RUBEN BALANE SUCCESSION REVIEWER
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SUCCESSION...
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•
Rea Bautista Patrick Manalo Loraine Saguinsin Naomi Quimpo
Succession Reviewer Inside: Illustrative Problems by Mr. Patrick, Sample Exam Questions, Answer Key and more!!!1
“Solvitur Ambulando” I.
General Provisions
Art.
774.
Succession
is
a
mode
of
acquisition
by
virtue
of
which
the
property,
rights
and
obligations
to
the
extent
of
the
value
of
the
inheritance,
of
a
person
are
transmitted
through
his
death
to
another
or
others
either
by
his
will
or
by
operation
of
law.
(n)
2
Class
Notes:
Kinds
of
Succession
• according
to
moment
of
transmission:
1) mortis
causa
2) inter
vivos
(none
in
PH
law,
only
donations)
1
Disclaimer:
All
photos
lifted
from
Google
images.
No
copyright
infringement
intended.
2
provisions
recited
1) 2) • 1) 2) 3)
accdg
to
extent
of
rights
and
obligations
transmitted:
universal
–
entire
patrimony
or
an
aliquot
part
particular
–
devise,
legacy
accdg
to
importance:
compulsory
testamentary
intestate
Parties:
• Decedent
o Testator
o Decedent
(intestate)
• Successor
o Heir
o Devisee
or
Legatee
Balane:
• Only
transmissible
rights
and
obligations
pass
by
succession
o Criterion:
if
the
rights
or
obligation
is
strictly
personal
(intuitu
personae),
it
is
intransmissible;
otherwise,
it
is
transmissible.
• Pecuniary
obligations
must
be
paid
first
before
distributing
the
residue
of
the
estate
to
the
heirs.
Union
Bank
vs.
Santibañez
(2005)
F:
Decedent
contracted
loans
during
his
lifetime.
After
decedent
died,
creditor
filed
an
action
for
collection
against
the
heirs.
H:
The
bank
should
have
filed
its
claim
in
the
probate
court
pursuant
to
Sec.
5,
Rule
86
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
The
filing
of
a
money
claim
against
the
decedent’s
estate
in
the
probate
court
is
mandatory.
Estate
of
K.H.
Hemady
vs.
Luzon
Surety
(1956)
F:
Lower
court
ruled
that
claims
filed
by
Luzon
Surety
against
decedent’s
estate
based
on
contracts
of
suretyship
entered
into
by
the
decedent
were
not
chargeable
because
death
extinguished
liability
as
surety/guarantor.
H:
Obligations
of
a
guarantor
are
transmissible.
Contracts
take
effect
only
between
parties,
their
assigns
and
heirs,
unless
they
are
intransmissible
by
their
nature,
by
stipulation
or
by
operation
of
law.
Alvarez
vs.
Intermediate
Appellate
Court
(1990)
F:
A
judgment
ordering
decedent
to
return
the
lots
was
entered
during
his
lifetime
but
was
not
executed
because
he
sold
the
lots
to
a
3rd
person.
A
suit
for
recovery
of
the
lots
was
filed
against
the
heirs
of
seller.
H:
Liability
that
arose
from
the
sale
of
decedent
in
bad
faith
was
not
extinguished
by
his
death
and
was
passed
on
to
his
heirs.
However,
the
heirs
are
only
liable
to
the
extent
of
the
value
of
their
inheritance.
Art.
775.
In
this
Title,
"decedent"
is
the
general
term
applied
to
the
person
whose
property
is
transmitted
through
succession,
whether
or
not
he
left
a
will.
If
he
left
a
will,
he
is
also
called
the
testator.
(n)
Art.
776.
The
inheritance
includes
all
the
property,
rights
and
obligations
of
a
person
which
are
not
extinguished
by
his
death.
(659)
Art.
777.
The
rights
to
the
succession
are
transmitted
from
the
moment
of
the
death
of
the
decedent.
(657a)
Notes:
• Infelicitous
wording.
The
rights
to
the
succession
are
vested;
inheritance
transmitted
• CONSEQUENCES:
1. The
law
at
the
time
of
the
decedent’s
death
will
determine
who
the
heirs
should
be.
Uson
vs.
Del
Rosario
(1953)
F:
Nebreda
died
in
1945
and
was
survived
by
his
wife
and
4
illegitimate
children.
Wife
brought
action
against
illegitimate
children
for
the
recovery
of
the
possession
of
land
left
by
husband
on
the
theory
that
she
is
the
sole
heir.
Defense:
while
under
the
Old
CC
spurious
children
do
not
have
successional
rights,
under
the
New
CC
they
are
granted
the
same
status
as
natural
children
thus
entitled
to
succeed
from
their
father’s
estate.
H:
The
right
granted
under
the
New
CC
cannot
be
given
retroactive
effect.
New
rights
have
retroactive
effect
only
when
they
do
not
prejudice
or
impair
vested
or
acquired
rights
of
the
same
origin.
The
right
of
ownership
of
Wife
over
the
land
became
vested
in
1945
upon
decedent’s
death
because
of
Article
657
of
the
Old
Civil
Code
(now
777)
which
was
in
effect
at
the
time
he
died.
2. Ownership
passes
to
the
heir
at
the
very
moment
of
death
who
therefore,
from
that
moment,
acquires
the
right
to
dispose
of
his
share.
De
Borja
vs.
Vda.
De
Borja
(1972)
F:
Decedent
died
with
a
will.
Before
probate
of
his
will
and
to
end
suits
between
them,
D’s
son
by
his
first
marriage
and
2nd
wife
entered
into
a
compromise
agreement
that
2nd
wife
will
receive
P800,000
as
full
and
complete
payment
of
her
hereditary
share.
H:
Agreement
is
valid.
There
is
no
legal
bar
for
the
heir
to
dispose
of
her
share
immediately
upon
death
of
the
decedent
even
if
actual
extent
is
not
yet
determined.
The
agreement
is
a
sale
of
the
shares
and
not
a
settlement
of
the
estate.
Alfonso
vs.
Sps.
Andres
(2010)
F:
Jose
inherited
subject
property
from
his
father.
This
was
assigned
to
him
in
a
Deed
of
Extrajudicial
Settlement.
Jose
sold
it
Sps
Andres.
H:
The
transfer
is
valid
because
title
of
property
of
person
who
died
intestate
passes
at
once
to
his
heirs,
subject
to
the
claims
of
administration
and
payments
of
debts
and
expenses.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Note:
•
Heir
can
sell
his
aliquot
share
but
not
specific
property/physical
portion
of
property.
Otherwise,
it
is
only
pro
tanto
valid
(to
the
extent
of
seller’s
share)
[Lee
vs
RTC
(2007)]
3.
The
heirs
have
the
right
to
be
substituted
for
deceased
as
party
in
an
action
that
survives
Bonilla
vs.
Barcena
(1976)
F:
Decedent,
during
her
lifetime,
filed
an
action
to
quiet
title.
During
the
pendency
of
the
case,
D
died
and
counsel
asked
that
her
heirs
be
substituted.
H:
The
heirs
may
be
substituted
to
the
deceased
party
because
upon
the
latter’s
death,
her
claim/rights
to
the
land
were
not
extinguished
but
were
transmitted
to
her
heirs.
Note:
• What
was
transmitted
was
the
right
to
prosecute
the
action
• If
there
is
dispute
as
to
who
are
the
legal
heirs,
must
first
establish
the
right
to
succeed
in
a
separate
action
[Heirs
of
Yaptinchay
vs
Del
Rosario,
304
SCRA
18]
Republic
vs.
Marcos
(2012)
F:
Cases
for
reversion,
reconveyance
and
restitution
of
ill‐ gotten
wealth
were
filed
against
persons
including
heirs
of
Marcos
were
sought
to
be
dismissed
against
the
latter‐ mentioned
defendants.
H:
Despite
the
finding
that
their
involvement
in
the
alleged
illegal
activities
was
not
established,
they
should
be
maintained
as
defendants
because
the
case
is
an
action
that
survives
thus
it
is
imperative
that
the
estate
be
represented.
As
to
Imelda
and
Bongbong,
they
are
the
executors
of
FM’s
estate,
and
as
to
Imee
and
Irene,
they
possibly
possess/ed
ill‐gotten
properties.
Art.
778.
Succession
may
be:
(1)
Testamentary;
(2)
Legal
or
intestate;
or
(3)
Mixed.
(n)
Art.
779.
Testamentary
succession
is
that
which
results
from
the
designation
of
an
heir,
made
in
a
will
executed
in
the
form
prescribed
by
law.
(n)
Art.
780.
Mixed
succession
is
that
effected
partly
by
will
and
partly
by
operation
of
law.
(n)
Balane:
• Some
inaccuracies:
o Did
not
mention
compulsory
o Mixed
is
not
really
a
type
of
succession
o No
definition
of
Legal/intestate
• Per
Agbayani,
our
Expert
in
Succession,
the
3
Kinds
of
Succession
according
to
importance
are:
1. Compulsory
2. Testamentary
3. Intestate
Page 2 of 73
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Art.
781.
The
inheritance
of
a
person
includes
not
only
the
property
and
the
transmissible
rights
and
obligations
existing
at
the
time
of
his
death,
but
also
those
which
have
accrued
thereto
since
the
opening
of
the
succession.
(n)
Balane:
• Best
deleted!
Inheritance
does
not
include
accruals!
Balus
vs.
Balus
(2010)
F:
Mortgage
on
decedent’s
land
was
foreclosed
by
the
Bank
and
there
being
to
redemption,
title
was
consolidated
to
the
Bank.
D
died
and
2
of
his
3
children
bought
land
from
the
Bank.
3rd
child
demanded
share
in
the
property
as
his
inheritance.
H:
Property,
the
ownership
over
which
has
been
lost
during
the
lifetime
of
a
decedent,
no
longer
forms
part
of
the
estate
which
his
compulsory
heirs
may
lay
a
claim
over.
Art.
782.
An
heir
is
a
person
called
to
the
succession
either
by
the
provision
of
a
will
or
by
operation
of
law.
Devisees
and
legatees
are
persons
to
whom
gifts
of
real
and
personal
property
are
respectively
given
by
virtue
of
a
will.
(n)
Balane:
• Heir
=
one
who
succeeds
to
the
whole
or
an
aliquot
part
of
the
inheritance
• Devisee
=
Succeeds
to
definite,
specific,
individual
REAL
properties
• Legatee
=
Succeeds
to
definite,
specific,
individual
PERSONAL
properties
• Distinction
is
important
in
preterition!
II. Testamentary Succession a. Wills 1.1. Wills in General
Art.
783.
A
will
is
an
act
whereby
a
person
is
permitted,
with
the
formalities
prescribed
by
law,
to
control
to
a
certain
degree
the
disposition
of
this
estate,
to
take
effect
after
his
death.
(667a)
Balane:
Operative
words:
1. Act
–
too
broad,
it
is
suggested
that
it
be
delimited
with
a
more
specific
term
such
as
“instrument”
2. Permitted
–
purely
statutory
3. Formalities
prescribed
by
law
–
depends
on
whether
attested
or
holographic
4. Control
to
a
certain
degree
–
power
to
dispose
gratuitously
is
limited
by
rules
on
legitime
5. After
his
death
–
takes
place
mortis
causa
a. Sir
says
this
should
be
“at
the
moment
of/upon
death”
11
Characteristics
of
Wills:
1. Purely
personal
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Free
and
intelligent
Solemn
and
formal
Revocable
and
ambulatory
Mortis
causa
Individual
Executed
with
animus
testandi
Executed
with
testamentary
capacity
Unilateral
Dispositive
of
property
Statutory
Vitug
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
(1990)
F:
Husband
and
Decedent
Wife
executed
a
Survivorship
Agreement
with
the
Bank
that
after
the
death
of
either
of
them,
the
money
in
their
joint
savings
account
would
belong
to
the
survivor.
H:
The
agreement
is
not
a
mortis
causa
conveyance
which
needs
to
be
in
a
will
but
a
mere
obligation
with
a
term,
the
term
being
death.
Take
note
of
the
definition
of
a
will
in
this
case:
“a
personal,
solemn,
revocable
and
free
act
by
which
a
capacitated
person
disposes
of
his
property
and
rights
and
declares
or
complies
with
duties
to
take
effect
after
his
death”
(The
deposit
was
not
property
of
the
decedent
but
was
conjugal
property.)
Seangio
vs.
Reyes
(2006)
F:
Holographic
will
contains
only
a
clause
disinheriting
an
heir
without
express
disposition
of
property.
H:
While
it
does
not
make
an
affirmative
disposition
of
the
testator’s
property,
the
disinheritance
of
the
son
is
an
act
of
disposition
of
the
property
of
the
testator
in
favor
of
those
who
would
succeed
in
the
absence
of
the
person
disinherited.
Art.
784.
The
making
of
a
will
is
a
strictly
personal
act;
it
cannot
be
left
in
whole
or
in
part
of
the
discretion
of
a
third
person,
or
accomplished
through
the
instrumentality
of
an
agent
or
attorney.
(670a)
Notes:
• Purely
personal
character
of
wills
• What
is
non‐delegable
is
the
exercise
of
the
disposing
power,
mechanical
acts
not
included.
• In
this
article,
“third
person”
should
read
as
“another
person”
because
who
is
the
“second
person”?
Jericho
Rosales?!
Art.
785.
The
duration
or
efficacy
of
the
designation
of
heirs,
devisees
or
legatees,
or
the
determination
of
the
portions
which
they
are
to
take,
when
referred
to
by
name,
cannot
be
left
to
the
discretion
of
a
third
person.
(670a)
Notes:
• The
ff
are
non‐delegable:
1. designation
of
heirs,
devisees,
legatees
2. duration
or
efficacy
of
such
designation
(including
conditions,
terms,
substitutions)
Page 3 of 73
3.
determination
of
portions
they
are
to
receive
Art.
786.
The
testator
may
entrust
to
a
third
person
the
distribution
of
specific
property
or
sums
of
money
that
he
may
leave
in
general
to
specified
classes
or
causes,
and
also
the
designation
of
the
persons,
institutions
or
establishments
to
which
such
property
or
sums
are
to
be
given
or
applied.
(671a)
Notes:
• Two
things
the
T
must
determine:
1. Property
or
amount
of
money
to
be
given
2. Class
or
cause
to
be
benefitted
• Two
things
he
may
delegate:
1. Designation
of
persons,
institutions
or
establishments
within
the
class
or
cause
2. Manner
of
distribution
Art.
787.
The
testator
may
not
make
a
testamentary
disposition
in
such
manner
that
another
person
has
to
determine
whether
or
not
it
is
to
be
operative.
(n)
Notes:
• This
does
not
prejudice
right
of
heirs,
devisee,
legatee
to
accept
or
renounce.
RULES
OF
CONSTRUCTION
AND
INTERPRETATION
In
case
of
doubt
as
to
different
interpretations
Art.
788.
If
a
testamentary
disposition
admits
of
different
interpretations,
in
case
of
doubt,
that
interpretation
by
which
the
disposition
is
to
be
operative
shall
be
preferred.
(n)
•
The
thing
may
rather
be
effective
than
be
without
effect
Ambiguity;
Latent
or
Patent
Art.
789.
When
there
is
an
imperfect
description,
or
when
no
person
or
property
exactly
answers
the
description,
mistakes
and
omissions
must
be
corrected,
if
the
error
appears
from
the
context
of
the
will
or
from
extrinsic
evidence,
excluding
the
oral
declarations
of
the
testator
as
to
his
intention;
and
when
an
uncertainty
arises
upon
the
face
of
the
will,
as
to
the
application
of
any
of
its
provisions,
the
testator's
intention
is
to
be
ascertained
from
the
words
of
the
will,
taking
into
consideration
the
circumstances
under
which
it
was
made,
excluding
such
oral
declarations.
(n)
• • •
Latent
=
not
obvious
on
the
face
of
the
will
Patent
=
Obvious
on
the
face
of
the
will
How
to
deal
with
ambiguities
whether
latent
or
patent:
Clear
up/resolve
in
order
to
give
effect
to
the
disposition
by
any
evidence
admissible
and
relevant
excluding
in
either
case,
oral
declarations
of
the
testator
(Dead
Man’s
Statute)
Words;
Technical
Words
Art.
790.
The
words
of
a
will
are
to
be
taken
in
their
ordinary
and
grammatical
sense,
unless
a
clear
intention
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
to
use
them
in
another
sense
can
be
gathered,
and
that
other
can
be
ascertained.
Technical
words
in
a
will
are
to
be
taken
in
their
technical
sense,
unless
the
context
clearly
indicates
a
contrary
intention,
or
unless
it
satisfactorily
appears
that
he
was
unacquainted
with
such
technical
sense.
(675a)
Preference
to
testacy
Art.
791.
The
words
of
a
will
are
to
receive
an
interpretation
which
will
give
to
every
expression
some
effect,
rather
than
one
which
will
render
any
of
the
expressions
inoperative;
and
of
two
modes
of
interpreting
a
will,
that
is
to
be
preferred
which
will
prevent
intestacy.
(n)
Invalidity
of
one
of
several
dispositions
Art.
792.
The
invalidity
of
one
of
several
dispositions
contained
in
a
will
does
not
result
in
the
invalidity
of
the
other
dispositions,
unless
it
is
to
be
presumed
that
the
testator
would
not
have
made
such
other
dispositions
if
the
first
invalid
disposition
had
not
been
made.
(n)
• severability
Property
acquired
after
will
was
made
Art.
793.
Property
acquired
after
the
making
of
a
will
shall
only
pass
thereby,
as
if
the
testator
had
possessed
it
at
the
time
of
making
the
will,
should
it
expressly
appear
by
the
will
that
such
was
his
intention.
(n)
Devise/Legacy
Art.
794.
Every
devise
or
legacy
shall
cover
all
the
interest
which
the
testator
could
device
or
bequeath
in
the
property
disposed
of,
unless
it
clearly
appears
from
the
will
that
he
intended
to
convey
a
less
interest.
(n)
Art.
795.
The
validity
of
a
will
as
to
its
form
depends
upon
the
observance
of
the
law
in
force
at
the
time
it
is
made.
Notes:
• Aspects
of
Validity:
o Extrinsic
–
Formal
o Intrinsic
–
Substantive
1.2. Testamentary Capacity Intent
and
Art.
796.
All
persons
who
are
not
expressly
prohibited
by
law
may
make
a
will.
(662)
Art.
797.
Persons
of
either
sex
under
eighteen
years
of
age
cannot
make
a
will.
(n)
Art.
798.
In
order
to
make
a
will
it
is
essential
that
the
testator
be
of
sound
mind
at
the
time
of
its
execution.
(n)
Art.
799.
To
be
of
sound
mind,
it
is
not
necessary
that
the
testator
be
in
full
possession
of
all
his
reasoning
faculties,
or
that
his
mind
be
wholly
unbroken,
unimpaired,
or
Page 4 of 73
unshattered
by
disease,
injury
or
other
cause.
It
shall
be
sufficient
if
the
testator
was
able
at
the
time
of
making
the
will
to
know
the
nature
of
the
estate
to
be
disposed
of,
the
proper
objects
of
his
bounty,
and
the
character
of
the
testamentary
act.
(n)
Art.
800.
The
law
presumes
that
every
person
is
of
sound
mind,
in
the
absence
of
proof
to
the
contrary.
The
burden
of
proof
that
the
testator
was
not
of
sound
mind
at
the
time
of
making
his
dispositions
is
on
the
person
who
opposes
the
probate
of
the
will;
but
if
the
testator,
one
month,
or
less,
before
making
his
will
was
publicly
known
to
be
insane,
the
person
who
maintains
the
validity
of
the
will
must
prove
that
the
testator
made
it
during
a
lucid
interval.
(n)
Art.
801.
Supervening
incapacity
does
not
invalidate
an
effective
will,
nor
is
the
will
of
an
incapable
validated
by
the
supervening
of
capacity.
(n)
Ortega
vs.
Valmonte
(2005)
F:
81
year
old
testator’s
will
was
opposed
on
the
ground
that
he
was
not
of
sound
mind.
H:
Mere
old
age
does
not
mean
that
a
person
is
not
of
sound
mind.
To
be
of
sound
mind,
at
the
time
of
making
the
will,
the
testator
need
only
know
(1)
the
nature
of
the
estate
to
be
disposed
of,
(2)
the
proper
objects
of
his
bounty,
and
(3)
the
character
of
the
testamentary
act.
Baltazar
vs.
Laxa
(2012)
F:
78‐year‐old
spinster’s
will
was
being
assailed
because
she
was
allegedly
not
of
sound
mind
when
it
was
made
(because
she
was
“forgetful”)
H:
Soundness
of
mind
is
presumed.
Forgetfulness
is
not
equivalent
to
unsoundness
of
mind.
Art.
802.
A
married
woman
may
make
a
will
without
the
consent
of
her
husband,
and
without
the
authority
of
the
court.
(n)
Art.
803.
A
married
woman
may
dispose
by
will
of
all
her
separate
property
as
well
as
her
share
of
the
conjugal
partnership
or
absolute
community
property.
(n)
1.3. Forms of Wills
Art.
804.
Every
will
must
be
in
writing
and
executed
in
a
language
or
dialect
known
to
the
testator.
(n)
Suroza
vs.
Honrado
(1981)
F:
Will
of
illiterate
testatrix
was
written
in
English,
a
language
she
did
not
understand.
H:
Will
is
void
because
of
the
mandatory
provision
of
Art
804
that
every
will
must
be
executed
in
a
language
or
dialect
known
to
the
testator.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Abangan
vs.
Abangan
(1919)
F:
Records
do
not
show
that
the
will,
executed
in
Cebu
and
written
in
the
dialect
of
that
locality
where
the
testatrix
is
neighbor,
was
in
a
language
known
to
the
testatrix.
H:
Compliance
with
the
language
requirement
is
presumed
if
(but
Sir
says
“proved
by”):
(1)
the
will
is
in
the
language/dialect
generally
spoken
in
the
place
of
execution
and
(2)
the
testator
is
a
native
or
resident
of
said
locality.
Art.
805.
Every
will,
other
than
a
holographic
will,
must
be
subscribed
at
the
end
thereof
by
the
testator
himself
or
by
the
testator's
name
written
by
some
other
person
in
his
presence,
and
by
his
express
direction,
and
attested
and
subscribed
by
three
or
more
credible
witnesses
in
the
presence
of
the
testator
and
of
one
another.
The
testator
or
the
person
requested
by
him
to
write
his
name
and
the
instrumental
witnesses
of
the
will,
shall
also
sign,
as
aforesaid,
each
and
every
page
thereof,
except
the
last,
on
the
left
margin,
and
all
the
pages
shall
be
numbered
correlatively
in
letters
placed
on
the
upper
part
of
each
page.
The
attestation
shall
state
the
number
of
pages
used
upon
which
the
will
is
written,
and
the
fact
that
the
testator
signed
the
will
and
every
page
thereof,
or
caused
some
other
person
to
write
his
name,
under
his
express
direction,
in
the
presence
of
the
instrumental
witnesses,
and
that
the
latter
witnessed
and
signed
the
will
and
all
the
pages
thereof
in
the
presence
of
the
testator
and
of
one
another.
If
the
attestation
clause
is
in
a
language
not
known
to
the
witnesses,
it
shall
be
interpreted
to
them.
(n)
Art.
806.
Every
will
must
be
acknowledged
before
a
notary
public
by
the
testator
and
the
witnesses.
The
notary
public
shall
not
be
required
to
retain
a
copy
of
the
will,
or
file
another
with
the
Office
of
the
Clerk
of
Court.
(n)
(1)
subscribed
by
the
T
or
his
agent
in
his
presence
and
by
his
express
direction
at
the
end
thereof,
in
the
presence
of
the
witnesses
• signature
Payad
vs.
Tolentino
(1936)
F:
Testatrix
thumb
marked
end
and
each
and
every
page
of
the
will
then
her
lawyer
wrote
her
name
to
indicate
the
places
where
her
thumb
marks
were.
H:
Will
is
valid.
A
statute
requiring
a
will
to
be
“signed”
is
satisfied
if
the
signature
is
made
by
the
testator’s
mark.
Matias
vs.
Salud
(1958)
F:
The
testatrix
placed
her
thumb
mark
in
lieu
of
her
usual
signature
on
the
will.
Beside
the
thumb
mark
was
the
name
of
the
testatrix
as
purportedly
written
by
one
of
the
witnesses.
The
attestation
clause,
however,
does
not
Page 5 of 73
indicate
that
the
person
who
wrote
the
name
of
the
testatrix
thereon
was
directed
by
the
latter
to
do
so.
H:
A
thumb
mark
is
considered
a
signature.
It
is
therefore
unnecessary
to
indicate
in
the
attestation
clause
that
another
person
has
been
directed
by
the
testator
to
write
his
(testator’s)
name
thereon,
because
in
effect,
the
testator
signed
the
will
himself.
Garcia
vs.
Lacuesta
(1951)
F:
Lawyer
wrote
the
name
of
the
testator
followed
by
“a
ruego
del
testador”
then
the
lawyer’s
name
on
the
testator’s
will.
Beside
his
name,
the
testator
wrote
an
X.
Attestation
clause
did
not
state
that
the
lawyer
was
expressly
directed
to
write
testator’s
name.
H:
Void
for
attestation
clause’s
failure
to
state
that
lawyer
wrote
T’s
name
under
his
express
direction.
The
cross
cannot
be
taken
as
a
signature
because
it
is
not
the
usual
way
by
which
the
deceased
signed
his
name,
nor
is
it
one
of
the
usual
ways
by
which
he
signed.
A
cross
does
not
have
the
trustworthiness
of
a
thumb
mark.
• Signing
by
an
agent
of
T
o Must
sign
in
T’s
presence
o By
his
express
direction
Barut
vs
Cabacungan
(1912)
F:
The
agent
(who
was
also
a
witness)
signed
the
name
of
the
testator
in
the
latter's
presence
and
by
his
express
direction.
Probate
was
opposed
on
the
ground
that
the
handwriting
of
the
person
who
signed
the
name
of
the
testator
was
of
another
witness.
H:
Valid.
It
is
not
essential
that
the
person
signing
for
the
testator
also
sign
his
name.
The
law
only
requires:
1.
name
was
written
at
T’s
express
direction;
2.
in
T’s
presence;
and
3.
in
the
presence
of
all
witnesses.
• Signing
at
the
end
‐ If
there
are
non‐dispositive
portions,
there
are
2
ends:
o Physical
end:
where
the
writing
stops
o Logical
end:
where
the
testamentary
disposition
ends
‐ T
may
sign
at
either
end
as
the
non‐dispositive
portions
are
not
essential
parts
of
the
will.
‐ If
T
signs
before
the
end,
the
ENTIRE
will
is
invalid!
• Signing
in
the
presence
of
witnesses
Nera
vs.
Rimando
(1911)
Doctrine:
Test
of
presence
–
not
whether
they
actually
saw
each
other
sign
but
whether
they
might
have
seen
each
other
sign
had
they
chosen
to
do
so,
considering
their
mental
and
physical
condition
and
position
with
relation
to
each
other
at
the
moment
of
inscription
of
each
signature.
• Such
that
the
position
of
the
parties
with
relation
to
each
other
at
the
moment
of
the
subscription
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
of
each
signature
must
be
such
that
they
may
see
each
other
sign
if
they
choose
to
do
so.
By
merely
casting
the
eyes
in
the
proper
direction
they
could
have
seen
each
other
sign
(2)
attested
and
subscribed
by
at
least
3
witnesses
in
the
presence
of
the
T
and
of
one
another
• Attesting:
act
of
witnessing
• Subscribing:
act
of
signing
Q:
Must
W
sign
at
the
end
of
the
will?
A:
Literally
and
ideally,
the
Ws
should
sign
at
the
end
of
the
will,
though
failure
in
this
regard
may
be
overlooked
(Taboada
vs
Rosal
[1982])
(3)
the
T
or
his
agent
must
sign
every
page,
except
the
last,
on
the
left
margin
in
the
presence
of
the
witnesses
• Mandatory
–
signing
on
every
page
in
the
witnesses’
presence
• Directory
–
place
of
the
signature
Icasiano
vs.
Icasiano
(1964)
F:
Original
of
the
will
did
not
contain
signature
of
one
of
the
witnesses
but
duplicate
copy
does.
H:
Inadvertent
failure
of
one
witness
to
affix
his
signature
to
one
page,
due
to
simultaneous
lifting
of
pages,
is
not
per
se
sufficient
denial
of
probate.
Impossibility
of
substitution
of
page
is
assured
by
the
signature
of
the
testatrix
and
the
two
other
witnesses,
and
the
imprint
of
the
seal
of
the
notary
public.
(4)
the
witnesses
must
sign
every
page,
except
the
last,
on
the
left
margin
in
the
presence
of
the
T
and
of
one
another
Lee
vs.
Tambago
(2008)
F:
Will
was
attested
by
only
2
witnesses.
H:
Void!
(5)
all
numbers
must
be
numbered
correlatively
in
letters
on
the
upper
part
of
each
page
• Mandatory
–
pagination
by
means
of
a
conventional
system
• Directory
–
pagination
in
letters
on
the
upper
part
of
each
page
(6)
attestation
clause
• Stating
the
number
of
pages
of
the
will;
• The
fact
that
the
T/his
agent
signed
the
will
and
every
page
thereof
in
the
presence
of
the
Ws
• The
fact
that
the
W
witnessed
and
signed
the
will
and
every
page
thereof
in
the
presence
of
the
T
and
of
one
another
‐ The
attestation
clause
is
the
affair
of
the
witnesses,
therefore,
it
need
not
be
signed
by
the
T
Cagro
vs.
Cagro
(1953)
Page 6 of 73
F:
The
signatures
of
the
instrumental
witnesses
were
not
at
the
bottom
of
the
attestation
clause
but
on
the
left‐hand
margin
of
the
page
containing
the
AC.
H:
Fatally
defective.
Signatures
at
the
left‐hand
side
were
in
compliance
with
the
mandate
that
the
will
be
signed
on
the
left‐hand
margin
of
all
its
pages
Azuela
vs.
CA
(2006)
F:
Witnesses
did
not
sign
at
the
bottom
of
the
attestation
clause
but
they
signed
the
left‐hand
margin
of
the
page
where
the
AC
is
found.
H:
Will
void.
Signatures
on
the
left‐hand
margin
comply
with
the
requirement
that
witnesses
sign
each
page
of
the
will.
The
signatures
to
the
attestation
clause
establish
that
the
witnesses
are
referring
to
the
statements
contained
in
the
attestation
clause
itself.
The
attestation
clause
is
separate
and
apart
from
the
disposition
of
the
will.
An
unsigned
attestation
clause
results
in
an
unattested
will.
(7)
acknowledgement
before
a
notary
public
Javellana
vs.
Ledesma
(1955)
F:
The
notary
public
signed
the
certificate
of
acknowledgement
in
his
office
and
not
in
the
presence
of
T
and
witnesses.
H:
VALID.
The
Civil
Code,
while
requiring
that
a
will
must
be
signed
by
the
T
and
the
witnesses
in
the
presence
of
each
other,
does
not
require
that
the
acknowledgement
by
the
notary
happen
in
the
presence
of
the
parties.
Obiter:
It
is
not
required
that
the
T
and
the
Ws
acknowledge
on
the
same
day
it
was
executed.
Logical
inference:
Neither
does
Art
806
require
that
T
and
Ws
acknowledge
in
each
other’s
presence.
Cruz
vs.
Villasor
(1973)
F:
There
were
only
three
witnesses
to
the
will
and
it
was
acknowledged
before
a
notary
public
who
was
one
of
the
witnesses.
H:
VOID
for
failing
to
meet
the
3‐witness
requirement.
The
notary
public
cannot
acknowledge
before
himself
his
having
signed
the
will.
Balane
asks:
If
one
of
the
witnesses
is
a
duly
commissioned
notary
public
and
he
notarizes
the
will,
the
will
is
void.
TRUE
OR
FALSE?
A:
FALSE
(If
there
are
more
than
3
witnesses,
the
will
meets
the
3‐witness
requirement
hence
still
valid)
Guerrero
vs.
Bihis
(2007)
F:
Notary
public
who
acknowledged
the
will
was
acting
outside
the
place
of
his
commission.
H:
VOID.
No
notary
shall
possess
authority
to
do
any
notarial
act
beyond
the
limits
of
his
jurisdiction.
Since
Atty.
in
this
case
was
not
commissioned
in
the
place
where
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
he
notarized
the
document,
he
lacked
the
authority
to
take
the
acknowledgment
of
the
testatrix
and
the
witnesses.
Ortega
vs.
Valmonte
(2005)
F:
Valmonte’s
will
is
being
contested
because
the
date
of
execution
and
the
date
of
acknowledgment
are
different.
H:
Will
is
valid.
Conflict
between
the
dates
does
not
invalidate
the
will
because
the
law
does
even
require
that
a
notarial
will
be
executed
and
acknowledged
on
the
same
occassion.
Q:
Must
an
attested
will
be
dated?
A:
No.
Consequently,
variance
between
the
indicated
dates
does
not
in
itself
invalidate
a
will
(Ortega
vs.
Valmonte
[2005])
Art.
807.
If
the
testator
be
deaf,
or
a
deaf‐mute,
he
must
personally
read
the
will,
if
able
to
do
so;
otherwise,
he
shall
designate
two
persons
to
read
it
and
communicate
to
him,
in
some
practicable
manner,
the
contents
thereof.
(n)
Art.
808.
If
the
testator
is
blind,
the
will
shall
be
read
to
him
twice;
once,
by
one
of
the
subscribing
witnesses,
and
again,
by
the
notary
public
before
whom
the
will
is
acknowledged.
(n)
•
Arts
807
and
808
are
mandatory
Garcia
vs.
Vasquez
(1970)
F:
The
will
and
the
AC
were
crammed
together
on
a
single
page
and
had
typographical
errors.
It
was
alleged
by
proponents
that
T
read
the
will
silently
before
she
signed
it
BUT
there
was
evidence
that
T’s
vision
was
for
counting
fingers
at
5
ft
and
for
distant
objects
only.
H:
VOID.
T
could
not
have
read
the
will
silently
as
she
was
not
unlike
a
blind
testator
and
execution
of
the
will
requires
observance
of
Art.
808.
Alvarado
vs.
Gaviola,
Jr
(1993)
F:
Testator
had
glaucoma.
When
the
will
was
executed,
each
witness
and
the
notary
were
given
their
own
copies
of
the
will.
It
was
read
aloud
by
the
lawyer
to
the
testator.
The
court
held
there
was
substantial
compliance.
H:
T
was
blind
for
purposes
of
Art
808
but
there
was
substantial
compliance
in
this
case.
The
purpose
of
the
law
was
satisfied
(to
make
known
to
the
T
the
contents
of
the
will
and
confirm
his
desires)
Art.
809.
In
the
absence
of
bad
faith,
forgery,
or
fraud,
or
undue
and
improper
pressure
and
influence,
defects
and
imperfections
in
the
form
of
attestation
or
in
the
language
used
therein
shall
not
render
the
will
invalid
if
it
is
proved
that
the
will
was
in
fact
executed
and
attested
in
substantial
compliance
with
all
the
requirements
of
Article
805.
(n)
Note:
Page 7 of 73
This
is
criticized
as
“liberalization
running
riot”.
JBL’s
suggested
rewording:
“In
the
absence
of
bad
faith,
forgery,
or
fraud,
or
undue
and
improper
pressure
and
influence,
defects
and
imperfections
in
the
form
of
the
attestation
or
in
the
language
used
therein
shall
not
render
the
will
invalid
if
such
defects
and
imperfections
can
be
supplied
by
an
examination
of
the
will
itself
and
it
is
proved
that
the
will
was
in
fact
executed
and
attested
in
substantial
compliance
with
all
the
requirements
of
Article
805.”
Caneda
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
(1993)
F:
The
attestation
clause
failed
to
specifically
state
the
fact
that
the
attesting
witnesses
and
the
testator
signed
the
will
and
all
its
pages
in
their
presence
and
that
they,
the
witnesses,
likewise
signed
the
will
and
every
page
thereof
in
the
presence
of
the
testator
and
of
each
other.
H:
AC
not
valid.
Art
809
does
not
apply.
It
cannot
be
conclusively
inferred
from
the
signatures
that
they
were
made
in
the
presence
of
each
other.
Furthermore,
the
defects
were
not
in
the
“form...or
language.”
Rule:
Omissions
which
can
be
supplied
by
an
examination
of
the
will
itself,
without
the
need
of
resorting
to
extrinsic
evidence,
will
not
be
fatal...However,
those
omissions
which
cannot
be
supplied
except
by
evidence
aliunde
would
result
in
the
invalidation
of
the
attestation
clause
and
ultimately,
of
the
will
itself.
Azuela
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
(2006)
F:
Attestation
clause
failed
to
state
the
number
of
pages.
H:
VOID.
Art
809
was
not
applied
because
there
was
no
indication
in
any
part
of
the
will
that
it
was
composed
of
such
a
number
of
pages.
Lopez
vs.
Lopez
(2012)
F:
The
will
stated
that
it
contained
7
pages
but
the
acknowledgement
stated
that
there
were
8.
AC
did
not
state
the
number
of
pages.
H:
Art
809
does
not
apply.
The
discrepancy
cannot
be
explained
by
mere
examination
of
the
will
itself
but
through
the
presentation
of
evidence
aliunde.
•
Art.
810.
A
person
may
execute
a
holographic
will
which
must
be
entirely
written,
dated,
and
signed
by
the
hand
of
the
testator
himself.
It
is
subject
to
no
other
form,
and
may
be
made
in
or
out
of
the
Philippines,
and
need
not
be
witnessed.
(678,
688a)
(1)
Entirely
written
by
the
hand
of
the
T
(2)
Dated
by
the
T
Roxas
vs.
De
Jesus
(1985)
F:
The
holographic
will
was
dated
FEB./61
H:
VALID.
GR:
Date
in
a
holographic
will
should
include
the
day,
month
and
year
of
its
execution
as
this
is
relevant
to
provide
for
contingencies
of
ascertaining
soundness
of
mind,
or
when
there
are
two
competing
wills.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
XPN:
Substantial
compliance
is
considered
valid
if
there
is
no
appearance
of
fraud,
BF,
undue
influence
and
pressure
and
the
authenticity
of
the
will
is
established.
Labrador
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
(1990)
F:
Date
was
stated
in
the
first
paragraph
of
the
second
page
of
the
will.
H:
VALID.
The
law
does
not
specify
a
particular
location
where
the
date
should
be
placed
in
a
will.
(3)
Signed
by
the
T
SUMMARY:
FORMAL
REQUIREMENTS
OF
WILLS
Testamentary
Capacity
1. There
is
a
general
grant
of
testamentary
capacity
to
natural
persons
2. Exceptions:
a. Under
18
b. Unsound
mind
• A
legal
question,
not
medical
• Soundness
of
mind
was
defined
Negatively
‐ Not
necessary
that
testator
be
in
full
possession
of
reasoning
faculties
‐ Not
necessary
that
testator’s
mind
be
wholly
unbroken,
unimpaired,
or
unshattered
by
disease,
injury
or
other
cause
Positively
Ability
to
know:
‐ Nature
of
estate
to
be
disposed
of
‐ Proper
objects
of
one’s
bounty
‐ Character
of
testamentary
act
3. There
is
a
presumption
of
soundness
of
mind,
but
a
presumption
of
insanity
exists
when:
(1)
one
month
or
less
before
making
his
will,
T
was
publicly
known
to
be
insane
(2)
executed
after
being
placed
under
guardianship
or
ordered
committed
because
of
insanity
and
before
said
order
was
lifted
Common
Requirements
(Attested
and
Holographic)
1.
in
writing
2.
language
and
dialect
known
to
the
testator
• There
is
no
presumption
that
language
is
known
to
the
T
• BUT
the
will
need
not
state
that
it
is
a
language
known
to
the
T.
It
may
be
proven
by
extrinsic
evidence
Special
Requirements;
Attested
Wills
1.
That
the
testator
sign
‐
in
the
presence
of
the
witnesses
• Remember
the
test
of
presence!
‐
at
the
end
on
each
and
every
page,
except
the
last,
on
the
left hand
margin
‐
if
signing
through
an
agent
• In
the
T’s
presence
• Under
his
express
direction
• Write
in
his
own
hand
the
T’s
name
in
the
proper
places
• There
is
no
need
to
sign
the
agent’s
name
(Barut)
Page 8 of 73
•
It
is
disputed
whether
the
agent
may
be
one
of
the
3
witnesses
2.
Attested
and
subscribed
by
3
or
more
credible
witnesses
‐
on
each
and
every
page,
except
the
last,
on
the
left hand
margin
in
the
T’s
presence
and
in
the
presence
of
each
other
3.
All
pages
must
be
numbered
correlatively
in
letters
on
the
upper
part
of
each
page
4.
Attestation
clause
‐
stating
the
number
of
pages
upon
which
the
will
is
written
the
fact
that
the
T
signed
the
will
and
each
and
every
page
thereof
(or
caused
an
agent
to
write
his
name,
in
his
presence
and
under
his
express
direction)in
the
presence
of
the
witnesses
that
the
witnesses
witnessed
and
signed
the
will
and
the
pages
thereof
in
the
presence
of
T
and
of
each
other
5.
Acknowledged
before
a
notary
public
Special
Requirements;
Attested
Wills;
Handicapped
Testators
1. Deaf/deaf‐mute
• If
able
to
read
–
must
read
personally
• If
unable
to
read
–
designate
2
persons
to:
(1) Read
it
(2) Communicate
to
him
the
contents
‐
in
some
practicable
manner
(sign
language,
lip
reading,
pictures,
etc)
2. Blind,
Illiterate,
Unable
to
read
• The
will
shall
be
read
to
him
twice
(1) One
of
the
subscribing
witnesses
(2) Notary
public
before
whom
the
will
is
acknowledged
The
burden
of
proof
is
upon
the
proponent
of
the
will
that
the
special
requirement
of
the
article
was
complied
with.
There
is
also
no
requirement
that
compliance
be
stated
in
the
attestation
clause.
Special
Requirements;
Holographic
wills
1.
Entirely
written
Balane
asks:
What
if
the
will
was
partly
written?
A:
If
with
knowledge/consent
of
T,
VOID
AS
A
WHOLE;
If
without,
the
part
written
by
another
is
void
(the
validity
of
a
will
cannot
be
placed
in
the
hands
of
another;
it
may
be
sabotaged)
2.
Dated
• Test
is
if
designated
date
can
be
independently
checked
and
ascertained
• Examples:
Christmas
Day
2012,
71st
anniversary
of
Pearl
Harbor,
At
the
beginning
of
Ramadan
2013
3.
Signed
ART.
811.
In
the
probate
of
a
holographic
will,
it
shall
be
necessary
that
at
least
one
witness
who
knows
the
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
handwriting
and
signature
of
the
testator
explicitly
declare
that
the
will
and
the
signature
are
in
the
handwriting
of
the
testator.
If
the
will
is
contested,
at
least
three
of
such
witnesses
shall
be
required.
In
the
absence
of
any
competent
witness
referred
to
in
the
preceding
paragraph,
and
if
the
court
deem
it
necessary,
expert
testimony
may
be
resorted
to.
Notes:
‐ this
article
prescribes
the
statutory
requisites
for
the
probate
of
a
holographic
will;
testimonial
evidence
(rule
of
evidence)
‐ jurisprudential
requirement
(in
addition
to
the
statutory
requirements):
o the
will
itself
must
be
presented
(Gan
v.
Yap
[1958],
infra)
the
will
itself
is
the
only
material
proof
(Scaevola)
Art.
811
applies
only
to
post
mortem
(not
ante
mortem)
probates
How
to
prove
genuineness
of
a
handwriting
(Sec.
22,
Rule
132,
Rules
of
Court)
‐ a
witness
who
actually
saw
the
person
writing
the
instrument
‐ a
witness
familiar
with
such
handwriting
and
who
can
give
his
opinion
thereon,
such
opinion
being
an
exception
to
the
opinion
rule
‐ a
comparison
by
the
court
of
the
questioned
handwriting
and
admitted
genuine
specimen
thereof;
and
‐ expert
evidence
The
threewitness
provision
in
case
of
contested
holographic
wills
is
directory,
not
mandatory
Azaola
v.
Singson
(1960)
Facts:
In
probate
of
testatrix’s
holographic
will,
only
one
witness
was
presented
by
proponent.
Opposition:
that
the
will
was
procured
by
undue
and
improper
influence;
that
testatrix
did
not
intend
the
instrument
to
be
her
last
will.
Held:
That
since
the
authenticity
of
the
holographic
will
was
not
contested,
production
of
more
than
one
witness
not
required.
That
even
if
the
will
was
contested,
ART.
811
does
not
require
presentation
of
three
witnesses
to
identify
handwriting
of
testator
since
no
witness
may
have
been
present
at
execution.
Balane
Notes:
‐ to
“contest”
means
to
attack
the
authenticity
of
the
will
(i.e.
that
the
will
is
forged)
‐ the
Latin
maxim
testis
unus,
testis
nullus
(one
witness
is
not
witness)
is
too
archaic
a
rule
(quoting
J.B.L.
Reyes)
o quality
of
testimony
over
number
of
witnesses
Codoy
v.
Calugay
(1999)
Facts:
Holographic
will
of
the
testatrix
presented
for
probate.
Proponents
presented
six
witnesses.
Opposition:
Page 9 of 73
that
the
will
was
forged
and
that
the
same
is
illegible.
Probate
allowed,
lower
court
citing
Azaola
v.
Singson.
Held:
That
the
provisions
of
Article
811
are
mandatory
because
of
the
word
“shall.”
That
not
all
of
the
witnesses
presented
by
the
proponents
were
familiar
with
the
testatrix’s
handwriting.
That
a
visual
examination
of
the
will
reveals
that
the
strokes
are
different
compared
with
other
documents
written
by
the
testatrix.
That
case
must
be
remanded
to
allow
contestants
to
adduce
evidence
in
support
of
their
opposition.
Balane
Asks:
Did
Codoy
reverse
Azaola?
Balane
Thinks:
No,
for
the
following
reasons:
‐ Codoy
ruling
not
based
on
there
being
less
than
three
witnesses
(there
were
in
fact
six)
‐ Codoy
ruling
did
not
state
that
since
there
were
less
than
three
witnesses,
even
if
their
testimonies
were
convincing,
probate
must
be
denied
(testimonies
were
indecisive)
‐ Codoy
ruling
said
that
visual
examination
of
the
will
reveals
that
strokes
are
different
compared
with
standard
documents
‐ basis
of
Codoy
ruling:
evidence
for
authenticity,
inadequate,
not
failure
on
the
part
of
proponents
to
present
three
witnesses
Balane
Notes:
‐ Codoy
is
consistent
with
Azaola
(quality
of
testimony
over
quantity
of
witnesses)
‐ Codoy,
rather
than
reversing
Azaola,
may
have
affirmed
it
‐ the
statement
of
the
Court
in
Codoy
to
the
effect
that
the
use
of
the
word
“shall”
in
Article
811
denotes
that
it
is
mandatory,
is
too
shallow
In
the
probate
of
a
holographic
will,
the
document
itself
must
be
produced;
a
lost
holographic
will
cannot
be
probated
Gan
v.
Yap
(1958)
Facts:
Petition
for
probate
of
testatrix’s
will.
Opposition:
that
testatrix
left
no
will.
Proponent
did
not
present
will
and
instead
tried
to
establish
contents
and
due
execution
thru
testimonies.
Held:
That
holographic
will
must
be
presented
to
court
for
probate,
the
document
itself
being
material
proof
of
authenticity.
That
if
holographic
will
not
presented,
opportunity
to
oppose
and
assess
the
handwriting
of
the
testator,
foreclosed.
That
lost
or
destroyed
holographic
will
may
be
proved
by
a
photographic
or
photostatic
copy
or
by
other
similar
means.
Exception
to
the
Gan
ruling:
Rodelas
v.
Aranza
(1982)
Facts:
A
photostatic
copy
of
testator’s
holographic
will
was
presented
for
probate.
Opposition:
that
the
original
must
be
presented.
Held:
That
a
photostatic
copy
or
photocopy
of
the
holographic
will,
allowed
because
comparison
can
be
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
made
with
the
standard
writings
of
the
testator.
That
this
exception
to
the
general
rule
was
stated
in
a
footnote
in
Gan
v,
Yap
(1958).
ART.
812.
In
holographic
wills,
the
dispositions
of
the
testator
written
below
his
signature
must
be
dated
and
signed
by
him
in
order
to
make
them
valid
as
testamentary
dispositions.
ART.
813.
When
a
number
of
dispositions
appearing
in
a
holographic
will
are
signed
without
being
dated,
and
the
last
disposition
has
a
signature
and
date,
such
date
validates
the
dispositions
preceding
it,
whatever
be
the
time
of
prior
dispositions.
Formal
requirement
for
additional
dispositions
in
a
holographic
will
‐ signature,
and
‐ date
When
there
are
several
additional
dispositions
‐ signature
and
date,
or
‐ each
additional
disposition
signed
and
undated,
but
the
last
disposition
signed
and
dated
If
(in
case
of
several
additional
dispositions)
the
additional
ones
before
the
last
are
dated
but
not
signed—
‐ only
the
last
will
be
valid,
provided
the
last
is
signed
and
dated
If
there
are
several
additional
dispositions
and
the
additional
ones
before
the
last
are
neither
signed
nor
dated,
but
the
last
is
both
signed
and
dated—
‐ intermediate
dispositions:
o VALID
if
all
dispositions
made
on
one
occasion
(signature
and
date
under
last
additional
disposition
validate
all)
o INVALID
or
VOID
if
dispositions
made
on
different
occasions
ART.
814.
In
case
of
any
insertion,
cancellation,
erasure
or
alteration
in
a
holographic
will,
the
testator
must
authenticate
the
same
by
his
full
signature.
“Full
signature,”
meaning
‐ not
necessarily
full
name
of
testator
‐ it
means
his
usual
and
customary
(habitual)
signature
Effect
of
noncompliance
with
article
‐ change
(insertion,
cancellation,
etc.)
is
simply
considered
as
not
made
‐ will
is
not
invalidated
as
a
whole,
but
at
most,
only
as
regards
the
particular
words
erased,
corrected,
or
inserted
(Kalaw
v.
Relova
[1984])
o unless
the
portion
involved
is
an
essential
part
of
the
will,
such
as
the
date
Illustration—
Kalaw
v.
Relova
(1984)
Facts:
Proponent
Gregorio
filed
a
petition
for
probate
of
testatrix’s
will.
Opposition
by
Rosa:
that
she
was
named
as
Page 10 of 73
sole
heir
and
sole
executrix.
There
were
two
alterations:
first,
Rosa’s
name
crossed
out
as
sole
heir
and
Gregorio’s
name
written
above
it
(no
initial);
second,
Rosa’s
name
crossed
out
as
sole
executrix
and
Gregorio’s
name
written
above
it
(with
initial).
Held:
That
ordinarily,
erasures
without
proper
signature
do
not
invalidate
the
will
as
a
whole,
but
at
most
only
as
respects
the
particular
words
erased.
That
that
general
rule
does
not
apply
in
this
case
because
the
holographic
will
had
only
one
substantial
provision
which
was
altered
without
proper
authentication.
That
the
entire
will
is
void
because
nothing
remains
in
the
will
that
could
remain
valid.
That
not
even
the
original
unaltered
text
can
be
given
effect
because
of
the
seeming
change
of
mind
of
testatrix.
Balane
Comments:
‐ it
is
beyond
cavil
that
the
insertion
of
Gregorio’s
name
cannot
be
given
effect
because
of
lack
of
proper
authentication
‐ but
why
was
the
cancellation
given
effect
when
it
was
not
properly
done?
‐ to
say
that
giving
effect
to
the
will
as
first
written
would
disregard
the
seeming
change
of
mind
of
the
testatrix
is
no
argument
at
all
o it
is
not
enough
that
the
testator
manifest
his
intent—he
must
manifest
it
in
a
manner
required
by
law
ART.
815.
When
a
Filipino
is
in
a
foreign
country,
he
is
authorized
to
make
a
will
in
any
of
the
forms
established
by
the
law
of
the
country
in
which
he
may
be.
Such
will
may
be
probated
in
the
Philippines.
ART.
816.
The
will
of
an
alien
who
is
abroad
produces
effect
in
the
Philippines
if
made
with
the
formalities
prescribed
by
the
law
of
the
place
in
which
he
resides,
or
according
to
the
formalities
observed
in
his
country,
or
in
conformity
with
those
which
this
Code
prescribes.
ART.
817.
A
will
made
in
the
Philippines
by
a
citizen
or
subject
of
another
country,
which
is
executed
in
accordance
with
the
law
of
the
country
of
which
he
is
a
citizen
or
subject,
and
which
might
be
proved
and
allowed
by
the
law
of
his
own
country,
shall
have
the
same
effect
as
if
executed
according
to
the
laws
of
the
Philippines.
ART.
815
to
817
govern
rules
of
formal
validity
in
the
following
instances
(not
covered:
a
Filipino
executing
a
will
in
the
Philippines)
‐ a
Filipino
abroad
(ART.
815)
‐ an
alien
abroad
(ART.
816)
‐ an
alien
in
the
Philippines
(ART.
817)
The
rule
(combining
these
three
articles,
ART.
15
and
17):
‐ every
testator,
whether
Filipino
or
alien,
wherever
he
may
be,
has
five
choices
as
to
what
law
to
follow
for
the
form
of
his
will,
viz.:
o law
of
citizenship
o law
of
place
of
execution
o law
of
domicile
o law
of
residence
o law
of
the
Philippines
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Illustration
‐ An
engineer
(German
citizen),
with
permanent
residence
in
Paris
(where
he
and
his
wife
reside),
was
contracted
by
the
Brazilian
government
to
construct
a
dam
in
Brasilia.
He
resided
in
Brazil
for
five
years.
One
summer
on
a
holiday,
he
goes
to
Tokyo
for
a
tour.
He
also
has
investments
in
the
Philippines.
The
German
engineer,
while
in
Tokyo,
made
a
will.
o the
following
laws
may
govern
the
form
of
the
engineer’s
will:
law
of
Germany
–
German
citizen
law
of
France
–
domiciled
in
France
law
of
Brazil
–
resident
of
Brazil
law
of
Japan
–
place
of
execution
law
of
the
Philippines
ART.
818.
Two
or
more
persons
cannot
make
a
will
jointly,
or
in
the
same
instrument,
either
for
their
reciprocal
benefit
or
for
the
benefit
of
a
third
person.
Joint
will,
meaning
‐ one
document
which
constitutes
the
wills
of
two
or
more
individuals
The
following
is
a
joint
will—
‐ “We,
the
testators,
of
legal
age
and
of
sound
and
disposing
mind...”
The
following
is
NOT
a
joint
will—
‐ if
there
are
separate
documents,
each
serving
as
one
independent
will
(even
if
written
on
the
same
sheet)
o e.g.
will
of
testator
A
on
front
part
of
sheet;
will
of
testator
B
on
the
back
of
the
same
sheet
o e.g.
will
of
testator
A
on
upper
part
of
sheet;
will
of
testator
B
on
lower
part
of
the
same
sheet
Joint
wills
are
VOID,
but
reciprocal
wills
are
VALID
‐ reciprocal
wills:
two
wills
instituting
each
of
the
respective
testators
as
heirs
o e.g.
will
of
testator
A
designated
B
as
heir;
will
of
testator
B
designated
A
as
heir
Reasons
for
the
prohibition
against
joint
wills
‐ limitation
on
modes
of
revocation
‐ diminution
of
testamentary
secrecy
‐ increased
danger
of
undue
influence
‐ increased
danger
of
one
testator
killing
the
other
ART.
819.
Wills,
prohibited
by
the
preceding
article,
executed
by
Filipinos
in
a
foreign
country
shall
not
be
valid
in
the
Philippines,
even
though
authorized
by
the
laws
of
the
country
where
they
may
have
been
executed.
Outline
on
joint
wills
‐ executed
by
Filipinos
in
the
Philippines
Page 11 of 73
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
o VOID
executed
by
Filipinos
abroad
o VOID,
even
if
authorized
by
law
of
place
of
execution
executed
by
aliens
abroad
o see
ART.
816
executed
by
aliens
in
the
Philippines
o one
view:
VOID
(public
policy)
o another
view:
ART.
817
applies
executed
by
a
Filipino
and
an
alien
o VOID
as
to
Filipino
o ART.
816
or
817
applies
as
to
alien
Subsection 4 – Witnesses to Wills
ART.
820.
Any
person
of
sound
mind
and
of
the
age
of
eighteen
years
or
more,
and
not
blind,
deaf
or
dumb,
and
able
to
read
and
write,
may
be
a
witness
to
the
execution
of
a
will
mentioned
in
article
805
of
this
Code.
ART.
821.
The
following
are
disqualified
from
being
witnesses
to
a
will:
(1)
Any
person
not
domiciled
in
the
Philippines;
(2)
Those
who
have
been
convicted
of
falsification
of
a
document,
perjury,
or
false
testimony.
Six
qualifications
of
witnesses
‐ of
sound
mind
o attestation
is
an
act
of
the
senses
‐ at
least
18
years
of
age
‐ not
blind,
deaf,
or
dumb
o again,
witnessing
is
an
act
of
the
senses
o dumb
means
mute,
not
someone
who
is
simply
stupid
‐ able
to
read
and
write
o or
literate,
because
such
literate
witness
would
have
a
better
understanding
of
the
solemnity
of
the
execution
of
a
will
and
his
act
of
being
a
witness
thereto
‐ domiciled
in
the
Philippines
o citizenship
of
witness,
immaterial
(even
if
he
is
not
a
Filipino
or
a
foreigner)
o the
only
requirement
is
that
the
witness
is
domiciled
in
the
Philippines
there
is
a
high
probability
that
witness
would
be
in
the
country
if
will
is
probated
and
said
witness
is
called
to
testify
in
court
‐ must
not
have
been
convicted
of
falsification
of
a
document,
perjury,
or
false
testimony
o conviction
must
be
by
final
judgment
o these
crimes
relate
to
the
witness’s
trustworthiness
or
credibility
if
a
witness
had
been
convicted
of
murder
or
rape,
he
is
qualified
because
he
can
still
be
honest
Competence
and
credibility,
distinguished
Gonzales
v.
CA
(1979)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Facts:
Testatrix’s
will
submitted
for
probate.
Opposition:
that
the
will
was
not
attested
to
by
three
credible
witnesses.
Witnesses
were
driver
of
the
testatrix,
driver’s
wife,
and
piano
teacher
of
testatrix’s
grandchild.
Contestant
argued
that
witnesses
must
initially
testify
as
to
their
good
standing
in
the
community,
their
reputation
for
trustworthiness
and
reliability,
their
honesty
and
uprightness,
in
order
that
their
testimony
may
be
believed
and
accepted.
Held:
That
the
credibility
of
a
witness
is
presumed
unless
the
contrary
is
proved.
That
the
rule
is
that
the
instrumental
witnesses
in
order
to
be
competent
must
be
shown
to
have
the
qualifications
under
ART.
820
and
none
of
the
disqualifications
under
ART.
821.
That
the
contestant’s
arguments
must
fail.
ART.
822.
If
the
witnesses
attesting
the
execution
of
a
will
are
competent
at
the
time
of
attesting,
their
becoming
subsequently
incompetent
shall
not
prevent
the
allowance
of
the
will.
Note:
‐ time
of
execution
of
the
will
is
the
only
relevant
temporal
criterion
ART.
823.
If
a
person
attests
to
the
execution
of
a
will,
to
whom
or
to
whose
spouse,
or
parent,
or
child,
a
devise
or
legacy
is
given
by
such
will,
such
devise
or
legacy
shall,
so
far
only
as
concerns
such
person,
or
spouse,
or
parent,
or
child
of
such
person,
or
any
one
claiming
under
such
person
or
spouse,
or
parent,
or
child,
be
void,
unless
there
are
three
other
competent
witnesses
to
such
will.
However,
such
person
so
attesting
shall
be
admitted
as
a
witness
as
if
such
devise
or
legacy
had
not
been
made
or
given.
Notes:
‐ article
is
misplaced,
since
it
is
not
concerned
with
capacity
to
be
a
witness,
but
with
capacity
to
succeed
‐ in
essence,
a
witness
cannot
succeed
to
a
will
he
is
witnessing
o because
such
witness
will
be
very
partial;
he
will
have
some
interest
to
protect
(i.e.
even
if
the
will
had
some
defect,
witness
will
of
course
not
testify
as
to
said
defect)
‐ it
must
be
noted
that
the
law
does
not
disqualify
the
witness
Disqualification
of
a
witness
to
succeed
to
a
devise
or
legacy
when
there
are
only
three
witnesses
‐ competence
of
witnesses,
not
affected
‐ will
is
valid
but
witness
(or
relatives
specified
in
this
article)
cannot
inherit
Article
also
applies
to
heirs
(not
only
legatees
and
devisees)
‐ intent
of
the
law
is
to
cover
all
testamentary
institutions
Disqualification
to
succeed
applies
only
to
testamentary
disposition
made
in
favor
of
the
witness
or
the
specified
relatives
Page 12 of 73
‐
if
the
party
is
also
entitled
to
a
legitime
or
an
intestate
share,
that
portion
is
not
affected
by
the
party’s
witnessing
the
will
o testamentary
disposition
in
favor
of
a
witness,
VOID
o but
if
the
same
witness
is
a
compulsory
heir,
his
legitime
is
unaffected
EXCEPTION
‐ if
there
are
three
other
witnesses
(or
four
witnesses)—
o the
testamentary
disposition
in
favor
of
one
of
them
is
valid
ART.
824.
A
mere
charge
on
the
estate
of
the
testator
for
the
payment
of
debts
due
at
the
time
of
the
testator’s
death
does
not
prevent
his
creditors
from
being
competent
witnesses
to
his
will.
Notes:
‐ the
creditor
does
not
need
the
testator’s
will
in
order
that
he
may
be
paid
o his
claim
will
be
proved
in
the
settlement
of
the
decedent’s
estate
o the
creditor
is
not
an
heir
Subsection 5 – Codicils and Incorporation by Reference ART.
825.
A
codicil
is
a
supplement
or
addition
to
a
will,
made
after
the
execution
of
a
will
and
annexed
to
be
taken
as
a
part
thereof,
by
which
any
disposition
made
in
the
original
will
is
explained,
added
to,
or
altered.
ART.
826.
In
order
that
a
codicil
may
be
effective,
it
shall
be
executed
as
in
the
case
of
a
will.
Codicil
‐ explains,
adds
to,
or
alters
a
disposition
in
a
prior
will
Subsequent
will
‐ makes
independent
and
distinct
dispositions
Codicil
need
not
conform
to
the
form
of
the
will
to
which
it
refers
‐ an
attested
will
may
have
a
holographic
codicil
‐ a
holographic
will
may
have
an
attested
codicil
ART.
827.
If
a
will,
executed
as
required
by
this
Code,
incorporates
into
itself
by
reference
any
document
or
paper,
such
document
or
paper
shall
not
be
considered
a
part
of
the
will
unless
the
following
requisites
are
present:
(1)
The
document
or
paper
referred
to
in
the
will
must
be
in
existence
at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
the
will;
(2)
The
will
must
clearly
describe
and
identify
the
same,
stating
among
other
things
the
number
of
pages
thereof;
(3)
It
must
be
identified
by
clear
and
satisfactory
proof
as
the
document
or
paper
referred
to
therein;
and
(4)
It
must
be
signed
by
the
testator
and
the
witnesses
on
each
and
every
page,
except
in
case
of
voluminous
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
books
of
account
or
inventories.
Documents
‐ inventories,
books
of
accounts,
documents
of
title,
papers
of
similar
nature
‐ must
not
make
testamentary
dispositions
(lest
formal
requirements
for
wills
be
circumvented)
Holographic
wills
cannot
incorporate
documents
by
reference
‐ par.
4
of
the
article
requires
the
signatures
of
the
testator
and
the
witnesses
on
every
page
of
the
incorporated
document
(except
voluminous
annexes)
Subsection 6 – Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions ART.
828.
A
will
may
be
revoked
by
the
testator
at
any
time
before
his
death.
Any
waiver
or
restriction
of
this
right
is
void.
A
will
is
essentially
revocable
or
ambulatory
‐ this
characteristic
cannot
be
waived
even
by
the
testator
‐ a
will
is
revocable
ad
nutum,
i.e.
at
the
testator’s
pleasure,
during
his
lifetime
‐ no
such
thing
as
an
irrevocable
will
‐ cf.
ART.
777
(successional
rights
vest
only
upon
death)
ART.
829.
A
revocation
done
outside
the
Philippines,
by
a
person
who
does
not
have
his
domicile
in
this
country,
is
valid
when
it
is
done
according
to
the
law
of
the
place
where
the
will
was
made,
or
according
to
the
law
of
the
place
in
which
the
testator
had
his
domicile
at
the
time;
and
if
the
revocation
takes
place
in
this
country,
when
it
is
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
this
Code.
Rules
for
revocation
‐ if
made
in
the
Philippines
o follow
Philippine
law
‐ if
made
outside
the
Philippines
o if
testator
domiciled
in
the
Philippines
follow
law
of
place
of
execution,
or
follow
law
of
place
where
testator
was
domiciled
at
the
time
of
revocation
o if
testator
domiciled
in
the
Philippines
(not
governed
by
ART.
829)
follow
Philippine
law
follow
law
of
place
of
revocation
follow
law
of
place
of
execution
ART.
830.
No
will
shall
be
revoked
except
in
the
following
cases:
(a)
By
implication
of
law;
or
(b)
By
some
will,
codicil,
or
other
writing
executed
as
provided
in
case
of
wills;
or
(c)
By
burning,
tearing,
cancelling,
or
obliterating
the
Page 13 of 73
will
with
intention
of
revoking
it,
by
the
testator
himself,
or
by
some
other
person
in
his
presence,
and
by
his
express
direction.
If
burned,
torn,
cancelled,
or
obliterated
by
some
other
person,
without
the
express
direction
of
the
testator,
the
will
may
still
be
established,
and
the
estate
distributed
in
accordance
therewith,
if
its
contents,
and
due
execution,
and
the
fact
of
its
unauthorized
destruction,
cancellation,
or
obliteration
are
established
according
to
the
Rules
of
Court.
First
mode
of
revocation:
By
operation
of
law—
‐ revocation
may
be
total
or
partial
‐ examples
o preterition
(ART.
854)
o legal
separation
(ART.
63,
par.
4,
Family
Code)
o unworthiness
to
succeed
(ART.
1032)
o transformation,
alienation,
or
loss
of
the
object
devised
or
bequeathed
(ART.
957)
o judicial
demand
of
a
credit
given
as
a
legacy
(ART.
936)
Second
mode
of
revocation:
By
a
subsequent
will
or
codicil—
‐ revocation
may
be
total
or
partial
‐ requisites
o subsequent
instrument
must
comply
with
the
formal
requirements
of
a
will
o testator
must
possess
testamentary
capacity
o subsequent
instrument
must
either
contain
an
express
revocatory
clause
(express)
or
be
incompatible
with
the
prior
will
(implied)
‐ revocatory
will
must
be
probated
Third
mode
of
revocation:
By
physical
destruction—
‐ four
ways
of
destroying:
o burning
o tearing
o cancelling
o obliterating
Physical
destruction
may
be
done—
‐ by
testator
personally,
or
‐ by
another
person
acting
in
the
testator’s
presence
and
by
the
testator’s
express
direction
Effect
of
unauthorized
destruction
‐ will
may
be
proved
as
lost
or
destroyed
o but
only
if
will
is
attested
o if
holographic,
will
cannot
be
probated
if
lost
or
destroyed
without
authority
(Gan
v,
Yap),
unless
a
copy
survives
(Rodelas
v.
Aranza)
Elements
of
a
valid
revocation
by
physical
destruction*
‐ corpus
o the
physical
destruction
itself
o there
must
be
evidence
of
physical
destruction
‐ animus
o capacity
and
intent
to
revoke
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
same
as
in
testamentary
capacity
the
testator
must
have
completed
everything
he
intended
to
do
o
*must
concur,
otherwise,
no
revocation
Testate
Estate
of
Adriana
Maloto
v.
CA
(1988)
Facts:
Heirs
of
late
Maloto
instituted
intestate
proceeding
for
settlement
of
decedent’s
estate.
Later,
a
document
purporting
to
be
the
will
of
decedent
was
discovered.
Some
heirs
filed
a
petition
for
probate
of
alleged
will.
Opposition:
that
the
testatrix’s
will
had
been
revoked,
her
maid
having
burned
the
same.
Held:
That
there
was
no
valid
revocation
by
physical
destruction
because
animus
revocandi
and
corpus
did
not
concur.
That
while
animus
revocandi
may
be
conceded
because
that
is
a
state
of
mind,
corpus
was
not
established.
That
it
was
not
shown
that
the
paper
burned
by
the
maid
was
the
will
of
the
testatrix;
that
the
burning
was
not
proven
to
have
been
done
under
the
testatrix’s
express
direction;
that
the
burning
was
not
done
in
the
presence
of
the
testatrix.
The
loss
or
unavailability
of
a
will
may,
under
certain
circumstances,
give
rise
to
the
presumption
that
it
had
been
revoked
by
physical
destruction
Gago
v.
Mamuyac
(1927)
Facts:
Proponent
sought
to
have
will
of
decedent
probated,
presenting
a
carbon
copy
of
same.
Opposition:
that
original
(will)
had
been
revoked
by
testator,
as
testified
to
by
witnesses.
Original
copy
of
will
could
not
be
found.
Held:
That
there
is
a
presumption
that
the
will
had
been
revoked
(cancelled
or
destroyed)
if
it
cannot
be
found
and
is
shown
to
be
in
the
possession
of
the
testator
when
last
seen.
That
the
presumption
is
that
the
will
was
revoked
by
the
testator
himself.
That
the
will
of
the
testator
in
this
case
is
presumed
to
have
been
properly
revoked.
ART.
831.
Subsequent
wills
which
do
not
revoke
the
previous
ones
in
an
express
manner,
annul
only
such
dispositions
in
the
prior
wills
as
are
inconsistent
with
or
contrary
to
those
contained
in
the
later
wills.
Note:
‐ the
execution
of
a
subsequent
will
does
not
ipso
facto
revoke
a
prior
one
ART.
832.
A
revocation
made
in
a
subsequent
will
shall
take
effect,
even
if
the
new
will
should
become
inoperative
by
reason
of
the
incapacity
of
the
heirs,
devisees
or
legatees
designated
therein,
or
by
their
renunciation.
Efficacy
of
the
revocatory
clause
does
not
depend
on
the
testamentary
dispositions
of
the
revoking
will
‐ unless
the
testator
so
provides
Page 14 of 73
GENERAL
RULE:
Revocation
is
an
absolute
provision
independent
of
the
acceptance
or
capacity
of
the
new
heirs
EXCEPTION
(“dependent
relative
revocation”):
If
testator
provides
in
the
subsequent
will
that
the
revocation
of
the
prior
one
is—
‐ dependent
on
the
capacity
of
the
heirs,
devisees,
or
legatees
instituted
in
the
subsequent
will,
or
‐ dependent
on
the
acceptance
of
the
heirs,
devisees,
or
legatees
instituted
in
the
subsequent
will
Dependent
relative
revocation,
explanation
(Molo
v.
Molo
[1951])
‐ if
act
of
revocation
of
a
previous
(original)
will
is
made
by
executing
a
subsequent
(new)
will,
the
revocation
is
conditional
and
dependent
upon
the
efficacy
of
the
subsequent
will
‐ if,
for
any
reason,
the
new
will
intended
to
be
made
as
a
substitute
is
inoperative,
the
revocation
fails
and
the
original
will
remains
in
full
force
‐ failure
of
the
new
will
upon
whose
validity
the
revocation
depends
is
equivalent
to
the
non‐ fulfillment
of
a
suspensive
condition,
and
hence
prevents
the
revocation
of
the
original
will
Dependent
relative
revocation
applies
ONLY
if
it
appears
that
the
testator
intended
his
act
of
revocation
to
be
conditioned
on—
‐ the
making
of
a
new
will,
or
‐ the
validity
of
a
new
will,
or
‐ the
efficacy
of
a
new
will
Rule
of
dependent
relative
revocation
applies
if
the
revocation
is
by
physical
destruction
Molo
v.
Molo
(1951)
Facts:
Testator
left
two
wills:
original
and
new
which
contained
a
revocatory
clause.
New
will
was
probated.
Later,
probation
was
set
aside
as
oppositors
proved
that
new
will
not
made
in
accordance
with
law.
Proponents
sought
to
have
original
will
probated.
Opposition:
that
original
will
had
been
revoked
by
new
will,
notwithstanding
disallowance
of
new
will.
Evidence
was
presented
by
contestants
that
original
will
had
been
destroyed
by
testator.
Held:
That
original
will
stands
because
subsequent
(new)
will
containing
a
revocatory
clause
has
been
disallowed.
That
a
subsequent
will
containing
a
revocatory
clause
which
was
denied
probate
cannot
produce
the
effect
of
annulling
the
original
or
previous
will
because
the
revocatory
clause
is
void.
That
destruction
of
original
will
cannot
have
the
effect
of
defeating
said
will
(prior
will)
because
of
the
fact
that
it
is
founded
on
mistaken
belief
that
subsequent
will
has
been
validly
executed
and
would
be
given
effect.
Balane
Thinks:
‐ “Can
it
not
be
argued
that
the
act
of
the
testator
in
destroying
the
will
in
fact
confirmed
his
intent
to
revoke
it?
(referring
to
the
case
of
Molo
v.
Molo)”
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Diaz
v.
De
Leon
(1922)
Facts:
Testator
executed
a
second
will
revoking
the
first.
First
will
presented
to
court
for
probate.
Held:
That
the
second
will
did
not
constitute
sufficient
revocation.
That
existence
of
animus
revocandi,
sufficient
for
revocation.
That
first
will,
having
been
shown
to
have
been
destroyed
with
animus
revocandi,
is
considered
revoked.
That
first
will
was
returned
to
testator
who
ordered
his
servant
to
tear
the
same,
which
was
done
in
the
presence
of
testator,
clearly
manifesting
his
intent
to
revoke
said
first
will.
That
first
will
cannot
be
probated
for
having
been
destroyed
with
animus
revocandi.
Rule
if
revocation
is
implied
(incompatibility
of
provisions)
‐ rule
in
ART.
832
applies
‐ intent
of
testator
to
set
aside
prior
will
is
clear
ART.
833.
A
revocation
of
a
will
based
on
a
false
cause
or
illegal
cause
is
null
and
void.
Wills,
revocable
ad
nutum
‐ testator
does
not
have
to
have
a
reason
or
cause
for
revoking
his
will
‐ the
law
protects
the
testator’s
true
intent
(i.e.
to
revoke),
so
this
article
sets
aside
a
revocation
that
does
not
reflect
such
true
intent
Requisites
for
the
application
of
ART.
833
regarding
revocation
for
a
false
cause
‐ cause
must
be
concrete,
factual,
and
not
purely
subjective
‐ cause
must
be
false
‐ testator
must
not
know
of
the
falsity
of
the
cause
‐ it
must
appear
from
the
will
that
the
testator
is
revoking
because
of
the
false
cause
Extension
of
ART.
833
to
illegal
causes
(reason:
public
policy),
in
effect,
restricts
the
testator’s
freedom
to
revoke
‐ illegal
cause
must
be
stated
in
the
will
as
the
cause
of
revocation
ART.
834.
The
recognition
of
an
illegitimate
child
does
not
lose
its
legal
effect,
even
though
the
will
wherein
it
was
made
should
be
revoked.
Notes:
‐ recognition
of
an
illegitimate
child
in
a
will
is
irrevocable
(i.e.
even
if
the
will
is
revoked,
the
recognition
remains
effective)
‐ under
the
Family
Code
(cf.
ART.
175,
Family
Code),
admission
of
illegitimate
filiation
in
a
will
would
constitute
proof
of
illegitimate
filiation
Subsection 7 – Republication and Revival of Wills ART.
835.
The
testator
cannot
republish,
without
reproducing
in
a
subsequent
will,
the
dispositions
contained
in
a
previous
one
which
is
void
as
to
its
form.
ART.
836.
The
execution
of
a
codicil
referring
to
a
previous
will
has
the
effect
of
republishing
the
will
as
Page 15 of 73
modified
by
the
codicil.
Notes:
‐ republication
or
revival
to
give
back
efficacy
to
a
will
which
has
become
inefficacious
Will,
void
as
to
form
if
it
does
not
comply
with
the
requirements
of
ART.
804
to
808;
810
to
814;
818
and
819
How
to
republish
a
will
that
is
void
as
to
its
form—
‐ to
execute
a
subsequent
will
and
reproduce
(i.e.
copy
out)
the
dispositions
of
the
original
will
o mere
reference,
not
enough
How
to
republish
a
will
that
is
not
void
as
to
its
form
but
(a)
void
for
a
reason
other
than
a
formal
defect
[e.g.
a
will
that
institutes
one
of
the
three
attesting
witnesses],
or
(b)
previously
revoked—
‐ to
execute
a
subsequent
will
or
codicil
referring
to
the
previous
will
o no
need
to
reproduce
the
provisions
of
the
prior
will
in
the
subsequent
instrument
ART.
837.
If
after
making
a
will,
the
testator
makes
a
second
will
expressly
revoking
the
first,
the
revocation
of
the
second
will
does
not
revive
the
first
will,
which
can
be
revived
only
by
another
will
or
codicil.
Explanation—
‐ the
revocation
of
a
second
will
(revoking
a
first
will)
by
a
third
will
does
not
revive
the
first
will
o the
revocatory
clause
of
a
revoked
will
(second
will)
remains
effective
(because
third
will
revoking
second
will
does
not
revive
first
will)
Balane
Notes:
‐ this
article
is
based
on
the
theory
of
instant
revocation,
which
is
inconsistent
with
the
principle
that
wills
take
effect
mortis
causa
‐ a
revocatory
will,
as
in
every
will,
in
order
to
have
effect
must
be
probated;
but
a
second
will
revoking
the
first,
which
second
will
has
already
been
revoked,
must
be
submitted
to
court
for
probate?
ART.
837
does
not
apply
in
case
of
implied
revocation
(i.e.
the
article
only
applies
if
revocation
of
the
first
will
by
the
second
will
is
express)—
‐ the
revocation
of
a
second
will
(revoking
a
first
will)
by
a
third
will
would
revive
the
first
will,
UNLESS
the
third
will
is
itself
inconsistent
with
the
first
EXCEPTION
‐ if
the
second
will
is
holographic
and
is
revoked
by
physical
destruction
o because
it
cannot
be
probated,
unless
a
copy
survives
Subsection 8 – Allowance and Disallowance of Wills ART.
838.
No
will
shall
pass
either
real
or
personal
property
unless
it
is
proved
and
allowed
in
accordance
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
with
the
Rules
of
Court.
The
testator
himself
may,
during
his
lifetime,
petition
the
court
having
jurisdiction
for
the
allowance
of
his
will.
In
such
case,
the
pertinent
provisions
of
the
Rules
of
Court
for
the
allowance
of
wills
after
the
testator’s
death
shall
govern.
The
Supreme
Court
shall
formulate
such
additional
Rules
of
Court
as
may
be
necessary
for
the
allowance
of
wills
on
petition
of
the
testator.
Subject
to
the
right
of
appeal,
the
allowance
of
the
will,
either
during
the
lifetime
of
the
testator
or
after
his
death,
shall
be
conclusive
as
to
its
due
execution.
Probate,
defined
‐ a
judicial
process
to
determine
the
due
execution
(formal
or
extrinsic
validity)
of
a
will
Probate
of
a
will,
mandatory
Guevara
v.
Guevara
(1943)
Facts:
Testator
executed
a
will
which
was
never
presented
to
court
for
probate.
Respondent
sought
to
recover
a
parcel
of
land
sold
to
petitioner,
claiming
that
said
land
was
part
of
her
legitime.
To
support
her
claim,
respondent
presented
the
will
before
the
court
to
prove
that
she
was
acknowledged
by
testator
as
his
natural
child,
and
only
for
that
purpose
(i.e.
not
for
probate).
Respondent
claimed
to
be
an
intestate
and
compulsory
heir
of
decedent.
Held:
That
the
procedure
adopted
by
respondent
cannot
be
sanctioned
because
presentation
of
will
to
court
for
probate
is
mandatory,
and
its
allowance
essential
and
indispensable
for
its
efficacy.
Two
stages
of
settlement
of
estate
‐ probate
of
will
o formal
validity
is
determined
‐ settlement
proper
o substantive
validity
(i.e.
efficacy
of
provisions)
of
will
is
passed
upon
Once
a
decree
of
probate
becomes
final,
it
is
res
judicata
De
la
Cerna
v.
Potot
(1964)
Facts:
Joint
will
executed
by
testator
and
testatrix.
When
testator
died,
will
admitted
to
probate.
Probate
decree
became
final.
Later,
same
will
submitted
to
court
for
probate
when
testatrix
died.
Probate
court
denied
probate
(the
second
time)
because
joint
wills
are
void.
Held:
That
the
admission
of
a
joint
will
to
probate
is
an
error
of
law
which
should
have
been
corrected
by
appeal,
but
which
did
not
affect
the
jurisdiction
of
the
probate
court,
nor
the
conclusive
effect
of
its
final
decision.
That
since
the
probate
court
(during
the
first
probate)
has
spoken
with
finality
when
it
admitted
the
joint
will
to
probate,
the
final
decree
of
probate
has
conclusive
effect
as
to
testator’s
will.
Page 16 of 73
Scope
of
final
decree
of
probate:
GENERAL
RULE:
Conclusive
as
to
due
execution
(i.e.
extrinsic
or
formal
validity
only)
Gallanosa
v.
Arcangel
(1978)
Facts:
Legal
heirs
of
testator
filed
an
action
for
annulment
of
testator’s
duly
probated
will.
Ground:
fraud
in
the
execution
and
simulation.
Testamentary
heirs
opposed.
Lower
court
annulled
probated
will.
Held:
That
procedural
laws
do
not
sanction
an
action
for
the
“annulment”
of
a
will.
That
decree
of
probate
of
will
is
conclusive
as
to
its
due
execution
or
formal
validity.
That
admission
of
will
to
probate
means
that
the
testator
was
of
sound
and
disposing
mind;
that
his
consent
was
not
vitiated;
that
the
will
was
signed
by
him
in
the
presence
of
the
required
number
of
witnesses;
and
that
the
will
is
genuine.
That
these
facts
cannot
again
be
questioned
in
a
subsequent
proceeding,
not
even
in
a
criminal
action
for
forgery
of
will.
That
trial
judge
gravely
abused
his
discretion
in
annulling
duly
probated
will.
What
formal
validity
encompasses
(Dorotheo
v.
CA
[1999])
‐ whether
the
will
submitted
is
indeed
the
decedent’s
last
will
and
testament
‐ compliance
with
the
prescribed
formalities
for
the
execution
of
wills
‐ testamentary
capacity
‐ due
execution
of
the
will
Due
execution
means:
‐ the
testator’s
sound
and
disposing
mind
‐ freedom
from
vitiating
factors
(duress,
menace,
undue
influence)
‐ will
genuine,
not
forgery
‐ proper
testamentary
age
‐ the
testator
is
not
expressly
prohibited
bylaw
from
making
a
will
Another
way
of
defining
the
scope
of
a
final
decree
of
probate
is
to
refer
to
ART.
839,
infra—
‐ objection
to
a
will
on
any
of
the
grounds
enumerated
in
that
article
is
foreclosed
by
a
final
decree
of
probate
EXCEPTION:
A
decree
of
probate
does
not
concern
itself
with
the
question
of
intrinsic
validity,
and
the
probate
court
should
not
pass
upon
that
issue,
except
if
on
its
face
the
will
appears
to
be
intrinsically
void
Nepomuceno
v.
CA
(1985)
Facts:
Testator
devised
entire
free
portion
to
kabit.
Testator
noted
in
his
will
that
he
could
not
marry
kabit
because
he
was
legally
married
to
someone
else.
Kabit
presented
will
to
court
for
probate.
Legal
wife
opposed.
Probate
denied:
the
will
was
invalid
on
its
face
because
of
prohibited
disposition.
Appellate
court
reversed:
will
valid
except
that
devise
in
favor
of
kabit
is
null
and
void,
per
ART.
739
in
relation
with
ART.
1028
of
the
Civil
Code.
Held:
That
while
the
general
rule
is
that
in
probate
proceedings
the
court’s
area
of
inquiry
is
limited
to
an
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
examination
and
resolution
of
the
extrinsic
validity
of
the
will,
the
general
rule
is
not
inflexible
and
absolute,
for
probate
court
not
powerless
to
pass
upon
certain
provisions
of
will.
That
probate
of
a
will
might
become
an
idle
ceremony
if
on
its
face
it
appears
to
be
intrinsically
void.
That
a
donation
cannot
be
given
between
persons
living
in
adultery
or
concubinage,
in
which
case
donation
is
void.
That
this
rule
also
applies
to
testamentary
dispositions.
That
therefore
the
testamentary
disposition
in
favor
of
kabit
is
void.
Baltazar
v.
Laxa
(2012)
Facts:
Will
of
the
testatrix
presented
to
court
for
probate.
Opposition:
those
enumerated
in
ART.
839,
infra).
Held:
That
courts
are
only
tasked
to
pass
upon
the
extrinsic
validity
of
will
in
probate
proceedings.
That
due
execution
of
will
or
its
extrinsic
validity
pertains
to
whether
testator,
being
of
sound
mind,
freely
executed
will
in
accordance
with
formalities
prescribed
by
law
(ART.
805
to
806).
That
there
is
faithful
compliance
with
formalities
laid
down
by
law
apparent
from
face
of
will.
That
contestants
failed
to
substantiate
their
allegations,
hence
probate
of
will
must
be
allowed.
ART.
839.
The
will
shall
be
disallowed
in
any
of
the
following
cases:
(1)
If
the
formalities
required
by
law
have
not
been
complied
with;
(2)
If
the
testator
was
insane,
or
otherwise
mentally
incapable
of
making
a
will,
at
the
time
of
its
execution;
(3)
If
it
was
executed
through
force
or
under
duress,
or
the
influence
of
fear,
or
threats;
(4)
If
it
was
procured
by
undue
and
improper
pressure
and
influence,
on
the
part
of
the
beneficiary
or
of
some
other
person;
(5)
If
the
signature
of
the
testator
was
procured
by
fraud;
(6)
If
the
testator
acted
by
mistake
or
did
not
intend
that
the
instrument
he
signed
should
be
his
will
at
the
time
of
affixing
his
signature
thereto.
Grounds
for
disallowance
of
a
will
listed
in
ART.
839,
exclusive
‐ a
final
probate
decree
forecloses
any
subsequent
challenge
on
any
of
the
matters
enumerated
in
this
article
‐ if
any
of
these
grounds
for
disallowance
is
proved,
the
will
shall
be
set
aside
as
void
o a
will
is
either
valid
or
void
(no
such
thing
as
a
voidable
will)
VALID
–
if
none
of
defects
in
ART.
839
are
present
VOID
–
if
any
one
of
the
defects
is
present
Re
ART.
839(1)—
‐ See
ART.
804
to
814,
818
to
819,
and
820
to
821
Page 17 of 73
Re
ART.
839(2)—
‐ cf.
ART.
796
to
803
Re
ART.
839(3)—
‐ force
(violence),
as
defined
in
contract
law
(ART.
1335)
‐ duress
(intimidation),
as
defined
in
contract
law
(ART.
1335)
Re
ART.
839(4)—
‐ undue
or
improper
pressure
or
influence
(undue
influence),
as
defined
in
contract
law
(ART.
1337)
Re
ART.
839(5)—
‐ fraud,
as
defined
in
contract
law
(ART.
1338)
Re
ART.
839(6)—
‐ mistake,
as
defined
in
contract
law
(ART.
1331)
Section 2 – Institution of Heir ART.
840.
Institution
of
heir
is
an
act
by
virtue
of
which
a
testator
designates
in
his
will
the
person
or
persons
who
are
to
succeed
him
in
his
property
and
transmissible
rights
and
obligations.
Notes:
‐ rules
on
institution
of
heir
apply
also
to
institution
of
devisees
and
legatees
‐ wills
are
for
institution
of
heirs
ART.
841.
A
will
shall
be
valid
even
though
it
should
not
contain
an
institution
of
an
heir,
or
such
institution
should
not
comprise
the
entire
estate,
and
even
though
the
person
so
instituted
should
not
accept
the
inheritance
or
should
be
incapacitated
to
succeed.
In
such
cases
the
testamentary
dispositions
made
in
accordance
with
law
shall
be
complied
with
and
the
remainder
of
the
estate
shall
pass
to
the
legal
heirs.
Notes:
‐ cf.
Seangio
v.
Reyes
(2006)
o involving
a
will
without
testamentary
dispositions
(disinheritance)
‐ if
heir,
legatee,
or
devisee
does
not
accept
or
is
incapacitated
o intestacy
as
to
that
part
results
ART.
842.
One
who
has
no
compulsory
heirs
may
dispose
by
will
of
all
his
estate
or
any
part
of
it
in
favor
of
any
person
having
capacity
to
succeed.
One
who
has
compulsory
heirs
may
dispose
of
his
estate
provided
he
does
not
contravene
the
provisions
of
this
Code
with
regard
to
the
legitime
of
said
heirs.
Even
if
will
does
not
contain
any
testamentary
disposition—
‐ it
will
be
formally
valid
provided
it
complies
with
all
the
formal
requisites
How
much
can
be
disposed
of
by
will—
‐ if
testator
has
no
compulsory
heirs:
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
‐
o the
entire
hereditary
estate
if
testator
has
compulsory
heirs:
o the
disposable
portion
(i.e.
the
net
hereditary
estate
minus
the
legitimes)
If
testator
disposes
by
will
of
less
than
he
is
allowed
whether
or
not
he
leaves
compulsory
heirs—
‐ mixed
succession
results
o testamentary
succession
as
to
that
part
disposed
of
by
will,
and
o intestate
succession
as
to
that
part
not
disposed
of
by
will
o (legitimes
pass
by
strict
operation
of
law)
ART.
843.
The
testator
shall
designate
the
heir
by
his
name
and
surname,
and
when
there
are
two
persons
having
the
same
names,
he
shall
indicate
some
circumstance
by
which
the
instituted
heir
may
be
known.
Even
though
the
testator
may
have
omitted
the
name
of
the
heir,
should
he
designate
him
in
such
manner
that
there
can
be
no
doubt
as
to
who
has
been
instituted,
the
institution
shall
be
valid.
ART.
844.
An
error
in
the
name,
surname,
or
circumstances
of
the
heir
shall
not
vitiate
the
institution
when
it
is
possible,
in
any
other
manner,
to
know
with
certainty
the
person
instituted.
If,
among
persons
having
the
same
names
and
surnames,
there
is
a
similarity
of
circumstances
in
such
a
way
that,
even
with
the
use
of
other
proof,
the
person
instituted
cannot
be
identified,
none
of
them
shall
be
an
heir.
Requirement
for
designation
of
heir
‐ that
the
heir,
legatee,
or
devisee
must
be
identified
in
the
will
with
sufficient
clarity
to
leave
no
doubt
as
to
the
testator’s
intention
Designation
of
name
and
surname
is
directory
‐ what
is
mandatory
is
that
the
identity
of
the
heirs,
legatees,
or
devisees
must
be
sufficiently
established
(usually,
by
giving
the
name
and
surname,
but
there
are
other
ways)
Other
ways
of
establishing
identity
of
heir,
devisee,
or
legacy
‐ “I
designate
as
heir
to
one‐eighth
of
my
estate
my
eldest
first
cousin”
‐ “I
devise
my
lechon
parlor
to
my
Civil
Procedure
professor”
If
there
is
any
ambiguity
in
the
designation,
the
ambiguity
must
be
resolved
in
accordance
with
ART.
789
‐ i.e.
by
evidence
aliunde,
excluding
oral
declarations
of
the
testator
If
ambiguity
cannot
be
resolved—
‐ testator’s
intent
becomes
unascertainable
o intestacy
therefore
as
to
that
portion
results
Page 18 of 73
ART.
845.
Every
disposition
in
favor
of
an
unknown
person
shall
be
void,
unless
by
some
event
or
circumstance
his
identity
becomes
certain.
However,
a
disposition
in
favor
of
a
definite
class
or
group
of
persons
shall
be
valid.
Unknown
person
‐ refers
to
a
successor
whose
identity
cannot
be
determined
because
the
designation
in
the
will
is
so
unclear
or
so
ambiguous
as
to
be
incapable
of
resolution
‐ this
does
not
refer
to
one
with
whom
the
testator
is
not
personally
acquainted
‐ testator
may
institute
somebody
who
is
a
perfect
stranger
to
him,
provided
the
identity
is
clear
Illustrations
of
a
successor
whose
identity
cannot
be
determined
‐ “I
designate
as
heir
to
one‐fourth
of
my
estate
a
fiction
writer”
‐ “I
give
one‐third
of
my
estate
to
someone
who
cares”
Illustration
of
a
designation
of
an
unknown
person
whose
identity,
“by
some
event
or
circumstance”
becomes
certain
‐ “I
designate
as
heir
to
one‐fourth
of
my
estate,
whoever
tops
the
bar
the
year
after
my
death”
Illustration
of
a
disposition
in
favor
of
a
definite
class
or
group
of
persons
‐ “I
institute
as
heir
to
the
entire
free
portion
of
my
estate,
the
poor”
ART.
846.
Heirs
instituted
without
designation
of
shares
shall
inherit
in
equal
parts.
General
presumption
in
cases
of
collective
designation—
‐ EQUALITY
‐ if
testator
intends
an
unequal
apportionment,
he
should
so
specify
ART.
846
applies
only
to
testamentary
heirs
as
such
(or
devisees
or
legatees),
and
NOT
to
an
heir
who
is
both
a
compulsory
and
a
testamentary
heir
(because
the
heir
will
get
his
legitime
and
his
testamentary
share)
To
illustrate—
‐ a
testator
institutes
his
son,
his
friend,
and
his
cousin
as
testamentary
heirs
o son
will
get
his
legitime
plus
his
testamentary
share
o friend
and
cousin
each
get
an
equal
share
o son’s
testamentary
share
is
equal
to
each
of
friend’s
and
cousin’s
testamentary
share
son
gets
more
(legitime
plus
testamentary
share)
Not
explicitly
covered
by
ART.
846
is
a
situation
where
the
shares
of
some
of
the
heirs
are
designated
and
those
of
others
are
not
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
ART.
847.
When
the
testator
institutes
some
heirs
individually
and
others
collectively
as
when
he
says,
“I
designate
as
my
heirs
A
and
B,
and
the
children
of
C,”
those
collectively
designated
shall
be
considered
as
individually
instituted,
unless
it
clearly
appears
that
the
intention
of
the
testator
was
otherwise.
Equality
and
individuality
of
designation
‐ in
addition,
this
article
establishes
the
presumption
that
the
heirs
collectively
referred
to
are
designated
per
capita
along
with
those
separately
designated
‐ if
testator
intends
a
block
designation,
he
must
so
specify
Illustration
‐ “I
designate
as
heirs
Mrs.
Shoal
Halimawis,
her
daughter
Ms.
Cera
Halimawis,
and
Block
A2015
of
the
PUP
College
of
Law”
(Block
A2015
composed
of
20
people;
testator
died
single
and
without
legitimate
issue)
o Mrs.
Shoal,
Ms.
Cera,
and
the
20
people
of
Block
A2015
would
be
considered
as
individually
instituted
each
would
receive
1/22
of
the
estate
ART.
848.
If
the
testator
should
institute
his
brothers
and
sisters,
and
he
has
some
of
full
blood
and
others
of
half
blood,
the
inheritance
shall
be
distributed
equally
unless
a
different
intention
appears.
Again,
EQUALITY
of
shares
‐ if
testator
intends
otherwise,
he
must
so
specify
This
article
applies
to
testamentary
succession
only
‐ in
testamentary
succession
o equality
of
shares
of
full‐
and
half‐blood
brothers
and
sisters,
unless
the
testator
provides
otherwise
‐ in
intestate
succession
o proportion
of
2:1
between
full‐
and
half‐blood
brothers
and
sisters
(ART.
1006)
and
only
if
the
disqualification
in
ART.
992
does
not
apply
ART.
848
seems
to
apply
even
to
illegitimate
brothers
and
sisters,
in
cases
where
the
testator
is
of
legitimate
status,
and
viceversa
‐ the
article
makes
no
distinction
‐ ubi
lex
non
distinguit,
nec
nos
distinguere
debemus
ART.
849.
When
the
testator
calls
to
the
succession
a
person
and
his
children,
they
are
all
deemed
to
have
been
instituted
simultaneously
and
not
successively.
Note:
‐ equality
and
individuality
rule
again
ART.
850.
The
statement
of
a
false
cause
for
the
institution
of
an
heir
shall
be
considered
as
not
written,
unless
it
appears
from
the
will
that
the
testator
would
not
have
made
such
institution
if
he
had
known
the
falsity
of
such
cause.
Page 19 of 73
Note:
‐
truth
or
falsity
of
cause
is
immaterial
because
the
basis
of
institution,
like
donation,
is
liberality
General
Rule:
Falsity
of
stated
cause
for
testamentary
disposition
does
not
affect
validity
or
efficacy
of
institution
‐ reason:
testamentary
dispositions
are
ultimately
based
on
liberality
Exception:
Falsity
of
stated
cause
for
institution
will
set
aside
or
annul
the
institution
if
certain
factors
are
present
‐ the
factors
/
requisites
(Austria
v.
Reyes
[1970])
o the
cause
for
the
institution
must
be
stated
in
the
will
o the
cause
must
be
shown
to
be
false
o it
must
appear
from
the
face
of
the
will
that
the
testator
would
not
have
made
such
institution
if
he
had
known
the
falsity
of
the
cause
Austria
v.
Reyes
(1970)
Facts:
Testatrix
instituted
as
heirs
her
legally
adopted
children.
Ante
mortem
probate
of
will
allowed.
Opposition
to
partition
of
estate:
entire
estate
should
descend
to
contestants
by
intestacy
because
of
intrinsic
nullity
of
institution
of
heirs
(theory
of
false
adoption);
that
testatrix
was
led
into
believing
that
instituted
heirs
entitled
to
legitimes
as
compulsory
heirs,
as
evidenced
by
her
use
of
the
phrase
“sapilitang
mana.”
Held:
That
requisites
for
annulment
(see
factors
enumerated
in
the
Exception
above)
of
institution
of
heirs
based
on
false
cause
not
present.
That
there
was
not
even
a
cause
for
institution
stated
in
will.
That
testatrix’s
use
of
phrase
“sapilitang
mana”
probably
means
that
she
approved
of
system
of
legitimes.
Correlate
ART.
850
(annulling
factor:
falsity)
with
ART.
1028
in
relation
to
ART.
739
(annulling
factor:
illegality)
ART.
851.
If
the
testator
has
instituted
only
one
heir,
and
the
institution
is
limited
to
an
aliquot
part
of
the
inheritance,
legal
succession
takes
place
with
respect
to
the
remainder
of
the
estate.
The
same
rule
applies,
if
the
testator
has
instituted
several
heirs
each
being
limited
to
an
aliquot
part,
and
all
the
parts
do
not
cover
the
whole
inheritance.
Wording
of
ART.
851,
erroneous
‐ legal
succession
does
not
take
place
with
respect
to
the
remainder
of
the
estate,
but
to
the
remainder
of
the
disposable
portion
o there
may
be
compulsory
heirs
whose
legitimes
will
cover
part
of
the
estate
o the
legitimes
do
not
pass
by
legal
or
intestate
succession
ART.
851
states
exactly
the
same
rule
laid
down
in
ART.
841
ART.
852.
If
it
was
the
intention
of
the
testator
that
the
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
instituted
heirs
should
become
sole
heirs
to
the
whole
estate,
or
the
whole
free
portion,
as
the
case
may
be,
and
each
of
them
has
been
instituted
to
an
aliquot
part
of
the
inheritance
and
their
aliquot
parts
together
do
not
cover
the
whole
inheritance,
or
the
whole
free
portion,
each
part
shall
be
increased
proportionally.
ART.
853.
If
each
of
the
instituted
heirs
has
been
given
an
aliquot
part
of
the
inheritance,
and
the
parts
together
exceed
the
whole
inheritance,
or
the
whole
free
portion,
as
the
case
may
be,
each
part
shall
be
reduced
proportionally.
Elements
common
to
both
ART.
852
and
853
‐ there
are
more
than
one
instituted
heir
‐ the
testator
intended
them
to
get
the
whole
estate
or
the
whole
disposable
portion
‐ the
testator
has
designated
a
definite
portion
for
each
heir
In
ART.
852—
‐ total
of
all
portions
is
less
than
the
whole
estate
(or
free
portion)
o therefore,
a
proportionate
increase
is
necessary
o difference
cannot
pass
by
intestacy
because
the
intention
of
the
testator
is
clear—to
give
the
instituted
heirs
the
entire
amount
In
ART.
853—
‐ the
total
exceeds
the
whole
estate
(or
free
portion)
o therefore,
a
proportionate
reduction
must
be
made
Illustrations
of
ART.
852:
‐ X
dies
without
any
compulsory
heirs
but
leaves
a
will:
“I
institute
A,
B,
and
C
to
my
entire
estate
in
the
following
proportions:
A
–
1/2,
B
–
1/3.
C
–
1/8.”
The
estate
is
valued
at
P600,000
at
the
time
of
X’s
death.
o the
total
of
the
specified
portions
is
only
23/24
o total
of
proportions:
575,000
A
=
300,000
(1/2
or
12/24
of
600,000)
B
=
200,000
(1/3
or
8/24)
C
=
75,000
(1/8
or
3/24)
o to
find
A’s
increased
share
(x):
SOLUTION
1:
x
=
300,000_
600,000
575,000
575x
=
180,000,000_
575
575
x
=
313,043.48
SOLUTION
2:
A
is
entitled
to
12/24
B
is
entitled
to
8/24
C
is
entitled
to
3/24
Total:
23/24
Page 20 of 73
Ratio
of
12:8:3
=
23
So:
12
=
x_____
23
600,000
23x
=
7,200,000__
23
23
x
=
313,043.48
o
find
B’s
increased
share
using
any
of
the
solutions
presented
above
(you
may
also
use
your
own
devised
solution
and
share
it
with
the
class);
your
answer
must
be
208,695.65
o
find
C’s
increased
share;
your
answer
must
be
78,260.87
o
now
add
A’s,
B’s,
and
C’s
increased
shares;
total
must
be
600,000
‐
X
dies
with
Y
(a
legitimate
child)
as
his
only
compulsory
heir.
X
leaves
a
will:
“I
give
A,
B,
and
C
the
entire
free
portion
of
my
estate,
such
that
A
gets
1/4,
B
gets
1/8,
and
C
gets
1/2
of
said
free
portion.”
X’s
net
estate
is
worth
P600,000.
o the
total
of
the
specified
portions
is
only
11/24
o total
of
proportions:
275,000
A
=
150,000
(1/4
or
6/24
of
600,000)
B
=
75,000
(1/8
or
3/24)
C
=
50,000
(1/12
or
2/24)
o NOTE:
the
free
portion
is
only
1/2
of
the
estate,
i.e.
half
of
600,000
or
only
300,000
as
the
total
legacies
given
to
A,
B,
and
C
is
only
275,000
(25,000
short
of
300,000)
their
shares
need
to
be
proportionately
increased
SOLUTION
1:
x
=
150,000__
300,000
275,000
275x
=
45,000,000_
275
275
x
=
163,636.36
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
SOLUTION
2:
A
is
entitled
to
6/24
B
is
entitled
to
3/24
C
is
entitled
to
2/24
Total:
11/24
So:
6
=
x_____
11
300,000
11x
=
1,800,000__
11
11
Ratio
of
6:3:2
=
11
x
=
163,636.36
o
find
B’s
increased
share;
your
answer
must
be
81,818.19
o
find
C’s
increased
share;
your
answer
must
be
54,545.45
o
now
add
A’s,
B’s,
and
C’s
increased
shares;
the
total
must
be
300,000
(Y
is
entitled
to
300,000,
his
legitime)
Illustrations
of
ART.
853:
‐ X
dies
without
any
compulsory
heirs
but
leaves
a
will:
“I
institute
A,
B,
and
C
to
my
entire
estate.
A
is
to
get
1/2,
B
is
to
get
1/3,
and
C
is
to
get
1/4
thereof.”
X’s
net
estate
is
valued
at
P600,000
at
the
time
of
his
death.
o the
total
of
the
specified
portions
is
13/12
o total
proportions:
650,000
A
=
300,000
(1/2
or
6/12
of
600,000)
B
=
200,000
(1/3
or
4/12)
C
=
150,000
(1/4
or
3/12)
o to
find
A’s
reduced
share
(x):
SOLUTION
1:
x
=
300,000__
600,000
650,000
650x
=
180,000,000_
650
650
x
=
276,923.08
SOLUTION
2:
Page 21 of 73
A
is
entitled
to
6/12
B
is
entitled
to
4/12
C
is
entitled
to
3/12
Total:
13/12
So:
6
=
_
x_____
13
600,000
13x
=
3,600,000__
13
13
o
Ratio
of
6:4:3
=
13
x
=
276,923.08
find
B’s
reduced
share;
your
answer
must
be
184,615.38
o
find
C’s
reduced
share;
your
answer
must
be
138,461.54
o
‐
325x
=
45,000,000_
325
325
x
=
138,461.54
SOLUTION
2:
A
is
entitled
to
6/24
B
is
entitled
to
4/24
C
is
entitled
to
3/24
Total:
13/24
Ratio
of
6:4:3
=
13
now
add
A’s,
B’s,
and
C’s
reduced
shares;
the
total
must
now
be
600,000
X
dies
with
Y
(a
legitimate
child)
as
his
only
compulsory
heir.
X
leaves
a
will:
“I
give
A,
B,
and
C
the
entire
disposable
portion
of
my
estate,
such
that
A
is
to
get
1/4
of
the
estate,
B
is
to
get
1/6
of
my
estate,
and
C
is
to
get
1/8
of
my
estate.”
X’s
net
estate
is
worth
P600,000.
o the
total
of
the
specified
portions
is
13/24
(more
than
1/2
or
12/24
available
as
disposable)
o total
of
proportions:
325,000
A
=
150,000
(1/4
or
6/24
of
600,000)
B
=
100,000
(1/6
or
4/24)
C
=
75,000
(1/8
or
3/24)
o NOTE:
the
free
portion
is
only
1/2
of
the
estate,
i.e.
half
of
600,000
or
only
300,000
as
the
total
legacies
given
to
A,
B,
and
C
is
325,000
(25,000
in
excess
of
the
300,000
disposable
portion)
their
shares
need
to
be
proportionately
decreased
SOLUTION
1:
x
=
150,000__
300,000
325,000
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
So:
6
=
x_____
13
300,000
13x
=
1,800,000__
13
13
x
=
138,461.54
o
find
B’s
reduced
share;
your
answer
must
be
92,307.69
o
find
C’s
reduced
share;
your
answer
must
be
69,230.77
now
add
A’s,
B’s,
and
C’s
reduced
shares;
the
total
must
now
be
300,000
(Y
is
entitled
to
300,000,
his
legitime)
ART.
854.
The
preterition
or
omission
of
one,
some,
or
all
of
the
compulsory
heirs
in
the
direct
line,
whether
living
at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
the
will
or
born
after
the
death
of
the
testator,
shall
annul
the
institution
of
heir;
but
the
devises
and
legacies
shall
be
valid
insofar
as
they
are
not
inofficious.
If
the
omitted
compulsory
heirs
should
die
before
the
testator,
the
institution
shall
be
effectual,
without
prejudice
to
the
right
of
representation.
Preterition
(omission)
in
sum:
‐ omission
from
what?
o from
inheritance,
NOT
from
the
will
(“total
omission
in
the
inheritance”)
‐ who
can
be
preterited?
o compulsory
heirs
in
the
direct
line
‐ what
is
the
effect
of
preterition?
o
Page 22 of 73
o
annuls
the
institution
of
heir
but
respects
legacies
and
devises
insofar
as
these
do
not
impair
the
legitimes
The
following
cases
do
NOT
constitute
preterition:*
‐ if
the
heir
in
question
is
instituted
in
the
will
but
the
portion
given
to
him
by
the
will
is
less
than
his
legitime
(Reyes
v.
BarrettoDatu
[1967])
‐ if
the
heir
is
given
a
legacy
or
devise
(Aznar
v.
Duncan
[1966])
‐ if
the
heir
had
received
a
donation
inter
vivos
from
the
testator
o donation
inter
vivos
is
considered
as
an
advance
on
the
legitime
(cf.
ART.
906,
909,
910,
and
1062)
‐ if
the
heir
is
not
mentioned
in
the
will
nor
was
a
recipient
of
a
donation
inter
vivos
from
the
testator,
but
not
all
of
the
estate
is
disposed
of
by
will
o the
omitted
heir
would
receive
something
by
intestacy
from
the
vacant
portion
(not
disposed
of
by
will)
*in
all
these
cases,
the
remedy
of
the
compulsory
heir,
if
the
value
of
what
he
received
is
less
than
his
legitime,
is
to
demand
completion
of
the
same
(ART.
906
and
907)
Reyes
v.
BarrettoDatu
(1967)
Facts:
Testator
instituted
as
heirs
his
two
daughters,
Salud
and
Milagros.
Later,
it
turned
out
that
Salud
was
not
the
testator’s
daughter
by
his
wife.
Milagros
claimed
that
Salud
not
entitled
to
any
share
in
her
father’s
estate.
Held:
That
while
the
share
assigned
to
Salud
impinged
on
the
legitime
of
Milagros,
Salud
did
not
for
that
reason
cease
to
be
a
testamentary
heir.
That
there
was
no
preterition
or
total
omission
of
a
forced
heir
(Milagros)
despite
the
fact
that
Milagros
was
allotted
in
her
father’s
will
a
share
smaller
than
her
legitime.
That
such
allotment
did
not
invalidate
the
institution
of
heir
(Salud).
Balane
Comments:
‐ in
Reyes:
(a)
there
was
a
compulsory
heir
[Milagros];
(b)
such
heir
was
instituted
in
the
will;
(c)
the
testamentary
disposition
given
to
such
heir
was
less
than
her
legitime
o there
was
NO
PRETERITION
o reason:
there
was
NO
TOTAL
OMISSION
inasmuch
as
the
heir
received
something
from
the
inheritance
o remedy
of
compulsory
heir
who
received
less
than
his
legitime:
completion
or
satisfaction
of
legitime
(ART.
906
and
907)
Aznar
v.
Duncan
(1966)
Facts:
Testator
instituted
as
heir
his
acknowledged
natural
daughter,
Lucy
Duncan.
Helen
Garcia,
another
natural
daughter
of
testator
who
however
was
not
acknowledged,
complained
that
she
had
been
preterited.
Helen
Garcia
was
given
only
a
legacy
of
3,600
pesos.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Held:
That
there
was
no
preterition
because
Helen
Garcia,
a
compulsory
heir,
was
not
entirely
omitted
from
the
inheritance
as
in
fact
she
received
a
legacy.
That
Helen
Garcia’s
remedy
is
to
have
her
legitime
satisfied.
Heirs
of
Ureta
v.
Heirs
of
Ureta
(2011)
Facts:
Heirs
of
Policronio
argued
that
they
had
been
preterited
because
they
were
deprived
of
a
share
in
the
estate
of
their
late
father.
Held:
That
preterition
is
a
concept
of
testamentary
succession
and
that
where
decedent
leaves
no
will,
as
in
this
case,
there
can
be
no
preterition.
There
is
preteriton
if
a
compulsory
heir
received
nothing
from
the
testator
by
way
of:
‐ testamentary
succession
‐ legacy
or
devise
‐ donation
inter
vivos
‐ intestacy
What
constitutes
preterition
is
not
omission
(in
the
sense
of
not
being
mention)
in
the
will
but
being
completely
left
out
of
the
inheritance
Seangio
v.
Reyes
(2006)
Facts:
Testator
executed
a
holographic
will
wherein
he
disinherited
one
of
his
compulsory
heirs
(Alfredo,
testator’s
son).
Virginia’s
name
mentioned
in
the
holographic
will.
Held:
That
there
was
no
preterition
because
it
was
testator’s
intention
to
bequeath
his
estate
to
all
his
compulsory
heirs
except
Alfredo.
That
testator
did
not
institute
an
heir
to
the
exclusion
of
other
compulsory
heirs.
That
mere
mention
of
Virginia’s
name
did
not
institute
her
as
universal
heir
but
a
mere
witness
to
Alfredo’s
maltreatment
of
testator.
Who
are
included
within
the
terms
of
ART.
854
‐ a
compulsory
heir
in
the
direct
line,
“whether
living
at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
the
will
or
born
after
the
death
of
the
testator”
o but
quasi‐posthumous
children
also
included
those
born
after
the
execution
of
the
will
but
before
the
testator’s
death
Compulsory
heirs
in
the
direct
line—
‐ children
or
descendants*
o including
adopted
children
(Acain
v.
IAC
[1987])
‐ parents
or
ascendants
(in
default
of
children
or
descendants)*
*legitimate
or
illegitimate;
the
law
does
not
distinguish
(Manresa)
Surviving
spouse
is
NOT
a
compulsory
heir
in
the
direct
line
‐ while
a
compulsory
heir,
he
is
NOT
in
the
direct
line
(Balanay
v.
Martinez,
Acain
v.
IAC)
‐ meaning
of
direct
line
(ART.
964,
par.
2)
Page 23 of 73
o
“a
direct
line
is
that
constituted
by
the
series
of
degrees
among
ascendants
and
descendants”
Predecease
of
preterited
compulsory
heir
(par.
2,
ART.
854)
‐ the
determination
of
whether
or
not
there
are
preterited
heirs
can
be
made
only
upon
the
testator’s
death
‐ if
the
preterited
heir
predeceases
(or
is
unworthy
to
succeed)
the
testator,
preterition
becomes
moot
o BUT
if
there
is
a
descendant
of
that
heir
who
is
himself
preterited,
then
the
effects
of
preterition
will
arise
o to
illustrate—
if
a
testator
(X)
makes
a
will
which
results
in
the
preterition
of
one
of
his
two
sons
(A);
A
predeceases
his
father
X
but
A
leaves
a
son
(A‐ 1);
ART.
854
applies
(i.e.
A‐1
is
preterited
because
he
succeeds
X
by
representation
of
his
father
A,
the
son
of
X)
Adopted
children—
Acain
v.
IAC
(1987)
Facts:
Widow
and
legally
adopted
child
of
testator
opposed
probate
of
testator’s
will:
they
had
been
preterited.
Will
had
no
legacies
or
devises.
Held:
That
widow
not
preterited
because
she
is
not
a
compulsory
heir
in
the
direct
line;
but
legally
adopted
child,
preterited.
That
adoption
gives
to
adopted
person
same
rights
and
duties
as
if
he
were
legitimate
child
of
adopter
and
makes
adopted
person
a
legal
heir
of
adopter.
That
will
is
totally
abrogated.
Effect
of
preterition
‐ annulment
of
the
institution
of
heir,
but
‐ validity
of
legacies
and
devises
to
the
extent
that
these
do
not
impair
legitimes
(to
the
extent
of
the
free
portion;
legacies
and
devises
merely
to
be
reduced
if
legitimes
are
impaired)
o preterition
is
the
only
instance
where
distinction
between
heirs
and
legatees
/
devisees
is
relevant
if
will
contains
only
institutions
of
heirs
and
there
is
preterition—total
intestacy
results
Meaning
of
annulment
of
institution
of
heir:
Nuguid
v.
Nuguid
(1966)
Facts:
Testatrix
died
without
descendants.
Testatrix
instituted
in
her
will
her
sister
as
sole
heir.
Testatrix’s
parents
opposed
probate:
that
they
had
been
preterited.
Held:
That
testatrix’s
parents
(forced
heirs
in
the
direct
ascending
line)
had
been
preterited,
as
will
completely
omits
both
of
them.
That
the
word
“annul”
means
to
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
abrogate,
to
make
void,
to
reduce
to
nothing,
to
annihilate,
to
obliterate,
to
blot
out,
to
make
void
or
of
no
effect,
to
nullify,
to
abolish.
That
institution
of
testatrix’s
sister
as
sole
her
is
annulled.
Preterition
contra
ineffective
disinheritance
‐ preterition
is
the
total
omission
from
the
inheritance,
without
the
heir
being
expressly
disinherited
o implied
basis:
inadvertent
omission
by
the
testator
so
if
testator
explicitly
disinherits
the
heir,
ART.
854
will
not
apply
‐ if
the
disinheritance
is
ineffective
for
absence
of
one
or
other
of
the
requisites
for
a
valid
disinheritance—
o the
heir
is
simply
entitled
to
demand
his
rightful
share
ART.
855.
The
share
of
a
child
or
descendant
omitted
in
a
will
must
first
be
taken
from
the
part
of
the
estate
not
disposed
of
by
will,
if
any;
if
that
is
not
sufficient,
so
much
as
may
be
necessary
must
be
taken
proportionally
from
the
shares
of
the
other
compulsory
heirs.
Proper
application
of
ART.
855—
‐ where
a
compulsory
heir
is
not
preterited
but
left
something
(because
not
all
the
estate
is
disposed
of
by
will)
less
than
his
legitime
How
to
fill
up
a
compulsory
heir’s
impaired
legitime:
‐ from
the
vacant
portion
‐ from
the
shares
of
the
testamentary
heirs,
legatees,
and
devises,
proportionally
ART.
855
is
superfluous
because
is
speaks
of
completion
of
legitime
(dealt
with
in
detail
in
ART.
907,
et
seq.)
ART.
855
is
inaccurate
‐ coverage
should
be
all
compulsory
heirs,
not
just
children
or
descendants
‐ proportionate
reduction
must
be
borne
by
testamentary
heirs,
including
devisees
and
legatees,
and
NOT
by
the
compulsory
heirs
ART.
856.
A
voluntary
heir
who
dies
before
the
testator
transmits
nothing
to
his
heirs.
A
compulsory
heir
who
dies
before
the
testator,
a
person
incapacitated
to
succeed,
and
one
who
renounces
the
inheritance,
shall
transmit
no
right
to
his
own
heirs
except
in
cases
expressly
provided
for
in
this
Code.
Right
to
succeed
cannot
be
transmitted—it
is
a
purely
personal
right
Representation
‐ representative
is
raised
to
the
level
of
the
person
represented
Complete
statement
of
the
rule:
‐ an
heir
(whether
compulsory,
voluntary
or
testamentary,
or
legal)
transmits
nothing
to
his
Page 24 of 73
heirs
in
case
of
predecease,
incapacity,
renunciation,
or
disinheritance
o however,
in
case
of
predecease
or
incapacity
of
compulsory
or
legal
heirs,
as
well
as
disinheritance
of
compulsory
heirs—
the
rules
on
representation
shall
apply
Section 3 – Substitution of Heirs ART.
857.
Substitution
is
the
appointment
of
another
heir
so
that
he
may
enter
into
the
inheritance
in
default
of
the
heir
originally
instituted.
Simple
substitution
is
really
a
form
of
conditional
institution
Basis
of
substitutions
‐ testamentary
freedom
‐ in
simple
substitutions,
the
testator
simply
makes
a
second
choice,
in
case
the
first
choice
does
not
inherit
‐ in
fideicommissary
substitutions,
the
testator
imposes
a
restriction
or
burden
on
the
first
heir
coupled
with
a
selection
of
a
subsequent
recipient
of
the
property
ART.
858.
Substitution
of
heirs
may
be:
(1)
Simple
or
common;
(2)
Brief
of
compendious;
(3)
Reciprocal;
or
(4)
Fideicommissary.
Four
kinds
of
substitution:
‐ simple
or
common
(vulgar)
[ART.
859]
‐ brief
or
compendious
(brevilocua
o
compendiosa)
[ART.
860]
‐ reciprocal
(recíproca)
[ART.
861]
‐ fideicommissary
(fideicomisaria)
[ART.
863]
In
reality,
there
are
only
two
kinds
of
substitutions:
vulgar
and
fideicomisaria
(mutually
exclusive,
i.e.
substitution
must
be
one
or
the
other,
cannot
be
both
at
the
same
time)
‐ the
other
two
are
modalidades
of
the
vulgar
or
the
fideicomisaria
ART.
859.
The
testator
may
designate
one
or
more
persons
to
substitute
the
heir
or
heirs
instituted
in
case
such
heir
or
heirs
should
die
before
him,
or
should
not
wish,
or
should
be
incapacitated
to
accept
the
inheritance.
A
simple
substitution
without
a
statement
of
the
cases
to
which
it
refers,
shall
comprise
the
three
mentioned
in
the
preceding
paragraph
unless
the
testator
has
otherwise
provided.
Causes
of
simple
substitution
‐ predecease
of
the
first
heir
‐ renunciation
of
the
first
heir
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
‐ incapacity
of
the
first
heir
How
testator
may
provide
for
simple
substitution
with
all
three
causes—
‐ by
specifying
all
the
three
causes
‐ by
merely
providing
for
a
simple
substitution
Restricted
simple
substitution
‐ testator
may
limit
the
operation
of
simple
substitution
by
specifying
only
one
or
two
of
the
three
causes
o vacancy
results
if
the
cause
specified
does
not
happen
(i.e.
if
another
cause
not
specified
in
the
will
occurs)
ART.
860.
Two
or
more
persons
may
be
substituted
for
one;
and
one
person
for
two
or
more
heirs.
Brief
or
compendious
substitution
‐ a
possible
variation
of
either
a
vulgar
or
a
fideicomisaria
‐ brief
o two
or
more
substitutes
for
one
original
heir
‐ compendious
o one
substitute
for
two
or
more
original
heirs
Substitution
will
take
place
only
if
all
the
original
heirs
are
disqualified—
‐ if
one
is
substituted
for
two
or
more
original
heirs,
and
one
but
not
all
is
not
qualified
to
inherit
o NO
SUBSTITUTION—share
left
vacant
will
accrue
to
surviving
co‐heir/s
if
A
and
B
were
instituted
as
heirs
to
1/3
of
the
estate,
with
C
as
substitute,
substitution
will
take
place
only
if
both
A
and
B
are
disqualified
to
inherit;
if
only
A
is
disqualified,
B
would
inherit
A’s
share,
exclusively
o EXCEPTION—
if
testator
provides
otherwise
(that
substitution
will
take
place
in
case
any
one
of
the
original
heirs
dies,
renounces,
or
is
incapacitated
ART.
861.
If
heirs
instituted
in
unequal
shares
should
be
reciprocally
substituted,
the
substitute
shall
acquire
the
share
of
the
heir
who
dies,
renounces,
or
is
incapacitated,
unless
it
clearly
appears
that
the
intention
of
the
testator
was
otherwise.
If
there
are
more
than
one
substitute,
they
shall
have
the
same
share
in
the
substitution
as
in
the
institution.
Reciprocal
substitution
‐ just
a
variation
of
simple
or
fideicommissary
substitution
Illustration
of
second
sentence,
ART.
861—
‐ A,
B,
and
C
are
instituted,
respectively,
to
1/2,
1/3,
and
1/6
of
the
estate
Page 25 of 73
o
o o
if
A
predeceases
the
testator,
B
and
C
will
acquire
A’s
1/2
portion
in
the
proportion
of
2:1
(their
testamentary
shares
being
1/3
and
1/6)
should
B
predecease,
A
and
C
will
get
B’s
1/3
portion
in
proportion
of
3:1
(1/2
and
1/6)
if
C
predeceases,
A
and
B
will
share
C’s
1/6
portion
in
the
proportion
of
3:2
ART.
862.
The
substitute
shall
be
subject
to
the
same
charges
and
conditions
imposed
upon
the
instituted
heir,
unless
the
testator
has
expressly
provided
the
contrary,
or
the
charges
or
conditions
are
personally
applicable
only
to
the
heir
instituted.
Rationale
‐ substitute
merely
takes
the
place
of
the
original
heir
ART.
863.
A
fideicommissary
substitution
by
virtue
of
which
the
fiduciary
or
first
heir
instituted
is
entrusted
with
the
obligation
to
preserve
and
to
transmit
to
a
second
heir
the
whole
or
part
of
the
inheritance,
shall
be
valid
and
shall
take
effect,
provided
such
substitution
does
not
go
beyond
one
degree
from
the
heir
originally
instituted,
and
provided,
further,
that
the
fiduciary
or
first
heir
and
the
second
heir
are
living
at
the
time
of
the
death
of
the
testator.
Elements
of
the
fideicomisaria
‐ a
first
heir
(fiduciary
/
fiduciario)
who
takes
the
property
upon
the
testator’s
death
o the
fiduciary
enters
upon
the
inheritance
upon
the
opening
of
the
succession
(i.e.
when
the
testator
dies)
‐ a
second
heir
(fideicommissary
heir
/
fideicomisario)
who
takes
the
property
subsequently
from
the
fiduciary
o fideicommissary
heir
does
not
receive
property
until
the
fiduciary’s
right
expires
o both
heirs
enter
into
the
inheritance
successively
(i.e.
one
after
the
other,
each
in
his
own
turn)
o note
that
while
the
fideicommissary
heir
does
not
receive
property
upon
the
testator’s
death,
his
right
thereto
vests
at
that
time
and
merely
becomes
subject
to
a
period,
and
that
right
passes
to
his
own
heirs
should
he
die
before
the
fiduciary’s
right
expires
‐ the
second
heir
must
be
one
degree
from
the
fiduciary
or
first
heir
o only
one
transmission
is
allowed
in
the
fideicomisaria
(from
fiduciary
to
the
fideicommissary
heir)
o “one
degree”
means
that
the
fideicommissary
heir
must
be
in
the
first
degree
of
relationship
with
the
fiduciary
or
first
heir
(i.e.
second
heir
must
either
be
a
child
or
a
parent
of
the
first
heir)
per
Palacios
v.
Ramirez
(1982),
infra
the
rule
applies
and
is
true
a
fortiori
in
case
of
an
adopted
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
‐
‐
child
vis‐à‐vis
his
adopter
(cf.
Acain
v.
IAC)
the
dual
obligation
imposed
upon
the
fiduciary
to
preserve
the
property
and
to
transmit
it
after
the
lapse
of
the
period
to
the
fideicommissary
heir
o this
is
the
essence
of
the
fideicomisaria
(Crisologo
v.
Singson
[1962])
o fiduciary
or
first
heir
is
basically
a
usufructuary,
with
the
right
to
use
and
enjoy
the
property
but
without
the
right
to
dispose
of
the
same
(jus
disponendi)
o effect
if
there
is
no
obligation
to
preserve
and
transmit—there
is
no
fideicommissary
substitution,
but
something
else
(PCIB
v.
Escolin
[1974])
both
heirs
must
be
living
and
qualified
to
succeed
at
the
time
of
the
testator’s
death
o living
o qualified
(cf.
ART.
1024
to
1034)
these
two
requisites
are
met
only
upon
the
testator’s
death,
and
applies
to
both
the
first
and
second
heirs
thus,
the
second
heir
need
not
survive
the
first
heir
if
the
second
heir
dies
before
the
first
heir,
the
second
heir’s
own
heirs
merely
take
his
place
Palacios
v.
Ramirez
(1982)
Facts:
Testator’s
will
instituted
his
companion
over
2/3
of
estate
(usufruct),
and
at
the
same
time
instituted
as
substitutes
of
companion
two
others
not
related
at
all
to
companion.
Held:
That
the
fideicommissary
substitution
is
void
because
law
mandates
that
“such
substitution
does
not
go
beyond
one
degree
from
the
heir
originally
instituted.”
That
“degree”
means
generation,
and
second
heir
must
be
related
to
and
be
one
generation
from
first
heir.
That
fideicommissary
heir
can
only
be
either
a
child
or
a
parent
of
first
heir.
Balane
Criticizes
the
Palacios
Ruling:
‐ per
Justice
José
Vitug,
the
Palacios
interpretation
of
“degree”
as
degree
of
relationship
“would
disenfranchise
a
juridical
person
from
being
either
a
fiduciary
or
fideicommissary
heir”
PCIB
v.
Escolin
(1974)
Facts:
Testatrix
instituted
to
the
whole
estate
her
husband,
with
right
to
dispose,
and
at
the
same
time
her
siblings
or
the
respective
heirs
of
her
siblings,
as
heirs
to
residue
and
remainder
of
estate,
after
death
of
husband.
Held:
That
there
is
no
fideicommissary
substitution
because
there
is
no
obligation
on
the
part
of
testatrix’s
husband
as
first
heir,
to
preserve
properties
for
substitute
heirs.
That
siblings
of
testatrix
instituted
simultaneously
Page 26 of 73
with
testatrix’s
husband,
subject
to
certain
conditions.
That
brothers
and
sisters
of
testatrix
were
to
inherit
what
husband
would
not
dispose
of
during
his
lifetime.
That
this
is
a
valid
simultaneous
institution
of
heir.
Balane
Comments:
‐ the
institution
in
PCIB
is
a
simultaneous
institution
(not
a
fideicomisaria
because
there
is
no
obligation
imposed
upon
the
husband
to
preserve
the
estate
or
any
part
thereof
for
anyone
else)
o on
the
one
hand,
of
the
husband
subject
to
a
resolutory
condition
(i.e.
right
terminates
at
the
time
of
death)
o on
the
other,
of
the
husband’s
brothers‐
and
sisters‐in‐law
subject
to
a
suspensive
condition
(i.e.
condition
may
or
may
not
happen—remainder
of
estate)
Tenure
of
the
fiduciary
or
first
heir
‐ primary
rule
o period
indicated
by
the
testator
‐ secondary
rule
o the
fiduciary’s
lifetime
(if
the
testator
did
not
indicate
a
period)
ART.
864.
A
fideicommissary
substitution
can
never
burden
the
legitime.
Note:
‐ the
legitime
passes
by
strict
operation
of
law,
therefore
the
testator
has
no
power
over
it
ART.
865.
Every
fideicommissary
substitution
must
be
expressly
made
in
order
that
it
may
be
valid.
The
fiduciary
shall
be
obliged
to
deliver
the
inheritance
to
the
second
heir,
without
other
deductions
than
those
which
arise
from
legitimate
expenses,
credits
and
improvements,
save
in
the
case
where
the
testator
has
provided
otherwise.
Re
par.
1:
‐ manner
of
imposing
a
fideicomisaria:
express
o two
ways
by
the
use
of
the
term
fideicommissary,
or
by
imposing
upon
the
first
heir
the
absolute
obligation
to
preserve
and
to
transmit
to
the
second
heir
Re
par.
2:
‐ allowable
deductions
o general
rule:
the
fiduciary
should
deliver
the
property
intact
and
undiminished
to
the
fideicommissary
heir
upon
the
arrival
of
the
period
o exception:
the
only
deductions
allowed,
in
the
absence
of
a
contrary
provision
in
the
will—
legitimate
expenses
(i.e.
necessary
and
useful,
not
ornamental
expenses)
credits
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
improvements
Damage
to,
or
deterioration
of,
property
‐ if
caused
by
a
fortuitous
event
or
ordinary
wear
and
tear
o fiduciary
not
liable
‐ if
caused
by
fiduciary’s
fault
or
negligence
o fiduciary
liable
ART.
866.
The
second
heir
shall
acquire
a
right
to
the
succession
from
the
time
of
the
testator’s
death,
even
though
he
should
die
before
the
fiduciary.
The
right
of
the
second
heir
shall
pass
to
his
heirs.
Notes:
‐ second
heir’s
right
vests
upon
the
testator’s
death
(cf.
ART.
777
and
ART.
878
since
as
far
as
the
second
heir
is
concerned,
the
institution
of
him
is
one
subject
to
a
suspensive
term)
‐ the
second
heir
need
not
survive
the
first
heir
in
order
for
substitution
to
be
effective
o the
second
heir’s
own
heirs
simply
take
his
place
ART.
867.
The
following
shall
not
take
effect:
(1)
Fideicommissary
substitutions
which
are
not
made
in
an
express
manner,
either
by
giving
them
this
name,
or
imposing
upon
the
fiduciary
the
absolute
obligation
to
deliver
the
property
to
a
second
heir;
(2)
Provisions
which
contain
a
perpetual
prohibition
to
alienate,
and
even
a
temporary
one,
beyond
the
limit
fixed
in
Article
863;
(3)
Those
which
impose
upon
the
heir
the
charge
of
paying
to
various
persons
successively,
beyond
the
limit
prescribed
in
Article
863,
a
certain
income
or
pension;
(4)
Those
which
leave
to
a
person
the
whole
or
part
of
the
hereditary
property
in
order
that
he
may
apply
or
invest
the
same
according
to
secret
instructions
communicated
to
him
by
the
testator.
Re
par.
1:
‐ see
notes
under
ART.
865
‐ note
that
lack
of
this
element
does
not,
by
that
fact
alone,
nullify
the
institution
o it
only
means
that
the
institution
is
not
a
fideicomisaria;
it
could
however
be
something
else,
as
in
PCIB
Re
par.
2:
‐ if
there
is
a
fideicomisaria,
the
limit
is
the
first
heir’s
lifetime
‐ if
there
is
no
fideicomisaria,
the
limit
is
20
years
(ART.
870)
Re
par.
3:
‐ there
can
only
be
two
beneficiaries
of
the
pension,
one
after
the
other,
and
the
second
must
be
one
degree
from
the
first
(as
in
ART.
863)
‐ there
is
no
prohibition
however
on
simultaneous
beneficiaries
Page 27 of 73
Re
par.
4:
‐ the
ostensible
heir
is
in
reality
only
a
dummy,
because
in
reality,
the
person
intended
to
be
benefited
is
the
one
to
whom
the
secret
instructions
refer
o purpose
of
surreptitious
disposition
is
to
circumvent
some
prohibition
or
disqualification—T.C.B.C.I.T.J.
(this
cannot
be
countenanced
in
this
jurisdiction)
o effect:
entire
disposition
or
provision
is
VOID
ART.
868.
The
nullity
of
the
fideicommissary
substitution
does
not
prejudice
the
validity
of
the
institution
of
the
heirs
first
designated;
the
fideicommissary
clause
shall
simply
be
considered
as
not
written.
Effect
if
fideicommissary
substitution
is
void
or
ineffective—
‐ institution
of
first
heir
simply
becomes
pure
and
unqualified
Effect
if
the
institution
of
the
first
heir
is
void
or
ineffective—
‐ not
provided
in
ART.
868
‐ “when
the
fiduciary
predeceases
or
is
unable
to
succeed,
the
fideicommissary
heir
takes
the
inheritance
upon
the
death
of
the
decedent”
(Mr.
Justice
Vitug)
o the
nullity
or
inefficacy
of
the
institution
of
the
fiduciary
should
not
nullify
the
institution
of
the
fideicommissary
heir
o the
right
of
the
fideicommissary
heir
should
then
be
absolute
and
effective
upon
the
testator’s
death,
as
if
no
fiduciary
or
first
heir
had
been
instituted
since
ultimately,
the
intention
of
the
testator
is
to
ultimately
pass
the
property
to
the
second
heir
(Manresa)
ART.
869.
A
provision
whereby
the
testator
leaves
to
a
person
the
whole
or
part
of
the
inheritance,
and
to
another
the
usufruct,
shall
be
valid.
If
he
gives
the
usufruct
to
various
persons,
not
simultaneously,
but
successively,
the
provisions
of
Article
863
shall
apply.
Note:
‐ if
testator
institutes
successive
usufructuaries,
there
can
only
be
two,
one
after
the
other,
and
as
to
the
two
of
them,
all
the
requisites
of
ART.
863
must
be
present
ART.
870.
The
dispositions
of
the
testator
declaring
all
or
part
of
the
estate
inalienable
for
more
than
twenty
years
are
void.
Effect
if
testator
imposes
a
longer
period
than
20
years
‐ prohibition
to
partition
is
valid
only
for
20
years
If
there
is
a
fideicommissary
substitution—
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
‐ ‐
time
limitation
will
not
apply
ART.
863
will
apply,
which
allows,
as
a
period,
the
lifetime
of
the
first
heir
Rationale
(as
in
ART.
867,
par.
2,
supra)
‐ commerce
Section 4 – Conditional Testamentary Dispositions and Testamentary Dispositions With a Term Three
kinds
of
testamentary
dispositions
‐ conditional
dispositions
o condition
(see
ART.
1179,
par.
1)
‐ dispositions
with
a
term
o term
(see
ART.
1193,
par.
1
and
3)
‐ dispositions
with
a
mode
(modal
dispositions)
o mode
(see
ART.
882)
General Provisions: ART.
871.
The
institution
of
an
heir
may
be
made
conditionally,
or
for
a
certain
purpose
or
cause.
ART.
872.
The
testator
cannot
impose
any
charge,
condition
or
substitution
whatsoever
upon
the
legitime
prescribed
in
this
Code.
Should
he
do
so,
the
same
shall
be
considered
as
not
imposed.
Conditions: ART.
873.
Impossible
conditions
and
those
contrary
to
law
or
good
customs
shall
be
considered
as
not
imposed
and
shall
in
no
manner
prejudice
the
heir,
even
if
the
testator
should
otherwise
provide.
Impossible
conditions
‐ may
be
factually
or
legally
impossible
Effect
if
impossible
or
illegal
condition
is
imposed
by
testator
‐ condition
is
simply
considered
as
not
written
o testamentary
disposition
is
not
annulled
o disposition
becomes
pure
(no
condition)
‐ rule
in
donations
is
same
(ART.
727)
while
rule
in
obligations
is
different
(ART.
1183)
o reason
for
the
difference:
basis
of
testamentary
dispositions
and
donations,
both
gratuity
(liberality);
on
the
other
hand,
obligations
are
onerous
(condition
imposed
is
causa,
and
if
eliminated
for
being
impossible
or
illegal,
there
would
be
a
failure
of
consideration)
ART.
874.
An
absolute
condition
not
to
contract
a
first
or
subsequent
marriage
shall
be
considered
as
not
written
unless
such
condition
has
been
imposed
on
the
widow
or
widower
by
the
deceased
spouse,
or
by
the
latter’s
ascendants
or
descendants.
Nevertheless,
the
right
of
usufruct,
or
an
allowance
or
some
personal
prestation
may
be
devised
or
bequeathed
to
any
person
for
the
time
during
which
he
or
she
should
remain
unmarried
or
in
widowhood.
Page 28 of 73
Conditions
prohibiting
marriage
‐ if
a
first
marriage
is
prohibited
o condition
always
considered
not
imposed
‐ if
a
subsequent
marriage
is
prohibited
o if
imposed
by
the
deceased
spouse
or
by
his
/
her
ascendants
or
descendants—VALID
o if
imposed
by
anyone
else—considered
not
written
Re
par.
2:
‐ this
paragraph
may
provide
the
testator
of
a
means
of
terminating
the
testamentary
benefaction
should
the
heir
contract
marriage
(even
a
first
one)
‐ wording
of
disposition
must
not
be
so
as
to
constitute
a
prohibition
forbidden
in
par.
1
o e.g.
“I
institute
as
heir
to
1/5
of
my
free
portion
Mr.
Quevedough
provided
he
does
not
marry
a
lawyer
or
a
non‐ lawyer”
NOT
ALLOWED
(absolute
prohibition)
o e.g.
“I
institute
as
heir
to
my
entire
free
portion
Ms.
Buttad
for
as
long
as
she
remains
single
or
a
widow”
ALLOWED
ART.
874
does
not
prohibit
the
imposition
of
a
condition
to
marry
(either
with
reference
to
a
particular
person
or
not)
‐ cf.
condition
to
marry
Neither
does
ART.
874
declare
void
a
relative
prohibition
‐ e.g.
“I
institute
to
2/5
of
my
free
portion
Mr.
Seraphim
Salvavidador
provided
he
does
not
marry
a
hotel
receptionist”
ART.
875.
Any
disposition
made
upon
the
condition
that
the
heir
shall
make
some
provision
in
his
will
in
favor
of
the
testator
or
of
any
other
person
shall
be
void.
This
article
is
the
scriptura
captatoria
(“Legacy hunting
dispositions,
whether
to
heirs
or
legatees,
are
void”)
‐ it
is
not
allowed
‐ quid
pro
quo,
forbidden
Reasons
for
the
prohibition
‐ captatoria
converts
testamentary
grants
into
contractual
transactions
‐ it
deprives
the
heir
of
testamentary
freedom
‐ it
gives
the
testator
the
power
to
dispose
mortis
causa
not
only
of
his
property,
but
also
of
his
heir’s
What
is
declared
void—
‐ testamentary
disposition
itself,
not
merely
the
condition
ART.
876.
Any
purely
potestative
condition
imposed
upon
an
heir
must
be
fulfilled
by
him
as
soon
as
he
learns
of
the
testator’s
death.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
This
rule
shall
not
apply
when
the
condition,
already
complied
with,
cannot
be
fulfilled
again.
ART.
877.
If
the
condition
is
casual
or
mixed,
it
shall
be
sufficient
if
it
happen
or
be
fulfilled
at
any
time
before
or
after
the
death
of
the
testator,
unless
he
has
provided
otherwise.
Should
it
have
existed
or
should
it
have
been
fulfilled
at
the
time
the
will
was
executed
and
the
testator
was
unaware
thereof,
it
shall
be
deemed
as
complied
with.
If
he
had
knowledge
thereof,
the
condition
shall
be
considered
fulfilled
only
when
it
is
of
such
a
nature
that
it
can
no
longer
exist
or
be
complied
with
again.
ART.
883.
x
x
x
If
the
person
interested
in
the
condition
should
prevent
its
fulfillment,
without
the
fault
of
the
heir,
the
condition
shall
be
deemed
to
have
been
complied
with.
ART.
879.
If
the
potestative
condition
imposed
upon
the
heir
is
negative,
or
consists
in
not
doing
or
not
giving
something,
he
shall
comply
by
giving
a
security
that
he
will
not
do
or
give
that
which
has
been
prohibited
by
the
testator,
and
that
in
case
of
contravention
he
will
return
whatever
he
may
have
received,
together
with
its
fruits
and
interests.
These
articles
govern
potestative,
casual,
and
mixed
conditions
‐ potestative:
one
that
depends
solely
on
the
will
of
the
heir
/
legatee
/
devisee
o e.g.
“I
institute
as
heir
to
4/5
of
my
free
portion
Ms.
Chit
Ha‐e
provided
that
she
establish
a
permanent
residence
in
Burunggan”
‐ casual:
one
that
depends
on
the
will
of
a
third
person
or
on
chance
o e.g.
“I
institute
as
heir
to
4/5
of
my
free
portion
Ms.
Chit
Ha‐e
provided
that
Mt.
Pinatubo
erupts”
(chance)
o e.g.
“I
institute
as
heir
to
4/5
of
my
free
portion
Ms.
Chit
Ha‐e
provided
that
Knorr
Miswari
surrenders
to
the
President”
(will
of
a
third
person)
‐ mixed:
one
that
depends
partly
on
the
will
of
the
heir
/
legatee
/
devisee
and
partly
either
on
the
will
of
a
third
person
or
chance
o e.g.
“I
institute
as
heir
to
4/5
of
my
free
portion
Ms.
Chit
Ha‐e
provided
she
marries
during
my
lifetime
Mr.
Rubber
Bellyhar”
(dependent
partly
on
the
will
of
Ms.
Chit
Hae,
the
heiress,
and
the
will
of
Mr.
Bellyhar,
a
third
person)
Rule
on
potestative
conditions
(ART.
876)
‐ positive
o general
rule:
must
be
fulfilled
as
soon
as
the
heir
learns
of
the
testator’s
death
o exception:
if
the
condition
was
already
complied
with
at
the
time
the
Page 29 of 73
‐
heir
learns
of
the
testator’s
death,
and
the
condition
is
of
such
a
nature
that
it
cannot
be
fulfilled
again
o constructive
compliance
(ART.
883,
par.
2):
condition
deemed
fulfilled
negative
(ART.
879)
o heir
must
give
security
(caución
muciana)
to
guarantee
the
return
of
the
value
of
the
property,
fruits,
and
interests,
in
case
of
contravention
if
condition
is
violated,
intestate
or
legal
heirs
must
go
after
security
(caución
muciana)
Rule
on
casual
or
mixed
conditions
(ART.
877)
‐ general
rule:
may
be
fulfilled
at
any
time
(before
or
after
the
testator’s
death),
unless
the
testator
provides
otherwise
o qualification:
if
already
fulfilled
at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
the
will—
if
testator
unaware
of
fact
of
fulfillment—deemed
fulfilled
if
testator
aware
thereof—(a)
if
cannot
be
fulfilled
again:
deemed
fulfilled;
(b)
if
can
be
fulfilled
again:
must
be
fulfilled
again
‐ constructive
compliance
(ART.
883,
par.
2)
o if
casual—not
applicable
o if
mixed—
if
dependent
partly
on
chance—not
applicable
if
dependent
partly
on
the
will
of
a
third
party—(a)
if
third
party
is
an
interested
party:
applicable;
(b)
if
third
party
is
not
an
interested
party:
not
applicable
ART.
880.
If
the
heir
be
instituted
under
a
suspensive
condition
or
term,
the
estate
shall
be
placed
under
administration
until
the
condition
is
fulfilled,
or
until
it
becomes
certain
that
it
cannot
be
fulfilled,
or
until
the
arrival
of
the
term.
The
same
shall
be
done
if
the
heir
does
not
give
the
security
required
in
the
preceding
article.
ART.
881.
The
appointment
of
the
administrator
of
the
estate
mentioned
in
the
preceding
article,
as
well
as
the
manner
of
the
administration
and
the
rights
and
obligations
of
the
administrator
shall
be
governed
by
the
Rules
of
Court.
Between
time
of
testator’s
death
and
time
of
fulfillment
of
suspensive
condition
or
of
certainty
of
its
nonoccurrence—
‐ property
to
be
placed
under
administration
o if
condition
happens:
property
to
be
turned
over
to
instituted
heir
o if
it
becomes
certain
that
condition
will
not
happen:
property
to
be
turned
over
to
a
secondary
heir
(if
there
is
one)
or
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
to
the
intestate
heirs,
as
the
case
may
be
ART.
880
must
not
be
applied
to
institutions
with
a
term
despite
wording
‐ otherwise,
there
will
be
an
irreconcilable
conflict
with
ART.
885,
par.
2,
which
mandates
that
before
the
arrival
of
the
term,
the
property
should
be
given
to
the
legal
heirs
Re
par.
2,
ART.
880—
‐ property
shall
be
in
the
executor’s
or
administrator’s
custody
until
the
heir
furnishes
the
caución
muciana
Procedural
rules
governing
appointment
of
administrator—
‐ Rules
77
to
90,
Rules
of
Court
ART.
884.
Conditions
imposed
by
the
testator
upon
the
heirs
shall
be
governed
by
the
rules
established
for
conditional
obligations
in
all
matters
not
provided
for
by
this
Section.
Note:
‐ suppletorily
governing
conditional
institutions
are
ART.
1179
to
1192,
on
conditional
obligations
Terms: ART.
878.
A
disposition
with
a
suspensive
term
does
not
prevent
the
instituted
heir
from
acquiring
his
rights
and
transmitting
them
to
his
heirs
even
before
the
arrival
of
the
term.
Term:
certain
to
arrive
‐ may
either
be
suspensive
or
resolutory
Condition:
uncertain
to
happen
When
heir’s
right
vests
(in
dispositions
with
a
term)
‐ upon
the
testator’s
death
o should
heir
die
before
the
arrival
of
the
suspensive
term,
he
merely
transmits
his
right
to
his
own
heirs
who
can
demand
when
the
term
arrives
(cf.
ART.
866)
Rule
in
conditional
institutions
(if
instituted
heir
dies
before
the
happening
of
the
condition)
‐ cf.
ART.
1034,
par.
3
(“if
the
institution,
devise,
or
legacy
should
be
conditional,
the
time
of
the
compliance
with
the
condition
shall
also
be
considered”)
o import:
in
conditional
institutions,
the
heir
should
be
living
and
qualified
to
succeed
both
at
the
time
of
the
testator’s
death
and
at
the
time
of
the
happening
of
the
condition
i.e.,
the
heir
or
devisee
or
legatee
who
dies
before
the
happening
of
the
condition,
even
if
he
survives
the
testator,
transmits
no
right
to
his
heirs
(Spanish
Civil
Code)
Page 30 of 73
ART.
885.
The
designation
of
the
day
or
time
when
the
effects
of
the
institution
of
an
heir
shall
commence
or
cease
shall
be
valid.
In
both
cases,
the
legal
heir
shall
be
considered
as
called
to
the
succession
until
the
arrival
of
the
period
or
(from)
its
expiration.
But
in
the
first
case
he
shall
not
enter
into
possession
of
the
property
until
after
having
given
sufficient
security,
with
the
intervention
of
the
instituted
heir.
If
term
suspensive
(ex
die,
“out
in
the
day”;
“[from]
its
[period’s]
expiration”)—
‐ before
the
arrival
of
the
term,
the
property
should
be
delivered
to
the
legal
or
intestate
heirs
‐ a
caución
muciana
has
to
be
posted
by
them
If
term
is
resolutory
(in
diem,
“into
the
day”;
“until
the
arrival
of
the
period”)—
‐ before
the
arrival
of
the
term,
the
property
should
be
delivered
to
the
instituted
heir
‐ no
caución
muciana
required
Modes: ART.
882.
The
statement
of
the
object
of
the
institution
or
the
application
of
the
property
left
by
the
testator,
or
the
charge
imposed
by
him,
shall
not
be
considered
as
a
condition
unless
it
appears
that
such
was
his
intention.
That
which
has
been
left
in
this
manner
may
be
claimed
at
once
provided
that
the
instituted
heir
or
his
heirs
give
security
for
compliance
with
the
wishes
of
the
testator
and
for
the
return
of
anything
he
or
they
may
receive,
together
with
its
fruits
and
interests,
if
he
or
they
should
disregard
this
obligation.
ART.
882,
par.
1—
‐ defines
a
mode
obliquely
‐ in
brief,
a
mode
is
an
obligation
imposed
upon
the
heir,
without
suspending
(as
a
condition
does)
the
effectivity
of
the
institution
o a
mode
obligates
but
does
not
suspend
o a
condition
suspends
but
does
not
obligate
Mode
must
be
clearly
imposed
as
an
obligation
‐ mere
preferences
or
wishes
expressed
by
testator,
not
modes
o e.g.
“I
institute
as
heir
to
2/5
of
my
free
portion
Ms.
Steffanie
Summera
and
I
would
be
very
delighted
and
my
soul
would
surely
rest
in
peace
if
she
gives
my
daughter
Ms.
Cera
Halimawis
money
allowance
of
P50,000
per
month
to
be
taken
from
said
2/5
of
my
free
portion”—NOT
MODE
A
mode
functions
similarly
to
a
resolutory
condition
Rabadilla
v.
CA
(2000)
Facts:
Testatrix
instituted
as
heir
in
her
will
Mr.
Rabadilla,
predecessor
of
petitioners.
Will
stated
that
Mr.
Rabadilla
shall
have
obligation
until
he
dies,
every
year,
to
give
to
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Ms.
Coscolluela
100
piculs
of
sugar,
and
that
should
Mr.
Rabadilla
die,
his
heirs
shall
similarly
have
same
obligation,
and
in
the
event
that
property
devised
is
sold,
etc.,
seller,
etc.
shall
have
same
obligation.
Held:
That
the
institution
of
Mr.
Rabadilla
is
a
modal
institution
(because
it
imposes
a
charge
or
obligation
upon
the
instituted
heir
without
affecting
the
efficacy
of
such
institution),
and
ART.
882
applies.
That
in
modal
institutions,
the
testator
states
(a)
the
object
of
the
institution,
(b)
the
purpose
or
application
of
the
property
left
by
the
testator,
or
(c)
the
charge
imposed
by
the
testator
upon
the
heir.
That
a
condition
suspends
but
does
not
obligate;
and
the
mode
obligates
but
does
not
suspend.
That
to
some
extent,
mode
is
similar
to
a
resolutory
condition.
Caución
muciana
to
be
posted
by
the
instituted
heir
ART.
883.
When
without
the
fault
of
the
heir,
an
institution
referred
to
in
the
preceding
article
cannot
take
effect
in
the
exact
manner
stated
by
the
testator,
it
shall
be
complied
with
in
a
manner
most
analogous
to
and
in
conformity
with
his
wishes.
x
x
x
Note:
‐ intention
of
the
testator
should
always
be
the
guiding
norm
in
determining
the
sufficiency
of
the
analogous
performance
o e.g.
“I
institute
as
heir
to
1/5
of
my
free
portion
Mr.
St.
Peter
and
he
shall,
every
month,
give
to
my
daughter
Ms.
Cera
Halimawis
one
sack
of
Milagrosa
rice
the
expense
for
which
is
to
be
taken
from
said
1/5
share”
if
Milagrosa
rice
is
no
longer
available
in
the
market,
then
a
variety
of
similar
quality
should
be
given
by
Mr.
St.
Peter,
the
instituted
heir,
to
Ms.
Cera
Halimawis,
in
the
same
quantity
Section 5 – Legitime Preliminary
Notes:
‐ legitime
o the
portion
of
the
decedent’s
estate
reserved
by
law
in
favor
of
certain
heirs
‐ free
or
disposable
portion
o the
portion
left
available
for
testamentary
disposition
after
the
legitimes
have
been
covered
‐ compulsory
heirs
o the
heirs
for
whom
the
law
reserves
a
portion
of
the
decedent’s
estate
Nature
of
legitimes
‐ legitimes
are
set
aside
by
mandate
of
law
‐ testator
is
required
to
set
aside
or
reserve
them
o the
testator
is
prohibited
from
disposing
by
gratuitous
title
(inter
vivos
or
mortis
causa)
of
these
legitimes
Page 31 of 73
but
dispositions
by
onerous
title
are
NOT
prohibited
because,
in
theory,
nothing
is
lost
from
the
estate
in
an
onerous
disposition,
(there
is
merely
an
exchange
of
values)
because
the
testator
is
compelled
to
set
aside
the
legitimes,
the
heirs
in
whose
favor
the
legitimes
are
set
aside
are
called
compulsory
heirs
o note:
testator
is
the
one
compelled,
not
his
heirs
who
are
free
to
accept
or
reject
the
inheritance
o
‐
ART.
886.
Legitime
is
that
part
of
the
testator’s
property
which
he
cannot
dispose
of
because
the
law
has
reserved
it
for
certain
heirs
who
are,
therefore,
called
compulsory
heirs.
ART.
887.
The
following
are
compulsory
heirs:
(1)
Legitimate
children
and
descendants,
with
respect
to
their
legitimate
parents
and
ascendants;
(2)
In
default
of
the
foregoing,
legitimate
parents
and
ascendants,
with
respect
to
their
legitimate
children
and
descendants;
(3)
The
widow
or
widower;
(4)
Acknowledged
natural
children,
and
natural
children
by
legal
fiction;
(5)
Other
illegitimate
children
referred
to
in
Article
287.
Compulsory
heirs
mentioned
in
Nos.
3,
4,
and
5
are
not
excluded
by
those
in
Nos.
1
and
2;
neither
do
they
exclude
one
another.
In
all
cases
of
illegitimate
children,
their
filiation
must
be
duly
proved.
The
father
or
mother
of
illegitimate
children
of
the
three
classes
mentioned,
shall
inherit
from
them
in
the
manner
and
to
the
extent
established
by
this
Code.
ART.
887
enumerates
the
compulsory
heirs;
enumeration
is
exclusive
Classification
of
compulsory
heirs
‐ primary
–
legitimate
children
and
/
or
descendants
o called
as
such
because
they
are
preferred
over,
and
exclude,
the
secondary
‐ secondary
–
legitimate
parents
and
/
or
ascendants;
illegitimate
parents
o called
as
such
because
they
receive
legitimes
only
in
default
of
the
primary
legitimate
parents
/
ascendants
–
only
in
default
of
legitimate
children
/
descendants
illegitimate
parents
–
only
in
default
of
any
kind
of
children
/
descendants
‐ concurring
–
surviving
spouse;
illegitimate
children
and
/
or
descendants
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
o
called
as
such
because
they
succeed
as
compulsory
heirs
together
with
primary
or
secondary
heirs
(except
only
that
illegitimate
children
/
descendants
exclude
illegitimate
parents,
i.e.
only
illegitimate
children
/
descendants
will
get
their
legitimes,
the
illegitimate
parents
to
get
nothing
in
the
form
of
legitimes)
The
COMPULSORY
HEIRS
‐ legitimate
children
(law
does
not
specify
how
they
should
share,
but
universal
agreement
is
that
they
will
share
equally
regardless
of
age,
sex,
or
marriage
of
origin;
include
legitimate
descendants
other
than
children,
in
the
proper
cases)
o ART.
164,
Family
Code
children
conceived
or
born
during
the
marriage
of
parents
children
conceived
of
artificial
insemination
o ART.
54,
Family
Code
children
conceived
or
born
before
judgment
of
annulment
or
absolute
nullity
of
marriage
under
ART.
36
has
become
final
/
executory
children
conceived
or
born
of
subsequent
marriage
under
ART.
53
(i.e.
after
annulment
/
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage,
and
separated
spouses
subsequently
remarry)
o ART.
179,
Family
Code
legitimated
children
(i.e.
subsequent
valid
marriage
between
parents
of
illegitimate
children)
o Sec.
17
and
18,
RA
8552
(Domestic
Adoption
Act
of
1998)
adopted
children
(is
an
adopted
child
entitled
to
inherit
by
compulsory
and
intestate
succession
from
his
biological
parents
and
relatives?—no
answer)
‐ legitimate
descendants
o general
rule:
the
nearer
exclude
the
more
remote
children,
if
all
qualified,
will
exclude
grandchildren,
and
so
on
o qualification:
right
of
representation
(succession
per
stirpes),
when
proper
‐ legitimate
parents
(include
legitimate
ascendants
other
than
parents,
in
the
proper
cases—see
Baritua
v.
CA
[1990],
infra)
o including
adopter
(per
Sec.
18,
RA
8552)
‐ legitimate
ascendants
o only
in
default
of
parents
Page 32 of 73
the
rule
(absolute
in
the
ascending
line):
the
nearer
exclude
the
more
remote
surviving
spouse
o of
the
decedent,
not
the
spouse
of
a
child
who
has
predeceased
the
decedent
(Rosales
v.
Rosales
[1987],
infra)
o marriage
must
be
valid
or
voidable
(with
no
final
decree
of
annulment
at
the
time
of
the
decedent’s
death)
o mere
estrangement
not
a
ground
for
disqualification
of
surviving
spouse
as
heir
o effect
of
decree
of
legal
separation
offending
spouse:
DISQUALIFIED
to
inherit
innocent
spouse:
QUALIFIED
to
inherit
o death
of
either
spouse
during
pendency
of
petition
for
legal
separation— dismissal
of
case
surviving
spouse,
QUALIFIED
to
inherit
(whether
innocent
or
not)
(Lapuz
v.
Eufemio
[1972],
infra)
illegitimate
children
o in
general:
children
conceived
and
born
outside
a
valid
marriage
(ART.
165,
Family
Code)
o in
particular:
children
born
of—(taken
from
SempioDiy)
couples
who
are
not
legally
married,
or
of
common‐law
marriages
incestuous
marriages
bigamous
marriages
adulterous
relations
between
the
parents
marriages
void
for
reasons
of
public
policy
under
ART.
38,
Family
Code
couples
below
18
years
old,
whether
married
(void)
or
not
other
void
marriages
under
ART.
35,
Family
Code
o note:
rule
if
decedent
died
before
the
effectivity
of
the
Family
Code
(August
3,
1988)
is
ART.
895
of
the
Civil
Code
o cf.
right
of
representation
(an
illegitimate
child
can
be
represented
by
both
legitimate
and
illegitimate
descendants,
while
a
legitimate
child
can
only
be
represented
by
legitimate
descendants,
per
ART.
902
and
ART.
992)
illegitimate
descendants
o same
rule
as
in
legitimate
descendants
nearer
exclude
the
more
remote
right
of
representation
illegitimate
parents
o only
parents
in
the
illegitimate
ascending
line)
unlike
in
the
legitimate
ascending
line
(includes
o
‐
‐
‐
‐
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
o
ascendants
of
whatever
degree)
excluded
by
legitimate
children
and
illegitimate
children
unlike
legitimate
parents
(excluded
only
by
legitimate
children
/
descendants)
Variations
in
legitimary
portions
‐ general
rule:
1/2
of
estate
is
given
to
one
heir
or
one
group
of
heirs
‐ exceptions:
o surviving
spouse
and
illegitimate
children
(ART.
894)
o surviving
spouse
in
a
marriage
in
articulo
mortis,
with
the
conditions
specified
(ART.
900,
par.
2)
o surviving
spouse
and
illegitimate
parents
(ART.
903)
The
different
combinations
‐ legitimate
children
alone
(ART.
888)
o 1/2
of
estate
divided
equally
‐ legitimate
children
and
surviving
spouse
(ART.
892,
par.
2)
o legitimate
children
–
1/2
of
estate
o surviving
spouse
–
a
share
equal
to
that
of
one
child
‐ one
legitimate
child
and
surviving
spouse
(ART.
892,
par.
1)
o legitimate
child
–
1/2
of
estate
o surviving
spouse
–
1/4
of
estate
‐ legitimate
children
and
illegitimate
children
(ART.
176,
Family
Code)
o legitimate
children
–
1/2
of
estate
o illegitimate
children
–
each
will
get
1/2
of
share
of
one
legitimate
child
‐ legitimate
children,
illegitimate
children,
and
surviving
spouse
o legitimate
children
–
1/2
of
estate
o illegitimate
children
–
each
will
get
1/2
of
share
of
one
legitimate
child
o surviving
spouse
–
a
share
equal
to
that
of
one
legitimate
child
his
or
her
share
is
preferred
over
those
of
the
illegitimate
children
which
shall
be
reduced
if
necessary
(ART.
895)
‐ one
legitimate
child,
illegitimate
children,
and
surviving
spouse
o legitimate
children
–
1/2
of
estate
o illegitimate
children
–
each
will
get
1/2
of
share
of
one
legitimate
child
in
effect,
just
divide
the
1/4
remainder
of
estate
to
the
illegitimate
children,
equally
o surviving
spouse
–
1/4
of
estate
his
or
her
share
is
preferred
over
those
of
the
illegitimate
children
which
shall
be
reduced
if
necessary
(ART.
895)
‐ legitimate
parents
alone
(ART.
889)
o 1/2
of
estate
Page 33 of 73
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐ ‐
legitimate
parents
and
illegitimate
children
(ART.
896)
o legitimate
parents
–
1/2
of
estate
o illegitimate
children
–
1/4
of
estate
legitimate
parents
and
surviving
spouse
(ART.
893)
o legitimate
parents
–
1/2
of
estate
o surviving
spouse
–
1/4
of
estate
legitimate
parents,
illegitimate
children,
and
surviving
spouse
(ART.
899)
o legitimate
parents
–
1/2
of
estate
o illegitimate
children
–
1/4
of
estate
o surviving
spouse
–
1/8
of
estate
surviving
spouse
alone
o 1/2
of
estate
(ART.
900,
par.
1),
or
o 1/3
of
estate
(if
marriage,
being
in
articulo
mortis,
falls
under
ART.
900,
par.
2)
surviving
spouse
and
illegitimate
children
(ART.
894)
o surviving
spouse
–
1/3
of
estate
o illegitimate
children
–
1/3
of
estate
surviving
spouse
and
illegitimate
parents
(ART.
903)
o surviving
spouse
–
1/4
of
estate
o illegitimate
parents
–
1/4
of
estate
illegitimate
children
alone
(ART.
901)
o 1/2
of
estate
Illegitimate
parents
alone
(ART.
903)
o 1/2
of
estate
Rosales
v.
Rosales
(1987)
Facts:
Decedent
died
intestate,
leaving
as
heirs
her
husband,
her
child,
and
her
grandchild
by
another
child
who
predeceased
her.
Widow
of
the
child
who
predeceased
decedent
claimed
that
she,
as
surviving
spouse
of
predeceased
child,
was
a
compulsory
heir
of
mother‐in‐law
(decedent).
Held:
That
spouse
of
predeceased
child
of
decedent
not
a
compulsory
heir
of
decedent
mother‐in‐law.
That
ART.
887
refers
to
estate
of
deceased
spouse
in
which
case
surviving
spouse
is
a
compulsory
heir,
and
does
not
apply
to
estate
of
parent‐in‐law.
Lapuz
v.
Eufemio
(1972)
Facts:
Wife
filed
a
petition
for
legal
separation
against
husband:
sexual
infidelity.
Wife
died
pendente
lite.
Trial
court
dismissed
action.
Held:
That
death
of
either
spouse
during
pendency
of
action
for
legal
separation
(before
final
decree)
abates
action.
That
this
abatement
also
applies
if
action
involves
property
rights.
That
effect
is
ultimately,
surviving
spouse,
whether
guilty
or
not
(note:
no
final
decree
of
legal
separation
because
of
death
of
one
of
the
spouses),
is
not
disqualified
to
inherit
from
decedent
(spouse
who
died).
Baritua
v.
CA
(1990)
Facts:
Decedent
died
in
an
accident,
and
parties
responsible
for
death
settled
with
surviving
spouse.
Decedent’s
parents
later
filed
a
complaint
for
damages
against
parties
liable
for
death
of
their
son.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Held:
That
decedent’s
parents
not
entitled
to
payment
because
payment
was
already
received
by
decedent’s
surviving
spouse
and
child,
the
deceased’s
compulsory
heirs.
That
parents
of
deceased
succeed
only
when
latter
dies
without
legitimate
descendant.
That
surviving
spouse
concurs
with
all
classes
of
heirs.
Tumbokon
v.
Legaspi
(2010)
Facts:
Grandmother
(decedent)
died
intestate.
She
left
as
compulsory
and
intestate
heirs
her
daughter
and
her
grandson
(son
of
predeceased
daughter).
Widower
or
son‐ in‐law
(husband
of
predeceased
daughter)
claimed
to
be
decedent’s
compulsory
heir.
Held:
That
son‐in‐law
(widower
of
decedent’s
predeceased
daughter)
not
a
compulsory
heir
of
decedent.
Articles governing the particular combinations: ART.
888.
The
legitime
of
legitimate
children
and
descendants
consists
of
one‐half
of
the
hereditary
estate
of
the
father
and
of
the
mother.
The
latter
may
freely
dispose
of
the
remaining
half,
subject
to
the
rights
of
illegitimate
children
and
of
the
surviving
spouse
as
hereinafter
provided.
Equal
sharing
among
legitimate
children
(including
adopted
children)
regardless
of
age,
sex,
or
marriage
of
origin,
of
1/2
of
the
estate
of
their
deceased
parent
Descendants
other
than
children
‐ general
rule:
the
nearer
exclude
the
more
remote
o grandchildren
cannot
inherit
since
children
will
bar
them,
unless
all
the
children
renounce
o the
rule
goes
on
down
the
line
(no
limit
to
the
number
of
degrees
in
the
descending
line
that
may
be
called
to
succeed)
‐ qualification:
right
of
representation
ART.
889.
The
legitime
of
legitimate
parents
or
ascendants
consists
of
one‐half
of
the
hereditary
estates
of
their
children
and
descendants.
The
children
or
descendants
may
freely
dispose
of
the
other
half,
subject
to
the
rights
of
illegitimate
children
and
of
the
surviving
spouse
as
hereinafter
provided.
ART.
890.
The
legitime
reserved
for
the
legitimate
parents
shall
be
divided
between
them
equally;
if
one
of
the
parents
should
have
died,
the
whole
shall
pass
to
the
survivor.
If
the
testator
leaves
neither
father
nor
mother,
but
is
survived
by
ascendants
of
equal
degree
of
the
paternal
and
maternal
lines,
the
legitime
shall
be
divided
equally
between
both
lines.
If
the
ascendants
should
be
of
different
degrees,
it
shall
pertain
entirely
to
the
ones
nearest
in
degree
of
either
line.
Legitimate
parents
/
ascendants
as
secondary
compulsory
heirs
Page 34 of 73
‐
they
succeed
only
in
default
of
the
legitimate
descending
line
Three
basic
rules
governing
succession
in
the
ascending
line—
‐ the
nearer
exclude
the
more
remote
o rule
is
ABSOLUTE
(i.e.
no
qualification;
no
right
of
representation)
‐ division
by
line
o applies
if
there
are
more
than
one
ascendant
in
the
nearest
degree
o legitime
to
be
divided
in
equal
parts
between
the
paternal
and
maternal
lines
‐ equal
division
within
the
line
o after
portion
corresponding
to
the
line
has
been
assigned,
there
will
be
equal
apportionment
between
or
among
the
recipients
between
the
line,
should
there
be
more
than
one
ART.
892.
If
only
one
legitimate
child
or
descendant
of
the
deceased
survives,
the
widow
or
widower
shall
be
entitled
to
one‐fourth
of
the
hereditary
estate.
In
case
of
a
legal
separation,
the
surviving
spouse
may
inherit
if
it
was
the
deceased
who
had
given
cause
for
the
same.
If
there
are
two
or
more
legitimate
children
or
descendants,
the
surviving
spouse
shall
be
entitled
to
a
portion
equal
to
the
legitime
of
each
of
the
legitimate
children
or
descendants.
In
both
cases,
the
legitime
of
the
surviving
spouse
shall
be
taken
from
the
portion
that
can
be
freely
disposed
of
by
the
testator.
TEST:
One
legitimate
child,
surviving
spouse—what
is
the
sharing?
If
there
has
been
legal
separation—
‐ if
there
is
a
final
decree
of
legal
separation
and
the
deceased
is
the
offending
spouse
o surviving
spouse
gets
his
legitime
(ART.
63,
par.
4,
Family
Code)
‐ if
there
is
a
final
decree
of
legal
separation
and
the
deceased
is
the
innocent
spouse
o surviving
(offending)
spouse
is
disqualified
from
inheriting
(idem.)
‐ if
after
the
final
decree
of
legal
separation
there
was
a
reconciliation
between
the
spouses
o reciprocal
right
to
succeed
is
restored
(reconciliation
sets
aside
the
final
decree)
(ART.
66,
par.
2,
Family
Code)
Death
pendente
lite—see
Lapuz
v.
Eufemio,
supra
Problem:
Termination
of
marriage
by
reappearance
of
prior
spouse
/
decree
of
annulment
or
absolute
nullity
of
marriage
‐ reappearance
of
prior
spouse
o suppose
a
person
(husband),
believing
in
good
faith
that
his
wife
had
already
died,
remarries,
and
then
subsequently
his
wife
reappears,
are
both
his
first
wife
and
second
wife
entitled
to
legitime
from
the
husband
if
he
dies?
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
‐
‐
marriages
judicially
annulled
or
declared
void
ab
initio
o same
rule
as
in
reappearance
applies;
problem
arises
if
either
or
both
partners
in
the
defective
marriage
remarry
later
Balane
comments:
why
should
consorts
of
a
terminated
marriage,
or
an
annulled
one,
or
one
declared
void
ab
initio,
continue
to
be
heirs
of
each
other
when
the
very
basis
of
the
right
of
succession
(i.e.
marriage)
no
longer
exists?
TEST:
Legitimate
children,
surviving
spouse—what
is
the
sharing?
Determination
of
surviving
spouse’s
share:
‐ as
long
as
at
least
one
of
several
children
inherits
in
his
own
right
o equivalent
to
share
of
one
child
‐ suppose
all
the
children
predecease
(or
are
disinherited
or
unworthy
to
succeed):
all
the
grandchildren
inherit
per
stirpes,
and
therefore
in
different
amounts
o spouse
still
gets
a
share
equivalent
to
that
of
what
one
child
would
have
gotten
if
qualified
‐ suppose
all
the
children
renounce:
all
the
grandchildren
inherit
per
capita,
and
therefore
equally
o spouse
still
gets
a
share
equivalent
to
that
of
what
one
child
would
have
gotten
had
he
succeeded
In
what
instance
then
will
the
surviving
spouse
get
a
share
equivalent
to
the
share
of
a
descendant?
ART.
893.
If
the
testator
leaves
no
legitimate
descendants,
but
leaves
legitimate
ascendants,
the
surviving
spouse
shall
have
a
right
to
one‐fourth
of
the
hereditary
estate.
This
fourth
shall
be
taken
from
the
free
portion
of
the
estate.
TEST:
Legitimate
ascendants,
surviving
spouse—what
is
the
sharing?
ART.
894.
If
the
testator
leaves
illegitimate
children,
the
surviving
spouse
shall
be
entitled
to
one‐third
of
the
hereditary
estate
of
the
deceased
and
the
illegitimate
children
to
another
third.
The
remaining
third
shall
be
at
the
free
disposal
of
the
testator.
TEST:
Illegitimate
children,
surviving
spouse—what
is
the
sharing?
[ART.
895.
The
legitime
of
each
of
the
acknowledged
natural
children
and
each
of
the
natural
children
by
legal
fiction
shall
consist
of
one‐half
of
the
legitime
of
each
of
the
legitimate
children
or
descendants.
The
legitime
of
an
illegitimate
child
who
is
neither
an
acknowledged
natural,
nor
a
natural
child
by
legal
fiction,
shall
be
equal
in
every
case
to
four‐fifths
of
the
legitime
of
an
acknowledged
natural
child.]
Page 35 of 73
The
legitime
of
the
illegitimate
children
shall
be
taken
from
the
portion
of
the
estate
at
the
free
disposal
of
the
testator,
provided
that
in
no
case
shall
the
total
legitime
of
such
illegitimate
children
exceed
that
free
portion,
and
that
the
legitime
of
the
surviving
spouse
must
first
be
fully
satisfied.
TEST:
One
legitimate
child,
illegitimate
children,
surviving
spouse—what
is
the
sharing?
TEST:
Legitimate
children,
illegitimate
children,
surviving
spouse—what
is
the
sharing?
Reduction
of
shares
(if
total
legitimes
exceed
the
entire
estate);
rules
‐ legitimes
of
legitimate
children
never
reduced
(they
are
primary
and
preferred
compulsory
heirs)
‐ legitime
of
surviving
spouse
never
reduced
‐ legitimes
of
illegitimate
children
will
be
reduced
pro
rata
and
without
preference
among
them
ART.
896.
Illegitimate
children
who
may
survive
with
legitimate
parents
or
ascendants
of
the
deceased
shall
be
entitled
to
one‐fourth
of
the
hereditary
estate
to
be
taken
from
the
portion
at
the
free
disposal
of
the
testator.
TEST:
Illegitimate
children,
legitimate
parents—what
is
the
sharing?
ART.
897.
When
the
widow
or
widower
survives
with
legitimate
children
or
descendants,
and
acknowledged
natural
children,
or
natural
children
by
legal
fiction,
such
surviving
spouse
shall
be
entitled
to
a
portion
equal
to
the
legitime
of
each
of
the
legitimate
children
which
must
be
taken
from
that
part
of
the
estate
which
the
testator
can
freely
dispose
of.
ART.
898.
If
the
widow
or
widower
survives
with
legitimate
children
or
descendants,
and
with
illegitimate
children
other
than
acknowledged
natural,
or
natural
children
by
legal
fiction,
the
share
of
the
surviving
spouse
shall
be
the
same
as
that
provided
in
the
preceding
article.
ART.
899.
When
the
widow
or
widower
survives
with
legitimate
parents
or
ascendants
and
with
illegitimate
children,
such
surviving
spouse
shall
be
entitled
to
one‐ eighth
of
the
hereditary
estate
of
the
deceased
which
must
be
taken
from
the
free
portion,
and
the
illegitimate
children
shall
be
entitled
to
one‐fourth
of
the
estate
which
shall
be
taken
also
from
the
disposable
portion.
The
testator
may
freely
dispose
of
the
remaining
one‐ eighth
of
the
estate.
TEST:
Legitimate
parents,
illegitimate
children,
surviving
spouse—what
is
the
sharing?
ART.
900.
If
the
only
survivor
is
the
widow
or
widower,
she
or
he
shall
be
entitled
to
one‐half
of
the
hereditary
estate
of
the
deceased
spouse,
and
the
testator
may
freely
dispose
of
the
other
half.
If
the
marriage
between
the
surviving
spouse
and
the
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
testator
was
solemnized
in
articulo
mortis,
and
the
testator
died
within
three
months
from
the
time
of
the
marriage,
the
legitime
of
the
surviving
spouse
as
the
sole
heir
shall
be
one‐third
of
the
hereditary
estate,
except
when
they
have
been
living
as
husband
and
wife
for
more
than
five
years.
In
the
latter
case,
the
legitime
of
the
surviving
spouse
shall
be
that
specified
in
the
preceding
paragraph.
Surviving
spouse
as
sole
compulsory
heir
‐ general
rule:
1/2
of
estate
‐ exception:
1/3
of
estate,
if
the
following
circumstances
concur
o the
marriage
was
in
articulo
mortis
o the
testator
died
within
three
months
from
the
time
of
the
marriage
o the
parties
did
not
cohabit
for
more
than
five
years,
and
o the
spouse
who
died
was
the
party
in
articulo
mortis
at
the
time
of
the
marriage
ART.
901.
When
the
testator
dies
leaving
illegitimate
children
and
no
other
compulsory
heirs,
such
illegitimate
children
shall
have
a
right
to
one‐half
of
the
hereditary
estate
of
the
deceased.
The
other
half
shall
be
at
the
free
disposal
of
the
testator.
TEST:
Illegitimate
children
alone—how
much
do
they
get?
ART.
902.
The
rights
of
illegitimate
children
set
forth
in
the
preceding
articles
are
transmitted
upon
their
death
to
their
descendants,
whether
legitimate
or
illegitimate.
Right
of
representation
to
the
legitimate
and
illegitimate
descendants
of
an
illegitimate
child
‐ compare
with
ART.
992
(in
case
of
legitimate
children,
right
of
representation
is
given
only
to
their
legitimate
descendants)
‐ effect:
right
of
representation
of
illegitimate
children
is
broader
than
right
of
representation
of
legitimate
children
ART.
903.
The
legitime
of
the
parents
who
have
an
illegitimate
child,
when
such
child
leaves
neither
legitimate
descendants,
nor
a
surviving
spouse,
nor
illegitimate
children,
is
one‐half
of
the
hereditary
estate
of
such
illegitimate
child.
If
only
legitimate
or
illegitimate
children
are
left,
the
parents
are
not
entitled
to
any
legitime
whatsoever.
If
only
the
widow
or
widower
survives
with
parents
of
the
illegitimate
child,
the
legitime
of
the
parents
is
one‐fourth
of
the
hereditary
estate
of
the
child,
and
that
of
the
surviving
spouse
also
one‐fourth
of
the
estate.
TEST:
Illegitimate
parents
alone—how
much
do
they
get?
TEST:
Illegitimate
parents,
surviving
spouse—what
is
the
sharing?
Page 36 of 73
This
is
the
only
instance
when
illegitimate
children
exclude
secondary
compulsory
heirs
(illegitimate
parents)
Intent
of
the
law
in
giving
spouse
arbitrary
shares—
‐ so
that
something
may
be
left
for
free
disposition
LEGITIMES
QUIZZER
SET
1:
Write
how
much
each
compulsory
heir
would
get.
Do
not
show
your
solution.
Time
limit—5
minutes.
1) 1
legitimate
child
=
1
adopted
child
=
2) 2
adopted
children
=
legitimate
parents
=
3) 1
adopted
child
=
4
illegitimate
children
=
4) surviving
spouse
=
6
legitimate
children
=
5) 5
legitimate
children
=
1
illegitimate
child
=
6) 5
illegitimate
children
=
legitimate
parents
=
7) 4
illegitimate
children
=
legitimate
parents
=
surviving
spouse
=
8) legitimate
parents
=
surviving
spouse
=
9) 1
legitimate
child
=
legitimate
parents
=
1
illegitimate
child
=
surviving
spouse
=
10) surviving
spouse
=
1
illegitimate
parent
=
LEGITIMES
QUIZZER
SET
2:
Write
how
much
each
compulsory
heir
would
get.
Do
not
show
your
solution.
Time
limit—5
minutes.
1) 3
legitimate
children
=
surviving
spouse
=
2) 2
legitimate
children
=
4
illegitimate
children
=
surviving
spouse
=
3) 3
legitimate
children
=
2
adopted
children
=
4) illegitimate
parents
=
2
illegitimate
children
=
5) 2
legitimate
children
=
1
illegitimate
child
=
6) 3
adopted
children
=
1
legitimate
parent
=
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
7)
1
legitimate
child
=
surviving
spouse
=
8)
1
legitimate
parent
=
2
illegitimate
children
=
9) 3
legitimate
children
=
2
adopted
children
=
surviving
spouse
=
10) 2
legitimate
children
=
surviving
spouse
=
The Reserva Troncal
ART.
891.
The
ascendant
who
inherits
from
his
descendant
any
property
which
the
latter
may
have
acquired
by
gratuitous
title
from
another
ascendant,
or
a
brother
or
sister,
is
obliged
to
reserve
such
property
as
he
may
acquired
by
operation
of
law
for
the
benefit
of
relatives
who
are
within
the
third
degree
and
who
belong
to
the
line
from
which
the
said
property
came.
Illustration
and
diagram
O
or
M.S.
R’ista
g.t.
o.
of
l.
P
R’ios
Explanation
of
illustration
and
diagram—
‐ P
(prepositus)
inherits
a
piece
of
land
from
his
father,
O
or
M.S.
(origin
or
mediate
source).
Subsequently,
P
dies,
intestate,
single,
and
without
legitimate
issue,
and
the
land
is
in
turn
inherited
by
his
mother
R’ista
(reservista)
‐ R’ista
is
now
required
to
reserve
the
property
in
favor
of
P’s
paternal
relatives
within
the
third
degree
(R’ios
or
reservatarios)
Other
terms
for
reserva
troncal
‐ lineal,
familiar,
extraordinaria,
semi‐troncal,
pseudo‐troncal
Purpose
‐ “the
reserva
troncal
is
a
special
rule
designed
primarily
to
assure
the
return
of
the
reservable
property
to
the
third
degree
relatives
belonging
to
the
line
from
which
the
property
originally
came,
and
to
avoid
its
being
dissipated...by
the
relatives
of
the
inheriting
ascendant
(Padura
v.
Baldovino
[1958])
‐ “to
avoid
the
danger
that
property
existing
for
many
years
in
a
family’s
patrimony
might
pass
gratuitously
to
outsiders
through
the
accident
of
marriage
and
untimely
death
(Gonzales
v.
CFI
[1981])
‐ “to
prevent
outsiders
from
acquiring,
through
an
accident
of
life,
property
which,
but
for
such
Page 37 of 73
accident,
would
have
remained
in
the
family”
(idem.)
Requisites
(as
given
in
Chua
v.
CFI
[1977])
‐ that
the
property
was
acquired
by
a
descendant
from
an
ascendant
or
from
a
brother
or
sister
by
gratuitous
title
o term
descendant
should
read
person
(if
grantor
is
brother
or
sister,
acquirer
is
not
a
descendant)
o acquisition
is
by
gratuitous
title
(título
lucrative)
when
the
recipient
does
not
give
anything
in
return
encompasses
transmissions
by
donation
or
by
succession
of
whatever
kind
‐ that
said
descendant
died
without
an
issue
o should
read:
“that
said
person
died
without
legitimate
issue”
(because
only
legitimate
descendants
will
prevent
the
property
from
being
inherited
by
the
legitimate
ascending
line
by
operation
of
law)
if
descendant
dies
with
illegitimate
issue,
there
will
be
reserva
troncal
‐ that
the
property
is
inherited
by
another
ascendant
by
operation
of
law
o by
operation
of
law
is
limited
to
succession
to
the
legitime
or
by
intestacy,
NOT
testamentary
succession
no
donation
‐ that
there
are
relatives
within
the
third
degree
belonging
to
the
line
from
which
said
property
came
o reservatarios,
to
be
discussed
infra
Process
‐ first
transfer
o by
gratuitous
title,
from
a
person
to
his
descendant,
brother,
or
sister
‐ second
transfer
o by
operation
of
law,
from
the
transferee
in
the
first
transfer
to
another
ascendant
it
is
this
second
transfer
that
creates
the
reserva
‐ third
transfer
o from
the
transferee
in
the
second
transfer
to
the
relatives
(reservatarios)
Solivio
v.
CA
(1990)
Facts:
Mother
died
intestate,
leaving
all
properties
to
sole
heir,
her
child.
Child
(decedent)
died
intestate,
single,
and
without
legitimate
issue.
Decedent
was
survived
by
maternal
aunt
and
paternal
aunt.
Maternal
aunt:
properties
left
by
decedent
belong
to
her
because
she
is
a
third
degree
relative
of
decedent’s
mother,
from
whose
line
property
came.
Held:
That
there
is
no
reserva
troncal
because
descendant
(decedent)
inherited
from
ascendant
(mother),
the
reverse
of
situation
covered
by
ART.
891.
Parties
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
‐ ‐
‐ ‐
origin
or
mediate
source
o the
transferor
in
the
first
transfer
prepositus
o the
first
transferee,
who
is
a
descendant
or
brother
/
sister
of
the
origin
reservista
or
reservor
o the
ascendant
obliged
to
reserve
reservatarios
or
reservees
o the
relatives
benefited
Two
basic
rules—
‐ no
inquiry
is
to
be
made
beyond
the
origin
o it
does
not
matter
who
the
owner
of
the
property
was
before
it
was
acquired
by
the
origin
‐ all
the
relationships
among
the
parties
must
be
legitimate
The
Origin
/
Mediate
Source
‐ either
an
ascendant
or
a
brother
or
sister
of
the
prepositus
o ascendant:
may
be
of
any
degree
of
ascent
o brother
or
sister:
conflicting
views
one
view
–
must
be
of
the
half‐blood
(because
otherwise,
property
would
not
change
lines
in
passing
to
a
common
ascendant
of
the
prepositus
and
the
brother;
no
reserve
if
fraternal
relationship
is
of
the
full‐ blood
because
it
would
be
impossible
to
identify
the
line
of
origin—whether
paternal
or
maternal)
(J.B.L.
Reyes)
another
view
–
does
not
matter
whether
of
the
full‐
or
half‐blood
(Sánchez
Román)
The
Prepositus
‐ either
a
descendant
or
a
brother
or
sister
of
the
origin
who
receives
property
from
the
origin
by
gratuitous
title
o he
is
the
first
transferee
‐ while
property
is
still
with
him,
there
is
as
yet
no
reserva
o reserve
arises
only
upon
the
second
transfer
o while
prepositus
owns
the
property,
he
has
all
rights
of
ownership
over
it
and
may
exercise
such
rights
in
order
to
prevent
a
reserve
from
arising,
by:
substituting
or
alienating
the
property
bequeathing
or
devising
it
either
to
the
potential
reservista
or
to
third
persons
(subject
to
the
constraints
of
the
legitime),
or
partitioning
in
such
a
way
as
to
assign
the
property
to
parties
other
than
the
potential
reservista
(subject
Page 38 of 73
‐
to
the
constraints
of
the
legitime)
the
prepositus
therefore
is
the
arbiter
of
the
reserva
troncal
(Sánchez
Román)
The
Reservista
‐ he
is
an
ascendant
of
the
prepositus,
of
whatever
degree
o must
be
an
ascendant
other
than
the
origin
(if
the
origin
is
also
an
ascendant)
if
two
parties
are
the
same
person,
no
reserva
troncal
‐ should
the
origin
and
the
reservista
belong
to
different
lines
(i.e.
grandchild
receives
property
by
donation
from
paternal
grandfather;
grandchild
dies;
property
received
by
donation
passes
by
succession
to
the
legitime
and
intestacy
to
the
father,
the
paternal
grandfather’s
son)?
o one
view
–
no
because
another
ascendant
is
one
belonging
to
a
line
other
than
that
of
the
reservista
(purpose
of
reserve
is
only
curative)
(J.B.L.
Reyes)
o another
view
–
yes
because
(a)
the
law
does
not
distinguish,
and
(b)
purpose
of
reserva
is
not
only
curative,
but
also
preventive,
i.e.
to
prevent
the
property
from
leaving
the
line
(Sánchez
Román)
The
Reservatarios
‐ the
reserva
is
in
favor
of
a
class,
collectively
referred
to
as
the
reservatarios
(reservees)
‐ requirements
to
be
a
reservatario:
o he
must
be
within
the
third
degree
of
consanguinity
from
the
prepositus
(Cabardo
v.
Villanueva
[1922])
o he
must
belong
to
the
line
from
which
the
property
came
(determined
by
the
origin)
if
origin
is
an
ascendant— either
of
the
paternal
or
maternal
line
if
origin
is
a
brother
or
sister
of
the
full
blood—it
would
be
impossible
to
distinguish
the
lines
o must
the
reservatario
also
be
related
to
the
origin?
one
view:
no,
because
the
article
speaks
only
of
two
lines
(paternal
and
maternal)
of
the
descendant,
without
regard
to
subdivisions
(Manresa)
another
view:
yes,
otherwise
results
would
arise
completely
contrary
to
the
purpose
of
the
reserva,
which
is
to
prevent
property
from
passing
to
persons
not
of
the
line
of
origin
(Sánchez
Román)
‐ reserva
in
favor
of
reservatarios
as
a
class
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
it
is
not
required
that
the
reservatario
must
already
be
living
when
the
prepositus
dies,
because
the
reserve
is
established
in
favor
of
a
group
or
class,
not
in
favor
of
specific
individuals
(Manresa)
as
long
as
the
reservatario
is
alive
at
the
time
of
the
reservista’s
death,
he
qualifies
as
such,
even
if
he
was
conceived
and
born
after
the
prepositus’s
death
preference
among
the
reservatarios
o rules
on
intestate
succession
govern
how
reservable
property
is
to
be
distributed
to
reservatarios
(Padura
v.
Baldovino
[1958])
i.e.
the
nearer
exclude
the
more
remote,
share
of
2:1
in
favor
of
full‐blood
in
relation
to
half‐blood
relatives
of
the
prepositus
representation
among
the
reservatarios
(see
Florentino
v.
Florentino
[1919])
o there
is
only
one
instance
of
representation
among
the
reservatarios:
if
the
prepositus
was
survived
by
brothers
or
sisters
and
children
of
a
predeceased
or
incapacitated
brother
or
sister
o
‐
‐
Padura
v.
Baldovino
(1958)
Facts:
Origin
(father)
died,
leaving
properties
by
will
to
surviving
wife
(mother
or
reservista)
and
three
children
(one
from
first
marriage,
two
from
second
marriage).
One
of
two
children
(prepositus,
single,
without
legitimate
issue)
in
the
second
marriage
predeceased
the
mother
(reservista).
Reservatarios
were
full‐blood
sister
of
prepositus
and
his
half‐brother
(child
of
origin
from
first
marriage).
Held:
That
reservatarios
of
the
full‐blood
are
entitled
to
a
share
twice
as
large
as
that
of
others
(half‐blood
relatives).
That
reservable
property
should
pass
not
to
all
reservatarios
as
a
class
but
only
to
those
nearest
in
degree
to
the
prepositus,
excluding
those
reservatarios
of
more
remote
degree.
That
reserva
troncal
merely
determines
group
of
relatives
(reservatarios)
to
whom
property
should
be
returned;
but
within
that
group
individual
right
to
property
should
be
decided
by
rules
of
intestate
succession.
That
basic
principles
of
intestacy
to
be
applied
are
(a)
proximity
in
degree,
(b)
right
of
representation,
and
(c)
rule
of
double
share
for
relatives
or
collaterals
of
whole
blood.
Florentino
v.
Florentino
(1919)
Facts:
Origin
left
by
will
all
his
properties
to
11
children.
One
child
(prepositus)
died
intestate,
single,
and
without
legitimate
issue,
and
was
succeeded
by
his
mother
(reservista).
Reservista
instituted
her
daughter
as
sole
heir,
giving
to
daughter
the
properties
she
inherited
from
prepositus,
her
son.
Surviving
siblings
and
nephews
and
Page 39 of 73
nieces,
as
representatives
of
predeceased
siblings
of
prepositus
complained.
Held:
That
properties
given
by
reservista
to
her
daughter
are
reservable.
That
reservatarios
within
the
third
degree,
as
in
case
of
nephews
and
nieces
of
prepositus
from
whom
reservable
property
came,
have
right
of
representation
(to
represent
their
ascendants,
or
fathers
and
mothers,
who
are
brothers
and
sisters
of
prepositus).
Juridical
nature
‐ nature
of
reservista’s
right
(Edroso
v.
Sablan
[1913],
infra)
o reservista’s
right
over
the
reserved
property
is
one
of
ownership
o ownership
is
subject
to
a
resolutory
condition
(i.e.
the
existence
of
reservatarios
at
the
time
of
the
reservista’s
death)
o right
of
ownership
is
alienable,
but
subject
to
the
same
resolutory
condition
o reservista’s
right
of
ownership
is
registrable
(if
property
can
be
registered)
‐ nature
of
reservatarios’
right
(Sienes
v.
Esparcia
[1961],
infra)
o reservatarios’
right
over
the
reserved
property
is
one
of
expectancy
o expectancy
is
subject
to
a
suspensive
condition
(i.e.
existence
of
reservista
at
the
time
of
the
reservatarios’
death;
expectancy
ripens
into
ownership
if
the
reservatarios
survive
the
reservista)
o right
of
expectancy
is
alienable,
but
subject
to
the
same
suspensive
condition
o reservatarios’
right
of
expectancy
is
registrable
(if
property
can
be
registered)
Edroso
v.
Sablan
(1913)
Facts:
Father
(origin)
died
with
a
will.
Property
of
father
passed
to
only
son
(prepositus)
who
died
intestate,
single,
and
without
legitimate
issue.
Property
of
son
inherited
from
his
father
passed
by
operation
of
law
to
mother
(reservista).
Mother
sought
to
have
property
inherited
from
son
registered.
Uncles
of
son
or
prepositus
(brothers
of
father
or
origin),
reservatarios,
opposed.
Held:
See
nature
of
reservista’s
right,
supra.
Sienes
v.
Esparcia
(1961)
Facts:
Father
(origin)
died
with
a
will.
Property
of
father
passed
to
five
children.
One
child
(prepositus)
died
intestate,
single,
and
without
legitimate
issue.
Property
of
child
inherited
from
his
father
passed
by
operation
of
law
to
mother
(reservista).
Mother
sold
property.
Surviving
half‐sisters
of
prepositus
also
sold
same
property.
Held:
See
nature
of
reservatarios’
right,
supra.
Reservista
has
no
power
to
appoint,
by
will,
which
reservatarios
were
to
get
the
reserved
property:
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Gonzales
v.
CFI
(1981)
Facts:
Father
(origin)
died
intestate.
Property
of
father
passed
to
children.
One
child
(prepositus)
died
intestate,
single,
and
without
legitimate
issue.
Property
inherited
by
child
passed
by
operation
of
law
to
mother
(reservista).
Mother
gave
by
holographic
will
property
she
inherited
from
prepositus
to
her
grandchildren
(children
of
her
surviving
sons).
Held:
That
reservista
cannot
convey
reservable
properties
by
will
(mortis
causa)
to
reservatarios
within
the
third
degree,
to
the
exclusion
of
reservatarios
in
the
second
degree
(her
surviving
daughters
and
sons).
That
the
principle
is
that
the
nearer
excluded
the
more
remote.
That
reservista
cannot
by
will
select
reservatarios
to
whom
reservable
property
should
be
given
and
deprive
the
other
reservatarios
of
their
share
therein.
Balane
Comments:
‐ the
rule
therefore
is
that
upon
the
reservista’s
death,
the
reserved
property
passes
by
strict
operation
of
law
(according
to
the
rules
of
intestate
succession)
to
the
proper
reservatarios
‐ thus
the
selection
of
which
reservatarios
will
get
the
property
is
made
by
law
and
not
by
the
reservista
Property
reserved
‐ kind
of
property
reservable
o any
kind
(real
or
personal,
corporeal
or
incorporeal,
fungible
or
non‐fungible,
etc)
in
Rodriguez
v.
Rodriguez
(1957),
a
sugar
quota
allotment
(incorporeal)
was
held
to
be
reservable
‐ effect
of
substitution
o the
rule
is
that
the
very
same
property
must
go
thru
the
process
of
transmissions
o what
must
come
from
the
origin
to
the
prepositus
(by
gratuitous
title)
and
to
the
reservista
(by
operation
of
law)
must
be
the
same
property
if
prepositus
substitutes
the
property
by
selling,
bartering,
or
exchanging
it.
the
substitute
cannot
be
reserved
e.g.
there
would
be
no
reserva
if
the
prepositus
sold
the
property
he
received
from
the
origin
under
a
pacto
de
retro
and
then
redeemed
it
(because
property
would
not
be
the
same
as
prepositus
bought
it
back
from
the
vendee
a
retro)
Reserved
property,
not
part
of
reservista’s
estate
upon
his
death:
Cano
v.
Director
(1959)
Page 40 of 73
Facts:
Reservista
died.
Surviving
reservatario
sought
to
have
land
(reserved
property)
registered
in
her
name.
Son
of
reservista
opposed.
Held:
That
reservatario
is
not
reservista’s
successor
mortis
causa
nor
is
reservable
property
part
of
reservista’s
estate.
That
upon
death
of
reservista,
reservatario
nearest
to
prepositus
becomes
automatically
and
by
operation
of
law
owner
of
reservable
property.
That
reservable
property
cannot
be
transmitted
by
a
reservista
to
his
own
successors
mortis
causa
so
long
as
a
reservatario
within
the
third
degree
from
prepositus
and
belonging
to
line
where
property
came
exists
when
reservista
dies.
Balane
States:
‐ since
the
reserved
property
is
not
computed
as
part
of
the
reservista’s
estate,
it
is
not
taken
into
account
in
determining
the
legitimes
of
the
reservista’s
compulsory
heirs
A
problem
will
arise
if
two
circumstances
concur:
(a)
the
prepositus
makes
a
will
instituting
the
ascendant reservista
to
the
whole
or
a
part
of
the
free
portion;
and
(b)
there
is
left
in
the
prepositus’s
estate,
upon
his
death,
in
addition
to
the
reserved
property,
property
not
reservable
[or,
if
(a)
prepositus
dies
with
two
or
more
properties,
one
reservable,
one
his
own;
and
(b)
prepositus
makes
a
will
giving
all
or
part
of
the
free
porstion
to
reservista]
‐ two
theories
advanced:
o reserva
máxima
–
as
much
of
the
potentially
reservable
property
as
possible
must
be
deemed
included
in
the
part
that
passes
by
operation
of
law
(maximizing
the
scope
of
the
reserva)
o reserva
mínima
–
every
single
property
in
the
prepositus’s
estate
must
be
deemed
to
pass,
partly
by
will
and
partly
by
operation
of
law,
in
the
same
proportion
that
the
part
given
by
will
bears
to
the
part
not
so
given
‐ to
illustrate:
suppose
prepositus
receives
2M
from
origin,
and
earns
4M
as
his
own;
prepositus
makes
a
will
instituting
his
mother
(reservista)
to
his
free
portion
(1/2
of
estate);
prepositus
dies
single
and
without
legitimate
issue;
reservista
inherits
entire
estate
of
prepositus
(half
by
legitime,
half
by
testamentary
succession);
how
much
of
the
2M
will
be
reserved?
o reserva
máxima
–
all
of
the
2M
(reservable
property)
will
pass
to
reservista
as
her
legitime
(rule:
fit
as
much
of
reservable
property
in
that
part
which
passes
by
operation
of
law)
3M
as
reservista’s
legitime
(included
in
this
3M
is
the
2M
reservable
property)
o reserva
mínima
–
only
1M
of
the
2M
reservable
property
will
pass
to
reservista
as
part
of
her
legitime
(rule:
every
item
to
pass
to
reservista
in
proportion
or
ratio
as
to
how
much
of
the
free
portion
the
prepositus
gave
to
the
reservista)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
3M
as
reservista’s
legitime
(composed
of
1M
from
the
2M
reservable
property,
and
2M
from
the
4M
own
property
of
the
prepositus;
1M
of
the
2M
reservable
property
passes
to
reservista
by
will,
and
2M
of
the
4M
own
property
of
the
prepositus
passes
to
reservista
by
will)
Rights
of
reservatarios
and
obligations
of
the
reservista
‐ to
inventory
the
reserved
properties
‐ to
annotate
the
reservable
character
(if
registered
immovables)
in
the
Registry
of
Property
within
90
days
from
acceptance
by
the
reservista
o there
is
only
one
title
to
the
immovable
property,
the
registered
owner
being
the
reservista,
and
the
reservable
character
of
the
property
has
to
be
annotated
at
the
back
of
the
title
as
a
lien
or
encumbrance
in
favor
of
the
reservatarios
‐ to
appraise
the
movables
‐ to
secure
by
means
of
mortgage:
(a)
the
indemnity
for
any
deterioration
of
or
damage
to
the
property
occasioned
by
the
reservista’s
fault
or
negligence,
and
(b)
the
payment
of
the
value
of
such
reserved
movables
as
may
have
been
alienated
by
the
reservista
onerously
or
gratuitously
Extinguishment;
how
reserva
troncal
extinguished
‐ by
death
of
reservista
o reservatarios
to
get
property;
no
more
reserva
reserva
troncal
begins
when
the
prepositus
dies
reserva
troncal
ends
when
the
reservista
dies
(reservatarios
must
be
alive)
‐ by
death
of
all
the
reservatarios
o note:
if
one
subscribes
to
the
view
that
the
reservista
can
belong
to
the
line
of
origin,
death
of
all
reservatarios
will
not
ipso
facto
extinguish
the
reserva
because
the
reservista
could
have
a
child
subsequently,
who
would
be
a
reservatario
‐ by
renunciation
by
all
the
reservatarios,
provided
that
no
other
reservatario
is
born
subsequently
‐ by
total
fortuitous
loss
of
the
reserved
property
‐ by
confusion
or
merger
of
rights
o as
when
the
reservatarios
acquire
the
reservista’s
right
by
a
contract
inter
vivos
e.g.
sale
of
reserva
to
reservatarios
‐ prescription
or
adverse
possession
ART.
904.
The
testator
cannot
deprive
his
compulsory
heirs
of
their
legitime,
except
in
cases
expressly
provided
by
law.
Page 41 of 73
Neither
can
he
impose
upon
the
same
any
burden,
encumbrance,
condition,
or
substitution
of
any
kind
whatsoever.
The
legitime
is
not
within
the
testator’s
control
‐ legitime
passes
to
compulsory
heirs
by
strict
operation
of
law
Testator
devoid
of
power
to
deprive
compulsory
heirs
of
legitime
‐ it
is
the
law,
not
the
testator,
which
determines
the
transmission
of
the
legitimes
‐ EXCEPT:
in
disinheritance
o the
only
instance
in
which
the
law
allows
the
testator
to
deprive
the
compulsory
heirs
of
their
legitimes
Testator
devoid
of
power
to
impose
burdens
on
legitime
‐ qualifications:
in
at
least
two
instances,
the
law
grants
the
testator
some
power
over
the
legitime
o payment
of
legitime
in
cash
(ART.
1080,
par.
2)
as
when
a
parent
who
wishes
to
keep
an
agricultural
enterprise
intact,
and
such
agricultural
enterprise
was
assigned
to
a
child
who
does
not
know
how
to
operate
the
same
o prohibition
on
partition
(ART.
1083,
par.
1)
‐ restrictions
on
the
legitime
imposed
by
law
o the
family
home
cannot
be
partitioned
(ART.
159,
Family
Code)
o the
reserva
troncal
ART.
905.
Every
renunciation
or
compromise
as
regards
a
future
legitime
between
the
person
owing
it
and
his
compulsory
heirs
is
void,
and
the
latter
may
claim
the
same
upon
the
death
of
the
former;
but
they
must
bring
to
collation
whatever
they
may
have
received
by
virtue
of
the
renunciation
or
compromise.
Reason
for
the
rule—
‐ before
predecessor’s
death,
heir’s
right
is
simply
inchoate
Duty
to
collate
‐ any
property
which
the
compulsory
heir
may
have
gratuitously
received
from
his
predecessor
by
virtue
of
the
renunciation
or
compromise
will
be
considered
as
an
advance
on
his
legitime
and
must
be
duly
credited
o e.g.
if
son
asked
for
30M
from
his
father
in
order
to
start
a
business,
and
the
father
agrees,
the
30M
would
be
considered
as
an
advance
on
the
son’s
legitime
during
the
settlement
of
his
father’s
estate,
if
it
turns
out
that
the
son
is
entitled
to
50M
as
legitime,
he
would
be
given
20M
more
(the
30M
already
credited
to
his
legitime)
Scope
and
prohibition
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
‐
article
only
applies
to
transactions
of
compromise
or
renunciation
between
the
predecessor
and
the
prospective
compulsory
heir
o BUT
a
transaction
of
similar
character
between
a
prospective
compulsory
heir
and
another
prospective
compulsory
heir,
or
between
a
prospective
compulsory
heir
and
a
stranger,
also
not
allowed
(ART.
1347,
par.
2)
e.g.
A
asked
50M
from
his
wealthy
brother,
B
in
order
to
start
a
business,
in
exchange
for
which
A
renounces
the
legitime
he
will
get
from
their
father
X
in
favor
of
B;
X
dies;
during
the
settlement
of
X’s
estate
it
turns
out
that
A
is
entitled
to
80M
as
legitime;
B
claims
that
A
can
no
longer
get
the
30M
balance
as
A
already
renounced
his
share
in
favor
of
B;
B
is
wrong,
for
A
can
still
get
his
30M
share
ART.
906.
Any
compulsory
heir
to
whom
the
testator
has
left
by
any
title
less
than
the
legitime
belonging
to
him
may
demand
that
the
same
be
fully
satisfied.
ART.
906
applies
only
to
transmissions
by
gratuitous
title
‐ e.g.
donation,
etc.
This
is
the
wellknown
right
of
completion
of
legitime
‐ cf.
ART.
855,
909
and
910
Principle:
anything
that
a
compulsory
heir
receives
by
gratuitous
title
from
the
predecessor
is
considered
as
an
advance
on
the
legitime
and
is
deducted
therefrom
‐ exceptions:
o if
the
predecessor
gave
the
compulsory
heir
a
donation
inter
vivos
and
provided
that
it
was
not
to
be
charged
against
the
legitime
(ART.
1062)
o testamentary
dispositions
made
by
the
predecessor
to
the
compulsory
heir,
unless
the
testator
provides
that
it
should
be
considered
part
of
the
legitime
(ART.
1063)
ART.
907.
Testamentary
dispositions
that
impair
or
diminish
the
legitime
of
the
compulsory
heirs
shall
be
reduced
on
petition
of
the
same,
insofar
as
they
may
be
inofficious
or
excessive.
Notes:
‐ same
principle
as
in
ART.
904
‐ if
testamentary
dispositions
exceed
the
disposable
portion,
compulsory
heirs
may
demand
their
reduction
to
the
extent
that
the
legitimes
have
been
impaired
‐ cf.
ART.
911
ART.
908.
To
determine
the
legitime,
the
value
of
the
property
left
at
the
death
of
the
testator
shall
be
considered,
deducting
all
debts
and
charges,
which
shall
Page 42 of 73
not
include
those
imposed
in
the
will.
To
the
net
value
of
the
hereditary
estate,
shall
be
added
the
value
of
all
donations
by
the
testator
that
are
subject
to
collation,
at
the
time
he
made
them.
The
net
hereditary
estate
‐ ART.
908
makes
possible
the
computation
of
the
absolute
amounts
of
the
legitimes
by
laying
down
the
manner
of
computing
the
net
value
of
the
estate
(the
net
hereditary
estate),
on
which
the
proportions
are
based
How
to
compute
the
hereditary
estate:
‐ inventory
of
all
existing
assets
o appraisal
or
valuation
of
existing
assets
at
the
time
of
the
decedent’s
death
o assets
include
only
those
that
survive
the
decedent
(i.e.
not
extinguished
by
his
death)
o value
determined
by
inventory
will
constitute
the
gross
assets
‐ deduct
unpaid
debts
and
charges
o all
unpaid
obligations
of
the
decedent
must
be
deducted
from
gross
assets
o only
obligations
with
monetary
value,
not
extinguished
by
death,
are
considered
(i.e.
not
intuitu
personae
obligations)
o difference
between
gross
assets
and
unpaid
obligations
will
be
the
available
assets
‐ add
the
value
of
donations
inter
vivos
o add
to
the
value
of
available
assets
all
the
inter
vivos
donations
made
by
the
decedent
o donations
inter
vivos
must
be
valued
as
of
the
time
they
were
made
(increase
or
decrease
in
value,
for
the
donee’s
account)
o sum
of
available
assets
and
all
donations
inter
vivos
is
the
net
hereditary
estate
To
illustrate—
‐ inventoried
assets:
17M
(gross
assets)
‐ deduct
debts:
6M
(11M
as
available
assets)
‐ add
donations
inter
vivos:
4M
(15M
as
net
hereditary
estate)
o if
testator
left
3
legitimate
children
and
a
surviving
spouse,
they
will
get
the
following:
2.5M
each
to
3
legitimate
children
(rule:
1/2
of
estate)
2.5M
to
surviving
spouse
(rule:
share
equivalent
to
that
of
one
child)
total
legitimes:
10M
free
portion:
1M
(note:
available
assets,
only
11M;
value
of
net
hereditary
estate
[15M]
only
relevant
for
purposes
of
computing
the
legitimes)
Vizconde
v.
CA
(1998)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Facts:
Decedent
sold
parcel
of
land
to
daughter.
Daughter
had
husband
and
two
children.
Daughter
and
children
died
in
massacre,
in
which
daughter
died
ahead.
Children
became
heirs
of
mother.
When
children
died,
their
father
(husband)
became
sole
heir.
Husband
(widower)
extrajudicially
settled
estate
of
wife
with
parents‐in‐law
(decedent
and
his
wife).
Decedent
died
and
a
collation
was
asked
where
widower
included.
Held:
That
inclusion
of
widower
(son‐in‐law
in
relation
to
decedent)
in
settlement
of
intestate
estate
of
his
father‐in‐ law
(father
of
his
late
wife)
is
erroneous
because
son‐in‐ law
not
a
compulsory
heir
of
his
father‐in‐law.
That
assuming
collation
were
proper,
still
property
sold
by
decedent
to
his
dead
daughter
(wife
of
decedent’s
son‐in‐ law
or
the
widower)
not
collationable
for
the
reason
that
transfer
was
not
by
gratuitous
title
but
by
onerous
title
(sale).
That
obligation
to
collate
is
lodged
with
decedent’s
compulsory
heir,
his
dead
daughter,
and
not
to
said
deceased
daughter’s
husband.
ART.
909.
Donations
given
to
children
shall
be
charged
to
their
legitime.
Donations
made
to
strangers
shall
be
charged
to
that
part
of
the
estate
of
which
the
testator
could
have
disposed
by
his
last
will.
Insofar
as
they
may
be
inofficious
or
may
exceed
the
disposable
portion,
they
shall
be
reduced
according
to
the
rules
established
by
this
Code.
ART.
910.
Donations
which
an
illegitimate
child
may
have
received
during
the
lifetime
of
his
father
or
mother,
shall
be
charged
to
his
legitime.
Should
they
exceed
the
portion
that
can
be
freely
disposed
of,
they
shall
be
reduced
in
the
manner
prescribed
by
this
Code.
Donations
inter
vivos
to
compulsory
heirs,
considered
as
an
advance
on
their
legitimes
‐ coverage
of
rule
o applies
to
all
compulsory
heirs
including
ascendants
excluding
a
surviving
spouse
(except
in
cases
of
donations
propter
nuptias
and
moderate
gifts)
‐ exception
o rule
of
imputation
of
legitime
will
not
apply
if
donor
provided
otherwise
(vide
ART.
1062)
in
which
case
donation
to
be
imputed
to
the
free
portion
Donations
inter
vivos
to
strangers
‐ a
stranger
is
anyone
who
does
not
succeed
as
a
compulsory
heir
o e.g.
father,
if
decedent
has
children
‐ donations
inter
vivos
to
strangers
are
imputed
to
the
disposable
portion
ART.
911.
After
the
legitime
has
been
determined
in
accordance
with
the
three
preceding
articles,
the
Page 43 of 73
reduction
shall
be
made
as
follows:
(1)
Donations
shall
be
respected
as
long
as
the
legitime
can
be
covered,
reducing
or
annulling,
if
necessary,
the
devises
or
legacies
made
in
the
will;
(2)
The
reduction
of
the
devises
or
legacies
shall
be
pro
rata,
without
any
distinction
whatever;
If
the
testator
has
directed
that
a
certain
devise
or
legacy
be
paid
in
preference
to
others,
it
shall
not
suffer
any
reduction
until
the
latter
have
been
applied
in
full
to
the
payment
of
the
legitime.
(3)
If
the
devise
or
legacy
consists
of
a
usufruct
or
life
annuity,
whose
value
may
be
considered
greater
than
that
of
the
disposable
portion,
the
compulsory
heirs
may
choose
between
complying
with
the
testamentary
provision
and
delivering
to
the
devisee
or
legatee
the
part
of
the
inheritance
of
which
the
testator
could
freely
dispose.
Legitimes
are
inviolable
‐ if
impaired,
gratuitous
dispositions
of
the
testator
(inter
vivos
or
mortis
causa)
have
to
be
set
aside
or
reduced
as
may
be
required
to
cover
the
legitimes
Method
of
reduction*
‐ first,
reduce
pro
rata
the
non‐preferred
legacies
and
devises
(ART.
911[2]),
and
the
testamentary
dispositions
(to
heirs)
(ART.
907)
o no
preference
among
these
legacies,
devises,
and
testamentary
dispositions
‐ second,
reduce
pro
rata
the
preferred
legacies
and
devises
(ART.
911,
last
par.)
‐ third,
reduce
the
donations
inter
vivos
according
to
the
inverse
order
of
their
dates
(i.e.
the
oldest
is
the
most
preferred)
*reductions
shall
be
to
the
extent
required
to
complete
the
legitimes,
even
if
in
the
process,
the
disposition
is
reduced
to
nothing
Devises
/
legacies
of
usufruct
/
life
annuities
/
pensions
(ART.
911[3])
‐ if
upon
being
capitalized
according
to
actuarial
standards,
the
value
of
the
grant
exceeds
the
free
portion
(i.e.
it
impairs
the
legitime),
it
has
to
be
reduced,
because
the
legitime
cannot
be
impaired
‐ the
testator
can
impose
no
usufruct
or
any
other
encumbrance
on
the
part
that
passes
as
legitime
‐ subject
to
the
two
rules
abovementioned,
the
compulsory
heirs
may
elect
between
ceding
to
the
devisee
/
legatee
the
free
portion
(or
the
proportional
part
thereof
corresponding
to
the
said
legacy
/
devise,
in
case
there
are
other
dispositions),
and
complying
with
the
terms
of
the
usufruct
or
life
annuity
or
pension
Art.
912.
If
the
devise
subject
to
reduction
should
consist
of
real
property,
which
cannot
be
conveniently
divided,
it
shall
go
to
the
devisee
if
the
reduction
does
not
absorb
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
one‐half
of
its
value;
and
in
a
contrary
case,
to
the
compulsory
heirs;
but
the
former
and
the
latter
shall
reimburse
each
other
in
cash
for
what
respectively
belongs
to
them.
The
devisee
who
is
entitled
to
a
legitime
may
retain
the
entire
property,
provided
its
value
does
not
exceed
that
of
the
disposable
portion
and
of
the
share
pertaining
to
him
as
legitime.
(821)
Balane:
Provision
covers
the
ff.
cases:
1. The
devisee
has
to
be
reduced
2. The
thing
given
as
a
devise
is
indivisible
• In
either
case,
there
should
be
pecuniary
reimbursment
to
the
party
who
did
not
get
his
physical
portion
of
the
thing
Rules:
1. If
the
extent
of
reduction
is
less
than
½
of
the
value
of
the
thing
–
it
should
be
given
to
the
devisee.
2. If
the
extenet
of
reduction
is
½
or
more
of
the
value
of
the
thing
–
it
should
be
given
to
the
compulsory
heir.
Art.
913.
If
the
heirs
or
devisees
do
not
choose
to
avail
themselves
of
the
right
granted
by
the
preceding
article,
any
heir
or
devisee
who
did
not
have
such
right
may
exercise
it;
should
the
latter
not
make
use
of
it,
the
property
shall
be
sold
at
public
auction
at
the
instance
of
any
one
of
the
interested
parties.
(822)
Balane:
• This
article
applies
if
neither
party
(the
compulsory
heir
and
the
devisee)
elects
to
exercise
his
right
under
Art.
912.
Rules:
1. Any
other
heir
or
devisee,
who
elects
to
do
so,
may
acquire
the
thing
and
pay
the
parties
(the
compulsory
heir
and
the
devisee
in
question)
their
respective
share
in
money.
2. If
no
heir
or
devisee
elects
to
acquire
it,
it
shall
be
sold
at
public
auction
and
the
net
proceeds
accordingly
divided
between
the
parties
concerned.
Art.
914
The
testator
may
devise
and
bequeath
the
free
portion
as
he
may
deem
fit.
(n)
6. Disinheritance
Art.
915.
A
compulsory
heir
may,
in
consequence
of
disinheritance,
be
deprived
of
his
legitime,
for
causes
expressly
stated
by
law.
(848a).
Balane:
Requisites
of
a
valid
disinheritance:
(SLaWPUTT)
1. It
must
be
made
in
a
will.
• It
must
be
admitted
into
probate.
2. It
must
be
for
a
cause
specified
by
law.
3. The
will
must
specify
the
cause.
4. It
must
be
unconditional.
Page 44 of 73
5. 6. 7.
It
must
be
total.
The
cause
must
be
true.
If
the
truth
of
the
cause
is
denied,
it
must
be
proved
by
the
proponent.
Effect
of
disinheritance:
The
disinherited
heir
forfeits:
1. his
legitime
2. his
intestate
portion,
if
any,
and
3. any
testamentary
disposition
made
in
a
prior
will
of
the
disinheriting
testator
Class
Notes:
• This
should
be
correlated
with
Art.
904.
Art.
916.
Disinheritance
can
be
effected
only
through
a
will
wherein
the
legal
cause
therefor
shall
be
specified.
(849)
Art.
917.
The
burden
of
proving
the
truth
of
the
cause
for
disinheritance
shall
rest
upon
the
other
heirs
of
the
testator,
if
the
disinherited
heir
should
deny
it.
(850)
Art.
918.
Disinheritance
without
a
specification
of
the
cause,
or
for
a
cause
the
truth
of
which,
if
contradicted,
is
not
proved,
or
which
is
not
one
of
those
set
forth
in
this
Code,
shall
annul
the
institution
of
heirs
insofar
as
it
may
prejudice
the
person
disinherited;
but
the
devises
and
legacies
and
other
testamentary
dispositions
shall
be
valid
to
such
extent
as
will
not
impair
the
legitime.
(851a)
Balane:
• If
the
disinheritance
lacks
one
or
other
of
the
requisites
in
this
article,
the
heir
in
question
gets
his
legitime.
• As
to
whether
he
will
get
also
any
part
of
the
intestate
portion
or
not,
it
depends
in
whether
the
testator
gave
away
the
free
portion
through
testamentary
dispositions:
o If
through
testamentary
provision,
these
dispositions
are
valid
and
the
compulsory
heir
improperly
disinherited
gets
only
his
legitime.
o He
will
get
his
corresponding
share
of
the
free
portion
is
if
is
not
through
testamentary
provision.
Art.
919.
The
following
shall
be
sufficient
causes
for
the
disinheritance
of
children
and
descendants,
legitimate
as
well
as
illegitimate:
(1)
When
a
child
or
descendant
has
been
found
guilty
of
an
attempt
against
the
life
of
the
testator,
his
or
her
spouse,
descendants,
or
ascendants;
(2)
When
a
child
or
descendant
has
accused
the
testator
of
a
crime
for
which
the
law
prescribes
imprisonment
for
six
years
or
more,
if
the
accusation
has
been
found
groundless;
(3)
When
a
child
or
descendant
has
been
convicted
of
adultery
or
concubinage
with
the
spouse
of
the
testator;
(4)
When
a
child
or
descendant
by
fraud,
violence,
intimidation,
or
undue
influence
causes
the
testator
to
make
a
will
or
to
change
one
already
made;
(5)
A
refusal
without
justifiable
cause
to
support
the
parent
or
ascendant
who
disinherits
such
child
or
descendant;
(6)
Maltreatment
of
the
testator
by
word
or
deed,
by
the
child
or
descendant;
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
(7)
When
a
child
or
descendant
leads
a
dishonorable
or
disgraceful
life;
(8)
Conviction
of
a
crime
which
carries
with
it
the
penalty
of
civil
interdiction.
(756,
853,
674a)
Balane:
Grounds
for
disinheritance:
(DAMAFASI)
1. Attempt
against
the
life
• All
stages
of
commission
are
included
–
attempted,
frustrtaed
or
consumated.
• Intent
to
kill
must
be
present.
• Final
conviction
is
necessary.
2. Accusation
• This
includes
the
filing
of
the
complaint
before
the
prosecutor,
or
presenting
incriminating
evidence
against
the
testator,
or
even
supressing
exculpatory
evidence.
• There
should
be
imprisonment
of
more
than
six
years.
• The
accusation
must
be
found
to
be
groundless.
3. Adultery
and
concubinage
• Final
conviction
is
required.
4. Fraud,
violence,
intimidation
and
undue
influence
in
the
making
of
the
will
5. Refusal
to
support
without
justifiable
cause
• The
demand
must
be
unjustifiably
refused.
• Refusal
may
be
justified:
o E.g.
If
the
obligor
does
not
have
enough
resources
for
all
whom
he
is
obliged
to
support.
The
ascendants
are
only
third
in
the
hierarchy
of
preference
among
claimants
of
support.
6. Maltreatment
• It
is
required
that
the
act
of
verbal
or
physical
assault
be
of
serious
nature.
• No
conviction
is
required.
It
is
not
even
required
that
any
criminal
case
be
filed.
• This
may
be
proved
by
preponderance
of
evidence.
7. Leads
a
dishonorable
or
disgraceful
life
• There
must
be
habituality
to
the
conduct.
• The
conduct
need
not
be
sexual
in
nature.
8. Crime
with
civil
interdiction
o Final
conviction
is
required.
Class
Notes:
• Accusation
o The
exoneration
or
acquittal
must
be
because
the
charge
is
groundless.
If
the
acquittal
is
only
beyond
reasonable
doubt,
then
there
is
some
ground.
• Fraud,
violence,
intimidation
and
undue
influence
in
the
making
of
the
will
o No
conviction
is
required
here
• Maltreatment
o Usually
this
is
hard
to
prove
because
there
is
no
witness
and
the
testator
is
dead.
• Leads
a
dishonorable
or
disgraceful
life
o It
cannot
be
only
once.
o It
need
not
be
sexual
in
nature.
For
example,
partaking
in
the
pork
barrel
scam
with
Janet
Napoles.
Page 45 of 73
Art.
920.
The
following
shall
be
sufficient
causes
for
the
disinheritance
of
parents
or
ascendants,
whether
legitimate
or
illegitimate:
(1)
When
the
parents
have
abandoned
their
children
or
induced
their
daughters
to
live
a
corrupt
or
immoral
life,
or
attempted
against
their
virtue;
(2)
When
the
parent
or
ascendant
has
been
convicted
of
an
attempt
against
the
life
of
the
testator,
his
or
her
spouse,
descendants,
or
ascendants;
(3)
When
the
parent
or
ascendant
has
accused
the
testator
of
a
crime
for
which
the
law
prescribes
imprisonment
for
six
years
or
more,
if
the
accusation
has
been
found
to
be
false;
(4)
When
the
parent
or
ascendant
has
been
convicted
of
adultery
or
concubinage
with
the
spouse
of
the
testator;
(5)
When
the
parent
or
ascendant
by
fraud,
violence,
intimidation,
or
undue
influence
causes
the
testator
to
make
a
will
or
to
change
one
already
made;
(6)
The
loss
of
parental
authority
for
causes
specified
in
this
Code;
(7)
The
refusal
to
support
the
children
or
descendants
without
justifiable
cause;
(8)
An
attempt
by
one
of
the
parents
against
the
life
of
the
other,
unless
there
has
been
a
reconciliation
between
them.
(756,
854,
674a)
Balane:
• Number
2,
3,
4,
5
and
7
are
the
same
ground
under
Article
919.
Other
grounds
for
disinheritance
of
parents
or
ascendants:
(CIA)
1. Abandonment
by
parent
of
his
children
• This
is
not
restricted
to
those
instances
of
abandonment
penalized
by
law.
2. Inducement
to
live
a
corrupt
or
immoral
life.
• Applies
only
to
daughters
• It
includes
grandparents
to
granddaughters
as
the
provision
contemplates
ascendants
vis‐à‐vis
descendants.
• Mere
attempt
against
their
virtue
is
enough
as
long
as
it
can
be
proven.
• No
conviction
is
required
in
all
three
cases
provided
in
the
provision.
3. Loss
of
parental
authority
• Not
all
causes
for
loss
of
parental
authority
are
grounds
for
disinheritance;
for
instance,
attainment
of
majority.
• Only
those
causes
which
involve
culpability
on
the
part
of
the
parents
will
provide
grounds
for
disinheritance:
o Judicial
deprivation
of
parental
authority
on
the
ground
of
sexual
abuse
o Loss
of
parental
authority
as
a
result
of
judicial
declaration
of
abandonment
of
the
child
o Judicial
deprivation
of
parental
authority
on
the
grounds
of
Excessively
harsh
or
cruel
treatment
of
the
child
Giving
the
child
corrupting
orders,
counsel
or
example
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Compelling
the
child
to
be
or
Subjecting
the
child
or
allowing
him
to
be
subjected
to
acts
of
lasciviousness
Attempt
against
the
life
of
a
parent
by
another
• Includes
all
stages
of
consummation.
No
conviction
is
required.
4.
Class
Notes:
• Accusation
Art.
921.
The
following
shall
be
sufficient
causes
for
disinheriting
a
spouse:
(1)
When
the
spouse
has
been
convicted
of
an
attempt
against
the
life
of
the
testator,
his
or
her
descendants,
or
ascendants;
(2)
When
the
spouse
has
accused
the
testator
of
a
crime
for
which
the
law
prescribes
imprisonment
of
six
years
or
more,
and
the
accusation
has
been
found
to
be
false;
(3)
When
the
spouse
by
fraud,
violence,
intimidation,
or
undue
influence
cause
the
testator
to
make
a
will
or
to
change
one
already
made;
(4)
When
the
spouse
has
given
cause
for
legal
separation;
(5)
When
the
spouse
has
given
grounds
for
the
loss
of
parental
authority;
(6)
Unjustifiable
refusal
to
support
the
children
or
the
other
spouse.
(756,
855,
674a)
Balane:
• The
only
new
ground
is
number
four.
A
decree
of
legal
separation
is
not
required.
There
are
ten
causes
of
legal
separation
given
in
Article
55
of
the
Family
Code.
• Art.
55.
A
petition
for
legal
separation
may
be
filed
on
any
of
the
following
grounds:
o (1)
Repeated
physical
violence
or
grossly
abusive
conduct
directed
against
the
petitioner,
a
common
child,
or
a
child
of
the
petitioner;
o (2)
Physical
violence
or
moral
pressure
to
compel
the
petitioner
to
change
religious
or
political
affiliation;
o (3)
Attempt
of
respondent
to
corrupt
or
induce
the
petitioner,
a
common
child,
or
a
child
of
the
petitioner,
to
engage
in
prostitution,
or
connivance
in
such
corruption
or
inducement;
o (4)
Final
judgment
sentencing
the
respondent
to
imprisonment
of
more
than
six
years,
even
if
pardoned;
o (5)
Drug
addiction
or
habitual
alcoholism
of
the
respondent;
o (6)
Lesbianism
or
homosexuality
of
the
respondent;
o (7)
Contracting
by
the
respondent
of
a
subsequent
bigamous
marriage,
whether
in
the
Philippines
or
abroad;
o (8)
Sexual
infidelity
or
perversion;
o (9)
Attempt
by
the
respondent
against
the
life
of
the
petitioner;
or
o (10)
Abandonment
of
petitioner
by
respondent
without
justifiable
cause
for
more
than
one
year.
Page 46 of 73
For
purposes
of
this
Article,
the
term
"child"
shall
include
a
child
by
nature
or
by
adoption.
(9a)
Unlike
in
Art.
920
where
actual
loss
of
parental
authority
is
required,
here
giving
grounds
therefor
is
sufficient.
o
•
Art.
922.
A
subsequent
reconciliation
between
the
offender
and
the
offended
person
deprives
the
latter
of
the
right
to
disinherit,
and
renders
ineffectual
any
disinheritance
that
may
have
been
made.
(856)
Balane:
Reconciliation
is
either:
1. An
express
pardon
–
which
must
be
expressly
and
concretely
extended
to
the
offender
who
accepts
it.
A
general
pardon
extended
by
the
testator
on
his
deatbed
to
all
who
have
offended
him
will
not
suffice.
2. An
unequivocal
conduct
–
wherein
the
intent
to
forgive
must
be
clear.
This
is
ultimately
a
question
of
facts
which
must
be
resolved
by
the
courts.
Effects
of
reconciliation:
1. If
it
occurs
before
disinheritance
is
made
–
right
to
disinherit
is
distinguished.
2. If
it
occurs
after
the
disinheritance
is
made,
disinheritance
is
set
aside.
Effects
of
setting
aside
disinheritance:
1. Disinherited
heir
is
restored
to
his
legitime.
2. If
the
disinheriting
will
did
not
dispose
of
the
disposable
protion,
the
disinherited
heir
is
entitled
to
his
proportionate
share,
if
any,
of
the
disposable
portion.
3. If
the
disposable
will
or
any
of
the
subsequent
will
disposed
of
the
disposable
portion
(or
any
part
thereof)
in
favor
of
testamentary
heirs,
legatees,
or
devisees,
such
dispositions
remain
valid.
Art.
923.
The
children
and
descendants
of
the
person
disinherited
shall
take
his
or
her
place
and
shall
preserve
the
rights
of
compulsory
heirs
with
respect
to
the
legitime;
but
the
disinherited
parent
shall
not
have
the
usufruct
or
administration
of
the
property
which
constitutes
the
legitime.
(857)
Balane:
• The
right
of
representation
is
granted
only
to
descendants
of
disinherited
descendants.
However
if
the
heir
disinherited
is
a
parent/ascendant
or
spouse,
the
children
or
descendants
of
the
disinherited
heir
do
not
have
any
right
of
representation.
• The
representative
takes
the
place
of
the
disinherited
heir
not
only
with
respect
to
the
legitime,
but
also
to
any
intestate
portion
the
disinherited
heir
would
have
inherited.
Representation
therefore,
occurs
in
compulsory
and
intestate
succession
but
not
in
testamentary
succession.
8.
Legacies and Devises
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Art.
924.
All
things
and
rights
which
are
within
the
commerce
of
man
be
bequeathed
or
devised.
(865a)
Balane:
• What
can
be
devised
or
bequethed:
anything
within
the
commerce
of
man.
It
is
not
required
that
the
thing
devised
or
bequethed
belong
to
the
testator.
• Limitations
on
legacy
or
devise
–
it
should
not
impair
the
legitime.
Art.
925.
A
testator
may
charge
with
legacies
and
devises
not
only
his
compulsory
heirs
but
also
the
legatees
and
devisees.
The
latter
shall
be
liable
for
the
charge
only
to
the
extent
of
the
value
of
the
legacy
or
the
devise
received
by
them.
The
compulsory
heirs
shall
not
be
liable
for
the
charge
beyond
the
amount
of
the
free
portion
given
them.
(858a)
Balane:
• The
wording
of
this
provision
is
erroneous.
A
compulsory
heir
as
such
cannot
be
burdened
with
a
legacy
or
devise
because
that
would
impair
his
legitime.
Only
a
testamentary
heir
can
be
so
burdened.
Art.
926.
When
the
testator
charges
one
of
the
heirs
with
a
legacy
or
devise,
he
alone
shall
be
bound.
Should
he
not
charge
anyone
in
particular,
all
shall
be
liable
in
the
same
proportion
in
which
they
may
inherit.
(859)
Balane:
• General
rule
is
that
the
estate
is
charged
with
the
legacy.
• Exception
is
that
the
testator
may
impose
the
burden
on
a
testamentary
heir
or
a
legatee
or
devisee.
If
he
does
so,
then
the
heir,
legatee,
or
devisee
charged
will,
if
he
accepts
the
disposition
in
his
favor,
be
bound
to
deliver
the
legacy
or
devise
to
the
person
specified.
Art.
927.
If
two
or
more
heirs
take
possession
of
the
estate,
they
shall
be
solidarily
liable
for
the
loss
or
destruction
of
a
thing
devised
or
bequeathed,
even
though
only
one
of
them
should
have
been
negligent.
(n)
Balane:
• The
liability
imposed
gere
is
based
on
malice,
fault
or
negligence.
The
liability
will
also
attach
to
the
executor
or
administrator
in
the
proper
cases.
Art.
928.
The
heir
who
is
bound
to
deliver
the
legacy
or
devise
shall
be
liable
in
case
of
eviction,
if
the
thing
is
indeterminate
and
is
indicated
only
by
its
kind.
(860)
Balane:
• General
rule,
the
estate
is
liable
in
case
of
eviction.
• Exception
is
in
the
case
of
a
subsidiary
legacy
or
devise,
the
heir,
legatee
or
devisee
charged
shall
be
liable.
Art.
929.
If
the
testator,
heir,
or
legatee
owns
only
a
part
Page 47 of 73
of,
or
an
interest
in
the
thing
bequeathed,
the
legacy
or
devise
shall
be
understood
limited
to
such
part
or
interest,
unless
the
testator
expressly
declares
that
he
gives
the
thing
in
its
entirety.
(864a)
Art.
930.
The
legacy
or
devise
of
a
thing
belonging
to
another
person
is
void,
if
the
testator
erroneously
believed
that
the
thing
pertained
to
him.
But
if
the
thing
bequeathed,
though
not
belonging
to
the
testator
when
he
made
the
will,
afterwards
becomes
his,
by
whatever
title,
the
disposition
shall
take
effect.
(862a)
Art.
931.
If
the
testator
orders
that
a
thing
belonging
to
another
be
acquired
in
order
that
it
be
given
to
a
legatee
or
devisee,
the
heir
upon
whom
the
obligation
is
imposed
or
the
estate
must
acquire
it
and
give
the
same
to
the
legatee
or
devisee;
but
if
the
owner
of
the
thing
refuses
to
alienate
the
same,
or
demands
an
excessive
price
therefor,
the
heir
or
the
estate
shall
only
be
obliged
to
give
the
just
value
of
the
thing.
(861a)
Art.
932.
The
legacy
or
devise
of
a
thing
which
at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
the
will
already
belonged
to
the
legatee
or
devisee
shall
be
ineffective,
even
though
another
person
may
have
some
interest
therein.
If
the
testator
expressly
orders
that
the
thing
be
freed
from
such
interest
or
encumbrance,
the
legacy
or
devise
shall
be
valid
to
that
extent.
(866a)
Art.
933.
If
the
thing
bequeathed
belonged
to
the
legatee
or
devisee
at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
the
will,
the
legacy
or
devise
shall
be
without
effect,
even
though
it
may
have
subsequently
alienated
by
him.
If
the
legatee
or
devisee
acquires
it
gratuitously
after
such
time,
he
can
claim
nothing
by
virtue
of
the
legacy
or
devise;
but
if
it
has
been
acquired
by
onerous
title
he
can
demand
reimbursement
from
the
heir
or
the
estate.
(878a)
Art.
934.
If
the
testator
should
bequeath
or
devise
something
pledged
or
mortgaged
to
secure
a
recoverable
debt
before
the
execution
of
the
will,
the
estate
is
obliged
to
pay
the
debt,
unless
the
contrary
intention
appears.
The
same
rule
applies
when
the
thing
is
pledged
or
mortgaged
after
the
execution
of
the
will.
Any
other
charge,
perpetual
or
temporary,
with
which
the
thing
bequeathed
is
burdened,
passes
with
it
to
the
legatee
or
devisee.
(867a)
Art.
935.
The
legacy
of
a
credit
against
a
third
person
or
of
the
remission
or
release
of
a
debt
of
the
legatee
shall
be
effective
only
as
regards
that
part
of
the
credit
or
debt
existing
at
the
time
of
the
death
of
the
testator.
In
the
first
case,
the
estate
shall
comply
with
the
legacy
by
assigning
to
the
legatee
all
rights
of
action
it
may
have
against
the
debtor.
In
the
second
case,
by
giving
the
legatee
an
acquittance,
should
he
request
one.
In
both
cases,
the
legacy
shall
comprise
all
interests
on
the
credit
or
debt
which
may
be
due
the
testator
at
the
time
of
his
death.
(870a)
Art.
936.
The
legacy
referred
to
in
the
preceding
article
shall
lapse
if
the
testator,
after
having
made
it,
should
bring
an
action
against
the
debtor
for
the
payment
of
his
debt,
even
if
such
payment
should
not
have
been
effected
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
at
the
time
of
his
death.
The
legacy
to
the
debtor
of
the
thing
pledged
by
him
is
understood
to
discharge
only
the
right
of
pledge.
(871)
Art.
937.
A
generic
legacy
of
release
or
remission
of
debts
comprises
those
existing
at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
the
will,
but
not
subsequent
ones.
(872)
Balane:
• Legacy/Devise
of
a
thing
owned
in
part
by
the
testator:
o General
Rule:
conveys
only
the
interest
or
part
owned
by
the
testator.
o Exception:
if
the
testator
provides
otherwise.
He
may
convey
more
than
he
owns.
The
estate
should
try
to
acquire
the
part
of
interest
owned
by
other
parties.
If
the
other
parties
are
unwilling
to
alienate,
the
estate
should
give
the
legatee/devisee
the
monetary
equivalent.
He
may
convey
less
than
he
owns.
• Legacy/Devise
of
a
thing
belonging
to
another:
o If
the
testator
ordered
the
acquisition
of
the
thing
–
the
order
should
be
complied
with.
If
the
owner
is
unwilling
to
part
with
the
thing,
the
legatee/devisee
should
be
given
the
monetary
equivalent.
o If
the
testator
erroneously
believed
that
the
thing
belonged
to
him
–
legacy/devise
void.
Exception:
if
subsequent
to
the
making
of
the
disposition,
the
thing
is
acquired
by
the
testator
onerously
or
gratuitously,
the
disposition
is
validated.
o If
the
testator
knew
that
the
thing
did
not
belong
to
him
but
did
not
order
its
acquisition,
the
Code
is
silent
on
this.
• Legacy/Devise
of
thing
belonging
to
the
legatee/devisee
or
subsequently
acquired
by
him:
o If
the
thing
already
belonged
to
the
legate/devisee
at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
the
will
–
legacy/devise
void.
It
is
not
validated
by
an
alienation
by
the
legatee/devisee
subsequent
to
the
making
of
the
will,
unless
the
acquirer
is
the
testator
himself.
o If
the
thing
was
owned
by
another
person
at
the
time
of
the
making
of
the
will
and
acquired
thereafter
by
the
legatee/devisee:
If
the
testator
erroneously
believed
that
it
belonged
to
him
–
legacy/devise
void.
If
the
testator
was
not
in
error.
• If
the
thing
was
acquired
onerously
by
legatee/devisee
–
Page 48 of 73
•
•
•
the
legatee/devisee
is
entitled
to
reimbursement
• If
the
thing
was
acquired
gratuitously
by
legatee/devisee,
nothing
more
is
due.
o If
the
thing
was
owned
by
the
testator
at
the
time
of
making
the
will
and
acquired
thereafter
from
him
by
the
legatee/devisee
–
Art
932
and
933
are
silent
on
this
but
Art.
957
par.
2
can
be
applied
and
the
legacy/devise
should
be
deemed
revoked.
Legacy/Devise
to
remove
an
encumbrance
over
a
thing
belonging
to
the
legatee/devisee:
o Valid
if
the
encumbrance
can
be
removed
for
a
consideration.
Legacy/Devise
of
a
thing
pledged:
o The
encumbrance
must
be
removed
by
paying
the
debt,
unless
the
testator
intended
otherwise.
o A
charge
other
than
a
pledge
or
mortgage
(as
a
usufruct
or
easement)
passes
to
the
legatee
or
devisee
together
with
the
thing
Legacy
of
credit
or
remission:
o Applies
only
to
amount
still
unpaid
at
the
time
of
the
testator’s
death
o Revoked
if
testator
subsequently
sues
the
debtor
for
collection
o If
generic,
applies
only
to
those
existing
at
the
time
of
execution
of
the
will,
unless
otherwise
provided
Art.
938.
A
legacy
or
devise
made
to
a
creditor
shall
not
be
applied
to
his
credit,
unless
the
testator
so
expressly
declares.
In
the
latter
case,
the
creditor
shall
have
the
right
to
collect
the
excess,
if
any,
of
the
credit
or
of
the
legacy
or
devise.
(837a)
Art.
939.
If
the
testator
orders
the
payment
of
what
he
believes
he
owes
but
does
not
in
fact
owe,
the
disposition
shall
be
considered
as
not
written.
If
as
regards
a
specified
debt
more
than
the
amount
thereof
is
ordered
paid,
the
excess
is
not
due,
unless
a
contrary
intention
appears.
The
foregoing
provisions
are
without
prejudice
to
the
fulfilment
of
natural
obligations.
(n)
Balane:
• Legacy/Devise
to
a
creditor
o General
rule:
It
will
be
treated
like
any
other
legacy/devise
and
therefore
will
not
be
imputed
to
the
debt.
o Exception:
It
will
be
imputed
to
the
debt
if
the
testator
so
provides,
and
if
the
debt
exceeds
the
legacy/devise,
the
excess
may
be
demanded
as
an
obligation
of
the
estate.
Art.
940.
In
alternative
legacies
or
devises,
the
choice
is
presumed
to
be
left
to
the
heir
upon
whom
the
obligation
to
give
the
legacy
or
devise
may
be
imposed,
or
the
executor
or
administrator
of
the
estate
if
no
particular
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
heir
is
so
obliged.
If
the
heir,
legatee
or
devisee,
who
may
have
been
given
the
choice,
dies
before
making
it,
this
right
shall
pass
to
the
respective
heirs.
Once
made,
the
choice
is
irrevocable.
In
the
alternative
legacies
or
devises,
except
as
herein
provided,
the
provisions
of
this
Code
regulating
obligations
of
the
same
kind
shall
be
observed,
save
such
modifications
as
may
appear
from
the
intention
expressed
by
the
testator.
(874a)
Balane:
To
whom
the
right
of
choice
(one
made
is
irrevoacble)
is
to
be
given:
• General
rule
o The
estate
through
the
executor
or
administrator
–
in
a
direct
legacy/devise
o The
heir,
legatee,
or
devisee
charged
–
in
a
subsidiary
legacy/devise
• Exception:
o The
legatee/devisee
(or
indeed
any
other
person),
if
the
testator
so
provides
If
the
person
who
is
to
choose
dies
before
the
choice
is
made:
• If
the
choice
belonged
to
executor
or
administrator
–
the
right
is
transmitted
to
his
successor
in
office.
• If
the
choice
belongs
to
an
heir,
legatee
or
devisee
–
the
right
is
transmitted
to
his
own
heirs.
Art.
941.
A
legacy
of
generic
personal
property
shall
be
valid
even
if
there
be
no
things
of
the
same
kind
in
the
estate.
A
devise
of
indeterminate
real
property
shall
be
valid
only
if
there
be
immovable
property
of
its
kind
in
the
estate.
The
right
of
choice
shall
belong
to
the
executor
or
administrator
who
shall
comply
with
the
legacy
by
the
delivery
of
a
thing
which
is
neither
of
inferior
nor
of
superior
quality.
(875a
Art.
942.
Whenever
the
testator
expressly
leaves
the
right
of
choice
to
the
heir,
or
to
the
legatee
or
devisee,
the
former
may
give
or
the
latter
may
choose
whichever
he
may
prefer.
(876a)
Art.
943.
If
the
heir,
legatee
or
devisee
cannot
make
the
choice,
in
case
it
has
been
granted
him,
his
right
shall
pass
to
his
heirs;
but
a
choice
once
made
shall
be
irrevocable.
(877a)
Balane:
Rules
on
validity:
• Generic
legacy
–
valid
even
If
no
such
movable
exist
in
the
testator’s
estate
upon
his
death.
The
estate
will
simply
have
to
acquire
what
is
given
by
legacy.
• Generic
devise
–
valid
only
if
there
exists
such
an
immovable
in
the
testator’s
estate
at
the
time
of
his
death
Rules
on
right
of
choice:
Page 49 of 73
• •
General
rule:
the
executor
or
administrator,
acting
for
the
estate
has
the
right
of
choice.
Exception:
if
the
testator
gives
the
right
of
choice
to
the
legatee/devisee,
or
to
the
heirs
on
whom
the
obligation
to
give
the
benefit
is
imposed
(in
a
subsidiary
legacy
or
devise)
Transmissibility
of
choices:
• If
the
choice
belongs
to
the
executor/administrator
and
he
dies
before
making
the
choice
–
right
is
transmitted
to
his
successor
in
the
position.
• If
the
choice
belongs
to
the
legatee/devisee
and
he
dies
before
making
the
choice
–
the
right
passed
to
his
heirs.
Regarding
choices:
• The
choice
must
be
limited
to
something
which
is
neither
superior
nor
inferior
in
quality.
This
rule
applies
whether
the
choice
belongs
to
the
executor/administrator
or
the
legatee/devisee.
Art.
944.
A
legacy
for
education
lasts
until
the
legatee
is
of
age,
or
beyond
the
age
of
majority
in
order
that
the
legatee
may
finish
some
professional,
vocational
or
general
course,
provided
he
pursues
his
course
diligently.
A
legacy
for
support
lasts
during
the
lifetime
of
the
legatee,
if
the
testator
has
not
otherwise
provided.
If
the
testator
has
not
fixed
the
amount
of
such
legacies,
it
shall
be
fixed
in
accordance
with
the
social
standing
and
the
circumstances
of
the
legatee
and
the
value
of
the
estate.
If
the
testator
or
during
his
lifetime
used
to
give
the
legatee
a
certain
sum
of
money
or
other
things
by
way
of
support,
the
same
amount
shall
be
deemed
bequeathed,
unless
it
be
markedly
disproportionate
to
the
value
of
the
estate.
(879a)
Balane:
• On
legacy
for
education:
o The
duration
is
the
age
of
majority
or
the
completion
of
a
professional,
vocational,
or
general
course,
whichever
comes
later
[in
the
latter
instance
only
if
the
legatee
pursues
his
studies
diligently.]
o On
the
amount,
it
is
primarily
fixed
by
the
testator.
Secodarily
is
that
which
is
proper
as
determined
by
two
variables:
(i)
the
social
standing
and
circumstances
of
the
legatee,
and
(ii)
the
value
of
the
disposable
portion
of
the
estate.
• On
legacy
for
support:
o The
duration
must
be
the
legatee’s
lifetime
unless
the
testator
provides
otherwise.
o The
amount
is
primarily
fixed
by
the
testator.
Secondarily
is
that
which
the
testator
during
his
lifetime
used
to
give
the
legatee
by
way
of
support,
unless
markedly
disproportionate
to
the
value
of
the
disposable
portion.
Tertiarily
is
that
which
reasonable,
on
the
basis
of
two
variables:
(i)
the
social
standing
and
circumstances
of
the
legatee,
and
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
•
(ii)
the
value
of
the
disposable
portion
of
the
estate.
Legacy
of
a
periodical
pension
can
be
demanded
upon
testator’s
death,
and
the
succeeding
ones
at
the
beginning
of
the
period
without
duty
to
reimburse
should
the
legatee
die
before
the
lapse
of
the
period.
Art.
945.
If
a
periodical
pension,
or
a
certain
annual,
monthly,
or
weekly
amount
is
bequeathed,
the
legatee
may
petition
the
court
for
the
first
installment
upon
the
death
of
the
testator,
and
for
the
following
ones
which
shall
be
due
at
the
beginning
of
each
period;
such
payment
shall
not
be
returned,
even
though
the
legatee
should
die
before
the
expiration
of
the
period
which
has
commenced.
(880a)
Art.
946.
If
the
thing
bequeathed
should
be
subject
to
a
usufruct,
the
legatee
or
devisee
shall
respect
such
right
until
it
is
legally
extinguished.
(868a)
Art.
947.
The
legatee
or
devisee
acquires
a
right
to
the
pure
and
simple
legacies
or
devises
from
the
death
of
the
testator,
and
transmits
it
to
his
heirs.
(881a)
Art.
948.
If
the
legacy
or
device
is
of
a
specific
and
determinate
thing
pertaining
to
the
testator,
the
legatee
or
devisee
acquires
the
ownership
thereof
upon
the
death
of
the
testator,
as
well
as
any
growing
fruits,
or
unborn
offspring
of
animals,
or
uncollected
income;
but
not
the
income
which
was
due
and
unpaid
before
the
latter's
death.
From
the
moment
of
the
testator's
death,
the
thing
bequeathed
shall
be
at
the
risk
of
the
legatee
or
devisee,
who
shall,
therefore,
bear
its
loss
or
deterioration,
and
shall
be
benefited
by
its
increase
or
improvement,
without
prejudice
to
the
responsibility
of
the
executor
or
administrator.
(882a)
Art.
949.
If
the
bequest
should
not
be
of
a
specific
and
determinate
thing,
but
is
generic
or
of
quantity,
its
fruits
and
interests
from
the
time
of
the
death
of
the
testator
shall
pertain
to
the
legatee
or
devisee
if
the
testator
has
expressly
so
ordered.
(884a)
Balane:
Rules
on
demandability,
ownership
and
fruits
of
legacies/devises:
• Demandability:
o pure
–
upon
testator’s
death
o with
a
(suspensive)
term
–
upon
arrival
of
the
term
o conditional
–
upon
the
happening
of
the
condition
• When
ownership
vests:
o pure
and
determinate
–
upon
testator’s
death
o pure
and
generic
–
if
from
testator’s
estate
‐
upon
testator’s
death
if
acquired
from
a
third
person
–
upon
acquisition
o with
a
(suspensive)
term
–
upon
arrival
of
the
term,
but
the
right
to
it
vests
upon
the
testator’s
death
Page 50 of 73
o
•
conditional
(suspensive)
–
upon
the
testator’s
death,
if
the
condition
is
fulfilled
Fruits:
o pure
and
determinate
–
upon
testator’s
death
o pure
and
generic
‐
upon
determination,
unless
the
testator
provides
otherwise
o with
a
term
–
upon
arrival
of
the
term
o with
a
condition
–
upon
the
happening
of
such
condition,
unless
the
testator
provides
otherwise
Art.
950.
If
the
estate
should
not
be
sufficient
to
cover
all
the
legacies
or
devises,
their
payment
shall
be
made
in
the
following
order:
(1)
Remuneratory
legacies
or
devises;
(2)
Legacies
or
devises
declared
by
the
testator
to
be
preferential;
(3)
Legacies
for
support;
(4)
Legacies
for
education;
(5)
Legacies
or
devises
of
a
specific,
determinate
thing
which
forms
a
part
of
the
estate;
(6)
All
others
pro
rata.
(887a)
Art.
951.
The
thing
bequeathed
shall
be
delivered
with
all
its
accessories
and
accessories
and
in
the
condition
in
which
it
may
be
upon
the
death
of
the
testator.
(883a)
Art.
952.
The
heir,
charged
with
a
legacy
or
devise,
or
the
executor
or
administrator
of
the
estate,
must
deliver
the
very
thing
bequeathed
if
he
is
able
to
do
so
and
cannot
discharge
this
obligation
by
paying
its
value.
Legacies
of
money
must
be
paid
in
cash,
even
though
the
heir
or
the
estate
may
not
have
any.
The
expenses
necessary
for
the
delivery
of
the
thing
bequeathed
shall
be
for
the
account
of
the
heir
or
the
estate,
but
without
prejudice
to
the
legitime.
(886a)
Art.
953.
The
legatee
or
devisee
cannot
take
possession
of
the
thing
bequeathed
upon
his
own
authority,
but
shall
request
its
delivery
and
possession
of
the
heir
charged
with
the
legacy
or
devise,
or
of
the
executor
or
administrator
of
the
estate
should
he
be
authorized
by
the
court
to
deliver
it.
(885a)
Art.
954.
The
legatee
or
devisee
cannot
accept
a
part
of
the
legacy
or
devise
and
repudiate
the
other,
if
the
latter
be
onerous.
Should
he
die
before
having
accepted
the
legacy
or
devise,
leaving
several
heirs,
some
of
the
latter
may
accept
and
the
others
may
repudiate
the
share
respectively
belonging
to
them
in
the
legacy
or
devise.
(889a)
Art.
955.
The
legatee
or
devisee
of
two
legacies
or
devises,
one
of
which
is
onerous,
cannot
renounce
the
onerous
one
and
accept
the
other.
If
both
are
onerous
or
gratuitous,
he
shall
be
free
to
accept
or
renounce
both,
or
to
renounce
either.
But
if
the
testator
intended
that
the
two
legacies
or
devises
should
be
inseparable
from
each
other,
the
legatee
or
devisee
must
either
accept
or
renounce
both.
Any
compulsory
heir
who
is
at
the
same
time
a
legatee
or
devisee
may
waive
the
inheritance
and
accept
the
legacy
or
devise,
or
renounce
the
latter
and
accept
the
former,
or
waive
or
accept
both.
(890a)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Balane:
Rules
on
acceptance
and
repudiation
of
legacies/devises:
1. Aceptance
maybe
total
or
partial
(as
implied
from
Art.
954,
par.1)
• Exception:
If
the
legacy/devise
is
partly
onerous
and
partly
gratuitous,
the
recipient
cannot
accept
the
gratuitous
part
and
the
renounce
the
onerous
part.
Any
other
combination
however
is
permitted.
• If
the
legatee
or
devisee
dies
before
accepting
or
renouncing,
his
heirs
shall
exercise
such
right
as
to
their
pro‐indiviso
share,
and
in
the
same
manner
as
outlined
above.
2. When
there
is
two
legacies/devises
to
the
same
recipient:
• If
both
gratuitous
–
the
recipient
may
accept
or
renounce
either
or
both
• If
both
onerous
–
same
rule
as
above
• If
one
is
gratuitous
and
the
other
is
onerous
–
the
recipient
cannot
accept
the
gratuitous
part
and
the
renounce
the
onerous
part.
Any
other
combination
however
is
permitted.
3. When
legacy
or
devise
is
also
given
to
one
who
is
a
compulsory
heir
• The
recipient
may
accept
either
or
both
4. Effect
if
will
provide
otherwise
–
all
the
rules
above
outlined
apply
in
the
absence
of
a
stipulation
in
the
will
providing
otherwise.
Art.
956.
If
the
legatee
or
devisee
cannot
or
is
unwilling
to
accept
the
legacy
or
devise,
or
if
the
legacy
or
devise
for
any
reason
should
become
ineffective,
it
shall
be
merged
into
the
mass
of
the
estate,
except
in
cases
of
substitution
and
of
the
right
of
accretion.
(888a)
Balane:
Rules
in
case
of
repudiation
by
or
incapacity
of
legatee/devisee:
1. Primarily
–
substitution
2. Secondarily
–
accretion
3. Tertiarily
–
intestacy
Art.
957.
The
legacy
or
devise
shall
be
without
effect:
(1)
If
the
testator
transforms
the
thing
bequeathed
in
such
a
manner
that
it
does
not
retain
either
the
form
or
the
denomination
it
had;
(2)
If
the
testator
by
any
title
or
for
any
cause
alienates
the
thing
bequeathed
or
any
part
thereof,
it
being
understood
that
in
the
latter
case
the
legacy
or
devise
shall
be
without
effect
only
with
respect
to
the
part
thus
alienated.
If
after
the
alienation
the
thing
should
again
belong
to
the
testator,
even
if
it
be
by
reason
of
nullity
of
the
contract,
the
legacy
or
devise
shall
not
thereafter
be
valid,
unless
the
reacquisition
shall
have
been
effected
by
virtue
of
the
exercise
of
the
right
of
repurchase;
(3)
If
the
thing
bequeathed
is
totally
lost
during
the
lifetime
of
the
testator,
or
after
his
death
without
the
heir's
fault.
Nevertheless,
the
person
obliged
to
pay
the
legacy
or
devise
shall
be
liable
for
eviction
if
the
thing
bequeathed
should
not
have
been
determinate
as
to
its
kind,
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
Article
928.
(869a)
Page 51 of 73
Balane:
Instances
when
legacy/devise
is
revoked
by
operation
of
law:
1. transformation
–
the
testator
converts
a
plantation
into
a
fishpond
2. alienation
–
the
alienation
by
the
testator
may
be
onerous
or
gratuitous.
• The
alienation
revokes
the
legacy/devise
even
if
for
any
reason
the
thing
reverts
to
the
testator.
• Exceptions:
o If
the
reversion
is
caused
by
the
annulment
of
the
alienation
and
the
cause
for
annulment
was
vitiation
of
consent
on
the
grantor’s
part,
either
by
reason
of
incapacity
or
of
duress.
o If
the
reversion
is
by
virtue
of
redemption
in
a
sale
with
pacto
de
retro.
3. total
loss
–
this
will
be
a
cause
for
revocation
only
if
it
takes
place
before
the
testator’s
death.
Fortuitous
loss
after
the
testator’s
death
will
not
constitute
revocation.
Art.
958.
A
mistake
as
to
the
name
of
the
thing
bequeathed
or
devised,
is
of
no
consequence,
if
it
is
possible
to
identify
the
thing
which
the
testator
intended
to
bequeath
or
devise.
(n)
Art.
959.
A
disposition
made
in
general
terms
in
favor
of
the
testator's
relatives
shall
be
understood
to
be
in
favor
of
those
nearest
in
degree.
(751)
III. Legal or Intestate Succession 1. General Provisions
Art.
960.
Legal
or
intestate
succession
takes
place:
(1)
If
a
person
dies
without
a
will,
or
with
a
void
will,
or
one
which
has
subsequently
lost
its
validity;
(2)
When
the
will
does
not
institute
an
heir
to,
or
dispose
of
all
the
property
belonging
to
the
testator.
In
such
case,
legal
succession
shall
take
place
only
with
respect
to
the
property
of
which
the
testator
has
not
disposed;
(3)
If
the
suspensive
condition
attached
to
the
institution
of
heir
does
not
happen
or
is
not
fulfilled,
or
if
the
heir
dies
before
the
testator,
or
repudiates
the
inheritance,
there
being
no
substitution,
and
no
right
of
accretion
takes
place;
(4)
When
the
heir
instituted
is
incapable
of
succeeding,
except
in
cases
provided
in
this
Code.
(912a)
Balane:
Intestacy:
• That
which
takes
place
by
operation
of
law
in
default
of
compulsory
and
testamentary
succession.
It
is
the
least
preferred
among
the
three
modes
of
succession,
but
is
the
most
common.
• It
applies
the
principle
of
exclusion
and
concurrence
(the
same
principle
as
in
compulsory
succession).
Kinds:
1. Total
–
no
testamentary
disposition;
only
if
there
is
no
will
disposing
of
the
property.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
2.
Partial
–
A
will
that
disposes
of
part
of
the
free
portion;
insofar
as
it
does
not
impair
Instances
when
legal
or
intestate
succession
operates:
(WISEPIR)
1. If
a
person
dies
without
a
will,
or
with
a
void
will,
or
one
which
has
subsequently
lost
its
validity;
• Sir:
The
will
does
not
lose
its
validity.
2. When
the
will
does
not
institute
an
heir
to,
or
dispose
of
all
the
property
belonging
to
the
testator.
In
such
case,
legal
succession
shall
take
place
only
with
respect
to
the
property
of
which
the
testator
has
not
disposed;
3. If
the
suspensive
condition
attached
to
the
institution
of
heir
does
not
happen
or
is
not
fulfilled,
or
if
the
heir
does
not
happen
or
is
not
fulfilled,
or
if
the
heir
dies
before
the
testator
or
repudiates
the
inheritance,
there
being
no
substitution,
and
no
right
of
accretion
takes
place.
4. When
the
heir
instituted
is
incapable
of
succeeding,
except
in
cases
provided
in
this
Code.
5. happening
of
resolutory
condition
6. expiration
of
resolutory
term
7. preterition
Art.
961.
In
default
of
testamentary
heirs,
the
law
vests
the
inheritance,
in
accordance
with
the
rules
hereinafter
set
forth,
in
the
legitimate
and
illegitimate
relatives
of
the
deceased,
in
the
surviving
spouse,
and
in
the
State.
(913a)
Art.
962.
In
every
inheritance,
the
relative
nearest
in
degree
excludes
the
more
distant
ones,
saving
the
right
of
representation
when
it
properly
takes
place.
Relatives
in
the
same
degree
shall
inherit
in
equal
shares,
subject
to
the
provisions
of
article
1006
with
respect
to
relatives
of
the
full
and
half
blood,
and
of
Article
987,
paragraph
2,
concerning
division
between
the
paternal
and
maternal
lines.
(912a)
Balane:
Basis
of
Instate
Succession:
• The
presumed
will
of
the
decedent,
which
would
distribute
the
estate
in
accordance
with
the
love
and
affection
he
has
for
his
family
and
close
relatives,
and
in
default
of
these
persons,
the
presumed
desire
of
the
decedent
to
promote
charitable
and
humanitarian.
Basic
Rules
of
Intestacy:
• The
rule
of
preference
of
lines
o The
three
lines
of
relationship
are:
the
descending
the
ascending
the
collateral
o The
law
lays
down
an
order
of
preference
among
these
lines,
such
that
the
descending
excludes
the
ascending
and
the
collateral,
and
the
ascending
excludes
the
collateral.
• The
rule
of
proximity
of
degree
o The
nearer
exclude
the
more
remote
without
prejudice
to
representation.
Page 52 of 73
•
The
rule
of
equality
among
relatives
of
the
same
degree
o If
the
nearer
exlucde
the
more
remote,
logically
those
of
equal
degree
should
inherit
in
equal
shares
o Exceptions
to
rule
of
equality
in
the
same
degree:
the
rule
of
preference
of
lines,
supra
the
distinction
between
the
legitimate
and
illegitmate
filiation
the
rule
of
division
by
line
in
the
ascending
line
the
distinction
between
full‐ blood
and
half‐blood
relationships
among
brothers
and
sisters,
as
well
as
nephews
and
nieces
representation
Class
Notes:
Additional
rule
of
intestacy
(not
found
in
the
book):
• The
rule
of
relationship
(there
are
four
kinds):
(FaBSS)
a. Family
–
Jus
familial,
ascendants
and
descendants
in
the
direct
line
b. Blood
–
Jus
sanguinis,
collaterals
up
to
the
fifth
degree
c. Spouse
–
Jus
conjugis
d. State
–
Jus
imperii,
the
right
of
sovereignty
1.1. Relationship
Art.
963.
Proximity
of
relationship
is
determined
by
the
number
of
generations.
Each
generation
forms
a
degree.
(915)
Art.
964.
A
series
of
degrees
forms
a
line,
which
may
be
either
direct
or
collateral.
A
direct
line
is
that
constituted
by
the
series
of
degrees
among
ascendants
and
descendants.
A
collateral
line
is
that
constituted
by
the
series
of
degrees
among
persons
who
are
not
ascendants
and
descendants,
but
who
come
from
a
common
ancestor.
(916a)
Art.
965.
The
direct
line
is
either
descending
or
ascending.
The
former
unites
the
head
of
the
family
with
those
who
descend
from
him.
The
latter
binds
a
person
with
those
from
whom
he
descends.
(917)
Art.
966.
In
the
line,
as
many
degrees
are
counted
as
there
are
generations
or
persons,
excluding
the
progenitor.
In
the
direct
line,
ascent
is
made
to
the
common
ancestor.
Thus,
the
child
is
one
degree
removed
from
the
parent,
two
from
the
grandfather,
and
three
from
the
great‐ grandparent.
In
the
collateral
line,
ascent
is
made
to
the
common
ancestor
and
then
descent
is
made
to
the
person
with
whom
the
computation
is
to
be
made.
Thus,
a
person
is
two
degrees
removed
from
his
brother,
three
from
his
uncle,
who
is
the
brother
of
his
father,
four
from
his
first
cousin,
and
so
forth.
(918a)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Balane:
Line:
• Direct
o Descending
o Ascending
• Collateral
o Direct
and
Collateral
–
Importance
of
distinction:
the
direct
is
preferred
over
the
collateral.
o Descending
direct
and
ascending
direct
–
Importance
of
distinction:
The
desce
Computation
of
degrees:
• Direct
line
–
there
is
no
legal
limit
to
the
number
of
degrees
for
entitlement
to
intestate
succession.
The
practical
limit,
of
course,
is
human
mortality.
o Mode
of
counting
degrees
in
the
direct
line:
one
generation
=
one
degree
parent‐child
=
one
degree
grandparent‐grandchild
=
two
degrees
great‐grandparents‐great‐ grandchild
=
third
degrees;
and
so
forth
• Collateral
line
–
Computation
of
degrees
is
particularly
important
in
the
collateral
line
because
intestate
succession
extends
only
to
the
5th
of
collateral
relationship.
o Modes
of
counting
degrees
in
the
collateral
line:
From
one
reference
point,
ascend
to
nearest
common
ancestor
[If
there
are
more
than
one
nearest
common
ancestor,
choose
any
one]
Then
descend
to
the
other
reference
point
Number
of
generations
constituting
the
ascent
and
the
descent
is
the
degree
of
collateral
relationship
o Collateral
by
Degrees
First
degree
–
none
Second
degree
–
brothers/sisters
Third
degree
• Uncles/Aunts
• Nephews/Nieces
Fourth
degree
• First
cousins
• Brothers/Sisters
of
a
grandparent
(granduncles/grand aunts)
• Grandchildren
of
a
brother/sister
(grand‐ nephews/grand‐ nieces)
Fifth
degree
• Children
of
a
first
cousin
• First
cousins
of
a
parent
Page 53 of 73
• •
Brothers/sisters
of
a
great‐grandparent
Great
grandchildren
of
a
brother/sister
Art.
967.
Full
blood
relationship
is
that
existing
between
persons
who
have
the
same
father
and
the
same
mother.
Half
blood
relationship
is
that
existing
between
persons
who
have
the
same
father,
but
not
the
same
mother,
or
the
same
mother,
but
not
the
same
father.
(920a)
Balane:
Importance
of
rules
on
relationships:
• The
nearer
excludes
the
more
remote
• Direct
line
is
preferred
over
the
collateral
• Descending
line
is
preferred
over
the
ascending
Two
basic
concepts
in
relationship:
• Concept
of
degree
–
This
method
of
computing
the
proximity
of
relationship.
Every
degree
is
one
generation.
• Concept
of
lines
–
These
are
relative
positions
in
the
family
between
2
persons.
o In
intestacy:
There
is
no
limit
in
the
direct
line
either
ascending
or
descending.
There
is
a
limit
of
five
degrees
in
the
collateral
line
(2
persons
having
a
common
ancestor)
Art.
968.
If
there
are
several
relatives
of
the
same
degree,
and
one
or
some
of
them
are
unwilling
or
incapacitated
to
succeed,
his
portion
shall
accrue
to
the
others
of
the
same
degree,
save
the
right
of
representation
when
it
should
take
place.
(922)
Balane:
• There
is
accretion
in
intestacy
among
heirs
of
the
same
degree,
in
case
of
predecease,
incapacity
or
renunciation
of
any
of
them.
• In
case
of
predecease
or
incapacity,
representation,
if
proper,
will
prevent
accretion
from
occurring.
• Relatives
must
be
in
the
same
kind
of
relationship.
For
accretion
to
take
place
the
heirs
involved
must
be
in
the
same
kind
of
relationship
to
the
decedent.
Thus,
there
can
be
no
accretion
among
a
grandchild,
a
grandparent
and
a
brother
of
the
decedent
because
they
are
not
inheriting
together
in
the
first
place.
Art.
969.
If
the
inheritance
should
be
repudiated
by
the
nearest
relative,
should
there
be
one
only,
or
by
all
the
nearest
relatives
called
by
law
to
succeed,
should
there
be
several,
those
of
the
following
degree
shall
inherit
in
their
own
right
and
cannot
represent
the
person
or
persons
repudiating
the
inheritance.
(923)
Balane:
Effect
of
Renunciation
by
All
in
the
Same
Degree:
• The
descending
line
first
–
if
all
the
descendants
of
a
certain
degree
renounce,
succession
passes
to
the
descendants
of
the
next
degree,
and
so
on,
ad
indefinitum.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
•
•
The
ascending
line
next
–
Should
no
one
be
left
in
the
descending
line,
the
heirs
in
the
ascending
acquire
the
right
of
succession,
again
in
order
of
degrees
of
proximity;
The
collateral
line
last
–
Only
if
all
the
descendants
and
ascendants
renounce
will
the
collateral
relatives
acquire
the
right
to
succeed.
Predecease
or
Incapacity
by
All
in
the
Same
Degree:
• This
eventuality
is
not
provided
for
by
this
article.
The
rules
above
are
equally
applicable
to
such
a
situation
except
in
cases
where
representation
is
proper,
i.e.,
in
the
descending
line.
• Representation
does
not
apply
in
cases
of
universal
renunciation
outlined
above.
1.2. Right of Representation
Art.
970.
Representation
is
a
right
created
by
fiction
of
law,
by
virtue
of
which
the
representative
is
raised
to
the
place
and
the
degree
of
the
person
represented,
and
acquires
the
rights
which
the
latter
would
have
if
he
were
living
or
if
he
could
have
inherited.
(942a)
Art.
971.
The
representative
is
called
to
the
succession
by
the
law
and
not
by
the
person
represented.
The
representative
does
not
succeed
the
person
represented
but
the
one
whom
the
person
represented
would
have
succeeded.
(n)
Art.
972.
The
right
of
representation
takes
place
in
the
direct
descending
line,
but
never
in
the
ascending.
In
the
collateral
line,
it
takes
place
only
in
favor
of
the
children
of
brothers
or
sisters,
whether
they
be
of
the
full
or
half
blood.
(925)
Art.
973.
In
order
that
representation
may
take
place,
it
is
necessary
that
the
representative
himself
be
capable
of
succeeding
the
decedent.
(n)
Art.
974.
Whenever
there
is
succession
by
representation,
the
division
of
the
estate
shall
be
made
per
stirpes,
in
such
manner
that
the
representative
or
representatives
shall
not
inherit
more
than
what
the
person
they
represent
would
inherit,
if
he
were
living
or
could
inherit.
(926a)
Art.
975.
When
children
of
one
or
more
brothers
or
sisters
of
the
deceased
survive,
they
shall
inherit
from
the
latter
by
representation,
if
they
survive
with
their
uncles
or
aunts.
But
if
they
alone
survive,
they
shall
inherit
in
equal
portions.
(927)
Art.
976.
A
person
may
represent
him
whose
inheritance
he
has
renounced.
(928a)
Art.
977.
Heirs
who
repudiate
their
share
may
not
be
represented.
(929a)
Balane:
Instances
when
representation
operates:
(DIP)
• Predecease
• Incapacity
or
Unworthiness
• Disinheritance
Page 54 of 73
In
what
kind
of
succession
representation
operates:
• The
legitime
–
there
is
no
express
provision
on
representation
in
legitime,
except
in
Article
923,
in
case
of
disinheritance.
• Intestacy
–
there
is
no
representation
in
testamentary
succession.
In
what
lines
does
representation
obtain:
• With
respect
to
the
legitime
–
in
the
direct
descending
line
only
• With
respect
to
intestacy
o In
the
direct
descending
line
o In
one
instance
in
the
collateral;
i.e.
nephews
and
nieces
representing
brothers
and
sisters
of
the
deceased.
Representation
by
illegitimate
children:
• If
the
child
to
be
represented
is
legitimate
–
only
legitimate
children/descendants
can
represent
him
• If
the
child
to
be
represented
is
illegitimate
‐
both
legitimate
and
illegitimate
children/descendants
can
represent
him
Representation
of
and
by
an
adopted
child:
• An
adopted
can
neither
represent
or
be
represented.
Teotico
vs.
Del
Val
(1965)
F:
Oppositor
claims
to
be
an
adopted
daughter
of
Francisca
Mortera,
a
deceased
sister
of
the
testatrix.
SC
ruled
that
the
oppositor
has
no
right
to
intervene
either
as
testamentary
or
as
legal
heir
in
the
probate
proceeding
of
the
deceased
sister
of
her
adopted
mother.
H:
Relationship
of
adoption
is
limited
solely
to
the
adopter
and
the
adopted
and
does
not
extend
to
the
relatives
of
the
adopting
parents
or
of
the
adopted
child
except
only
as
expressly
provided
for
by
law.
As
a
consequence,
the
adopted
is
an
heir
of
the
adopter
but
not
of
the
relatives
of
the
adopter.
Represenation
by
a
renouncer:
• Although
a
renouncer
cannot
be
represented,
he
can
represent
the
person
whose
inheritance
he
has
renounced.
How
representation
operates:
• Per
stirpes
–
the
representative
or
representatives
receive
only
what
the
person
represented
would
have
received.
If
there
are
more
than
one
representative
in
the
same
degree,
then
divide
the
portion
equally,
without
prejudice
to
the
distinction
between
legitimate
and
illegitimate
children,
when
applicable.
Rules
on
Qualification:
• The
representative
must
be
qualified
to
succeed
the
decedent.
• The
representative
need
not
be
qualified
to
succeed
the
person
represented.
• The
person
represented
need
not
be
qualified
to
succeed
the
decedent
–
in
fact,
the
reason
why
representation
is
taking
place
is
that
the
person
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
represented
is
not
qualified,
because
of
predecease,
or
in
capacity
or
disinheritance.
Representation
by
grandchildren
and
Representation
by
nephews/nieces:
Difference
Rule
• If
all
the
children
are
disqualified
–
the
grandchildren
still
inherit
by
representation.
• If
all
the
brothers/sisters
are
disqualified
–
the
nephews/nieces
inherit
per
capita.
• Note:
If
only
some,
not
all
children
or
brothers/sisters
are
disqualifed
the
rule
is
the
same.
2. Order of Intestate Succession Intestate Heirs
I. Legitimate
Children/Descendants
II. Illegitimate
Children/Descendants
III. Legitimate
Parents/Ascendants
IV. Illegitimate
Parents
V. Surviving
Spouse
VI. Brothers,
Sisters,
Nephews,
Nieces
VII. Other
Collaterals
–
to
the
5th
degree
VIII. State
Class
Notes:
• It
is
correct
to
say
that
a
compulsory
heir
is
an
intestate
heir.
But
it
is
not
correct
to
say
that
an
intestate
heir
is
not
a
compulsory
heir.
Intestacy
Balane:
Rules
of
Exclusion
and
Concurrence:
(Note:
Children
include,
in
proper
cases,
other
descendants;
and
parents,
other
ascendants.)
1. legitimate
children
a. exclude
parents,
collaterals
&
State
b. concur
with
surviving
spouse
&
illegitimate
children
c. are
excluded
by
no
one
2. illegitimate
children
a. exclude
illegitimate
parents,
collaterals
&
State
b. concur
with
surviving
spouse,
legitimate
children,
and
legitimate
parents
c. are
excluded
by
no
one
3. legitimate
parents
a. exclude
collaterals
&
state
b. concur
with
illegitimate
children
&
surviving
spouse
c. are
excluded
by
legitimate
children
4. illegitimate
parents
[only,
not
ascendants]
a. exclude
collaterals
&
State
b. concur
with
surviving
spouse
c. are
excluded
by
legitimate
children
and
illegitimate
children
5. surviving
spouse
a. excludes
collaterals
other
than
brothers,
sisters,
nephews
&
nieces,
&
State
b. concur
with
legitimate
children,
illegitimate
children,
legitimate
Page 55 of 73
6.
7.
8.
parents,
illegitimate
parents,
brothers
sisters,
nephews
&
nieces
c. is
excluded
by
no
one
brothers
&
sisters,
nephews
&
nieces
a. exclude
all
other
collaterals
&
the
State
b. concur
with
surviving
spouse
c. are
excluded
by
legitimate
children,
illegitimate
children,
legitimate
parents,
and
illegitimate
parents
Other
collaterals
a. exclude
collaterals
in
remoter
degrees
&
the
State
b. concur
with
collaterals
in
the
same
degree
c. are
excluded
by
legitimate
children,
illegitimate
children,
legitimate
parents,
illegitimate
parents,
surviving
spouse,
brothers
&
sisters,
and
nephews
&
nieces
State
a. excludes
no
one
b. concurs
with
no
one
c. is
excluded
by
everyone
Class
Notes:
• Number
5
surviving
spouse
does
not
exclude
the
group
in
number
6.
Balane:
Combinations
in
Intestate
Succession
(found
passim
in
Art.
978):
1. legitimate
children
alone
• the
whole
estate
divided
equally
2. legitimate
children
&
illegitimate
children
• the
whole
estate,
each
illegitimate
child
getting
½
the
share
of
one
legitimate
child
3. legitimate
children
&
surviving
spouse
• the
whole
estate,
divided
equally
(the
surviving
spouse
counted
as
one
legitimate
child)
4. legitimate
children,
surviving
spouse
&
illegitimate
children
• the
whole
estate,
the
surviving
spouse
being
counted
as
one
legitimate
child
• each
illegitimate
child
getting
½
the
share
of
one
legitimate
5. legitimate
parents
alone
• the
whole
estate
divided
equally
6. legitimate
ascendants
(other
than
parents)
alone
• the
whole
estate,
observing,
in
proper
cases,
the
rule
of
division
by
line
7. legitimate
parents
&
illegitimate
children*
• legitimate
parents
–
½
of
the
estate
• illegitimate
children
–
½
of
the
estate
8. legitimate
parents
&
suriving
spouse*
• legitimate
parents
–
½
of
the
estate
• surviving
spouse
–
½
of
the
estate
9. legitimate
parents,
surviving
spouse,
illegitimate
children*
• legitimate
parents
–
½
of
the
estate
• surviving
spouse
–
¼
of
the
estate
• illegitimate
children
–
¼
of
the
estate
10. illegitimate
children
alone
• the
whole
estate
divided
equally
11. illegitimate
children
&
surviving
spouse*
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
12. 13.
14.
15.
16. 17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24. 25.
• illegitimate
children
–
½
of
the
estate
• surviving
spouse
–
½
of
the
estate
surviving
spouse
alone
• the
whole
estate
surviving
spouse
&
illegitimate
parents
(no
article
governing,
combination
applied
by
analogy
with
Art.
997)*
• surviving
spouse
–
½
of
the
estate
• illegitimate
parents
–
½
of
the
estate
surviving
spouse
&
legitimate
brothers
&
sisters,
nephews
&
nieces*
• surviving
spouse
–
½
of
the
estate
• legitimate
brothers,
sisters,
nephews,
nieces
–
½
of
the
estate
(the
nephews
&
nieces
inheriting
by
representation,
in
the
proper
cases)
surviving
spouse
&
illegitimate
brothers
&
sisters,
nephews
&
nieces*
• surviving
spouse
–
½
of
the
estate
• illegitimate
brothers,
sisters,
nephews,
nieces
–
½
of
the
estate
(the
nephews
&
nieces
inheriting
by
representation,
in
the
proper
cases)
• the
illegitimate
brothers
&
sisters
are
those
mentioned
in
Art.
994.
illegitimate
parents
alone
• the
whole
estate
illegitimate
parents
&
children
of
any
kind
• illegitimate
parents
–
excluded
• children
inherit
in
accordance
with
Nos.
1,
2
&
10.
legitimate
brothers
&
sisters
alone
• the
whole
estate,
with
a
brother/sister
of
the
half‐blood
inheriting
½
of
the
estate
the
share
of
a
brother/sister
of
the
full
blood
legitimate
brothers
&
sisters,
nephews
&
nieces
• the
whole
estate,
observing
the
2:1
proportion
of
the
full‐and
half‐blood
fraternity
(No.
18
supra)
and
the
nephews
and
nieces
inheriting
by
representation
in
the
proper
cases
nephew
&
nieces
with
uncles
&
aunts
• by
inference
uncles
and
aunts
–
excluded
(accdg.
to
Bacayo
v.
Borromeo)
nephews
and
nieces
inheriting
in
accordance
with
No.
23
infra
illegitimate
brothers
and
sisters
alone
–
no
article
governing
• the
whole
estate,
observing
the
2:1
proportion
of
full‐
and
half‐
blood
fraternity
–
by
analogy
with
No.
18
supra
illegitimate
brothers,
sisters,
nephews
and
nieces
‐
no
article
governing
• the
whole
estate,
as
in
No.
19
supra,
by
analogy
nephews
&
nieces
alone
• the
whole
estate,
per
capita,
but
observing
the
2:1
proportion
for
the
full‐
and
the
half‐
blood
other
collaterals
• the
whole
estate,
per
capita,
the
nearer
in
degree
excluding
the
more
remote
State
Page 56 of 73
• •
•
the
whole
estate
Assignment
&
disposition
of
decedent’s
assets
o If
the
decedent
was
a
resident
of
the
Philippines
at
any
time:
Personal
property
–
to
municipality
of
last
residence
Real
property
–
where
situated
o If
the
decedent
never
a
resident
of
the
Philippines:
Personal
and
real
property
–
where
respectively
situated
How
property
is
to
be
used
o For
the
benefit
of
public
educational
and
charitable
institutions
in
the
respective
municipalities/cities
o Alternatively,
at
the
instance
of
an
interested
party,
or
motu
propio,
court
may
order
creation
of
a
permanent
trust
for
the
benefit
of
the
institutions
concerned
Class
Notes:
• Follow
the
rules
except
for
number
2
and
number
4.
Both
have
different
steps
from
the
step.
Be
careful
because
you
might
end
up
impairing
the
legitime.
• Just
follow
the
rules
on
intestacy,
the
legitimes
will
never
be
impaired.
They
are
automatically
covered
by
the
rules.
• But
Art.
983
(which
covers
number
2
also)
might
impair
the
legitime.
Illustration
on
how
Art.
983
can
impair
the
legitime:
X’s
estate
is
worth
P1,800,000
X
(decedent)
|
|
:
:
:
:
:
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
4M
4M
2M
2M
2M
2M
2M
Here
the
legitime
of
A
and
B
is
impaired
because
their
legitime
is
P900,000
and
their
share
together
is
P800,000.
There
is
a
deficit
of
P100,000
in
their
legitime.
Since
Art.
983
impairs
the
legitime
as
shown
in
the
illustration,
two
steps
must
be
followed
to
avoid
such:
1. Give
the
legitime
first
–
legitimate
before
illegitimate.
2. If
there
is
an
excess
divided
it
to
a
ratio
of
2:1.
3. If
lacking,
reduce
the
share
of
illegitimate
children
pro‐rata.
Illustration:
X
(decedent)
|
|
:
:
:
:
:
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
4.5
4.5
2.25
2.25
2.25
2.25
2.25
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
The
total
is
P2,025,000.
The
estate
is
only
P1,800,000.
There
is
a
deficit
of
P225,000.
The
solution
is
to
reduce
the
shares
of
illegitimate
children
pro‐rata.
Reduction
of
share
of
each
illegitimate
child:
225,000
(deficit)
/
5
(illegitimate
children)
=
P45,000.
The
share
of
each
illegitimate
child
should
be
reduced
by
P45,000.
Thus
from
P225,000,
each
illegitimate
child
will
now
get
P180,000
each.
Class
Notes:
• Number
1
illustrated
total
intestacy.
• Number
15
will
only
happen
in
one
case.
o In
a
case
where
X
has
three
children,
A
(legitimate),
B
(illegitimate)
and
C
(illegitimate),
when
B
dies,
A
cannot
inherit
from
him
(and
B
cannot
inherit
from
him)
but
C
can.
o This
is
not
prohibited
by
Article
992.
o In
Manuel
v.
Ferrer:
“When
the
law
speaks
of
‘brothers
and
sisters,
nephews
and
nieces’
as
legal
heirs
of
an
illegitimate
child,
it
refers
to
illegitimate
brothers
and
sisters
as
well
as
to
the
children,
whether
legitimate
of
illegitimate
of
such
brothers
and
sisters.”
• In
number
20,
if
there
are
nephews
and
nieces,
they
exclude
uncles
and
aunts.
Sample
Problems:
1. Patrick,
illegitimate
child
of
the
late
Don
Ruben
by
his
late
mistress
Evelyn
dies
in
a
vehicular
accident
while
riding
his
Harley
because
he
hates
wearing
a
helmet.
He
did
not
leave
a
will
and
his
estate
is
worth
P25,000,000.
His
spouse
Amirah
and
his
full
sister
Cielo
were
devastated
by
his
abrupt
death.
Meanwhile
Robert,
Don
Ruben’s
child
by
his
wife
Araceli,
is
also
maddened
with
grief
as
he
was
not
able
to
make
peace
with
his
estranged
brother.
How
should
Mr.
Patrick’s
estate
be
distributed?
2. Serafin,
a
notorious
womanizer
and
self‐ proclaimed
Cassanova,
was
killed
in
flagrante
delicto
with
his
current
mistress
Danica.
He
was
shot
by
John
Mark,
Danica’s
ex‐boyfriend
when
he
caught
them
together.
This
scandalized
his
wife
Lorie
to
no
end.
To
compound
the
wife’s
grief,
Danica’s
children
with
Serafin:
Auring,
Koring,
Kristina,
Paula,
Ogie
and
Joselit
are
fighting
with
Lorie’s
twin
children
Jess
and
Roslene
over
their
late
father’s
estate
which
is
worth
only
P500,000.
How
should
the
estate
be
apportioned?
2.1. Descending Direct Line
Art.
978.
Succession
pertains,
in
the
first
place,
to
the
descending
direct
line.
(930)
Art.
979.
Legitimate
children
and
their
descendants
succeed
the
parents
and
other
ascendants,
without
distinction
as
to
sex
or
age,
and
even
if
they
should
come
from
different
marriages.
An
adopted
child
succeeds
to
the
property
of
the
adopting
Page 57 of 73
parents
in
the
same
manner
as
a
legitimate
child.
(931a)
Balane:
• The
right
of
an
adopted
child
in
relation
to
his
adopter
is
now
governed
by
Secs.
17
and
18
of
R.A.
8552,
which
lays
down
the
same
rule
as
the
second
paragraph
of
this
article.
Sayson
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
(1992)
F:
Private
respondents
who
are
adopted
children
of
Teodoro
and
Isabel,
filed
a
claim
in
the
estate
of
the
parents
of
their
adopters.
H:
SC
held
that
the
private
respondents
exclusive
heirs
of
their
parents
and
deemed
to
as
total
strangers
to
their
grandparents.
The
adopted
child
shall
be
deemed
to
be
a
legitimate
child
and
have
the
same
right
as
the
latter,
but
these
rights
do
not
include
the
right
of
representation.
Art.
980.
The
children
of
the
deceased
shall
always
inherit
from
him
in
their
own
right,
dividing
the
inheritance
in
equal
shares.
(932)
Art.
981.
Should
children
of
the
deceased
and
descendants
of
other
children
who
are
dead,
survive,
the
former
shall
inherit
in
their
own
right,
and
the
latter
by
right
of
representation.
(934a)
Art.
982.
The
grandchildren
and
other
descendants
shall
inherit
by
right
of
representation,
and
if
any
one
of
them
should
have
died,
leaving
several
heirs,
the
portion
pertaining
to
him
shall
be
divided
among
the
latter
in
equal
portions.
(933)
Art.
983.
If
illegitimate
children
survive
with
legitimate
children,
the
shares
of
the
former
shall
be
in
the
proportions
prescribed
by
Article
895.
(n)
Balane:
• Segregate
the
legitimes
of
the
children
–
both
legitimate
and
illegitimate.
• If
any
residue
is
left,
apportion
it
in
proportion
of
2:1
• If
the
estate
may
not
be
sufficient
to
satisfy
the
legitimes,
the
legitimes
of
the
illegitimates
will
have
to
be
reduced
pro
rata.
Art.
984.
In
case
of
the
death
of
an
adopted
child,
leaving
no
children
or
descendants,
his
parents
and
relatives
by
consanguinity
and
not
by
adoption,
shall
be
his
legal
heirs.
(n)
Balane:
• Repealed
by
Secs.
17
and
18
of
R.A.
8552.
2.2. Ascending Direct Line
Art.
985.
In
default
of
legitimate
children
and
descendants
of
the
deceased,
his
parents
and
ascendants
shall
inherit
from
him,
to
the
exclusion
of
collateral
relatives.
(935a)
Art.
986.
The
father
and
mother,
if
living,
shall
inherit
in
equal
shares.
Should
one
only
of
them
survive,
he
or
she
shall
succeed
to
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
the
entire
estate
of
the
child.
(936)
Art.
987.
In
default
of
the
father
and
mother,
the
ascendants
nearest
in
degree
shall
inherit.
Should
there
be
more
than
one
of
equal
degree
belonging
to
the
same
line
they
shall
divide
the
inheritance
per
capita;
should
they
be
of
different
lines
but
of
equal
degree,
one‐half
shall
go
to
the
paternal
and
the
other
half
to
the
maternal
ascendants.
In
each
line
the
division
shall
be
made
per
capita.
(937)
2.3. Illegitimate Children
Art.
988.
In
the
absence
of
legitimate
descendants
or
ascendants,
the
illegitimate
children
shall
succeed
to
the
entire
estate
of
the
deceased.
(939a)
Art.
989.
If,
together
with
illegitimate
children,
there
should
survive
descendants
of
another
illegitimate
child
who
is
dead,
the
former
shall
succeed
in
their
own
right
and
the
latter
by
right
of
representation.
(940a)
Art.
990.
The
hereditary
rights
granted
by
the
two
preceding
articles
to
illegitimate
children
shall
be
transmitted
upon
their
death
to
their
descendants,
who
shall
inherit
by
right
of
representation
from
their
deceased
grandparent.
(941a)
Art.
991.
If
legitimate
ascendants
are
left,
the
illegitimate
children
shall
divide
the
inheritance
with
them,
taking
one‐half
of
the
estate,
whatever
be
the
number
of
the
ascendants
or
of
the
illegitimate
children.
(942‐841a)
Art.
992.
An
illegitimate
child
has
no
right
to
inherit
ab
intestato
from
the
legitimate
children
and
relatives
of
his
father
or
mother;
nor
shall
such
children
or
relatives
inherit
in
the
same
manner
from
the
illegitimate
child.
(943a)
Corpuz
vs
Administrator
(1978)
F:
Deceased
Teodoro
has
no
forced
heirs.
His
closest
relatives
were
half‐siblings.
Tomas,
the
son,
of
Juanita,
who
is
in
turn
the
daughter
of
Teodoro’s
half‐brother
Jose,
filed
an
action
to
recover
her
mother’s
supposed
share
in
the
intestate
estate
of
the
decedent.
H:
Juanita
is
not
a
legal
heir
of
Teodoro
since
there
is
no
reciprocal
succession
between
legitimate
and
illegitimate
relatives.
The
rule
is
based
on
the
theory
that
the
illegitimate
child
is
disgracefully
looked
upon
by
the
legitimate
family,
while
the
latter
is,
in
turn,
hated
by
the
illegitimate
child.
Leonardo
vs
Court
of
Appeals
(1983)
F:
Petitioner
Cresenciano,
claiming
to
be
the
son
of
the
late
Sotero,
sought
to
be
declared
one
of
the
lawful
heirs
of
decedent
who
is
the
grandfather
of
Sotero.
H:
At
most,
petitioner
would
be
an
illegitimate
child
who
has
no
right
to
inherit
in
ab
intestato
from
the
legitimate
children
and
relatives
of
his
father,
like
the
deceased.
Diaz
vs.
IAC
(1987)
Page 58 of 73
F:
The
case
involves
a
dispute
between
the
petitioners,
the
illegitimate
children
of
decedent’s
son
Pablo
Santero,
and
the
decedent’s
niece
Felisa
Pamuti
Jardin,
as
to
who
could
legally
inherit
from
the
decedent.
Petitioners
allege
that
they
could
inherit
by
right
of
representation
of
their
father,
who
is
a
legitimate
child
of
the
decedent.
H:
SC
held
the
legal
heir
to
be
the
niece.
The
New
Civil
Code
still
does
not
confer
to
illegitimate
children
the
right
to
represent
their
parents
in
the
inheritance
of
their
legitimate
grandparents,
even
if
the
New
Civil
Code
have
made
illegitimate
children
as
compulsory
primary
heirs
under
Art.
887.
Diaz
vs.
IAC
(1990)
F:
A
second
MR
from
the
earlier
1987
case.
Issue
here
is
does
the
term
“relatives”
in
Art.
992
include
the
legitimate
parents
of
the
father
or
mother
of
the
illegitimate
children?
May
these
illegitimate
children
of
Pablo
(father)
inherit
from
Simona
(grandmother),
by
right
of
representation
of
their
father
Pablo
who
was
a
legitimate
son?
H:
Art.
992
prohibits
absolutely
a
succession
ab
intestato
between
an
illegitimate
child
and
the
legitimate
children
and
“relatives”
of
the
father
or
mother
of
said
legitimate
child.
Art.
993.
If
an
illegitimate
child
should
die
without
issue,
either
legitimate
or
illegitimate,
his
father
or
mother
shall
succeed
to
his
entire
estate;
and
if
the
child's
filiation
is
duly
proved
as
to
both
parents,
who
are
both
living,
they
shall
inherit
from
him
share
and
share
alike.
(944)
Art.
994.
In
default
of
the
father
or
mother,
an
illegitimate
child
shall
be
succeeded
by
his
or
her
surviving
spouse
who
shall
be
entitled
to
the
entire
estate.
If
the
widow
or
widower
should
survive
with
brothers
and
sisters,
nephews
and
nieces,
she
or
he
shall
inheritt
one‐ half
of
the
estate,
and
the
latter
the
other
half.
(945a)
Balane:
• According
to
jurisprudence,
when
the
law
speaks
of
brothers
and
sisters,
nephews
and
nieces
as
legal
heirs
of
an
illegitimate
child,
it
refers
to
illegitimate
brothers
and
sisters
as
well
as
the
children,
whether
legitimate
or
illegitimate,
of
such
brothers
and
sisters.
2.4. Surviving Spouse
Art.
995.
In
the
absence
of
legitimate
descendants
and
ascendants,
and
illegitimate
children
and
their
descendants,
whether
legitimate
or
illegitimate,
the
surviving
spouse
shall
inherit
the
entire
estate,
without
prejudice
to
the
rights
of
brothers
and
sisters,
nephews
and
nieces,
should
there
be
any,
under
article
1001.
(946a)
Art.
996.
If
a
widow
or
widower
and
legitimate
children
or
descendants
are
left,
the
surviving
spouse
has
in
the
succession
the
same
share
as
that
of
each
of
the
children.
(834a)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Balane:
• This
rule
holds
even
if
there
is
only
one
legitimate
child,
in
which
case
the
child
and
the
surviving
spouse
will
divide
the
estate
equally.
Santillon
vs.
Miranda
(1965)
F:
How
shall
the
estate
of
a
person
who
dies
intestate
be
divided
when
the
only
survivors
are
the
spouse
and
one
legitimate
child?
The
son
is
claiming
that
Art.
892
should
be
applied
while
the
wife
states
that
the
division
is
½
between
them.
H:
SC
ruled
for
the
wife.
Art.
996
which
applies
in
intestacy
should
be
read:
“If
the
widow
or
widower
and
a
legitimate
child
are
left,
the
surviving
spouse
has
the
same
share
as
that
of
the
child.”
Art.
997.
When
the
widow
or
widower
survives
with
legitimate
parents
or
ascendants,
the
surviving
spouse
shall
be
entitled
to
one‐half
of
the
estate,
and
the
legitimate
parents
or
ascendants
to
the
other
half.
(836a)
Art.
998.
If
a
widow
or
widower
survives
with
illegitimate
children,
such
widow
or
widower
shall
be
entitled
to
one‐ half
of
the
inheritance,
and
the
illegitimate
children
or
their
descendants,
whether
legitimate
or
illegitimate,
to
the
other
half.
(n)
Art.
999.
When
the
widow
or
widower
survives
with
legitimate
children
or
their
descendants
and
illegitimate
children
or
their
descendants,
whether
legitimate
or
illegitimate,
such
widow
or
widower
shall
be
entitled
to
the
same
share
as
that
of
a
legitimate
child.
(n)
Art.
1000.
If
legitimate
ascendants,
the
surviving
spouse,
and
illegitimate
children
are
left,
the
ascendants
shall
be
entitled
to
one‐half
of
the
inheritance,
and
the
other
half
shall
be
divided
between
the
surviving
spouse
and
the
illegitimate
children
so
that
such
widow
or
widower
shall
have
one‐fourth
of
the
estate,
and
the
illegitimate
children
the
other
fourth.
(841a)
Art.
1001.
Should
brothers
and
sisters
or
their
children
survive
with
the
widow
or
widower,
the
latter
shall
be
entitled
to
one‐half
of
the
inheritance
and
the
brothers
and
sisters
or
their
children
to
the
other
half.
(953,
837a)
Art.
1002.
In
case
of
a
legal
separation,
if
the
surviving
spouse
gave
cause
for
the
separation,
he
or
she
shall
not
have
any
of
the
rights
granted
in
the
preceding
articles.
(n)
2.5. Collateral Relatives
Art.
1003.
If
there
are
no
descendants,
ascendants,
illegitimate
children,
or
a
surviving
spouse,
the
collateral
relatives
shall
succeed
to
the
entire
estate
of
the
deceased
in
accordance
with
the
following
articles.
(946a)
Art.
1004.
Should
the
only
survivors
be
brothers
and
sisters
of
the
full
blood,
they
shall
inherit
in
equal
shares.
(947)
Art.
1005.
Should
brothers
and
sisters
survive
together
with
nephews
and
nieces,
who
are
the
children
of
the
Page 59 of 73
descendant's
brothers
and
sisters
of
the
full
blood,
the
former
shall
inherit
per
capita,
and
the
latter
per
stirpes.
(948)
Art.
1006.
Should
brother
and
sisters
of
the
full
blood
survive
together
with
brothers
and
sisters
of
the
half
blood,
the
former
shall
be
entitled
to
a
share
double
that
of
the
latter.
(949)
Art.
1007.
In
case
brothers
and
sisters
of
the
half
blood,
some
on
the
father's
and
some
on
the
mother's
side,
are
the
only
survivors,
all
shall
inherit
in
equal
shares
without
distinction
as
to
the
origin
of
the
property.
(950)
Art.
1008.
Children
of
brothers
and
sisters
of
the
half
blood
shall
succeed
per
capita
or
per
stirpes,
in
accordance
with
the
rules
laid
down
for
the
brothers
and
sisters
of
the
full
blood.
(915)
Art.
1009.
Should
there
be
neither
brothers
nor
sisters
nor
children
of
brothers
or
sisters,
the
other
collateral
relatives
shall
succeed
to
the
estate.
The
latter
shall
succeed
without
distinction
of
lines
or
preference
among
them
by
reason
of
relationship
by
the
whole
blood.
(954a)
Art.
1010.
The
right
to
inherit
ab
intestato
shall
not
extend
beyond
the
fifth
degree
of
relationship
in
the
collateral
line.
(955a)
2.6. The State
Art.
1011.
In
default
of
persons
entitled
to
succeed
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
preceding
Sections,
the
State
shall
inherit
the
whole
estate.
(956a)
Art.
1012.
In
order
that
the
State
may
take
possession
of
the
property
mentioned
in
the
preceding
article,
the
pertinent
provisions
of
the
Rules
of
Court
must
be
observed.
(958a)
Art.
1013.
After
the
payment
of
debts
and
charges,
the
personal
property
shall
be
assigned
to
the
municipality
or
city
where
the
deceased
last
resided
in
the
Philippines,
and
the
real
estate
to
the
municipalities
or
cities,
respectively,
in
which
the
same
is
situated.
If
the
deceased
never
resided
in
the
Philippines,
the
whole
estate
shall
be
assigned
to
the
respective
municipalities
or
cities
where
the
same
is
located.
Such
estate
shall
be
for
the
benefit
of
public
schools,
and
public
charitable
institutions
and
centers,
in
such
municipalities
or
cities.
The
court
shall
distribute
the
estate
as
the
respective
needs
of
each
beneficiary
may
warrant.
The
court,
at
the
instance
of
an
interested
party,
or
on
its
own
motion,
may
order
the
establishment
of
a
permanent
trust,
so
that
only
the
income
from
the
property
shall
be
used.
(956a)
IV. Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession 1.
Right of Accretion
Art.
1015.
Accretion
is
a
right
by
virtue
of
which,
when
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
two
or
more
persons
are
called
to
the
same
inheritance,
devise
or
legacy,
the
part
assigned
to
the
one
who
renounces
or
cannot
receive
his
share,
or
who
died
before
the
testator,
is
added
or
incorporated
to
that
of
his
co‐ heirs,
co‐devisees,
or
co‐legatees.
(n)
Art.
1016.
In
order
that
the
right
of
accretion
may
take
place
in
a
testamentary
succession,
it
shall
be
necessary:
(1)
That
two
or
more
persons
be
called
to
the
same
inheritance,
or
to
the
same
portion
thereof,
pro
indiviso;
and
(2)
That
one
of
the
persons
thus
called
die
before
the
testator,
or
renounce
the
inheritance,
or
be
incapacitated
to
receive
it.
(928a)
Accretion
a. Definition
(Art.
1015)
Occasions
for
the
operation
of
accretion:
• Renunciation
• Predecease
• Incapacity
b. Elements
(Art.
1016)
Pro
indiviso
–
“as
undivided”
or
“in
common”;
does
not
import
equality
Ex:
I
give
my
portion
to
A,
B
and
C
I
give
1/8
of
my
estate
to
A,
B
and
C
Can
there
be
accretion
if
the
shares
are
not
equal?
Ex:
A
to
get
½,
B
to
get
1/3,
and
C
to
get
1/6
• Tolentino:
NO.
Must
be
equal.
• Sir:
Yes,
it
is
possible.
See
Art.
1019,
which
contemplates
unequal
shares.
Art.
1017.
The
words
"one‐half
for
each"
or
"in
equal
shares"
or
any
others
which,
though
designating
an
aliquot
part,
do
not
identify
it
by
such
description
as
shall
make
each
heir
the
exclusive
owner
of
determinate
property,
shall
not
exclude
the
right
of
accretion.
In
case
of
money
or
fungible
goods,
if
the
share
of
each
heir
is
not
earmarked,
there
shall
be
a
right
of
accretion.
(983a)
Art.
1018.
In
legal
succession
the
share
of
the
person
who
repudiates
the
inheritance
shall
always
accrue
to
his
co‐heirs.
(981)
In
intestacy,
accretion
occurs:
(RIP)
a. In
repudiation
or
renunciation
b. In
predecease,
only
if
representation
does
not
take
place
c. In
incapacity
or
unworthiness,
only
if
representation
does
not
take
place
The
co‐heirs
in
whose
favor
accretion
occurs
must
be
co‐ heirs
in
the
same
category
as
the
excluded
heir.
Page 60 of 73
Art.
1019.
The
heirs
to
whom
the
portion
goes
by
the
right
of
accretion
take
it
in
the
same
proportion
that
they
inherit.
(n)
Art.
1020.
The
heirs
to
whom
the
inheritance
accrues
shall
succeed
to
all
the
rights
and
obligations
which
the
heir
who
renounced
or
could
not
receive
it
would
have
had.
(984)
Exceptions:
a. In
testamentary
succession,
if
the
testator
provides
otherwise
b. If
the
obligation
is
purely
personal,
and
hence,
intransmissible
Art.
1021.
Among
the
compulsory
heirs
the
right
of
accretion
shall
take
place
only
when
the
free
portion
is
left
to
two
or
more
of
them,
or
to
any
one
of
them
and
to
a
stranger.
Should
the
part
repudiated
be
the
legitime,
the
other
co‐ heirs
shall
succeed
to
it
in
their
own
right,
and
not
by
the
right
of
accretion.
(985)
In
what
kinds
of
succession
does
accretion
take
place?
1) Testamentary
succession
2) Intestate
succession
Not
compulsory
(refer
to
par.
2,
Art.
1021)
Art.
1022.
In
testamentary
succession,
when
the
right
of
accretion
does
not
take
place,
the
vacant
portion
of
the
instituted
heirs,
if
no
substitute
has
been
designated,
shall
pass
to
the
legal
heirs
of
the
testator,
who
shall
receive
it
with
the
same
charges
and
obligations.
(986)
In
testamentary
succession,
accretion
is
subordinate
to
substitution,
if
the
testator
has
so
provided.
• Substitution
–
express
intent
• Accretion
–
implied
intent
No
substitution,
No
accretion:
Vacant
part
will
lapse
into
intestacy
and
be
disposed
of
accordingly
2. Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy
Art.
1024.
Persons
not
incapacitated
by
law
may
succeed
by
will
or
ab
intestato.
The
provisions
relating
to
incapacity
by
will
are
equally
applicable
to
intestate
succession.
(744,
914)
Gen.
Rule:
In
favor
of
capacity
to
succeed,
as
long
as
successor
has
juridical
personality
To
prove
incapacity:
Legal
ground;
Must
be
shown
Par.
2
is
wrong.
Art.
1025.
In
order
to
be
capacitated
to
inherit,
the
heir,
devisee
or
legatee
must
be
living
at
the
moment
the
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
succession
opens,
except
in
case
of
representation,
when
it
is
proper.
A
child
already
conceived
at
the
time
of
the
death
of
the
decedent
is
capable
of
succeeding
provided
it
be
born
later
under
the
conditions
prescribed
in
article
41.
(n)
Par.
1
is
wrong;
there
is
no
exception.
Natural
Persons:
Requirement
for
capacity
to
succeed:
Must
be
living
when
succession
opens
See
Arts.
40
and
41
of
the
Civil
Code
• Living:
already
conceived
when
decedent
dies,
provided
it
be
born
later
• When
succession
opens:
Decedent’s
death
If
institution
is
subject
to
a
suspensive
condition:
Must
be
living
both
when
decedent
dies
and
when
the
condition
happens.
If
institution
is
subject
to
a
suspensive
term:
Must
be
living
when
decedent
dies
Exception:
None
Parish
Priest
of
Roman
Catholic
Church
of
Victoria,
Tarlac
vs.
Rigor
(1979)
F:
Testator
intended
to
devise
his
riceland
to
his
“nearest
male
relative
who
would
become
a
priest
after
his
death”.
There
was
an
ambiguity
as
to
whether
he
contemplated
only
his
nearest
male
relative
at
the
time
of
his
death
or
any
of
his
nearest
male
relatives
at
any
time
after
the
same.
H:
The
bequest
refers
to
the
testator’s
nearest
male
relative
living
at
the
time
of
his
death
and
not
to
any
indefinite
time
thereafter.
Art.
1026.
A
testamentary
disposition
may
be
made
to
the
State,
provinces,
municipal
corporations,
private
corporations,
organizations,
or
associations
for
religious,
scientific,
cultural,
educational,
or
charitable
purposes.
All
other
corporations
or
entities
may
succeed
under
a
will,
unless
there
is
a
provision
to
the
contrary
in
their
charter
or
the
laws
of
their
creation,
and
always
subject
to
the
same.
(746a)
Juridical
Persons:
Requirement
for
capacity
to
succeed:
Must
exist
as
a
juridical
person
when
the
decedent
dies.
(1)
The
State
and
its
political
subdivisions
• State:
must
have
acquired
the
4
elements
–
territory,
people,
government,
sovereignty
• Local
government
unit:
must
have
been
created
by
law
(2)
Other
corporations,
institutions
and
entities
for
public
interest
or
purpose,
created
by
law
• their
personality
begins
as
soon
as
they
have
been
constituted
according
to
law;
Page 61 of 73
(3)
Corporations,
partnerships
and
associations
for
private
interest
or
purpose
• Corporation:
must
have
been
created
in
accordance
with
the
Corporation
Code
• Partnership:
partners
must
have
agreed
(except
when
real
property
is
contributed,
where
you’ll
need
a
public
instrument
Except
for
the
State,
Juridical
persons
cannot
succeed
by
legitime
or
intestacy.
Art.
1027.
The
following
are
incapable
of
succeeding:
(1)
The
priest
who
heard
the
confession
of
the
testator
during
his
last
illness,
or
the
minister
of
the
gospel
who
extended
spiritual
aid
to
him
during
the
same
period;
(2)
The
relatives
of
such
priest
or
minister
of
the
gospel
within
the
fourth
degree,
the
church,
order,
chapter,
community,
organization,
or
institution
to
which
such
priest
or
minister
may
belong;
(3)
A
guardian
with
respect
to
testamentary
dispositions
given
by
a
ward
in
his
favor
before
the
final
accounts
of
the
guardianship
have
been
approved,
even
if
the
testator
should
die
after
the
approval
thereof;
nevertheless,
any
provision
made
by
the
ward
in
favor
of
the
guardian
when
the
latter
is
his
ascendant,
descendant,
brother,
sister,
or
spouse,
shall
be
valid;
(4)
Any
attesting
witness
to
the
execution
of
a
will,
the
spouse,
parents,
or
children,
or
any
one
claiming
under
such
witness,
spouse,
parents,
or
children;
(5)
Any
physician,
surgeon,
nurse,
health
officer
or
druggist
who
took
care
of
the
testator
during
his
last
illness;
(6)
Individuals,
associations
and
corporations
not
permitted
by
law
to
inherit.
(745,
752,
753,
754a)
Par.
15:
• Apply
only
to
natural
persons
• Applicable
in
testamentary
succession,
not
to
legitime
or
intestacy
• Rationale:
The
law
seeks
to
prevent
possible
abuse
of
moral
or
spiritual
ascendancy
• Duress
or
influence
is
conclusively
presumed;
need
not
be
proved
Par.
1
• To
whom
applicable:
priests,
pastors,
ministers
etc.
belonging
to
religions,
sects
or
cults,
whose
office
or
function
it
is
to
extend
the
peculiar
spiritual
ministrations
of
their
creed
• Requisites:
a. Will
must
have
been
executed
during
the
testator’s
last
illness
b. Spiritual
ministration
must
have
extended
during
the
last
illness
c. Will
must
have
been
executed
during
or
after
the
spiritual
ministration
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
A
makes
a
will
in
favor
of
his
pastor.
Later,
he
becomes
seriously
ill,
and
calls
the
pastor
for
spiritual
ministration.
A
dies.
Is
the
pastor
disqualified?
No.
Proper
sequence:
A
is
dying
Summons
pastor
Spiritual
ministration
During
or
After
spiritual
ministration,
he
makes
a
will,
with
a
disposition
in
favor
of
the
pastor
A
dies
Does
the
prohibition
apply
to
ministers
of
religions
other
than
the
Christian
denomination?
Yes,
if
such
religion
has
a
counterpart
(someone
who
gives
spiritual
ministration)
Par.
2
Purpose:
To
prevent
indirect
violations
or
circumventions
of
Par.
1
Suppose
B
summons
a
priest,
who
is
also
his
son,
and
he
makes
a
disposition
in
his
will,
in
his
son’s
favor.
B’s
son
is
disqualified
from
receiving
the
terstamentary
disposition,
but
not
to
his
legitime.
Par.
3
• Requisite:
Will
must
have
been
executed
by
the
ward
during
the
effectivity
of
the
guardianship
• To
whom
applicable:
Guardians
of
persons
and
property
Exception:
Guardian
who
is
also
an
ascendant,
descendant,
brother,
sister
or
spouse
of
ward‐testator
Note:
the
provision
does
not
exclude
the
relatives
of
the
guardian,
unlike
the
rule
for
priests
Par.
4
• There
is
an
exception.
See
Art.
823,
where
the
witness
may
be
qualified
if
there
are
3
other
witnesses
Par.
5
• Scope
of
prohibition:
Person
must
have
taken
care
of
the
testator
during
the
latter’s
final
illness
“Taking
care”
means
medical
attendance
with
some
regularity
or
continuity
Par.
6:
Total
disqualification;
Should
be
a
separate
article
Art.
1028.
The
prohibitions
mentioned
in
article
739,
concerning
donations
inter
vivos
shall
apply
to
testamentary
provisions.
(n)
Art.
1029.
Should
the
testator
dispose
of
the
whole
or
part
of
his
property
for
prayers
and
pious
works
for
the
benefit
of
his
soul,
in
general
terms
and
without
specifying
its
application,
the
executor,
with
the
court's
approval
shall
deliver
one‐half
thereof
or
its
proceeds
to
the
church
or
denomination
to
which
the
testator
may
belong,
to
be
used
for
such
prayers
and
pious
works,
and
the
other
half
to
the
State,
for
the
purposes
mentioned
in
Article
1013.
(747a)
Page 62 of 73
Requisites:
a. Disposition
for
prayers
and
pious
works
for
the
benefit
of
the
testator’s
soul
b. No
specification
of
application
of
disposition
Apportionment
of
disposition
or
its
proceeds:
• ½
to
the
church
or
denomination
to
which
the
testator
belonged
• ½
to
the
State
(see
Art.
1013)
Art.
1030.
Testamentary
provisions
in
favor
of
the
poor
in
general,
without
designation
of
particular
persons
or
of
any
community,
shall
be
deemed
limited
to
the
poor
living
in
the
domicile
of
the
testator
at
the
time
of
his
death,
unless
it
should
clearly
appear
that
his
intention
was
otherwise.
The
designation
of
the
persons
who
are
to
be
considered
as
poor
and
the
distribution
of
the
property
shall
be
made
by
the
person
appointed
by
the
testator
for
the
purpose;
in
default
of
such
person,
by
the
executor,
and
should
there
be
no
executor,
by
the
justice
of
the
peace,
the
mayor,
and
the
municipal
treasurer,
who
shall
decide
by
a
majority
of
votes
all
questions
that
may
arise.
In
all
these
cases,
the
approval
of
the
Court
of
First
Instance
shall
be
necessary.
The
preceding
paragraph
shall
apply
when
the
testator
has
disposed
of
his
property
in
favor
of
the
poor
of
a
definite
locality.
(749a)
Beneficiaries:
The
poor
Par.
1
refers
to
the
poor
of
the
testator’s
domicile,
unless
excluded
by
the
testator
in
his
will.
Who
determines
the
individual
beneficiaries
within
the
class
designated
by
the
testator?
AEA
a. Person
authorized
by
the
testator,
or
in
his
default
b. Executor,
or
in
his
default
c. Administator
Art.
1031.
A
testamentary
provision
in
favor
of
a
disqualified
person,
even
though
made
under
the
guise
of
an
onerous
contract,
or
made
through
an
intermediary,
shall
be
void.
(755)
Effect
of
simulation
or
circumvention:
Disposition
is
void,
hence
ineffective
as
to
the
intended
beneficiary
and
the
intermediary.
Intestate
heirs,
to
whom
the
property
would
go,
have
the
right
to
claim
the
nullity.
Art.
1032.
The
following
are
incapable
of
succeeding
by
reason
of
unworthiness:
(1)
Parents
who
have
abandoned
their
children
or
induced
their
daughters
to
lead
a
corrupt
or
immoral
life,
or
attempted
against
their
virtue;
(2)
Any
person
who
has
been
convicted
of
an
attempt
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
against
the
life
of
the
testator,
his
or
her
spouse,
descendants,
or
ascendants;
(3)
Any
person
who
has
accused
the
testator
of
a
crime
for
which
the
law
prescribes
imprisonment
for
six
years
or
more,
if
the
accusation
has
been
found
groundless;
(4)
Any
heir
of
full
age
who,
having
knowledge
of
the
violent
death
of
the
testator,
should
fail
to
report
it
to
an
officer
of
the
law
within
a
month,
unless
the
authorities
have
already
taken
action;
this
prohibition
shall
not
apply
to
cases
wherein,
according
to
law,
there
is
no
obligation
to
make
an
accusation;
(5)
Any
person
convicted
of
adultery
or
concubinage
with
the
spouse
of
the
testator;
(6)
Any
person
who
by
fraud,
violence,
intimidation,
or
undue
influence
should
cause
the
testator
to
make
a
will
or
to
change
one
already
made;
(7)
Any
person
who
by
the
same
means
prevents
another
from
making
a
will,
or
from
revoking
one
already
made,
or
who
supplants,
conceals,
or
alters
the
latter's
will;
(8)
Any
person
who
falsifies
or
forges
a
supposed
will
of
the
decedent.
(756,
673,
674a)
Application:
all
kinds
of
succession
Grounds
for
unworthiness:
Pars.
1,
2,
3,
5,
6:
see
discussion
under
Art.
919
(as
grounds
for
disinheritance)
Par.
4:
a. Heir
has
knowledge
of
violent
death
of
the
decedent
b. Heir
is
of
legal
age
c. Heir
fails
to
report
it
to
all
officer
of
the
law
within
a
month
after
learning
of
it
d. Authorities
have
not
yet
taken
action
e. Legal
obligation
for
the
heir
to
make
an
accusation
Effect
of
Unworthiness:
Total
disqualification
by
any
form
of
succession
Art.
1033.
The
cause
of
unworthiness
shall
be
without
effect
if
the
testator
had
knowledge
thereof
at
the
time
he
made
the
will,
or
if,
having
known
of
them
subsequently,
he
should
condone
them
in
writing.
(757a)
2
ways
to
restore
capacity:
a. Written
condonation
b. Execution
by
the
offended
party
of
a
will
with
knowledge
of
the
cause
of
unworthiness
(the
will
must
also
institute
the
unworthy
heir
or
restore
him
to
capacity)
How
to
reconcile
common
grounds
for
Unworthiness
and
Disinheritance
(Arts.
1033
and
922):
a. If
offended
party
does
not
make
a
will
subsequent
to
the
occurrence
of
the
common
cause:
Art.
1033
applies
Page 63 of 73
b.
If
offended
party
makes
a
will
subsequent
to
the
occurrence
of
the
common
cause:
If
he
knew
of
the
cause
1) If
he
disinherits
–
apply
Art.
922
2) If
he
institutes
or
pardons
the
offender
–
restored
to
capacity
3) If
will
is
silent
–
unworthiness
stays
If
he
did
not
know
of
the
cause
–
unworthiness
stays
Art.
1034.
In
order
to
judge
the
capacity
of
the
heir,
devisee
or
legatee,
his
qualification
at
the
time
of
the
death
of
the
decedent
shall
be
the
criterion.
In
cases
falling
under
Nos.
2,
3,
or
5
of
Article
1032,
it
shall
be
necessary
to
wait
until
final
judgment
is
rendered,
and
in
the
case
falling
under
No.
4,
the
expiration
of
the
month
allowed
for
the
report.
If
the
institution,
devise
or
legacy
should
be
conditional,
the
time
of
the
compliance
with
the
condition
shall
also
be
considered.
(758a)
When
capacity
is
to
be
determined:
Gen.
Rule:
Time
of
decedent’s
death
If
institution
is
subject
to
a
suspensive
condition:
a. Time
of
decedent’s
death,
and
b. Time
of
happening
of
condition
If
final
judgment
is
a
requisite
of
unworthiness:
Time
of
final
judgment
Art.
1035.
If
the
person
excluded
from
the
inheritance
by
reason
of
incapacity
should
be
a
child
or
descendant
of
the
decedent
and
should
have
children
or
descendants,
the
latter
shall
acquire
his
right
to
the
legitime.
The
person
so
excluded
shall
not
enjoy
the
usufruct
and
administration
of
the
property
thus
inherited
by
his
children.
(761a)
Extent
of
Representation:
Legitime
and
intestacy
Representation
in
the
collateral
line:
If
the
unworthy
heir
is
a
brother
or
sister,
his
children
(nephews
and
nieces
of
the
decedent)
will
represent
Art.
1036.
Alienations
of
hereditary
property,
and
acts
of
administration
performed
by
the
excluded
heir,
before
the
judicial
order
of
exclusion,
are
valid
as
to
the
third
persons
who
acted
in
good
faith;
but
the
co‐heirs
shall
have
a
right
to
recover
damages
from
the
disqualified
heir.
(n)
This
applies
the
Doctrine
of
Innocent
Purchaser
for
Value
without
prejudice
to
the
right
to
damages
of
the
prejudiced
heirs
against
the
incapacitated
heir.
Art.
1037.
The
unworthy
heir
who
is
excluded
from
the
succession
has
a
right
to
demand
indemnity
or
any
expenses
incurred
in
the
preservation
of
the
hereditary
property,
and
to
enforce
such
credits
as
he
may
have
against
the
estate.
(n)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
This
article
grants
a
right
of
reimbursement
of
necessary
expenses
to
the
excluded
heir.
Art.
1038.
Any
person
incapable
of
succession,
who,
disregarding
the
prohibition
stated
in
the
preceding
articles,
entered
into
the
possession
of
the
hereditary
property,
shall
be
obliged
to
return
it
together
it
its
accessions.
He
shall
be
liable
for
all
the
fruits
and
rents
he
may
have
received,
or
could
have
received
through
the
exercise
of
due
diligence.
(760a)
Disqualified
heir
here
is
a
possessor
in
bad
faith.
a. Obligation
to
return,
with
accessions
b. Liability
for
fruits
which
were
received
and
could
have
been
received
Art.
1039.
Capacity
to
succeed
is
governed
by
the
law
of
the
nation
of
the
decedent.
(n)
Art.
1040.
The
action
for
a
declaration
of
incapacity
and
for
the
recovery
of
the
inheritance,
devise
or
legacy
shall
be
brought
within
five
years
from
the
time
the
disqualified
person
took
possession
thereof.
It
may
be
brought
by
any
one
who
may
have
an
interest
in
the
succession.
(762a)
The
right
of
heir
to
recover
the
inheritance
must
be
exercised
within
5
years.
5‐year
prescriptive
period
applies
to:
a. the
declaration
of
incapacity
of
the
heir
b. the
recovery
of
the
inheritance
or
portion
thereof
wrongfully
possessed
by
the
disqualified
heir.
3. Acceptance and Repudiation of the Inheritance
Art.
1041.
The
acceptance
or
repudiation
of
the
inheritance
is
an
act
which
is
purely
voluntary
and
free.
(988)
Art.
1042.
The
effects
of
the
acceptance
or
repudiation
shall
always
retroact
to
the
moment
of
the
death
of
the
decedent.
(989)
Retroactivity:
a. Of
acceptance
–
successor
will
be
deemed
to
have
owned
and
possessed
the
property
from
the
moment
of
decedent’s
death
b. Of
renunciation
–
substitute,
co‐heir
or
intestate
heir
who
gets
the
property
in
default
of
the
renouncer,
is
deemed
to
have
owned
and
possessed
it
from
the
moment
of
decedent’s
death
c. Conditional
institutions
1) Condition
happens
–
Property
passes
with
retroactive
effect
2) Condition
does
not
happen
–
Property
goes
to
the
appropriate
successor,
with
the
same
retroactive
effect
Art.
1043.
No
person
may
accept
or
repudiate
an
Page 64 of 73
inheritance
unless
he
is
certain
of
the
death
of
the
person
from
whom
he
is
to
inherit,
and
of
his
right
to
the
inheritance.
(991)
Article
requires:
a. Certainty
of
death
b. Established
right
to
inherit
Art.
1044.
Any
person
having
the
free
disposal
of
his
property
may
accept
or
repudiate
an
inheritance.
Any
inheritance
left
to
minors
or
incapacitated
persons
may
be
accepted
by
their
parents
or
guardians.
Parents
or
guardians
may
repudiate
the
inheritance
left
to
their
wards
only
by
judicial
authorization.
The
right
to
accept
an
inheritance
left
to
the
poor
shall
belong
to
the
persons
designated
by
the
testator
to
determine
the
beneficiaries
and
distribute
the
property,
or
in
their
default,
to
those
mentioned
in
Article
1030.
(992a)
Art.
1045.
The
lawful
representatives
of
corporations,
associations,
institutions
and
entities
qualified
to
acquire
property
may
accept
any
inheritance
left
to
the
latter,
but
in
order
to
repudiate
it,
the
approval
of
the
court
shall
be
necessary.
(993a)
Art.
1046.
Public
official
establishments
can
neither
accept
nor
repudiate
an
inheritance
without
the
approval
of
the
government.
(994)
Art.
1047.
A
married
woman
of
age
may
repudiate
an
inheritance
without
the
consent
of
her
husband.
(995a)
Art.
1048.
Deaf‐mutes
who
can
read
and
write
may
accept
or
repudiate
the
inheritance
personally
or
through
an
agent.
Should
they
not
be
able
to
read
and
write,
the
inheritance
shall
be
accepted
by
their
guardians.
These
guardians
may
repudiate
the
same
with
judicial
approval.
(996a)
Accept
Repudiate
Parents
or
guardians
Yes
Yes*
Authorized
person
Yes
No
Lawful
Yes
Yes*
representatives
Public
official
Yes,
but
only
with
approval
of
establishments
government
Married
person
(w/o
Yes
Yes
spouse’s
consent)
Deaf‐mutes
who
can
Yes,
personally
or
through
an
read
and
write
agent
Deaf‐mutes
who
Yes,
through
Yes,
through
cannot
read
and
their
guardians
their
write
guardians*
*Requires
judicial
authorization
Art.
1049.
Acceptance
may
be
express
or
tacit.
An
express
acceptance
must
be
made
in
a
public
or
private
document.
A
tacit
acceptance
is
one
resulting
from
acts
by
which
the
intention
to
accept
is
necessarily
implied,
or
which
one
would
have
no
right
to
do
except
in
the
capacity
of
an
heir.
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Acts
of
mere
preservation
or
provisional
administration
do
not
imply
an
acceptance
of
the
inheritance
if,
through
such
acts,
the
title
or
capacity
of
an
heir
has
not
been
assumed.
(999a)
Kinds
of
acceptance:
a. Express
1) Public
document
2) Private
writing
b. Tacit
c. Implied
Art.
1050.
An
inheritance
is
deemed
accepted:
(1)
If
the
heirs
sells,
donates,
or
assigns
his
right
to
a
stranger,
or
to
his
co‐heirs,
or
to
any
of
them;
(2)
If
the
heir
renounces
the
same,
even
though
gratuitously,
for
the
benefit
of
one
or
more
of
his
co‐heirs;
(3)
If
he
renounces
it
for
a
price
in
favor
of
all
his
co‐heirs
indiscriminately;
but
if
this
renunciation
should
be
gratuitous,
and
the
co‐heirs
in
whose
favor
it
is
made
are
those
upon
whom
the
portion
renounced
should
devolve
by
virtue
of
accretion,
the
inheritance
shall
not
be
deemed
as
accepted.
(1000)
Tacit
acceptance
is
inferred
from
acts
of
ownership
performed
by
the
heir
over
the
property.
Art.
1051.
The
repudiation
of
an
inheritance
shall
be
made
in
a
public
or
authentic
instrument,
or
by
petition
presented
to
the
court
having
jurisdiction
over
the
testamentary
or
intestate
proceedings.
(1008)
Form
of
renunciation:
a. Public
or
authentic
(genuine)
instrument
b. Petition
filed
in
the
settlement
proceedings
Art.
1052.
If
the
heir
repudiates
the
inheritance
to
the
prejudice
of
his
own
creditors,
the
latter
may
petition
the
court
to
authorize
them
to
accept
it
in
the
name
of
the
heir.
The
acceptance
shall
benefit
the
creditors
only
to
an
extent
sufficient
to
cover
the
amount
of
their
credits.
The
excess,
should
there
be
any,
shall
in
no
case
pertain
to
the
renouncer,
but
shall
be
adjudicated
to
the
persons
to
whom,
in
accordance
with
the
rules
established
in
this
Code,
it
may
belong.
(1001)
This
is
an
instance
of
accion
pauliana,
which
is
the
right
given
to
creditors
to
impugn
or
set
aside
contracts,
transactions
or
dispositions
of
their
debtors
which
will
prejudice
or
defraud
them.
Extent
of
right
of
creditor
to
accept
the
inheritance
in
the
name
of
the
debtor:
Only
to
the
amount
or
value
necessary
to
satisfy
the
credit
Art.
1053.
If
the
heir
should
die
without
having
accepted
or
repudiated
the
inheritance
his
right
shall
be
transmitted
to
his
heirs.
(1006)
Art.
1054.
Should
there
be
several
heirs
called
to
the
Page 65 of 73
inheritance,
some
of
them
may
accept
and
the
others
may
repudiate
it.
(1007a)
Their
right
to
accept
or
repudiate
corresponds
to
the
aliquot
share
to
which
they
are
entitled.
Art.
1055.
If
a
person,
who
is
called
to
the
same
inheritance
as
an
heir
by
will
and
ab
intestato,
repudiates
the
inheritance
in
his
capacity
as
a
testamentary
heir,
he
is
understood
to
have
repudiated
it
in
both
capacities.
Should
he
repudiate
it
as
an
intestate
heir,
without
knowledge
of
his
being
a
testamentary
heir,
he
may
still
accept
it
in
the
latter
capacity.
(1009)
Rationale:
The
testamentary
disposition
is
the
express
will
of
the
testator,
whereas
intestacy
is
only
his
implied
will.
One
who
renounces
the
express
will
is
deemed
to
have
renounced
the
implied
also,
but
not
the
other
way
around.
Rule
does
not
apply
to
legitime.
Art.
1056.
The
acceptance
or
repudiation
of
an
inheritance,
once
made,
is
irrevocable,
and
cannot
be
impugned,
except
when
it
was
made
through
any
of
the
causes
that
vitiate
consent,
or
when
an
unknown
will
appears.
(997)
Gen.
Rule:
Acceptance
or
repudiation
of
inheritance
is
irrevocable
Exceptions:
a. Factors
vitiating
consent
are
present
–FIVUM
(fraud,
intimidation,
undue
influence,
mistake,
fraud)
b. Appearance
of
an
unknown
will
(which
is
valid
and
admitted
to
probate)
Art.
1057.
Within
thirty
days
after
the
court
has
issued
an
order
for
the
distribution
of
the
estate
in
accordance
with
the
Rules
of
Court,
the
heirs,
devisees
and
legatees
shall
signify
to
the
court
having
jurisdiction
whether
they
accept
or
repudiate
the
inheritance.
If
they
do
not
do
so
within
that
time,
they
are
deemed
to
have
accepted
the
inheritance.
(n)
Implied
acceptance
–
failure
to
signify
acceptance
or
renunciation
within
the
30‐day
period
4. Executors and Administrators
Art.
1058.
All
matters
relating
to
the
appointment,
powers
and
duties
of
executors
and
administrators
and
concerning
the
administration
of
estates
of
deceased
persons
shall
be
governed
by
the
Rules
of
Court.
(n)
Art.
1059.
If
the
assets
of
the
estate
of
a
decedent
which
can
be
applied
to
the
payment
of
debts
are
not
sufficient
for
that
purpose,
the
provisions
of
Articles
2239
to
2251
on
Preference
of
Credits
shall
be
observed,
provided
that
the
expenses
referred
to
in
Article
2244,
No.
8,
shall
be
those
involved
in
the
administration
of
the
decedent's
estate.
(n)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Art.
1060.
A
corporation
or
association
authorized
to
conduct
the
business
of
a
trust
company
in
the
Philippines
may
be
appointed
as
an
executor,
administrator,
guardian
of
an
estate,
or
trustee,
in
like
manner
as
an
individual;
but
it
shall
not
be
appointed
guardian
of
the
person
of
a
ward.
(n)
See
Rules
78‐90
of
the
Rules
of
Court
5. Collation
3
meanings
of
collation:
1. As
computation
–
add
all
available
assets,
deduct
debts,
and
add
the
donations
to
get
the
net
hereditary
estate
Arts.
1061,
1067,
1071,
1072
2. As
imputation
–
determine
if
the
donation
is
chargeable/imputable
to
the
legitime
or
free
portion
Arts.
1062
–1066,
1068,
1069,
1071–1073
3. As
return
–
If
donation
to
a
stranger
exceeds
the
free
portion,
he
would
have
to
give
back
to
the
estate
as
much
as
is
needed
to
complete
the
legitimes
Arts.
1075,
1076
Art.
1061.
Every
compulsory
heir,
who
succeeds
with
other
compulsory
heirs,
must
bring
into
the
mass
of
the
estate
any
property
or
right
which
he
may
have
received
from
the
decedent,
during
the
lifetime
of
the
latter,
by
way
of
donation,
or
any
other
gratuitous
title,
in
order
that
it
may
be
computed
in
the
determination
of
the
legitime
of
each
heir,
and
in
the
account
of
the
partition.
(1035a)
Donations
inter
vivos
–
made
to
compulsory
heirs
AND
strangers
Value
of
donation:
At
the
time
donation
was
made
Art.
1062.
Collation
shall
not
take
place
among
compulsory
heirs
if
the
donor
should
have
so
expressly
provided,
or
if
the
donee
should
repudiate
the
inheritance,
unless
the
donation
should
be
reduced
as
inofficious.
(1036)
Gen.
Rule:
Donations
inter
vivos
to
compulsory
heirs
should
be
imputed
to
the
heir’s
legitime
(considered
an
advance
to
the
legitime)
Exceptions:
a. Donor
provides
otherwise
b. Donee
renounces
the
inheritance
Instances
when
donations
inter
vivos
are
to
be
imputed
to
the
free
portion:
a. When
made
to
strangers
b. When
made
to
compulsory
heirs
and
the
donor
so
provides
c. When
made
to
compulsory
heirs
who
renounce
the
inheritance
d. When
in
excess
of
the
compulsory
heir’s
legitime,
as
to
the
excess
Art.
1063.
Property
left
by
will
is
not
deemed
subject
to
collation,
if
the
testator
has
not
otherwise
provided,
but
Page 66 of 73
the
legitime
shall
in
any
case
remain
unimpaired.
(1037)
Gen.
Rule:
Testamentary
dispostions
to
compulsory
heirs
should
not
be
imputed
to
the
legitime,
but
to
the
free
portion
Exception:
If
the
testator
provides
otherwise
Art.
1064.
When
the
grandchildren,
who
survive
with
their
uncles,
aunts,
or
cousins,
inherit
from
their
grandparents
in
representation
of
their
father
or
mother,
they
shall
bring
to
collation
all
that
their
parents,
if
alive,
would
have
been
obliged
to
bring,
even
though
such
grandchildren
have
not
inherited
the
property.
They
shall
also
bring
to
collation
all
that
they
may
have
received
from
the
decedent
during
his
lifetime,
unless
the
testator
has
provided
otherwise,
in
which
case
his
wishes
must
be
respected,
if
the
legitime
of
the
co‐heirs
is
not
prejudiced.
(1038)
Grandchildren
have
to
impute
to
their
legitime:
a. Whatever
the
parent
whom
they
are
representing
would
have
been
obliged
to
collate;
and
b. Whatever
they
themselves
have
received
from
the
grandparent
by
gratuitous
title
(subject
to
the
rules
and
exceptions
under
Art.
1062)
Art.
1065.
Parents
are
not
obliged
to
bring
to
collation
in
the
inheritance
of
their
ascendants
any
property
which
may
have
been
donated
by
the
latter
to
their
children.
(1039)
Donation
to
the
grandchild
should
be
imputed
to
the
free
portion,
since
it
is
a
donation
to
a
stranger.
Art.
1066.
Neither
shall
donations
to
the
spouse
of
the
child
be
brought
to
collation;
but
if
they
have
been
given
by
the
parent
to
the
spouses
jointly,
the
child
shall
be
obliged
to
bring
to
collation
one‐half
of
the
thing
donated.
(1040)
Donation
given
to
the
child’s
spouse
will
not
be
imputed
to
the
child’s
legitime,
as
it
is
a
donation
made
to
a
stranger.
Treatment
of
donations
made
to
the
spouses
jointly:
• ½
belongs
to
the
donor’s
child
(Art.
1062)
• ½
belongs
to
the
child’s
spouse
(donation
to
stranger)
Art.
1067.
Expenses
for
support,
education,
medical
attendance,
even
in
extraordinary
illness,
apprenticeship,
ordinary
equipment,
or
customary
gifts
are
not
subject
to
collation.
(1041)
Support
–
defined
in
Art.
194,
Family
Code;
does
not
include
expenses
for
the
recipient’s
professional,
vocational
or
other
career
Art.
1068.
Expenses
incurred
by
the
parents
in
giving
their
children
a
professional,
vocational
or
other
career
shall
not
be
brought
to
collation
unless
the
parents
so
provide,
or
unless
they
impair
the
legitime;
but
when
their
collation
is
required,
the
sum
which
the
child
would
have
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
spent
if
he
had
lived
in
the
house
and
company
of
his
parents
shall
be
deducted
therefrom.
(1042a)
Gen.
Rule:
Expenses
for
the
child’s
professional,
vocational,
or
other
career,
are
not
inofficious;
should
not
be
charged
against
the
recipient’s
legitime,
but
against
the
free
portion
Exception:
If
the
parents
provide
otherwise
Art.
1069.
Any
sums
paid
by
a
parent
in
satisfaction
of
the
debts
of
his
children,
election
expenses,
fines,
and
similar
expenses
shall
be
brought
to
collation.
(1043a)
Donations
by
the
parent
to
the
child
should
be
treated
like
other
donations
to
compulsory
heirs
under
Art.
1062.
Art.
1070.
Wedding
gifts
by
parents
and
ascendants
consisting
of
jewelry,
clothing,
and
outfit,
shall
not
be
reduced
as
inofficious
except
insofar
as
they
may
exceed
one‐tenth
of
the
sum
which
is
disposable
by
will.
(1044)
Wedding
gifts
in
excess
of
1/10
of
the
free
portion
are
inofficious.
Art.
1071.
The
same
things
donated
are
not
to
be
brought
to
collation
and
partition,
but
only
their
value
at
the
time
of
the
donation,
even
though
their
just
value
may
not
then
have
been
assessed.
Their
subsequent
increase
or
deterioration
and
even
their
total
loss
or
destruction,
be
it
accidental
or
culpable,
shall
be
for
the
benefit
or
account
and
risk
of
the
donee.
(1045a)
Value
to
be
computed
and
imputed:
the
value
of
thing
donated
at
the
time
donation
was
made
Reason:
Any
appreciation
or
depreciation
of
the
thing
after
that
time
should
be
for
the
donee’s
account,
since
donation
transfers
ownership
to
him
Art.
1072.
In
the
collation
of
a
donation
made
by
both
parents,
one‐half
shall
be
brought
to
the
inheritance
of
the
father,
and
the
other
half,
to
that
of
the
mother.
That
given
by
one
alone
shall
be
brought
to
collation
in
his
or
her
inheritance.
(1046a)
Joint
donation:
Pertaining
to
equal
shares
to
the
estates
of
the
father
and
mother
Donation
by
one
parent:
Treated
separately
Art.
1073.
The
donee's
share
of
the
estate
shall
be
reduced
by
an
amount
equal
to
that
already
received
by
him;
and
his
co‐heirs
shall
receive
an
equivalent,
as
much
as
possible,
in
property
of
the
same
nature,
class
and
quality.
(1047)
Art.
1074.
Should
the
provisions
of
the
preceding
article
be
impracticable,
if
the
property
donated
was
immovable,
the
co‐heirs
shall
be
entitled
to
receive
its
equivalent
in
cash
or
securities,
at
the
rate
of
quotation;
and
should
there
be
neither
cash
or
marketable
securities
in
the
estate,
so
much
of
the
other
property
as
may
be
necessary
shall
be
sold
at
public
auction.
Page 67 of 73
If
the
property
donated
was
movable,
the
co‐heirs
shall
only
have
a
right
to
select
an
equivalent
of
other
personal
property
of
the
inheritance
at
its
just
price.
(1048)
Applies
if
Art.
1073
is
not
possible.
a. Immovables
–
co‐heirs
entitled
to
cash
or
securities
b. Movables
–
co‐heirs
entitled
to
similarly‐valued
movable
Art.
1075.
The
fruits
and
interest
of
the
property
subject
to
collation
shall
not
pertain
to
the
estate
except
from
the
day
on
which
the
succession
is
opened.
For
the
purpose
of
ascertaining
their
amount,
the
fruits
and
interest
of
the
property
of
the
estate
of
the
same
kind
and
quality
as
that
subject
to
collation
shall
be
made
the
standard
of
assessment.
(1049)
Rationale:
The
obligation
to
return
inofficious
donations
to
the
estate
arises
at
the
time
succession
vests
(decedent’s
death).
From
that
time,
the
compulsory
heir
is
entitled
to
the
fruits.
Extent
of
compulsory
heir’s
right
to
fruits:
a. Entirety
of
fruits
–
if
donation
was
totally
inofficious
b. Prorated
between
heir
and
donee
–
if
partially
inofficious
Art.
1076.
The
co‐heirs
are
bound
to
reimburse
to
the
donee
the
necessary
expenses
which
he
has
incurred
for
the
preservation
of
the
property
donated
to
him,
though
they
may
not
have
augmented
its
value.
The
donee
who
collates
in
kind
an
immovable
which
has
been
given
to
him
must
be
reimbursed
by
his
co‐heirs
for
the
improvements
which
have
increased
the
value
of
the
property,
and
which
exist
at
the
time
the
partition
if
effected.
As
to
works
made
on
the
estate
for
the
mere
pleasure
of
the
donee,
no
reimbursement
is
due
him
for
them;
he
has,
however,
the
right
to
remove
them,
if
he
can
do
so
without
injuring
the
estate.
(n)
Totally
Partially
inofficious
inofficious
Necessary
Reimburse
in
full
Partial
reimbursement
in
Useful
Reimburse
in
full,
proportion
to
the
if
improvement
value
to
be
still
exists
returned
Ornamental
No
reimbursement
No
reimbursement
Only
removal,
if
no
Only
removal*
if
no
injury
to
the
estate
injury
to
the
estate
*
If
the
property
is
physically
divided,
and
the
ornament
happens
to
be
located
in
the
donee’s
portion,
donee
will
have
all
rights
of
ownership.
Art.
1077.
Should
any
question
arise
among
the
co‐heirs
upon
the
obligation
to
bring
to
collation
or
as
to
the
things
which
are
subject
to
collation,
the
distribution
of
the
estate
shall
not
be
interrupted
for
this
reason,
provided
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
adequate
security
is
given.
(1050)
6. Partition and Distribution of Estate
6.1. Partition
Partition
is
a
judicial
proceeding
that
comprises
the
entire
settlement
of
the
decedent’s
estate,
covered
by
Rules
73
to
90
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
1
Decedent
dies
2
Coownership
of
heirs
over
net
hereditary
estate
or
partible
estate
3
Subsequent
partition
by:
‐
extrajudicial
agreement
(Rule
74,
Sec.
1,
Rules
of
Court),
OR
‐
through
judicial
order
in
appropriate
settlement
proceedings
(Rule
90,
Rules
of
Court)
Art.
1078.
Where
there
are
two
or
more
heirs,
the
whole
estate
of
the
decedent
is,
before
its
partition,
owned
in
common
by
such
heirs,
subject
to
the
payment
of
debts
of
the
deceased.
(n)
Art.
1079.
Partition,
in
general,
is
the
separation,
division
and
assignment
of
a
thing
held
in
common
among
those
to
whom
it
may
belong.
The
thing
itself
may
be
divided,
or
its
value.
(n)
Kinds
of
partition:
a. Actual
–
physical
division
of
the
thing
among
the
co‐heirs
b. Constructive
–
any
act,
other
than
physical
division,
which
terminates
the
co‐ownership
(ex:
sale
to
a
3rd
person)
Casilang
vs.
Dizon
(2013)
F:
The
decedent’s
grandchildren
petitioned
to
have
Jose
evicted
and
executed
a
deed
of
extrajudicial
partition
over
the
lot.
H:
Jose
is
the
lawful
owner
of
the
lot.
He
and
his
siblings
were
able
to
present
sufficient
evidence
that
they
entered
into
a
verbal
partition,
while
Rosario
was
unable
to
show
any
proof
that
her
father
inherited
the
lot
from
Liborio.
Art.
1080.
Should
a
person
make
partition
of
his
estate
by
an
act
inter
vivos,
or
by
will,
such
partition
shall
be
respected,
insofar
as
it
does
not
prejudice
the
legitime
of
the
compulsory
heirs.
A
parent
who,
in
the
interest
of
his
or
her
family,
desires
to
keep
any
agricultural,
industrial,
or
manufacturing
enterprise
intact,
may
avail
himself
of
the
right
granted
him
in
this
article,
by
ordering
that
the
legitime
of
the
other
children
to
whom
the
property
is
not
assigned,
be
Page 68 of 73
paid
in
cash.
(1056a)
Partition
by
the
Causante
(decedent):
Characteristics:
a. Takes
effect
only
upon
death
b. Revocable
as
long
as
the
causante
is
alive
(hence,
can
be
changed,
modified
or
rescinded)
How
made:
a. By
will,
or
b. By
act
inter
vivos
• In
writing
• In
a
public
instrument
Legasto
vs.
Verzosa
(1930)
F:
During
the
testatrix's
lifetime,
she
made
a
partition
of
the
parcels
of
land
to
her
heirs
by
virtue
of
deeds
of
assignment.
However
probate
of
the
will
was
denied.
H:
Will
is
not
valid
as
it
was
not
admitted
for
probate.
Partition
of
the
testator's
estate
inter
vivos,
as
contemplated
in
the
Civil
Code,
can
only
be
validly
made
in
the
presence
of
a
valid
will,
which
is
why
the
(old)
provision
speaks
of
a
"testator."
Limitation
on
partition
by
causante:
Legitimes
of
compulsory
heirs
cannot
be
impaired
Art.
1081.
A
person
may,
by
an
act
inter
vivos
or
mortis
causa,
intrust
the
mere
power
to
make
the
partition
after
his
death
to
any
person
who
is
not
one
of
the
co‐heirs.
The
provisions
of
this
and
of
the
preceding
article
shall
be
observed
even
should
there
be
among
the
co‐heirs
a
minor
or
a
person
subject
to
guardianship;
but
the
mandatary,
in
such
case,
shall
make
an
inventory
of
the
property
of
the
estate,
after
notifying
the
co‐heirs,
the
creditors,
and
the
legatees
or
devisees.
(1057a)
Mandatary
cannot
be
a
co‐heir,
to
ensure
fairness
and
impartiality.
Art.
1082.
Every
act
which
is
intended
to
put
an
end
to
indivision
among
co‐heirs
and
legatees
or
devisees
is
deemed
to
be
a
partition,
although
it
should
purport
to
be
a
sale,
and
exchange,
a
compromise,
or
any
other
transaction.
(n)
Tuason
vs.
Tuason
(1951)
F:
The
share
of
one
of
the
Tuason
siblings
in
a
huge
parcel
of
land
was
sold
to
Araneta.
They
executed
a
MoA
where
they
agreed
that
no
co‐owner
shall
sell
his
interest
in
the
land
w/o
first
giving
preference
to
the
other
co‐owners.
Angela
argued
that
the
contract
is
null
and
void
for
violating
CC400.
H:
CC400
is
not
applicable.
The
contract’s
provision
preserving
the
co‐ownership
until
all
lots
have
been
sold,
is
a
mere
incident
to
the
main
object
of
dissolving
the
co‐ ownership.
Art.
1083.
Every
co‐heir
has
a
right
to
demand
the
division
of
the
estate
unless
the
testator
should
have
expressly
forbidden
its
partition,
in
which
case
the
period
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
of
indivision
shall
not
exceed
twenty
years
as
provided
in
article
494.
This
power
of
the
testator
to
prohibit
division
applies
to
the
legitime.
Even
though
forbidden
by
the
testator,
the
co‐ownership
terminates
when
any
of
the
causes
for
which
partnership
is
dissolved
takes
place,
or
when
the
court
finds
for
compelling
reasons
that
division
should
be
ordered,
upon
petition
of
one
of
the
co‐heirs.
(1051a)
Gen.
Rule:
Any
co‐heir
may
demand
partition
at
any
time
Exceptions:
a. When
forbidden
by
the
testator
for
a
period
not
exceeding
20
years
Exceptions
to
the
exception:
• When
any
of
the
causes
for
dissolution
of
a
partnership
occurs
• When
the
court
finds
compelling
reasons
for
partition
b. When
the
co‐heirs
agree
on
indivision
for
a
period
not
exceeding
10
years
(renewable)
c. When
the
law
prohibits
partition
Art.
1084.
Voluntary
heirs
upon
whom
some
condition
has
been
imposed
cannot
demand
a
partition
until
the
condition
has
been
fulfilled;
but
the
other
co‐heirs
may
demand
it
by
giving
sufficient
security
for
the
rights
which
the
former
may
have
in
case
the
condition
should
be
complied
with,
and
until
it
is
known
that
the
condition
has
not
been
fulfilled
or
can
never
be
complied
with,
the
partition
shall
be
understood
to
be
provisional.
(1054a)
Rationale:
Right
as
heir
vests
only
when
the
suspensive
condition
happens.
Other
heirs
can
demand
parition
after
furnishing
adequate
security.
Art.
1085.
In
the
partition
of
the
estate,
equality
shall
be
observed
as
far
as
possible,
dividing
the
property
into
lots,
or
assigning
to
each
of
the
co‐heirs
things
of
the
same
nature,
quality
and
kind.
(1061)
Equality
among
coheirs:
a. Quantitative
–
Shares
of
co‐heirs
are
determined
by
law
and
by
will
b. Qualitative
–
The
law
mandates
equality
in
nature,
kind
and
quality
Exceptions:
• Causante
has
made
the
partition
himself
• Co‐heirs
agree
otherwise
• Qualitative
equality
is
impossible
or
impracticable
Art.
1086.
Should
a
thing
be
indivisible,
or
would
be
much
impaired
by
its
being
divided,
it
may
be
adjudicated
to
one
of
the
heirs,
provided
he
shall
pay
the
others
the
excess
in
cash.
Nevertheless,
if
any
of
the
heirs
should
demand
that
the
thing
be
sold
at
public
auction
and
that
strangers
be
allowed
to
bid,
this
must
be
done.
(1062)
To
whom
thing
may
be
sold:
Page 69 of 73
a. b.
To
a
3rd
person,
or
To
any
of
the
co‐heirs
(if
none
of
them
object)
Art.
1087.
In
the
partition
the
co‐heirs
shall
reimburse
one
another
for
the
income
and
fruits
which
each
one
of
them
may
have
received
from
any
property
of
the
estate,
for
any
useful
and
necessary
expenses
made
upon
such
property,
and
for
any
damage
thereto
through
malice
or
neglect.
(1063)
Upon
partition,
the
co‐heirs
shall
render
a
mutual
accounting
of
benefits
received
and
necessary
and
useful
expenses
incurred
by
each
of
them.
Art.
1088.
Should
any
of
the
heirs
sell
his
hereditary
rights
to
a
stranger
before
the
partition,
any
or
all
of
the
co‐heirs
may
be
subrogated
to
the
rights
of
the
purchaser
by
reimbursing
him
for
the
price
of
the
sale,
provided
they
do
so
within
the
period
of
one
month
from
the
time
they
were
notified
in
writing
of
the
sale
by
the
vendor.
(1067a)
Right
of
redemption
given
to
a
coheir
• Co‐heir
sold
his
undivided
share
or
portion
in
the
estate
• Share
was
sold
to
a
stranger
• Written
notice
by
co‐heirs
to
the
vendor
Garcia
vs.
Calaliman
(1989)
F:
There
was
an
extrajudicial
partition
and
deed
of
sale.
Two
groups
of
heirs
sold
their
shares
to
Calaliman
and
Trabadillo.
The
heirs
of
the
vendors
filed
a
case
against
Calaliman
and
Trabadillo
for
legal
redemption.
Heirs
were
not
notified
of
the
sale
so
they
claim
the
30
day
period
stipulated
in
Art
1088
has
yet
to
begin.
H:
Written
notice
is
required
before
the
period
of
one
month
for
the
other
co‐heirs
to
redeem
begins
to
run.
The
redemptioner
is
entitled
to
written
notice
to
remove
all
uncertainty
as
to
the
sale,
its
terms
and
its
validity,
and
to
quiet
any
doubt
that
the
alienation
is
not
definitive.
If
only
1
coheir
redeems:
he
will
pay
the
purchase
price
If
more
than
1
will
redeem:
they
will
pay
proportionally
to
their
share
in
the
property
Art.
1089.
The
titles
of
acquisition
or
ownership
of
each
property
shall
be
delivered
to
the
co‐heir
to
whom
said
property
has
been
adjudicated.
(1065a)
Art.
1090.
When
the
title
comprises
two
or
more
pieces
of
land
which
have
been
assigned
to
two
or
more
co‐heirs,
or
when
it
covers
one
piece
of
land
which
has
been
divided
between
two
or
more
co‐heirs,
the
title
shall
be
delivered
to
the
one
having
the
largest
interest,
and
authentic
copies
of
the
title
shall
be
furnished
to
the
other
co‐heirs
at
the
expense
of
the
estate.
If
the
interest
of
each
co‐heir
should
be
the
same,
the
oldest
shall
have
the
title.
(1066a)
6.2. Effects of Partition
Art.
1091.
A
partition
legally
made
confers
upon
each
heir
the
exclusive
ownership
of
the
property
adjudicated
to
him.
(1068)
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
Obvious
effect:
Termination
of
co‐ownership
Art.
1092.
After
the
partition
has
been
made,
the
co‐heirs
shall
be
reciprocally
bound
to
warrant
the
title
to,
and
the
quality
of,
each
property
adjudicated.
(1069a)
Obligation
of
mutual
warranty:
Liable
for
defects
of
title
and
quality
(Art.
501)
Warranties
are
the
same
as
in
sales:
a. Eviction
(title)
b. Hidden
defects
(quality)
Art.
1093.
The
reciprocal
obligation
of
warranty
referred
to
in
the
preceding
article
shall
be
proportionate
to
the
respective
hereditary
shares
of
the
co‐heirs,
but
if
any
one
of
them
should
be
insolvent,
the
other
co‐heirs
shall
be
liable
for
his
part
in
the
same
proportion,
deducting
the
part
corresponding
to
the
one
who
should
be
indemnified.
Those
who
pay
for
the
insolvent
heir
shall
have
a
right
of
action
against
him
for
reimbursement,
should
his
financial
condition
improve.
(1071)
Proportional
liability
of
coheirs
on
warranty:
Burdens
should
be
proportional
to
benefits
Art.
1094.
An
action
to
enforce
the
warranty
among
heirs
must
be
brought
within
ten
years
from
the
date
the
right
of
action
accrues.
(n)
Action
to
enforce
warranty:
10
years
To
be
counted
from
the
time
the
portion
was
lost
or
the
hidden
defect
was
discovered.
Art.
1095.
If
a
credit
should
be
assigned
as
collectible,
the
co‐heirs
shall
not
be
liable
for
the
subsequent
insolvency
of
the
debtor
of
the
estate,
but
only
for
his
insolvency
at
the
time
the
partition
is
made.
The
warranty
of
the
solvency
of
the
debtor
can
only
be
enforced
during
the
five
years
following
the
partition.
Co‐heirs
do
not
warrant
bad
debts,
if
so
known
to,
and
accepted
by,
the
distributee.
But
if
such
debts
are
not
assigned
to
a
co‐heir,
and
should
be
collected,
in
whole
or
in
part,
the
amount
collected
shall
be
distributed
proportionately
among
the
heirs.
(1072a)
Credit
assigned
to
a
coheir
in
partition:
Warranty
covers
only
insolvency
of
the
decedent’s
debtor
at
the
time
of
partition,
not
subsequent
insolvency,
for
which
the
co‐heir
takes
the
risk.
Prescriptive
period:
5
years
Art.
1096.
The
obligation
of
warranty
among
co‐heirs
shall
cease
in
the
following
cases:
(1)
When
the
testator
himself
has
made
the
partition,
unless
it
appears,
or
it
may
be
reasonably
presumed,
that
his
intention
was
otherwise,
but
the
legitime
shall
always
remain
unimpaired;
(2)
When
it
has
been
so
expressly
stipulated
in
the
Page 70 of 73
agreement
of
partition,
unless
there
has
been
bad
faith;
(3)
When
the
eviction
is
due
to
a
cause
subsequent
to
the
partition,
or
has
been
caused
by
the
fault
of
the
distributee
of
the
property.
(1070a)
Instances
when
there
is
no
mutual
warranty:
1. Partition
by
the
testator
himself
(save
where
the
legitime
has
been
impaired)
2. Agreement
among
the
co‐heirs
to
suppress
the
warranty
3. Supervening
events
causing
the
loss
or
the
diminution
in
value
4. Fault
of
the
co‐heir
5. Waiver
6.3. Rescission and Nullity of Partition
Art.
1097.
A
partition
may
be
rescinded
or
annulled
for
the
same
causes
as
contracts.
(1073a)
Causes
for
annulment:
Art.
1390
Causes
for
rescission:
Art.
1381‐1382
Art.
1098.
A
partition,
judicial
or
extra‐judicial,
may
also
be
rescinded
on
account
of
lesion,
when
any
one
of
the
co‐ heirs
received
things
whose
value
is
less,
by
at
least
one‐ fourth,
than
the
share
to
which
he
is
entitled,
considering
the
value
of
the
things
at
the
time
they
were
adjudicated.
(1074a)
Lesion
is
economic
injury,
where
thep
arty
receives
less
than
he
is
entitled
to
receive.
Amount
of
lesion:
Minimum
is
¼
Art.
1099.
The
partition
made
by
the
testator
cannot
be
impugned
on
the
ground
of
lesion,
except
when
the
legitime
of
the
compulsory
heirs
is
thereby
prejudiced,
or
when
it
appears
or
may
reasonably
be
presumed,
that
the
intention
of
the
testator
was
otherwise.
(1075)
Gen.
Rule:
Heirs
cannot
demand
partition
on
the
ground
of
lesion,
if
partition
was
done
by
the
testator.
Exceptions
to
Art.
1098:
a. Impairment
of
the
legitime
b. Mistake
by
the
testator
or
vitiation
of
his
intent
Art.
1100.
The
action
for
rescission
on
account
of
lesion
shall
prescribe
after
four
years
from
the
time
the
partition
was
made.
(1076)
Prescriptive
period
(lesion):
4
years
Art.
1101.
The
heir
who
is
sued
shall
have
the
option
of
indemnifying
the
plaintiff
for
the
loss,
or
consenting
to
a
new
partition.
Indemnity
may
be
made
by
payment
in
cash
or
by
the
delivery
of
a
thing
of
the
same
kind
and
quality
as
that
awarded
to
the
plaintiff.
If
a
new
partition
is
made,
it
shall
affect
neither
those
who
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
have
not
been
prejudiced
nor
those
have
not
received
more
than
their
just
share.
(1077a)
Coheir
who
is
sued
for
rescission
has
two
options:
a. Re‐partition,
or
b. Indemnify
the
co‐heir
the
amount
of
lesion
suffered
Art.
1102.
An
heir
who
has
alienated
the
whole
or
a
considerable
part
of
the
real
property
adjudicated
to
him
cannot
maintain
an
action
for
rescission
on
the
ground
of
lesion,
but
he
shall
have
a
right
to
be
indemnified
in
cash.
(1078a)
Art.
1103.
The
omission
of
one
or
more
objects
or
securities
of
the
inheritance
shall
not
cause
the
rescission
of
the
partition
on
the
ground
of
lesion,
but
the
partition
shall
be
completed
by
the
distribution
of
the
objects
or
securities
which
have
been
omitted.
(1079a)
Incompleteness
of
partition
is
not
a
ground
for
rescission.
Remedy:
Supplemental
partition
Art.
1104.
A
partition
made
with
preterition
of
any
of
the
compulsory
heirs
shall
not
be
rescinded,
unless
it
be
proved
that
there
was
bad
faith
or
fraud
on
the
part
of
the
other
persons
interested;
but
the
latter
shall
be
proportionately
obliged
to
pay
to
the
person
omitted
the
share
which
belongs
to
him.
(1080)
Heir
is
mistakenly
excluded
• In
good
faith
‐
the
omitted
heir
gets
his
rightful
share
• In
bad
faith
–
partition
shall
be
annulled
Art.
1105.
A
partition
which
includes
a
person
believed
to
be
an
heir,
but
who
is
not,
shall
be
void
only
with
respect
to
such
person.
(1081a)
Heir
is
mistakenly
included.
In
this
case
the
property
will
be
taken
away
from
him
and
redistributed
among
the
proper
recipients.
Congratulations!
You
are
now
ready
to
nail
the
exam!
A
few
things
to
remember:
• Spot
concepts
that
might
apply
(if
there’s
a
will,
there’s
a
way...for
preterition
to
operate,
or
if
there
are
two
transfers—reserva
troncal)
• What
rules
should
apply?
Legitimes?
Partial
Intestacy?
• Use
dark
ink.
You
may
now
proceed
to
test
your
skills.
Try
the
following
sample
exam
questions.
Page 71 of 73
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.
26.
27.
The
sisters
had
children:
a.
Claire:
Skull
and
Spike
b.
Lindsey:
Mahinhin,
Makahiya,
Makisig
and
Maliksi
c.
Lorely:
Serafin
and
Salvi
In
2004,
Shelan
made
a
will
giving
¼
of
his
total
estate
to
her
3
sisters,
with
simple
substitution
of
any
of
them
in
favor
of
their
respective
children.
QUESTIONS:
A
final
decree
of
probate
forecloses
objections
to
the
will
on
the
ground
of
preterition.
T
or
F?
Full
and
half‐blood
siblings
instituted
in
a
will
inherit
equally
unless
otherwise
provided.
T
or
F?
It
is
not
necessary
to
institute
an
heir
by
name.
T
or
F?
A
person
without
testamentary
capacity
may
not
revoke
a
will.
T
or
F?
An
illiterate
person
does
not
have
testamentary
capacity.
T
or
F?
In
some
case,
the
testator
is
presumed
insane.
T
or
F?
A
will
need
not
always
be
witnessed.
T
or
F?
A
holographic
will
cannot
be
probated
on
the
basis
solely
of
testimonial
evidence.
T
or
F?
Supervening
Incapacity
does
not
invalidate
a
will
but
deprives
the
testator
the
power
to
revoke
it.
T
or
F?
Republication
of
a
will
that
is
formally
void
cannot
be
done
by
mere
reference.
T
or
F?
The
date
of
a
holographic
will
need
not
be
written
at
the
bottom.
T
or
F?
The
testator
may
delegate
the
revocation
of
his
will.
T
or
F?
A
deaf‐mute
person
may
execute
a
will
but
cannot
witness
one.
T
or
F?
If
there
is
preterition,
all
testamentary
dispositions
are
considered
not
written.
T
or
F?
A
will
and
a
codicil
have
identical
formal
requirements.
T
or
F?
Preterition
can
never
occur
if
testator
died
without
a
will.
T
or
F?
The
attestation
clause
must
be
in
a
language
known
to
the
testator.
T
or
F?
A
blind
man
can
neither
make
nor
witness
a
will.
T
or
F?
A
minor
can
neither
make
nor
witness
a
will.
T
or
F?
A
convicted
thief
has
competence
to
witness
a
will.
T
or
F?
A
foreigner
may
witness
a
will.
T
or
F?
A
testamentary
disposition
in
favour
of
a
witness
does
not
affect
his
competence
as
a
witness.
T
or
F?
A
probated
will
may
be
ineffective.
T
or
F?
An
undated
will
is
not
ipso
facto
void.
T
or
F?
Robert
died
intestate,
with
an
estate
worth
6M.
He
is
survived
by
his
wife
Diane,
their
only
child,
Big
Bird,
and
Robert’s
3
illegitimate
children:
Elmo,
Oscar
and
Ernie.
How
should
Robert’s
estate
be
divided?
On
his
way
to
the
library,
Ranulfo,
single,
childless,
died
when
a
meteorite
fell
on
him.
He
left
a
will
which
gave
1/3
of
his
estate
to
his
girlfriend,
Marjorie,
and
a
legacy
of
P600,000
to
the
UP
Astronomical
Society
(UPAS).
He
was
survived
by
his
parents
Cornelio
and
Maiska
who
now
contends
that
the
will
is
ineffective
because
they
are
left
with
nothing.
Ranulfo’s
estate
is
worth
900,000
a. Is
their
contention
correct?
b. How
much
will
Marjorie
and
UPAS
get?
John
was
married
to
Shelan
but
after
60
years
of
marriage
the
couple
were
childless.
Shelan
had
3
sisters:
Claire
(full‐blood),
Lindsey
(half‐blood)
and
Lorely
(half‐blood).
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
All
three
sisters
predeceased
Shelan.
When
Shelan
died
in
2007,
survived
by
her
husband,
nephews
and
nieces,
she
had
an
estate
valued
at
24M.
How
should
it
be
apportioned?
28. Jaypee
and
Amirah,
both
natives
of
Surigao,
have
been
married
for
30
years.
They
have
one
daughter,
Jamie,
27
yeasr
old,
single,
no
children
and
a
junior
executive
at
Hope
Cigarettes
Corp.
One
day
in
May,
Warla
invites
her
parents
to
spend
the
weekend
with
her
and
her
fiance,
Nick
in
a
cottage
on
the
beach
of
San
Fabian,
Pangasinan.
The
4
of
them
leave
Manila
at
dawn
on
Saturday
in
Nick’s
new
car.
In
Tarlac,
they
met
a
terrible
accident:
a
south‐bound
ten‐wheeler
truck
driven
by
Cari
hits
them
head
on.
Nick
dies
on
the
spot.
The
three
others
survived
and
were
rushed
to
the
hospital
where,
that
evening,
Jaypee
expired.
Amirah
and
Jamie
are
transferred
to
Manila
for
better
treatment.
Jamie
lingers
on
for
a
week
but
the
trauma
proves
too
much
and
she
dies
on
Monday.
Amirah
raliies
and
actually
regains
consciousness,
but
unexpected
blood
clot
forms
in
the
brain
three
weeks
after
her
daughter’s
death
and
she
too
dies
on
Friday.
The
ill‐starred
family
are
survived
by
Korina
and
Enrique
(Amirah’s
parents),
Rosalyn
and
Karren
(Jaypee’s
sisters),
and
Jantzen
and
Jess
(Amirah’s
siblings).
Jaypee
owned
a
piece
of
land
(Surigao
property)
worth
6M
pesos
–
that
was
his
only
property
inherited
by
him
from
his
parents.
Amirah
owned
nothing.
Jamie
owned
a
lot
in
Alabang
(Alabang
property)
worth
3M
–
he
had
bought
from
his
bonuses
from
Hope.
To
whom
shall
the
two
pieces
of
property
go?
ANSWERS:
(The
samplex
did
not
have
answers.
The
following
aswers
are
not
necessarily
correct.
–Rea)
1. F.
A
decree
of
probate
only
concerns
the
extrinsic
validity
of
a
will.
2. T.
Distinction
between
full‐
and
half‐blood
has
no
application
in
testamentary
succession.
Unless
the
contrary
clearly
appears,
there
is
a
presumption
of
equality.
3. T.
What
is
essential
is
that
the
heir
be
identifiable.
4. T.
A
will
is
revoked
with
the
participation
of
the
testator
only
in
two
ways:
by
another
Page 72 of 73
5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.
26.
27.
will/codicil
or
by
physical
destruction.
Both
require
testamentary
capacity.
F.
T.
See
Art.
800
par
2.
T.
Holographic
wills.
T.
The
will
itself
(or
a
copy)
must
be
presented.
T.
The
testator
must
have
testamentary
capacity
to
revoke
a
will.
See
also
Art.
801.
T.
Art.
835.
T.
The
law
does
not
require
a
specific
location
for
the
date
of
the
holographic
will.
(Labrador
v
CA)
T.
Physical
destruction.
T.
Art.
820.
F.
Only
institution
of
heir
is
annulled;
legacies
and
devises
remain
valid
so
long
as
they
are
not
inofficious.
See
Art.
854.
T.
Art.
826.
T.
If
there
is
no
testamentary
disposition,
the
compulsory
heir
would
always
receive
something
through
intestacy.
(But
what
if
the
T
disposed
all
properties
by
donation
inter
vivos?
My
stand
is
that
there
is
still
no
preterition
because
the
donations
impinging
on
the
legitime
will
be
inofficious
per
Art
752.
I’m
not
sure.
Really
not
sure.)
F.
The
AC
is
not
the
business
of
the
testator.
F.
A
blind
man
may
make
a
will!
T.
1)No
testamentary
capacity;
2)
Not
qualified
to
be
a
witness.
T.
See
Art.
821.
T.
T.
The
dispositions
are
void
unless
there
are
3
other
witnesses.
T.
If
the
will
is
intrinsically
invalid.
T.
Attested
wills
need
ot
be
dated.
Diane:
1.714M
Big
Bird:
1.714M
Elmo:
0.857M
Oscar:
0.857M
Ernie:
0.857M
a.
Yes.
They
are
preterited.
(1/3
of
estate
that
will
go
to
Marjorie
=
300,000
plus
legacy
of
600,000
to
UPAS
equals
900,000.
The
parents,
who
are
Oyie’s
compulsory
ehirs
are
left
with
nothing.)
b.
Marjorie
will
get
nothing
because
in
preterition,
the
institution
of
heir
is
annulled
.
Legacy
to
UPAS
remains
valid
but
should
be
reduced
to
450,000
because
it
exceeds
the
free
portion.
PARTIAL
INTESTACY
Will:
¼
=
6M
This
will
pass
to
nephews
and
nieces
by
substitution.
(2M
per
set
of
substitutes)
Legitime:
John:
1/2
of
the
estate
as
his
legitime
Remaining
¼
goes
to
nephews
and
nieces
goes
by
intestacy
and
by
virtue
of
their
right
to
representation
(with
distinction
between
full
and
half‐blood—2:1:1=3M:1.5M:1.5M)
Hence,
John
=
12M
Skull
and
Spike
=
2.5
each
Mahinhin,
Makahiya,
Makisig
and
Maliksi
=
875k
each
Serafin
and
Salvi
=
1.75M
each
SUCCESSION – RUBEN F. BALANE REA.PATRICK.LOR.NAOMI
28. First,
Jaypee’s
estate:
6M
Surigao
property
By
intestacy,
Jamie
=
½
=
3M
Amirah
=
½
=
3M
Next,
Jamie’s
estate:
Ayala
property
(3M)
plus
3M
from
Jaypee
=
6M
By
intestacy,
The
whole
estate
goes
to
Amirah
Finally,
Amirah’s
estate:
½
of
Surigao
property
from
Jaypee
+
Ayala
property
(3M)
from
Jamie
+
second‐half
of
Surigao
property
from
Jamie
which
the
latter
got
from
Jaypee
=
9M
BUT
the
second‐half
of
Surigao
property
is
subject
to
reserva
troncal
hence,
will
go
to
Rosalyn
and
Karren
(1/4
each).
Remaining
6M
will
pass
on
to
Amirah’s
intestate
heirs:
Korina
and
Enrique
(3M
each).
Jantzen
and
Jess
are
excluded.
Therefore,
Surigao
property:
Korina,
Enrique,
Rosalyn
and
Karren
=
¼
undivided
interest
each
Ayala
property:
Korina
and
Enrique
=
½
undivided
interest
each.
Page 73 of 73
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