Rule 42 Petition For Review

 

Republic of the Philippines Court of Appeals City of Manila JOSEPH AQUINO  ,Plaintiff-Appellee C.A. G.R. No. Civil Case No. 2014-10677 1234-2013 MCTC Case No. 2012-045

-  versus JINGGOY ENRILE  ,Defendant-Appellant x----------------------------------------------x

PETITION FOR REVIEW DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, by its undersigned counsel, hereby respectfully states as follows – follows –  

I.I.  

The Parties

1. 1.   Defendant-Appellant JINGGOY ENRILE is a resident of 12 Golden Arc,  Antipolo City, Rizal. 2. 2.   Plaintiff-Appellee JOSEPH AQUINO is a resident of Lot 13, Block 24 Royal Residences, Antipolo City, Rizal.

II. II.  

Material Date/s

3. 3.   On April 21, 2014, Defendant-Appellants received a resolution from the Court wherein the Motion for Reconsideration filed on February 20, 2014 was denied. 4. 4.   Hence, this petition.

III.   III.

Statement of the Case

 

5. 5.   In January 2011, ENRILE was paid Php. 100,000.00 (Exhibit B) to construct a fence in AQUINO’S property.  property.  6. 6.   ENRILE’s initial work that commenced in February 2011 was criticized by  AQUINO’s wife Araceli as being substandard ((p. p. 7, TSN, May 21, 2012) for which reason ENRILE was told by Araceli to stop working on the fence. 7. 7.   ENRILE acceded to this when he sent AQUINO a letter in March 2011 (Exhibit 1). However, the Construction Agreement does not state that unlawful termination of the contract (at least insofar as the construction of the perimeter fence is concerned) will free ENRILE therefrom (p. 8, RTC Decision). 8. 8.    AQUINO therefore therefore in insisted sisted th that at ENRIL ENRILE E finish the the const construction ruction of the the fenc fence. e. 9. 9.    AQUINO filed a case for SPECIFIC PERFORM PERFORMANCE ANCE in the MCTC of  Antipolo.. On March 6, 2014, the court ruled against ENRILE, directin  Antipolo directingg him to finish the perimeter fence that AQUINO paid him to do. 10.  On appeal to the RTC of Antipolo City, the court, in a decision dated February 10. 7, 2014, mainly adopted AQUINO’s claim that the MCTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the specific performance case (pp. 2-5, Memorandum for  Aquino), that the complain complaintt (Annex A, Memorandum Memorandum for Aquino) filed in the case is a proper remedy (p. 5, Memorandum of Aquino), and that the defendant's refusal to honor the construction agreement, as pleaded in his answer (Annex 1, Memorandum for Enrile), is not proper (p. 6, Memorandum for Aquino). 11.  The RTC rejected ENRILE's arguments that the MCTC has no jurisdiction 11. over the case on the ground that it is a construction dispute cognizable by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (pp. 4-8, Memorandum for Enrile), that the specific performance case is not the proper remedy to enforce a contract (p. 9, Memorandum for Enrile), and that, if at all, ENRILE is already free from his contractual obligations, when his services were terminated by AQUINO's wife Araceli (p. 13, Memorandum for Enrile). 12.  The Construction Agreement expressly states that any dispute arising 12. therefrom or in the performance of obligations thereunder, the value of such dispute not exceeding P100,000.00, shall be resolved by filing the proper

 

action in the MCTC of Antipolo City (Sec. 3, Part III, Construction Agreement). This was not disputed by ENRILE (p. 3, TSN, May 18, 2012).

IV.   IV.

Assignment of Errors

13.  The RTC erred when it upheld the MCTC decision in the case for Specific 13. Performance, as the latter had no jurisdiction to hear and try the case; 14.  The RTC erred when it ruled that Specific Performance is the proper remedy 14. for the case at hand; 15.  The RTC erred when it did not consider Defendant-Appellant JINGGOY 15. ENRILE as was terminated.

V. V.  

Arguments/Discussion

A.) The MCTC had no jurisdiction to hear and try the case.

The law1  specifically confers the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission with the jurisdiction to hear and try cases involving construction disputes. As stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulation of EO 1008, The CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over construction disputes, which arose from, or is connected with contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines whether the dispute arose before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. These disputes may involve government or private contracts.The MCTC had no jurisdiction to hear and try the case. 2 

Construction  is defined as referring to all on-site works on buildings or altering

structures, from land clearance through completion including excavation, erection and assembly and installation of components and equipment.3The contract between ENRILE and AQUINO clearly fall within the purview of a Construction Agreement 1E.O.

1008 - CREATING AN ARBITRATI ARBITRATION ON MACHINERY IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY OF THE

PHILIPPINES 2  Rule 2, Section 2.1 Jurisdiction, Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration Gammon Philippines, Inc. v. Metro Rail Transit Development Corporation, G.R. No. 144792, 31 January 2006, 481 SCRA 209, 218-219. 3

 

wherein the former was paid by the latter to construct a fence in the latter’s property. The dispute arose even before the subject of the contract was completed.

The Construction Agreement states that any dispute arising therefrom or in the performance of obligations thereunder, the value of such dispute not exceeding P100,000.00, shall be resolved by filing the proper action in the MCTC of Antipolo City.4 However, the aforementioned stipulation in the Construction Agreement cannot be given legal effect. It is a well-settled rule that the constitution and the law confer the jurisdiction of the courts, and not by consent or agreement of the parties.

Premises considered, the MCTC of Antipolo have no jurisdiction to try the case.

B.)

Assuming

the

MCTC

had

Jurisdiction; Specific Performance was not the Proper Remedy and that the RTC erred when it did not consider ENRILE as dismissed.

 Assuming that the MCTC had jurisdictio jurisdictionn and that the Defend Defendant-Appell ant-Appellant ant was at fault, he may not be required to fulfill the contract via a suit for Specific Performance.

The Civil Code states:  Article 1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at his cost. This same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention to the tenor of the obligation. Furthermore, it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be undone.

Pursuant to the above-mentioned provision, the obligation may be performed by a third person and the expenses thereof shall be charged against the obligor.

4

 Sec. 3, Part III, Construction Agreement

 

Therefore, the facts which is similar to an earlier case 5 ruled that, “if a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at his cost,” he is chargeable with the cost of completing the said project, for it is axiomatic in law that compliance with what is lawfully agreed upon is obligatory. 6 

The law does not authorize the imposition of personal force or coercion upon the debtor to comply with his obligation. The application of the above-mentioned provision presupposes the act can be done by third persons. In this case, different carpenters can do the act, as the job is fairly easy, putting up a fence.

Under Article 1167 of the Civil Code, a person who is obliged to do something and fails to do it shall be liable for the cost of executing the obligation in a proper manner.7 At most, Defendant-Appella Defendant-Appellant nt JINGGOY ENRIL ENRILE E shall be liable for the cost of executing the obligation.Defendant-Appellant cannot be compelled by the use of public force to comply with the obligation because this would be in complete violation of personal liberty granted by our Constitution.

When Araceli fired Defendant-Appellant from the job, JINGGOY ENRILE was complying in good faith with an order of an agent of his employer.  Article 1869 1869 of the Civil Code emphasizes the consensual nature of the contract of agency, as it provides that “Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority. Agency may be oral, unless the law requires a specific form.” Therefore, form.” Therefore, the acts of the Wife, Araceli, were in turn the acts of Plaintiff-Appellee JOSEPH AQUINO.

Jurisprudence 8 provides that an agency may be expressed but it may also be implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence, or lack of action or his failure to repudiate the agency knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority. Likewise, acceptance by the agent may also be express, although it may

5

Life Ass’nCo,m Ltd. vs Hernandez, et al 12 C.A. Rep. 750    Cui vs. Gonzales, 41 Phil. 523 7  Chaves vs Gonzales, 32 SCRA 574 8 Equitable PCI-Bank v. Ku, 355 SCRA 309 (2001)  6 Insular

 

also be implied from his acts that carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the circumstances. Thus, when Araceli was inspecting the work of JINGGOY ENRILE, manifesting authority in the contracted project between plaintiff and defendant, she acted as an agent of JOSEPH AQUINO, thereby making her acts to be those of the latter.

Furthermore, JOSEPH AQUINO did not repudiate the acts of his wife, Araceli, to be without authority. From the Decision of the RTC, dated February 07, 2014, the court stated that the Construction Agreement does not state that unlawful termination of the contract will free ENRILE therefrom.9 From this, AQUINO therefore insisted that ENRILE finish the construction of the fence. 10   Based on the foregoing, AQUINO merely rooted his claim from the Construction Agreement without repudiating the acts done by his wife. He could have merely stated that his wife had no authority to fire Defendant. Instead, AQUINO cowered from his wife and based his suit on the Construction Agreement, thereby acceding to the acts of his wife as his own.

Hence, based on the foregoing, assuming the MCTC had jurisdiction, Specific Performance is not the proper remedy for the plaintiff-appellee and that Araceli acted as the agent of Joseph Aquino.

PRAYER WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the assailed Decision dated March 06, 2014 be reversed and/or set aside, and a  judgmentt be rendered dismissing the case of Specific Performan  judgmen Performance ce for lack of  jurisdiction.  jurisdictio n.

Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 20 May 2014 at Antipolo City.

9 P.

8, RTC Decision, February 7, 2014 6 Memorandum of Aquino

10 P.

 

  COPY FURNISHED: Numeriano Hernandez Counsel for Plaintiff Makati City

PETRACHE, Jose Gabrielle G. Counsel for the Defendant-Appellee 11th Floor, Lucas Arts Bldg., Ayala Ave, Makati City Tel. No. 888-1234 PTR No. 3217654  – 1/1/2010  – Legaspi City IBP Lifetime Membership No. 67890 Roll of Attorney No. 11223 MCLE Compliance No. IV-012345610/01/10

VERIFICATION/CERTIFICATION I, JINGGOY ENRILE, ENRILE, of legal age, Filipino, single and a resident ofAntipolo City, after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that: 1) 1)   I am the plaintiff in the above-captioned Complaint; 2) 2)   I have caused the preparation of the foregoing complaint, read the same and the contents thereof are true and correct to the best of our knowledge and belief; 3) 3)   I have not commenced any other action or proceedings involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, or in the Court of Appeals or in any tribunal or agency; 4) 4)   If I should learn that a similar action or proceedings has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or any tribunal or agency, then we hereby undertake to notify this Honorable Court within five (5) days from such notice

JINGGOY ENRILE Affiant   Affiant SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 27 th  day of November 2013, the affiant, JINGGOY ENRILE exhibiting to me his Driver’s License bearing No. N01-12-987654 N01-12-987654 which will expire on July 12, 2015.  2015.  RENE RAFFY T. PINERA NOTARY PUBLIC  Appointment No. M123 M123 –  – Until  Until Dec. 31, 2014 6/F Rene Bldg., 29 Aguinaldo St., Quezon City PTR No. 2521458/01.03.12/Makati City IBP No. 85742/01.03.12/PPLM Roll No. 6124845678

Doc. No._____ Page No._____ Book No._____ Series of 2014.