RULE 40-56 APPEALS.docx

1 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE CECILIA B. ESTINOZO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER SIXTEENTH DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 150276. February 12, 2008. THIRD DIVISION. NACHURA, J. APPEAL AND CERTIORARI; MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Estinozo while in Sogod, Southern Leyte, represented to private complainants Gaudencio Ang, Rogelio Ceniza, Nilo Cabardo, Salvacion Nueve, Virgilio Maunes, Apolinaria Olayvar, and Mariza Florendo that she was one of the owners of Golden Overseas Employment and that she was recruiting workers to be sent abroad. She then asked from the said complainants the payment of placement and processing fees totaling P15,000.00. Private complainants paid the fees, went with petitioner to Manila. On the promised date of their departure, however, private complainants never left the country. Came November 1986 and still they were not deployed. This prompted private complainants to suspect that something was amiss, and they demanded the return of their money. Petitioner assured them refund of the fees and even executed promissory notes to several of the complainants; but, as before, her assurances were mere pretenses. Complainants then filed seven separate Informations for Estafa against petitioner with the RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte. On request of petitioner, the cases were consolidated and jointly heard by the trial court. During the trial, in her defense, petitioner testified, among others, that she was an employee of the COA who worked as a

part-time secretary at FCR Recruitment Agency owned by Fe Corazon Ramirez; that she received the amounts claimed by the complainants and remitted the same to Ramirez; that complainants actually transacted with Ramirez and not with her and that she was only forced to execute the promissory notes. On November 9, 1994, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of estafa. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the case to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the trial court. On May 30, 2001, within the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review, petitioner filed with the appellate court a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration. On June 28, 2001, the CA, in the its Resolution, denied the said motion pursuant to Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA). Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 28, 2001 Resolution of the CA but the appellate court denied the same, on August 17, 2001. Displeased with this series of denials, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing all the issuances of the CA. ISSUE: WON SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS THE PROPER REMEDY AVAILED OF BY THE PETITIONER. RULING: No. The petition is the wrong remedy to question the appellate court’s issuances. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

2 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE or final order or resolution of the CA may file a verified petition for review on certiorari. Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari, a limited form of review and a remedy of last recourse, which lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a special civil action. Granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an appropriate remedy, still the Court cannot grant the writ prayed for because there is no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in the challenged issuances. The rule, as it stands now without exception, is that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases before the Supreme Court, as one of last resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant the extension requested. This rule also applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. Thus, the appellate court correctly denied petitioner’s Motion for

Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration. It is well to point out that with petitioner’s erroneous filing of a motion for extension of time and with her nonfiling of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review from the CA’s decision, the challenged decision has already attained finality and may no longer be reviewed. The instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute for the lost appeal—certiorari is not a procedural device to deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. When a decision becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to review the said judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. Spouses Reterta vs. Spouses Mores G.R. No. 159941 August 17, 2011 Subject of Appeal Facts: The petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land (the land) situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, containing an area of 47,708 square meters, having inherited the land from their father; that their late father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation; that their late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years; that they had

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

3 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T64071 had later issued to the respondents. The respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of case due to the land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence the case. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. The petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration. Therefore, the petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition holding that the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The remedy of the petitioners was to have appealed the same to this Court. But petitioners did not. Instead they filed the present special civil action for certiorari after the decision of the court a quo has become final. Certiorari, however cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The MR of petitioners was likewise denied, hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari Held:The CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari, considering that the order granting the

respondents motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an interlocutory, order against which the proper remedy was an appeal in due course. Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its being availed of only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that a special civil action for certiorari was their proper remedy to assail the order of dismissal in light of certain rules of procedure,specifically pointing out that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court (An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order) prohibited an appeal of a denial of the motion for reconsideration, and that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court ( No appeal may be taken from: xxx An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration) expressly declared that an order denying a motion for reconsideration was not appealable. They remind that the third paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided that in the instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. The petitioners position has no basis. For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting the respondents motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

4 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy. The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, viz: The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or executory as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new

trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and executory. xxx Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

5 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE petitioners, indicates that the proper remedy against the denial of the petitioners motion for reconsideration was an appeal from the final order dismissing the action upon the respondents motion to dismiss. The said rule explicitly states thusly: Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration. An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order. The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law. By denying a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself. The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court the version in force at the time

when the CA rendered its assailed decision on May 15, 2002 included an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit: Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: (a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) order;

An

interlocutory

(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) An order of execution; (g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints,

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

6 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and (h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice. In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (n) It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-appealable orders, and that such a revision of a procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on that basis would not be right and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied the rule of procedure in force at the time when it issued its assailed final order. MANALOTO VS VELOSO ORDINARY APPEAL FACTS: Manaloto et al. filed a case of unlawful detainer before the MeTC against Veloso. MeTC later on decided in favor of Manaloto et al. This prompted Veloso to go to the RTC which in turn reversed the MeTC’s decision. Prior, however, to such RTC’s decision and while the appeal was pending therein, Veloso filed a civil case of breach of contract and damages against Manaloto et al before the RTC, branch 227. Manaloto et al in turn filed an omnibus motion, praying for the dismissal of

veloso’s civil case (Breach of contract and damages). Later RTC branch 227 issued a resolution/decision dismissing veloso’s case. Veloso received a copy of such resolution/decision on September 26, 2003. He then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said judgment on October 10, 2003, which RTC-Branch 227 denied in an order dated December 30, 2003. He received a copy of the RTCBranch 227 order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on February 20, 2004, and he filed his Notice of Appeal on March 1, 2004. However, the RTC-Branch 227, in an Order dated March 23, 2004, dismissed Veloso’s appeal for being filed out of time. ISSUE: WHETHER VELOSO’S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME. HELD: No. Jurisprudence has settled the fresh period rule, according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In Sumiran v. Damaso, we presented a survey of the cases applying the fresh period rule: As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

7 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the Court stated: To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. In the case before us, Veloso received a copy of the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-0248341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days thereafter, on October 10, 2003, Veloso filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC-Branch 227 denied Veloso’s Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which he received on February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration, Veloso already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the fresh period rule, Veloso was able to file his appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15 days. GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE vs. LUIS ESTEBAN LATORRE G.R. No. 183926 March 29, 2010 RULE 45 IN RELATION TO RULE 41 FACTS:

Petitioner Generosa filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a Complaint for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction against her own son, respondent Luis and one Ifzal Ali. Petitioner averred that Luis and Ifzal entered into a Contract of Lease over a 1,244-sq. meter real property, situated at No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmariñas Village, Makati City. The lease contract declared that Luis was the absolute and registered owner of the property. Petitioner alleged that such declaration was erroneous because she and respondent were co-owners of the property in equal shares. PETITIONER narrated that: 1.) she and respondent executed their respective Deeds of Donation, conveying the property in favor of The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc. Later on, both executed separate Deeds of Revocation of Donation and Reconveyance of the subject property but such Deeds were not registered so the property remained in the name of the Foundation; 2.) She discovered that respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the TCT of the property, claiming full ownership over the same by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by petitioner in favor of respondent. She claimed that the deed was a falsified document; that her signature thereon was forged by respondent; and that she never received P21 Million or any other amount as consideration for her share of the property. Thus, petitioner prayed that Ifzal be enjoined from paying the rentals to respondent, and the latter from receiving said rentals; that both be ordered to pay petitioner her share of the rentals; and that respondent be enjoined from asserting full ownership over the

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

8 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE property and from committing any other act in derogation of petitioner's interests. Petitioner also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, litigation expenses, and costs of the suit. RESPONDENT narrated that: 1.) he was a former Opus Dei priest but he left the congregation after he was maltreated by his Spanish superiors; 2.) for almost 20 years, the Opus Dei divested the Latorre family of several real properties. In order to spare the property from the Opus Dei, both agreed to donate it to the Foundation. Both also decided to revoke the donation. The Foundation consented to the revocation but due to lack of funds, the title was never transferred and remained in the name of the Foundation; 3.) petitioner lived with him and his family from 1988 to 2000, and that he provided for petitioner's needs, spending a substantial amount of money; that because of this, and the fact that the rentals paid for the use of the subject property went to petitioner, both parties agreed that petitioner would convey her share over the subject property to respondent; and that petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent; 4.) that petitioner left the house because she detested his act of firing their driver. It was then that this case was filed against him by petitioner. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground that the venue of the case was improperly laid since the case was a real action. The property is located in Makati City, hence, petitioner should have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City. Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of want of jurisdiction, asserting that he was immune from suit because he was an officer of the Asian Development Bank. RTC: 1.) issued a TRO; 2.) directed both

Ifzal and respondent to pay petitioner her share of the rentals; 3.) ordered respondent not to commit any act in derogation of petitioner's interest over the property. RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss. Thus, trial on the merits ensued. Respondent filed an Answer Ad Cautelam, insisting that the case was a real action and that the venue was improperly laid. The RTC dismissed petitioner's claim against Ifzal because the dispute was clearly between petitioner and respondent and ruled in favor of respondent, declaring that the case should have been filed and tried in the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45. ISSUES: I. Whether the RTC erred in treating the venue as jurisdiction and in treating petitioner's complaint as a real action. II. Whether the filing of the case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Yes HELD: The Petition is DENIED. Petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v. Consul, we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

9 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court. The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on questions of law. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Our ruling in Velayo-Fong v. Velayo is instructive: A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. In her Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioner prayed that this Court decide the case on the merits. To do so, however, would require the examination

by this Court of the probative value of the evidence presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition. ARIEL A. TRES REYES vs. MAXIMS TEA HOUSE and JOCELYN POON [G.R. No. 140853. February 27, 2003] FACTS: Ariel Tres Reyes was hired by Maxim’s Tea House as a driver, assigning him to its Ermita, Manila Branch. Ariel thereafter was tasked to fetch the employees of Savannah Moon. Ariel Tres Reyes complied, and while he was driving the van with the employees of Savannah Moon inside, it collided with a truck. The collision resulted to Physical Injuries sustained by Tres Reyes and the Employee. Thereafter, Tres Reyes was terminated by Maxim’s Tea House. Tres Reyes filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter however, ruled in favor of Maxim’s Tea House and found Tres Reyes grossly negligent for failure to avoid the collision. Tres Reyes then file a PARTIAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION before the NLRC. The NLRC treated the Partial Motion for Reconsideration as an APPEAL, then ruled in favor of Tres Reyes stating that he was not negligent.

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

10 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E Maxim’s Tea House then file a special civil action of Certiorari with the CA, arguing that the the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration notwithstanding that it was a prohibited pleading under Sec. 17 (now Sec. 19), Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure and despite want of showing that it was seasonably filed. The case was then brought before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN TREATING AS AN APPEAL THE PARTIAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF TRES REYES. HELD:YES. The issue involves a question of substance versus form. Strictly speaking, a motion for reconsideration of a decision, order, or award of a Labor Arbiter is prohibited by Section 19, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. But said rule likewise allows that a motion for reconsideration shall be treated as an appeal provided it meets all the requisites of an appeal. Petitioner insists that his pleading was in form a motion for reconsideration, but in substance it was an appeal which complied with all the technical requirements. Respondents counter that the formal requisites take precedence. We have minutely scrutinized the records of this case, particularly the questioned Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but we find no basis for the appellate courts finding that said pleading did not contain a statement as to when petitioner received a copy of the decision. Note that all that Section 3, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure requires with

respect to material dates is a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision. We rule that petitioner’s declaration in his motion that he received a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision on September 28, 1998 is more than sufficient compliance with said requirement imposed by Section 3, Rule VI. We likewise find that the motion in question was filed with the NLRC on October 8, 1998 or on the tenth (10th) day from the date of receipt by petitioner of his copy of the Labor Arbiters decision. Otherwise put, said pleading was filed within the reglementary ten-day period, as provided for in Section 1, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. The law on the timeliness of an appeal from the decision, award, or order of the Labor Arbiters, states clearly that the aggrieved party has ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof to appeal to the Commission.Needless to say, an appeal filed at the last minute of the last day of said period is, for all intents and purposes, still seasonably filed. the Court of Appeals accepted respondents averment that petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration was not verified. The records, however, contradict their averments. We find that petitioner verified his motion to reconsider the Labor Arbiters decision on October 8, 1998, or on the same day that it was filed. We must, perforce, rule that petitioner has substantially complied with the verification requirement as provided for in Section 3, Rule VI of the Commissions Rules of Procedure. In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice, technicalities must be avoided.

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

11 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E Technicalities should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Where the ends of substantial justice shall be better served, the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed.

Meanwhile, on February 15, 2000, the appellate court’s Fourth Division dismissed LBP’s ordinary appeal primarily holding that LBP availed of the wrong mode of appeal. LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO DE LEON, G.R. No. 143275 March 20, 2003

On July 14, 2000, LBP filed before this Court a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. On September 10, 2002, this Court rendered a Decision affirming the decision of the dismissal of the appellate court due to the wrong mode of appeal.

FACTS:The Respondent spouses Arlene and Bernardo de Leon filed a petition to fix the just compensation of a parcel of land2 before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch 63, acting as a Special Agrarian Court. On December 19, 1997, the agrarian court rendered summary judgment fixing the compensation of the subject property as follows: (1) P1,260,000 for the 16.69 hectares of riceland and (2) P2,957,250 for the 30.4160 hectares of sugarland. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity) and LBP both filed separate appeals using different modes. DAR filed a petition for review while LBP interposed an ordinary appeal by filing a notice of appeal. DAR’s petition for review3 was assigned to the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals while LBP’s ordinary appeal4 was assigned to the Fourth Division of the same court. On November 6, 1998, the appellate court’s Special Third Division rendered a decision in the petition for review filed by DAR, giving due course to the said petition and was ordered by the appellate court to recomputed the compensation and pay the legal interest.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES HAD CHOSEN THE WRONG MODE OF APPEAL. HELD: Yes. In affirming the dismissal by the appellate court of LBP’s ordinary appeal, this Court held that Section 60of RA 6657 (The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) is clear in providing petition for review as the appropriate mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 61(the provision on which LBP bases its argument that ordinary appeal is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts) merely makes a general reference to the Rules of Court and does not categorically prescribe ordinary appeal as the correct way of questioning decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Thus, we interpreted Section 61 to mean that the specific rules for petitions for review in the Rules of Court and other relevant procedures of appeals shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. LBP pleads that the subject Decision should at least be given prospective

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

12 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E application considering that more than 60 similar agrarian cases filed by LBP via ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals are in danger of being dismissed outright on technical grounds on account of our ruling herein. This, according to LBP, will wreak financial havoc not only on LBP as the financial intermediary of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program but also on the national treasury and the already depressed economic condition of our country. Thus, in the interest of fair play, equity and justice, LBP stresses the need for the rules to be relaxed so as to give substantial consideration to the appealed cases. On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as the conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for availing of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on the Buenaventura ruling, LBP acted on the mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Hence, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, we find it proper to emphasize the prospective application of our Decision dated September 10, 2002. A prospective application of our Decision is not only grounded on equity and fair play but also based on the constitutional tenet that rules of procedure shall not impair substantive rights. SPOUSES GODOFREDO ALFREDO and CARMEN LIMON ALFREDO, SPOUSES ARNULFO SAVELLANO and EDITHA B. SAVELLANO, DANTON D. MATAWARAN, SPOUSES DELFIN F. ESPIRITU, JR. and ESTELA S. ESPIRITU and ELIZABETH TUAZON,

petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ARMANDO BORRAS and ADELIA LOBATON BORRAS, respondents. G.R. No. 144225. June 17, 2003.* Appeals; Certiorari; In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Supreme Court reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts. —In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts. The factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this Court. This applies with greater force when both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on their factual findings. FACTS: Spouses Alfredo sold for Php 15,000 to Spouses Borras a parcel of land measuring 81,524 square meters which was mortgaged with DBP for Php 7,000, with the agreement that Spouses Borras will pay the DBP loan and its accumulated interest and the balance to be paid in cash to the sellers. Spouses Borras gave Spouses Alfredo the money to pay the loan to DBP which signed the release of mortgage and returned the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 284 to the Alfredos. Spouses Borras subsequently paid the balance of the purchase price of the Subject Land for which Carmen Alfredo issued a receipt dated 11 March 1970. The Alfredos then delivered to Adelia Borras the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 284, with the document of cancellation of mortgage, official receipts of realty tax payments, and tax declaration in the name of Godofredo Alfredo. The Alfredos introduced the Spouses Borras as the new owners of the Subject Land, to the Natanawans, the old tenants of the

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

13 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E Subject Land. The Borrases then took possession of the Subject Land. In January 1994, The Borrases learned that hired persons had entered the Subject Land and were cutting trees under instructions of allegedly new owners of the Subject Land. Subsequently, Armando and Adelia discovered that Spouses Alfredo had resold portions of the Subject Land to several persons. This prompted the Borrases to file an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Bataan. Further, they discovered that Spouses Alfredo had secured an owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 284 after filing a petition in court for the issuance of a new copy claiming in their petition that they lost their owner’s duplicate copy. Spouses Borras wrote the Alfredos complaining about their acts, but the latter did not reply. Thus, Armando and Adelia filed a complaint for specific performance. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Spouses Borras. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals issued its Decision affirming the decision of the trial court in toto. In its petition for review under Rule 45 petitioners Alfredo contended that they did not deliver the title of the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia as shown by Adelia Borras' testimony on crossexamination. ISSUE: WON THE PETITIONERS CONTENTION BE CONSIDERED? HELD: No. Petitioners raise this factual issue for the first time. The Court of Appeals could have passed upon this issue had petitioners raised this earlier, At any rate, the cited testimony of Adelia does not convincingly prove that Godofredo and Carmen did not deliver

the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia. Adelia’s cited testimony must be examined in context not only with her entire testimony but also with the other circumstances. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts. The factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this Court. This applies with greater force when both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on their factual findings. N.B. Civil Procedure; Actions; Reconveyance; Quieting of Title; An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.—An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. The body of the pleading or complaint determines the nature of an action, not its title or heading. Thus, the present action should be treated as one for reconveyance. Prescription; An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years.—To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, plaintiff’s possession of the disputed property is material. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

14 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. Laches; Neither is the action barred by laches.— Neither is the action barred by laches. We have defined laches as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable time, to do that which, by the exercise of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. PEOPLE VS. CORPUZ, 412 SCRA 479(2003) APPEALS The principle that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by the Court great respect if not conclusive effect does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance which if considered would alter the outcome of the case. FACTS: In June 1998, private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego, Erlinda Pascual and Restian Surio went to Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation at 1651 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila to apply for employment as factory workers in Taiwan. They were accompanied by a certain “Aling Josie” who introduced them to the agency’s President and General Manager Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes. Mrs. Reyes asked them to accomplish the

application forms. Thereafter, they were told to return to the office with P10,000.00 each as processing fee. On July 30, 1998, private complainants returned to the agency to pay the processing fees. Mrs. Reyes was not at the agency that time, but she called appellant on the telephone to ask her to receive the processing fees. Thereafter, appellant advised them to wait for the contracts to arrive from the Taiwan employers. Two months later, nothing happened to their applications. Thus private complainants decided to ask for the refund of their money from appellant6 who told them that the processing fees they had paid were already remitted to Mrs. Reyes. When they talked to Mrs. Reyes, she told them that the money she received from appellant was in payment of the latter’s debt. Thus, on January 13, 1999, private complainants filed their complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation which led to the arrest and detention of appellant. On March 23, 2000, while the case was before the trial court, private complainants received the refund of their processing fees from appellant’s sister-inlaw. Consequently, they executed affidavits of desistance8 from participation in the case against appellant. For her part, appellant resolutely denied having a hand in the illegal recruitment and claimed that she merely received the money on behalf of Mrs. Reyes, the President/General Manager of Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation, where she had been working as secretary for three months prior to July 30, 1998. On that day, Mrs. Reyes called her on the telephone and

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

15 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E told her to receive private complainants’ processing fees. In compliance with the order of her employer and since the cashier was absent, she received the processing fees of private complainants, which she thereafter remitted to Mrs. Reyes. She had no knowledge that the agency’s license was suspended by the POEA on July 29, 1998. On November 16, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, finding appellant Elizabeth Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic sabotage. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT HELD: Yes. Appellant contends that she is not liable for the foregoing illegal recruitment activities considering that she was merely an employee having no control over the recruitment business of the Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation and that she did not actually recruit the private complainants. Moreover, she did not appropriate for her own use the processing fees she received and she had no knowledge that the agency’s license was suspended by the POEA. The trial court convicted appellant based on its findings that despite the suspension of the agency’s license, appellant still convinced the applicants to give their money with the promise to land a job abroad. Moreover, as the registered secretary of the agency she had management control of the recruitment business. It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of

witnesses and probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this Court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial court. However, this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. The exception obtains in this case. The records of the case show that AlgaMoher International Placement Service Corporation is a licensed land-based recruitment agency. Its license was valid until August 24, 1999. Likewise, appellant was its registered secretary while Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes is its President/General Manager. Part of its regular business activity is to accept applicants who desire to work here or abroad. Appellant, as secretary of the agency, was in charge of the custody and documentation of the overseas contracts. Moreover, as stated in the last sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. Settled is the rule that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

16 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, and can act, only by and through its human agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter. The employee or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight his contribution may be. The law of agency, as applied in civil cases, has no application in criminal cases, and no man can escape punishment when he participates in the commission of a crime upon the ground that he simply acted as an agent of any party. The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDY AMOR, JANE GAMIL, minors GIAN CARLO AMOR represented by ATTY. OWEN AMOR, and CARLO BENITEZ represented by JOSEPHINE BENITEZ G.R. No. 127473 December 8, 2003 EVIDENCE; APPEALS FACTS: Private respondents Judy Amor, Jane Gamil, minor Gian Carlo Amor, represented by his father, Atty. Owen Amor, and, minor Carlo Benitez, represented by his mother, Josephine

Benitez, filed with the RTC of Sorsogon, a complaint for damages against petitioner due to the latter’s failure to honor their confirmed tickets. It is alleged in their complaint that Judy Amor purchased three confirmed plane tickets for her and her infant son, Gian Carlo Amor as well as her sister Jane Gamil for the May 8, 1988, 7:10 a.m. flight, PR 178, bound for Manila from defendants branch office in Legaspi City. On said date, Judy with Gian, Jane and minor Carlo Benitez, nephew of Judy and Jane, arrived at the Legaspi Airport at 6:20 a.m. for PR 178. Carlo Benitez was supposed to use the confirmed ticket of a certain Dra. Emily Chua. They were accompanied by Atty. Owen Amor and the latter’s cousin, Salvador Gonzales who fell in line at the check-in counter with four persons ahead of him and three persons behind him. While waiting for his turn, Gonzales was asked by Lloyd Fojas, the check-in clerk on duty, to approach the counter. Fojas wrote something on the tickets which Gonzales later read as late check-in 7:05. When Gonzales turn came, Fojas gave him the tickets of private respondents Judy, Jane and Gian and told him to proceed to the cashier to make arrangements. Salvador then went to Atty. Amor and told him about the situation. Atty. Amor pleaded with Fojas, pointing out that it is only 6:45 a.m., but the latter did not even look at him or utter any word. Atty. Amor then tried to plead with Delfin Canonizado and George Carranza, employees of petitioner, but still to no avail. Private respondents were not able to board said flight. The plane left at 7:30 a.m., twenty minutes behind the original schedule. Private respondents then went to the Bus terminals hoping to catch a ride

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

17 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E for Manila. Finding none, they went back to the airport and tried to catch an afternoon flight. Unfortunately, the 2:30 p.m. flight, PR 278, was cancelled due to aircraft situation. Private respondents were told to wait for the 5:30 p.m. flight, PR 180. They checked-in their bags and were told to hand in their tickets. Later, a PAL employee at the check-in counter called out the name of private respondent minor Carlo Benitez. Plaintiff Judy approached the counter and was told by the PAL personnel that they cannot be accommodated. Fojas who was also at the counter then removed the boarding passes inserted in private respondents tickets as well as the tags from their luggages. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered petitioner to reimburse private respondents the purchase price of the four (4) plane tickets plus damages, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the appellate court. ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RTC’S DECISION IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS? HELD: Yes. Evidently, in resolving the two issues raised in the present petition, it is inevitable and most crucial that we first determine the question whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling that private respondents were late in checking-in. Both issues call for a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.

rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. Factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us especially when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court. This is because it is not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again. However, this general rule admits of exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. Petitioner invokes exception (b).

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

18 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E As to the first issue: Whether or not private respondents checked-in on time for PR 178. The determination of this issue is necessary because it is expressly stipulated in the airline tickets issued to private respondents that PAL will consider the reserved seat cancelled if the passenger fails to check-in at least thirty minutes before the published departure time. After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to disturb the affirmance by the CA of the findings of the trial court that the private respondents have checked-in on time; that they reached the airport at 6:20 a.m., based on the testimonies of private respondent Judy Amor, and witnesses Salvador Gonzales and Atty. Owen Amor who were consistent in their declarations on the witness stand and corroborated one another’s statements; and that the testimony of petitioners lone witness, Lloyd Fojas is not sufficient to overcome private respondent’s evidence. It is a well-entrenched principle that absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion or any palpable error in its findings, this Court will not question the probative weight accorded by the lower courts to the various evidence presented by the parties. As we explained in Superlines Transportation Co. Inc., vs. ICC Leasing & Financing Corporation The Court is not tasked to calibrate and assess the probative weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trial all over again…So long as the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are consistent with or are not palpably contrary to the evidence on record, this Court shall decline to embark on a review on the probative weight of the evidence of the parties.

RUBEN AUGUSTO AND ATTY. NOEL D. ARCHIVAL, PETITIONERS, . HON. JUDGE TEODORO K. RISOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 27, LAPU- LAPU CITY, CLEOFE OMOLON, RESPONDENTS. G.R. NO. 131794. DECEMBER 10, 2003. FACTS: Felisa Augusto and her siblings, Jose Augusto, Magdalena Augusto and Alfonso Augusto, all married, were the co- owners of a parcel of land located in Barrio Mactan, Opon, Cebu. The lot was sold to Guillermo Omolon for P200.00. Guillermo Omolon and his wife, Cleofe Omolon. In the meantime, the property was registered in the names of Monico, Felisa, Jose, Filomeno, Teofilo and Sinfroso, all surnamed Augusto, under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO3560. Guillermo Omolon died intestate and was survived by Cleofe Omolon. Sometime in July 1995, Cleofe Omolon filed a petition for the reconstitution of the OCT before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, which grants the petition and thus directs the Register of Deeds of LapuLapu City to reconstitute the Original Certificate of Title. However, upon presentation of the aforesaid order to the Office of the Register of Deeds of LapuLapu City, Cleofe was informed that the ownerÊs copy had already been issued to Ruben Augusto, pursuant to an Order issued by the court dated August 23, 1996, and that based on the record, the same was in the possession of Atty. Noel Archival. Hence, on May 14, 1997, Cleofe filed a

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

19 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E petition before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, alleging that as lawful co-owner and possessor of Lot No. 4429, she had every right to have and hold the owner’s duplicate of the said OCT. She prayed that after due proceedings, the respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival be ordered to surrender the owner’s copy of the said title. In their Comment on the petition, therein respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival alleged, inter alia, that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Felisa, Magdalena, Alfonso and Jose, all surnamed Augusto, was falsified and fictitious, and, thus, null and void. In the interim, Cleofe had her adverse claim annotated at the dorsal portion of the title in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City.On October 22, 1997, the RTC issued an order directing Atty. Noel Archival to produce the owner’s copy of OCT No. 3560 to allow the annotation of Cleofe’s interest, upon which the owner’s duplicate copy of the title may thereafter be returned. The trial court declared that, based on the pleadings of the parties, the issue of ownership over the property had been raised, a matter which the court, sitting as a cadastral court, could not pass upon. The trial court further ruled that pending resolution of the issue of ownership over the property in an appropriate proceeding therefor, there was a need for the annotation of the petitioners’ interest over the property. The respondents therein filed a ‘Motion for a Partial Reconsideration’ of the Order alleging that Cleofe’s interest over the property had been sufficiently protected by the annotation of her adverse claim. However, on November 14, 1997, the court issued an Order denying the motion of the respondents therein.

On November 26, 1997, the respondents filed a notice of appeal from the said order to the Court of Appeals. On December 5, 1997, the RTC issued an order denying due course therefor, on its perception that the orders subject thereof were interlocutory; hence, not appealable. The respondents, now the petitioners, filed the instant petition alleging that the public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders, and that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to them. The petitioners argue that contrary to the ruling of the public respondent, its October 22, 1997 Order was final and appealable, as the same disposed of the case. In her comment on the petition, the private respondent averred that the October 22, 1997 Order of the public respondent was merely interlocutory as it did not fully dispose of the case and had reserved the further determination of other questions. ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the public respondent is a final order hence appealable. HELD: NO. Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules or Court provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final order, and not from an interlocutory one. A final order is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. An order or judgment is deemed final if it finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

20 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. Where no issue is left for future consideration, except the fact of compliance with the terms of the order, such order is final and appealable. In contrast, an order is interlocutory if it does not finally dispose of the case. In this case, the order of the public respondent directing the petitioners to produce the owner’s copy of OCT No. 3560 in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the annotation of the private respondent’s interest over the property is merely interlocutory and not final; hence, not appealable by means of a writ of error. The public respondent had not fully disposed of the case as it had not yet ruled on whether to grant the private respondent’s prayer for the surrender of the owner’s copy of OCT No. 3560. As gleaned from the order of the respondent judge, he believed that he had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership over the property and was disposed to dismiss the petition. CORAZON ESCUETA VS. RUFINA LIM G.R. No. 137162 January 24, 2007 (TIME FOR FILING PETITION; CONTENTS AND VERIFICATION Sec. 3 Rule 38) Facts: Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title to, real property, with preliminary injunction and issuance of [a holddeparture order] from the Philippines against Ignacio E. Rubio. Respondent amended her complaint to include specific performance and damages. In her amended complaint, Lim averred inter alia that she bought the hereditary shares (consisting of 10 lots) of Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy, Alejandrino, Bayani, and other co-heirs;

that said vendors executed a contract of sale dated April 10, 1990 in her favor; that Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy received a down payment or earnest money in the amount of P102,169.86 and P450,000, respectively; that it was agreed in the contract of sale that the vendors would secure certificates of title covering their respective hereditary shares; that the balance of the purchase price would be paid to each heir upon presentation of their individual certificate[s] of title; that Ignacio Rubio refused to receive the other half of the down payment which is P[100,000]; that Ignacio Rubio refused and still refuses to deliver to Lim the certificates of title covering his share on the two lots; that with respect to the heirs of Luz Baloloy, they also refused and still refuse to perform the delivery of the two certificates of title covering their share in the disputed lots; that Lim was and is ready and willing to pay Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy upon presentation of their individual certificates of title, free from whatever lien and encumbrance; As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her knowledge that the disputed lots have already been sold by Ignacio Rubio to respondent, it is alleged that a simulated deed of sale involving said lots was effected by Ignacio Rubio in her favor; and that the simulated deed of sale by Rubio to Escueta has raised doubts and clouds over respondent’s (Lim) title. Now the Defense of Baloloys, Rubio and Escueta . . . As per heirs of Luz Baloloy, Lim has no cause of action, because the subject contract of sale has no more force and effect as far as the Baloloys are concerned, since they have withdrawn

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

21 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E their offer to sell for the reason that respondent failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as orally promised on or before May 1, 1990. Rubio and Escueta's defense is that Lim has no cause of Action because Rubio has not entered into a contract of sale with the latter. That the P100,000 respondent (Lim) claimed Rubio received as down payment for the lots is a simple transaction by way of a loan with Lim. However, the Baloloys failed to appear at the pre-trial. Upon motion of respondent (Lim), the trial court declared the Baloloys in default. Baloloys then filed a motion to lift the order declaring them in default, which was denied by the trial court in an order dated November 27, 1991. Consequently, respondent was allowed to adduce evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a partial decision dated July 23, 1993 against the Baloloys. The Baloloys filed a petition for relief from judgment and order dated July 4, 1994 and supplemental petition dated July 7, 1994. This was denied by the trial court in an order dated September 16, 1994. Hence, appeal to the Court of Appeals was taken challenging the order denying the petition for relief. Trial on the merits ensued between respondent and Rubio and Escueta. After trial, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the complaint and amended complaint againts Petitioners Escueta, Rubio and the Register of Deeds. The counterclaim of petitioners is also dismissed. However, [petitioner] Rubio is ordered to return to the [respondent],Lim, the amount of P102,169.80, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from April 10, [1990] until the same is fully paid.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s order and partial decision, but reversed the later decision. The Decision dismissing [respondent’s, Lim] complaint is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered. Accordingly; a. the validity of the subject contract of sale in favor of [respondent] is upheld. b. Rubio is directed to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale conditioned upon the payment of the balance of the purchase price by [respondent] within 30 days from the receipt of the entry of judgment of this Decision. c. the contracts of sale between Rubio and Escueta involving Rubio’s share in the disputed properties is declared NULL and VOID. d. Rubio and Escueta are ordered to pay jointly and severally the [respondent] the amount ofP[20,000] as moral damages and P[20,000] as attorney’s fees. 3. the appeal of Rubio and Escueta on the denial of their counterclaim is DISMISSED. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied. Hence, this petition. Take Note Argument(s):

of

Petitioner's

ff.

1. CA did not consider the circumstances surrounding petitioners’ failure to appear at the pre-trial and to file the petition for relief on time. As to the failure to appear at the pre-trial, there was fraud, accident and/or excusable neglect, because petitioner Bayani was in the United States. There was no service of the notice of pre-trial or order. Neither did the former counsel of record inform him. Consequently, the order declaring him in

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

22 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E default is void, and all subsequent proceedings, orders, or decision are void. 2. Petitioner Alejandrino was not clothed with a power of attorney to appear on behalf of Bayani at the pre-trial conference. 3. The amount encashed by Rubio represented not the down payment, but the payment of respondent’s debt. His acceptance and encashment of the check was not a ratification of the contract of sale. ISSUE: WON BAYANI BALOLOY WAS PROPERLY DECLARED IN DEFAULT FOR LACK OF REPRESENTATION. HELD:For lack of representation, Bayani Baloloy was properly declared in default. Pre-trial is mandatory. The notices of pretrial had been sent to both the Baloloys and their former counsel of record. Being served with notice, he is "charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him." He must "see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial." What the Baloloys and their former counsel have alleged instead in their Motion to Lift Order of As In Default dated December 11, 1991 is the belated receipt of Bayani Baloloy’s special power of attorney in favor of their former counsel, not that they have not received the notice or been informed of the scheduled pre-trial. Not having raised the ground of lack of a special power of attorney in their motion, they are now deemed to have waived it. Certainly, they cannot raise it at this late stage of the proceedings. (Legal Basis . . .)

Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the above-cited rule. "The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings and not from the date he actually read the same." The Baloloys, apparently in an attempt to cure the lapse of the aforesaid reglementary period to file a petition for relief from judgment, included in its petition the two Orders dated May 6, 1994 and June 29, 1994. The first Order denied Baloloys’ motion to fix the period within which plaintiffs-appellants pay the balance of the purchase price. The second Order refers to the grant of partial execution, i.e. on the aspect of damages. These Orders are only consequences of the partial decision subject of the petition for relief, and thus, cannot be considered in the determination of the reglementary period within which to file the said petition for relief. Furthermore, no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence exists in order

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

23 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E that the petition for relief may be granted. There is no proof of extrinsic fraud that "prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting all of his case to the court" or an "accident which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against, and by reason of which the party applying has probably been impaired in his rights." There is also no proof of either a "mistake of law or an excusable negligence "caused by failure to receive notice of the trial that it would not be necessary for him to take an active part in the case by relying on another person to attend to the case for him, when such other person was chargeable with that duty, or by other circumstances not involving fault of the moving party." Petition Denied.

Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. bought certain parcels of land including that of Petra and developed said properties into a subdivision project called Mega Heights Subdivision. On May 4, 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a Notice of Coverage, placing the property under the coverage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The heirs of Petra opposed DAR. Then on August 27, 1991, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision declaring the nature of the property as residential and not suitable for agriculture. The Regional Director filed a notice of appeal, which the Provincial Adjudicator disallowed for being pro forma and frivolous. The decision became final and executory and Springfield proceeded to develop the property. The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief from judgment of the DARAB Decision.

SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. and HEIRS OF PETRA CAPISTRANO PIIT, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 40, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) G.R. NO. 142628 February 6, 2007 (Rule 45 -The principal issue presented for resolution is whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction to annul final judgment of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)) FACTS: Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned a lot in Cagayan de Oro City.

On October 5, 1995, the DARAB granted the petition and gave due course to the Notice of Coverage. It also directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to proceed with the documentation, acquisition, and distribution of the property to the true and lawful beneficiaries. The DARAB also issued an Order dated May 22, 1997, ordering the heirs of Piit and Springfield to pay the farmerbeneficiaries the amount of Twelve Million, Three Hundred Forty Thousand, Eight Hundred Pesos (P12,340,800.00), corresponding to the value of the property since the property has already been developed into a subdivision.

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

24 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E That's why on On June 13, 1997, Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995 and all its subsequent proceedings. Petitioners contend that the DARAB decision was rendered without affording petitioners any notice and hearing. (The sad part) On motion filed by the farmer-beneficiaries, the RTC issued an Order dated June 25, 1997, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the annulment of judgment filed before it is actually an action for certiorari in a different color. According to petitioners, what it sought before the RTC is an annulment of the DARAB Decision and not certiorari, as the DARAB Decision is void ab initio for having been rendered without due process of law. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision because it is a co-equal body. ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the DARAB. HELD:B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide for any power of the RTC to annul judgments of quasijudicial bodies. (Note must be made that the petition for annulment of the DARAB decision was

filed with the RTC on June 13, 1997, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Thus, the applicable law is B.P. Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, enacted on August 10, 1981.) DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A. No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory powers and functions. The DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure adopted on December 26, 198827specifically provides for the manner of judicial review of its decisions, orders, rulings, or awards. Rule XIV, Section 1 states: SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision, order, award or ruling by the Board or its Adjudicators on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals by certiorari, except as provided in the next succeeding section. Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Board or Adjudicator appealed from, shall be immediately executory. Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly provides for an appeal from the DARAB decisions to the CA. The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature,

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

25 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E and logically, beyond the control of the latter. Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a coequal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the same. LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA DIONA, vs. ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. BALANGUE, and ESTEBAN A. BALANGUE, JR. G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013 ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FACTS:Respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner secured by a Real Estate Mortgageover their 202square meter property located in Valenzuela. When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint praying, among others, that respondents be ordered: (a) To pay petitioner the principal obligation of P45,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, from 02 March 1991 until the full obligation is paid. XXXX (c) To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the

aforementioned parcel of land, and for the disposition of the proceeds thereof in accordance with law, upon failure of the respondents to fully pay petitioner within the period set by law the sums set forth in this complaint. Respondents filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer but despite the extension, respondents failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence ex parte. The RTC granted plaintiff’s motion and rendered a decision ordering the respondents to pay the sum of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND (P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid principal loan obligation plus interest at 5% per monthreckoned from March 2, 1991, until the same is fully paid. Respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons. According them, they had no knowledge of the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. Meanwhile, Petitioner moved for the public auction of the mortgaged property, which the RTC granted. In the auction sale petitioner was the only bidder and thus a Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor. Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

26 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E her Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001 ballooned from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00. The RTC granted respondents’ motion and accordingly modified the interest rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum. Displeased with the RTC’s Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA rendered a Decision declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate of interest to 12% per annum. Respondents then filed with the same court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages.They contended that the portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their right to due process. According to respondents, the loan did not carry any interest as it was the verbal agreement of the parties that in lieu thereof petitioner’s family can continue occupying respondents’ residential building located in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said loan is fully paid. The CA granted respondents’ motion for reconsideration and order the annulment of the judgement insofar as it awarded 5% monthly interest in favor of petitioner;

Petitioner sought reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its June 26, 2006 Resolution, ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN ORDERING THE ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT IN SO FAR AS THE INTEREST RATE OF THE OBLIGATION IS CONCERNED HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the award of 5% monthly interest violated the right of the respondents to due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court ruled that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest." While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

27 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment.In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law. It also ruled that the grant of 5% monthly interest to the petitioner is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of due process. It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that: Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant. In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations in the pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage executed by the parties does not include any provision on interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged

that respondents borrowed from her "the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum" and sought payment thereof. She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC’s award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due process. It violated the due process requirement because respondents were not informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint. Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by petitioner’s general prayer for "other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises x x x." To repeat, the court’s grant of relief is limited only to what has been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto, supported by evidence, and covered by the party’s cause of action. Besides, even assuming that the awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly alleged and proven during trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be equitably reduced in accordance with applicable jurisprudence.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. JOSE EVANGELISTA G.R. No. 140945. May 16, 2005

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

28 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E ANNULMENT OF JUDGEMENT FACTS: Sometime in 1968, a real property (915.50sqm) located in Quezon City, was originally awarded by the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (petitioners predecessor) to a certain Adela Salindon. After the death of Salindon, it was transferred to Arsenio Florendo, Jr., Milagros Florendo, Beatriz Florendo and Eloisa FlorendoKulphongpatana through an extrajudicial settlement executed by the heirs of Salindon. However, the award in favor of Salindon was nullified and set aside in a decision in G.R. No. L-60544, entitled Arsenio Florendo, Jr., et al. vs. Hon. Perpetuo D. Coloma, for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, and petitioner was declared the owner of the property. Despite said decision, the property was auctioned off by the Quezon City Treasurers Office for unpaid real property taxes by the Florendos. The highest bidder was Luisito Sarte. Sarte filed a petition for issuance of title and confirmation of sale, which was granted by the RTC QC. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28182 was issued in the name of Sarte, who divided the property into Lot 1-A (TCT No 108070), and Lot 1-B. It was in 1991 that petitioner filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 for recovery of real property with Sarte, the City Treasurer of Quezon City and the Quezon City Register of Deeds, as defendants. While the case was pending, Sarte executed in favor of respondent Jose Evangelista, a Deed of Assignment covering Lot 1-A.TCT No. 108070 was cancelled and TCT No. 122944 was issued in the name of Evangelista. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds annotated on TCT No. 122944

an Affidavit of Adverse Claim of petitioner NHA. Petitioner then filed a motion for leave to file supplemental complaint in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, seeking to include respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business Corporation and BPI Agricultural Development Bank as defendants (subsequent purchasers). The trial court, however, denied the motion. Thus, petitioner, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale, Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639, and Damages, against Sarte, respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business Corporation, BPI Agricultural Development Bank and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. But the trial court dismissed without prejudice said case on October 23, 1995, on the ground of the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. The trial court, in Civil Case No. Q-9110071, rendered its decision in favor of petitioner, stating that: 3. Any transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs; Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the trial courts judgment, particularly paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion, referring to the nullity

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

29 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E of any transfer, assignment, sale or mortgage made by Sarte. In his petition, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as ground. According to respondent, since he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-9110071, he was prevented from ventilating his cause, right or interest over the property, and the judgment was not binding on him, as the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. The CA granted the petition and declared null and void paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision insofar as petitioners title to the property is concerned.The CA found that respondent was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 and the trial court did not acquire any jurisdiction over his person. The CA also ruled that the judgment violated respondents right against deprivation of the property without due process of law. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA. Hence, this Petition. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN ANNULLING PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION ON GROUNDS OF LACK OF JURISDICTION AND LACK OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.Jurisprudence and Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court lay down the grounds upon which an action for annulment of judgment may be brought, i.e., (1) extrinsic fraud, and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject

matter of the claim, and in either case, the judgment or final order and resolution are void.A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never made a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. Respondent is adversely affected by such judgment, as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from Sarte, and title was already transferred to him. It will be the height of inequity to allow respondents title to be nullified without being given the opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.Clearly, the trial courts judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive portion is concerned. Petitioner further argues that it should not bear the consequence of the trial courts denial of its motion to include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. True, it was not petitioners fault that respondent was not made a party to the case. But likewise, it was not respondents fault that he was not given the opportunity to present his side of the story. Whatever prompted the trial court to deny petitioners motion to include respondent as defendant is not for the Court to reason why. Petitioner could have brought the trial courts denial to the CA on certiorari but it did not. Instead, it filed Civil Case No. Q-95-23940 for Annulment of Deed of Assignment,

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA

30 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W 1 : C I V I L P R O C E D U R E Deed of Absolute Sale, Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639, and Damages, against herein respondent Sarte and others. Unfortunately for petitioner, this was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 82) on the ground

of litis pendentia. Be that as it may, the undeniable fact remains -- respondent is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, and paragraph 3, or any portion of the trial courts judgment for that matter, cannot be binding on him.

AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAÑARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO, QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA