of just compensation considering that the Complaint for expropriation was filed by NPC on December 2, 1997. Further, the Court notes that the BoC, in the said Report, merely alleged that its members arrived at the amount of P1,000 as just compensation for the subject properties based on actual sales, presumably of surrounding parcels of land, and on the opinion of "reliable persons" that were interviewed. However, the said Report is not supported by any corroborative documents such as sworn declarations of the "reliable persons" that were supposedly interviewed. The Court has consistently ruled that just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several factors must be considered such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current market value of like properties, tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors can be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by documentary evidence. A commissioners’ report of land prices which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court. Under the Rules of Court, any evidence – whether oral or documentary – is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand. A commissioners’ report of land prices is considered as evidence in the determination of the amount of just compensation due the land owner in expropriation cases. The recommended amount of just compensation contained in the commissioners’ report of land prices, in turn, is based on various factors such as the fair market value of the property, the value of like properties. Thus, it becomes imperative that the commissioners’ report of land prices be supported by pertinent documents, which impelled the commissioners to arrive at the recommended amount for the condemned properties, to aid the court in its determination of the amount of just compensation. Otherwise, the commissioner’s report becomes hearsay and should thus not be considered by the court. Because the determination of just compensation for the subject properties is insufficient, the respective Decisions should be set aside. Nevertheless, the Court cannot fix the amount of just compensation for the subject properties at P500.00 pursuant to the BoC's Report dated May 2, 2001. The said Report suffers from the same infirmity as the Second Report - unsupported by any documentary evidence and its recommendation are based on the prevailing market value in 2001.

This case is remanded to the trial court for the proper determination of just compensation, in conformity with this Decision. Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 109338, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte, a complaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter Corporation (PSC). Judgment was rendered in favor of Leviste. When the decision became final and executory, the trial court issued a writ of execution and respondent sheriff Eduardo R. Moreno levied upon two (2) parcels of land. The parcels of land were sold at public auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation (Vines Realty). A copy of the writ of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines standing on certain portions of the subject property. Vines Realty filed an amended motion for an order of demolition and removal of improvements on the subject land. Among the improvements for removal were the power lines and electric posts belonging to petitioner. Respondent Vines Realty cut down petitioner’s electric posts professedly using a chainsaw and resulting in a loud blast affecting the area. The sheriff, at the request of Vines Realty demolished the remaining electric posts resulting in the cutting off of power supply to various business establishments and barangays. It was the contention that Vines Realty was the owner of the roadside and that petitioner could not construct power lines therein without its permission. Petitioner promptly replied that the power lines were constructed within the right of way of the provincial road leading to the port of Osmeña as granted by the District Engineer of DPWH. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located in the land sold at public auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage. HELD: YES. Among the powers granted to electric cooperatives by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 269[36] are: Section 16 Powers-

(j) To construct, maintain and operate electric transmission and distribution lines along, upon, under and across publicly owned lands and public thoroughfares, including, without limitation, all roads, highways, streets, alleys, bridges and causeways; Provided, that such shall not prevent or unduly impair the primary public uses to which such lands and thoroughfares are otherwise devoted; (k) To exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the exercise of such power by other corporations constructing or operating electric generating plants and electric transmission and distribution lines or systems. Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with the power of eminent domain. The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires. The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property. No matter how commendable petitioners purpose is, it is just and equitable that Vines Realty be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the taking of its property, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. Moreover, CANORECO only sought the continuation of the exercise of its right-of-way easement and not ownership over the land. Public utilities power of eminent domain may be exercised although title is not transferred to the expropriator.

Consequently, we rule that a courts writ of demolition can not prevail over the easement of a right-of-way which falls within the power of eminent domain.

CASE TITLE: National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Guivelondo, GR NO.: 154411 DATE: June 19, 2003 DOCTRINE: The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.

PETITIONER: National Housing Authority RESPONDENT: Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, CA, Hon. Isaias Dicdican, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City, and Pascual Y. Abordo, Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City.

FACTS: The National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. The purpose for this expropriation proceeding is that the affected lands are to be developed as a specialized housing project by

petitioner. Upon determination of the just compensation of the properties of respondents, both petitioner and respondents filed for its reconsideration. Prior to the denial of their reconsideration, petitioner moved to dismiss its complaint for eminent domain on the ground that the implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries can not afford. It was denied because the Partial Judgment 1 had already become final and executory and there was no just and equitable reason to warrant the dismissal of the case. Thereafter, respondent Sheriff Pascual Y. Abordo served on petitioner a Notice of Levy pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued by the trial court to enforce the Partial Judgment. Meanwhile, the CA set aside the dismissal of the petition and reinstated the same. Consequently, a temporary restraining order was issued enjoining respondent sheriff to preserve the status quo. However, respondent sheriff served on the Landbank of the Philippines a Notice of Third Garnishment against the deposits, moneys and interests of petitioner therein. Subsequently, respondent sheriff levied on funds and personal properties of petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action for eminent domain may be dismissed where the case had been decided and the judgment had already become final and executory.

HELD: No. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes 1 Judgment of the complaint for eminent domain which adopted the recommendation of the Commissioners and fixing the just compensation of the lands of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo at P11,200.00 per square meter.

of the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned. In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court which declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became final and may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any court. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim. Moreover, petitioner’s argument that the intended public use was rendered nugatory by the unreasonable just compensation fixed by the court, which is beyond the means of the intended beneficiaries of the socialized housing project is tenuous. The public purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just compensation that the court has fixed. The need to provide decent housing to the urban poor dwellers in the locality was not lost by the mere fact that the land cost more than petitioner had expected. Respondent landowners had already been prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner cannot be permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to abandon it later when it finds the amount of just compensation unacceptable. Napocor v. Bongbong

FACTS: Spouses Antero and Rosario Bongbong are the registered owners of a 364,451square-meter parcel of land situated at Barangay Sambulawan, Villaba, Leyte. The property is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. R-2189 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte. As early as 1996, the National Power Corporation (NPC) negotiated with the spouses Bongbong to use a portion of the property for the construction of a 230 KV LCIP Malitbog-Tabango CETL TWR SITE 1046 for the Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. When the spouses Bongbong agreed, NPC occupied a 25,100-sq-m portion of the property. ETISAc On April 22, 1996, NPC paid the spouses Bongbong

the amount of P33,582.00 representing the value of the improvements that were damaged by the construction of the project. The voucher for the payment of easement fee was prepared. However, when NPC offered a check for P163,150.00 (representing 10% of the total market value of the area affected) as payment for the easement fee, Antero refused to accept the amount and demanded that NPC pay the full value of the 25,100-sq-m portion it had occupied. On October 28, 1997, the spouses Bongbong received the P163,150.00 under protest. 3 On October 3, 1997, the spouses Bongbong demanded that the NPC pay P8,748,448.00 which they alleged to be the just and reasonable value for their land and improvements. ISSUE: Whether or not the procedure laid down in Rule 67 should be followed in determining just compensation? HELD: No. Rule 67 need not be followed where the expropriator has violated procedural requirements. When a government agency itself violates procedural requirements, it waives the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67. The usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates procedural requirements. NPC's taking of Pobre's property without filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation is a transgression of procedural due process. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 50 the Court clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of Rule 67 would not apply.

Republic v. Gingoyon FACTS The case involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for the terminal complex it built. The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court's decision in Agan v. PIATCO, promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the "Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International

Airport Passenger Terminal III" entered into between the Philippine Government (Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was contrary to public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation. It also appears that arbitral proceedings were commenced. Thereafter the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for Special Raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal's assessed value for taxation purposes. The case was raffled to respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day the RTC issued an Order 16 directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government. However the RTC subsequently issued another Order designed to supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the said Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes" and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects. An Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for Inhibition (Hon. Gingoyon) was filed which were both denied by the court. Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed.

ISSUE 1. Whether or not the Resolution permits expropriation 2. Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this case. HELD

1. The 2004 Resolution Which Is Law of This Case Generally Permits Expropriation The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant to this case in two aspects, namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just compensation determined in accordance with law and equity; and (ii) that the government is barred from taking over NAIA 3 until such just compensation is paid. the right of the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was preconditioned by lawful order on the payment of just compensation to PIATCO as builder of the structures. The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as real property. 26 The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex "stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]." 2. Application of Rule 67 Violates the 2004 Agan Resolution Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property "for national government infrastructure projects." Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67

continues to apply. The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974 concerns the particular essential step the Government has to undertake to be entitled to a writ of possession. Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized government depositary the assessed value of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the Government make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue. Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court's requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government may take over the property. NOTE: The Proper Amount to be Paid under Rep. Act No. 8974 There could be no "BIR zonal valuations" on the NAIA 3 facility, as provided in Rep. Act No. 8974, since zonal valuations are only for parcels of land, not for airport terminals. Its entitlement to just compensation should be limited to the value of the improvements and/or structures themselves. Thus, the determination of just compensation cannot include the BIR zonal valuation under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974. "in case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proferred value, taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]." As regards the amount, the Court sees no impediment to recognize this sum of P3 Billion as the proffered value. Still, we cannot deem the Government as having faithfully complied with Rep. Act No. 8974. For the law plainly requires direct payment to the property owner, and not a mere deposit with the authorized government depositary. Without such direct payment, no writ of possession may be obtained. -Writ of Possession May Not Be Implemented Until Actual Receipt by PIATCO of Proferred Value

-Rights of the Government upon Issuance of the Writ of Possession -The Government itself is authorized to perform the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3. However, before payment it acquires no ownership thereto. Significantly, in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia[ 62 ] this Court ruled that the expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit: ". . . The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint" . . . . The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. . . . . It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed Final Determination of Just Compensation must be made Within 60 Days -Appointment of Commissioners RA 8974 is silent – Apply Rule 67 -Inhibition of Hon. Gongoyon – The disqualification of a judge is a depravation of his/ her judicial pwer and should not be allowed on the basis of mere speculations and surmises. It cannot be based on the adverse nature of the judge’s rulings towards the movant for inhibition, especially if these are in accord with the law. CASE TITLE: Republic vs. Samson-Tatad GR NO.: G.R. No. 187677 DATE: April 17, 2013

PETITIONER: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) RESPONDENT: HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, and SPOUSES WILLIAM AND REBECCA GENATO DOCTRINE: Such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be construed as final and binding on the parties. By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.

FACTS: Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint against several defendants, including private respondents, for the expropriation of several parcels of land affected by the construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue Flyover. Private respondents, Spouses William and Rebecca Genato, are the registered owners of a piece of land ("subject property") covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter from Engr. Patrick B. Gatan, Project Manager IV of the DPWH-NCR, reporting that the subject property was "government land and that the transfer certificate of title of the said claimant [respondent] . . . is of dubious origin and of fabrication as it encroached or overlapped on a government property." As a result, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint seeking to limit the coverage of the proceedings to an area conforming to the findings of the DPWH. Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to have the subject property "declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting claims." While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the subject property actually belonged to the Government, private respondents interposed objections saying that petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence, as it constituted a collateral attack on the validity of their TCT. The RTC then required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. RTC

Upon receipt of the Memoranda, the trial court issued an Order finding that the issue of the validity of the TCT can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose and not in this instant proceeding. Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CA The CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition. In this petition, petitioner argues that under Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, if the ownership of a property to be expropriated is uncertain, the court in the same expropriation proceeding is also given authority to make a proper adjudication of the matter. This view is allegedly supported by Republic v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided formerly by Judge L. Pasicolan (Republic) in which the trial court hearing the expropriation proceeding was also allowed to resolve the issue of ownership. Private respondents, on the other hand, invoke Section 48 of P.D. 1529, viz.: SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity of respondents' title under the TCT. HELD: The SC ruled that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to just compensation. Proper interpretation of Section 9, Rule 67 The SC first had the occasion to interpret Section 9, Rule 67 in the case of Republic v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided formerly by Judge L. Pasicolan. In addressing the issue of "whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned," the Court answered in the affirmative:

The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned, must be resolved in the affirmative. That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provides: SEC. 9.Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the clerk of court for the benefit of the persons adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made. In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true ownership of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy. Such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be construed as final and binding on the parties. By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. Inapplicability of Section 48, P.D. 1529

Here, the attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as an "attack." It must be emphasized that the objective of the case is to appropriate private property, and the contest on private respondents' title arose only as an incident to the issue of whom should be rightly compensated. Contrary to petitioner's allegations, the Complaint and Amended Complaint cannot also be considered as a direct attack. The amendment merely limited the coverage of the expropriation proceedings to the uncontested portion of the subject property. The RTC's Order declaring the property as subject of conflicting claims is a recognition that there are varying claimants to the sums to be awarded as just compensation. This serves as an authority for the court to conduct a limited inquiry on the property's ownership.