Rule 23-29.pdf

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CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC. vs. SPS. MANGUDADATU Respondent-Spouses Respondent-Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the 12thJudicial Region in Tacurong City, Sultan Kudarat, a Complaint for damages against Petitioner Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. ("JLI"). On July 3, 2001, petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Decision dated June 19, 2001. On July 18, 2001, it filed an Omnibus Motion for New T rial and Change of Venue which was deemed admitted but later denied. On December 12, 2001, petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution dated December 4, 2001. Alleging that it had yet to receive a copy of an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution. On January 7, 2002, its counsels -- Attys. Jaime L. Mario Jr. and D ioscoro G. Peligro -- submitted separate withdrawals of appearance. On the same date, the law firm Ong Abad Santos & Meneses filed an Entry of Appearance with Supplement to Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution. To its Supplement, petitioner attached the Affidavits of Attys. Mario and Peligro attesting that they had not yet received a copy of the Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial. On the same day, January 7, 2002, petitioner received a Sheriff’s Notice dated December 26, 2001, regarding the public auction sale of its properties. Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash. On January 23, 2002, petitioner received a copy of respondents’ Vigorous Opposition (Re: Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution, and its Supplement) dated January 16, 2001. Attached to t his pleading were two separate Certifications supposedly issued issued by the postmaster of Tacurong City, affirming that the Order denying the Motion for New Trial had been received by petitioner’s two previous counsels of record.21 The Certification pertaining to Atty. Peligro alleged that a certain Michelle Viquira had received on October 19, 2001, a copy of the Order intended for him.22 The Certification as regards Atty. Mario stated that he had personally received his copy on December 21, 2001. On January 24, 2002, petitioner personally served counsel for respondents a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Attys. Mario and Peligro.4 The Deposition was intended to prove that petitioner had not received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus Motion for New Trial.  At 9:30 a.m. on January January 28, 2002, the deposition-taking proceeded proceeded as scheduled -- at the Business Center Conference Room of the Mandarin Oriental Hotel in Makati City -- before Atty. Ana Peralta-Nazareno, a notary

public acting as deposition officer. At 12:00 noon of the same day, respondents sent petitioner a fax message via JRS Express, advising it that they had filed a Motion to Strike Off from the records the Notice to Take Deposition; and asking it not to proceed until the RTC would have resolved the Motion, a copy of which it eventually received later in the day, at 3:10 p.m. On January 29, 2002, separate Notices were sent by Atty. Nazareno to Attys. Mario and Peligro, as witnesses, for them to examine the transcript of their testimonies. On the same date, Atty. Nazareno filed via registered mail a Submission to the RTC attaching (1) a Certification that the witnesses had been present and duly sworn to by her; (2) a transcript bearing their signatures, attesting that it was a true record of their testimonies; (3) a copy of the Notice to Take Deposition delivered to her; and (4) a copy of the Notice signed by respondents’ counsel.29 During the February 1, 2002 hearing on the Motion to Quash, petitioner submitted its (1) Formal Offer of Exhibits, together with the documentary exhibits marked during the deposition- taking; (2) Reply to respondents’ Vigorous Opposition to the Motion to Quash; and (3) Opposition ad Cautelam to respondents’ Motion to Strike Off the Notice to Take Deposition. Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, seeking to hold in abeyance the February 21, 2002 RTC Resolution and the December 4, 2001 Writ of Execution. Petitioner alleged that since it had not received the Order denying its Motion for New Trial, the period to appeal had not yet lapsed. It thus concluded that the judgment, not being final, could not be the subject of a writ of execution. The CA ruled that petitioner could no longer avail itself of a deposition under Rule 23 of Rules of Court, since trial had already been terminated. ISSUE: Whether ISSUE:  Whether or not petitioner can no longer avail of the taking of oral depositions when trial already has been terminated. HELD: NO.  A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an answer has been served.60 Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.61 The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is "well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law."62 Limitations would arise, though, if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is

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CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS the subject of the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.63 The Rules of Court65 and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes,66 we allowed the taking of the witnesses’ testimonies testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the trial. Thus, "[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial." There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated. In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding,69 depositions are allowed as a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial  judge." Depositions Depositions are allowed, provided provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court). The Rules of Court vests in the trial court t he discretion to order whether a deposition may be taken or not under specified circumstances that may even differ from those the proponents have intended. Northwest Airlines Inc. vs CA FACTS: FACTS: Camille Cruz, then a teenage girl who would be travelling alone for the first time, purchased from petitioner Northwest Airlines a round-trip ticket for a flight from Manila to Boston via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure date from Manila to Boston was August 27, 1992 in economy class while the scheduled return flight from Boston to Manila in business class was on December 22, 1992. On November 25, 1992, Cruz re-scheduled her return flight from Boston to Manila to December 17, 1992. Accordingly, petitioner booked her on Northwest flight NW005 C (Flight 5) with route as follows: Boston to Chicago; Chicago to Tokyo; and, Tokyo to Manila. Petitioner reconfirmed the flight scheduled on Decembder 17, 1992 at least 72 hours prior to the said

scheduled flight. However, However, a day before her flight she was informed that instead of following her original itinerary, Cruz should instead board the TWA flight from Boston to Kennedy International Airport in New York. She then proceeded to the airport, but was later informed that flight she was to take was cancelled. Private respondents apprehension was further aggravated when she was informed that she was issued the wrong ticket to Seoul instead of Tokyo and her accommodation was downgraded from business class to economy. Hence, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim alleging therein that flight on which private respondent was originally booked was cancelled due to maintenance problems and that the airline had done its best to book Cruz on the next available flight. Trial progressed until 1995 when it was petitioners turn to present its witness on three scheduled dates. Two of the settings were cancelled when petitioners counsel filed notice for oral deposition of one Mario Garza, witness for petitioner, in New York. Private respondent filed her opposition and suggested written interrogatories instead. However, in an Order dated July 26, 1995, the tr ial court denied private respondents opposition, thus allowing the deposition to proceed. The oral deposition took place in New York , two days before the issuance of the trial courts order allowing the deposition to proceed. The records show that although it was the Honorable Consul Milagros R. Perez who swore in the deponent, she thereafter designated Attorney Gonzalez as Deposition Officer.  At the hearing, petitioner presented presented the deposition record record of its witness witness while private respondent reserved her right to cross-examine and present rebuttal evidence. Cruz questioned the conduct of the oral deposition as irregular and moved for suppression of the same on the following grounds: 1. deposition was taken on July 24, 1995 despite the fact the Court only ruled on the matter on July 26, 1995. 2. No certification given by the officer taking the deposition that the same is true record of the testimony by the deponent in violation of section 20, Ruole 24 3. deposition was not securely sealed in an enveloped secred with title of the action and marked Deposition of (here insert the name of witness) in violation of Rule 24, Section 20 of the Rules of Court. 4. The officer taking the deposition did not give any notice to the plaintiff of the filing of the deposition in violation of Rule 24, Section 21 of the Rules of Court.

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CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS 5. The person designated as deposition officer is not among those persons authorized to take deposition in foreign countries in violation of Rule 24, Section 11 of the Rules of Court. 6. There is no showing on record that the deponent read and signed the deposition in violation of Rule 24, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. Private respondents motion was denied, the trial court admitted petitioners formal offer of evidence. On appeal, C A granted private respondents petition to disallow the deposition. ISSUE: ISSUE: WON the oral deposition should be admitted into evidence. HELD: HELD: NO The deposition was not a mode of discovery but rather a direct testimony by respondents witness and there appears a strategy b y respondent to exclude petitioners participation participation from the proceedings. In this case, two days of trial were cancelled and notice for oral deposition was given in lieu of third date. The place of deposition is not easily within reach for it required time to get a travel visa, book a flight and substantial travel fare is needed to obtain round trip ticket from manila to New York and back to Manila. Under Section 11 rule 24 it provides: provides: In a foreign state or country, depositions shall be taken (a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory. The deposition document clearly indicates that while the consul swore in the witness and the stenographer, it was another officer in the Philippine Consulate who undertook the entire proceedings thereafter. Respondent Northwest argues on the presumption of regularity of official functions and even obtained a certification to this effect plus an assertion that none of the participants in the Consulate were in any way related to the respondent or their counsel. But presumptions should fail when the record itself bears out the irregularity. Petition denied, the order did not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury to the adverse party. Tolentino DE LOS REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-27263; March 17, 1975 FACTS: Petitioners Rogelio de los Reyes and Aurelio de los Reyes filed two separate complaints against the herein private respondents with the Court of First

Instance of Rizal. Before the trial court set a date for the hearing, petitioners served notice upon the counsel of respondent Wong Chu King that they would take the deposition of defendant-respondent defendant-respondent Wong Chu King, upon oral examination, pursuant to the provision of Section 1, Rule 24 of the revised Rules of Court, on August 8, 1966 at 9:30 a.m., at the Office of the Municipal Secretary of Makati, Rizal, the oral examination to continue from day to day until completed. Petitioners caused the issuance by the trial court, through its Deputy Clerk of Court, of a subpoena to defendant-respondent Wong Chu King and a subpoena duces tecum to the President of respondent La Campana Fabrica de Tabacos, Inc., or his duly authorized representative, commanding them to appear on said date, time, place before the Notary Public mentioned in the Notice To Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination. On August 8, 1966, the date set for the taking of the deposition, at around 10:00 a.m. while counsel for the petitioners was waiting for the prospective deponent in the Office of the Notary Public before whom the deposition would be taken, the counsel for petitioners received from one of the lawyers for the private respondents an Ex Parte Urgent Motion asking the trial court to relieve the defendants-respondents from attending the taking of the deposition scheduled on the same date and for the court to provide safeguards for the immediate return of all documents produced or examined right after any day's proceeding. Petitioners filed a motion citing defendantsrespondents for contempt for their failure to appear during the scheduled taking of deposition and an Opposition to the ex-parte urgent motion. While the ex-parte urgent motion and the motion for contempt were still pending resolution by the trial court, pr ivate respondents filed their Motion To Set Civil Cases Nos. 9306 and 9307 for trial. Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to set and prayed for the issuance of a judgment by default against the defendants-responde defendants-respondents. nts. The trial Judge denied the motion to declare the defendants-respondents in default and in contempt of court and at the same time directed the plaintiffspetitioners to submit instead written interrogatories before the Court would determine the date when the deposition could be held and taken. On October 12, 1966, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an action for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Order insofar as it directly the herein petitioners to submit written interrogatories before it could determine the date of the taking of the deposition of herein respondent Wong Chu King. In a decision promulgated February 8, 1967, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners maintain that under the Rules of Court, a party is authorized to take the testimony of any person, whether a party to th e case or not, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories after the filing of the answer without need for a leave of court. The choice of whether the

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CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS deposition be taken upon oral examination or written interrogatories, the petitioners aver, depends on the party exercising such right. Considering the benefits and advantages of an oral examination over that of written interrogatories, the petitioners chose the former. Petitioners now claim that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the questioned Order subjects the taking thereof to the leave of court and, therefore, the petitioners claim, the issuance of said order was without or in excess of the court's jurisdiction. Respondents, on the other hand, aver that although the right of a party to take the deposition of any person, whether a party or not, upon oral examination or written interrogatories exists in our jurisdiction, the said right is not unfettered or absolute. The use of this right by any party is subject to sound restriction in the discretion of the court. The respondents maintain that the taking of deposition for purposes of discovery, being merely one of the remedies that may be availed of only as a legitimate aid to litigation, should be controlled by the court. ISSUE:Whether ISSUE:Whether or not the trial Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction or authority when he issued the Order directing the plaintiffs to submit instead written interrogatories before the Court could definitely determine the date when the deposition would be held. RULING: We cannot subscribe to the petitioners' view that the choice as to the mode of taking the testimony of a deponent, whether upon oral examination or written interrogatories, rests exclusively upon the party exercising such right. If the theory advanced by the petitioners were to be adopted, the exercise of this right is bound to be abused and utilized for harassment. It is for this reason that Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24, of the Rules of Court, were incorporated to serve as safeguards and protection from abuse. A trial Judge must possess certain measure of control over the right of parties in the taking of depositions in order to prevent abuse. Under Section 16 of the Rules of Court, the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make an order that the deposition be taken only on written interrogatories. Evidently the trial court exercises a certain degree of discretion in connection with the taking of a deposition. Therefore, the trial Judge in the present case neither exceeded his  jurisdiction nor nor abused his discretion discretion when he issued issued the questioned Order directing that written interrogatories be submitted before determining the date when the deposition would be taken. Sps Zepeda vs. China Banking Corp G.R. No. 172175; October 9, 2006 FACTS:

Petitioners Spoused Zepeda obtained a loan with China Bank secured by a real estate mortgage. Petitioners subsequently encountered difficulties in paying their loan obligations hence they requested for restructuring which was allegedly granted by Chinabank. Hence, they were surprised when respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed foreclosed the subject property where it emerged as the highest bidder. Respondent bank was issued a Provisional Certificate of Sale and upon petitioners’ failure to redeem the prope rty, ownership was consolidated in its favor. Spouses Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification of foreclosure proceedings and loan documents with damages against respondent. According to them the foreclosure proceedings should be annulled for failure to comply with the posting and publication requirements. They also claimed that they signed the Real Estate Mortgage and Promissory Note in blank and were not given a copy and the interest rates thereon were unilaterally fixed by the respondent. Respondent bank’s ba nk’s motion to dismiss was denied, hence it filed an answer with special affirmative defenses and counterclaim. It also filed a set of written interrogatories with 20 questions. The trial court denied Chinabank’s affirmative defenses for lack of merit as well as its motion to expunge the complaint for being premature.  Aggrieved, respondent respondent bank filed a petition petition for certiorari under under Rule 65 which was granted by the Court of Appeals. It held that the trial court gravely abused, ruling that compelling reasons warrant the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint because they acted in bad faith when they ignored the hearings set by the trial court to determine the veracity of Chinabank’s affirmative defenses; they failed to answer Chinabank’s written interrogatories;  and the complaint states no cause of action. ISSUE: Whether ISSUE:  Whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to answer respondent’s written interrogatories as provided for in Section 3(c), Rule 29 of the Rules of Court. RULING: The consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the party upon whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a particular question in the set of written interrogatories and despite an order compelling him to answer the particular question, still refuses to obey the order. In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not just a particular question. Clearly then, r espondent bank should have filed a motion based on Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29.

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CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS CONCRETE AGGREGATES CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HON. PRISCILA PRISCILA S. A GANA, Regional Trial Cou rt of Cebu City, B ranch 24, and VIVIEN S. S. SORIGUEZ SORIGUEZ Does Rule 26 of the Revised Rules of Court require a party to respond to a Request for Admission of matters raised in his pleadings? Will his failure to place under oath his denials in his response to the request be deemed an admission of the matters sought to be admitted? FACTS Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling Bituminous Concrete Mix, Ready Mix Concrete and other construction materials. It has several plant sites in the country one of which is the Cebu plant site situated in Tuyan, Naga, Cebu. Private respondent on the other hand is engaged in the business of providing security services to various establishments under the name and style 101 Security and Detective Services. Sometime in October 1990 petitioner retained the services of private respondent for its Cebu plant site. On 8 November 1991 it terminated the services of private respondent alleging that it was dissatisfied with the latter's services because she failed to prevent and promptly investigate a theft case which occurred in its Cebu plant site. On 6 October 1992 private respondent Vivien S. Soriguez instituted an action with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu[1] for collection of unpaid fees for her security services rendered to petitioner. She also claimed that the termination of her services was unlawful so that she should be awarded moral damages. Petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was justified because private respondent was answerable for the losses it incurred arising from the theft attributable to her fault. Petitioner thus claimed that there was legal set-off or compensation regarding the unpaid fees due private respondent and the amount of the stolen articles owned by petitioner. On 30 August 1993 petitioner sent private respondent a Request for  Admission by the latter of her responsibility responsibility of the theft that occurred on on 5 June 1991 at the Cebu plant site.[2]Thereafter private respondent through counsel filed a Manifestation and Reply to the Request for Admission.[3] It was not under oath. On 8 October 1993 petitioner f iled a Motion for Summary Judgment positing that private respondent impliedly admitted the matters set forth in the Request for Admission by failing to respond under oath as required under Sec. 2, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court.[4] Petitioner contended that the manifestation and reply not being verified was ineffectual and thus should be stricken off the records. Private respondent countered that her reply although not under oath effectively denied the matters set forth in the request.

Public respondents ruled in favor of private respondent holding that the circumstances warranted a relaxation of the rules in the interest of justice.[5] Respondent courts further ruled that a summary judgment was improper because the dispute involved factual issues which could only be resolved in a full-blown hearing.[7]  After the trial court denied its motion for reconsideration petitioner petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of A ppeals in a special civil action for certiorari but the latter likewise denied the petition for lack of merit; hence, the instant petition. ISSUE The pivotal issue in this case is the effect of the Request for Admission filed by petitioner and, consequently, whether private respondent may be considered to have impliedly admitted the matters referred to in the request when she filed a manifestation and reply that was not under oath. RULING We deny the petition. The Request for Admission of petitioner does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As we held in Po v. Court of Appeals[9] and Briboneria v. Court of Appeals,[10] Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading. That is its primary function. It does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.  A cursory reading of of petitioner's Request Request for Admission clearly clearly shows that itit contains the same material averments in his Answer to respondent's Complaint in the trial court. Petitioner merely recopied or reproduced in its Request for Admission its affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleged in its Answer. As we held in Po v. CA,[11] petitioner's request constitutes an utter redundancy and a useless, pointless process which the respondent should not be subjected to. In the first place, what the petitioner seeks to be admitted by private respondent is the very subject matter of the complaint. In effect, petitioner would want private respondent to deny her allegations in her verified Complaint and admit the allegations in the Answer of petitioner (Manifestation and Reply to Request for Admission). Plainly, this is illogical if not preposterous. Respondent cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Answer of petitioner just because she failed to have her response to the request placed under oath since these are the very matters she raises in her verified Complaint in the court below. The following allegations specifically contained therein are self-evident: 9. That, in compliance thereto (sic) (referring to the r equest for investigation), herein plaintiff, through her authorized representative, went at (sic) the place and conducted the necessary investigation and found out that the herein plaintiff was not responsible for those a lleged losses simply because of the following, to wit:

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CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS a. Those alleged losses like Blower, Oil Filter, transmission and others were taken and brought outside the guarded place by certain Danny Baterna, driver of defendant, as reflected in the Log Book of the plaintiff .x x x x [12] Clearly, therefore, private respondent need not reply to the Request for  Admission because because her Complaint itself controverts the the matters set forth in in the Answer of petitioner which were merely reproduced in the request. In Uy Chao v. De la Rama Steamship[13] we observed that the purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. In the aforesaid cases of Po and Briboneria we held that  A party should not not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint.[14] To this we add that a party should not be made to deny matters already averred in his complaint. At this point, it is necessary to emphasize what this Court laid down in the same Po and Briboneria cases:  A request for admission admission is not intended intended to merely reproduce reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense.[15] Since the answer of private respondent to the request is no longer required in the instant case, it therefore becomes unnecessary to dwell on the issue of the propriety of an answer that is not under oath. Even assuming that a response to the request is needed, private respondent had already substantially complied complied with the requirement of the law when she specifically denied the material allegations of the petitioner in her Manifestation and Reply to the Request for Admission. Although not under oath the reply to the request readily showed that the intent of private respondent was to deny the matters set forth in the Request for Admission. That the reply is not under oath is merely a formal and not a substantive defect. This procedural lapse may be dispensed with if the circumstances call for the dispensing of the rule in the interest of justice. While we commend petitioner's zeal in promoting faithful adherence to the rules of procedure we cannot ignore the wellentrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be liberally construed as to do substantial justice.[16] There being genuine issues of fact between the private parties, public respondents correctly denied the motion of petitioner for summary judgment. Where facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.[17] Trial courts have limited

authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.[18] Verily, there is a need to determine by presentation of evidence if respondent is really liable for the stolen articles and for violating its contract for security services with petitioner. Until these issues are determined no legal compensation can take place between the parties. This factual dispute can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits, a process which need not take long to conclude.[19] WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, as well as by the R egional Trial Court of Cebu, the instant petition is DENIED and the records of this case are rem anded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SALVADOR BRIBONERIA vs COURT COURT OF APPEALS; G.R. No. 101682; 101682; December 14, 1992 FACTS: On FACTS:  On 23 May 1988, petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, plaintiff, filed a complaint for Annulment of Document and Damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig alleging that he, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the registered owners of a parcel of land with a residential house thereon located at Amsterdam Street Provident Village, J. de la Peña, Marikina, MetroManila. He alleged that he was surprised to learn that his wife N onita A. Briboneria sold to defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa by means of a Deed of  Absolute Sale for he never authorized or or empowered Nonita or anybody anybody for or on his behalf to enter into any transaction regarding the sale, transfer or conveyance of the property. As a result thereof, he was denied the use and enjoyment of his properties since defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa had even leased the premises to another who in turn had prohibited him from entering the premises. In due time, private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, as defendant, filed her answer admitting some allegation but denies the rest for lack of knowledge and/or information sufficient to form a judgment as to the truths thereof.  After issues in the the case had been joined, joined, petitioner served served on the private respondent Mag-isa a request for admission served to his counsel Atty  Alfredo A. Alto On 10 November 1988, the private respondents filed with the court a quo their Answer to Request for Admission, alleging that most if not all the matters subject of petitioner's request for admission had been admitted,

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CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS denied and/or clarified in their verified answer, and that the other matters not admitted, denied and/or clarified were either irrelevant or improper. Petitioner then filed a Motion f or summary Judgment, claiming that the  Answer to Request for Admission was filed filed by private respondents respondents beyond the ten (10) day period fixed in the request and that the answer was not under oath; that, consequently the private respondents are deemed to have admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for admission, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. The private respondents filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, while the petitioner filed a reply. The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the order of the trial court setting aside the Petioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that the said order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of  jurisdiction. On 13 August 1990, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition. Thus this petition. Petiotioner’s Contention: Contention: He claims that the material facts and documents described in the request for admission are relevant evidentiary matters supportive of his cause of action and not mere reiterations and/or reproductions of those alleged in the complaint. He further argues that the private respondents have impliedly admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for admission on account of their failure to answer the request for admission within the period fixed therein, and for said answer not being under oath. ISSUE: 1. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not matters of fact and the documents requested to be admitted are mere reiterations and/or reproductions of those alleged in the complaint 2. Whether or not a request for admission must be served directly on a party, and not his counsel, in order that said request can be considered as validly served

HELD: 1. HELD:  1. YES. A cursory reading of the petitioner's complaint and his request for admission clearly shows, as found by respondent appellate court, that "the material matters and documents set forth in the request for admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint which private respondents either admitted or denied in their answer." In the case of Po vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A

request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. . . .

2. Directly to the party and not to the counsel. Thus, in the present case there is no valid service. Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the request for admission must be served directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be deemed to have admitted the genuineness of any relevant document in and exhibited with the request or relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer t he request for admission.  As a general rule as provided for under under Section 2, Rule 13 of of the Rules of Court is that all notices must be served upon counsel and not upon party. However, the general rule cannot apply where the law expressly provides that notice must be served upon a definite definite person. Moreover, Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court does not control the mode of service of request for admission. It should be observed that the orders, motions and other papers mentioned in said section have this property in common: they have to be filed with the court. A request for admission, on the other hand, need not be filed with the court; it was intended to operate extra-judicially and courts are not burdened with the duty to determine the propriety or impropriety of the request for admission. Such Section shall not control the mode of service of request for admission. In the present case, it will be noted that the request for admission was not served upon the private respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel, Atty.  Alfredo A. Alto. Private Private respondent Mag-isa, therefore, cannot be deemed deemed to have admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for admission for having failed to file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the request. WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. REY LAADA v s. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ G. R. N0. 102390 / February 1, 2002 / DE LEON, JR., J.: Facts: 1. NLRC issued a TRO against Union of Filipino Employees (UFE) who declared a strike on account of alleged unfair labor practices committed by

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CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS Nestle Philippines, Inc. (Nestle), from blocking, barricading and obstructing the points of ingress and egress from Nestles Cabuyao plant. 2. To enforce the TRO, Nestle sought the assistance of both the 224th Philippine Constabulary (PC) Company in Laguna, under the command of petitioner PC/Capt. Rey Laada, and the members of the Cabuyao police department and fire brigade. 3. To transfer its products from the Cabuyao factory to its warehouse in Taguig, Metro Manila during the strike, Nestle hired the trucks of the  Alimagno brothers, brothers, Constancio, Jr., who was then the Officer-in-Charge Officer-in-Charge of Cabuyao, and Jesus. 4. Alexander Asinas of the UFE and Francis Santos of Nestle agreed to constitute a panel to discuss about the said trucks. In apparent bad f aith, Santos signaled both the PC contingent to disperse the strikers. 5. PC contingent began hitting the strikers with truncheons as water cannons from fire trucks assisted them in the dispersal operation that resulted in the arrest of (14) strikers and injuries to many others. Stones were thrown by strikers but (5) trucks succeeded in leaving the compound. 6. Driving on his way home from his masteral class at the University of the Philippines College of Public Health, Dr. Vied Vemir Garcia Hemedez arrived in the area and stopped his car not knowing that the 6th ten-wheeler truck owned by Jesus Alimagno and driven by Pacifico Galasao, was then leaving the Nestle compound in full speed. 7. To avoid stones being thrown at his direction, Galasao was driving in a crouching position. Considering the length of the truck that was also overloaded, Galasao lost control control of it, he abruptly sw erved the truck to the left to avoid the strikers. However, he did not stop nor slow it down, the truck went diagonally across to the left side of the road, bumped the car of Dr. Hemedez, and dragged it until the car turned upside down and also sideswept a house off the road, rammed down a beauty parlor, and run over and killed (2) persons sitting on a bench near the parlor facing the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel. 8. The truck stopped as it crashed into the chapels reinforced concrete wall and post. Galasao rose from his seat, got off the truck, and, apparently anticipating an attack, proceeded to the chapel. 9. Pinned down, Dr. Hemedez was able to ask someone to inform his parents, his brothers of Dr. Hemedez, namely, Roel, Emeterio and Rogelio, Jr., followed by their mother, Mrs. Eliza Hemedez, and her daughter, Andora, arrived tried to pull him but to no avail. 10. Roel asked the PC soldiers to unload or allow them to unload the trucks cargo but Capt. Laada refused to unload the cargo of the truck for fear that the cargo might be looted. They pleaded again but still refused, (2) hours later when the cargo was finally unloaded.

11. Dr. Hemedez was finally pulled out but died shortly after arrival at the hospital due to Intra-thoracic hemorrhage, massive, due to severe impact (Vehicular Accident). 12. With the RTC, a civil case for damages – damages  – filed  filed by parents of Dr. Hemedez against Nestle, Jesus Alimagno, Francis Santos, Pacifico Galasao, and PC/Capt. Rey Laada. 13. Nestle – Nestle – set  set up a cross-claim against Galasao in order that he could reimburse them should they be adjudged liable, and a counterclaim for attorneys fees for what they called an unfounded suit. 14. Laada - filed a counterclaim for moral damages and attorneys fees arising from the plaintiffs having unjustly impleaded him in the baseless suit designed to be a speculative monetary claim against Nestle. Procedural facts – facts  – 1. Hemedez spouses served the defendants a request for admission of the truth of the facts set forth in their complaint and the genuineness of each of the documents appended thereto. Through their respective counsel, Nestle and Santos, Capt. Laada, and Alimagno and Galasao filed their verified answer to the request for admission. 2. Spouses filed motion to strike out the defendants answers and/or declare the matters sought to be admitted as impliedly admitted - contending that under Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court the parties themselves and not their counsel should personally answer the request for admission and hence the answer filed by their counsel in their behalf was by nature based on hearsay. 3. RTC Order – Order – denied  denied motion for lack of merit and held that the defendants have substantially complied with the requirements of the rules by so specifically denying the matters which they could not admit and indicating the reasons why they could not admit or deny the specific matters sought to be admitted, thus leaving such matter controverted. 4. Hemedez spouses sought a reconsideration through an omnibus motion but was denied except the prayer to amend the complaint. RTC held that particular stage of the proceedings, the court could not make a categorical ruling as to the veracity of the denials made by defendants of certain facts based on immateriality, irrelevancy or for lack of information until after it has considered in a full blown trial all the evidence presented and pertinent to the issue of the case. 5. On appeal to CA  – annulled  – annulled the lower courts Orders, granting the motions to strike out the answers subject of the requests for admission and declaring each of the m atters requested to be impliedly admitted, and remanding the case to the court a quo for proper proceedings.  Allegations of Nestle Nestle & Santos – Santos  – a. Nestle & Belltown Transport Services, Inc. had a trucking and hauling agreement whereby latter agreed to make deliveries of the products of Nestle

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CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS and assumed liability for any injuries or damages to properties that would arise from the agreement. b. Accident happened in the course of an illegal strike - the proximate cause of death was the violent assault by the strikers against the truck. c. The complaint should be dismissed for failure to implead UFE, its officers and striking members, as indispensable indispensable parties. d. Incident happened outside of Nestles premises, delayed unloading of the cargo from the truck thus rested upon Belltowns sole judgment.  Allegations of Capt. Capt. Laada – Laada  – a. the unruly mobs attack on the trucks that built up a monstrous traffic jam caused the incident. b. they exerted all efforts to save all casualties and not just Dr. Hemedez. Issue Issue - whether or not an answer to a request for admission signed and sworn to by the counsel of the party so requested is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court -- should a person to whom a request for admission is addressed personally answer the request? Held: 1. Rule 26 of the Rules of Court - SEC. 2. Im plied admission - Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than ten (10) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. 2. Interpretation of the phrase the party to whom the request is directed when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the r equest for admission, it should not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make the response in his behalf. Indeed, the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously; otherwise, it will negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code, as well as Sec. 23, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court. 3. There is NO showing that petitioners Nestle and Santos did not authorize their respective counsel to file in their behalf the respective answers requested of them by private respondents in the latters written request for admission. The subject matters of the request for admission are the same as the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint for which private respondents have filed their respective answers. 4. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or

defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy. 5. In Briboneria v. Court of Appeals & in Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. Court of Appeals - rule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Thus, if the request for admission only serves to delay the proceedings by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated. 6. Private respondents who should be most interested in the speedy disposition of the case unfortunately and unwittingly caused its delay by a request for admission that only achieved nothing but further delay in the proceedings. 7. The consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are GRANTED. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1991 is SET  ASIDE, and the Regional Trial Court of Laguna is is ordered to proceed proceed with the case.  AIR PHIL CO. V PENNSWELL INC. GR 172835 December 13, 2007 Facts:  Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation transportation services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants. Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Under the contracts, petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum until the amount would would be fully paid. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts, respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC. In its Answer, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four items. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely altered the names and labels of such goods. Petitioner asseverated that had respondent been forthright about the identical character of the products, it would not have purchased the items complained of. Hence this suit for Collection of Sum of Money. During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components of the following products. The RTC rendered an Order granting the

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CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS petitioner’s motion. CA reversed the same contending is falls under the exemption-Trade Secrets therefore exempted from compulsory disclosure. It being considered privileged information. Issue: W/N CA erred in upholding RTC decision denying petitioner’s motion to subject respondent’s products to compulsory disclosure. Held: No. Held:  No. The products are covered by the exception of trade secrets being divulged in compulsory compulsory disclosure. The Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding of the RTC’s reversal that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the detailed chemical composition of its products. The Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the Constitution.  A trade secret is is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to a secret formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some article of trade having a commercial value. American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors to determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer’s business; (2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors; (5) the amount of effort or m oney expended by the company in developing the information; and (6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent source.  Also, Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification disqualification by reason of privileged communication, communication, to wit: (a) communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) communication communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they

voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits. Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. The documents must not be privileged against disclosure. On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter; that is, books and papers which, because of their confidential and privileged character, could not be received in evidence. Such a condition is in addition to the requisite that the items be specifically described, and must constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in the party’s possession, custody or control. The revelation of respondent’s trade secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the main case pending with the RTC, which is on the coll ection of a sum of money. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner petitioner received respondent’s goods in trade in in the normal course of business. To be sure, there are defenses under the laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest of justice ought ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade secrets. Weighing the conflicting interests between the parties, SC rules in favor of the greater interest of respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public. Josielene Lara Chan v. Johnny T. Chan G.R. No. 179786 Jul y 24, 2013 2013  Abad , J.

This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband. Facts: Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan filed before RTC of Makati City a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan, the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient

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CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation. Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical record s when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to “be allowed to submit in evidence” the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. The RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration. The CA also denied Josielene’s petition. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient physician-patient communication. Held: (see Held:  (see #2) NO. The CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records. 1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems. Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. hospital  records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure 2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance  of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for

production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. However, the right to compel the production of documents under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are not privileged. To allow, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician Physi cian memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent. 3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records, invoking Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence. But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer.  Any request for disclosure disclosure of his hospital hospital records would again be premature. Note: Concurring (Separate) Opinion of J. Leonen I agree that the hospital records of respondent Johnny Chan may not be produced in court without his/her consent. Issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for its production will violate the physician-patient privilege rule under Rule 130, Sec. 24(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, this privilege is not absolute. The request of petitioner for a copy of the medical records has not been properly laid. Instead of a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, Josielene Lara Chan should avail of the mode of discovery under Rule 28 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 28 pertains to the physical or mental examination of persons. This may be ordered by the court, in its discretion, upon motion and showing of good cause by the requesting party, in cases when the mental and/or physical condition of a party is in controversy. Aside from showing good cause, the requesting party needs only to notify the party to be examined (and all other parties) and specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination, including the name of the physician who will conduct the examination. The examined party may obtain a copy of the examining physician's physician's report concerning his/her mental or physical examination. The requesting party shall deliver this report to him/her. After such delivery, however, the requesting party becomes entitled to any past or future medical report involving the same mental or ph ysical condition. Upon motion and notice, the court may order the examined party to deliver those medical reports to the

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CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS requesting party if the examined party refuses to do so. Moreover, if the examined party requests a copy of the examining physician's report or if he/she takes the examining physician's deposition, the request waives the examined party's privileges when the testimony of any person who examined or will examine his/her mental of physical status is taken in the action or in any action involving the same controversy.