Rule 66-67 Cases Complete

ARQUERO vs COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 168053 September 21, 2011 Peralta, J. Doctrine: The petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. Facts: On October 2, 2003, petitioner filed the Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunctive Writ before the RTC of Palawan against public and private respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3854. Petitioner argued that the designation of private respondent deprived her of her right to exercise her function and perform her duties in violation of her right to security of tenure. Considering that petitioner was appointed in a permanent capacity, she insisted that private respondent’s designation as OIC of the PNS is null and void there being no vacancy to the position. Petitioner thus prayed that the RTC issue an order granting the writ of quo warranto enjoining private respondent from assuming the position of OIC of the PNS, declaring the questioned designation null and void and without operative effect, and declaring petitioner to be entitled to the office of the principal of the PNS. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has a right to institute this quo warranto proceeding as to the contested public office and oust private respondent from enjoyment thereof Ruling: Yes. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office. It may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office. In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. In other words, the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested position. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed. It is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office. MORO vs. DEL CASTILLO, JR. G.R. No. 184980 March 30, 2011 ABAD, J.: Doctrine: In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. Facts: Ombudsman charged respondent Del Castillo, Chief Accountant of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Accounting Center of the AFP, with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Ombudsman alleged that Del Castillo made false statements in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities from 1996 to 2004 and that he acquired properties out of proportion to his salary. GHQ reassigned Del Castillo to the Philippine Air

Force (PAF) Accounting Center. Moro, then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy, took over the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center. Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension for six months and eventually ordered his dismissal from the service. The penalty imposed on him included cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government. Del Castillo filed a MR, which is pending to this date. After the lapse of his six-month suspension Del Castillo attempted to reassume his former post. But, he was unable to do so since Moro declined to yield the position. Del Castillo filed a petition for quo warranto against Moro with the RTC. Del Castillo claimed that Moro was merely detailed as GHQ Chief Accountant when the Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension. Since the latter’s period of suspension already lapsed, he was entitled to resume his former post and Moro was but a usurper. Moro pointed out in his Answer that his appointment as GHQ Chief Accountant was a permanent appointment. Indeed, the GHQ had already reassigned Del Castillo to the PAF Accounting Center even before the Ombudsman placed him under preventive suspension. RTC dismissed Del Castillo’s petition. Del Castillo filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA reversed the RTC Decision. With the denial of his MR, Moro filed this petition via Rule 45. Issue: Whether or not respondent Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center that he once held. Held: No. An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed against one who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. It may be brought by the RP or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office. In this case, it was Del Castillo who filed the action after his preventive suspension ended. He argues that, assuming his reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center was valid, the same could not exceed one year. But, as Moro points out, he had been authorized under SO 91 to serve as GHQ Chief Accountant. Del Castillo, on the other hand, had been ordered dismissed from the service by the Ombudsman. Consequently, he cannot reassume the contested position. Del Castillo of course insists, citing Lapid v. Court of Appeals that only decisions of the Ombudsman that impose the penalties of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than a month or a fine of one month salary are final, executory, and unappealable. Consequently, when the penalty is dismissal as in his case, he can avail himself of the remedy of appeal and the execution of the decision against him would, in the meantime, be held in abeyance. But, the Lapid case has been superseded by In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH. The Court held that an appeal shall not stop a decision of the Ombudsman from being executory. In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed. Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name months after the Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service. The dismissal order was immediately executory even pending appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo warranto or reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.

Rule 66 Case Number 3 RENALD F. VILANDO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND

HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011 Mendoza, J.: Doctrine: A petition for quo warranto is not a means to oblige the HRET to reopen naturalization proceedings for a determination of the citizenship of the ascendant of Limkaichong. Facts: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental in 2007. Limkaichong won over her rival Paras, and on July 23, 2007, she assumed office. Her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, alleging that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father. These petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong, assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases against her. The Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec, dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto. Vilando, as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET. They invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichong’s citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy, Limkaichong’s father. Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack. The HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives. Vilando filed for certiorari with the SC. Issue: Whether the HRET erred in dismissing the petitions for Quo Warranto Held: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives. Vilando’s argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichong’s father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is devoid of merit. The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichong’s father should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant. True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members. Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father, which is not permissible. Rule 66 – Case No. 4 HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner, National Police Commission vs. HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, in his capacity as the new appointee vice herein petitioner HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, National Police Commission G.R. No. 191560 March 29, 2011 BRION, J. DOCTRINE: We stress that the person instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must show that he is entitled to the office in dispute; otherwise, the action may be dismissed at any stage. FACTS: 1. PGMA reappointed Roces as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner. 2. When Roces died, PGMA appointed the petitioner as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman. 3. Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. Urro’s appointment paper is dated March 5, 2010. 4. DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate congratulatory letters to the respondents. 5. After being furnished a copy of the congratulatory letters on March 22, 2010, the petitioner filed the present petition questioning the validity of the respondents’ appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. 6. On July 30, 2010, the newly elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban

on Midnight Appointments." 7. The petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years counted from the date of her appointment in October (should be September) 2004. 8. The petitioner alternatively submits that even if his appointment were temporary, a temporary appointment does not give the President the license to abuse a public official simply because he lacks security of tenure. PRAYER -- The petitioner asks that respondent Urro be ousted as NAPOLCOM Commissioner and he be allowed to continue in office. ISSUE: Does the petitioner have the clear right to be reinstated to his former position and to oust respondent Urro as NAPOLCOM Commissioner? HELD: No. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail. From this perspective, the petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to the disputed office as a condition precedent to the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the respondents’ appointments.

Rule 66 Case number 5/6 Munder vs. Comelec and Atty. Sarip SERENO, J.: Doctrine: If a petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy failed to comply with the prescriptive period, his remedy after a candidate has been proclaimed is to file a quo warranto action with the Regional Trial Court to prove that such candidate lacks the eligibility required by law. Facts: Munder ran as mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and filed his CoC on Nov. 26, 2009. The last day for filig the certificate of candidacy was on Nov. 30, 2009. Under Sec. 4 (A) (1) of the Comelec Resolution 8689, a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be filed within 5 days from the last day of filing of the COC but not later than 25 days from filing thereof. Respondent Atty. Sarip likewise filed a COC vied for the same position in the same municipality.

On April 13, 2010 Sarip filed a petition for disqualification with the comelec on the ground that Munder was not a registered voted of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that the latter’s application for candidacy was not accomplished in full. Sarip argued that the candidate Munder was different from the registered voter Munder since they had different birth years. Consequently, according to Sarip, Munder did not posses the Qualification to run as elective official and should be disqualified. Sarip filed his petition for Disqualification pursuant to Resolution No. 8696 Sec. 4 (b) (1) and argued that he had timely filed the petition. In the May 2010 elections, Munder won overwhelmingly. The Municipal board of canvassers of Bubong, Lanao Del Sur, thus proclaimed Munde as Mayor. Munder filed his answer and argued that false representations, dishonesty and mockery of justice were not grounds for disqualification of a candidate under Comelece resolution no. 8696. In effect he argued that Sarip availed himself of the wrong remedy and that the latter’s petition should be treated as a Petition to Deny Due Cours or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, at the time Sarip filed his petition, the said petition had already lapsed. Issue: whether or not the petition for Disqualification is the proper remedy. Held: No. Sarip’s remedy is not a petition for Disqualification, but a petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy which must comply with the prescriptive period. Otherwise, his remedy, after Munder has been proclaimed is to file a quo warranto action with the RTC to prove that Munder lacks eligibility required by law.

Rule 67

NPC vs Samar GR No. 197329 September 8, 2014 Del Castillo, J. Doctrine: Violation of the procedural requirements under rule 67 waived the usual procedure prescribed, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation Facts: Civil Case No. IR-2243 Sometime in 1990, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) with the RTC, seeking to expropriate respondent Samar’s 1,020-square meter lot situated in San Jose (Baras), Nabua, Camarines Sur which NPC needed for the construction of a transmission line. The RTC directed the issuance of a Writ of Condemnation in favor of NPC. Accordingly, NPC entered the subject lot and constructed its transmission line, denominated as Tower No. 83. However, on July 12, 1994, the trial court issued another Order dismissing Civil Case No. IR2243 without prejudice for failure to prosecute because the committee failed to appraise the

reasonable value of the land. NPC did not appeal nor did commence the expropriation proceeding. Civil Case No. IR-2678 On December 5, 1994, respondents filed with the same trial court a Complaint, for compensation and damages against NPC relative to the subject lot which NPC took over but for which it failed to pay just compensation on account of the dismissal of Civil Case No. IR-2243. Respondent prayed for moral and exemplary damages. As agreed by the parties during pre-trial, a panel of commissioners composed of one representative each from the parties, and a third from the court was constituted for the purpose of determining the value of the subject lot. After conducting their appraisal, the commissioners submitted their individual reports. Atty. Wenifredo Pornillos, commissioner for the respondents, recommended a valuation within the range of P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per square meter. Lorenzo C. Orense, commissioner for NPC, did not set an amount, although he stated that the lot should be valued at the prevailing market prices of agricultural, and not residential, lands within the area. The court representative, Esteban D. Colarina, proposed a P1,100.00 per square meter valuation. RTC and CA rendered their decidion in favor of Samar. Issue: Whether or not just compensation for the expropriated property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint.

Ruling: Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government. However, if the government takes possession before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that ‘upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.

Records show that sometime in 1990, NPC filed an expropriation case docketed as Civil Case No. IR-2243. However, in an Order dated July 12, 1994, the expropriation case was dismissed by the RTC for failure of NPC to prosecute. Subsequently, or on December 5, 1994, respondents filed Civil Case No. IR-2678 which is a complaint for compensation and recovery of damages. Considering the dismissal of the expropriation case for failure of the NPC to prosecute, it is as if no expropriation suit was filed. Hence, pursuant to the above-quoted ruling, NPC is deemed “to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation.” Nevertheless, just compensation for the property must be based on its value at the time of the taking of said property, not at the time of the filing of the complaint. Consequently, the RTC should have fixed the value of the property at the time NPC took possession of the same in 1990, and not at the time of the filing of the complaint for compensation and damages in 1994 or its fair market value in 1995. NAPOCOR VS SPOUSE CRUZ G.R. No. 165386 July 29, 2013 BRION, J.: Doctrine: The settled rule in expropriation proceedings is that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. Although the appointment of commissioners is mandatory, the Rules do not impose any qualifications or restrictions on the appointment, other than that the commissioners should not number more than three and that they should be competent and disinterested parties. Facts: An expropriation proceeding was commenced by Napocor against respondents Spouses Salvador and Nenita Cruz, and other sposes who are the owners of individual lots located in Del Monte Park Subdivision, Dulong Bayan, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. A complaint was filed primarily sought the determination of just compensation due the respondents. RTC directed the Bulacan Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) "to review and submit an appraisal report on the properties to be acquired by Napocor in order ‘to guide the Court in fixing the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants.’ RTC allowed Napocor to take possession of the lots, after Napocor deposited an amount equivalent to their assessed value. PAC submitted its report to the RTC which pegged the just compensation at P2,200.00 per SQ M. After considering the PAC’s report, the RTC issued an order fixing the just compensation at P3,000.00 per SQ M. Although the RTC found the PAC’s recommended amount of P2,200.00 reasonable, it noted that an additional P800.00 was necessary in view of the then prevailing economic crises and the devaluation of the peso. Napocor appealed the RTC’s order with the CA. It assailed the appointment of the PAC, claiming that its appointment was contrary to Rule 67 of the roc. It also alleged that the determination of the amount of just compensation was without basis. CA affirmed but removed the additional P800. The CA instead imposed legal interest at 12% per annum on the amount of just compensation. Its MR of the CA decision having been denied, Hence, the the present petition. Issue: WON the the appointment of the PAC as commissioners was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Held: No. The settled rule in expropriation proceedings is that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.

To assist the courts in this task, Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court requires the appointment of "not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." Although the appointment of commissioners is mandatory, the Rules do not impose any qualifications or restrictions on the appointment, other than that the commissioners should not number more than three and that they should be competent and disinterested parties. Court finds that the appointment of the PAC as commissioners substantially complies with Section 5, Rule 67 of the ROC. It is immaterial that the RTC appointed a committee instead of three persons to act as commissioners, since the PAC is composed of three members – the Provincial Assessor, the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer. Considering their positions, we find each member of the PAC competent to perform the duty required of them, i.e., to appraise the valuation of the affected lots. The mere fact that they are government officials does not disqualify them as disinterested persons, as the provincial government has no significant interest in the case. Instead, what we find material is that the PAC was tasked to perform precisely the same duty that the commissioners, under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, are required to discharge. If Napocor found the appointment of the PAC to be objectionable, it should have filed its objections early on and not belatedly raise them in its appeal with the CA. Instead, Napocor belatedly raised its objections only in its appeal with the CA. AS TO THE COMPENSATION We find untenable Napocor’s claim that the amount of just compensation was without factual and legal basis. That the properties were valued at P427.76 per square meter in 1996, then at P2,200.00 in 1997 does not necessarily indicate that the assessment by the PAC was manipulated. Napocor itself acknowledge an increase in the value of the properties when it modified its offered settlement from P427.76 to P1,900.00. Also, the LBP Appraisal Report, which Napocor itself commissioned, has pegged the fair market value of the properties at P2,200.00 per square meter. The report considered important improvements in the vicinity, among them, the construction of a school, a church and several public buildings. If Napocor had any objections on the amount of just compensation fixed in the commissioners’ report, its remedy was to file its objections within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice of the report. AS TO THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT We note that not only did it belatedly file its objections to the appointment of the PAC and to the commissioners’ report; it also failed to submit copies of the compromise agreement with the CA despite the numerous extensions it requested. Significantly, the execution of the compromise agreement, by itself, did not enjoin the CA from resolving the appeal. By its terms and as found out by the CA, the compromise agreement required the approval of the CA for it to take effect. Thus, Napocor can no longer assail the CA’s authority to resolve the appeal after it consistently failed to furnish the CA a copy of the agreement. The questions of Atty. Pedro Principe's representation and his entitlement to attorney's fees, insofar as the respondents are concerned, are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15, for resolution. The trial court is hereby ordered to resolve these matters with due haste.

Rule 67 Case Number 3 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, and SPOUSES WILLIAM AND REBECCA GENATO, G.R. No. 187677 April 17, 2013 Sereno, CJ.: Doctrine: The court that hears the expropriation case has jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned.

Facts: On July 5, 2001, DPWH filed a complaint to expropriate the parcels of land of the Spouses Genato affected by the construction of the EDSA-QUEZON AVENUE Flyover. Shortly thereafter, it was alleged by the DPWH-NCR that the parcels of land of Spouses Genato were government land and of dubious title. However, the petitioner was barred by the RTC from presenting evidence that the parcels of land were of dubious title. It is the contention of private respondents that by allowing petitioner to present adversarial evidence, the court is in effect allowing respondents’ Torrens title to be collaterally attacked, which is prohibited by Sec. 48 of PD 1529: SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. The RTC ruled that the issue of validity can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose and barred plaintiff from presenting evidence. Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order which was denied, hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari. Issue: Whether petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity of respondent’s title Held: NO. The SC ruled that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to just compensation. Expropriation, or the exercise of the State’s right to eminent domain, is proscribed by the restraints of public use and just compensation. It is governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which presents procedural guidelines for the court to ensure that due process is observed and just compensation rightly paid to the private owners. That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provides: SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the clerk of court for the benefit of the persons adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made. This situation is akin to ejectment cases in which a court is temporarily authorized to determine ownership, if only to determine who is entitled to possession. This is not conclusive, and it remains open to challenge through proper actions. The attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as an "attack." It must be emphasized that the objective of the case is to appropriate private property, and the contest on private respondents' title arose only as an incident to the issue of whom should be rightly compensated.

Rule 67 – Case No. 4 CITY OF MANILA vs. MELBA TAN TE G.R. No. 169263 September 21, 2011 PERALTA, J. DOCTRINE: Thus, with said amendments, the present state of Rule 67 dispenses with the filing of an extraordinary motion to dismiss such as that required before in response to a complaint for expropriation. The present rule requires the filing of an answer as responsive pleading to the complaint. FACTS: 1. Manila City Mayor Joselito L. Atienza approved Ordinance No. 7951 authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain pieces of real property along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets where low-cost housing units could be built and then awarded to bona fide residents therein. 2. In the aggregate, the covered property measures 1,425 square meters, and includes the 475square-meter lot owned by respondent Melba Tan Te. 3. Respondent had sought before the MeTC the ejectment of these occupants from the premises. The favorable ruling in that case evaded execution; hence, the court, despite opposition of the City of Manila, issued a Writ of Demolition at respondent’s instance. 4. It appears that in the interim between the issuance of the writ of execution and the order of demolition, the City of Manila had instituted an expropriation case affecting the same property. 5. Petitioner filed 2 complaints for expropriation. 6. Respondent submitted a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Ordinance No. 7951 was an invalid expropriation measure because it violated the rule against taking private property without just compensation; that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279; and that she qualified as a small property owner and, hence, exempt from the operation of R.A. No. 7279, the subject lot being the only piece of realty that she owned. 7. This was granted by the RTC and was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Did the CA erred in its decision? HELD: Yes. The he trial court in this case should have denied respondent’s motion to dismiss and required her to submit in its stead an answer within the reglementary period. This, because whether petitioner has observed the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 before resorting to expropriation, and whether respondent owns other properties than the one sought to be expropriated, and whether she is actually a small property owner beyond the reach of petitioner’s eminent domain powers, are indeed issues in the nature of affirmative defenses which require the presentation of evidence

aliunde. Besides, Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not consider these matters grounds for a motion to dismiss, and an action can be dismissed only on the grounds authorized by this provision. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. Respondent is DIRECTED to file her Answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from the finality of this Decision.

Rule 67 Case number 5 Edna Delicano, Eduardo Lopez, Mario Cruz, Howard Meneses and Corazon Meneses vs. Pechaten Corporation GR. No. 191251 Sept. 7, 2011 CARPIO, J,: Doctrine: Considering that the Decision of the Court of Appeals-Special Sixth Division reversing the judgment of expropriation already became final and executory, it is only proper that respondent should be restored to its rightful possession of the property in accordance with Sec. 11 of Rule 67. Facts: in June 1993, Pechaten Corporation and Teodoro Alberto, Honorata Salmorin, Aquilina Hizon, and Dalmacia Meneses entered into a two-year contract involving the property. The parties agreed that the monthly rental for the first year would be Php 864 to be increased to Php 1,037 per month during the second year of the contract. Subsequently, the lessees executed a waiver of their rights or interest in the lease contract in favor of Virgilio Meneses, the son of Dalmacia Meneses. When the lease expired on June 1995, respondent offered Virgilio Meneses to renew the lease agreement or purchase the property. Virgilio Meneses ignored the offer and failed to pay monthly rentals for the property starting July 1995. Respondent sent a demand letter to Meneses to vacate the property and pay accrued rent. When Meneses refused, respondent filed with the MeTC a case for unlawful detainer with damages against Meneses. Meanwhile the City of Manila filed on August 2004 a complaint for exporopriation against respondent involving the property. RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the City of Manila. On March 2008 RTC issued an order of expropriation in favor of the City of Manila. Upon death of Meneses, he was substituted by his heirs, who are petitioners in this case. In view of the orders of Manila RTC involving the property in the expropriation case, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration for the unlawful detainer case alleging that it was moot by virtue of the Writ of Possession issued by the Manila RTC in expropriation case involving the property. Respondent opposed the motion, alleging that the order of the RTC, declaring that he city of Manila has the lawful right to take the property for public use, is the subject of appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals agreed with the respondent that the dismissal of the expropriation case was a supervening event which warrants the reconsideration of its decision. Issue: whether or not the petitioners are still entitled to retain possession over the subject property despite the dismissal of the expropriation case. Held: No. Section 11 Rule 67 states that “but if the appellate court determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be rendered ordering the RTC to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant of the possession of the property”

In this case, the Court of Appeals-Special Sixth Division, in the related expropriation case entitled City of Manila v. Pechaten Corporation held that the expropriation of the property was not for public use. Thus, the Court of Appeals Special Sixth division dismissed the complaint for eminent domain. The City of Manila did not appeal the decision, which became final and executor. Considering that the Decision of the Court of Appeals Special Sixth Division reversing the judgment of expropriation already became final and executory, it is only proper that respondent should be restored to its rightful possession of the property.

NPC vs YCLA Sugar Development Corp. GR No. 193936 December 11, 2013 Reyes, J. Doctrine: The trial court, in expropriation cases, may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the report submitted by the Board of Commissioners, which is merely advisory and recommendatory in character

Facts: YCLA Sugar Development Corporation (YCLA) is the registered owner of three parcels of land situated in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) in order to complete its Grid Project in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, NPC had to construct transmission lines that would traverse several private properties, including the said parcels of land owned by YCLA. NPC filed a Complaint for expropriation with the RTC against YCLA and several other individuals. The NPC sought the expropriation of a portion of the parcels of land owned by the said defendants for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over areas that would be affected by the construction of transmission lines. The portion of YCLA’s properties that would be affected by the construction of NPC’s transmission lines has an aggregate area of 5,846 square meters. YCLA filed its Answer alleging that the Complaint should be dismissed outright due to NPC’s failure to allege the public use for the intended expropriation of its properties. The parties moved, inter alia, for the constitution of a Board of Commissioners to be appointed by the RTC to determine the reasonable amount of just compensation to be paid by the NPC. Board of Commissioners submitted its Report, which fixed the amount of just compensation of the subject properties at P500.00 per sq m. YCLA objected to the amount recommended by the Board of Commissioners, claiming that the amount of just compensation should be fixed at P900.00 per sq m considering the improvements in their properties. YCLA filed a motion asking the RTC to direct the Board of Commissioners to conduct an ocular inspection over the subject properties On September 15, 2003, the Board of Commissioners

submitted its second Report, which fixed the just compensation of the subject properties at P1,000.00 per sq m. justified by its location on strategic place and the consequential damages to the whole properties of the defendants because the plaintiff occupied the front portion along the highway.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC and the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just compensation of the subject properties. Ruling: No. It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.

The trial court, in expropriation cases, may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the report submitted by the Board of Commissioners, which is merely advisory and recommendatory in character. It may also recommit the report or set aside the same and appoint new commissioners. In this case, the lower courts gave full faith and credence to the Board of Commissioners' Report dated September 15, 2003 notwithstanding that it was not supported by any documentary evidence. Considering that the legal basis for the determination of just compensation for the subject properties is insufficient, the respective Decisions of the RTC and the CA should be set aside. Case be remanded to the trial court for proper determination of the just compensation. MASIKIPvs.THE CITY OF PASIG G.R. No. 136349 January 23, 2006 SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.: Doctrine: The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Facts: Petitioner Masikip is the owner of a parcel of land located at Caniogan, Pasig City. The Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. Respondent wrote another letter, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." Petitioner sent a reply stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." Respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents." Respondent filed with the TC a complaint for expropriation. Respondent prayed that the TC, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the just compensation; Petitioner filed a MTD the complaint on the following grounds:

IPLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, CONSIDERING THAT: (A) NO GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE PROPERTY (B) ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY CHOSEN THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED. (C) EVEN ASSUMING THAT DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY MAY BE EXPROPRIATED BY PLAINTIFF, THE FMV OF THE PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED FAR EXCEEDS P78,000.00 TC issued an Order denying the MTD on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig. As to the just compensation, the TC held that the same is to be determined in accordance with the ROC. Petitioner filed a MR but it was denied. It appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, Issue: 1.

2.

WON CA erred in holding that the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property for public use. (Procedural issue) WON there is genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. (substantive)

Held: 1. Yes. Petitioner filed her MTD the complaint for expropriation in 1995. It was denied by the trial court in 1996. At that time, the rule on expropriation was governed by Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. – Within the time specified in the summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All such objections and defenses not so presented are waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on the plaintiff’s attorney of record and filed with the court with proof of service."

The MTD contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes the responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate. The CA therefore erred in holding that the MTD filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, "specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property for public use." Pursuant to the above Rule, the motion is a responsive pleading joining the issues. What the TC should have done was to set the case for the reception of evidence to determine whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property. Significantly, the above Rule allowing a defendant in an expropriation case to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer was amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly mandates that any objection or defense to the taking of the property of a defendant must be set forth in an answer. The fact that the CA rendered its Decision on October 31, after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, is of no moment. It is only fair that the Rule at the time petitioner filed her MTD should govern. The new provision cannot be applied retroactively to her prejudice. 2. Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking. In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property. While she does not dispute the intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine necessity for the proposed use and purposes. According to petitioner, there is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being utilized by its residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public. we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. The certification issued by the Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

Rule 67 Case Number 8

CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO) vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. LUIS L. DICTADO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte, EDUARDO R. MORENO, LT. COL. RUFINO CHAVEZ, CAPT. ALFREDO BORJA, CONRAD C. LEVISTE and VINES REALTY CORPORATION G.R. No. 109338 November 20, 2000 Pardo, J.: Doctrine: The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Facts: Leviste filed with the Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte, a complaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter Corporation. Leviste won, the trial court issued a writ of execution and respondent sheriff Eduardo R. Moreno levied upon two (2) parcels of land which were sold at public auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation. Vines Realty filed for an order of demolition and removal of improvements on the subject land, some of which were the power lines and electric posts belonging to petitioner. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground, among other reasons, that petitioner was not a party to the case and therefore not bound by the judgment of the trial court and that it had subsisting right-ofway agreements over said property. The trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with restraining order and preliminary injunction which was granted. Despite the same, the trial court issued another order directing the National Power Corporation sub-unit in Camarines Norte to shut off the power lines, and then Vines Realty cut down petitioner’s electric posts using a chainsaw. Vines Realty filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of demolition, which was granted. Issue: Whether CANORECO is entitled to retain possession of the power lines Held: YES. The Court cannot conceive how, knowing fully well that destroying the power lines and electric posts would cause overwhelming losses to a lot of business establishments and a great inconvenience to a lot of people, the trial court still ordered the demolition of the property. Their personal motives aside, the Court finds that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in hastily ordering the removal of the electric posts. The trial court failed to appreciate the nature of electric cooperatives as public utilities. Among the powers granted to electric cooperatives by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 269 are: "Section 16 Powers(j) To construct, maintain and operate electric transmission and distribution lines along, upon, under and across publicly owned lands and public thoroughfares, including, without limitation, all roads, highways, streets, alleys, bridges and causeways; Provided, that such shall not prevent or unduly impair the primary public uses to which such lands and thoroughfares are otherwise devoted;

"(k) To exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the exercise of such power by other corporations constructing or operating electric generating plants and electric transmission and distribution lines or systems." Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with the power of eminent domain. The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. The Supreme Court, in Republic vs. PLDT thus held that: "Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way." However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires. Rule 67 – Case no. 9 NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO G.R. No. 154411 June 19, 2003 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. DOCTRINE: A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid. After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. FACTS: 1. Petitioner filed with the RTC an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, who were the claimants/owners of Cadastral Lot No. 1613-D located at Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City; and that the lands are within a blighted urban center which petitioner intends to develop as a socialized housing project. 2. The Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, respondents herein, filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their objections to petitioner’s power to expropriate their properties. 3. RTC ordered the expropriation. 4. RTC appointed three Commissioners to ascertain the correct and just compensation of the properties of respondents. 5. The trial court rendered Partial Judgment adopting the recommendation of the Commissioners and fixing the just compensation of the lands of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo at P11,200.00

per square meter. 6. Petitioner NHA filed two motions for reconsideration assailing the amount of just compensation which were denied. 7. Prior to the aforesaid denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for eminent domain, alleging that the implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries cannot afford. ISSUE: Can the State be compelled and coerced by the courts to exercise or continue with the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain? HELD: It depends – Yes, during the pendency of the case but not when the case has been decided and the judgment had already become final and executory. There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable. An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned. Rule 67 case number 10 National Power Corporation vs. Dr. Anton Bongbong and Rosario Bongbong GR No. 164079 April 3, 2007 CALLEJO, SR., J.: Doctrine: Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who desires to sell, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. It must be stressed that although the determination of the amount of just compensation is within the court’s discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or capriciously—it must be based on all established rules, upon correct legal principles and competent evidence. When there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of Rule 67 would not apply. Facts: As early as 1996 the NPC negotiated with the Spouses Bongbong to use a portion of the property for the construction of the project. When the spouses Bongbong agreed the NPC occupied a portion of the property. NPC paid the Spouses Bongbong the amount of Php 33,582 representing the value of the improvements that were damaged by the construction of the project. The voucher for

the payment of easement fee was prepared. However, when the NPC offered a check for Php 163,150 as payment of easement fee, Bongbong refused to accept the amount and demanded that NPC pay the full value of property occupied. On oct. 1997 the spouses received the 163,150 under protest. On Oct 1997 the spouses demanded that the NPC pay 8,748,448 which they alleged to be the just and reasonable value for their land and improvements. In the complaint, the spouses Bongbong alleged the NPC was given the authority to enter the property due to its assurances and promises that it would pay just compensation but it never did. It pointed out that the nearby landowners were paid Php 300 per sq m considering that the price of land has increased with the devaluation of the peso, the amount of the Php 250 per sq m was reasonable. Issue: whether or not the procedure laid down in Rule 67 should be followed in determining just compensation Held: No. Rule 67 need not be followed where the expropriator has violated procedural requirements. When a government agency itself violates procedural requirements, it waives the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67. In the case of NPC vs. CA to wit: we held that the usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates procedural requirements. In sum, we find that the trial court arbitrarily fixed the amount of just compensation due to respondent at Php 300 per sq m without considering the differences in the nature, character and condition of the subject property compared to other properties in the province which petitioner had acquired. For this reason, the Court has no alternative but to remand the case to the trial court for the proper determination of just compensation.

Republic vs Gingoyon GR No. 166429 December 19, 2005 Tinga,J Doctrine: Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision of the trial court upon the finality of the said decision. Facts: NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO) was nullified. Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through expropriation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that a mere deposit of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government depository is enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court). However, respondents avers that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued, direct payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence (2004 Resolution). Issue: WON expropriation can be conducted by mere deposit of the assessed value of the property.

Ruling: No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after direct payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of fairness. The same principle applied in the 2004 Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest expropriation law (RA No. 8974) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD G.R. No. 187677 April 17, 2013 SERENO, CJ.:

Doctrine: The court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned Facts: Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DPWH filed a Complaint against several defendants, including private respondents, for the expropriation of several lands affected by the construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue Flyover. Private respondents, Spouses Genato, are the registered owners of a piece of land.

During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter Engr. Gatan, reporting that the subject property was "government land and that the TCT of the said claimant respondent is of fabrication as it encroached or overlapped on a government property." As a result, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint seeking to limit the coverage of the proceedings to an area conforming to the findings of the DPWH.

Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to have the subject property "declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting claims. RTC admitted petitioner’s Amended Complaint, deferred the release to respondents the amount of P18,400,000 deposited in the bank, equivalent to the current zonal value of the land, and declared the property as the subject of conflicting claims.

While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the subject property actually belonged to the Government, private respondents interposed objections saying that petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence, as it constituted a collateral attack on the validity of their TCT.

TC finds that the issue of the validity of the TCT can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose and not in this instant proceeding. Accordingly, plaintiff is barred from presenting evidence as they constitute collateral attack. Petitioner filed a MR but the motion was denied by the RTC. Private respondents filed a Motion for the payment of just compensation amounting to 20,700,000 and for the release of P18,400,000. This Motion remains pending in the RTC. Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE Whether or not petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity of respondents’ title

Held:

No. Petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to just compensation.

Petitioner argues that under Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, if the ownership of a property to be expropriated is uncertain, the court in the same expropriation proceeding is also given authority to make a proper adjudication of the matter. Section 9 of Rule 67 reads:

SECTION 9. Uncertain Ownership. Conflicting Claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the persons adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.

This view is allegedly supported by Republic v. CFI of Pampanga, in which the TC hearing the expropriation proceeding was also allowed to resolve the issue of ownership.

Private respondents, on the other hand, invoke Section 48 of P. D. 1529, SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

This being an in rem proceeding, "plaintiff Republic of the Philippines seeks the relief, both in the original and amended complaints, to transfer to plaintiff the titles to said parcels of land together with their improvements free from all liens and encumbrances. For this particular purpose, the expropriation suit is essentially a direct proceeding."

The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned, must be resolved in the affirmative. That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case is evident. By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.