RULE 65 Case Digest

Facts: No less than the Constitution maps out the wide grant of investigatory powers to the Ombudsman. Hand in hand with this bestowal, the Ombudsman is mandated to investigate and prosecute, for and in behalf of the people, criminal and administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees, as well as private persons in conspiracy with the former. There can be no equivocation about this power-and-duty function of the Ombudsman. A consolidated petitions separately filed by Oscar R. Ampil (Ampil): (1) one is for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and (2) the other is for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Challenged in the petition for certiorari is the Resolution of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J, dismissing the criminal complaint filed by Ampil against respondents Policarpio L. Espenesin (Espenesin), Francis Serrano (Serrano), Yvonne S. Yuchengco (Yuchengco) and Gema O. Cheng (Cheng), and the Order denying Ampil’s motion for reconsideration thereof. Ampil’s complaint charged respondents with Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. The appeal by certiorari, on the other hand, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 113171, which affirmed the Order dated 13 July 2009 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-0474-J on the administrative aspect of the mentioned criminal complaint for Falsification and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against the Registrar of Deeds, respondent Espenesin. Initially, the Ombudsman issued a Decision dated 30 April 2008, finding Espenesin guilty of Simple Misconduct and meting on Espenesin the penalty of one (1) month suspension. On motion for reconsideration of Ampil, the Ombudsman favored Espenesin’s arguments in his Opposition, and recalled the one-month suspension the Ombudsman had imposed on the latter. Accordingly, we find grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s incomplete disposition of Ampil’s complaint. That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient" brooks no objection. The Ombudsman’s conduct of preliminary investigation is both power and duty. Thus, the Ombudsman and his Deputies, are constitutionalized as protectors of the people, who "shall act promptly on complaints filed in

any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government x x x, and shall, x x x notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof." The raison d'être for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the execution of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to determine the existence of probable cause or the lack thereof. On this score, we have consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, on several occasions, we have interfered Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable cause:

with

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(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance. While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there is no probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents

under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, we are puzzled why the Ombudsman completely glossed over Ampil’s charge that respondents committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the Resolution or in the Order denying reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman tackle and resolve the issue of whether respondents violated the particular provisions of Republic Act No. 3019. Curiously, the Ombudsman docketed Ampil’s complaintaffidavit as one "for: Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended." The Ombudsman even prefaced the Resolution, thus: "this has reference to the complaint filed by Oscar Ampil on 17 September 2007 against respondents, for Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended." We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft case exists against respondents is a question of fact. We have consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. In this case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman made no finding at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. We hasten to reiterate that we are only dealing herein with the preliminary investigation aspect of this case. We do not adjudge respondents’ guilt or the lack thereof

Facts: On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of P23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.7 Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is respondent who owns and occupies Lot 8, Block 3 of said subdivision. That the total water consumption of the family

amounted to P28,580.09. However, respondent only paid the amount of P5,468.38, thus, leaving a balance of P23,111.71 which was left unpaid despite petitioner’s repeated demands. In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of P75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding their agreement that the same would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments. In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for not paying the adjusted water charges since March 2003 up to August 2005. The MTCC Ruling MTCC rendered a Decision holding that since petitioner was issued a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC)13 by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) only on August 7, 2003, then, it can only charge respondent the agreed flat rate of P75.00 per month prior thereto or the sum of P1,050.00 for the period June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003. Thus, given that respondent had made total payments equivalent to P1,685.99 for the same period, she should be considered to have fully paid petitioner. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC The RTC Ruling The RTC issued a Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari, finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing respondent to pay petitioner a bigger sum than that which has been awarded. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated February 16, 2012, hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.

Held: YES. Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that: XXX ... The decision shall be final and unappealable. Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This GENERAL RULE has been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation, wherein it was held that: "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled: (EXCEPTION) x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is NOT an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari. In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling. Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the RTC). To be sure, the Court (SC), the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of

Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court. This procedure is also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 1113833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI GRANTED RTC DECISION REVERED AND SET ASIDE.

Facts: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was operated by respondent PAGCOR. Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, while he was performing his functions as teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato (Cecilia) approached him in his booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills. There were 45 P1,000.00 and ten P500.00 bills for the total amount of P50,000.00. Following casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead of five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for P10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared the total amount of P40,000.00 to Cecilia. Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out P40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested petitioner to check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed a

recount and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of P1,000.00 bills. Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount handed to him by the latter. Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to take a break. After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his booth. However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to berate petitioner. As a result, the two of them were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he submitted on the same day of the incident. Petitioner received another Memorandum, stating that the Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. During the pendency of said motion, petitioner also filed a Motion for Production, praying that he be furnished with copies of documents relative to the case including the recommendation of the investigating committee and the Decision/Resolution of the Board supposedly containing the latter’s factual findings. In a letter-reply, PAGCOR denied the said motion. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal basis to support the finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30day suspension which is not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA. Issue: Whether the CA is correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?

Held: NO. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days. Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still subject to judicial review. It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that P AGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside. Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record.34 Considering the circumstances

and since this Court is not a trier of facts, remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in order.

Facts: Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr.(VestidasJr.) were charged before the CTA under an Information which reads: That on or about November 5, 2011, or prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and broker of Plinth Enterprise respectively, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent to defraud the government, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and fraudulently import into the Port of Manila, 858 cartons of 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus Software Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012, subject to customs duties, by misdeclaration under Import Entry No. C-181011 and Bill of Lading No. PFCMAN1715, filed with the Bureau of Customs (BOC),covering One Forty Footer (1x40) container van shipment bearing No. KKFU7195683 which was falsely declared to contain 40 pallets/1,690 cartons of CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case, said imported items having customs duties amounting to Three Million Three Hundred Forty One Thousand Two Hundred Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which only the amount of One Hundred Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Two Pesos (Php100,362) was paid, in violation of the above-captioned law, and to the prejudice and damage of the Government in the amount of Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos (Php3,240,883).

In a hearing held on August 1, 2012, Garcia and VestidasJr. pleaded "Not Guilty" to the aforementioned charge. Thereafter, a preliminary conference was held on September 5, 2012 followed by the pre-trial on September 13, 2012. Both the prosecution and the defense agreed to adopt the joint stipulations of facts and issues entered in the course of the preliminary conference. On January 15, 2013, Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court to Cancel Hearing Scheduled on January 21, 2013,which was granted by the CTA. Thereafter, they filed the Demurrer to Evidence, dated January 13, 2012, claiming that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. in its March 26, 2013 Resolution, for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case. Hence, this petition for certiorari., ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA when in ruled that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in evidence; 2) the object evidence consisting of the alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and 3) the witnesses failed to positively identify the accused as responsible for the misdeclaration of goods. Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing under Rule 65. Held: The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation for possible criminal or administrative offenses committed by the Run After the Smugglers (RA TS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), Bureau of Customs, relative to the filing and handling of the subject complaint for violations of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. The Court agrees with the disposition of the CTA. At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for the filing thereof under Rule 65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution was received by the BOC two (2) days after its promulgation, or on May 17, 2013.

Nonetheless, the RATS was only alerted by the developments in the case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M. Campos Jr. (Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties. According to Atty. Campos, it was only on that occasion when he discovered the May 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA. Thus, it was prayed that the petition be given due course despite its late filing. This belated filing cannot be countenanced by the Court. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. While there are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules. Notably, the records show that the petition was filed only on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but it will also sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a tinge of merit that would deserve leniency. The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court processes that needed to be addressed by the office. Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on the part of an office tasked to effectively curb smuggling activities which rob the government of millions of revenue every year.

Facts: The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI). Record shows that the corporate life of RBFI expired on May 31, 2005 Notwithstanding, petitioner Alfeo D. Vivas (Vivas) and his principals acquired the controlling interest in RBFI sometime in January 2006. At the initiative of Vivas and the new management team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI and results thereof highlighted the dismal operation of the rural bank. In view of those findings, certain measures calculated to revitalize the bank were allegedly introduced. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued the Certificate of Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI for another fifty (50) years. The BSP also approved the change of its corporate name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated . Pursuant to The New Central Bank Act, the Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) of the BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI. Shortly after the completion of the general examination, an exit conference was held at the BSP during which the BSP officials and examiners apprised Vivas, the Chairman and President of ECBI, as well as the other bank officers and members of its BOD, of the advance findings noted during the said examination. Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 1255, placing ECBI under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework because of the following serious findings and supervisory concerns noted during the general examination: 1] negative capital of 14.674 million and capital adequacy ratio of negative 18.42%; 2] CAMEL (Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity) composite rating of "2" with a Management component rating of "1"; and 3] serious supervisory concerns particularly on activities deemed unsafe or unsound. Vivas claimed that the BSP took the above courses of action due to the joint influence exerted by a certain hostile shareholder and a former BSP examiner. Vivas moved for a reconsideration on the grounds of non-observance of due process and arbitrariness. The ISD II, on several instances, had invited the BOD of ECBI to discuss matters pertaining to the placement of the bank under PCA framework and other supervisory concerns before making the appropriate recommendations to the MB. The proposed

meeting, however, did not materialize due to postponements sought by Vivas. In view of ECBI’s refusal to comply with the required examination, the MB issued Resolution imposing monetary penalty/fine on ECBI, and referred the matter to the Office of the Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of appropriate legal action. The BSP also wrote a letter, advising ECBI to comply with MB Resolution No. 771, which essentially required the bank to follow its directives. ISD II reiterated its demand upon the ECBI BOD to allow the BSP examiners to conduct a general examination. MB issued Resolution approving the issuance of a cease and desist order against ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and transactions that were considered unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from doing such other acts or transactions constituting fraud or might result in the dissipation of its assets. MB issued Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership in accordance with the recommendation of the ISD II which prohibits the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership and designating the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver of the bank. Vivas filed this petition for prohibition before this Court, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership. Issue:

Whether or not the petition for prohibition is proper?

Held: NO. Vivas Availed of the Wrong Remedy Prohibition is already unavailing. Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred . Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. In our jurisdiction, the rule on prohibition is enshrined in Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that the judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as the law and justice require. Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

Facts: Petitioner Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for three (3) consecutive terms, i.e., the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections. In his first term as local chief executive, petitioner Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the position of Municipal Administrator, whose appointment was unanimously approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. During his second and third terms as municipal mayor, petitioner Corales renewed the appointment of petitioner Dr. Angeles. But, on these times, the Sangguniang disapproved petitioner Dr. Angeles’ appointment on the ground of nepotism, as well as the latter’s purported unfitness and unsatisfactory performance. Even so, petitioner Dr. Angeles continued to discharge the functions and duties of a Municipal Administrator for which he received an annual salary of P210,012.00. Following an audit on various local disbursements, Maximo Andal (Andal), the Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum addressed to petitioner , who was asked to submit a reply. Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon, petitioner Corales, together with petitioner Dr. Angeles, opted to file a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna. Petitioners sought, by way of prohibition, to require the Office of the Provincial Auditor, through Andal, to recall its AOM and to eventually desist from collecting reimbursement from petitioner Corales for the salaries paid to and received by petitioner Dr. Angeles for the latter’s services as Municipal Administrator. Petitioners similarly sought, by way of mandamus, to compel the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan, as a collegial body, to recall its Resolutions denying confirmation to petitioner Dr. Angeles’ appointment as Municipal Administrator and in their stead to confirm the validity and legitimacy of such appointment. In its turn, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on Andal’s behalf, who was impleaded in his official capacity, filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus grounded on lack of cause of action, prematurity and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss Issue: Whether CA erred in dismissing the petitioner’s suit for prohibition Held: As gleaned from the facts, petitioner Corales was simply required to submit his comment/reply on the observations stated in the AOM. As so keenly observed by the Court of Appeals, any mention in the AOM that petitioner Corales shall reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr.

Angeles in light of the repeated disapproval or rejection by the Sangguniang Bayan of his appointment as Municipal Administrator was merely an initial opinion, not conclusive, as there was no showing that Andal had taken any affirmative action thereafter to compel petitioner Corales to make the necessary reimbursement. Otherwise stated, it has not been shown that Andal carried out or enforced what was stated in the AOM. On the contrary, petitioner Corales was given an opportunity to refute the findings and observations in the AOM by requesting him to comment/reply thereto, but he never did. More so, even though the AOM already contained a recommendation for the issuance of a Notice of Disallowance of the payment of salary expenses, the records are bereft of any evidence to show that a Notice of Disallowance has, in fact, been issued. Concomitantly, the AOM did not contain any recommendation to the effect that petitioner Corales would be held personally liable for the amount that would be disallowed. It is, therefore, incongruous to conclude that the said AOM is tantamount to a directive requiring petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to and received by petitioner Dr. Angeles during the latter’s stint as Municipal Administrator after his appointment thereto was held invalid for want of conformity from the Sangguniang Bayan. From the foregoing, it is beyond doubt that the issuance of an AOM is, indeed, an initial step in the conduct of an investigative audit considering that after its issuance there are still several steps to be conducted before a final conclusion can be made or before the proper action can be had against the Auditee. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner Corales’ claim that his comment thereon would be a mere formality. Further, even though the AOM issued to petitioner Corales already contained a recommendation for the issuance of a Notice of Disallowance, still, it cannot be argued that his comment/reply to the AOM would be a futile act since no Notice of Disallowance was yet issued. Again, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that Andal has already taken any affirmative action against petitioner Corales after the issuance of the AOM. Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is "no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In this case, petitioners insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust administrative remedies considering that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and appropriate remedial measure to assail the imposition under the AOM aside from an action for prohibition.

This Court finds the said contention plain self-deception. As previously stated, petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative process was still in its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even granting that the AOM issued to petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is premature since there are still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM. Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: "[a]n aggrieved party may appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report, memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit." From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission proper. It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court. Clearly, petitioners have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but they failed to exhaust the same and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise stated, the auditing process has just begun but the petitioners already thwarted the same by immediately filing a Petition for Prohibition.

Facts: James L. King (King) charged Roderick Lim-Go, Lucy Go, Nelson Go, John Doe and Peter Doe with violation of B.P. 22 and Estafa. King filed a Second Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit for Estafa impleading Grace Tan-Go, and herein petitioners Rolando Tan, Elena Tan, and Lamberto Tan, as additional respondents.

King averred that the spouses Roderick Lim Go and Grace Tan-Go (spouses Go) proposed to him a business transaction wherein the spouses Go would borrow cash from King in exchange for which Roderick Go would issue postdated checks corresponding to the amount borrowed plus interest. Roderick Go’s parents, Go Tong Go and Lucy Go, and brother, Nelson Go, assured King that whatever checks Roderick Go would issue would be funded on their due dates and that the checking account at the United Overseas Bank, Carbon Branch, Cebu City is their joint account. King agreed to the business proposal. Thereafter, Roderick Go started issuing checks, inclusive of interest, in exchange for the cash given by King. The checks when presented for encashment were initially honored by the drawee bank; consequently, King reposed his trust and confidence in spouses Go. The spouses Go, together with herein petitioners Rolando Tan (father of Grace Tan-Go), Elena Tan (mother of Grace Tan-Go), asked P100 Million from King allegedly for the renovation of their movie houses in Butuan City. However, King could only accommodate P40 Million, in exchange for which, Roderick Go issued several checks to King in the amount of P61.28 Million, inclusive of the interest for three months. At first, the checks issued by Go were honored by the drawee bank when presented. However, on June 24, 2002, when several of the checks he issued were about to fall due, Roderick Go requested King for a meeting. While at the agreed meeting place, Roderick Go allegedly attacked King with a box cutter and told him that all the checks that he issued would be dishonored and for this reason he had to injure, kidnap and kill him. This incident is the subject of a separate criminal case. Thereafter, all the checks dated June 21, 23 and 24, 2002 issued by Roderick Go were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Despite repeated demands, no payment was made; hence, King filed a complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22 and Estafa. Petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals. They sought to restrain the trial court from proceeding with the subject criminal cases against them and prayed that the same be dismissed. CA issued the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit Issue: Whether the resort to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition was proper.

Held: We rule in the negative. Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. It is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and when the proceedings are done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court. Further, the writ will not lie to correct errors of judgment but only errors of jurisdiction. As long as the tribunal acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment which are correctible by a timely appeal. In determining whether a tribunal acted in grave abuse of discretion, mere abuse of discretion is not enough. There must be grave abuse of discretion as where the tribunal exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as would amount to an evasion, or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in contemplation of law. In the case at bar, petitioners contend that there was no appeal or other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law because they were prevented by the trial court from appealing public respondent Montero’s Joint Resolution which found, among others, probable cause for estafa against them. They claim that the trial court "forced arraigned" them. This was allegedly done in order to prevent them from appealing the Joint Resolution to the Secretary of Justice. We are not persuaded. Petitioners admit that they received a copy of the Joint Resolution dated November 8, 2002 as early as November 13, 2002. However, from the time they received the copy of the aforesaid Resolution to the time they were arraigned on November 19, 2002, petitioners did not take steps to move for reconsideration, or appeal the aforesaid Resolution to the Secretary of Justice. More importantly, the Court of Appeals observed that there is no evidence on record to support petitioners’ claim that they were "forced arraigned." In fact, the arraignment of petitioners proceeded without objections on the part of petitioners or their counsel. Absent proof of force or intimidation, the trial judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his functions. We also note that petitioners’ other co-accused, Roderick Lim

Go and Grace Tan-Go, were able to timely appeal the Joint Resolution dated November 8, 2002 to the Secretary of Justice while petitioners failed to appeal the same before their arraignment. By participating in the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice, petitioners have actively litigated the issues regarding the factual and legal basis of the finding of probable cause against them as well as the authority of public respondent Montero to file the subject criminal information. Yet, these issues are exactly the same issues being raised by petitioners before this Court through the instant petition which is separate and distinct from the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice whose aforesaid Resolution is not the one before us for review. To reiterate, what is before us for review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by petitioners to restrain the trial court from proceeding with the criminal cases against them. In effect, by taking these two distinct courses of actions, petitioners have pursued the same or related causes, prayed for the same or substantially the same reliefs, and, in the process, have created the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues which is precisely the evil that the rule on forum-shopping seeks to prevent. As a consequence of petitioners’ violation of the rule against forum-shopping and in order to preserve the laudable objectives of the rule against forum-shopping, the dismissal of the petition for prohibition should be upheld.

Facts: On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsiño, Arthur Villaruel and two others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay. Private complainants filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases. Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.

The Office of the City Prosecutor affirmed the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused. The 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, reversed the holding that there was lack of probable cause. The City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations. Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus, bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration: Issue: Whether Supreme Court can compel respondent Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a writ of Mandamus by virtue of the of the resolution issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor for finding no probable cause against the accused? Held: No. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bay’s exercise of judicial discretion. There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did

not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay. In sum, petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their Motion to Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at bar. Finally, we nevertheless carefully reviewed the records of the case. After going through the same, we find that we are in agreement with the trial court that there is indeed probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial. We decided to omit a detailed discussion of the merits of the case, as we are not unmindful of the undue influence that might result should this Court do so, even if such discussion is only intended to focus on the finding of probable cause.

Facts: In 1989, petitioner Sanchez, a constable in the Philippine Constabulary (PC), was discharged from the service for allegedly losing his service firearm. Petitioner Meteoro, also a constable, was likewise discharged from the service in 1990 for being absent without leave. On appeal, they were both cleared of all charges. They then applied for reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon even up to the integration of the PC into the Philippine National Police (PNP). The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued resolution considering as absorbed into the police force, among others, those who had been discharged by virtue of pending administrative or criminal cases but who were later acquitted or had their cases dismissed, and who subsequently filed petitions for reinstatement that were not acted upon by the PNP. Then, on April 3, 1998, NAPOLCOM issued Resolution No. 98105 affirming and confirming the absorption into the PNP, effective on

January 27, 1998, of the 126 ex-PC constables named in the list submitted by Director Edgar C. Galvante of the PNP Directorate for Personnel and Records Management (DPRM). Petitioners Sanchez and Meteoro are in numbers 90 and 122, respectively, of the Galvante list. Subsequently, on May 28, 1998, NAPOLCOM Commissioner Rogelio A. Pureza issued a Memorandum to then Chief of the PNP Santiago Alino for the issuance of absorption orders to the 45 PC constables included in the initial batch of those covered by the PNP Board Resolutions. Petitioner Sanchez is in number 45 of that list. As no absorption order had yet been issued by the Chief of the PNP, the constables in the list requested the assistance of the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). On July 29, 1998, the Office of the Secretary of the DILG sent a memorandum to respondent Roberto T. Lastimoso, then the Chief of the PNP, endorsing the constables’ entreaties and requesting for a feedback thereon. Without any response from the Chief of the PNP, and their pleas for the issuance of the absorption orders still unacted upon, petitioners instituted, on September 30, 1998, a petition for mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-35659 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. During the pendency of the said petition, NAPOLCOM issued Resolution No. 99-061 on April 19, 1999 recalling the earlier Resolution No. 98-105. The recall was based on the Commission’s finding that the list submitted by Galvante was not actually of the constables whose applications for absorption were indorsed for approval, but of those whose applications were still to be reviewed, evaluated and disposed of. In other words, the 126 named in the list were still to be interviewed and their applications to be deliberated upon by the PNP Special Committee. On November 15, 2001, however, the RTC rendered its Decision in the mandamus case declaring as void ab initio NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-061 and ruling in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA, in the assailed June 18, 2003 Decision, reversed the ruling of the trial court and ruled that a writ of mandamus could not be issued because petitioners had not established with distinct clarity their right to be absorbed into the PNP. Issue:: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action for mandamus to compel the respondent to absorb the petitioners in the philippine national police.

Held: We have repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions that the remedy of mandamus is employed only to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary one. The issuance of the writ is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. In Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc., we emphasized, through the erudite and eloquent ponencia of Justice Dante O. Tinga, that the writ can be issued only when the applicant’s legal right to the performance of a particular act sought to be compelled is clear and complete, one which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law, thus: In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, on the one hand, petitioner has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought and that, on the other hand, respondent has an imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of him. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. Viewed in light of the said guideposts, the PNP Chief’s issuance of the orders for the absorption of herein petitioners in the police force is not compellable by a writ of mandamus precisely because the same does not involve a performance of a ministerial duty. Let it be noted that petitioners were discharged from the PC service, subsequently cleared of the charges against them, applied for reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon until the integration of the PC into the PNP in 1990 when R.A. No. 697523 was enacted. Thus, we no longer speak of the reinstatement of the petitioners to the service because the Philippine Constabulary no longer exists, but of their employment in the PNP which is, as we held in Gloria v. De Guzman, technically an issuance of a new appointment. The power to appoint is essentially discretionary to be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Consequently, it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of mandamus. Furthermore, the petitioners do not have a clear legal right over the issuance of the absorption orders. They cannot claim the right to be issued an appointment based on the NAPOLCOM issuances, specifically Resolution Nos. 98-037 and 98-105. Suffice it to state that R.A. No. 6975 clearly provides that the power to appoint PNP personnel with the rank of "Police Officer I" to "Senior Police

Officer IV" to which petitioners may be appointed is vested in the PNP regional director or in the Chief of the PNP as the case may be, and not in the NAPOLCOM Even if, for the sake of argument, petitioners can derive a right from NAPOLCOM Resolution Nos. 98-037 and 98-105, still their right collapses and their mandamus petition becomes moot with the issuance by NAPOLCOM of Resolution No. 99-061 recalling the approval of their absorption. The trial court should then have immediately dismissed the mandamus petition when the OSG submitted a copy of Resolution because well-settled is the rule that courts will not resolve a moot question.

Facts: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027, pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.Respondent mayor approved the ordinance and became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication. However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months but later on, adopted a new resolution extending the validity and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. That resolution also called for a reassessment of the ordinance. Petitioners filed this original action for mandamus praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

Issue: Whether Mandamus is proper in this case in order to compel Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027; otherwise stated W Respondent has the mandatory duty to enforce Ordinace No. 8027. Held: YES. Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a welldefined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.

Facts: After the Chinese civil war, China was divided into two governments PROC (who had control of mainland China) & ROC (who had control of Taiwan). At first ROC was the one recognized by (different) other states. However, eventually states began recognizing the PROC. One of those states is the RP. RP ended its official diplomatic relation w/ Taiwan on 9 June 1975 when it recognized the other government thru Joint Communiqué. The RP's commitment to the One China policy of the PROC however, did not preclude the country from keeping unofficial relations w/ Taiwan on a "people-to-people" basis. This meant that the relationship between Taiwan & RP has to be coursed thru officials outside of the official or governmental organs. This unofficial relationship was facilitated by the offices of Taipei Economic Cultural Office (Taiwan) and MECO (RP). MECO was organized on 16 Dec 1997 as a non-stock non-profit corporation. At present MECO oversees the rights & interests of OFWs in Taiwan; promotes the Philippines as a tourist and investment destination for the Taiwanese; and facilitate the travel of Filipinos and Taiwanese from Taiwan to Philippines and vice versa. On 23 Aug 2010 petitioner requested for a copy of the latest financial & audit report of the MECO from COA, invoking for that purpose his "Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern". Funa believed that MECO is a GOCC under DTI thus subject to audit by COA. According to the report of the Assistant Commissioner, MECO was not among the agencies audited by any of the three clusters of the Corporate Government Sector. Hence, Funa filed for mandamus stating that the failure of COA to audit MECO is neglecting its duty under the Constitution (Sec 2(1) Article IX-D). According to Funa, MECO should be audited by COA because: 1) MECO is vested w/ government functions 2) MECO is controlled by the government 3) MECO is under the operational & policy supervision of DTI

4) That prevailing practice in USA for its MECO counterpart (AIT) is to be audited by that country's Comptroller General According to MECO, on procedure: the mandamus petition was prematurely filed saying that ministerial duty only ripens once there has been a refusal by the tribunal, board, or office concerned to perform such duty. The only demand that petitioner has made was for a request of the financial & audit report which request was not even finally disposed of by the time the instant petition was filed. According to COA: 1) the petition is moot because the COA chairperson already issued Office Order No. 2011-698 by virtue of which COA already sent a team to Taiwan specifically for the purpose of auditing, among others, MECO. 2) the petitioner lacks locus standii to bring the suit because by failing to show in a concrete manner that he had been aggrieved/prejudiced, at the first instance, before the CA or RTC, the petitioner was not able to provide compelling reason to justify a direct resort to the SC. Issue:

Whether writ of mandamus is proper?

Held: NO. The issuance by the COA of Office Order No. 2011-698 qualifies as a supervening event that effectively renders moot and academic the main prayer of the instant mandamus petition. A writ of mandamus to compel the COA to audit the accounts of the MECO would certainly be a mere superfluity, when the former had already obliged itself to do the same. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Manila Economic and Cultural Office is hereby declared a nongovernmental entity. However, the accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office pertaining to: the verification fees contemplated by Section 7 of Executive Order No. 1022 issued 1 May 1985, that the former collects on behalf of the Department of Labor and Employment, and the fees it was authorized to collect under Section 2(6) of Executive Order No. 15 issued 16 May 2001, are subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA.