Rule 110 Compiled Digests

PEOPLE VS CAOILE DOCTRINE: For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution provides that victim AAA was raped on three instances by Moises Caoile. The first one was when the accused invited [AAA] to go to the bamboo trees in their place. Upon reaching thereat, the accused directed [AAA] to lie down on the ground. [AAA] followed the instruction of the accused whom she called uncle Moises. The second one happened Four (4) days thereafter while [AAA] was at the pumping well near their house and the accused invited her to gather guavas at the mountain. The third one happened when the accused invited [AAA] to gather santol fruits. [AAA] went with the accused, and once again the accused had carnal knowledge of her. On the other hand, the evidence for the defense provides that [AAA] was a frequent visitor in the accused‘s house and during his so called alone moments that the accused courted [AAA]. Soon thereafter, accused and [AAA] found themselves falling in love with one other. The accused did not know that [AAA] was a demented person since she acted like a normal individual. In fact, she went to a regular school and she finished her elementary education.

The incident was reported to the Rosario police station when [CCC], [AAA]‘s aunt, heard [AAA] blurt out that she was abused by the accused. After executing the respective affidavits, [AAA] was examined and it was found out that [AAA]‘s genitalia suffered a multiple hymenal laceration which, at the time of the examination, was already healed. Claire Baliaga, a psychologist of the Philippine Mental Health Association testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] and discovered [AAA] had mental age of a seven-year, nine-month old child. Accused-appellant Moises Caoile (Caoile), in two separate Amended Informations filed before the RTC on January 5, 2006, was charged with two separate counts of Rape of a Demented Person under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. Caoile pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment and joint trial on the merits ensued. The defense moved that it be allowed to have [AAA] be evaluated by a psychiatrist of its own choice who concluded that [AAA] is suffering from Mild Mental Retardation. RTC rendered a Joint Decision finding Caoile guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape. Caoile elevated the RTC ruling to the Court of Appeals, claiming that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt by attacking the credibility of AAA and the methods used to determine her mental state.The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision ISSUE: W/N the mistake in the Amended Informations will exonerate Caoile vis-à-vis the crime Caoile was actually convicted of considering that AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented." RULING:

Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides for two circumstances when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered rape: 1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason x x x; and 2. Paragraph 1(d): when the offended party is x x x demented.16 Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations with rape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d). The term demented17 refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual‘s former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity.18 On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.19 The mistake in the will not exonerate Caoile even though AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented." .1âwphi1 In the first place, he did not even raise this as an objection. More importantly, none of his rights, particularly that of to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, was violated. Although the Amended Informations stated that he was being charged with the crime of rape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d), it also stated that his victim was "a person with a mental age of seven (7) years old." Elucidating on the foregoing, this Court, in People v. Valdez,21 held:

For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON vs. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016 DOCTRINES:  Once there has been a judicial finding of probable cause, an executive determination of probable cause is irrelevant.

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Once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue is rendered moot by the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.

FACTS: A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National Police- Olongapo City Police Office and private respondent Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo (Laude) against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). Pemberton received a Subpoena issued by the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City giving him 10 days from receipt within which to file a counter-affidavit. Laude filed an Omnibus Motion, which Pemberton opposed. During the preliminary investigation on October 27, 2014, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City stated that Pemberton‘s right to file a counter- affidavit was deemed waived. The City Prosecutor of Olongapo City continued to evaluate the evidence and conducted ocular inspections in connection with the preliminary investigation. It ―found probable cause against [Pemberton] for the crime of murder.‖ An Information for murder was filed against Pemberton before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. The trial court issued a warrant of arrest. On December 18, 2014, Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. On the same day, he filed a Motion to Defer the Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court. Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton‘s Petition for Review and stated that based on the evidence on record, there was ―no reason to alter, modify, or reverse the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City.‖ Aggrieved, Pemberton filed this

Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Pemberton argues that: (a) Secretary De Lima took into account additional evidence which the City Prosecutor allegedly had no authority to receive and which Pemberton had no opportunity to address and rebut, thereby denying him due process of law; (b) Secretary De Lima found probable cause to charge Pemberton with the crime of murder when ―the evidence on record does not support the existence of probable cause to indict [him] . . . with either homicide or murder[;]‖a nd (c) Secretary De Lima found that ―the killing was attended with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength[,] and cruelty despite prevailing jurisprudence dictating that the elements of these qualifying circumstances . . . be established by direct evidence.‖ Secretary De Lima, through the Office of the Solicitor General, points out that this Petition is procedurally infirm. The Petition assails the appreciation of evidence and law by Secretary De Lima, which are ―errors of judgment . . . [that] cannot be remedied by a writ of certiorari.‖ Further, by filing this Petition before this court and not the Court of Appeals, Pemberton violated the principle of hierarchy of courts. Moreover, the case is moot and academic, considering that the Regional Trial Court has convicted Pemberton for the crime charged. ISSUES: 1. Whether respondent Secretary Leila M. De Lima committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the finding of probable cause against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton, thereby denying petitioner due process of law. 2. Whether petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing his Petition before this Court instead of the Court of Appeals

3. Whether this case has been rendered moot and academic. RULING: 1. NO. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon probable cause of reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect. There is no basis to doubt that respondent De Lima judiciously scrutinized the evidence on record. Based on respondent De Lima‘s assessment, there was ample evidence submitted to establish probable cause that petitioner murdered the victim. Foregoing circumstances all taken together leads to the fair and reasonable inference that respondent is probably guilty of killing Laude through treachery, abuse of superior strength, and cruelty. Absence of direct evidence does not preclude a finding of probable cause. It has been the consistent pronouncement of the Supreme Court that, in such cases, the prosecution may resort to circumstantial evidence. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. De Lima‘s determination was based on a careful evaluation of evidence presented. 2. YES. It is not clear why any action by the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, cannot be considered as sufficient for review of petitioner‘s case. Furthermore, the possibility of the conclusion of the trial of the case against petitioner is not a reason that is special and important enough to successfully invoke this Court‘s original jurisdiction. Once there has been a judicial finding of probable cause, an executive determination of probable cause is irrelevant.

3. YES. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue is rendered moot by the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment. Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any motion to dismiss the case or to determine the accused‘s guilt or innocence rests within the sound discretion of the court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he [or she] cannot impose his [or her] opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. Even without the conviction, this Petition has already been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the judicial finding of

probable cause in the form of the Regional Trial Court's issuance of an arrest warrant against petitioner.

transactions perpetrated by respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal). Respondents were the only voting members of the branchs credit committee authorized to extend credit accommodation to clients up to P200,000.00. That through the so-called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up capital of only P125,000.00 and actual maintaining balance of P5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00 against uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at petitioners Port Area branch. Consequently, Universal was able to utilize petitioners funds even before the seven-day clearing period for regional checks expired; that Universals withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were without prior approval of petitioners head office; that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason Account Closed; and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.

Metropolitan Bank v. Reynado GR No. 164538 Date: Aug 9, 2010 RULE 110 Doctrine: 1. Novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability. 2. Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion that is, when he has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Facts:  On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. •

According to the audit officer of metrobank, Antonio Ivan S. Aguirre, the special audit conducted on the cash and mending operations of its Port are branch uncovered fraudulent

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In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and claimed that they only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit accounts and daily transactions.

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Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total amount of P50,990,976.27 as of February 4, 1997 and undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly amortizations in the sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered by postdated checks, plus balloon payment of the remaining principal balance and interest and other charges, if any, on December 31, 2001.

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Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad (Prosecutor Edad) in her Resolution dated July 10, 1997 found petitioners evidence insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa. Acccording to Edad: ―The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts complainant bank in estoppel to argue that the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this case, the relations between the parties have changed, novation has set in and prevented the incipience of any criminal liability on the part of respondents‖

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DOJ decreed that there is no Estafa in the case

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Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal did not absolve private respondents from criminal liability for estafa. Petitioner submits that the settlement affects only the civil obligation of Universal but did not extinguish the criminal liability of the respondents. Petitioner thus faults the CA in sustaining the DOJ which in turn affirmed the finding of Prosecutor Edad for committing apparent error in the appreciation and the application of the law on novation. By petitioners claim, citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tonda, the negotiations pertain to and affect only the civil aspect of the case but do not preclude prosecution for the offense already committed

Issue/s: 1. WON novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish criminal liability. 2. WON it is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear criminally liable for the offense charged. Held:

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Novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability.

Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The civil law principle of relativity of contracts provides that contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof. In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not parties to the agreement. The intention of the parties thereto not to include them is evident either in the onerous or in the beneficent provisions of said agreement. They are not assigns or heirs of either of the parties. Not being parties to the agreement, respondents cannot take refuge therefrom to bar their anticipated trial for the crime they committed. It may do well for respondents to remember that the criminal action commenced by petitioner had its genesis from the alleged fraud, unfaithfulness, and abuse of confidence perpetrated by them in relation to their positions as responsible bank officers. It did not arise from a contractual dispute or matters strictly between petitioner and Universal. This being so, respondents cannot rely on subject settlement agreement to preclude prosecution of the offense already committed to the end of extinguishing their criminal liability or prevent the incipience of any liability that may arise from the criminal offense. This only demonstrates that the execution of the agreement between petitioner and Universal has no bearing on the innocence or guilt of the respondents.

2. Yes, it is the duty of the public prosecutor. In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.The Secretary of Justice, however, may review or modify the resolution of the prosecutor. Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion that is, when he has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the information. As the OSG correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have been the inclusion of certain employees of Universal who were found to have been in cahoots with respondents in defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot seriously argue that because the officers of Universal were not indicted, respondents themselves should not likewise be charged. Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to justify desistance by the public

prosecutor from prosecution of the criminal case just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof were charged. In this case, mandamus is the proper remedy when the resolution of public respondent is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The writ of mandamus is not available to control discretion neither may it be issued to compel the exercise of discretion. Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine which persons appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However, the moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation, the rule loses its discretionary character and becomes mandatory. Thus, where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency of the evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the corresponding information against the person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount to a deliberate refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, gravely abused his discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of estafa as acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latters finding and proceeded with the questioned resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of probable cause. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse. The present case calls for the application of the exception. Given the facts of this case, petitioner has clearly established that the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.

CALLO CLARIDAD VS ESTEBAN [G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013] Doctrine: The determination of probable cause to file a criminal complaint or information in court is exclusively within the competence of the Executive Department, through the Secretary of Justice. The courts cannot interfere in such determination, except upon a clear showing that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed, and that it was committed by the accused. Facts: The petitioner, Marie Callo-Claridad, is the mother of the late Cheasare Armani “Chase” Callo Claridad, whose lifeless but bloodied body was discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007 between vehicles parked at the carport of a residential house located at No.10 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes, Quezon City. Allegedly, Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban (Philip) less than an hour before the discovery of his lifeless body. It was around 7:50 p.m., SG Abelardo Sarmiento Jr., while patrolling around the village, noticed that the side of the Honda Civic with plate JTG 333 had red streaks, which prompted him to move towards the parked cars. He inspected the then empty vehicle and noticed that its radio was still turned on. He checked the cars and discovered that the rear and side of the Honda Civic

with plate CRD 999 were smeared with blood. He saw on the passenger seat a cellular phone covered with blood. It was then that he found the bloodied and lifeless body of Chase lying between the parallel cars. The body was naked from the waist up, with a crumpled bloodied shirt on the chest, and with only the socks on. The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City dismissed the complaint in its resolution dated December 18, 2007. The OCP observed that there was lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence sufficient to charge Philip with homicide, much less murder; that the circumstantial evidence could not link Philip to the crime; that several possibilities would discount Philip’s presence at the time of the crime, including the possibility that there were more than one suspect in the fatal stabbing of Chase; that Philip was not shown to have any motive to kill Chase; that their common friends attested that the two had no illfeelings towards each other; that no sufficient evidence existed to charge Teodora with the crime, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory; and that the allegation that Teodora could have been the female person engaged in a discussion with a male person inside the car with plate JTG 333 was unreliable being mere hearsay. The Secretary of Justice stated that the confluence of lack of an eyewitness, lack of motive, insufficient circumstantial evidence, and the doubt as to the proper identification of Philip by the witnesses resulted in the lack of probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with the crime alleged. The Secretary of Justice held that the only circumstantial evidence connecting Philip to the crime was the allegation that at between 7:00 to 7:30 o‘clock of the evening in question, Chase had boarded the white Honda

Civic car driven by Philip; that the witnesses’ positive identification of Philip as the driver of the car was doubtful, however, considering that Philip did not alight from the car, the windows of which were tinted; and that the rest of the circumstances were pure suspicions, and did not indicate that Philip had been with Chase at the time of the commission of the crime. Issue: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the decision of the Secretary of Justice finding that there was no probable cause to charge the respondents with murder for killing Chase Callo Claridad. Ruling: The Supreme Court denies the petition. According to Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary investigation is “an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.” The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, because it is yet to be followed by the trial proper in a court of law. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties‘ evidence but for the presentation only of such evidence as may engender a wellfounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. The role and object of preliminary investigation were “to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime,

from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive prosecutions.‖ The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor after conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an offended party. Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. Probable cause, although it requires less than evidence justifying a conviction, demands more than bare suspicion. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof. The pieces of evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the respondents were probably guilty of the crime and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase derived from the bare recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and Corpus (respectively, the house help and nanny in the household of a resident of the subdivision) about seeing Chase board the white Honda Civic at

around 7:00 p.m. of February 27, 2007, and about Philip being the driver of the Honda Civic. But there was nothing else after that, because the circumstances revealed by the other witnesses could not even be regarded as circumstantial evidence against Philip. To be sure, some of the affidavits were unsworn. The statements subscribed and sworn to before the officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) having the authority to administer oaths upon matters connected with the performance of their official duties undeniably lacked the requisite certifications to the effect that such administering officers had personally examined the affiants, and that such administering officers were satisfied that the affiants had voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. The lack of the requisite certifications from the affidavits of most of the other witnesses was in violation of Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides thusly: Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner: (a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

The CA explained that the requirement for the certifications under the aforecited rule was designed to avoid self-serving and unreliable evidence from being considered for purposes of the preliminary investigation, the present rules for which do not require a confrontation between the parties and their witnesses; hence, the certifications were mandatory. The Court denies the petition for review on certiorari, and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Jimenez vs. Sorongon, G.R. No. 178607, December 5, 2012 Doctrine: In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. Facts: On August 19, 2003, petitioner Jimenez, the President of Unland Shipping and Management Corporation, filed a complaintaffidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. The petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI‘s articles of incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA. The 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal information with the RTC of Mandaluyong

City. Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. The petitioner and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition and comment to the opposition, respectively. RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the existence of probable cause to hold the respondents for trial. Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents.The RTC granted respondent Alamil‘s motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamil‘s motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found that no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC. On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a prohibited pleading since the motion did not have the public prosecutor‘s conformity. Then petitioner appealed to CA by way of certiorari but denied it. Issue: Whether or not CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioner‘s petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question

involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible. Procedural law basically mandates that all criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides: The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, which is the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG. WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

People v Valdez GR No.175602 January 18, 2012 DOCTRINE The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the crime charged is crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the ever-present

obligation of the State to duly inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation. A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. FACTS On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o‘clock in the evening, Estrella Sayson, was at the canteen preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the evening. Estrella‘s family and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the party. At about 10:00 o‘clock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio, to come out. Jonathan was then attending to customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not heed his mother‘s warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants

threaten Moises with the words ―Gusto mo unahin na kita?‖ Moises replied ―huwag.‖ Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a burger machine. After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime. The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions. ISSUE PO2 Valdez contends that the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery. HELD The Court affirms the convictions, but holds PO2 Valdez guilty only of three counts of homicide due to the failure of the informations to allege the facts and circumstances constituting treachery. It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. In the case of People v Dimaano, for complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as

is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

FLEURDELIZ B. ORGANO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and the JAIL WARDEN OF MANILA, respondents. FACTS: (Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65) The accused, among others, being then public officers and taking advantage of their official positions as employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue criminally amass and acquire funds belonging to the National Government by opening an unauthorized bank account with the Landbank of the Philippines, West Triangle Branch for and in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and deposit therein money belonging to the government of the Philippines, consisting of revenue tax payments then withdraw therefrom the sum of P193,565,079.64 between November, 1996 to February, 1997, without proper authority, through checks made payable to themselves and/or the sole proprietorship firms of the above-named private persons, thereby succeeding in misappropriating, converting, misusing and/or malversing said public funds tantamount to a raid on the public treasury, to their own personal gains,

advantages and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: 1. Lilia B. Organo filed a Motion to Quash Information for lack of jurisdiction 2. Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused 3. Organo filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and /or Quash Warrant of Arrest Pending Resolution on the Issue of Lack of Jurisdiction and Other Incidents. 4. respondent court denied Organo's motion. 5. Reason: accused movant is still a fugitive from justice and continues to evade arrest so that jurisdiction over her person has not yet been acquired by this Court. Movant Organo should first surrender and place her person under the jurisdiction of this Court before she may file any further pleading with this Court. 6. Organo filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a case of plunder when none of the accused occupy Salary Grade 27 or higher as provided under Republic Act No. 6758 HELD: No. REASON: - In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 - RA 7080 was impliedly repealed by RA 8249, such that prosecutions for plunder are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan

only when the accused is a public official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. - As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended; R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. It retains only cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above and, generally, national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758) - However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A.

PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN GR Nos. 147706-07 - February 16, 2005

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Doctrine: 

The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to include the presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could have simply made the necessary distinction. But it did not.

Facts: 

Summary: Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), takes the affirmative position in

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this petition for certiorari. Respondent Efren L. Alas and respondent court contends otherwise. Nov. 17, 1999 – Filing of Information: The Office of the Ombudsman filed two separate informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of the Philippines Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government. Oct. 30, 2002 – Motion to Quash the Information: Respondent Alas filed a motion to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After considering the arguments of both parties, the respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private corporation and that its officers, particularly herein respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. Dissatisfied, the People, through the OSP, filed this petition for certiorari.

Sandiganbayan‘s Ruling and Respondent Alas‘ Contention reiterating the ruling of the former:  The records disclosed that while PPSB is a subsidiary of the Philippines Postal Corporation (PHILPOST), which is a government owned corporation, the same is not created by special law (original charter). It was organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 – which is a General Legislation).

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It was registered in the SEC. Under its Articles of Incorporation, the purpose for which said entity is formed was primarily for business, x x x likewise its 7 secondary purposes points that it exists for business. Thus, its officers and employees are not covered by the GSIS and are under the SSS law, and actions for reinstatement and backwages are not within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission but by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). According to jurisprudence, ―The test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government corporation created by special charter are subject to its provision while those incorporated under the general corporation law are not within its coverage.

Prosecution‘s Contention:  The PPSB was a GOCC as the term was defined under Section 2 (13) of the Administrative Code of 1987. LIKEWISE, in further defining the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan RA 8249 did not make a distinction as to the manner of creation of the GOCCs for their officers to fall under its jurisdiction. Hence, being the President and COO of the PPSB at the time of commission of the crimes charged, respondent Alas came under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the same officers in GOCCs organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code in view of the delimitation provided for in Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the Constitution which states that:

―The Civil Service Commission embraces all branches, subdivisions, and instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters. Held: We find merit in the petition. It should be pointed out however, that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is separate and distinct from the Civil Service Commission. The same is governed by Article XI, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution (not Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the Constitution) which provides that‖ ―x x x the present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law‖. This provision, in effect, retained the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court as defined under Art. XIII, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated its creation, thus: ―Sec 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbyan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offense committed by public officers and employees, including those in governmentowned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.‖

On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authority vested under the 1987 Constitution, enacted RA 7975 maintaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of GOCCs without distinction whatsoever. Thereafter, on Feb. 5, 1997, Congress enacted RA 8249 which preserved the subject provision mentioned. The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to include the presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could have simply made the necessary distinction. But it did not. In Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, this Court, already mindful of the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution, ruled that the concerned officers of GOCCs, whether created by special law or formed under the Corporation Code, come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the provisions of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. For indeed, a GOCC can conceivably create as many subsidiaries under the Corporation Code as it might wish, use public funds, disclaim public accountability and escape the liabilities and responsibilities provided by law. By including the concerned officers of GOCCs organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the legislature evidently seeks to avoid just that. Petition of prosecution GRANTED. Decision of respondent Sandiganbayan REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

PEOPLE V. YPARRAGUIRE

G.R. No. 124391. July 5, 2000

Doctrine: The offended party can initiate a prosecution for rape even if she is a minor, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. The complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding, it is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction in the court to try the case. The courts jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered analogous to an attempt to compromise, which offer of compromise by the appellant may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt pursuant to Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Facts: On March 24, 1994, at about 11:00 oclock in the evening, while complainant Charmelita D. Ruina, an invalid and mentally retarded, was on her bed at the store of her mother at the Public Market at Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, where she and her mother lived, accused Elmer Yparraguirre alias "Lalo" entered her room, the door of which was not locked because her mother went to the store of her elder sister. Upon getting inside, he undressed himself and approached the Complainant who was apparently awake. He caressed her and sucked her breasts. She shouted for help but nobody came to rescue her, perhaps because it was late already in the evening and her voice was not loud enough to be heard at the distance as, in fact, it could be heard at only about three to five meters away x x x. Accused told her to keep

quiet and when she put up some limpy resistance, he boxed her. He then removed her panty went on top of her and inserted his manhood into her most private part. She felt pain. After raping her, he left her room. Soon her mother, Sanselas Leongas Ruina, arrived. She reported to her the incident. The following morning, accused went back to the store and apologized for what he did and promised not to do it again. But his plea would not mollify Sanselas. She took the complainant to the Madrid (Surigao del Sur) District Hospital for physical examination. Dr. Carlo P. Altrecha recorded the following findings in the Medical Certificate that he issued on March 26, 1994 Issue: Whether the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was signed and filed by the chief of police and not by the complainant.

determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the private offenses because the same is governed by the Judiciary law, not the Revised Penal Code which deals with the definition of felonies and their punishment. Stated differently, the complaint required in Article 344 is but a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. Such condition was imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial.[4] The complaint simply starts the prosecutory proceeding but does not confer jurisdiction on the court to try the case[5] because the overriding consideration in determining whether the condition precedent in Article 344 has been complied with is the intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront committed.[6] Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefitting the accused. When it is said that the requirement in Article 344 (that there should be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction in the court to try the case. The courts jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.

Held: The contention has no merit. Pursuant to the Section 5, Rule 110 provision, the offended party can initiate a prosecution for rape even if she is a minor, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Although the victim in this case is no longer a minor, it is undisputed that she is a mental retardate and suffering from physical deformity. No woman would come out in the open, inform the authorities of the injustice done to her, make a statement of what had happened unless her purpose is to redress the wrong done against her honor. Once the violation of the law becomes known through a direct original participation initiated by the victim, the requirements of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to the effect that the offense of rape "shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents," are satisfied. Said provision is not

Doctrine: Rule 110 – Prosecution of Offenses Title: PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA, 174 SCRA 653 FACTS:

1. On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and the respondent to the case, and Erich Geiling, a German national, were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. 2. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner. 3. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia and Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively. 4. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 5. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied he motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both accused. 6. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and fined.

Whether or not the private respondent‘s adultery charges against the petitioner is still valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing of charges. RATIO: The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should only be the offended spouse. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country in 1983, is admitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, with relation to the status of Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent has been finalized through the courts in Germany and the RTC inManila, the marriage of the couple were already finished, thus giving no merit to the charges the respondent filed against the petitioner. Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner holds no legal merit to commence the adultery case asthe offended spouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The temporary restraining order issued in this case was made permanent. RULING: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 8752435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.

ISSUE: People v. Mariano G.R. No. L-47437 September 29, 1983 Doctrine:

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It is not sanctioned by Section 4 of Rule 110 nor by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code whose provisions do not categorically specify that the father has the preferential right to file the complaint for seduction, abduction, rape or abusos deshonestos. It is noteworthy that ‗the father and mother jointly exercise parental authority over their legitimate children who are not emancipated.‘ It is their duty to represent their emancipated children in all actions which may redound to their benefit "Under the circumstances, the complaint filed by the mother was a sufficient compliance with Article 344 and Section 4 of Rule 110. It conferred jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The father‘s passivity should not preclude the mother from securing redress for the outrage committed against her daughter."

Facts:  Socorro Soria, a demented woman of 24 years, had been confined as a mental patient at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Manila, since February 26, 1971 up to May 3, 1974 when she was transferred to the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital in Pili, Camarines Sur for further treatment.  On May 26, 1975, her parents brought her home to Burabod, Daet, Camarines Norte, to be treated by the appellant, known in the locality as a faith healer or "spiritista." chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library  In the afternoon of September 25, 1976, appellant went to the residence of the Sorias to treat Socorro. After securing some "salonpas" from Mrs. Maria Soria, mother of Socorro, he entered the room of his patient, and locked the door.

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Mrs. Soria proceeded to the room and when she noted that the door was indeed locked from inside, she and Elizabeth peeped through a small aperture and saw the appellant on top of Socorro in the act of sexual intercourse. When Mrs. Soria confronted him, appellant expressed his willingness to be Socorro‘s husband and promise to construct an annex to his house where he would keep Socorro as his wife. On September 27, 1976, a verified complaint for rape, signed by Mrs. Maria Soria, was filed against appellant before the Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines Norte. on the basis thereof, an information was filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte. It is settled in this jurisdiction that an accused who has carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded or demented woman is guilty of rape the reason being that she is incapable of giving rational consent to the sexual intercourse. Appellant further argues that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because the victim‘s mother had no right or authority to file a complaint for rape inasmuch as the father was still living. He invokes the following provisions of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court

Issue: WON the victim‘s mother had no right or authority to file a complaint for rape inasmuch as the father was still living. He invokes the following provisions of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Held: No. The mother had authority under Sec. 4 Rule 110. Appellant‘s contention is . . . based on a dubious technicality. If sustained, it might defeat the ends of justice. It is not sanctioned

by section 4 of Rule 110 nor by article 344 of the Revised Penal Code whose provisions do not categorically specify that the father has the preferential right to file the complaint for seduction, abduction, rape or abusos deshonestos. It is noteworthy that ‗the father and mother jointly exercise parental authority over their legitimate children who are not emancipated‘. It is their duty to represent their emancipated children ‗in all actions which may redound to their benefit‘ [Arts. 311 and 316, Civil Code]. Under the circumstances the complaint filed by the mother was a sufficient compliance with article 344 and section 4 of Rule 110. It conferred jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The father‘s passivity should not preclude the mother from securing redress for the outrage committed against her daughter."

Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, People Philippines and Office of the Ombudsman GR No. 148965 February 26, 2002

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Doctrine: The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar / When conspiracy is charged as a crime (e.g. conspiracy to commit treason) Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure governs. Facts: November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against then president Joseph Estrada, five criminal complaints against the former president and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the ombudsman. The ombudsman found probable cause and filed with the Sandiganbayan several complaints against the former president and other respondents therein. One of the informations was the

crime of plunder under RA 7080 and among those respondents was Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila. The arraignment was set and no bail for petitioner‘s provisional liberty was fixed. Jinggoy filed a motion to Quash or Suspend the amended information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. The ombudsman opposed the motion. The court issued a warrant of arrest. Thereafter, Jinggoy and his co0accused were placed in custody of the law. Jinggoy filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a series or combination of overt or criminal acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court. The court denied the motions for lack of merit. Jinggoy moved for reconsideration of the resolution but respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign Jinggoy. Jinggoy refused to make his plea prompting the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him. Hence, this petition. Jinggoy claims that Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction Issues: (1)WON R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to Jinggoy, and denying him the equal protection of the laws; (2)WON the penalty for Jinggoy should be other than reclusion perpetua or death (3)WON the court erred in sustaining the charge against Jinggoy for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which

and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process; (4) WON the conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information as provided for in Sec. 6 Rule 110 of the Revised rules of Criminal Procedure

crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other.

Held: The petition was dismissed. (1) Jinggoy‘s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute plunder. Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which is of receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x. In this sub-paragraph (a), Jinggoy, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling on several instances. The phrase on several instances means Jinggoy committed the predicate act in series.

(3) In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonalityto help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.

(2) Jinggoy is under the impression that: (1) he is charged with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Jinggoy, however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in committing the

(4) Conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended

party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed. Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The information must also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. However, The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as coprincipals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime.

Following the stream of the Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information. In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused. Following the ruling in People v. Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder

RULE 110 ENRILE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR NO. 213455 AUGUST 11, 2015 DOCTRINE: An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in

implementing the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, specifically require certain matters to be stated in the Information for its sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense charged. To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. Ultimate facts is defined as ―those facts which the expected evidence will support. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are tobe established.‖ It refers to the facts that the evidence will prove at the trial. Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion. They are facts supporting the existence of some other alleged and unproven fact. In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action, which an accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial. Its purpose is to enable an accused: to know the theory of the government‘s case; to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering evidence. In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is governed by Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient

particularity to apprise the accused of the crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the Information means. A bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid information for it merely fills in the details on an otherwise valid information to enable an accused to make an intelligent plea and prepare for his defense. If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order. But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused cannot prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper remedy. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure grants the accused the remedy of a bill of particulars to better inform himself of the specifics or particulars concerning facts or matters that had not been averred in the Information with the necessary clarity for purposes of his defense.

NATURE: Petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the Court En Banc to act on the petition; (b) to expedite the proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and (c) to issue a temporary restraining order to the respondents from holding a pre-trial and further proceedings in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238‖1 filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) challenging the July 11, 2014 resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan FACTS: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for Plunder against Enrile, Jessica Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald Lim and John Raymond de Asis before the Sandiganbayan (SB). Enrile responded by filing before the SB (1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record

to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail), and (2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information, on June 10, 2014, and June 16, 2014, respectively. On July 3, 2014, the SB denied Enrile‘s motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case against the accused. On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing informing him that his arraignment would be held before the SB‘s Third Division on July 11, 2014. On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the SB. On the same date, he filed a motion for deferment of arraignment since he was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the SB pursuant to the SB‘s order and his motion for bill of particulars was called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Enrile‘s counsel, argued the motion orally. Thereafter, SB Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang (Cabotaje-Tang), declared a “10-minute recess” to deliberate on the motion. When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Court‘s denial of Enrile‘s motion for bill of particulars essentially on the following grounds: (1) the details that Enrile desires are ―substantial reiterations‖ of the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information; and (2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial. The SB then directed Atty. Mendoza to immediately proceed with his motion for reconsideration. Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the reconsideration of the denial of Enrile‘s motion for bill of particulars. The SB again declared a recess to deliberate on the motion. After five (5)

minutes, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the SB‘s denial of the motion for reconsideration. Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enrile‘s arraignment. The SB responded by directing the doctors present to determine whether he was physically fit to be arraigned. After he was declared fit, the SB proceeded with Enrile‘s arraignment. Enrile entered a “no plea,” prompting the Sandiganbayan to enter a “not guilty” plea on his behalf. Enrile‘s contention: Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific participation in the crime of plunder had been. He posits that the Information should have stated the details of the particular acts that allegedly constituted the imputed series or combination of overt acts that led to the charge of plunder. Enrile posits that his „desired details‟ are not evidentiary in nature; they are material facts that should be clearly alleged in the Information so Decision G.R. No. 213455 that he may be fully informed of the charges against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of particulars are cited in a context different from his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the resolution of the probable cause issue was interlocutory and did ―not bar the submission of the same issue in subsequent proceedings especially in the context of a different proceeding.‖

ISSUE: Whether or not the SB‘s denial of Enrile‘s motion for bill of particulars is proper in that (a) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and (2) that Enrile‘s cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds previously raised RULING: (1) (a) Proper Denial (1) Enrile‘s requested details on “Who among the accused acquired the alleged “ill-gotten wealth” are not proper subjects for a bill of particulars. The law on plunder provides that it is committed by ―a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with x x x.‖ The term ―connivance‖ suggests an agreement or consent to commit an unlawful act or deed with another; to connive is to cooperate or take part secretly with another. It implies both knowledge and assent that may either be active or passive. Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and the Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to specify, as an essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one, by two or by all of the accused. In the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at least P50 million. We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as a crime by itself but only as the mode of committing the crime. Thus, there is no absolute necessity of reciting its particulars in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged.

(2) We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the questions – For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official document is a portion of the “Priority Development Assistance Fund” identified as that of a member of Congress, in this instance, as ENRILE’s, to be found? In what amount for each year is ENRILE’s Priority Development Assistance Fund? and x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted which validated the findings that each of Enrile’s PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects? These matters will simply establish and support the ultimate fact that Enrile‘s PDAF was used to fund fictitious or nonexistent projects. Whether a discretionary fund (in the form of PDAF) had indeed been made available to Enrile as a member of the Philippine Congress and in what amounts are evidentiary matters that do not need to be reflected with particularity in the Information, and may be passed upon at the full-blown trial on the merits of the case. We also deny Enrile‘s plea for details on who ―the others‖ were (aside from Napoles, Lim and De Asis) from whom he allegedly received kickbacks and commissions. These other persons do not stand charged of conspiring with Enrile and need not therefore be stated with particularly, either as specific individuals or as John Does. The Court cannot second- guess the prosecution‘s reason for not divulging the identity of these ―others‖ who may potentially be witnesses for the prosecution. (b) Improper Denial (1) We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the following questions – What are the particular overt acts which constitute the

“combination”? What are the particular overt acts which constitute the “series”? Who committed those acts? It is not sufficient to simply allege that the amount of illgotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth – whether through a combination or series of overt acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 – is an important element that must be alleged. When the Plunder Law speaks of ―combination,‖ it refers to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080. On the other hand, to constitute a ―series‖ there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d). The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase ―combination or series of overt or criminal acts.‖ Hence, even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act. Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder,the various overt acts that constitute the ―combination‖ and ―series‖ the Information alleged, are material facts that should not only be alleged, but must be stated with sufficient definiteness so that the accused would know what he is specifically charged of and why he stands charged, so that he could properly defend himself against the charge. A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case shows that the prosecution made little or no effort to particularize the transactions that would constitute the required series or combination of overt acts. In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its recital of the manner Enrile and his coaccused allegedly operated, thus describing its general

view of the series or combination of overt criminal acts that constituted the crime of plunder. Without any specification of the basic transactions where kickbacks or commissions amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been allegedly received, Enrile‘s preparation for trial is obviously hampered. This defect is not cured by mere reference to the prosecution‘s attachment, as Enrile already stated in his Reply that the ―desired details‖ could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution, which documents are not integral parts of the Information. Hence, the prosecution does not discharge its burden of informing Enrile what these overt acts were by simply pointing to these documents. To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very specific sum based on a number of different acts and hence must have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown reinforces the required specificity in describing the different overt acts. 2. Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and commissions, so that he could prepare the necessary pieces of evidence, documentary or otherwise, to disprove the allegations against him. We point out that the period covered by the indictment extends from ―2004 to 2010 or thereabout,‖ of which, we again stress that different overt acts constituting of the elements of Plunder took place during this period. 3. Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that Enrile allegedly funded coupled with the name of Napoles‘ NGO (e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform Enrile of the particular transactions referred to. Thus, the ―identified project” and “Napoles‟ NGO” are material facts that should be clearly and definitely stated in the Information

to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense evidence on the specific transaction pointed to. The omission of these details will necessarily leave Enrile guessing on what transaction/s he will have to defend against, since he may have funded other projects with his PDAF. Specification will also allow him to object to evidence not referred to or covered by the Information‘s ultimate facts. 4. The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles‘ NGOs are also material facts that must be specified, since they served a necessary role in the crime charged – the alleged conduits between Enrile and Napoles‟ NGOs. They were indispensable participants in the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed. 5. In the present case, the particulars on the:(1) projects involved; (2) Napoles‘ participating NGOs; and (3) the government agency involved in each transaction will undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know the specific transactions involved, and thus enable him to prepare adequately and intelligently whatever defense or defenses he may have. The purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the Information that are indefinite, vague, or are conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which he stands accused. Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond to the charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or are unclear to him. In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayan‘s denial of the petitioner‘s motion for a bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized or specified are all evidentiary – without any explanation

supporting this conclusion – constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that must be alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be specified, and made the necessary determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the ―desired details‖ could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous documents what the desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond and make an intelligent defense. (2) While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of particulars involved the right of an accused to due process, the enumeration of the details desired in Enrile‘s supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars are different viewed particularly from the prism of their respective objectives. In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not state a crime for which he can be convicted; thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in details that would allow him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of form. Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state the nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are required to be specified in sufficient detail because the

allegations in the Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are made. That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does not preclude the accused from requesting for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of particulars. Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly plead and prepare for trial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RENATO alias BONG TORRECAMPO and RENE TORRECAMPO, appellants. [G.R. No. 139297. February 23, 2004] Doctrines: - Circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for purposes of conviction must have the following elements: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and, (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. - Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide: Sec. 8. Designation of the Offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and

specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. - Aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, must be alleged in the information before they can be considered by the court. These new provisions apply even if the crime was committed prior to their effectivity since they are favorable to the accused, as in this case. Facts: Jovito Caspillo was found stabbed and decapitated in his rented room. For his death, brothers Renato alias Bong and Rene Torrecampo were charged before the RTC of Las Pinas with murder. The above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one, Nora Torrecampo whose present whereabouts still unknown, they stabbed Caspillo in the different part(s) of his body and even cut off his head with a bladed weapon. Jovito was a tenant of the Escosio family. He shared a room with his brother Randy and first cousins Nora and Karen Torrecampo. The Escosios occupied the other room of the house. Erlinda Escosio testified that on November 11, 1994, she was seated at the door of their room removing lice from the hair of her daughter when she saw Nora and Renato pass by. They were followed by Rene Torrecampo. All three (3) went to the

room of Jovito. A while later, Erlinda heard a weepy Nora pleading to get into Jovitos room where the loud noise of the radio could be heard. Some minutes after, she saw Nora and appellant Renato come out of the room. Appellant Renato dragged Nora to the direction of Sampaguita Compound. Appellant Rene left the room after them. He was carrying a bag. Erlinda continued that after the departure of appellants and Nora, she walked to the toilet and noticed blood at the door of Jovito. Curious, she peeped inside and was shocked by the sight of a body drenched in blood with its head severed from the neck. It was Jovito. Terrified, she called for her neighbors and the barangay tanods. People milled to the crime scene until the authorities arrived. She felt that appellants were the culprits. She explained that the main door is the only way in and out of the house. Either way, one would have to pass by their room to get to Jovitos. On subject date and time, she only saw appellants and Nora go in and come out of the scene of the crime. At the police station, she identified both appellants. According to Cherry Francisco, a neighbor who lives in front of the house of the Escosios, she was eating breakfast with her family when she heard noises coming from the room of Jovito. She went out to investigate and noticed Nora beating at the door crying out, Bakit ninyo siya pinatay? The door was suddenly opened and someone grabbed Nora by the hair and pulled her inside the room. Rene Torrecampo testified in his defense. He averred that on November 11, 1994, he left for work and arrived at LFS Engineering an hour later as indicated in the office logbook. He claimed that he found out about Jovitos death only during his coffee break when Renato‘s wife telephoned them about it. According to him, they left for Laong immediately after getting permission from their employer Lamberto Samonte. On their way

home, Rene and Karen stopped by the latters place primarily to find out what happened to Jovito and incidentally to get some of her things. The room was a mess and Jovito was nowhere to be found. Rene added that at work the next day he read in Abante that his brother Renato was being tagged as the principal suspect in the killing. Hence, he and his brother immediately requested their employer Lamberto Samonte to accompany them to the Las Pinas Police Station to surrender. The police took them to the Office of then Municipal Mayor Ben Casimiro where they were presented to the media. An investigation ensued. Appellants were detained and ultimately charged for the murder of Jovito. Renato Torrecampo basically related a similar story. Together with his brother, he asked their employer to escort him to the police station to clear his name. However, they were detained instead and threatened into admitting the commission of the crime. They insisted that they had no knowledge thereof and explained that they were at their place of work when it happened. The police did not believe them. Forthwith, they were charged with murder. The defense likewise offered in evidence the testimonies of SPO1 Benjamin Javier, Edgardo Gremio and SPO4 Esmeraldo Lucena. SPO1 Javier of the Las Pinas Police Criminal Investigation Division was assigned to investigate the death of Jovito. He said that he found the dead body of Jovito in his small rented room, which was adjacent to the room of the owner of the two (2)-bedroom house. The rooms were separated by a plywood wall. He placed the time of death at 10:30 A.M. based on his interview of Erlinda Escosio. He took down the statement of Erlinda on November 12, 1994. He believed her story and submitted a report on his findings. Edgardo Gremio and SPO4 Esmeraldo Lucena gave corroborative testimonies. Gremio testified that he is a member

of the Barangay Police Force in Laong Street, Barangay Almanza Uno, Las Pinas.

conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

On the basis of circumstantial evidence, the court a quo found Renato and Rene Torrecampo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced them to death. It likewise ordered them to solidarily pay the heirs of the victim Jovito Caspillo P100,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of life; P35,014.00 in actual damages for the wake, funeral and burial expenses; and, the costs of the suit. Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

In the instant case, the circumstances enumerated by the trial court establish an unbroken chain of events showing the complicity of appellants and no other in the killing of victim Jovito Caspillo. Indeed, the case of the prosecution is woven principally around the testimonies of witnesses Erlinda Escosio and Cherry Francisco whose testimonies were sufficiently tested and found credible on the crucible of cross-examination. Notably, as correctly observed by the court a quo, appellants failed to demonstrate ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify against them. Absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for the witnesses to prevaricate, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.

In convicting appellants, the trial court relied on the following circumstances: (a) at about 9:00 A.M. on November 11, 1994, Erlinda saw Jovito very much alive; (b) after an hour, Erlinda saw appellant Renato and his sister Nora pass by, followed shortly by appellant Rene; (c) Erlinda heard a commotion inside the room of Jovito and after a few minutes saw appellants emerging from the room with Nora in tow; (d) Cherry heard a loud banging from the room of Jovito so she went outside and saw Nora frantically pounding at the door, then Nora was pulled inside the room; (e) after thirty (30) minutes, Cherry witnessed a seemingly weak Nora being assisted by appellant Renato coming out of the room; and, (f) Cherry likewise observed appellant Rene leaving the room with his hands and clothes covered with blood. Circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for purposes of conviction must have the following elements: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and, (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and reasonable

Issue: W/N the decision of the trial court is not supported and contrary to the evidence adduced during trial Ruling: No. The Court rejected this contention. First. Appellants submit that the trial court should have completely rejected both oral and written accounts of prosecution witness Erlinda Escosio considering that her in-court testimony is contrary to her sworn statement. Clearly, reference is made on what Erlinda did not mention in her sworn statement. This is not an inconsistency but merely an incompleteness of narration. Sworn statements, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for various reasons, sometimes from partial suggestion or for want of suggestion and inquiries. There is no rule of evidence to the effect that omission of certain particulars in a sworn statement would estop an affiant from making an elaboration thereof or from correcting inaccuracies during the trial.

Second. To merit belief, alibi and denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. The records reveal that appellants employer only substantiated their claim that they left LFS Engineering at 10:00 A.M. on that ill-fated day. No clear and convincing evidence was adduced to establish that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Indeed, they admitted leaving LFS Engineering to go to the locus criminis though they claimed to have arrived there only at 11:00 A.M. Their testimony cannot prevail over the positive identification of Erlinda and Cherry, who are disinterested witnesses. Third. It may be in keeping with human experience for anyone including appellants to wash the blood away from their clothes and body after committing a crime. However, it is also natural for them to act with haste so they could immediately leave the crime scene and avoid suspicion. It is thus not incredible that the hurried and haphazard attempt to remove the bloodstains left the herein appellants with some traces of blood still visible to the naked eyes of witnesses Erlinda and Cherry. Fourth. The court in criminal prosecution is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of human experience and not by mere surmises. Fifth. Appellants also assail the denial by the trial court of their motion for an ocular inspection of the crime scene. They suggest that had it been granted, the accuracy or inexactitude of the description by SPO1 Javier could have been established. The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the ocular inspection would have been an exercise in futility for the reason that the house had then long been renovated. The Information alleged the circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and/or evident premeditation, and charged the crime of murder. The circumstances that qualify the killing to

murder must be proved indubitably as the killing itself. The prosecution failed to prove these circumstances. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor. This assumes a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The evidence does not show that appellants took advantage of their number in order to overpower the victim. The evidence against appellants is merely circumstantial. Nor was evident premeditation proved. There is no proof in the instant case of (a) the time when appellants determined to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that they clung to their determination to commit the crime; and, (c) the lapse of sufficient period of time between the determination and the execution of the crime, to allow appellants to reflect upon the consequences of their act. Hence, this circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated. The Solicitor General submits that treachery should be appreciated against the appellants as Jovito was asleep when killed. He contends that while treachery was not alleged in the Information, it could be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. The Court however did not agreed with this. Erlinda testified that Jovito was asleep prior to the arrival of appellants but she did not say that he was still sleeping when the attack commenced. Even assuming that treachery was proved, it could not be considered a generic aggravating circumstance. Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide: Sec. 8. Designation of the Offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the

offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. Clearly, under the aforesaid provisions, aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, must be alleged in the information before they can be considered by the court. These new provisions apply even if the crime was committed prior to their effectivity since they are favorable to the accused, as in this case. Appellants cannot invoke the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For voluntary surrender to be considered, it must be shown that: (1) the offender was not actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an agent of that person; and, (3) his surrender was voluntary. The records disclose that appellants voluntarily presented themselves to the Las Pinas Police Department to clear their name. Prescinding from these premises, the Court held that the decision of the trial court finding appellants Torrecampos guilty of murder and imposing upon them the penalty of death is MODIFIED; they are instead found guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

People vs Jugueta

―As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.‖ FACTS: That on or about 9:00 o‘clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Finding appellant‘s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. ISSUE: Whether or not the information is valid

HELD: The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense. However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.

MATALAM vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 165751 Doctrine: SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with

leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. But if amended in substance, the accused is entitled to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended charge is related to or is included in the original charge.

Facts: An information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga and Naimah Unte with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for their alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil. The accusatory portion of the information reads: On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. After the reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Exept Datu Guimid Matalam. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the amended information charges an entirely new cause of action. The corpus delicti of the amended information is no longer his alleged refusal to pay the backwages ordered by the Civil Service Commission, but the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not Matalam was deprived of due process of law when the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amneded Information without conducting another or new preliminary investigation. Ruling: Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge

another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed substantial. According to Retired Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, before the plea is taken, the information may be amended in substance and/or form, without leave of court; but if amended in substance, the accused is entitled to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended charge is related to or is included in the original charge. If the amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original information, a new preliminary investigation is not required.

If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his right to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due process. A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process. As to statement of the court a quo that the conduct of another preliminary investigation would be merely a waste of time, it must be emphasized that though the conduct thereof will hold back the progress of the case, the same is necessary in order that the accused may be afforded his right to a preliminary investigation. The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation should never be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.

PEOPLE VS TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA DOCTRINE: Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 18 provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned. A substantial amendment consists of the

recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. FACTS: Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn SuaKho. On February 12, 2001, at the condominium of Sua-Kho, the housemaid heard her employer screaming, and she saw the accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. The victim was brought to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors tried to revive her, but failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victim‘s car. He was arrested soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his home province. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an amended Information. In the amended Information, it states that the accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different parts of her body with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab wounds, which directly caused her death; that the act was committed inside the dwelling of Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued where the accused raised the defense of selfdefense. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City rendered judgment finding Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article

248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injection. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court because the penalty imposed was death. However, the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court.

Rules of Court, 18 provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned. 19

The Court of Appeals disregarded appellant‘s claim of self defense for lack of evidence and for being incredible considering the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and his flight from the crime scene. However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequately established which qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance. As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and age of the victim, the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were included as amendments to the information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not be allowed because it will prejudice the rights of the appellant.

In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 20 we had the occasion to distinguish between substantial and formal amendments:

ISSUE: W/N the CA err in not allowing the amendments in the information regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age or sex RULING: YES. We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that appellant‘s claim of self-defense is selfserving hence should not be given credence. We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments in the information regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution‟s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription. The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. 21

The insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. 22 Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or sex. 23 Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. 24

DOCTRINE:

There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have killed her elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately intended to offend or disregard the respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. SuaKho.

Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn SuaKho. On February 12, 2001, at the condominium of Sua-Kho, the housemaid heard her employer screaming, and she saw the accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. The victim was brought to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors tried to revive her, but failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victim‘s car. He was arrested soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his home province.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER qualified by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and dwelling, with no mitigating circumstances.

PEOPLE VS TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 18 provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. FACTS:

Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an amended Information. In the amended Information, it states that the accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different parts of her body with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab wounds, which directly caused her death; that the act was committed inside the dwelling of Evelyn

Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued where the accused raised the defense of selfdefense. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City rendered judgment finding Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injection. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court because the penalty imposed was death. However, the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals disregarded appellant‘s claim of self defense for lack of evidence and for being incredible considering the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and his flight from the crime scene. However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequately established which qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance. As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and age of the victim, the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were included as amendments to the information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not be allowed because it will prejudice the rights of the appellant. ISSUE: W/N the CA err in not allowing the amendments in the information regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age or sex

RULING: YES. We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that appellant‘s claim of self-defense is selfserving hence should not be given credence. We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments in the information regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 18 provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned. 19 In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 20 we had the occasion to distinguish between substantial and formal amendments: A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution‟s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription. The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or

not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. 21 The insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. 22 Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or sex. 23 Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. 24 There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have killed her elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately intended to offend or disregard the respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. SuaKho. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER qualified by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating

circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and dwelling, with no mitigating circumstances.

SOBERANO VS PEOPLE G.R. No. 154629 Date: October 5, 2005 Rule 110 Doctrine: Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. "However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. "If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

Facts: •

• In November 2000, the prominent public relations practitioner, Salvador Bubby Dacer, together with his driver, Emmanuel Corbito, was abducted along Zobel Roxas St. in the City of Manila. Their charred remains, consisting of burnt bones, metal dental plates and a ring, were later found in Barangay Buna Lejos, Indang, Cavite. They were positively identified by their dentists and by forensic pathologists from the University of the Philippines. Both victims were killed by strangulation. •

•

An information was filed by the panel of prosecutors with RTC , Manila charging a number of accused some of whom are public officers of double murder. On 23 May 2001, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information which was granted and the Amended Information was admitted by the trial court. The new information included now the allegation that: (the previous info did not assert that the victims were abducted) xxx abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO at the corner of Osmea Highway (formerly South Super Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street in Manila, and later brought them to Indang, Cavite, xxx

•

On 18 June 2001, one of the accused, P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asserting that he was mistakenly identified as a participant in the double murder. He stressed that it was not him but a certain SPO3 Allan Cadenilla Villanueva who was previously identified by several witnesses as one of the culprits. This was granted by the trial court.

A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information dated 17 September 2001 was filed by the prosecution. The Amended Information —

(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as they are now witnesses for the State; (2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and (3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Via. •

Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato and Jovencio Malabanan opposed the Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information in an Opposition14 dated 28 September 2001. They prayed that the Motion to Admit Amended Information and the discharge of accused Dumlao, Diloy and the brothers Lopez be denied. In its Order dated 01 October 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Admit Amended Information. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in an Order15 dated 24 October 2001. On 16 November 2001, the prosecution moved in open court to inhibit Judge Ponferrada from hearing the case. Acting on this motion, Judge Ponferrada, on 22 November 2001, ordered that the case be re-raffled. The case was re-raffled to Branch 18, RTC, Manila, presided by Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio. On 04 January 2002, the prosecution filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order before the Supreme Court praying that the Orders of then Judge Ponferrada dated 01 and 24 October 2001 be annulled and set aside and that Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio of Branch 18 be restrained, in the meantime, from proceeding with the case in accordance with

said orders. In a Resolution16 dated 21 January 2002, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.

Issue/s: WON the Court a quo erred in allowing the discharge of accused Diloy and the Lopez brothers Held: No the court did not erred in allowing the discharge of accused Diloy and the Lopez brothers Section 14, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads – "Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. "However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. "If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall

dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial." Applying the import of the afore-quoted Section 14, Rule 110, it appears that the Amended Information sought to be admitted by the petitioner finds sufficient support therein, considering, firstly, that there has been no arraignment yet. Secondly, when respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA granted the motion for reinvestigation in the Order dated July 04, 2001, there was in effect a prior leave of court given to the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice to conduct the same, substantially complying with such requirement under the second paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110. After all, a leave of court is defined a "permission obtained from a court to take some action which, without such permission, would not be allowable: as, to sue a receiver, to file an amended pleading, to plead several pleas." n the case of People v. Montesa, Jr., the Supreme Court‘s pertinent ruling, which We now reiterate, finds application in the case at bench, i.e., where a judge grants a motion for reinvestigation [as in this case], he is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and to determine whether the information it has filed should stand, and that the final disposition on the reinvestigation should be the sole and only valid basis for the judge‘s final action with respect to the reinvestigation. Thus, in accord with the aforesaid Montesa, Jr. ruling, respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA‘s "sole and only basis" for the inclusion (or exclusion, for that matter) of the

additional accused should be the final disposition on the reinvestigation conducted by the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justices. There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here is primary an amendment of an information to exclude some accused and that the same is made before plea. Thus, at the very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable which means that the amendment should be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. What seems to complicate the situation is that the exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of discharging them as witnesses for the State. The consequential question is, should the requirements for discharge of an accused as state witness as set forth in Section 17, Rule 119 be made as additional requirements (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 17, Rule 119) or should only one provision apply as ruled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 or Section 17, Rule 119)? An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground. At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is because, as

correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one.29 The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.30 By virtue of the trial court having granted the prosecution‘s motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government.31 Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion -- wide and far reaching – regarding the disposition thereof.

SOBERANO VS PEOPLE G.R. No. 154629 Date: October 5, 2005 Rule 110 Doctrine: Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. "If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

information included now the allegation that: (the previous info did not assert that the victims were abducted) xxx abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO at the corner of Osmea Highway (formerly South Super Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street in Manila, and later brought them to Indang, Cavite, xxx •

On 18 June 2001, one of the accused, P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asserting that he was mistakenly identified as a participant in the double murder. He stressed that it was not him but a certain SPO3 Allan Cadenilla Villanueva who was previously identified by several witnesses as one of the culprits. This was granted by the trial court.

•

A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information dated 17 September 2001 was filed by the prosecution. The Amended Information —

Facts: • In November 2000, the prominent public relations practitioner, Salvador Bubby Dacer, together with his driver, Emmanuel Corbito, was abducted along Zobel Roxas St. in the City of Manila. Their charred remains, consisting of burnt bones, metal dental plates and a ring, were later found in Barangay Buna Lejos, Indang, Cavite. They were positively identified by their dentists and by forensic pathologists from the University of the Philippines. Both victims were killed by strangulation. •

•

An information was filed by the panel of prosecutors with RTC , Manila charging a number of accused some of whom are public officers of double murder. On 23 May 2001, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information which was granted and the Amended Information was admitted by the trial court. The new

(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as they are now witnesses for the State; (2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and (3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Via. •

Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato and Jovencio Malabanan opposed the Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information in an Opposition14 dated 28 September 2001. They prayed that the Motion to Admit Amended Information and the discharge of accused

Dumlao, Diloy and the brothers Lopez be denied. In its Order dated 01 October 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Admit Amended Information. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in an Order15 dated 24 October 2001. On 16 November 2001, the prosecution moved in open court to inhibit Judge Ponferrada from hearing the case. Acting on this motion, Judge Ponferrada, on 22 November 2001, ordered that the case be re-raffled. The case was re-raffled to Branch 18, RTC, Manila, presided by Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio. On 04 January 2002, the prosecution filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order before the Supreme Court praying that the Orders of then Judge Ponferrada dated 01 and 24 October 2001 be annulled and set aside and that Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio of Branch 18 be restrained, in the meantime, from proceeding with the case in accordance with said orders. In a Resolution16 dated 21 January 2002, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.

Issue/s: WON the Court a quo erred in allowing the discharge of accused Diloy and the Lopez brothers Held: No the court did not erred in allowing the discharge of accused Diloy and the Lopez brothers Section 14, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads –

"Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. "However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. "If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial." Applying the import of the afore-quoted Section 14, Rule 110, it appears that the Amended Information sought to be admitted by the petitioner finds sufficient support therein, considering, firstly, that there has been no arraignment yet. Secondly, when respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA granted the motion for reinvestigation in the Order dated July 04, 2001, there was in effect a prior leave of court given to the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice to conduct the same, substantially complying with such requirement under the second paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110. After all, a leave of court is defined a "permission obtained from a court to take some action which,

without such permission, would not be allowable: as, to sue a receiver, to file an amended pleading, to plead several pleas."

trial court and the Court of Appeals (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 or Section 17, Rule 119)?

n the case of People v. Montesa, Jr., the Supreme Court‘s pertinent ruling, which We now reiterate, finds application in the case at bench, i.e., where a judge grants a motion for reinvestigation [as in this case], he is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and to determine whether the information it has filed should stand, and that the final disposition on the reinvestigation should be the sole and only valid basis for the judge‘s final action with respect to the reinvestigation.

An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.

Thus, in accord with the aforesaid Montesa, Jr. ruling, respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA‘s "sole and only basis" for the inclusion (or exclusion, for that matter) of the additional accused should be the final disposition on the reinvestigation conducted by the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justices. There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here is primary an amendment of an information to exclude some accused and that the same is made before plea. Thus, at the very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable which means that the amendment should be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. What seems to complicate the situation is that the exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of discharging them as witnesses for the State. The consequential question is, should the requirements for discharge of an accused as state witness as set forth in Section 17, Rule 119 be made as additional requirements (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 17, Rule 119) or should only one provision apply as ruled by the

At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one.29 The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.30 By virtue of the trial court having granted the prosecution‘s motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government.31 Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion -- wide and far reaching – regarding the disposition thereof.

 Crespo vs. Mogul, G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987 Doctrine: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. Facts:  On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.  When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information.  In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.  A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court.

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In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that ―the motion‘s trust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court‘s independence and integrity.‖ The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the

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Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.

Issue: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits. Ruling: Yes. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Fronda-Baggao v People GR No.151785 December 10, 2007 DOCTRINE Petitioner contends that the amendment of the four Informations for illegal recruitment into a single Information for illegal recruitment in large scale violates her substantial rights as this would deprive her of the right to bail which she already availed of. Such contention is misplaced. Obviously, petitioner relies on Section 14 of the same Rule 110 which provides that after the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. As stated earlier, petitioner has not yet been arraigned. Hence, she cannot invoke the said provision. FACTS Sometime in 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, four separate Informations for illegal recruitment against Susan Fronda-Baggao, petitioner, and Lawrence Lee. Petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade; hence, the cases against her were archived. On July 25, 1999, petitioner was finally arrested. On July 26, 1999, the prosecutor filed with the trial court a motion to amend the Informations. He prayed that the four separate Informations for illegal recruitment be amended so that there would only be one Information for illegal recruitment in large

scale. On the same day, the trial court denied the motion for lack of merit. On August 6, 1999, the prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order dated January 26, 2000, the trial court granted the motion and admitted the Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. ISSUE W/NOT the four Informations for illegal recruitment could be amended and lumped into one Information for illegal recruitment in large scale. HELD YES. As provided under Section 14 of Rule 110: Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis ours) A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows that although it uses the singular word complaint or information, it does not mean that two or more complaints or Informations cannot be amended into only one Information. Surely, such could not have been intended by this Court. Otherwise, there can be an absurd situation

whereby two or more complaints or Informations could no longer be amended into one or more Informations. On this point, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court is relevant, thus: SEC. 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.