Rule 2 Case Digest

Outline: RULE 2 - Cause of Action

CIVIL PROCEDURE

CIVIL PROCEDURE Lesson for August 2, 2014, Saturday Judge Mike Asuncion

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Felipe Sr. v. Hon. Leuterio, G.R. No. L-4606, May 30, 1952

Cause of Action - the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another - Sec. 2, Rule 2 -

Du v. Jayoma, G.R. No. 175042, April 23, 2012

Elements: -

Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. v. Barrios, G.R. No. L-1539, December 3, 1947

Right of Action vs. Cause of Action - Marquez v. Varela, G.R. No. L-4845, December 24, 1952 Failure to state a cause of action - Remitere v. Montinola Vda. De Yulo,. G.R. No. L-19751, February 28, 1966 Test of the sufficiency of a cause of action - Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. v. David, G.R. No. 129928, August 25, 2005 Splitting a single cause of action - Quadra v. CA, G.R. No. 147593, July 31, 2006 - Bachrach Motor v. Icarangal, G.R. No. L-45350, May 29, 1939 - City of Bacolod v. San Miguel Brewery, G.R. No. L-25134, October 30, 1969 Joinder and mis-joinder of causes of action -

Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012 Sps. Perez v. Hermano, G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005

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Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action FELIPE, SR. vs LEUTERIO G.R. No. L-4606, 30 May 1952 Facts: A benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in Naga City. The contestants were eight, among them Nestor Nosce, Emma Imperial, and Luis General, Jr. There were five judges of the competition, the petitioner Ramon B. Felipe, Sr. being the Chairman. After the orators had delivered their respective pieces, and after the judges had expressed their votes, the Chairman publicly announced their decision awarding first price to Nestor Nosce, second price to Emma Imperial, third price to Menandro Benavides and fourth place to Luis General, Jr. Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges protesting the verdict and alleging that one of the Judges had committed a mathematical mistake, resulting in her second place only instead of the first. Upon refusal of the Board to amend their award, she filed a complaint in the court of first instance. At the contest the five judges were each furnished a blank form wherein he gave the participants grades according to his estimate of their abilities, giving number 1 to the best, number 2 to the second best etc., down to number 8. Then the grades were added, and the contestant receiving the lowest number got first prize, the next second prize, etc. The sums for the first four winners were: Nosce 10; Imperial 10; Benevides 17, General 17. It appearing that Nosce and Imperial had tied for the first place, the Chairman, apparently with the consent of the board, broke the tie awarding first honors to Nosce and second honors to Imperial. It was discovered later that the form filed by Delfin th Rodriguez, one of the Judges, gave Imperial a total score of 94 (4 rd place) and General a total score of 95 (3 place). Imperial asserts that her total should be 95 instead of 94 and therefore should rank 3rd place in Rodriguez' vote. And if she got 3 from Rodriguez, her total vote should have been 9 instead of ten, with the result that she copped first place in the speaking joust. Rodriguez testified that he made a mistake in adding up Imperial's ratings; that she should have been given a total of 95, or placed no. 3, the same as General; that he was not disposed to break the tie between her and General and insisted that he wanted to give rank 3 to Imperial and rank 3 also to General. The situation then is this: Days after a contest has been conducted and the winners announced, one of the judges confesses he made a mistake, that the ratings he gave the second place winner should have been such as would entitle her to first place. The other judges refuse to alter their verdict. Issue: May the matter be brought to the court to obtain a new award, reversing the decision of the board of judges? No.

CIVIL PROCEDURE Held: For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and colleges in these islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have taken part in them either as contestants in their school days, or as members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some (few) verdicts did not reflect the audience's preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable. Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We found in American jurisprudence no litigation questioning the determination of the board of judges. SC observes that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general jurisdiction. The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or judges. Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of "damnum absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions.

Cause of Action - the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another - Sec. 2, Rule 2 DU vs. JAYOMA G.R. No. 175042, 23 April 2012 Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Mabini, Bohol, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1988, requiring the conduct of a public bidding for the operation of a cockpit in the said municipality every four years. For the period January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992, the winning bidder was Engr. Edgardo Carabuena. Due to his failure to comply with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit, the Sangguniang Bayan adopted Resolution authorizing petitioner Danilo Du to continue his cockpit operation until the winning bidder complies with the legal requirements. meikimouse

Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action Upon discovering that petitioner has been operating his cockpit in violation of Municipal Ordinance, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Municipal Resolution suspending petitioner’s cockpit operation. Pursuant to Municipal Resolution, respondent Venancio R. Jayoma, then Mayor of Mabini, in a letter, ordered petitioner to desist from holding any cockfighting activity. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, a Petition for Prohibition (Special Civil Action) against respondent mayor and nine members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini. Petitioner prayed that a preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order be issued to prevent respondents from suspending his cockpit operation. Petitioner claimed that he has a business permit to operate until December 31, 1997; and that the Municipal Resolution was unlawfully issued as it deprived him of due process. Respondents interposed that under the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of a cockpit is lodged in the Sangguniang Bayan; that respondent mayor, in ordering the suspension of petitioner’s cockpit operation, was merely exercising his executive power to regulate the establishment of cockpits in the municipality, pursuant to the ordinances and resolutions enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan; and that Municipal Resolution does not need to be approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because it is not an ordinance but an expression of sentiments of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the RTC enjoining respondents from suspending the cockpit operation of petitioner until further orders from the court. The Petition for Prohibition was later amended to include damages, which the RTC admitted in an Order. The CA reversed the Decision of the RTC. According to the CA, petitioner did not acquire a vested right to operate a cockpit in the municipality as he was only granted a temporary privilege by the Sangguniang Bayan. CA denied petitioner’s reconsideration.

CIVIL PROCEDURE failed to comply with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit. Clearly, under the said resolution, petitioner’s authority to operate the cockpit would end on December 31, 1992 or upon compliance by the winning bidder with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit, whichever comes first. As we see it, the only reason he was able to continue operating until July 1997 was because the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini failed to monitor the status of the cockpit in their municipality. And even if he was able to get a business permit from respondent mayor for the period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997, this did not give him a license to operate a cockpit. Under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC, it is the Sangguniang Bayan which is empowered to "authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks." Considering that no public bidding was conducted for the operation of a cockpit from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997, petitioner cannot claim that he was duly authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan to operate his cockpit in the municipality for the period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997. Respondent members of the Sangguniang Bayan, therefore, had every reason to suspend the operation of petitioner’s cockpit by enacting Municipal Resolution. As the chief executive of the municipal government, respondent mayor was duty-bound to enforce the suspension of the operation of petitioner’s cockpit pursuant to the said Resolution. License to operate a cockpit is a mere privilege. In addition, it is well enshrined in our jurisprudence that "a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege that may be revoked when public interests so require." Having said that, petitioner’s allegation that he was deprived of due process has no leg to stand on.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding that petitioner is not entitled to damages. No. There was no cause of action. Held: The petition lacks merit. A cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." Corollarily, the essential elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s right with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may file an action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. Petitioner has no legal right to operate a cockpit. In this case, we find that petitioner has no cause of action against the respondents as he has no legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality. Under Resolution, the Sangguniang Bayan allowed him to continue to operate his cockpit only because the winning bidder for the period January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992

Cause of Action - the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another - Sec. 2, Rule 2 Elements: MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO. vs. BARRIOS G.R. No. L-1539, 03 December 1947 Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the respondent judge denying the motion to dismiss the complaint of the other respondents which seek to recover amounts of money due then from the petitioner before the outbreak of the war, on the ground that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of the court's jurisdiction in rendering said order; and for prohibition to forbid the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case on the ground that the respondent judge had no jurisdiction to try and decide it. The ground for the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner is that the complaint of the respondents does not state meikimouse

Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because the plaintiffs have no right to demand the payment of the defendants' alleged debts until after the termination or legal cessation of the moratorium provided No. 32, the pertinent part of which reads as follows: III. DEBT MORATORIUM 1. Enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable within the Philippines, except debts and other monetary obligations, entered into in any area after declaration by Presidential Proclamation, that such area has been freed from enemy occupation and control, is temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Government. Issue: Whether or not the complaint of the plaintiffsrespondents states no cause of action and the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the present case do not entitle the petitioner to said reliefs. Yes!

Held: It is plain and Supreme Court (SC) is of the opinion that the complaint filed by the plaintiff respondent in the court below does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. In the present case the complaint alleges the legal right of the plaintiffs to be paid the amount due them from the defendant, as well as the correlative obligation of the defendant to pay said debts to the plaintiffs when it becomes due and payable; but not the omission on the part of the defendant to pay in violation of the legal rights of the plaintiffs to be paid, because according to the above quoted provision of Executive Order No. 32, said debts are not yet payable or their payment can not be enforced until the legal cessation of the moratorium, which is still in force. As the defendant herein petitioner is not yet in default, plaintiffs have no cause of action against him. While the debt moratorium is in force the defendantpetitioner has no obligation yet to pay the plaintiffs, and the latter can not file a suit against him in the courts of justice requiring him to recognize his debts to the plaintiffs and to pay them (after the moratorium) not only the amount of the indebtedness, but the legal interest thereon from the filling of the complaint, the attorney's fees of ten per centum of the amounts due, and the costs of the suits. There is no such action to compel a defendant to acknowledge or recognize his debt which is not yet payable, distinct and different from the action for recovery or payment of a debt already due and payable, against the debtor who refuses to pay it. To allow the plaintiffs' action and grant the relief demanded in the complaint, would be to compel the defendant to pay legal interest of the amount claimed from filing of the said complaint, as well as the attorney's fees of 10 per cent of the sum due thereon as stipulated, and the costs of the suit, as if the defendants' obligations to the

CIVIL PROCEDURE plaintiffs were already payable and he had failed or refused to pay them. Why should the defendant be required to bear the expenses incidental to a suit before he has violated the plaintiffs' right? How could plaintiffs assume that the defendant will not pay his debts when they become payable, and for that reason they have filed this action against defendant? Why should not the contrary be presumed, that is, that the debtor will pay his obligation at the proper time, in order to prevent a suit, preserve its credit, and avoid the expenses incident to a suit, and the payment of legal interest on the amount due and attorney's fees? After stating SC’s opinion that the complaint of the plaintiffs respondents states no cause of action, SC has to hold that the facts stated in the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the present case do not entitle the petitioner to said reliefs. It requires no argument to show that the respondent judge had jurisdiction and did not exceed it or act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss, and therefore we have to dismiss the present petition. This Court, in special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition, can only determine the question whether or not the court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of its discretion in doing the act complained of. SC can not correct errors committed by the lower courts in their judgments, decrees or orders rendered in the exercise of their jurisdiction.

Right of Action vs. Cause of Action MARQUEZ vs. VARELA G.R. No. L-4845, December 24, 1952 Facts: This is an appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of manila dismissing the complaint as to plaintiff L.G. Marquez. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows : that plaintiff Gutierrez Lora was authorized by defendants to negotiate the sale of their share or interest in a parcel of land on Plaza Goiti, Manila, and having meet his co-plaintiff L. G. Marquez, a real estate broker, both of them agreed to work together for the sale of defendant's property; that they found a ready, willing, and able buyer, which accepted defendants' price and terms, but that thereafter defendants, without any justifiable reason, refused to carry out the sale and execute the necessary deed therefor; and that as a consequence plaintiffs failed to receive the commission which they were entitled to receive. The defendants presented a motion to dismiss the complaint as to L. G . Marquez on the ground that he has no cause of action against defendants , and this motion having been granted, plaintiff L. G. Marquez has prosecuted this appeal. The complaint was dismissed on the alleged ground that it states no cause of action against the defendants.

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Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action Issue: Whether or not the objection to the complaint justified./ Whether or not the complaint of Marquez is properly dismissed. No Whether or not there is a cause of action in favor of Marquez against the defendants. Yes. Held: The term "cause of action" has been held to be synonymous with "right of action" , but in the law of pleading (Code Pleading) one is distinguished from the other in that a right of action is a remedial right belonging to some person, while a cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to such remedial right. The one is a matter of right and depends on the substantive law, while the other is a matter of statement and is governed by the law of procedure. (Phillips, Code Pleading, section 189, page 170.) It is not denied that Lora, if he rendered the service alleged in the complaint, would have a right to be paid compensation for the service he rendered jointly with Marquez. He acted as a broker, and a broker is entitled to a commission for his services. (Article 277, Code of Commerce: Henry vs. Velasco, 34 Phil. 587; Perez de Tagle vs. Luzon Surety Co, 38 Off. Gaz. 1213). There is no prohibition in law against the employment of a companion to look for a buyer; neither is it against public policy. Neither was there even any implied understanding between Lora and the defendants that no part of the compensation to which Lora would be entitled to receive could be paid to any companion or helper of Lora. Marquez's right to compensation can not, therefore, be disputed under the operative facts set forth in the complaint. There is a primary right in favor of Marquez (to be paid for his services even through Lora only) and a corresponding duty devolving upon the defendants (to pay for said services). Since (as alleged) defendants refuse to comply with their duty, Marquez now is entitled to enforce his legal right by an action in court. The complaint in the case at bar, therefore, contains both the primary right and duty and the delict or wrong combined which constitute the cause of action in the legal sense as used in Code Pleading (Pomeroy, Code Remedies, section 347), and the cause of action is full and complete. Objection to the complaint, however, is not that Marquez has no right to share in the compensation to be paid Lora, whom defendants had directly engaged, but that Marquez can not join in this action and enforce therein his rights directly against the defendants, evidently because defendants never dealt with Marquez, directly or indirectly, or, in other words, that both Marquez and his services were not known to dismiss show that such in fact was the objection: This paragraph clearly shows that the authority to sell was only given to plaintiff Z. Gutierrez Lora and not to the other plaintiff L. G. Marquez. Attention is respectfully called to the word "plaintiff" used in said paragraph III and expressed in singular form to the exclusion of the other plaintiff L. G. Marquez. If the plaintiff L. G. Marquez had worked at all for the sale of the property at the instance of an invitation of his co- plaintiff

CIVIL PROCEDURE Z. Gutierrez Lora, we maintain that his action if there is any is against his co-plaintiff and not against the defendants herein. As far as the defendant are concerned in this case, plaintiff L. G. Marquez is not only a stranger in this case but also unknown to the defendants; and if he had worked at all for the sale of the defendants' share and participation in the parcels of lands referred to in the complaint, the same was made not only at his own lookout, risk and responsibility but also with no authority whatsoever. (Record on Appeal, pages 16, 17) The principle underlying defendants' objection is one of substantive law, recognized under common law, where no one could sue for a breach of a contract who was not a party thereto, and the action allowed to be brought only in the name of the one holding the legal title. The requirement was based upon the doctrine of privity of contract. Sec. 234. Plaintiffs in Action ex Contractu. — When an action of contract concerns only the original parties to the instrument, it is not difficult to determine who should be the plaintiff. Obviously the one seeking to enforce it is the real party in interest. At common law no one could sue for the breach of contract who was not a party thereto. Hence an action on contract, whether express or implied, was required to be brought in the name of the one who held the legal interest. This requirement was based upon the doctrine of privity of contract. . . . (Phillips, Code Pleading, page 226.) Sec. 235. Privity of Contract. — When necessary. — It was a rule of the common law that before one may complain of another for breach of contract, there must be some direct contractual relation, or privity, between them; and this, with only a few exceptions, is a requirement of the law today. . . . (Phillips, code Pleading, page 227.) But we did not import into this jurisdiction the common law procedure. Our original code of civil Procedure (Act 190) was taken mainly from the code of Civil Procedure of California, and this in turn was based upon the Code of Civil procedure of New York adopted in that stated in 1948. Our system of pleading is Code Pleading that system used in the states of the Union that had adopted codes of procedure. The code system of pleading adopted in substance the rules of equity practice as to parties, under which "all persons having an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs". (Phillips, Code Pleading, section 251, page 247.) In New York and California interest in the subject matter, or in any relief growing out of the same transaction or series of transactions is sufficient to allow joinder Under the former Code of civil procedure "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," and "all persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs, " and " if any person having an interest and in obtaining the relief demanded refuses to join as plaintiff, he may be made a defendant and the fact meikimouse

Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action of his interest and refusal to join to be stated in the complaint." ( Section 114, Act 190) The principle underlying the rule is that all persons having a material interest under the substantive law should be made parties, as distinguished from that of the common law which allowed only a two-sided controversy, each party to be opposed to the other. Phillips, Code Pleading, 2d ed. section 228, page 216.) The above principles have not been changed by the reforms in the rules in 1940 and 1941. The action is still to be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Under section 6 of Rule 3, "All persons in whom . . . any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction . . . is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, . . . join as plaintiffs . . . where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs . . . may arise in the action; Plaintiff Marquez, in the case at bar, clearly falls under the above rule. He is entitled to be paid his commission out of the very contract of agency between Lora and the defendants; Lora and he acted jointly in rendering services to defendants under Lora's contract, and the same questions of law and fact govern their claims. The rules do not require the existence of privity of contract between Marquez and the defendants as required under the common law; all that they demand is that Marquez has a material interest in the subject of the action, the right to share in the broker's commission to be paid Lora under the latter's contract, which right Lora does not deny. This is sufficient to justify the joinder of Marquez as a party plaintiff, even in the absence of privity of contract between him and the defendants.

Failure to state a cause of action REMITERE vs MONTINOLA VDA. DE YULO G.R. No. L-19751, February 28, 1966 Facts: Remitere filed a complaint against the defendantsappellees, Montinola and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. A parcel of land was registered in the name of Remedios Montinola Vda. de Yulo, the defendant herein. Prior to the transfer, the public sale mentioned in this complaint, however, was and still is absolutely a void sale, and certainly did not pass titles and ownership of said lots, starting from its primitive owner, now being represented by the plaintiffs herein, as surviving heirs thereto, until it reaches the possession by the defendant. That by reason of its invalidity, all and every benefits that the transferees, including the defendant herein, had acquired from the parcels of land in question, should be indemnified to the plaintiffs. The complaint prayed that the defendants be ordered to reconvey the two lots in question to the plaintiffs; that the defendant Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the certificates of title in the name of the defendant Remedios Montinola Viuda de

CIVIL PROCEDURE Yulo and to issue new ones in the names of the plaintiffs; and that the defendants pay the costs. The defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action, and (2) that even assuming that a cause of action exists, the same has already prescribed. The lower court dismissed the complaint precisely on the grounds relied upon by the defendants-appellees. Hence this appeal. In this appeal, the plaintiffs-appellants contend that the trial court erred: (1) in declaring that the complaint contains no narration of facts; (2) in holding that complaint states no cause of action; and (3) in holding that the plaintiffs' cause of action, if any, has already prescribed. Issue: Whether or not the complaint states no cause of action. Held: Yes. The lower court had correctly ruled that the complaint in the present case does not narrate facts that constitute a cause of action. The lack of a cause of action as a ground for dismissal must appear on the face of the complaint, and to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action only the facts alleged therein, and no other, should be considered. A reading of the complaint in this case will readily impress one that no ultimate facts which may constitute the basis of plaintiffs-appellants rights which had been violated are alleged. Neither are there allegations of ultimate facts showing acts or omissions on the part of the defendants-appellees which constitute a violation of the rights of plaintiffs-appellants. Apparently, the plaintiffs-appellants rely on the allegations of paragraphs 3 and 5 of the complaint for their cause of action. Paragraph 3 states: 3. Upon the demise of Gregorio Remitere on January 1, 1914 the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, in Civil Case No. 1661, Re-Application for Letters of Administration, appointed his wife as administratrix of his estate, among which the two lots in question. During this period, the provincial sheriff of Negros Occidental, conducted a public auction sale over the said parcels of land, and on the same day, September 23, 1918, he issued thereof a deed of sale in favor of Mariano Yulo of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, for the total consideration of P20,000.00. . . . . The allegations embodied in the above quoted paragraph are mere averments or recitals of facts that do not establish any right or claim on the part of the plaintiffs. The allegations do not state any connection that the plaintiffs have with the deceased Gregorio Remitere, nor do they state what connection or claim the plaintiffs have on the properties left by the deceased Gregorio Remitere. The allegation about the sale at public auction does not state in what way the rights or interests of the plaintiffs had been affected, nay prejudiced, by that sale. Again, paragraph 5 of the complaint states:

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Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action 5. The public sale mentioned in paragraph 3 of this complaint, however, was and still is absolutely a void sale, and certainly did not pass titles and ownership of said lots, starting from its primitive owner, now being represented by the plaintiffs herein, as surviving heirs thereto, until it reaches the possession by the defendants. That by reason of its invalidity, all and every benefits that the transferees, including the defendant herein, had acquired from the parcels of land in question, should be indemnified to the plaintiffs. It is not stated anywhere in the complaint why the sale at public auction was absolutely void, nor were there stated any particular facts or circumstances upon which the alleged nullity of the sale or transaction is predicated. The averment that "the public sale . . . was and still is absolutely a void sale, and certainly did not pass titles and ownerships of said lots, starting from its primitive owner, now being represented by the plaintiffs herein, as surviving heirs thereto, until it reaches the possession by the defendants. . ." is a conclusion of law or an inference from facts not stated in the pleading. A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusion of fact, or conclusion of law. An allegation that a contract is valid, or void, as in the instant case, is a mere conclusion of law. General allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are mere conclusion of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law; as are allegations that a contract is in conformity with, or in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision. . . . . (71 C.J.S. pp. 44-45.) (Emphasis supplied.) Not being statements of ultimate facts which constitute the basis of a right of the plaintiffs-appellants, nor are they statements of ultimate facts which constitute the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendants-appellees that violated the right of the plaintiffs-appellants the allegations of the complaint in the present case have not fulfilled the requirements of Section 3, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court (Sec. 1, Rule 6 of the former Rules of Court) that the complaint should contain a "concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action." This Court has defined the term "cause of action" as follows: A cause of action has been defined by the Supreme Court as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligations of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. (Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, et al., L-1539, Dec. 30, 1947)

CIVIL PROCEDURE The term "ultimate facts" has been defined or explained as follows: Ultimate facts defined.—The term "ultimate facts" as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient. . . . . (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1963 ed., p. 213) Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests. (Montemayor vs. Raborar, et al., 53 O.G. No. 19, p. 6596, citing Pomeroy, Code Remedies, 5th Ed., sec. 420).

Test of the sufficiency of a cause of action MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II COOPERATIVE, INC. vs DAVID G.R. No. 129928, August 25, 2005 Facts: Private respondent David, a supplier of electrical hardware, filed a case for specific performance and damages against MOELCI II, a rural electric cooperative in Misamis Occidental. The said case, which was essentially a collection suit, pending before Judge Felixberto Olalia (hereinafter, Judge Olalia) of the RTC Manila, was predicated on a document and that according to David is the contract pursuant to which he sold to MOELCI II one (1) unit of 10 MVA Transformer. MOELCI II filed its Answer to Amended Complaint which pleaded, among others, affirmative defenses which also constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were lack of cause of action, there being allegedly no enforceable contract between David and MOELCI II under the Statute of Frauds pursuant to Section 1 (g) and (i), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and improper venue. MOELCI II filed with the trial court a Motion (For Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative Defenses and Deferment of PreTrial Conference) (hereinafter referred to as Motion) arguing that the document attached as Annex "A" to the Amended Complaint was only a quotation letter and not a contract as alleged by David. Thus, it contends that David’s Amended Complaint is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. David contended in the main that because a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action is required to be based only on the allegations of the complaint, the "quotation meikimouse

Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action letter," being merely an attachment to the complaint and not part of its allegations, cannot be inquired into. MOELCI II filed a rejoinder to the opposition in which it asserted that a complaint cannot be separated from its annexes; hence, the trial court in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action must consider the complaint’s annexes. Judge Olalia issued an order denying MOELCI II’s motion for preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses. MOELCI II’s motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in another order. MOELCI II elevated this incident to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Olalia in the issuance of the two aforesaid orders. Court of Appeals dismissed MOELCI II’s petition holding that the allegations in David’s complaint constitute a cause of action. With regard to MOELCI II’s contention that David’s Amended Complaint is dismissible as the document, attached thereto as Annex "A," upon which David’s claim is based is not a contract of sale but rather a quotation letter, the Court of Appeals ruled that the interpretation of the document requires evidence aliunde which is not allowed in determining whether or not the complaint states a cause of action. The appellate court further declared that when the trial court is confronted with a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, it is mandated to confine its examination for the resolution thereof to the allegations of the complaint and is specifically enjoined from receiving evidence for that purpose. With the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner is now before this Court seeking a review of the appellate court’s pronouncements. MOELCI II asserts that the Court of Appeals committed serious error in: (1) ruling that the resolution of its motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action necessitated hearings by the trial court with the end in view of determining whether or not the document attached as Annex "A" to the Amended Complaint is a contract as alleged in the body of said pleading; and (2) not ordering the trial court to dismiss the Amended Complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. Anent the first ground, MOELCI II further claims that with the denial of its Petition, the appellate court in effect exhorted the trial court to defer the resolution of its motion to dismiss until after the hearing of the case on the merits contrary to Rule 16 of the Rules of Court and wellsettled jurisprudence. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion. Held: No. To determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the

CIVIL PROCEDURE complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. It has been hypothetically admitted that the parties had entered into a contract sale David bound himself to supply MOELCI II (1) unit 10 MVA Power transformer with accessories for a total price of P5,200,000.00 plus 69 KV Line Accessories for a total price of P2,169,500.00; that despite written and verbal demands, MOELCI II has failed to pay the price thereof plus the custom duties and incidental expenses of P272,722.27; and that apart from the previously stated contract of sale, David regularly delivered various electrical hardware to MOELCI II which, despite demands, has an outstanding balance of P281,939.76. The court believed all the foregoing sufficiently lay out a cause of action. Even extending our scrutiny to Annex "A," which is after all deemed a part of the Amended Complaint, will not result to a change in our conclusion. The interpretation of a document requires introduction of evidence which is precisely disallowed in determining whether or not a complaint states a cause of action. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed MOELCI II’s petition and upheld the trial court’s ruling.

Splitting a single cause of action QUADRA vs CA G.R. No. 147593, July 31, 2006 Facts: Petitioner Quadra was the Chief Legal Officer of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) when he organized and actively participated in the activities of Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Employees Association (CUGCO), an organization composed of the rank and file employees of PCSO, and then later, the Association of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel and Supervisors (CUGCO) (ASSPS [CUGCO]). He was administratively charged before the Civil Service Commission with violation of Civil Service Law and Rules for neglect of duty and misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. Civil Service Commission rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the charges and recommending the penalty of dismissal. General Manager of PCSO, Ignacio Santos Diaz, sent petitioner a letter of dismissal, in accordance with the decision of the Civil Service Commission. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Civil Service Commission. At the same time, petitioner, together with ASSPS (CUGCO), filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a complaint for unfair labor practice against respondent PCSO and its officers.

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Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action CIR issued its decision finding respondent PCSO guilty of unfair labor practice for having committed discrimination against the union and for having dismissed petitioner due to his union activities. It ordered the reinstatement of petitioner to his former position with full backwages and with all the rights and privileges pertaining to said position. Respondent PCSO complied with the decision of the CIR. But while it reinstated petitioner to his former position and paid his backwages, it also filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari entitled "Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, et al. v. The Association of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel, et al." assailing the decision of the CIR in Case No. 4312-ULP. During the pendency of the case in the Supreme Court, petitioner filed with the CIR a "Petition for Damages." He prayed for moral and exemplary damages in connection with Case No. 4312ULP. Respondent PCSO moved to dismiss the petition for damages on the following grounds: (1) the CIR has no jurisdiction to award moral and exemplary damages; (2) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment, it appearing that two complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action; and (3) the petition states no valid cause of action. Petitioner resigned from PCSO . The petition for damages and the motion to dismiss, however, remained pending with the CIR until it was abolished and the NLRC was created. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision awarding moral and exemplary damages to petitioner . The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, prompting respondent PCSO to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC. It held that there was no basis for the grant of moral and exemplary damages to petitioner as his dismissal was not tainted with bad faith. It was the Civil Service Commission that recommended petitioner's dismissal after conducting an investigation. It also held that the petition claiming moral and exemplary damages filed by petitioner after respondent PCSO had complied with the CIR decision of reinstatement and backwages amounted to splitting of cause of action. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied for lack for merit. Petitioner now seeks the Court to review the ruling of the Court of Appeals. He argued that: First: The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the PCSO did not act in bad faith when it dismissed the petitioner is contrary to the already final and executory decision of the CIR finding the PCSO guilty of bad faith and unfair labor practice in dismissing the petitioner. The decision of the CIR was affirmed by the High Court in the case of PCSO. The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to amend the final and executory decision of the CIR which was affirmed by the High Court. Once a decision has become final [and] executory, it could no longer be amended or altered. Second: The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the claims for moral and exemplary damages of the petitioner is allegedly "tantamount to splitting of cause of action under Sec. 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure" is contrary to law. When

CIVIL PROCEDURE petitioner filed with the CIR his complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice, the prevailing law and jurisprudence was that the CIR did not have jurisdiction to grant moral and exemplary damages. Petitioner's claim for moral damages was filed with the CIR in the same case by virtue of the ruling of the High Court in Rheem v. Ferrer, 19 SCRA 130 holding that the CIR has jurisdiction to award moral and exemplary damages arising out of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s contention is correct. (2 contention)

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Held: Yes. The court ruled that the filing of a petition for damages before the CIR did not constitute splitting of cause of action under the Revised Rules of Court. The Revised Rules of Court prohibits parties from instituting more than one suit for a single cause of action. Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing a single cause of action, claim or demand into two or more parts, and bringing suit for one of such parts only, intending to reserve the rest for another separate action. The purpose of the rule is to avoid harassment and vexation to the defendant and avoid multiplicity of suits. The prevailing rule at the time that the action for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal was filed and tried before the CIR was that said court had no jurisdiction over claims for damages. Hence, petitioner, at that time, could not raise the issue of damages in the proceedings. However, on January 27, 1967, the Supreme Court rendered its ruling in Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Ferrer, et al. upholding the jurisdiction of the CIR over claims for damages incidental to an employee's illegal dismissal. Petitioner properly filed his claim for damages after the declaration by the Court and before the ruling on their case became final. Such filing could not be considered as splitting of cause of action.

Splitting a single cause of action BACHRACH MOTOR vs ICARANGAL G.R. No. L-45350, May 29, 1939 Facts: Icarangal with Figueroa executed a promissory note in favor of appellant Bachrach in the amount of P1,614. As a security for its payment, Icarangal executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land which was duly registered in the RD in 1931. When the promissors defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installments, Bachrach instituted in the CFI an action for collection of the amount due on the note. Judgement was rendered in favor of Bachrach, thereafter, a writ of execution was issued and the properties of Icarangal was subsequently levied by the sheriff including the mortgaged property.

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Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action Oriental Commercial Co., Inc. (Oriental), the other defendant, interposed a third-party claim, alleging that the mortgaged property had already been acquired by it thru public auction in 1933. By said reason, the sheriff desisted from the sale of the property, and as a consequence, the judgement rendered in favor of Bachrach remained unsatisfied. Bachrach instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court dismissed the complaint, hence, the filing of the present appeal. Issue: Whether or not Bachrach is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after obtaining a personal judgment against Icarangal on the promissory note. Held: YES. The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." It comes from that old maxim nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem cause (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause). And it developed, certainly not as an original legal right of the defendant, but as an interposition of courts upon principles of public policy to prevent inconvenience and hardship incident to repeated and unnecessary litigations. For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor. We hold, therefore, that, in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such

CIVIL PROCEDURE personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano vs. Enriquez, 24 Phil., 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil., 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies. In arriving at the foregoing conclusion, we are not unaware of the rule prevailing in certain States of the American Union, to the effect that, in cases like the one at bar, the creditor can pursue his remedies against the note and against the security concurrently or successively. The reason given for the rule seems to be that the causes of action in the two instances are not the same, one being personal and the other, real. But, as we have heretofore stated, the creditor's cause of action is not only single but indivisible, although the agreements of the parties, evidenced by the note and the deed of mortgage, may give rise to different remedies. (Frost vs. Witter, 132 Cal., 421.) The cause of action should not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement. And considering, as we have shown, that one of the two remedies available to the creditor is as complete as the other, he cannot be allowed to pursue both in violation of those principles of procedure intended to secure simple, speedy and unexpensive administration of justice. Judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Splitting a single cause of action CITY OF BACOLOD vs SAN MIGUEL BREWERY G.R. No. L-25134, October 30, 1969 Facts: In 1949, the City Council of Bacolod passed Ordinance No. 66, series of 1949, imposing upon any person or corporation engaged in the manufacturing of bottling products such as softdrinks within the jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod, a fee of 1/24 of a centavo for every bottle thereof, plus surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to exceed 24% for one whole year for the delinquent manufacturer. In 1959, the ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 150, series of 1959, by increasing the fee to 1/8 of a centavo for every bottle thereof, or an increased from P0.01 to P0.03 per case of softdrinks. San Miguel Brewery, Inc. (San Miguel) refused to pay the additional fee and challenged the validity of the whole ordinance.

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Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action In 1960, the City Council sued San Miguel before the CFI for the payment of the unpaid bottling taxes due with legal interests and for the payment of P0.03 per case bottling tax. San Miguel filed its answer. The trial court rendered judgement in favor of the appellee. Appellant appealed the said decision to SC where it pressed the question of the invalidity of the above mentioned taxing ordinances. The SC affirmed the CFI decision and upheld the constitutionality of the taxing ordinances. After the finality of the SC decision, the appellee (City Council) moved for the reconsideration thereof, praying that the same be amended so as to include the penalties and surcharges provided for in the ordinances. The said motion was denied, for the reason the “the decision is already final and may not be amended”. During the execution before the CFI, the appellee again sought the inclusion of the surcharges referred to, the said motion was denied. Appellee filed before the CFI a second action/complaint to collect the said surcharges. Appellant move for the dismissal of the complaint anchored on two grounds: (1) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment, and (2) a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. This motion was denied by the trial court, and so the appellant filed its answer. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the appellee. Appellants moved for a reconsideration but it was denied, hence, the instant appeal. Issue: Whether or not the actions of the appellee splits up a single cause of action. Held: YES. It cannot be denied that appellant's failure to pay the bottling charges or taxes and the surcharges for delinquency in the payment thereof constitutes but one single cause of action which under the above rule can be the subject of only one complaint, under pain of either of them being barred if not included in the same complaint with the other. The error of appellee springs from a misconception or a vague comprehension of the elements of a cause of action. The classical definition of a cause of action is that it is "a delict or wrong by which the rights of the plaintiff are violated by the defendant." Its elements may be generally stated to be (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a corresponding obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission of the plaintiff which constitutes a violation of the plaintiff's right which defendant had the duty to respect. For purposes, however, of the rule against splitting up of a cause of action, a clearer understanding can be achieved, if together with these elements, the right to relief is considered. In the last analysis, a cause of action is basically an act or an omission or several acts or omissions. A single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. In other words, for a single cause of action or violation of a right, the plaintiff may be entitled to several reliefs. It is the filing of separate complaints for these several reliefs that constitutes splitting up of the cause of action. This is what is prohibited by the rule.

CIVIL PROCEDURE In the case at bar, when appellant failed and refused to pay the difference in bottling charges from July 1, 1959, such act of appellant in violation of the right of appellee to be paid said charges in full under the Ordinance, was one single cause of action, but under the Ordinance, appellee became entitled, as a result of such non-payment, to two reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the balance of the basic charges; and (2) the payment of the corresponding surcharges, the latter being merely a consequence of the failure to pay the former. Stated differently, the obligation of appellant to pay the surcharges arose from the violation by said appellant of the same right of appellee from which the obligation to pay the basic charges also arose. Upon these facts, it is obvious that appellee has filed separate complaints for each of two reliefs related to the same single cause of action, thereby splitting up the said cause of action. The trial court held that inasmuch as there was no demand in the complaint in the first case for the payment of the surcharges, unlike in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Blas Gutierrez, et al., G.R. No. L-13819. May 25, 1960, wherein there was such a demand, there is no bar by prior judgment as to said surcharges, the same not having been "raised as an issue or cause of action in Civil Case No. 5693." This holding is erroneous. Section 4 of Rule 2, above-quoted, is unmistakably clear as to the effect of the splitting up of a cause of action. It says, "if separate complaints are brought for different parts (reliefs) of a single cause of action, the filing of the first (complaint) may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the merits in either is available as a bar in the others." In other words, whenever a plaintiff has filed more than one complaint for the same violation of a right, the filing of the first complaint on any of the reliefs born of the said violation constitutes a bar to any action on any of the other possible reliefs arising from the same violation, whether the first action is still pending, in which event, the defense to the subsequent complaint would be litis pendentia, or it has already been finally terminated, in which case, the defense would be res adjudicata. Indeed, litis pendentia and res adjudicata, on the one hand, and splitting up a cause of action on the other, are not separate and distinct defenses, since either of the former is by law only the result or effect of the latter, or, better said, the sanction for or behind it. It thus results that the judgment of the lower court must be, as it is hereby, reversed and the complaint of appellee is dismissed. No costs.

Joinder and mis-joinder of causes of action ADA vs BAYLON G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012 Background of the case: Spouses Florentino and Maximina Baylon died in 1961 and 1974 respectively. Children: Rita, Victoria, Dolores, Panfila, Ramon and Lilia, herein petitioner. Dolores died intestate and without issue in 1976. Victoria died in 1981 and was survived by daughter, Luz, herein petitioner. Ramon died intestate in 1989, and was survived by herein respondent Florante, his child from his first marriage, and meikimouse

Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action Flora his second wife, and their legitimate children, the other herein petitioners. Facts: Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for partition, accounting and damages against Florante, Rita and Panfila, alleging therein that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime, owned 43 parcels of land all situated in Negros Oriental. After the death of Spouses Baylon, they claimed that Rita took possession of the said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income from the same. Using the income produced by the said parcels of land, Rita allegedly purchased two parcels of land. The petitioners averred that Rita refused to effect a partition of the said parcels of land. In their Answer, Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted that they and the petitioners co-owned 22 out of the 43 parcels of land mentioned in the latter’s complaint, whereas Rita actually owned parcels of land, 10 out of the 43 parcels which the petitioners sought to partition, while the remaining parcels of land are separately owned by Petra Cafino Adanza, Florante, Meliton Adalia, Consorcia Adanza, Lilia & Santiago Mendez. Further, they claimed that the 2 parcels of land, claimed to be brought from the income produced from the estate of the late spouses, were acquired by Rita using her own money. They denied that Rita appropriated solely for herself the income of the estate of Spouses Baylon, and expressed no objection to the partition of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but only with respect to the co-owned parcels of land. During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation, conveyed the 2 above mentioned parcels of land to Florante. On July 16, 2000, Rita died intestate and without any issue. Thereafter, learning of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading, praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. They further alleged that Rita was already sick and very weak when the said Deed of Donation was supposedly executed and, thus, could not have validly given her consent thereto. Florante and Panfila opposed the rescission of the said donation, asserting that Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code applies only when there is already a prior judicial decree on who between the contending parties actually owned the properties under litigation. RTC Decision: The RTC held that the death of Rita during the pendency of the case, having died intestate and without any issue, had rendered the issue of ownership insofar as parcels of land which she claims as her own moot since the parties below are the heirs to her estate. Thus, the RTC regarded Rita as the owner of the said 10 parcels of land and, accordingly, directed that the same be partitioned among her heirs. Nevertheless, the RTC rescinded the donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, holding that the donation inter vivos was executed to prejudice the plaintiffs’ right to succeed to the estate of Rita in case of death considering that it refers to the parcels of land in litigation. Florante sought reconsideration insofar as to the rescission of the donation. The trial court denied the motion.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CA Decision: On appeal, the CA rendered a decision reversing the RTC decision. The CA remanded the case to RTC for the determination of ownership of the said 2 parcels of land. The CA held that before the petitioners may file a rescission, they must first obtain a favorable judicial ruling that the subject 2 parcels of land belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, an action for rescission is premature. The petitioners moved for the reconsideration, but it was denied, hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not an action for partition and rescission may be joined in a single cause of action. Held: NO. There was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action. By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or [29] rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as they may have against an opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules. Disposition: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated October 26, 2007 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01746 is MODIFIED in that the Decision dated October 20, 2005 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Tanjay City, meikimouse

Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action Negros Oriental, Branch 43 in Civil Case No. 11657, insofar as it decreed the rescission of the Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997 is hereby REINSTATED. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for the determination of the ownership of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in accordance with this Decision. NOTES:  A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon motion of a party or by the court sua sponte, may be adjudicated by the court together with the other causes of action; not a ground for dismissal  A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of action as long as it has some relation to the original cause of action set forth in the original complaint  The purpose of supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even though they themselves constitute a right of action.

CIVIL PROCEDURE mortgage their property to Hermano, more so that they have never received a single centavo from the latter. As to third cause of action, they prayed for damages against all defendants. In his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent Hermano denied petitioner’s allegations. He then filed a civil case for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage (Branch 216) against petitioner Aviso. He also filed a ”Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint Against Him or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial” before Branch 224, arguing that there was a misjoinder of causes of action under Rule 2, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. The trial court (Branch 224) granted the said motion over the opposition of the petitioners, holding that respondent Hermano should be dropped as one of the defendants in this case and whatever claims petitioner may have against Hermano, they can set it up by way of an answer to said judicial foreclosure. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was also dismissed. They filed a petition for certiorari to the CA under Rule 65, however it was dismissed on mere technicality, the petition having been filed out of time. Hence, this petition after the denial of their motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not there was mis-joinder of causes of action.

Joinder and mis-joinder of causes of action SPS. PEREZ vs HERMANO G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005 Facts: The civil case filed by the petitioners before the trial court against the respondents for “Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for TRO (Branch 224) presented three (3) causes of action: first, enforcement of contract to sell entered into between petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc.; second, for the annulment or rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered into between petitioners and respondent Hermano; and third, for damages against all defendants. First cause of action: Sometime in 1997, petitioners entered into a Contract of Sell with Zescon through Sales-Contreras, for the purchase of 5 parcels of land in the total amount of P19,104,000.00. as part of their agreement, a portion of the purchase price would be paid to them as downpayment, another portion to be given to them as cash advance upon the execution of the contract and another portion to be used by the buyer, Zescon, to pay for loans earlier contracted by petitioners which loans were secured by mortgages. Second cause of action: In a tricky machination and simultaneous with the execution of the aforesaid Contract of Sell, they were made to sign other documents, two of which were Mortgage deeds over the same 5 properties in favor of respondent Hermano, whom they had never met. It was allegedly explained to them by Sales-Contreras that the mortgage contracts would merely serve to facilitate the payment of the price as agreed upon in their Contract to Sell. They claim that it was never their intention to

Held: NONE. The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized. Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder. In herein case, petitioners have adequately alleged in their complaint that after they had already agreed to enter into a contract to sell with Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, the latter also gave them other documents to sign, to wit: A Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties but for a lower consideration, two mortgage deeds over the same properties in favor of respondent Hermano with accompanying notes and acknowledgment receipts for Ten Million pesos (P10,000,000) each. Petitioners claim that Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, misled them to mortgage their properties which they had already agreed to sell to the latter.

meikimouse

Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action From the above averments in the complaint, it becomes reasonably apparent that there are questions of fact and law common to both Zescon Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano arising from a series of transaction over the same properties. There is the question of fact, for example, of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., indeed misled petitioners to sign the mortgage deeds in favor of respondent Hermano. There is also the question of which of the four contracts were validly entered into by the parties. Note that under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, for a mortgage to be valid, it is imperative that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Thus, respondent Hermano will definitely be affected if it is subsequently declared that what was entered into by petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc., was a Contract of Sale (as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by them) because this would mean that the contracts of mortgage were void as petitioners were no longer the absolute owners of the properties mortgaged. Finally, there is also the question of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., as represented by Sales-Contreras, and respondent Hermano committed fraud against petitioners as to make them liable for damages. Prescinding from the foregoing, and bearing in mind that the joinder of causes of action should be liberally construed as to effect in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy involving one subject matter, we hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in severing from the complaint petitioners’ cause of action against respondent Hermano. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 19 October 2000 dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari and its Resolution dated 02 March 2001 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, dated 28 February 2000 and 25 May 2000 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The RTC is further ordered to reinstate respondent Antonio Hermano as one of the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-98-34211. No costs.

CIVIL PROCEDURE cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately. 

Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions: (a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties; (b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules; (c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and (d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

NOTES: Requisites for Joinder of Causes of Action (a) It will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) The causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character Objectives of the rule or provision (a) To avoid multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter; and (b) To expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost 

Should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants



Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action G.R. No. L-4606

May 30, 1952

RAMON B. FELIPE, SR., as Chairman, Board of Judges, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE N. LEUTERIO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, EMMA IMPERIAL, represented by her guardian-adlitem JUSTO V. IMPERIAL, and SOUTHERN LUZON COLLEGE, respondents. Ramon Felipe, Jr., and L. B. Karingal for petitioner. Ezequiel S. Grageda and Victoriano Yamson for respondents Judge Leuterio and Emma Imperial. Padilla and San Juan for respondent Southern Luzon College. BENGZON, J.: Statement of the case. The issue in the litigation is whether the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical competition. In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first honor was given by the board of five judges to Nestor Nosce, and second honor to Emma Imperial. Six days later, Emma asked the court of the first instance of that province to reversed that award, alleging that one of the judges had fallen to error in grading her performance. After a hearing, and over the objection of the other four judges of the contest, the court declared Emma Imperial winner of the first place. Hence this special civil action challenging the court's power to modify the board's verdict. The facts. There is no dispute about the facts: 1. On March 12, 1950 a benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in Naga City. The contestants were eight, among them Nestor Nosce, Emma Imperial, and Luis General, Jr. 2. There were five judges of the competition, the petitioner Ramon B. Felipe, Sr. being the Chairman. 3. After the orators had delivered their respective pieces, and after the judges had expressed their votes, the Chairman publicly announced their decision awarding first price to Nestor Nosce, second price to Emma Imperial, third price to Menandro Benavides and fourth place to Luis General, Jr. 4. Four days afterwards, Emma Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges protesting the verdict, and alleging that one of the Judges had committed a mathematical mistake, resulting in her second place only, instead of the first, which she therefore claimed. 5. Upon refusal of the Board to amend their award, she filed a complaint in the court of first instance. 6. At the contest the five judges were each furnished a blank form wherein he give the participants grades according to his estimate of their abilities, giving number 1 to the best, number 2 to the second best etc., down to number 8. Then the grades were added, and the contestant receiving the lowest number got first prize, the next second prize, etc.

CIVIL PROCEDURE 7. The sums for the first four winners were: Nosce 10; Imperial 10; Benevides 17, General 17, the Board of judges having voted as follows: Judge

Nosce

Imperial

Buenavides Gen

Felipe Sr. .........

3

1

2

4

Obias ..............

1

2

4

3

Rodriguez ..........

1

4

5

3

Prado ..............

3

2

1

3

Moll ...............

2

1

5

4

10

10

17

17

8. It appearing that Nestor Nosce and Emma Imperial had tied for the first place, the Chairman, apparently with the consent of the board, broke the tie awarding first honors to Nosce and second honors to Imperial. 9. For the convenience of the judges the typewritten forms contained blank spaces in which, after the names of the rival orators and their respective orations, the judge could not jot down the grades he thought the contestants deserved according to "Originality", "Timeliness", "English", "Stage Personality", "Pronunciation and Enunciation" and "Voice". From such data he made up his vote. 10. It was discovered later that the form filed by Delfin Rodriguez, one of the Judges, gave Imperial and General the following ratings under the above headings; Imperial 19-15-15-18-14-14 Total 94Place 4th General 19-15-15 or 14-19-14-14 Total 95-Place 3rd. 11. Imperial asserts that her total should be 95 instead of 94 and therefore should rank 3rd place in Rodriguez' vote. And if she got 3 from Rodriguez, her total vote should have been 9 instead of ten, with the result that she copped first place in the speaking joust. 12. Rodriguez testified that he made a mistake in adding up Imperial's ratings; that she should have been given a total of 95, or placed No. 3, the same as General; that he was not disposed to break the tie between her and General and insisted that he wanted to give rank 3 to Imperial and rank 3 also to General. Discussion. Although it would seem anomalous for one judge to give the same rank to two contestants, we will concede for the moment that Delfin Rodriguez could have given 3 to Imperial to General. However if deductions are to be made from his recorded vote (Exhibit 3) one may infer that after the contest and before submitting his vote he decided to give General an edge over Imperial. How? Under the caption "English" General was given by himself at first "14", later increased to "15". Evidently because after he had added the ratings of Imperial and (erroneously) reached the sum of 94, he added the ratings of General (which were the same as Imperial with 14 under "English") and (mistakenly) reached 94 also. So what did he also? He raised the 14 to 15 and thus gave general 95 to place him over Imperial's 94. (Mistakingly again, because with 15 General got 96 instead of 95). But to us the important thing is Rodriguez' vote during and immediately after the affair. His vote in Exhibit 3 definitely gave meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action General place No. 3 and Imperial place No. 4. His calculations recorded on Exhibit 3 were not material. In fact the Chairman did not bother to fill out the blank spaces in his own form, and merely set down his conclusions giving one to Imperial, 2 to Benavides etc. without specifying the ratings for "Voice", "English", "Stage Personality" etc. In other words what counted was the vote. Probably for the above reasons the board refused to "correct" the alleged error. The situation then is this: Days after a contest has been conducted and the winners announced, one of the judges confesses he made a mistake, that the ratings he gave the second place winner should have been such as would entitle her to first place. The other judges refuse to alter their verdict. May the matter be brought to the court to obtain a new award, reversing the decision of the board of judges? For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and colleges in these islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have 1 taken part in them either as contestants in their school days , or as members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some (few) verdicts did not reflect the audience's preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable.

CIVIL PROCEDURE principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or judges. Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of "damnum absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges. By the way what is here in stated must not be understood as applying to those activities which the government has chosen to regulate with the creation of the Games and Amusements Board in Executive Order No. 392, Series 1950. Judgment. In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so declare, that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions. Wherefore the order in controversy is hereby set aside. No costs.

Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the highest tenets of sportmanship: finally of the referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are supposed to join the competition to contribute to its success by striving their utmost: the prizes are secondary. No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because their's was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges. Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We found in American jurisprudence no litigation questioning the determination of the board of judges. Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords some reason for doubting the existence of the right sought to be enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before allowing it, being loath to establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the generally accepted views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012). We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general jurisdiction. The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action G.R. No. 175042

April 23, 2012

DANILO A. DU, Petitioner, vs. VENANCIO R. JAYOMA, then Municipal Mayor of Mabini, Bohol, VICENTE GULLE, JR., JOVENIANO MIANO, WILFREDO MENDEZ, AGAPITO VALLESPIN, RENE BUCIO, JESUS TUTOR, CRESCENCIO BERNALES, EDGARDO YBANEZ, and REY PAGALAN, then members of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Mabini, Bohol, Respondents. DECISION

CIVIL PROCEDURE 16

In their Answer, respondents interposed that under the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of a cockpit is lodged 17 in the Sangguniang Bayan; that respondent mayor, in ordering the suspension of petitioner’s cockpit operation, was merely exercising his executive power to regulate the establishment of cockpits in the municipality, pursuant to the ordinances and resolutions enacted by 18 the Sangguniang Bayan; and that Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997, does not need to be approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because it is not an ordinance but an expression of 19 sentiments of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini. 20

DEL CASTILLO, J.: In the absence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff, there can be no cause of action. 1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of 2 3 Court assails the Decision dated July 11, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00492. Factual Antecedents On July 7, 1988, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of 4 Mabini, Bohol, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1988, requiring the conduct of a public bidding for the operation of a cockpit in the said municipality every four years. For the period January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992, the winning 5 bidder was Engr. Edgardo Carabuena. However, due to his failure to comply with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit, the Sangguniang Bayan on December 1, 1988 adopted Resolution No. 6 127, series of 1988, authorizing petitioner Danilo Du to continue his cockpit operation until the winning bidder complies with the legal 7 requirements. On July 9, 1997, upon discovering that petitioner has been operating his cockpit in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1988, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Municipal Resolution No. 065, series 8 of 1997, suspending petitioner’s cockpit operation effective upon 9 approval. On July 11, 1997, pursuant to Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997, respondent Venancio R. Jayoma, then Mayor of Mabini, in a 10 letter, ordered petitioner to desist from holding any cockfighting 11 activity effective immediately. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed with Branch 51 of the Regional 12 Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, a Petition for Prohibition, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 4, against respondent mayor and nine members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini, namely: Vicente Gulle, Jr., Joveniano Miano, Wilfredo Mendez, Agapito Vallespin, Rene Bucio, Jesus Tutor, Crescencio Bernales, Edgardo Ybanez and Rey Pagalan. Petitioner prayed that a preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order be issued to prevent respondents 13 from suspending his cockpit operation. Petitioner claimed that he 14 has a business permit to operate until December 31, 1997; and that the Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997, was 15 unlawfully issued as it deprived him of due process.

On October 22, 1997, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the RTC enjoining respondents from suspending the cockpit 21 operation of petitioner until further orders from the court. The Petition for Prohibition was later amended damages, which

22

to include

23

the RTC admitted in an Order dated January 21, 1998. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On October 5, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision petitioner, to wit:

24

in favor of

WHEREFORE, and on the ground that petitioner was able to prove his case with preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents, ordering the respondents jointly and severally to pay the petitioner: 1. The amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) in the concept of moral damages; 2. The amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) in the concept of unearned income considering the unrebutted testimony of the petitioner [that] he lost Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) for each of the fifteen (15) Sundays that his cockpit was closed as its operation was ordered suspended by the respondent. By mathematical computation P4,000.00 x 15 amounts to P60,000.00; 3. The amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages to deter other public officials from committing similar acts; 4. The amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and to pay the cost. SO ORDERED.

25

Ruling of the Court of Appeals On appeal, the CA reversed the Decision of the RTC. According to the CA, petitioner did not acquire a vested right to operate a cockpit in the municipality as he was only granted a temporary privilege by the 26 Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, there being no right in esse, petitioner 27 is not entitled to damages. Thus, the dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision granting petitioner the award of meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action damages is SET ASIDE and the petition filed by petitioner against respondents is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

28

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied by the CA in 29 a Resolution dated October 4, 2006. Issue Hence, the instant petition raising the core issue of whether the CA 30 erred in finding that petitioner is not entitled to damages. Petitioner’s Arguments Petitioner contends that Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997, is ultra vires as it was maliciously, hastily, and unlawfully enforced by respondent mayor two days after its passage without 31 the review or approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bohol. He alleges that respondents suspended the operation of his cockpit without due process and that the suspension was politically 32 motivated. In addition, he claims that as a result of the incident, he is entitled to actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as 33 attorney’s fees. Respondents’ Arguments Echoing the ruling of the CA, respondents insist that petitioner is not entitled to damages because he did not acquire a vested right to 34 operate a cockpit in the municipality. They also maintain that the suspension of petitioner’s cockpit operation was pursuant to law 35 and prevailing ordinance. Our Ruling The petition lacks merit. A cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a party 36 violates a right of another." Corollarily, the essential elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s right with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may file an action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate 37 relief. Petitioner has no legal right to operate a cockpit. In this case, we find that petitioner has no cause of action against the respondents as he has no legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality. Under Resolution No. 127, series of 1988, the Sangguniang Bayan allowed him to continue to operate his cockpit only because the winning bidder for the period January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992 failed to comply with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit. Clearly, under the said resolution, petitioner’s authority to operate the cockpit would end on December 31, 1992 or upon compliance by the winning bidder with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit, whichever comes first. As we see it, the only reason he was able to continue operating until July

CIVIL PROCEDURE 1997 was because the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini failed to monitor the status of the cockpit in their municipality. And even if he was able to get a business permit from respondent mayor for the period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997, this did not give him a license to operate a cockpit. Under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC, it is the Sangguniang Bayan which is empowered to "authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks." Considering that no public bidding was conducted for the operation of a cockpit from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997, petitioner cannot claim that he was duly authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan to operate his cockpit in the municipality for the period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997. Respondent members of the Sangguniang Bayan, therefore, had every reason to suspend the operation of petitioner’s cockpit by enacting Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997. As the chief executive of the municipal government, respondent mayor was duty-bound to enforce the suspension of the operation of petitioner’s cockpit pursuant to the said Resolution. It bears stressing that no evidence was presented to show that upon review by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bohol, the resolution was declared invalid or that the resolution was issued beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan or mayor. Jurisprudence consistently holds that an ordinance, or in this case a resolution, is "presumed valid in the absence of evidence showing that it is not in 38 accordance with the law." Hence, we find no reason to invalidate Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997. License to operate a cockpit is a mere privilege. In addition, it is well enshrined in our jurisprudence that "a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege that may be revoked when 39 public interests so require." Having said that, petitioner’s allegation that he was deprived of due process has no leg to stand on. Petitioner not entitled to damages Without any legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality, petitioner is not entitled to damages. Injury alone does not give petitioner the right to recover damages; he must also have a right of 40 action for the legal wrong inflicted by the respondents. We need not belabor that "in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, there must be damnum et injuria – that act must 41 be not only hurtful, but wrongful." 1âwphi1 All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing petitioner’s case. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 11, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00492 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action G.R. No. L-1539

CIVIL PROCEDURE

December 3, 1947

MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL vs. CONRADO BARRIOS, ET AL., respondents.

CO.,

Hilado Brothers for Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for respondents.

petitioner,

petitioner.

FERIA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the respondent judge denying the motion to dismiss the complaint of the other respondents which seek to recover amounts of money due then from the petitioner before the outbreak of the war, on the ground that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of the court's jurisdiction in rendering said order; and for prohibition to forbid the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case on the ground that the respondent judge had no jurisdiction to try and decide it. The ground for the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner is that the complaint of the respondents does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because the plaintiffs have no right to demand the payment of the defendants' alleged debts until after the termination or legal cessation of the moratorium provided No. 32, the pertinent part of which reads as follows:lawphil.net III. DEBT MORATORIUM 1. Enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable within the Philippines, except debts and other monetary obligations, entered into in any area after declaration by Presidential Proclamation, that such area has been freed from enemy occupation and control., is temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Government. (41 Off. Gaz., No. 1 p. 56.) It is plain and were are of the opinion that the complaint filed by the plaintiff respondent in the court below does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. In the present case the complaint alleges the legal right of the plaintiffs to be paid the amount due them from the defendant, as well as the correlative obligation of the defendant to pay said debts to the plaintiffs when it becomes due and payable; but not the omission on the part of the defendant to pay in violation of the legal rights of the plaintiffs to be paid, because according to the above quoted provision of Executive Order No. 32, said debts are not yet payable or their payment can not be enforced until the legal cessation of the moratorium, which is still in force. As the defendant herein petitioner is not yet in default, plaintiffs have no cause of action against him.

only the amount of the indebtedness, but the legal interest thereon from the filling of the complaint, the attorney's fees of ten per centum of the amounts due, and the costs of the suits. There is no such action to compel a defendant to acknowledge or recognize his debt which is not yet payable, distinct and different from the action for recovery or payment of a debt already due and payable, against the debtor who refuses to pay it. To allow the plaintiffs' action and grant the relief demanded in the complaint, would be to compel the defendant to pay legal interest of the amount claimed from filing of the said complaint, as well as the attorney's fees of 10 per cent of the sum due thereon as stipulated, and the costs of the suit, as if the defendants' obligations to the plaintiffs were already payable and he had failed or refused to pay them. Why should the defendant be required to bear the expenses incidental to a suit before he has violated the plaintiffs' right? How could plaintiffs assume that the defendant will not pay his debts when they become payable, and for that reason they have filed this action against defendant? Why should not the contrary be presumed, that is, that the debtor will pay his obligation at the proper time, in order to prevent a suit, preserve its credit, and avoid the expenses incident to a suit, and the payment of legal interest on the amount due and attorney's fees? In the case of Henares vs. Cordova (G.R. No. L-1536), a petition for prohibition was filed by the petitioner alleging that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, which is the collection of an alleged indebtedness unenforceable under the debt moratorium, and this Court denied the petition on the ground that Executive Order No. 25, as amended by Executive Order No. 32, did not have the effect of divesting the lower court of its jurisdiction to try and hear the case. We did not deem it necessary then to express our opinion on the sufficiency of the complaint, but now we do for the guidance of the courts and legal practitioners, and state that said Executive Order No. 25, as amended by Executive Order No. 32 not only suspends the execution of the judgment that the court may render so far as it orders the payment of debts and other monetary obligations, as stated in the resolution in said case but also suspends the filing of suit in the courts of justice for the enforcement of the payment of debts and other monetary obligations therein referred to, if timely objection is set up by the defendant debtor. It is to be borne in mind that the debt moratorium is a right granted by law to the debtors, and as such right it may be waived because its waiver does not effect the public interest or the rights of third parties. After stating our opinion that the complaint of the plaintiffs respondents states no cause of action, we have to hold that the facts stated in the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the present case do not entitle the petitioner to said reliefs. It requires no argument to show that the respondent judge had jurisdiction and did not exceed it or act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss, and therefore we have to dismiss the present petition. This Court, in special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition, can only determine the question whether or not the court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of its discretion in doing the act complained of. We can not correct errors committed by the lower courts in their judgments, decrees or orders rendered in the exercise of their jurisdiction. In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied.

While the debt moratorium is in force the defendant-petitioner has no obligation yet to pay the plaintiffs, and the latter can not file a suit against him in the courts of justice requiring him to recognize his debts to the plaintiffs and to pay them (after the moratorium) not meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action

CIVIL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. L-4845 December 24, 1952 L. G. MARQUEZ and Z. GUTIERREZ LORA, plaintiffs. L. G. Marquez, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANCISCO VARELA and CARMEN VARELA, defendants-appellees. Amelito R. Mutuc Jorge V. Jazmines for appellees.

for

appellant

LABRADOR, J.: This is an appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of manila dismissing the complaint as to plaintiff L.G. Marquez. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows : that plaintiff Gutierrez Lora was authorized by defendants to negotiate the sale of their share or interest in a parcel of land on Plaza Goiti, Manila, and having meet his co-plaintiff L. G. Marquez, a real estate broker, both of them agreed to work together for the sale of defendant's property; that they found a ready, willing, and able buyer, which accepted defendants' price and terms, but that thereafter defendants, without any justifiable reason, refused to carry out the sale and execute the necessary deed therefor; and that as a consequence plaintiffs failed to receive the commission which they were entitled to receive. The defendants presented a motion to dismiss the complaint as to L. G . Marquez on the ground that he has no cause of action against defendants , and this motion having been granted, plaintiff L. G. Marquez has prosecuted this appeal. The complaint was dismissed on the alleged ground that it states no cause of action against the defendants. Is this objection to the complaint justified? The term "cause of action" has been held to be synonymous with "right of action" (37 Words and Phrases, 642), but in the law of pleading (Code Pleading) one is distinguished from the other in that a right of action is a remedial right belonging to some person, while a cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to such remedial right. The one is a matter of right and depends on the substantive law, while the other is a matter of statement and is governed by the law of procedure. (Phillips, Code Pleading, section 189, page 170.) It is not denied that Lora, if he rendered the service alleged in the complaint, would have a right to be paid compensation for the service he rendered jointly with Marquez. He acted as a broker, and a broker is entitled to a commission for his services. (Article 277, Code of Commerce: Henry vs. Velasco, 34 Phil. 587; Perez de Tagle vs. Luzon Surety Co, 38 Off. Gaz. 1213). There is no prohibition in law against the employment of a companion to look for a buyer; neither is it against public policy. Neither was there even any implied understanding between Lora and the defendants that no part of the compensation to which Lora would be entitled to receive could be paid to any companion or helper of Lora. Marquez's right to compensation can not, therefore, be disputed under the operative facts set forth in the complaint. The next issue is, is there a cause of action in favor of Marquez against the defendants? From the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that there is a primary right in favor of Marquez (to be paid for his services even through Lora only) and a corresponding duty devolving upon the defendants (to pay for said services). Since (as

alleged) defendants refuse to comply with their duty, Marquez now is entitled to enforce his legal right by an action in court. The complaint in the case at bar, therefore, contains both the primary right and duty and the delict or wrong combined which constitute the cause of action in the legal sense as used in Code Pleading (Pomeroy, Code Remedies, section 347), and the cause of action is full and complete. Objection to the complaint, however, is not that Marquez has no right to share in the compensation to be paid Lora, whom defendants had directly engaged, but that Marquez can not join in this action and enforce therein his rights directly against the defendants, evidently because defendants never dealt with Marquez, directly or indirectly, or, in other words, that both Marquez and his services were not known to dismiss show that such in fact was the objection: This paragraph clearly shows that the authority to sell was only given to plaintiff Z. Gutierrez Lora and not to the other plaintiff L. G. Marquez. Attention is respectfully called to the word "plaintiff" used in said paragraph III and expressed in singular form to the exclusion of the other plaintiff L. G. Marquez. If the plaintiff L. G. Marquez had worked at all for the sale of the property at the instance of an invitation of his co- plaintiff Z. Gutierrez Lora, we maintain that his action if there is any is against his coplaintiff and not against the defendants herein. As far as the defendant are concerned in this case, plaintiff L. G. Marquez is not only a stranger in this case but also unknown to the defendants; and if he had worked at all for the sale of the defendants' share and participation in the parcels of lands referred to in the complaint, the same was made not only at his own look-out, risk and responsibility but also with no authority whatsoever. (Record on Appeal, pages 16, 17) The principle underlying defendants' objection is one of substantive law, recognized under common law, where no one could sue for a breach of a contract who was not a party thereto, and the action allowed to be brought only in the name of the one holding the legal title. The requirement was based upon the doctrine of privity of contract. Sec. 234. Plaintiffs in Action ex Contractu. — When an action of contract concerns only the original parties to the instrument, it is not difficult to determine who should be the plaintiff. Obviously the one seeking to enforce it is the real party in interest. At common law no one could sue for the breach of contract who was not a party thereto. Hence an action on contract, whether express or implied, was required to be brought in the name of the one who held the legal interest. This requirement was based upon the doctrine of privity of contract. . . . (Phillips, Code Pleading, page 226.) Sec. 235. Privity of Contract. — When necessary. — It was a rule of the common law that before one may complain of another for breach of contract, there must be some direct contractual relation, or privity, between them; and this, with only a few exceptions, is a requirement of the law today. . . . (Phillips, code Pleading, page 227.) meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action

CIVIL PROCEDURE

At common law, in order that two or more persons may join in an action upon a contract, there must be community of interest between them; that is, they must be parties to the contract and jointly interested in therein. (47 . C. J. 54)lawphil.net Persons subsequently admitted to the benefit of a contract, without the privity or assent of the promisor, can not join in a suit on the contract. (47 C.J., 55) But we did not import into this jurisdiction the common law procedure. Our original code of civil Procedure (Act 190) was taken mainly from the code of Civil Procedure of California, and this in turn was based upon the Code of Civil procedure of New York adopted in that stated in 1948. Our system of pleading is Code Pleading that system used in the states of the Union that had adopted codes of procedure. The code system of pleading adopted in substance the rules of equity practice as to parties, under which "all persons having an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs". (Phillips, Code Pleading, section 251, page 247.) In New York and California interest in the subject matter, or in any relief growing out of the same transaction or series of transactions is sufficient to allow joinder. (Ibid, footnote 10a. page 247.) Under the former Code of civil procedure "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," and "all persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs, " and " if any person having an interest and in obtaining the relief demanded refuses to join as plaintiff, he may be made a defendant and the fact of his interest and refusal to join to be stated in the complaint." ( Section 114, Act 190) The principle underlying the rule is that all persons having a material interest under the substantive law should be made parties, as distinguished from that of the common law which allowed only a two-sided controversy, each party to be opposed to the other. Phillips, Code Pleading, 2d ed. section 228, page 216.) The above principles have not been changed by the reforms in the rules in 1940 and 1941. The action is still to be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Under section 6 of Rule 3, "All persons in whom . . . any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction . . . is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, . . . join as plaintiffs . . . where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs . . . may arise in the action; Plaintiff Marquez, in the case at bar, clearly falls under the above rule. He is entitled to be paid his commission out of the very contract of agency between Lora and the defendants; Lora and he acted jointly in rendering services to defendants under Lora's contract, and the same questions of law and fact govern their claims. The rules do not require the existence of privity of contract between Marquez and the defendants as required under the common law; all that they demand is that Marquez has a material interest in the subject of the action, the right to share in the broker's commission to be paid Lora under the latter's contract, which right Lora does not deny. This is sufficient to justify the joinder of Marquez as a party plaintiff, even in the absence of privity of contract between him and the defendants. We find, therefore, that the complaint of Marquez was improperly dismissed. The order of dismissal is hereby reversed, with costs against defendants. meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action G.R. No. L-19751

February 28, 1966

ALFREDO REMITERE, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants, vs. REMEDIOS MONTINOLA VDA. DE YULO, ET AL., defendantsappellees. E.M. Almario for the plaintiffs-appellants. Eduardo Arboleda for the defendants-appellees. ZALDIVAR, J.: This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case No. 6377. On December 6, 1961 the plaintiffs-appellants, Alfredo Remitere, et al., filed a complaint against the defendants-appellees, Remedies Montinola Viuda de Yulo and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, the pertinent allegations of which complaint, for the purposes of this decision, are as follows: 2. In Cadastral Decrees Nos. 69518 and 69515 issued by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental on August 21, 1918, copies of which are herewith attached as Annexes "A" and "B" and made an integral part of this complaint, Gregorio Remitere was declared and registered owner of Lots Nos. 35 and 52 of the Cadastral Survey of Isabela, with areas of 4.4731 and 29.7398 hectares, respectively. These lots were issued the corresponding Original Certificates of Title under the Land Registration Act, being 10894 and 10898. 3. Upon the demise of Gregorio Remitere on January 1, 1914, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, in Civil Case No. 1661, Re-Application for Letters of Administration, appointed his wife as administratrix of his estate, among which are the two lots in question. During this period, the provincial sheriff of Negros Occidental conducted a public auction sale over the said parcels of land, and on the same day, September 23, 1918, he issued thereof a deed of sale in favor of Mariano Yulo of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, for the total consideration of P20,000.00. Copy of the deed of sale is herewith attached as Annex "C" and formed part of this complaint. 4. As a result, series of cancellations to the Original Certificates of Title mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof had followed. First, they were cancelled by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 2819 and 2820, registered in the name of Mariano C. Yulo by virtue of the Certificates of Sale issued by the provincial sheriff of Negros Occidental. They were in turn cancelled by R-T 602 and R-T 4706, by virtue of reconstitution of titles. Then these were cancelled by T-532 and T-2979, by virtue of deeds of sales registered in the name of Remedios Montinola Vda. de Yulo, the defendant herein..

CIVIL PROCEDURE 5. The public sale mentioned in Article 3 of this complaint, however, was and still is absolutely a void sale, and certainly did not pass titles and ownership of said lots, starting from its primitive owner, now being represented by the plaintiffs herein, as surviving heirs thereto, until it reaches the possession by the defendant. That by reason of its invalidity, all and every benefits that the transferees, including the defendant herein, had acquired from the parcels of land in question, should be indemnified to the plaintiffs. And that, in order to justify their rights and interests pursuant to the mandates prescribed by law over said lots and discontinue the irreparable losses and damages that they are still sustaining, on account of the perversed transfer of September 23, 1918, the same should be reverted to their immediate possessions and titles. The complaint prayed that the defendants be ordered to reconvey the two lots in question to the plaintiffs; that the defendant Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the certificates of title in the name of the defendant Remedios Montinola Viuda de Yulo and to issue new ones in the names of the plaintiffs; and that the defendants pay the costs. The defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action, and (2) that even assuming that a cause of action exists, the same has already prescribed. The lower court dismissed the complaint precisely on the grounds relied upon by the defendants-appellees. Hence this appeal. In this appeal, the plaintiffs-appellants contend that the trial court erred: (1) in declaring that the complaint contains no narration of facts; (2) in holding that complaint states no cause of action; and (3) in holding that the plaintiffs' cause of action, if any, has already prescribed. We find that the lower court had correctly dismissed the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët The lack of a cause of action as a ground for dismissal must appear on the face of the complaint, and to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action only the facts alleged therein, and no other, should be considered. A reading of the complaint in this case will readily impress one that no ultimate facts which may constitute the basis of plaintiffs-appellants rights which had been violated are alleged. Neither are there allegations of ultimate facts showing acts or omissions on the part of the defendants-appellees which constitute a violation of the rights of plaintiffs-appellants. Apparently, the plaintiffs-appellants rely on the allegations of paragraphs 3 and 5 of the complaint for their cause of action. Paragraph 3 states: 3. Upon the demise of Gregorio Remitere on January 1, 1914 the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, in Civil Case No. 1661, Re-Application for Letters of Administration, appointed his wife as administratrix of his estate, among which the two lots in question. meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action During this period, the provincial sheriff of Negros Occidental, conducted a public auction sale over the said parcels of land, and on the same day, September 23, 1918, he issued thereof a deed of sale in favor of Mariano Yulo of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, for the total consideration of P20,000.00. . . . . The allegations embodied in the above quoted paragraph are mere averments or recitals of facts that do not establish any right or claim on the part of the plaintiffs. The allegations do not state any connection that the plaintiffs have with the deceased Gregorio Remitere, nor do they state what connection or claim the plaintiffs have on the properties left by the deceased Gregorio Remitere. The allegation about the sale at public auction does not state in what way the rights or interests of the plaintiffs had been affected, nay prejudiced, by that sale. Again, paragraph 5 of the complaint states: 5. The public sale mentioned in paragraph 3 of this complaint, however, was and still is absolutely a void sale, and certainly did not pass titles and ownership of said lots, starting from its primitive owner, now being represented by the plaintiffs herein, as surviving heirs thereto, until it reaches the possession by the defendants. That by reason of its invalidity, all and every benefits that the transferees, including the defendant herein, had acquired from the parcels of land in question, should be indemnified to the plaintiffs. It is not stated anywhere in the complaint why the sale at public auction was absolutely void, nor were there stated any particular facts or circumstances upon which the alleged nullity of the sale or transaction is predicated. The averment that "the public sale . . . was and still is absolutely a void sale, and certainly did not pass titles and ownerships of said lots, starting from its primitive owner, now being represented by the plaintiffs herein, as surviving heirs thereto, until it reaches the possession by the defendants. . ." is a conclusion of law or an inference from facts not stated in the pleading. A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusion of fact, or conclusion of law. An allegation that a contract is valid, or void, as in the instant case, is a mere conclusion of law.

CIVIL PROCEDURE This Court has defined the term "cause of action" as follows: A cause of action has been defined by the Supreme Court as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligations of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. (Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, et al., L-1539, Dec. 30, 1947) The term "ultimate facts" has been defined or explained as follows: Ultimate facts defined.—The term "ultimate facts" as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient. . . . . (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1963 ed., p. 213) Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests. (Montemayor vs. Raborar, et al., 53 O.G. No. 19, p. 6596, citing Pomeroy, Code Remedies, 5th Ed., sec. 420). We, therefore, hold that the lower court had correctly ruled that the complaint in the present case does not narrate facts that constitute a cause of action. Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, We deem it not necessary to discuss whether the lower court had correctly ruled that the plaintiffs' cause of action, if any, had prescribed or not. Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

General allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are mere conclusion of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law; as are allegations that a contract is in conformity with, or in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision. . . . . (71 C.J.S. pp. 44-45.) (Emphasis supplied.) Not being statements of ultimate facts which constitute the basis of a right of the plaintiffs-appellants, nor are they statements of ultimate facts which constitute the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendants-appellees that violated the right of the plaintiffsappellants the allegations of the complaint in the present case have not fulfilled the requirements of Section 3, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court (Sec. 1, Rule 6 of the former Rules of Court) that the complaint should contain a "concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action."

meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action

CIVIL PROCEDURE 17

G.R. No. 129928 August 25, 2005 MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II COOPERATIVE, vs. VIRGILIO S. DAVID, Respondent.

INC.,

Petitioners,

Surety Co., Inc. v. Macrohon, that a complaint cannot be separated from its annexes; hence, the trial court in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action must 18 consider the complaint’s annexes. After the parties filed their respective memoranda, Judge Olalia issued an order dated 16 November 1995 denying MOELCI II’s motion for preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses. MOELCI II’s motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in 19 another order issued by Judge Olalia on 13 March 1996.

DECISION Tinga, J.: 1

In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. 2 (hereinafter, MOELCI II) seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Former Ninth Division in C.A. G.R. SP No. 41626 3 and its Resolution denying MOELCI II’s motion for reconsideration. The questioned Decision dismissed MOELCI II’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and effectively affirmed the trial court’s orders dated 4 5 16 November 1995 and 13 March 1996 which respectively denied petitioner’s Motion (For Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative Defenses 6 and Deferment of Pre-Trial Conference) and Motion for 7 Reconsideration. The antecedents are as follows: Private respondent Virgilio S. David (hereinafter, David), a supplier 8 of electrical hardware, filed a case for specific performance and damages against MOELCI II, a rural electric cooperative in Misamis Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-69402 entitled "Virgilio David v. Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (MOELCI II)." The said case, which was essentially a collection suit, pending before Judge Felixberto Olalia (hereinafter, Judge Olalia) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8 (the trial court), was predicated on a 9 document attached as Annex "A" to the Amended Complaint that according to David is the contract pursuant to which he sold to 10 MOELCI II one (1) unit of 10 MVA Transformer. 11

MOELCI II filed its Answer to Amended Complaint which pleaded, among others, affirmative defenses which also constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were lack of cause of action, there being allegedly no enforceable contract between David and MOELCI II under the Statute of Frauds pursuant to Section 1 (g) 12 and (i), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and improper venue. 13

In accordance with Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, (now Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) MOELCI II filed with the trial court a Motion (For Preliminary Hearing of 14 Affirmative Defenses and Deferment of Pre-Trial Conference) (hereinafter referred to as Motion). In said Motion, MOELCI II in essence argued that the document attached as Annex "A" to the Amended Complaint was only a quotation letter and not a contract as alleged by David. Thus, it contends that David’s Amended 15 Complaint is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. In his opposition to MOELCI II’s Motion, David contended in the main that because a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action is required to be based only on the allegations of the complaint, the "quotation letter," being merely an attachment to the complaint and not part of its allegations, cannot 16 be inquired into. MOELCI II filed a rejoinder to the opposition in which it asserted, citing extensively the ruling of the Court in World Wide Insurance &

MOELCI II elevated this incident to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Olalia in the issuance of the two aforesaid orders. On 14 March 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed MOELCI II’s petition holding that the allegations in David’s complaint constitute a cause of action. With regard to MOELCI II’s contention that David’s Amended Complaint is dismissible as the document, attached thereto as Annex "A," upon which David’s claim is based is not a contract of sale but rather a quotation letter, the Court of Appeals ruled that the interpretation of the document requires evidence aliunde which is not allowed in determining whether or not the complaint states a cause of action. The appellate court further declared that when the trial court is confronted with a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, it is mandated to confine its examination for the resolution thereof to the allegations of the complaint and is specifically enjoined from receiving evidence 20 for that purpose. With the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner is now before this Court seeking a review of the appellate court’s pronouncements. MOELCI II asserts that the Court of Appeals committed serious error in: (1) ruling that the resolution of its motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action necessitated hearings by the trial court with the end in view of determining whether or not the document attached as Annex "A" to the Amended Complaint is a contract as alleged in the body of said pleading; and (2) not ordering the trial court to dismiss the Amended 21 Complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. Anent the first ground, MOELCI II further claims that with the denial of its Petition, the appellate court in effect exhorted the trial court to defer the resolution of its motion to dismiss until after the hearing of the case 22 on the merits contrary to Rule 16 of the Rules of Court and well23 settled jurisprudence. 24

In his comment, David counters that a sufficient cause of action exists. He also points out that he and MOELCI II differ in the interpretation of the construction of the document attached as Annex "A" of the Amended Complaint; hence, there is a need to conduct hearings thereon. He likewise contends that the trial court did not defer the resolution of petitioner’s motion to dismiss. On the contrary, the trial court denied squarely the motion "to abbreviate the proceedings and for the parties to proceed to trial and avoid 25 piece meal resolution of issues." 26

In its Reply, MOELCI II reiterates its position that the document attached as Annex "A" of the Amended Complaint clearly is a quotation letter and not a perfected contract of sale as alleged by David. The absence of doubt or ambiguity of the contents and import of the document leaves no room for its interpretation. meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action

CIVIL PROCEDURE

At issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion. We find no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

words, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no other should be considered. The respondent Judge departed from this rule in conducting a hearing and in receiving evidence in support of the private 31 respondent’s affirmative defense, that is, lack of cause of action.

27

In Municipality of Biñan, Laguna v. Court of Appeals, decided under the old Rules of Court, we held that a preliminary hearing permitted under Section 5, Rule 16, is not mandatory even when the same is prayed for. It rests largely on the sound discretion of the court, thus: SEC. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. The use of the word "may" in the aforequoted provision shows that such a hearing is not mandatory but discretionary. It is an auxiliary 28 verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and possibility.

To determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be 32 averred by the defendants. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the 33 prayer of said complaint.

Such interpretation is now specifically expressed in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 6, Rule 16 provides that a grant of preliminary hearing rests on the sound discretion of the court, to wit-

In the case at bar, the Amended Complaint states in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6, thus:

SEC. 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses.- If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. …

3. On June 8 1992 the parties entered into a contract for the sale by the plaintiff to the defendant of one (1) unit 10 MVA Power transformer with accessories for a total price of P5,200,000.00 plus 69 KV Line Accessories for a total price of P2,169,500.00 under the following relevant terms and conditions:

Based on the foregoing, a preliminary hearing undeniably is subject to the discretion of the trial court. Absent any showing that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or with such grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack of jurisdiction, as in the present case, the trial court’s order granting or dispensing with the need for a preliminary hearing may not be 29 corrected by certiorari.

1. Fifty percent (50%) downpayment upon signing of contract.

Moreover, consistent with our ruling in The Heirs of Juliana Clavano 30 v. Genato, as MOELCI II’s Motion is anchored on the ground that the Complaint allegedly stated no cause of action, a preliminary hearing thereon is more than unnecessary as it constitutes an erroneous and improvident move. No error therefore could be ascribed to the trial court in the denial of such Motion. The Court ruled in the cited case, thus: . . . . respondent Judge committed an error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the private respondent’s affirmative defenses. It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? Stated otherwise, the sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground. No extraneous matter may be considered nor facts not alleged, which would require evidence and therefore must be raised as defenses and await the trial. In other

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Fifty percent (50%) upon delivery 2. Delivery- Ninety (90) working days upon receipt of your Purchase Order and Downpayment Copy of the contract is hereto attached as Annex "A." 4. Because of the standing relationship between the parties and the urgent need on the part of the defendant for the power transformer to remedy the electric supply deficiency in its area of coverage the plaintiff waived the 50% downpayment and delivered soon thereafter the 10 MVA transformer with accessories evidence (sic) by a copy of the sales invoice hereto attached as Annex "B". 5. Despite demands however, verbal and written, since December 1992, the defendant has failed to pay the price thereof of P5,200,000.00 plus the custom duties and incidental expenses of P272,722.27. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 6. Apart from the above transaction, the plaintiff has been, on a regular basis, delivering various electrical hardware to the defendant which, as of 31 January 1994, despite demands, has an outstanding 34 balance of P281,939.76. And David prayed as follows: meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action

CIVIL PROCEDURE

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment render ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff:

preliminary hearing and go on to trial. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the 38 merits.

ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 1. The total sum of P5,472,722.27 plus the stipulated interest at 24% per annum from December 1992 until fully paid. ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 2. The balance of P281,939.76 plus the stipulated interest at 24% per annum from due dates until fully paid. COMMON PROPER (sic)

Finally, we do not agree with MOELCI II’s contention that the Court of Appeals sanctioned the trial court’s deferment of the resolution of MOELCI II’s Motion. The trial court squarely denied the Motion 39 and not merely deferred its resolution. Thus, there is no deferment to speak of that should be enjoined. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 March 1997 and its Resolution dated 14 July 1997 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

3. Attorney’s fee at 25% of the foregoing amounts plus expenses of litigation and not less than P100,000.00 with costs. 4. Other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.

35

It has been hypothetically admitted that the parties had entered into a contract sale David bound himself to supply MOELCI II (1) unit 10 MVA Power transformer with accessories for a total price of P5,200,000.00 plus 69 KV Line Accessories for a total price of P2,169,500.00; that despite written and verbal demands, MOELCI II has failed to pay the price thereof plus the custom duties and incidental expenses of P272,722.27; and that apart from the previously stated contract of sale, David regularly delivered various electrical hardware to MOELCI II which, despite demands, has an outstanding balance of P281,939.76. We believe all the foregoing sufficiently lay out a cause of action. Even extending our scrutiny to Annex "A," which is after all deemed a part of the Amended Complaint, will not result to a change in our conclusion. Contrary to MOELCI II’s assertion, Annex "A" is not an "undisguised 36 quotation letter." While Annex "A" is captioned as such, the presence of the signatures of both the General Manager and the Chairman of the Committee of Management immediately below the 37 word "CONFORME" appearing on the document’s last page lends credulity to David’s contention that there was, or might have been, a meeting of minds on the terms embodied therein. Thus, the appendage of Annex "A" does not entirely serve to snuff out David’s claims. In fact, the ambiguity of the import and nature of Annex "A" which necessitates a resort to its proper interpretation, fortifies the propriety of the trial court’s denial of MOELCI II’s Motion. The interpretation of a document requires introduction of evidence which is precisely disallowed in determining whether or not a complaint states a cause of action. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed MOELCI II’s petition and upheld the trial court’s ruling. Now, whether in truth Annex "A" is, as entitled, a mere quotation letter is a matter that could best be proven during a full-blown hearing rather than through a preliminary hearing as this may involve extensive proof. Verily, where a preliminary hearing will not suffice, it is incumbent upon the trial court to deny a motion for meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action G.R. No. 147593

July 31, 2006

GERONIMO Q. QUADRA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, respondents. DECISION PUNO, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55634 dated December 29, 2000 and its resolution dated March 26, 2001. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 4312-ULP which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter granting moral and exemplary damages to petitioner Geronimo Q. Quadra in connection with his dismissal from the service. Petitioner Geronimo Q. Quadra was the Chief Legal Officer of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) when he organized and actively participated in the activities of Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Employees Association (CUGCO), an organization composed of the rank and file employees of PCSO, and then later, the Association of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel and Supervisors (CUGCO) (ASSPS [CUGCO]). In April 1964, he was administratively charged before the Civil Service Commission with violation of Civil Service Law and Rules for neglect of duty and misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. On July 14, 1965, the Civil Service Commission rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the charges and recommending the penalty of dismissal. The following day, on July 15, 1965, the General Manager of PCSO, Ignacio Santos Diaz, sent petitioner a letter of dismissal, in accordance with the decision of the Civil Service Commission. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Civil Service Commission on August 10, 1965. At the same time, petitioner, together with ASSPS (CUGCO), filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a complaint for unfair labor practice against respondent PCSO and its officers. The case was docketed as Case No. 4312-ULP. On November 19, 1966, the CIR issued its decision finding respondent PCSO guilty of unfair labor practice for having committed discrimination against the union and for having dismissed petitioner due to his union activities. It ordered the reinstatement of petitioner to his former position with full backwages and with all the rights and privileges pertaining to said 1 position. Respondent PCSO complied with the decision of the CIR. But while it reinstated petitioner to his former position and paid his backwages, it also filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari entitled "Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, et al. v. The Association of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel, et al." assailing the decision of the CIR in Case No. 4312-ULP. The petition was docketed 2 as G.R. No. L-27546. On March 16, 1967, during the pendency of the case in the Supreme Court, petitioner filed with the CIR a "Petition for Damages." He prayed for moral and exemplary damages in connection with Case No. 4312-ULP. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Rheem

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of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Ferrer, et al. where it upheld the jurisdiction of the CIR over claims for damages incidental to an employee's dismissal. Respondent PCSO moved to dismiss the petition for damages on the following grounds: (1) the CIR has no jurisdiction to award moral and exemplary damages; (2) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment, it appearing that two complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action; and (3) the petition states no valid cause of action. Petitioner resigned from PCSO on August 18, 1967. The petition for damages and the motion to dismiss, however, remained pending with the CIR until it was abolished and the NLRC was created. On April 25, 1980, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision awarding moral and exemplary damages to petitioner in the amount of P1.6 million. The dispositive portion of the decision stated: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered awarding to complainant Geronimo Q. Quadra moral damages consisting of the following sum: Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00) for besmirched reputation; Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00) for social humiliation; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for mental anguish; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for serious anxiety; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for wounded feelings; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for moral shock; and the further sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, on account of the arbitrary and unlawful dismissal effected by respondents. Consequently, respondents are therefore ordered to pay complainant Quadra the total sum of One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,600,000.00) within ten (10) days after this Decision becomes final. SO ORDERED.

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The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, prompting respondent PCSO to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC. It held that there was no basis for the grant of moral and exemplary damages to petitioner as his dismissal was not tainted with bad faith. It was the Civil Service Commission that recommended petitioner's dismissal after conducting an investigation. It also held that the petition claiming moral and exemplary damages filed by petitioner after respondent PCSO had complied with the CIR decision of reinstatement and backwages amounted to splitting of cause of 6 action. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the 7 Court of Appeals, but the same was denied for lack for merit. Petitioner now seeks the Court to review the ruling of the Court of Appeals. He basically argues: First: The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the PCSO did not act in bad faith when it dismissed the petitioner is meikimouse

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contrary to the already final and executory decision of the CIR dated November 1[9], 1966 finding the PCSO guilty of bad faith and unfair labor practice in dismissing the petitioner. The decision of the CIR was affirmed by the High Court in the case of PCSO, et al. v. Geronimo Q. Quadra, et al., 115 SCRA 34. The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to amend the final and executory decision of November 1[9], 1966 of the CIR which was affirmed by the High Court. Once a decision has become final [and] executory, it could no longer be amended or altered.

Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional rights of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect; and disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. As the conscience of the government, it is the Court's sworn duty to ensure that none trifles with labor rights.

Second: The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the claims for moral and exemplary damages of the petitioner is allegedly "tantamount to splitting of cause of action under Sec. 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure" is contrary to law. When petitioner filed with the CIR his complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice, the prevailing law and jurisprudence was that the CIR did not have jurisdiction to grant moral and exemplary damages. Petitioner's claim for moral damages was filed with the CIR in the same case by virtue of the ruling of the High Court in Rheem v. Ferrer, 19 SCRA 130 holding that the CIR has jurisdiction to award moral and exemplary damages arising out of illegal dismissal and unfair labor 8 practice.

For this reason, we find it proper in this case to impose moral and exemplary damages on private respondent. x x x

The petition is impressed with merit. A dismissed employee is entitled to moral damages when the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent 9 manner. It appears from the facts that petitioner was deliberately dismissed from the service by reason of his active involvement in the activities of the union groups of both the rank and file and the supervisory employees of PCSO, which unions he himself organized and headed. Respondent PCSO first charged petitioner before the Civil Service Commission for alleged neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the service because of his union activities. The Civil Service Commission recommended the dismissal of petitioner. Respondent PCSO immediately served on petitioner a letter of dismissal even before the latter could move for a reconsideration of the decision of the Civil Service Commission. Respondent PCSO may not impute to the Civil Service Commission the responsibility for petitioner's illegal dismissal as it was respondent PCSO that first filed the administrative charge against him. As found by the CIR, petitioner's dismissal constituted unfair labor practice. It was done to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. It stated:

On the second issue, we agree with petitioner that the filing of a petition for damages before the CIR did not constitute splitting of cause of action under the Revised Rules of Court. The Revised Rules of Court prohibits parties from instituting more than one suit for a single cause of action. Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing a single cause of action, claim or demand into two or more parts, and bringing suit for one of such parts only, intending to reserve the rest for another separate action. The purpose of the rule is to avoid harassment and vexation to the defendant and avoid multiplicity of 12 suits. The prevailing rule at the time that the action for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal was filed and tried before the CIR was that said court had no jurisdiction over claims for damages. Hence, petitioner, at that time, could not raise the issue of damages in the proceedings. However, on January 27, 1967, the Supreme Court rendered its ruling in Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Ferrer, 13 et al. upholding the jurisdiction of the CIR over claims for damages incidental to an employee's illegal dismissal. Petitioner properly filed his claim for damages after the declaration by the Court and before the ruling on their case became final. Such filing could not be considered as splitting of cause of action. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR Case No. 4312-ULP is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

Upon the entire evidence as a whole (sic), the [c]ourt feels and believes that complainant Quadra was discriminatorily dismissed by reason of his militant union activities, not only as President of PCSEA, but also as President of the 10 ASSPS. In Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (NEECO I) Employees 11 Association, et al. v. NLRC, et al., we found it proper to award moral and exemplary damages to illegally dismissed employees as their dismissal was tainted with unfair labor practice. The Court said:

meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action G.R. No. 147593

July 31, 2006

GERONIMO Q. QUADRA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, respondents. DECISION PUNO, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55634 dated December 29, 2000 and its resolution dated March 26, 2001. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 4312-ULP which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter granting moral and exemplary damages to petitioner Geronimo Q. Quadra in connection with his dismissal from the service. Petitioner Geronimo Q. Quadra was the Chief Legal Officer of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) when he organized and actively participated in the activities of Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Employees Association (CUGCO), an organization composed of the rank and file employees of PCSO, and then later, the Association of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel and Supervisors (CUGCO) (ASSPS [CUGCO]). In April 1964, he was administratively charged before the Civil Service Commission with violation of Civil Service Law and Rules for neglect of duty and misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. On July 14, 1965, the Civil Service Commission rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the charges and recommending the penalty of dismissal. The following day, on July 15, 1965, the General Manager of PCSO, Ignacio Santos Diaz, sent petitioner a letter of dismissal, in accordance with the decision of the Civil Service Commission. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Civil Service Commission on August 10, 1965. At the same time, petitioner, together with ASSPS (CUGCO), filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a complaint for unfair labor practice against respondent PCSO and its officers. The case was docketed as Case No. 4312-ULP. On November 19, 1966, the CIR issued its decision finding respondent PCSO guilty of unfair labor practice for having committed discrimination against the union and for having dismissed petitioner due to his union activities. It ordered the reinstatement of petitioner to his former position with full backwages and with all the rights and privileges pertaining to said 1 position. Respondent PCSO complied with the decision of the CIR. But while it reinstated petitioner to his former position and paid his backwages, it also filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari entitled "Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, et al. v. The Association of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel, et al." assailing the decision of the CIR in Case No. 4312-ULP. The petition was docketed 2 as G.R. No. L-27546. On March 16, 1967, during the pendency of the case in the Supreme Court, petitioner filed with the CIR a "Petition for Damages." He prayed for moral and exemplary damages in connection with Case No. 4312-ULP. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Rheem

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of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Ferrer, et al. where it upheld the jurisdiction of the CIR over claims for damages incidental to an employee's dismissal. Respondent PCSO moved to dismiss the petition for damages on the following grounds: (1) the CIR has no jurisdiction to award moral and exemplary damages; (2) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment, it appearing that two complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action; and (3) the petition states no valid cause of action. Petitioner resigned from PCSO on August 18, 1967. The petition for damages and the motion to dismiss, however, remained pending with the CIR until it was abolished and the NLRC was created. On April 25, 1980, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision awarding moral and exemplary damages to petitioner in the amount of P1.6 million. The dispositive portion of the decision stated: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered awarding to complainant Geronimo Q. Quadra moral damages consisting of the following sum: Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00) for besmirched reputation; Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00) for social humiliation; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for mental anguish; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for serious anxiety; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for wounded feelings; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for moral shock; and the further sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, on account of the arbitrary and unlawful dismissal effected by respondents. Consequently, respondents are therefore ordered to pay complainant Quadra the total sum of One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,600,000.00) within ten (10) days after this Decision becomes final. SO ORDERED.

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The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, prompting respondent PCSO to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC. It held that there was no basis for the grant of moral and exemplary damages to petitioner as his dismissal was not tainted with bad faith. It was the Civil Service Commission that recommended petitioner's dismissal after conducting an investigation. It also held that the petition claiming moral and exemplary damages filed by petitioner after respondent PCSO had complied with the CIR decision of reinstatement and backwages amounted to splitting of cause of 6 action. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the 7 Court of Appeals, but the same was denied for lack for merit. Petitioner now seeks the Court to review the ruling of the Court of Appeals. He basically argues: First: The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the PCSO did not act in bad faith when it dismissed the petitioner is meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action

CIVIL PROCEDURE

contrary to the already final and executory decision of the CIR dated November 1[9], 1966 finding the PCSO guilty of bad faith and unfair labor practice in dismissing the petitioner. The decision of the CIR was affirmed by the High Court in the case of PCSO, et al. v. Geronimo Q. Quadra, et al., 115 SCRA 34. The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to amend the final and executory decision of November 1[9], 1966 of the CIR which was affirmed by the High Court. Once a decision has become final [and] executory, it could no longer be amended or altered.

Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional rights of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect; and disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. As the conscience of the government, it is the Court's sworn duty to ensure that none trifles with labor rights.

Second: The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the claims for moral and exemplary damages of the petitioner is allegedly "tantamount to splitting of cause of action under Sec. 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure" is contrary to law. When petitioner filed with the CIR his complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice, the prevailing law and jurisprudence was that the CIR did not have jurisdiction to grant moral and exemplary damages. Petitioner's claim for moral damages was filed with the CIR in the same case by virtue of the ruling of the High Court in Rheem v. Ferrer, 19 SCRA 130 holding that the CIR has jurisdiction to award moral and exemplary damages arising out of illegal dismissal and unfair labor 8 practice.

For this reason, we find it proper in this case to impose moral and exemplary damages on private respondent. x x x

The petition is impressed with merit. A dismissed employee is entitled to moral damages when the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent 9 manner. It appears from the facts that petitioner was deliberately dismissed from the service by reason of his active involvement in the activities of the union groups of both the rank and file and the supervisory employees of PCSO, which unions he himself organized and headed. Respondent PCSO first charged petitioner before the Civil Service Commission for alleged neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the service because of his union activities. The Civil Service Commission recommended the dismissal of petitioner. Respondent PCSO immediately served on petitioner a letter of dismissal even before the latter could move for a reconsideration of the decision of the Civil Service Commission. Respondent PCSO may not impute to the Civil Service Commission the responsibility for petitioner's illegal dismissal as it was respondent PCSO that first filed the administrative charge against him. As found by the CIR, petitioner's dismissal constituted unfair labor practice. It was done to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. It stated:

On the second issue, we agree with petitioner that the filing of a petition for damages before the CIR did not constitute splitting of cause of action under the Revised Rules of Court. The Revised Rules of Court prohibits parties from instituting more than one suit for a single cause of action. Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing a single cause of action, claim or demand into two or more parts, and bringing suit for one of such parts only, intending to reserve the rest for another separate action. The purpose of the rule is to avoid harassment and vexation to the defendant and avoid multiplicity of 12 suits. The prevailing rule at the time that the action for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal was filed and tried before the CIR was that said court had no jurisdiction over claims for damages. Hence, petitioner, at that time, could not raise the issue of damages in the proceedings. However, on January 27, 1967, the Supreme Court rendered its ruling in Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Ferrer, 13 et al. upholding the jurisdiction of the CIR over claims for damages incidental to an employee's illegal dismissal. Petitioner properly filed his claim for damages after the declaration by the Court and before the ruling on their case became final. Such filing could not be considered as splitting of cause of action. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR Case No. 4312-ULP is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

Upon the entire evidence as a whole (sic), the [c]ourt feels and believes that complainant Quadra was discriminatorily dismissed by reason of his militant union activities, not only as President of PCSEA, but also as President of the 10 ASSPS. In Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (NEECO I) Employees 11 Association, et al. v. NLRC, et al., we found it proper to award moral and exemplary damages to illegally dismissed employees as their dismissal was tainted with unfair labor practice. The Court said:

meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action G.R. No. L-25134

October 30, 1969

THE CITY OF BACOLOD, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., defendant-appellant. First Assistant City Fiscal Raymundo O. Rallos for plaintiff-appellee. Picazo and Agcaoili for defendant-appellant. BARREDO, J.: An appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in its Civil Case No. 7355, ordering the San Miguel Brewery, Inc. to pay to the City of Bacolod the sum of P36,519.10, representing surcharges on certain fees which, under existing ordinances of the City of Bacolod, the San Miguel Brewery should have paid quarterly to the treasurer of the said city for and/or during the period from July, 1959 to December, 1962, but which were paid only on April 23, 1963. On February 17, 1949, the City Council of Bacolod passed Ordinance No. 66, series of 1949 imposing upon "any person, firm or corporation engaged in the manufacturer bottling of coca-cola, pepsi cola, tru orange, lemonade, and other soft drinks within the jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod, ... a fee of ONE TWENTY-FOURTH (1/24) of a centavo for every bottle thereof," plus "a surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to exceed 24% for one whole year," upon "such local manufacturers or bottler above-mentioned who will be delinquent on any amount of fees due" under the ordinance. In 1959, this ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 150, series of 1959, by increasing the fee to "one-eighth (1/8) of a centavo for every bottle thereof." In other words, the fee was increased from P0.01 to P0.03 per case of soft drinks. Appellant refused to pay the additional fee and challenged the validity of the whole ordinance. Under date of March 23, 1960, appellee sued appellant in Civil Case No. 5693 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, with the corresponding Complaint alleging, inter alia: 3. — That the defendant, Manager of the San Miguel Brewery, Bacolod Coca Cola Plant, Bacolod Branch since the approval of Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949 as amended by Ordinance No. 150, Series of 1959, which took effect on July 1, 1959, only paid to the plaintiff herein the P0.01 bottling tax per case of soft drinks thereby refusing to pay the P0.03 bottling tax per case of soft drinks which amounted to P26,306.54 at P0.02 per case of soft drinks such as coca cola and tru orange manufactured or bottled by said company as per statement submitted by the Assistant City Treasurer of Bacolod City herewith attached as Annex "C" of this complaint; and praying ... that judgment be rendered for the plaintiff: "(a) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the bottling taxes of P0.03 per case of soft drinks as provided for in Section 1, Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949, as amended by Ordinance No.

CIVIL PROCEDURE 150, Series of 1959, as well as the sum of P26,306.54 representing unpaid bottling taxes due with legal rate of interest thereon from the date of the filing of this complaint until complete payment thereof; ... costs, etc."' In due time, appellant filed its answer. This was followed by a stipulation of facts between the parties, whereupon, the court rendered judgment on November 12, 1960; with the following dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, San Miguel Brewery Inc. is ordered to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P26,306.54 and the tax at the rate of three centavos per case levied in Ordinance No. 66 and 150 from March, 1960, and thereafter. Costs against the defendant. Appellant appealed from the said decision to this Court where it pressed the question of the invalidity of the abovementioned taxing ordinances. In that appeal (G.R. No. L-18290), however, this Court affirmed the decision appealed from and upheld the constitutionality of the questioned ordinances and the authority of the appellee to enact the same. For reasons not extant in the record, it was already after this decision had become final when appellee moved for the reconsideration thereof, praying that the same be amended so as to include the penalties and surcharges provided for in the ordinances. Naturally, the said motion was denied, for the reason that "the decision is already final and may not be amended." When execution was had before the lower court, the appellee again sought the inclusion of the surcharges referred to; and once again the move was frustrated by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which denied the motion, as follows: Acting upon the motion dated October 24, 1963, filed by the Assistant City Fiscal, Raymundo Rallos, counsel for the plaintiff, and the opposition thereto filed by attorneys for the defendants dated November 9, 1963, as well as the reply to the opposition of counsel for the defendants dated December 5, 1963, taking into consideration that the decision of this Court as affirmed by the Supreme Court does not specifically mention the alleged surcharges claimed by the plaintiff-appellee, the Court hereby resolves to deny, as it hereby denies, the aforesaid motion, for not being meritorious. Failing thus in its attempt to collect the surcharge provided for in the ordinances in question, appellee filed a second action (Civil Case No. 7355) to collect the said surcharges. Under date of July 10, 1964, it filed the corresponding complaint before the same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental alleging, inter alia, that: 6. That soon after the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court affirming the decision of the Hon. Court, the defendant herein on April 23, 1963 paid to the City of Bacolod, the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR PESOS and TWENTY CENTAVOS (P156,924.20) as taxes from July, 1959 to December, 1962 in compliance with the provision of Section 1, Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949, as amended by Ordinance No. 150, Series of 1959, which corresponds to the taxes due under said section in the amount of P0.03 per case of soft soft drinks manufactured by the defendant, but refused and still continued refusing to pay the meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action surcharge as provided for under Section 4 of Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949, as amended by Ordinance No. 150, Series of 1959, which reads as follows: "SEC. 4 — A surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to exceed 24% for one whole year, shall be imposed on such local manufacturer or bottlers above mentioned who will be delinquent on any amount of fees under the ordinance." which up to now amounted to THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS AND TEN CENTAVOS (P36,519.10), as shown by the certified statement of the office of the City Treasurer of Bacolod City herewith attached as Annex "E" and made an integral part of this complaint; 7. That the said interest and/or penalties to the said bottling taxes which defendant refused to pay have long been overdue; and again praying ... that judgment be rendered for the plaintiff: (a) Ordering the defendant to pay the penalty and/or interest therein Section 4 of Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949, as amended by Ordinance No. 150, Series of 1959 the total amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS and TEN CENTAVOS (P36,519.10), representing the surcharges from August, 1959 to December, 1962, inclusive, and the 24% penalty computed as of June 30, 1964, from the amount of P152,162.90, with legal rate of interest thereon from the date of the filing of this complaint until complete payment thereof;" plus costs, etc. On July 24, 1964, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that: (1) the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, and (2) a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. This motion was denied by the court a quo in its order dated August 22, 1964; so appellant filed its answer wherein it substantially reiterated, as affirmative defenses, the abovementioned grounds of its motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the parties submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings, whereupon, the court rendered judgment on March 11, 1965 with the following dispositive portion: . IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant San Miguel Brewery, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P36,519.10 representing the surcharges as provided in section 4 of Ordinance 66, series of 1949 of the City of Bacolod. No costs. Appellants moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied, hence, the instant appeal. Appellant has only one assignment of error, to wit:

CIVIL PROCEDURE THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT LIABLE TO THE APPELLEE FOR THE SUM OF P36,519.10 REPRESENTING SURCHARGES AS PROVIDED IN TAX ORDINANCE NO. 66, SERIES OF 1949, AS AMENDED, OF THE CITY OF BACOLOD. Under this, it argues that the action of appellee cannot be maintained because (1) a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action; and (2) appellee's action for recovery of the surcharges in question is barred by prior judgment. We find appellant's position essentially correct. There is no question that appellee split up its cause of action when it filed the first complaint on March 23, 1960, seeking the recovery of only the bottling taxes or charges plus legal interest, without mentioning in any manner the surcharges. The rule on the matter is clear. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court of 1940 which were still in force then provided: SEC. 3. Splitting a cause of action, forbidden. — A single cause of action cannot be split up into two or more parts so as to be made the subject of different complaints. . SEC. 4. Effect of splitting. — If separate complaints were brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the merits in either is available as a bar in the others. Indeed, this rule against the splitting up of a cause of action is an old one. In fact, it preceded the Rules of Court or any statutory 1 provision. In Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Icarangal et al., this Court already explained its meaning, origin and purpose, thus: But, even if we have no such section 708 of our Code of Civil Procedure, or section 59 of the Insolvency Law, we have still the rule against splitting a single cause of action. This rule, though not contained in any statutory provision, has been applied by this court in all appropriate cases. Thus, in Santos vs. Moir (36 Phil. 350, 359), we said: "It is well recognized that a party cannot split a single cause of action into parts and sue on each part separately. A complaint for the recovery of personal property with damages for detention states a single cause of action which cannot be divided into an action for possession and one for damages; and if suit is brought for possession only a subsequent action cannot be maintained to recover the damages resulting from the unlawful detention." In Rubio de Larena vs. Villanueva (53 Phil. 923, 927), we reiterated the rule by stating that "... a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it the basis for several suits" and that when a lease provides for the payment of the rent in separate installments, each installment constitutes an independent cause of action, but when, at the time the complaint is filed, there are several installments due, all of them constitute a single cause of action and should be included in a single complaint, and if some of them are not so included, they are barred. The same doctrine is stated in Lavarro vs. Labitoria (54 Phil. 788), wherein we said that "a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action make it a basis for several suits" and that a claim for partition of real property as well as for improvements constitutes a single cause of action, and a complaint for partition alone bars a subsequent complaint for the improvements. And in Blossom & Co. vs. Manila Gas Corporation (55 Phil. 226-240), we held that "as a general rule a contract to do several things at several times is divisible in its nature, so as to authorize successive actions; and a judgment recovered for a single breach of a continuing contract or covenant is no bar to suit for a subsequent breach thereof. But where the covenant or contract is entire, and the breach total, there can be only one action, and plaintiff must therein recover all his damages. The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." (1 C.J. 1107) It comes from that old maxim nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause). (Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall 163, 168; 21 Law Ed. 872; also U.S. vs. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61; 25 Law Ed. 93). And it developed, certainly not as an original legal right of the defendant, but as an interposition of courts upon principles of public policy to prevent inconvenience and hardship incident to repeated and unnecessary litigations. (1 C. J. 1107). In the light of these precedents, it cannot be denied that appellant's failure to pay the bottling charges or taxes and the surcharges for delinquency in the payment thereof constitutes but one single cause of action which under the above rule can be the subject of only one complaint, under pain of either of them being barred if not included in the same complaint with the other. The error of appellee springs from a misconception or a vague comprehension of the elements of a cause of action. The classical definition of a cause of action is that it is "a delict or wrong by which the rights of the plaintiff are violated by the defendant." Its elements may be generally stated to be (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a corresponding obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission of the plaintiff which constitutes a violation of the plaintiff's right which defendant had the duty to respect. For purposes, however, of the rule against splitting up of a cause of action, a clearer understanding can be achieved, if together with these elements, the right to relief is considered. In the last analysis, a cause of action is basically an act or an omission or several acts or omissions. A single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. This happens, for example, when a passenger of a common carrier, such as a taxi, is injured in a collision thereof with another vehicle due to the negligence of the respective drivers of both vehicles. In such a case, several rights of the passenger are violated, inter alia, (1) the right to be safe from the negligent acts of either or both the drivers under the law on culpa-acquiliana or quasi-delict; (2) the right to be safe from criminal negligence of the said drivers under the penal laws; and (3) the right to be safely conducted to his destination under the contract of carriage and the law covering the same, not counting anymore the provisions of Article 33 of the Civil Code. The violation of each of these rights is a cause of action in itself. Hence, such a passenger has at least three

CIVIL PROCEDURE causes of action arising from the same act. On the other hand, it can happen also that several acts or omissions may violate only one right, in which case, there would be only one cause of action. Again the violation of a single right may give rise to more than one relief. In other words, for a single cause of action or violation of a right, the plaintiff may be entitled to several reliefs. It is the filing of separate complaints for these several reliefs that constitutes splitting up of the cause of action. This is what is prohibited by the rule. In the case at bar, when appellant failed and refused to pay the difference in bottling charges from July 1, 1959, such act of appellant in violation of the right of appellee to be paid said charges in full under the Ordinance, was one single cause of action, but under the Ordinance, appellee became entitled, as a result of such non-payment, to two reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the balance of the basic charges; and (2) the payment of the corresponding surcharges, the latter being merely a consequence of the failure to pay the former. Stated differently, the obligation of appellant to pay the surcharges arose from the violation by said appellant of the same right of appellee from which the obligation to pay the basic charges also arose. Upon these facts, it is obvious that appellee has filed separate complaints for each of two reliefs related to the same single cause of action, thereby splitting up the said cause of action. The trial court held that inasmuch as there was no demand in the complaint in the first case for the payment of the surcharges, unlike in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Blas Gutierrez, et al., G.R. No. L-13819. May 25, 1960, wherein there was such a demand, there is no bar by prior judgment as to said surcharges, the same not having been "raised as an issue or cause of action in Civil Case No. 5693." This holding is erroneous. Section 4 of Rule 2, above-quoted, is unmistakably clear as to the effect of the splitting up of a cause of action. It says, "if separate complaints are brought for different parts (reliefs) of a single cause of action, the filing of the first (complaint) may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the merits in either is available as a bar in the others." In other words, whenever a plaintiff has filed more than one complaint for the same violation of a right, the filing of the first complaint on any of the reliefs born of the said violation constitutes a bar to any action on any of the other possible reliefs arising from the same violation, whether the first action is still pending, in which event, the defense to the subsequent complaint would be litis pendentia, or it has already been finally 2 terminated, in which case, the defense would be res adjudicata. Indeed, litis pendentia and res adjudicata, on the one hand, and splitting up a cause of action on the other, are not separate and distinct defenses, since either of the former is by law only the result or effect of the latter, or, better said, the sanction for or behind it. It thus results that the judgment of the lower court must be, as it is hereby, reversed and the complaint of appellee is dismissed. No costs.

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Full Text Cases – Cause of Action G.R. No. 182435

CIVIL PROCEDURE

August 13, 2012

LILIA B. ADA, LUZ B. ADANZA, FLORA C. BA YLON, REMO BA YLON, JOSE BA YLON, ERIC BA YLON, FLORENTINO BA YLON, and MA. RUBY BA YLON, Petitioners, vs. FLORANTE BA YLON, Respondent. *

VILLARAMA, JR., DECISION REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 1 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision dated October 26, 2007 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01746. The assailed decision partially reversed and 2 set aside the Decision dated October 20, 2005 issued ~y the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tan jay City, Negros Oriental, Branch 43 in Civil Case No. 11657.

During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997, conveyed Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 to Florante. On July 16, 2000, Rita died intestate and without any issue. Thereafter, learning of the said donation inter vivos in favor of 17 Florante, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading dated February 6, 2002, praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. They further alleged that Rita was already sick and very weak when the said Deed of Donation was supposedly executed and, thus, could not have validly given her consent thereto. Florante and Panfila opposed the rescission of the said donation, asserting that Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code applies only when there is already a prior judicial decree on who between the 18 contending parties actually owned the properties under litigation. The RTC Decision On October 20, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision, portion of which reads:

The Antecedent Facts This case involves the estate of spouses Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon (Spouses Baylon) who died on November 7, 3 1961 and May 5, 1974, respectively. At the time of their death, Spouses Baylon were survived by their legitimate children, namely, Rita Baylon (Rita), Victoria Baylon (Victoria), Dolores Baylon (Dolores), Panfila Gomez (Panfila), Ramon Baylon (Ramon) and herein petitioner Lilia B. Ada (Lilia). Dolores died intestate and without issue on August 4, 1976. Victoria died on November 11, 1981 and was survived by her daughter, herein petitioner Luz B. Adanza. Ramon died intestate on July 8, 1989 and was survived by herein respondent Florante Baylon (Florante), his child from his first marriage, as well as by petitioner Flora Baylon, his second wife, and their legitimate children, namely, Ramon, Jr. and herein petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and Ma. Ruby, all surnamed Baylon. 4

On July 3, 1996, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for partition, accounting and damages against Florante, Rita and Panfila. They alleged therein that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime, 5 owned 43 parcels of land all situated in Negros Oriental. After the death of Spouses Baylon, they claimed that Rita took possession of the said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income from the same. Using the income produced by the said parcels of 6 land, Rita allegedly purchased two parcels of land, Lot No. 4709 and 7 half of Lot No. 4706, situated in Canda-uay, Dumaguete City. The petitioners averred that Rita refused to effect a partition of the said parcels of land. 8

for herself the income of the estate of Spouses Baylon, and expressed no objection to the partition of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but only with respect to the co-owned parcels of land.

In their Answer, Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted that they and 9 the petitioners co-owned 22 out of the 43 parcels of land mentioned in the latter’s complaint, whereas Rita actually owned 10 10 parcels of land out of the 43 parcels which the petitioners sought to partition, while the remaining 11 parcels of land are separately 11 12 13 owned by Petra Cafino Adanza, Florante, Meliton Adalia, 14 15 16 Consorcia Adanza, Lilia and Santiago Mendez. Further, they claimed that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 were acquired by Rita using her own money. They denied that Rita appropriated solely

19

the decretal

Wherefore judgment is hereby rendered: (1) declaring the existence of co-ownership over parcels nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40 and 41 described in the complaint; (2) directing that the above mentioned parcels of land be partitioned among the heirs of Florentino Baylon and Maximina Baylon; (3) declaring a co-ownership on the properties of Rita Baylon namely parcels no[s]. 6, 11, 12, 20, 24, 27, 31, 32, 39 and 42 and directing that it shall be partitioned among her heirs who are the plaintiffs and defendant in this case; (4) declaring the donation inter vivos rescinded without prejudice to the share of Florante Baylon to the estate of Rita Baylon and directing that parcels nos. 1 and 2 paragraph V of the complaint be included in the division of the property as of Rita Baylon among her heirs, the parties in this case; (5) excluding from the co-ownership parcels nos. 20, 21, 22, 9, 43, 4, 8, 19 and 37. Considering that the parties failed to settle this case amicably and could not agree on the partition, the parties are directed to nominate a representative to act as commissioner to make the partition. He shall immediately take [his] oath of office upon [his] appointment. The commissioner shall make a report of all the proceedings as to the partition within fifteen (15) days from the completion of this partition. The parties are given ten (10) days within which to object to the report after which the Court shall act on the commissioner report. 20

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours) meikimouse

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The RTC held that the death of Rita during the pendency of the case, having died intestate and without any issue, had rendered the issue of ownership insofar as parcels of land which she claims as her own moot since the parties below are the heirs to her estate. Thus, the RTC regarded Rita as the owner of the said 10 parcels of land and, accordingly, directed that the same be partitioned among her heirs. Nevertheless, the RTC rescinded the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in favor of Florante. In rescinding the said donation inter vivos, the RTC explained that: However, with respect to lot nos. 4709 and 4706 which [Rita] had conveyed to Florante Baylon by way of donation inter vivos, the plaintiffs in their supplemental pleadings (sic) assailed the same to be rescissible on the ground that it was entered into by the defendant Rita Baylon without the knowledge and approval of the litigants [or] of competent judicial authority. The subject parcels of lands are involved in the case for which plaintiffs have asked the Court to partition the same among the heirs of Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas. Clearly, the donation inter vivos in favor of Florante Baylon was executed to prejudice the plaintiffs’ right to succeed to the estate of Rita Baylon in case of death considering that as testified by Florante Baylon, Rita Baylon was very weak and he tried to give her vitamins x x x. The donation inter vivos executed by Rita Baylon in favor of Florante Baylon is rescissible for the reason that it refers to the parcels of land in litigation x x x without the knowledge and approval of the plaintiffs or of this Court. However, the rescission shall not 21 affect the share of Florante Baylon to the estate of Rita Baylon. Florante sought reconsideration of the Decision dated October 20, 2005 of the RTC insofar as it rescinded the donation of Lot No. 4709 22 and half of Lot No. 4706 in his favor. He asserted that, at the time of Rita’s death on July 16, 2000, Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 were no longer part of her estate as the same had already been conveyed to him through a donation inter vivos three years earlier. Thus, Florante maintained that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 should not be included in the properties that should be partitioned among the heirs of Rita. On July 28, 2006, the RTC issued an Order motion for reconsideration filed by Florante.

23

which denied the

The CA Decision On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

24

dated October 26, 2007,

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 20, 2005 and Order dated July 28, 2006 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they decreed the rescission of the Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997 and the inclusion of lot no. 4709 and half of lot no. 4706 in the estate of Rita Baylon. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for the determination of ownership of lot no. 4709 and half of lot no. 4706. SO ORDERED.

25

The CA held that before the petitioners may file an action for rescission, they must first obtain a favorable judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA asserted, an action for rescission is premature. Further, the CA ruled that the

petitioners’ action for rescission cannot be joined with their action for partition, accounting and damages through a mere supplemental pleading. Thus: If Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 belonged to the Spouses’ estate, then Rita Baylon’s donation thereof in favor of Florante Baylon, in excess of her undivided share therein as co-heir, is void. Surely, she could not have validly disposed of something she did not own. In such a case, an action for rescission of the donation may, therefore, prosper. If the lots, however, are found to have belonged exclusively to Rita Baylon, during her lifetime, her donation thereof in favor of Florante Baylon is valid. For then, she merely exercised her ownership right to dispose of what legally belonged to her. Upon her death, the lots no longer form part of her estate as their ownership now pertains to Florante Baylon. On this score, an action for rescission against such donation will not prosper. x x x. Verily, before plaintiffs-appellees may file an action for rescission, they must first obtain a favorable judicial ruling that lot no. 4709 and half of lot no. 4706 actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Florentino and Maximina Baylon, and not to Rita Baylon during her lifetime. Until then, an action for rescission is premature. For this matter, the applicability of Article 1381, paragraph 4, of the New Civil Code must likewise await the trial court’s resolution of the issue of ownership. Be that as it may, an action for rescission should be filed by the parties concerned independent of the proceedings below. The first cannot simply be lumped up with the second through a mere 26 supplemental pleading. (Citation omitted) 27

The petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision dated 28 October 26, 2007 but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 6, 2008. Hence, this petition. Issue The lone issue to be resolved by this Court is whether the CA erred in ruling that the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in favor of Florante may only be rescinded if there is already a judicial determination that the same actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon. The Court’s Ruling The petition is partly meritorious. Procedural Matters Before resolving the lone substantive issue in the instant case, this Court deems it proper to address certain procedural matters that need to be threshed out which, by laxity or otherwise, were not raised by the parties herein. Misjoinder of Causes of Action

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The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves two separate, distinct and independent actions – partition and rescission. First, the petitioners raised the refusal of their co-heirs, Florante, Rita and Panfila, to partition the properties which they inherited from Spouses Baylon. Second, in their supplemental pleading, the petitioners assailed the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante pendente lite. The actions rescission cannot single action.

of be

partition joined

in

and a

By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or 29 rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the 30 litigants. Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as they may have against an opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not 31 include special civil actions governed by special rules. Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each 32 particular cause of action. A misjoined cause of action, severed upon motion of a by the court sua sponte, adjudicated by the court with the other causes of action.

if not party or may be together

Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance 33 of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately. However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the

court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action. On this score, our disquisition in Republic of the 34 Philippines v. Herbieto is instructive, viz: This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots. xxxx Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case. They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the court’s jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of 35 parties). (Citations omitted) It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity. Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC direct the severance of the petitioners’ action for rescission from their action for partition. While this may be a patent omission on the part of the RTC, this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of its decision. The RTC validly adjudicated the issues raised in the actions for partition and rescission filed by the petitioners. Asserting a New Cause of Action in a Supplemental Pleading In its Decision dated October 26, 2007, the CA pointed out that the said action for rescission should have been filed by the petitioners independently of the proceedings in the action for partition. It opined that the action for rescission could not be lumped up with the action for partition through a mere supplemental pleading. We do not agree. A a

supplemental new cause of

pleading action as

may long

as

raise it

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has some relation to the cause of action set forth original complaint.

in

original the

said donation inter vivos in their supplemental pleading is germane to, and is in fact, intertwined with the cause of action in the partition case. Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 are included among the properties that were sought to be partitioned.

Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads: Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. – Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading. 36

In Young v. Spouses Sy, this Court had the opportunity to elucidate on the purpose of a supplemental pleading. Thus: As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint. The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even though 37 they themselves constitute a right of action. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours) Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or events which had transpired after the filing of the pleading sought to be supplemented, even if the said supplemental facts constitute another cause of action. 38

Admittedly, in Leobrera v. Court of Appeals, we held that a supplemental pleading must be based on matters arising subsequent to the original pleading related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action. We further stressed therein that a supplemental pleading may not be used to try a new cause of action. However, in Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and 39 Development Corp., we clarified that, while a matter stated in a supplemental complaint should have some relation to the cause of action set forth in the original pleading, the fact that the supplemental pleading technically states a new cause of action should not be a bar to its allowance but only a matter that may be considered by the court in the exercise of its discretion. In such cases, we stressed that a broad definition of "cause of action" should be applied. Here, the issue as to the validity of the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante is a new cause of action that occurred after the filing of the original complaint. However, the petitioners’ prayer for the rescission of the

The petitioners’ supplemental pleading merely amplified the original cause of action, on account of the gratuitous conveyance of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 after the filing of the original complaint and prayed for additional reliefs, i.e., rescission. Indeed, the petitioners claim that the said lots form part of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but cannot be partitioned unless the gratuitous conveyance of the same is rescinded. Thus, the principal issue raised by the petitioners in their original complaint remained the same. Main Issue: Propriety of Rescission After having threshed out the procedural matters, we now proceed to adjudicate the substantial issue presented by the instant petition. The petitioners assert that the CA erred in remanding the case to the RTC for the determination of ownership of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706. They maintain that the RTC aptly rescinded the said donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. 40

In his Comment, Florante asserts that before the petitioners may file an action for rescission, they must first obtain a favorable judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon. Until then, Florante avers that an action for rescission would be premature. The petitioners’ contentions are well-taken. The resolution of the instant dispute is fundamentally contingent upon a determination of whether the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in favor of Florante may be rescinded pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code on the ground that the same was made during the pendency of the action for partition with the RTC. Rescission is the damage contracting persons.

a remedy to or injury caused parties or

to

address the third

Rescission is a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties and even to third persons, to secure the reparation of damages caused to them by a contract, even if it should be valid, by means of the restoration of things to their condition at the moment prior to the 41 celebration of said contract. It is a remedy to make ineffective a contract, validly entered into and therefore obligatory under normal conditions, by reason of external causes resulting in a pecuniary 42 prejudice to one of the contracting parties or their creditors. Contracts which are rescissible are valid contracts having all the essential requisites of a contract, but by reason of injury or damage caused to either of the parties therein or to third persons are considered defective and, thus, may be rescinded. The kinds of rescissible contracts, according to the reason for their susceptibility to rescission, are the following: first, those which are meikimouse

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rescissible because of lesion or prejudice; second, those which are 44 rescissible on account of fraud or bad faith; and third, those which, 45 46 by special provisions of law, are susceptible to rescission. Contracts subject pursuant Civil Code.

which of to

refer to litigation is Article 1381(4)

things rescissible of the

Contracts which are rescissible due to fraud or bad faith include those which involve things under litigation, if they have been entered into by the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority. Thus, Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible: xxxx (4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority. The rescission of a contract under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code only requires the concurrence of the following: first, the defendant, during the pendency of the case, enters into a contract which refers to the thing subject of litigation; and second, the said contract was entered into without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of a competent judicial authority. As long as the foregoing requisites concur, it becomes the duty of the court to order the rescission of the said contract. The reason for this is simple. Article 1381(4) seeks to remedy the presence of bad faith among the parties to a case and/or any fraudulent act which they may commit with respect to the thing subject of litigation. When a thing is the subject of a judicial controversy, it should ultimately be bound by whatever disposition the court shall render. The parties to the case are therefore expected, in deference to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the case, to refrain from doing acts which would dissipate or debase the thing subject of the litigation or otherwise render the impending decision therein ineffectual. There is, then, a restriction on the disposition by the parties of the thing that is the subject of the litigation. Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code requires that any contract entered into by a defendant in a case which refers to things under litigation should be with the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of a competent judicial authority. Further, any disposition of the thing subject of litigation or any act which tends to render inutile the court’s impending disposition in such case, sans the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of the court, is unmistakably and irrefutably indicative of bad faith. Such acts undermine the authority of the court to lay down the respective rights of the parties in a case relative to the thing subject of litigation and bind them to such determination.

It should be stressed, though, that the defendant in such a case is not absolutely proscribed from entering into a contract which refer to things under litigation. If, for instance, a defendant enters into a contract which conveys the thing under litigation during the pendency of the case, the conveyance would be valid, there being no definite disposition yet coming from the court with respect to the thing subject of litigation. After all, notwithstanding that the subject thereof is a thing under litigation, such conveyance is but merely an exercise of ownership. This is true even if the defendant effected the conveyance without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of a competent judicial authority. The absence of such knowledge or approval would not precipitate the invalidity of an otherwise valid contract. Nevertheless, such contract, though considered valid, may be rescinded at the instance of the other litigants pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. Here, contrary to the CA’s disposition, the RTC aptly ordered the rescission of the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in favor of Florante. The petitioners had sufficiently established the presence of the requisites for the rescission of a contract pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. It is undisputed that, at the time they were gratuitously conveyed by Rita, Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 are among the properties that were the subject of the partition case then pending with the RTC. It is also undisputed that Rita, then one of the defendants in the partition case with the RTC, did not inform nor sought the approval from the petitioners or of the RTC with regard to the donation inter vivos of the said parcels of land to Florante. Although the gratuitous conveyance of the said parcels of land in favor of Florante was valid, the donation inter vivos of the same being merely an exercise of ownership, Rita’s failure to inform and seek the approval of the petitioners or the RTC regarding the conveyance gave the petitioners the right to have the said donation rescinded pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. Rescission under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is not preconditioned upon the judicial determination as to the ownership of the thing subject of litigation. In this regard, we also find the assertion that rescission may only be had after the RTC had finally determined that the parcels of land belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon intrinsically amiss. The petitioners’ right to institute the action for rescission pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is not preconditioned upon the RTC’s determination as to the ownership of the said parcels of land. It bears stressing that the right to ask for the rescission of a contract under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is not contingent upon the final determination of the ownership of the thing subject of litigation. The primordial purpose of Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is to secure the possible effectivity of the impending judgment by a court with respect to the thing subject of litigation. It seeks to protect the binding effect of a court’s impending adjudication vis-àvis the thing subject of litigation regardless of which among the contending claims therein would subsequently be upheld. Accordingly, a definitive judicial determination with respect to the thing subject of litigation is not a condition sine qua non before the meikimouse

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rescissory action contemplated under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code may be instituted. Moreover, conceding that the right to bring the rescissory action pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is preconditioned upon a judicial determination with regard to the thing subject litigation, this would only bring about the very predicament that the said provision of law seeks to obviate. Assuming arguendo that a rescissory action under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code could only be instituted after the dispute with respect to the thing subject of litigation is judicially determined, there is the possibility that the same may had already been conveyed to third persons acting in good faith, rendering any judicial determination with regard to the thing subject of litigation illusory. Surely, this paradoxical eventuality is not what the law had envisioned. Even if the donation validly rescinded, as to the ownership parcels of land is still necessary.

inter a of

vivos is determination the subject

simultaneously with the other properties subject of the partition case before the RTC. In such case, although the parties in the case before the RTC are still co-owners of the said parcels of land, the RTC would not have the authority to direct the partition of the said parcels of land as the proceedings before it is only concerned with the estate of Spouses Baylon. WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated October 26, 2007 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01746 is MODIFIED in that the Decision dated October 20, 2005 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Tanjay City, Negros Oriental, Branch 43 in Civil Case No. 11657, insofar as it decreed the rescission of the Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997 is hereby REINSTATED. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for the determination of the ownership of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in accordance with this Decision. SO ORDERED.

Having established that the RTC had aptly ordered the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, the issue that has to be resolved by this Court is whether there is still a need to determine the ownership of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706. In opting not to make a determination as to the ownership of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706, the RTC reasoned that the parties in the proceedings before it constitute not only the surviving heirs of Spouses Baylon but the surviving heirs of Rita as well. As intimated earlier, Rita died intestate during the pendency of the proceedings with the RTC without any issue, leaving the parties in the proceedings before the RTC as her surviving heirs. Thus, the RTC insinuated, a definitive determination as to the ownership of the said parcels of land is unnecessary since, in any case, the said parcels of land would ultimately be adjudicated to the parties in the proceedings before it. We do not agree. Admittedly, whoever may be adjudicated as the owner of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706, be it Rita or Spouses Baylon, the same would ultimately be transmitted to the parties in the proceedings before the RTC as they are the only surviving heirs of both Spouses Baylon and Rita. However, the RTC failed to realize that a definitive adjudication as to the ownership of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 is essential in this case as it affects the authority of the RTC to direct the partition of the said parcels of land. Simply put, the RTC cannot properly direct the partition of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 until and unless it determines that the said parcels of land indeed form part of the estate of Spouses Baylon. It should be stressed that the partition proceedings before the RTC only covers the properties co-owned by the parties therein in their respective capacity as the surviving heirs of Spouses Baylon. Hence, the authority of the RTC to issue an order of partition in the proceedings before it only affects those properties which actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon. In this regard, if Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706, as unwaveringly claimed by Florante, are indeed exclusively owned by Rita, then the said parcels of land may not be partitioned meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action G.R. No. 147417 July 8, 2005 SPS. VICTOR & MILAGROS PEREZ and CRISTINA AGRAVIADOR AVISO, Petitioners, vs. ANTONIO HERMANO, Respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules 1 of Court assailing the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioners’ original action for certiorari under Rule 65 for being filed 2 out of time. Assailed as well is the Resolution dismissing petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts of the case are as follows: On 27 April 1998, petitioners Cristina Agraviador Aviso and spouses Victor and Milagros Perez filed a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and against respondent herein Antonio Hermano 3 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 224. On 15 May 1998, respondent (then defendant) Hermano filed his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On 17 January 2000, respondent Hermano filed a "Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial" which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 28 February 2000. This Order was received by petitioners on 21 March 2000. On 23 March 2000, petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on 25 May 2000 and received by petitioners on 18 June 2000. On 17 August 2000, petitioners filed an original action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing the complaint against respondent Hermano. On 19 October 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the first assailed Resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari "for having been filed beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended." On 02 March 2001, the second assailed Resolution was promulgated dismissing petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals holding that: From the time petitioners received the assailed Order on March 21, 2000 and filed their motion for reconsideration, four (4) days had elapsed. On June 18, 2000, petitioners received the denial of their motion for reconsideration. When the instant petition was filed on August 17, 2000, a total of 63 days had elapsed. A.M. No. 00-2-03-50 further amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the New Rules on Civil Procedure states that the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, Order or Resolution and in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the 60-day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

CIVIL PROCEDURE Viewed from its light, the assailed Orders had already attained 4 finality, and are now beyond the power of this Court to review. Aggrieved by the foregoing ruling, petitioners are now before us assigning the following – MANIFEST AND/OR SERIOUS ERROR COMMITTED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE PETITIONERS FILED THEIR PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE IT AND CONSEQUENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE APPRECIATION OF FACTS AND/OR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, WITH ITS FINDING OF FACT NOT BEING BORNE BY THE RECORD OR EVIDENCE, AND THUS ITS 5 CONCLUSION IS ENTIRELY BASELESS. According to petitioners, following the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, their petition was filed on the 60th day, thus, within the reglementary period. Respondent insists, on the other hand, that the petition was filed on the 61st day while the Court of Appeals had declared that the petition was filed on the 63rd day. We agree in the position taken by petitioners. Admittedly, at the time petitioners filed their petition for certiorari on 17 August 2000, the rule then prevailing was Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended by Circular No. 39-98 effective 01 September 1998, which provides: Sec. 4. Where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, or if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order, or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied) However, on 01 September 2000, during the pendency of the case before the Court of Appeals, Section 4 was amended anew by A.M. 6 No. 00-2-03-SC which now provides: Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

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The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasijudicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied) Under this amendment, the 60-day period within which to file the petition starts to run from receipt of notice of the denial of the 7 motion for reconsideration, if one is filed. 8

In Narzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission, we described this latest amendment as curative in nature as it remedied the confusion brought about by Circular No. 39-98 because, "historically, i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari." Curative statutes, which are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements, by their very essence, 9 are retroactive. And, being a procedural rule, we held in Sps. Ma. Carmen and Victor Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge Benito 10 Legarda that "procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent." Consequently, petitioners had a fresh period of 60 days from the time they received the Order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration on 18 June 2000. When they filed their petition with the Court of Appeals on 17 August 2000, exactly 60 days had elapsed following the rule that in computing a period, the first day 11 shall be excluded and the last day included. Hence, there can be no doubt that the petition was filed within the reglementary period for doing so and it was reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in not giving said petition due course. However, instead of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals which would only unduly prolong the disposition of the substantive issue raised, we shall resolve the petition originally filed therein. Petitioners brought to the Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the lone issue of: WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT [Hon. Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 224, Quezon City] HAD PLAINLY AND MANIFESTLY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AS AGAINST 12 RESPONDENT ANTONIO HERMANO IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-98-34211. Petitioners assert that respondent Hermano should not have been dismissed from the complaint because: (1) He did not file a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court and, in fact, his "Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial" was filed almost two years after he filed his

Answer to the complaint; (2) There was no misjoinder of causes of action in this case; and (3) There was no misjoinder of parties. The case filed by petitioners against respondent Hermano and the other defendants, namely Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras and Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele, was one for "Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction" docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-34211 and raffled to Branch 224. Petitioners presented three causes of action in their complaint, the first for enforcement of contract to sell entered into between petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc., the second for annulment or rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered into between petitioners and respondent Hermano and the third for damages against all defendants. For the first cause of action, petitioners allege that sometime in November 1997, they entered into a Contract to Sell with Zescon Land, Inc., through Zenie Sales-Contreras, for the purchase of five (5) parcels of land in the total amount of Nineteen Million One Hundred Four Thousand Pesos (P19,104,000.00). As part of their agreement, a portion of the purchase price would be paid to them as down payment, another portion to be given to them as cash advance upon the execution of the contract and another portion to be used by the buyer, Zescon Land, Inc., to pay for loans earlier contracted by petitioners which loans were secured by mortgages. Re-pleading the foregoing in their second cause of action, petitioners contend that "in a tricky machination and simultaneous with the execution of the aforesaid Contract to Sell," they were made to sign other documents, two of which were Mortgage deeds over the same five properties in favor of respondent Hermano, whom they had never met. It was allegedly explained to them by Sales-Contreras that the mortgage contracts would merely serve to facilitate the payment of the price as agreed upon in their Contract to Sell. Petitioners claim that it was never their intention to mortgage their property to respondent Hermano and that they have never received a single centavo from mortgaging their property to him. Petitioners acknowledge, however, that respondent Hermano was responsible for discharging their obligations under the first mortgage and for having the titles over the subject lands released, albeit not to them but to respondent Hermano. They seek a TRO against respondent Hermano who had informed them that he would be foreclosing the subject properties. In their third cause of action, petitioners pray for damages against all the defendants alleging that: Due to the failure and refusal, without any valid justification and reason, by defendants Zescon and Contreras to comply with their obligations under the Contract to Sell, including their failure and refusal to pay the sums stipulated therein, and in misleading and misrepresenting the plaintiffs into mortgaging their properties to defendant Antonio Hermano, who in turn had not paid the plaintiffs the proceeds thereof, putting them in imminent danger of losing the same, plaintiffs had suffered, and continue to suffer, sleepless nights …. By reason of defendants Zescon and Contreras’s failure and refusal to pay the sums stipulated in the Contract to Sell, and of defendant meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action Antonio Hermano’s not having paid plaintiffs the proceeds of the mortgage agreements, plaintiffs had been deprived of the beneficial use of the proceeds and stood to lose, as they continue to lose, by 13 way of unearned profits at least P1,000,000.00. In his Answer with (Compulsory) Counterclaim dated 15 May 1998, 14 respondent Hermano denied petitioners’ allegations. Then, on 19 February 1999, respondent Hermano filed a civil case entitled "Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage" against petitioner Aviso docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-36914 and raffled to Branch 216 of the RTC of Quezon City. On 17 January 2000, respondent Hermano filed a "Motion With Leave To Dismiss The Complaint Against Defendant Antonio Hermano, Or Ordered Severed For Separate Trial" before Branch 224. In said motion, respondent Hermano argued that there was a mis-joinder of causes of action under Rule 2, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. To quote respondent Hermano: 3. In the instant case, the plaintiffs’ action for the Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for The Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc., and/or its President Zenie Sales Contreras, may not, under Rule 2, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, join defendant Hermano as party defendant to annul and/or rescind the Real Estate Mortgages of subject properties. There is a misjoinder of parties defendants under a different transaction or cause of action; that under the said Rule 2, Section 6, upon motion of defendant Hermano in the instant case, the complaint against defendant 15 Hermano can be severed and tried separately; . . . . Over petitioners’ opposition to said motion, the same was granted by the trial court in its Order dated 28 February 2000 on the justification that: . . . [D]efendant having filed a special civil action for judicial foreclosure of mortgage and now pending before RTC Branch 216, he should be dropped as one of the defendants in this case and whatever claims plaintiffs may have against defendant Hermano, 16 they can set it up by way of an answer to said judicial foreclosure. And, in an Order dated 25 May 2000, the trial court resolved petitioners’ motion for reconsideration by dismissing the same, to wit: After going over the arguments of the parties, the Court believes that defendant Hermano has nothing to do with the transaction which the plaintiffs entered into with defendant Zescon Land, Inc. Besides, the said motion raised matters and defenses previously 17 considered and passed upon by the Court. It is these two Orders that were brought up by petitioners to the Court of Appeals on petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The pivotal issue to be resolved, therefore, is whether or not respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against respondent Hermano in Civil Case No. Q-9834211. As far as we can glean from the Orders of the trial court, respondent Hermano was dropped from the complaint on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action. Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that there was no misjoinder in this case.

CIVIL PROCEDURE To better understand the present controversy, it is vital to revisit the rules on joinder of causes of action as exhaustively discussed in 18 Republic v. Hernandez, thus: By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed. While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character. The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice. The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized. Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder. meikimouse

Full Text Cases – Cause of Action Section 6, Rule 2 on misjoinder of causes of action provides: Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately. There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for joinder under Section 5, Rule 2 are not met. Section 5 provides: Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions: (a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties; (b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules; (c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and

CIVIL PROCEDURE subsequently declared that what was entered into by petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc., was a Contract of Sale (as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by them) because this would mean that the contracts of mortgage were void as petitioners were no longer the absolute owners of the properties mortgaged. Finally, there is also the question of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., as represented by Sales-Contreras, and respondent Hermano committed fraud against petitioners as to make them liable for damages. Prescinding from the foregoing, and bearing in mind that the joinder of causes of action should be liberally construed as to effect in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy involving one subject matter, we hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in severing from the complaint petitioners’ cause of action against respondent Hermano. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 19 October 2000 dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari and its Resolution dated 02 March 2001 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, dated 28 February 2000 and 25 May 2000 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The RTC is further ordered to reinstate respondent Antonio Hermano as one of the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-98-34211. No costs. SO ORDERED.

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. As far as can be gathered from the assailed Orders, it is the first condition - on joinder of parties - that the trial court deemed to be lacking. It is well to remember that the joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the 19 same transaction or series of transaction. In herein case, petitioners have adequately alleged in their complaint that after they had already agreed to enter into a contract to sell with Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, the latter also gave them other documents to sign, to wit: A Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties but for a lower consideration, two mortgage deeds over the same properties in favor of respondent Hermano with accompanying notes and acknowledgment receipts for Ten Million pesos (P10,000,000) each. Petitioners claim that Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, misled them to mortgage their properties which they had already agreed to sell to the latter. From the above averments in the complaint, it becomes reasonably apparent that there are questions of fact and law common to both Zescon Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano arising from a series of transaction over the same properties. There is the question of fact, for example, of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., indeed misled petitioners to sign the mortgage deeds in favor of respondent Hermano. There is also the question of which of the four contracts were validly entered into by the parties. Note that under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, for a mortgage to be valid, it is imperative that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Thus, respondent Hermano will definitely be affected if it is meikimouse