Robert C. North, Matthew Willard.pdf

Review: The Convergence Effect: Challenge to Parsimony Author(s): Robert C. North and Matthew Willard Source: International Organization, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Spring, 1983), pp. 339-358 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706539 . Accessed: 19/01/2011 11:01 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpress. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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The convergenceeffect: challenge to parsimony Robert C. North and Matthew Willard

Richard K. Ashley. The Political Economy of War and Peace. London: Frances Pinter;New York: Nichols, 1980. Francis A. Beer. Peace against War: The Ecology of International Violence.San Francisco:W. H. Freeman, 1981. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. The War Trap. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981. A. F. K. Organskiand Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. David Wilkinson. Deadly Quarrels:Lewis F. Richardsonand the Statistical Study of War. Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress, 1980. Debates in the field of internationalpolitics over the last two decades have driven otherwise sober scholars to indulge in vivid metaphor. In 1961 Inis Claude referredto internationalpolitical theory as "more a thing of shreds and patches than a seamless garment covering our understandingof the processes of internationalrelations."' Since then, little progress has been made toward even a minimal unificationof the field. "In our teaching and research,"wrote Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, "we are like travellersin a houseboat, shuttling back and forth between separate 'islands' of theory, whose relatednessconsists only in their being commonly in the great'ocean' of 'internationalbehavior.' Some theorists take up permanentresidence on one island or other, others continue to shuttle, but few attempt to build bridges, perhaps because the islands seem too far apart."2 1. Inis L. Claude Jr., "The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations," International Organization 15 (Spring 1961), p. 220. 2. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 21-22. International Organization 37, 2, Spring 1983 0020-8183/83/020339-19 $1.50 ? 1983 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the World Peace Foundation

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In an alternative metaphor, we might compare theoreticiansand investigatorsin the field of internationalpolitics with medieval knightswho lower their castle drawbridgesfrom time to time and ride their chargersout to the jousting field intent on unhorsingtheir rivals. Then, whatever the outcome of the joust, they recrosstheir moats and raisethe drawbridgesbehind them. Opportunitiesfor cumulativeresearchand the development,refinement,and enrichmentof paradigmsundersuch circumstancesremainpainfullylimited. It is not difficult to account for splinteringtendencies in the field. The realitiesof internationalpolitics are extended, diverse, and complex. Unless the whole is broken down into manageableparts, the problems seem too largefor the availabletools. And unless parsimonyis pursued,theoriestend to expand out of control. Paradoxically,however, the more that we learn about the disjoined parts of reality,the less we may know about the whole. And whereas a lack of parsimonyoften yields amorphoustheory, an excess of parsimony may produce tautology, explain the obvious, or, in the case of some approachesto internationalpolitics, reduce complex human interactions to rigid, almost mechanical abstractions. Focusing upon the study of war, P. TerrenceHopmann, Dina A. Zinnes, and J. David Singer have arguedthat what is needed is "not a call for the generation of allegedly 'new' theories . . ." but, rather, "a clearer understanding

of theories that already exist; a clearer understandingof their respective potencies in explainingparticularevents of war (and other outcomes, presumably);a clearerunderstandingof the relationshipsbetween one partical theory and others."3 One possible step in this direction is an integrationthat appearsfeasible from a readingof these five books. As far back as 1959 Kenneth Waltzaddressingthe question, "Whereare the majorcauses of war to be found?"sought to make manageablethe "bewildering"variety of possible answers to that question by orderingthem under three headings:"within man" (the first image); "within the structureof the separate states" (second image); and "within the state system" (third image).4Little progresshas been made towardthe linkingof these "levels" or systems, however, or the achievement of any degree of consensus. The five titles under review suggest, implicitly if not explicitly, two observations. First, phenomena on all three levels are probablyrelevant to an understandingof war and other internationaloutcomes. Second, without some more definable, bounded, widely agreed-uponconceptual framework and withoutidentifiablelinkagesbetweenactorson and betweenimagelevels, approachesto the study of war and other outcomes are likely to remain as isolated as the "islands of theory" to which Snyder and Diesing referred. 3. P. Terrence Hopmann, Dina A. Zinnes, and J. David Singer, eds., Cumulation in International Relations Research, University of Denver Monograph Series in World Affairs 18, Book 3 (198 1), pp. 30-31. 4. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 12.

The convergenceeffect 341 The core problem lies in the use of the word linkage. In the early 1960s Heinz Eulau called the linking of differentlevels of analysis "a major unresolved item on the methodologicalagenda."'The word "linkage"is commonly used in many different ways-linkage between issues, between variables,betweenactors,and so forth.All threeof these usagesare legitimate. Here, however, we use the word linkageprimarilyas James Rosenaudefined it-a recurrentsequenceof behaviorthat originateson one side of the boundary between two systems and that in some way becomes connectedor closely associated with phenomena on the other side in the process of unfolding.6 Human activity-behavior-is implicit, if not explicit, in all such linkages. What Hopmann, Zinnes, and Singer identified as worth pursuingwas a model or "even an analytical frameworkcapable of linking behaviors on one level with those on another and capable of accountingfor differential explanatorycontributionsof such linkages."7In this article we propose to formulate a loose conceptual frameworkas the first of three stages in developing adequate theory. In this first stage we relax parsimonyin order to create conceptual blueprintsof international(or better, global) politics as a whole. Our aim is to identify as many as possible of the generic elements such as actors, motivations, demands, capabilities,decisions, linkages,processes of conflictand integration,and the like. After accomplishingthis initial stage, however tentatively,we should attempt in a second, more challenging stageto consolidateor mergeas many as possibleof the specificassumptions, elements, and processes of the frameworkinto a more abstract,more generalized,more parsimonious,more nearly universalmodel. We should base such a procedure upon the premise that the number of generic functions necessary and sufficientfor explainingoutcomes in global politics-the decision function, for one-is limited, even though numerous variations on these functions may be appropriatefor particularcases or analyticpurposes. Once these generic functions have been integratedinto a "master"model, it should be possible in a third stage to derive whole familiesof partial,more detailed, more discretely specified models for cross-checking,comparing, empiricaltesting, and refinementof the genericmodel. Our emphasisin this article will be on the first, or conceptuallyexpansionist,of the three stages. A conceptual framework,as we use the term, is more specific, internally consistent, and integratedthan an approachbut more tentative than, and lacking the consensual support of, a paradigm.It is also less parsimonious, less rigorous, and less directly falsifiable than a theory or formal model. Although we conceive of a conceptualframeworkas includinga wide range of explanatory positions, we also assume that in the initial stage one can substitute descriptionwhere rigorousexplanationremains to be developed. 5. Heinz Eulau, The BehavioralPersuasionin Politics (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 123.

6. James Rosenau, Linkage Politics (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 44-45. 7. Hopmann, Zinnes, and Singer,Cumulation,pp. 30-31.

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We take it that a conceptual frameworkand its constituent parts may be falsified,substitutedfor, or refined- ultimately-through constructionof the more parsimonious"master" model and the testing of more localized and specific derived models. From a readingof these five books we infer a phenomenon that we call the convergenceeffect. With varyingdegreesof directnessand indirectness, remoteness and proximity, a great many diverse actors, interactive relationships, and associated factors on differentlevels of aggregationand organizationmay contributeto an outbreakof war or other event that needs explanation. Wars and other major internationalevents may be seen, in short, as outcomes of "horizontal"and "vertical"phenomena converging from many different"directions."A recent example is provided by the advance of Israeli forces from the Lebanese border to Beirut. This outcome, in principleat least, could be explained by the convergenceof a vast array of historical and contemporaryconsiderationsincluding limited land and other resources, population pressures,relations between the Palestine Liberation Organizationand various Arab states, changes in the configuration of domestic Israeli politics, the death of Anwar Sadat, Lebanon's internal conflicts, bureaucraticrelationships within the government of Israel, the personalstrengthsand idiosyncraciesof MenachemBeginand Ariel Sharon, the trend of interchangesbetween Begin and Ronald Reagan, and so on. Criticsmight agree that these convergingphenomena are not equally importantas explanationsbut the crucialand bothersomeconsiderationis that any effort at making a selection-any attempt to establish criteria,evenwill be biased by the "island of theory" one happens to be situatedon. We propose here that, by providing a more unified context for analysis, a conceptual frameworkwould help to alleviate the problem. In The Political Economy of War and Peace, RichardAshley begins with three factorsthat many criticswould see as remotein explainingthe outbreak of war or the preservationof peace. His purposeis to explore"conflictamong today's major military powers" (the Chinese People's Republic, the Soviet Union, and the United States) with emphasis upon "the long-term process entanglingthe threemajorpowersin a common nearlyineluctableproblematique." He identifies this "modern securityproblematique"as an outcome, in part,of uneven developmentof seeminglyremoteand indirectlyinfluential demographic,technological,and economicfactorswithinandbetweennations. Expandingon and refiningthe lateral-pressureconcept of Nazli Choucriand Robert North,8 he presents three sets of intertwinedprocesses that he sees as driving countries into conflict: unilateralgrowth (population increases, advances in technology, and derivations therefrom);bilateral competition and rivalry;and multilateralbalance of power. From the start he confronts 8. Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975).

The convergenceeffect 343 but fails to deal adequatelywith a selection and boundaryproblem:to what extent can he draw conclusionsabout the "modem securityproblematique" from three countries,and why these particularthree?How much difference in findingsmight the additionof even one more country(Japan,for example, or Israel) conceivably make? Although classically inclined political economists may consider the title of the book misleading, Ashley-by deriving his basic processes from the fundamentalinterplaybetween human beings and the naturalenvironment (pp. 3, 11-12) and fromthe capacityof humanbeingsto learn(pp. 217-18)9necessarilyassumes and explicatessome of the criticalways in which political and economic functions combine in contributingto conflict as well as to cooperation and the formation of alliances. In Chapter 1, Ashley presents what he identifies as a conceptual frameworkfor defining and developing "the modem securityproblematique."This amounts to his "abstractedrepresentation"of some aspects of "the gap between the actual and preferred human condition" (p. 315). AlthoughAshley's "representation"makes valuable contributions, it is not sufficientlybroad, inclusive, or specified to encompass and thus to identify linkagesbetween any substantialnumber of competing theories. Since Ashley adheres most closely to the startingpoint we prefer,however, we shall try to develop the broadoutlinesof a conceptual frameworkbeginningwith and building upon his basic assumptions. Severalof Ashley's premises,explicit and implicit, need to be underscored as fundamental contributionsto the overall conceptual frameworkwe are seeking. Individual human beings, and only individual human beings (not groups,states, or internationalsystems),perceive,think, feel, make decisions, and act (pp. 11-12). States and other organizationsare actors only in a metaphorical sense; they are more accuratelyperceived as systems of individuals interactingin a variety of roles.'0 Except for alliances and other coalitions of states, most internationalsystems-balance-of-power systems and the like-are not actors in either sense. Whatever activity takes place in such systems is performedby individualsinteractingin the name of states. What are often referredto as internationalsystem-level constraints might better be envisaged as the constraintsthat states impose on each other metaphorically,as the outcomeof decisionstakenby theirleadersand bureaucrats. As Ashley implies throughout his book, every human being is both an energy- and an information-processingsystem. All of an individual'sactivites-thinking, feeling, and other psychic as well as muscularphenomenadepend upon sustainedacquisitionand metabolismof energyfrom the physical environment (pp. 10-12, 252-5 3). Human beings are thus motivated in a generalizedway merely by being and actingto stay alive. More specifically, 9. CompareRichardM. Cyertand James G. March,A BehavioralTheoryof the Firm (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall,1963), pp. 99-101. 10. Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs (Princeton:

PrincetonUniversity Press, 1965), p. 11.

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decision-makingbehaviorincludestwo basic components:the determination to act differentlyfrom the way one is acting at a given time, or even to continue doing what one is already doing; and the selection of a means, mode, or course of action." Since individualsrespondover time to different pressures,inducements, and motivations, many of them mixed, and since different people respond to the same phenomena in different ways, it is extremelydifficultto specify such factorsin any detail. One way of handling the problem is to view all human beings as acting to narrow or close gaps between their perceptionsof value ("what ought to be") and perceptionsof fact ("what is") (pp. 10-12, 215-16, 252-53). 12The strengthof a pressure, inducement, or motivation can be estimated by the amount of capital resources, effort,deprivation,or other cost that the actor is preparedto invest in order to narrow or close the gap. Demands, as David Eastondefinesthem, may be viewed as "an expression of opinion" deriving from a "need" or desire to narrowor close a gap.'3As we used the term here, however, a demand is not necessarilycommunicated nor is it necessarilysatisfied.Demands combine with capabilitiesto produce activity;even simple undertakingscannot be implementedunless an appropriate capabilityexists for carryingout the action. Capabilitiesderive from technology-cognitive, muscular,organizing,and mechanicalknowledgeand skills-and access to resources.People develop theircapabilitiesin two major ways: they increasetheir knowledgeand skills (technology);and they bargain with and apply leverage (positive, coercive, negative, punishing)on others in order to achieve collectively what they find difficultto accomplish singly. In principle,at least, economic, political, military,and other capabilitiescan be measuredby specificindicatorssuch as gross nationalproductper capita, militaryexpenditures,militaryexpendituresper capita,personnelunderarms, and so forth. In pursuit of security, basic resources, goods, services, and enhanced capabilities,people make demands directly upon the naturalenvironmentand also upon otherpeopleand upon organizations,which,through leaders and bureaucrats,tend in turn to make demands upon them. Ashley sees demands increasingwith technology as well as population. Providingopportunitiesfor variousspecializedcapabilities,technologyenables people to acquire new resources and find new uses for old resources.Each such application, however, contributes to further demands: resources to maintain the technology and pay its costs, and to meet some of the rising expectationsthat tend to be associatedwith technologicaladvancement.The 11. HerbertA. Simon,AdministrativeBehaviors(New York:Macmillan,1955), pp. 3-6; John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton:

PrincetonUniversity Press, 1947), p. 17. 12. Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor:University of MichiganPress, 1956), p. 11; Karl W. Deutsch, The Nervesof Government(New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 75-97. 13. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley, 1965), pp. 38-39.

The convergenceeffect 345 more advanced the technology, moreover, the greaterthe amount and the wider the range of demands for goods and services. Driven by unusually strong motivations or inducements, extremely high demands may substitutefor limited capabilitiesin some situations(the Viet Minh and Viet Cong in the 1960s, for example); whereas extremely high capabilitiesmay substitute for low demands in other situations (producing a "steamrollereffect").In combinationpopulationgrowth,technologicaladvancement, risingdemands, and increasingcapabilities(some governmental but many generatedby commercial,industrial,and other private undertakings)commonly give rise to the expansionof a society'sactivitiesand interests beyond nationalfrontiers.This lateralpressureapproximatesbut is somewhat broader than what Simon Kuznets refers to as "outward expansion" (pp. 13-14).14

Dealing with simple aggregationsof populations, technologies, demands, resources,and capabilities,Ashley does not indicate how such aggregations of "molecular"units combine into higher, "molar" actor-unitssuch as the state. Identifyingorganizationsand institutionsas "socialstructurationsgiven form and identity through complex reproductivepatterns of choice among individuals," he fails to specify what the implicitly integrativechoices, decisions, and resultingprocessesare (pp. 27-28). This criticismcan be leveled against Choucri and North's approach as well: the political processes contributingto lateral pressureare ignored in the analysis. The strength of lateral pressures differs country by country, depending upon the respective levels and rates of change of critical variables such as populations,technologies, capabilities,and so forth, at any given time. Differential levels and rates of change of these basic variables contribute to power transitions, the uneven development of capabilities,and conditions for dominance and subordinationamong societies. When the expandingactivities and interests of two or more countries intersect, competition and rivalry may be exacerbated. Ashley is critical of traditionaltreatments of the internationalsystemespecially balance-of-powerapproaches-but he does not pursue such criticism as far as the logic of his own propositionsmight have allowed. In the conventional literature,"power"is defined in many differentways. Unfortunately, many of us who rely on the concept fail to use it consistently or even to define it with precision. Is power synonymous with capability?Or does it referto the ability of one actor to influenceanotherto do something he would not otherwise do, or to prevent him from doing something he is preparedto do? If power means the ability to influenceor dominate another, actor, then the concept refers to an outcome of interactionsbetween two parties,not to a precondition.Ashley questionsthe balance-of-powerconcept 14. Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 334-48.

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as an objective phenomenon.but concedes that, if national leaders act as if the concept were real, it takes on a cognitive reality and contributes to outcomes. Although Ashley calls his treatment of population, technology, and resources as master variables in the internationalsystem "world modeling research,"he does not specify what a world model would look like or how it would differ from the internationalsystem. He does state that a world modeling approach"uses sophisticatedmodeling techniques... in order to representand empiricallyexamine long-term aggregatesocial processes on a global scale" (p. ix). FrancisBeeralso deals with aggregationand its contributionto organization and institutions.Beer'sPeace against Warfocuses on four major questions: What do we know about the historical occurrenceand causalities of war? What are the major causes of peace and war and how are they related?What is the likely future of peace and war? What can be done to create less war and more peace? Drawingfrom many qualitativeand quantitativesources, he seeks to provide an "epidemiology"of war and peace resting on two assumptions:that war is "like a disease" and that "a scientific knowledge of war can be developed similar to the knowledgewe have about disease" which will allow us "betterto describe,explain, predict and control it" (pp. xxii, 10).

As we noted at the outset of this article, the use of similes, metaphors, and analogies is commonplace in the social sciences-and often with good effect. The danger is that the unwary may be captivated by the metaphor or misled into thinking that analogiesare closer than they really are. Aside from avoiding pitfalls in their use, which Beer consciously attempts to do, the theoreticianneeds to consider whether the readeris likely to be misled and whetherthe use of such concepts is worthwhile.In fact, Beer'sapproach to the study of war and peace does not depend upon his epidemiological analogy but, perhaps inhibited by his introductionof the disease simile, he fails to develop a set of hypotheses sufficientlyrigorousfor the organization and integrationof his many ideas and insights. Beer sees conditions associated with war as located in the "world system and its two majorcomponents,the environmentand decisionmakers"(p. 9). This perspective encompasses a wide range of elements. Failing to specify linkages between human beings and the natural and social environments, however, he leaves unresolved what appear to be inadequaciesin his assessmentsof the constraintsof nature.He cites climaticconditions,the human "conquestof nature,"and the deleteriouseffectsof"an almostentirelyartificial environment"of "ourown making"(pp. 8-9), but largelyneglectsunevenness in the natural distributionsof energy and other resources. Aggregationis a central element in Beer's schema. Referringto it as "the logic of technology,"he perceivesaggregationas includingthe common links in the social environment and making "largerrelatively integratedunits"

The convergenceeffect 347 (organizations,bureaucracies,markets,transactions,communications,communities,governments,bodies of law, and the like)out of "smallerpreviously unconnected parts." Aggregationimplies "structure,symmetry, regulation, cooperation,"and provides "the differencebetween orderand randomness" (pp. 11-12, 7 1-74). Aggregationallows people to "coordinatetheir activities and ideas, to workcooperativelyin largergroups,"and to provide machinery for limitingconflict;but it also contributesto polarization,whichencompasses three cleavages-differentiation, inequality, and instability.While referring to aggregationsas "integratedunits," Beer, like Ashley, makes no attempt to explain the processes by which individuals combine to become molar actor units or how such "higher"units relateto "lowerunits," includingthe individual. Fortunately, the literatureof political science encompasses concepts of process that provide for many, though possibly not all, of the linkagesthat need to be identified and used if phenomena on individual and various organizationallevels are to be connected systematically.Until recent years largely overlooked in the literatureof internationalpolitics, bargaining,leverage, and coalition formationappearto be virtuallysynonymouswith the political process-"who gets what, when and how."'" Thomas Schellinghas construedbargainingprocesses as verbal and nonverbal interchangesin situations where the ability of one actor to gain his ends depends to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other actor will make.'6Effortsby one bargainerto influencethe choices or decisionsof the other actorare identifiedvariouslyas leverages,inducements, sidepayments,rewards,threats, punishments,coercions, "the carrot,""the stick," and so forth. Here we shall refer to such efforts as leverages. Both positive and negative leveragesare used in the formationand maintenance of coalitionsas well as in the conductof relationsbetweencoalitions.William Riker and others referto states as coalitions of coalitions, managedby governments or regimes (specializedelite coalitions).'7 We conceive of coalitions and coalitions of coalitions as emerging from and being sustained by networksof bargainingand leverage.'8The concept of "network"is, of course, used in many different ways: there are communicationsnetworks,kinship networks,trade networks,and so forth. Net15. Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When and How (New York: Meridian, 1958). 16. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 5; I. William Zartman, The 50% Solution (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1976). 17. William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations; and Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). 18. See Anatol Rapaport, "A Probabilistic Approach to Networks," Social Networks 2 (1979/ 80): 1-18; George Modelski, Principles of World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 232, 270-72, refers to "layered networks."

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works are often defined as voluntaryrelationships.In these pages, however, we think of bargainingand leveragenetworksas tending to vary from more to less voluntarydependingupon the extent to which they become formally integratedinto the structureof a coalitionor, especially,a coalitionof coalitions and its government or regime. Thus a neighborhoodsecuritynetwork may be voluntary in ways that a police securitynetworkin the same area would not be. Yet both networksinvolve bargainingand leverageof a sort, although the bargainingand leverage that takes place within the command structure of the police or the militarymay be unrecognizableat firstglance.Perseverant bargainingand leverage activities serve as network linkageswithin, across, and between coalitions and coalitions of coalitions. Some of these networks become institutionalized;others are much more transitory.Many provide connections where conventional theories place "systemic," "level," "structural,"and other conceptualboundaries.Bargainingand leverageemerge as strong candidatesfor generic status in our proposed conceptualframework. Within societies organizedas states, the government enjoys, in principle at least, the ultimate in coercive leverage:a monopoly of legal force. On a day-to-day basis most governments, dictatorshipsincluded, make considerable use of the carrotbut in all states the threat of force is also there and the stick is displayed if we are caught evading taxes, challengingthe draft, or committing some other less-than-minorinfraction.Indeed, to exemplify this, the whole apparatusof taxation can be viewed conceptuallyas a neverending bargainingand leverage confrontationbetween the government, in pursuitof resourcesto run itself and to meet some proportionof the demands made upon it, and the citizen, who by and largewould like to see an optimum number of his or her demands met in returnfor a minimum of taxes paid. Presidingover these operations,the rulingelite-through the governmentmust decide how many resourcesare to be allocated for "butter"(welfare, subsidies to special interests, and other "carrot"leverages)and how many to police, armed forces, tax-collectingagencies, and other institutionalized wielders of "sticks." One responsibility of the chief executive is to keep domestic and external bargainingand leverage in operationalbalance. Demand, capability, bargaining,leverage, and coalition- and adversaryformationgo a long way towardjoining the multilevel phenomenaof Ashley and Beer and connecting their concerns in systematic ways with those of Organskiand Kugler, Wilkinson-Richardson,and Bueno de Mesquita. We can think of the international(or better, the global) conceptual framework that begins to emerge as an array of coalitions and coalitions of coalitions, each sustained by domestic bargainingand leverage networks, each linked with others by transnationaland internationalnetworks of bargainingand leverage, and all competing for the life-sustainingresourcesavailable from the environmentin which they are nested. The populationsof these coalitions of coalitions are growing or declining differentially,their technologies and specializedcapabilitiesare advancingat differentrates. An outbreakof war,

The convergenceeffect 349 or some other decision or action that occurs in any sector of the whole framework,will thus tend to be explicablein terms of phenomenaconverging from differentlevels and sectors. Depending on the problem under investigation, certain variablesor sectors may be held constant;but in each case the rationalefor selectingsuch an analyticalstrategyneeds to be made explicit. Metaphorically,coalitions and coalitions of coalitions qualify as organizational actor systems to the extent that individual participants,through some regime or comparablearrangement,can agreeupon and effect unified activities in the name of the organization.States meet these criteria,as do other types of organization.Lacking such unity of purpose, decision, and action, however, most balance-of-powerand other international systems (other than tightly joined blocs or alliances) are not organizationalactor systems but human ecological systems of interacting coalition actors or coalition-of-coalitionactors. So-called international"systemic" constraints and other influencesare no more than the outcome of activitiesamong states and other actors possessingunequalcapabilitiesand potentialsin bargaining and leverage. A similarconcernpertainsto the conceptof "structures."Structuresamount to relativelystabilizedpatternsof coalitionsand theirlinkingactivities,which are conditioned by all sorts of interactive phenomena from demographic changes to technologicaladvances, economic fluctuations,shifts in productivity, alterations in military capabilities,and the like. Uneven levels and ratesof changein these variousdimensions-both within societiesand across societies-give rise to continuallyshiftingdomestic and internationalasymmetries. Such asymmetries influence who gets what, when, and how, and contributeto adversarialconflict and also to the formationof coalitions on all organizationallevels. The mechanicaltreatmentof such structuresmay deprive the investigatorof access to importantchanges taking place within and between countries.'9 Well within the broad conceptual context suggestedby Ashley and Beer, A. F. K. Organskiand Jacek Kugler in The War Ledger address and test propositionsabout some major questions that have challengedthe field for a long time: Why do wars occur?Under what conditionsdo powerfulnations fight?What determines which side will win and which side will lose? How are the participantsin a war affectedby victory and defeat?Is there a predictable pattern (the Phoenix phenomenon) in states' recoveries from war? And to what extent, if any, has the conflictbehaviorbetween nations altered since the advent of the nuclear era? In approachingthe first question, Organskiand Kuglerput forwardthree models of the "causes" of war: balance of power, collective security, and 19. See ErnstB. Haas, "WordsCan HurtYou; or, Who SaidWhatto Whom aboutRegimes," InternationalOrganization36 (Spring 1982), p. 242: "The existence of structuremust be demonstrated. . . not prespecified."

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power transition(pp. 14-63). In the balance-of-powermodel war is seen as the outcome of an unequal distributionof power (essentially,a gap between an equal distribution and the actual distribution).Balance-of-powerproponents disagreeas to whether the weaker power, seeking to close the gap between its own capabilitiesand that of its strongerrival, is the more likely aggressoror whetherthe strongerpower, threatenedby effortsof the weaker nation to "catch up," is more likely to initiate hostilities. As defined by Organski and Kugler, a collective security model assumes that an equal distributionof powerleads to war,triggeredby the previouslyweakerpower's successfullyclosing the gap. In the power transitionmodel, by contrast, it is unevenness in the size and rates of growth among various members of the internationalsystem, not necessarily defined as a clearcut balance or imbalance, that contributes to the outbreak of war. The power transition model emphasizesdifferentialchangeratherthan the more static(andpossibly nonexistent) phenomenon of pure balance or deviation therefrom. After exploratorytests of the three models, Organskiand Kuglerconclude that war is caused by "differencesin rates of growthamong the greatpowers and, of particularimportance,the differencesin rates between the dominant nation and the challengerthat permit the latter to overtake the former. It is such leapfroggingthat destabilizesthe system" (p. 6 1).20 This findingtends to support those of Ashley. Organskiand Kugler'sfindingsare persuasiveand should be investigated further. Indeed, their choice of historical data for testing the three models makes follow-up investigations essential. In particular,they have focused on World War I and World War II for their analysis and have generateda number of cases of "war initiation"by pairingall the major protagonistsin these two conflicts. The procedureyielded a sample of country pairs that did or did not fight. However, this method of generatingmultiplecases from the two world wars may obscure elusive and complex dynamics whereby localizedwarsare transformedinto majorconflagrations.Organskiand Kugler have advanced well beyond some of the more simplistic balance-of-power explanations of outbreaks of war but their procedures need considerable refining,as they themselves concede. Moving from the "causes"of war to predictingits outcome, Organskiand Kuglerconsiderwhetherpatternsof economic and militarygrowthand "the consequent responses of power [determine]the outcome of conflicts they seem to have caused." In this part of their study the authors devise an indicatorof politicaldevelopment for measuringthe abilityof a government to mobilize the resourcesnecessaryfor war (pp. 74-85). Here Organskiand Kuglerdrawupon concepts of penetration,extraction,allocation,regulation, and so forth, which can be viewed as an aspect of the bargainingthat is 20. See, forexample,RobertGilpin, Warand Changein WorldPolitics(New York:Cambridge University Press, 1981); Choucriand North, Nations in Conflict.

The convergenceeffect 351 carried on by ruling elites in the course of day-to-day governance.21The degree of success achieved by a government in such domestic bargaining and leverage may be expected to constrain its ability to bargainand apply leverage externally. Unfortunately, Organskiand Kugler applied their indicator only to developing nations as war participants.They contend that an indicatorof political development is unnecessaryfor developed nations, thereby seeming to overlook the probability that political, like economic, development is unevenand changingamongdevelopedas well as amongdevelopingcountries. The success of the authors in this aspect of the investigationis limited also by theirchoice of cases. Theirselectionconsistsof countriesreceivingvarying, but in at least two instances "massive," amounts of foreign aid. Organski and Kugler allow for this consideration but concede that "We have not definitelyresolved the difficultyinsofaras our measureis concerned"(p. 84). Additionally,in their examination of the Arab-Israeliwars they treat Syria, Jordan, and Egyptas a single unit. With the benefit of hindsightone wishes that Organskiand Kugler had used a common set of countries for the two investigations-both, that is, for the analysis of "causes"of war and for the predictionsof outcome. Organskiand Kugler's investigation of the Phoenix phenomenon stems from the observation that "after wars, the active losers catch up with the winners in comparatively short order, and .., the system of international power [read"competition"?Ibegins to behave as one would have anticipated if no war had occurred"(p. 142). Among their findingsare that, in the short run, winnersexperiencedonly slightlosses as a resultof a war whereaslosers sufferedheavily; in the long run, however, victors showed little change from prewartrends whereaslosers acceleratedtheir recoveryand "roughlyfifteen to eighteenyears afterthe guns were stopped were back up to the levels they would have attained had no war occurred"(p. 212). However, the authors do not take sufficientaccount of those entities such as Austria-Hungaryand the OttomanEmpirethat have been permanentcasualtiesof war.Historically, the disappearanceof losing states has often contributedto major changesin the internationalsystem. This has tended to be true whetherthe losing polity has been absorbed by the victor, splinteredinto a number of independent states that did not exist before, or integratedwith other elements into a new federationor empire. Such changes can alter the internationalconfiguration of power in important ways, as the breakup of the Austro-Hungarianand Ottoman empires after World War I amply demonstrates. Finally, Organskiand Kugler assess the impact of the advent of nuclear weaponry on the outbreakof war. They raise the question whether political and economic power have tended to be decoupled as a consequence.From 21. See Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., System, Process and Policy: Comparative

Politics (Boston:Little, Brown, 1978), chap. 2.

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an examination of fourteen "critical"cases they reach the conclusion that "nuclearweapons do not deter confrontationson all levels" and that "the tendency to go to war increasesas the likelihoodof greatpower involvement increases and as the possibility that nuclearweapons may be used becomes more real"(p. 161). While concedingthe absence of any basis for concluding that nuclearweaponrynecessarilydeters nations from war-a post hoc ergo propterhoc fallacy-we fail to see formalevidence for Organskiand Kugler's finding to the effect that "the tendency to go to war increases ... as the possibilitythat nuclearweapons may be used becomes more real" (p. 161). In Deadly Quarrels,David Wilkinsonproposesto summarizewhat mathematician Lewis Frye Richardson "intended to do and did in Statistics of Deadly Quarrels";22 to investigate what Richardson left incomplete, what

has since been done with his work, and what can be done now; and to extend Richardson'swork somewhat (p. 9). Although Richardsonis best known for his book Arms and Insecurity,23in which he attempted to construct mathematicalmodels of arms races,Wilkinsonassesses Statisticsof Deadly Quarrels as "his most seminal work" (p. 3). Wilkinson recodes and reanalyzesRichardson'sdata, compares Richardson's methods with those used by successors(includingcritics),reappraises Richardson's work in the context of the contemporary literature on the subject,and makesspecificrecommendationsfor furtherresearch.Wilkinson's nine coding and data appendicesprovide a valuable source for investigators concerned with the statistics of "deadly quarrels."The book as a whole suffers,however, from the lack of a clear statement of what Wilkinsonproposes to do, a thesis integratingthe various parts, and a brief recapitulation of what Wilkinson himself has contributedto the undertaking. Becauseof the specializednatureof his book, Wilkinsondoes not contribute directlyto the notion of a conceptualframework:he does not provide a fully developed theory. Nor does he, any more than Richardsondid, suggesthow the latter's somewhat disparatearray of theorems, equations, and clusters of data might be linked in unified ways. Nevertheless, virtually all the data and considerations in the book must be presumed relevant to an understanding of war and its antecedents. It goes without saying that a useful conceptualframeworkwould have to encompass them and indicate, at least tentatively, how'they fit together on internationaland global levels. Fortunately,some of the mechanismsand processesof linkagemost relevant for the Richardson-Wilkinsondata and conceptshave alreadybeen discussed in the literature.Over recent years Schelling, Alexander George, Richard Smoke, Oran Young, Snyder and Diesing, and others have used bargaining and leverage in several studies of deterrence,escalations,arms races, crises, 22. Lewis F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960). 23. Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960).

The convergenceeffect 353 limited wars, and comparable situations.24Such bargainingand exercise of leverage often start off like a poker game in which the players, determined to win by any available means, have pistols and are backed up by armed friendsleaningagainstthe bar.Common to all these phenomenais a situation in which an act by one country, A, is perceived by another, B, as blocking its (B's) purpose and widening the gap between B's perceptions of reality and preference. From this perspectivea truearmsraceamountsto specialcase of bargaining and escalationof leverages.Not all escalationsare true arms races, however. Even if the arms expendituresof countries A and B are increasingat comparable rates, there may be no connection between the two trends. Each nationmay be strengtheningits armamentsfor domesticreasons;for example, their respective industrialand militaryestablishmentsmay have developed informal coalitions in pursuit of their own respective special interests. Or each may be respondingto a threatfrom some third country.In a true arms race,on the otherhand, the leadersof A, perceivingB's increasein armaments as a threat to A's security,may try to stay ahead of B or seek to deter B by raisingtheir own military expenditures.B's leaders may then proceed with mirror-imageincreases of their own-trying to influenceA's behavior with increasingexpenditures. We believe we are able to describe all true arms races in terms of escalatingexchanges of leverage. Some-but not all-arms races, crises, and other threateninginteractions between states lead to the type of decision situationthat Bueno de Mesquita concerns himself with in The War Trap. In this book he presents what he identifies as "a general theory of war and foreign conflict initiation and escalation"together with "both the logic of the theory and a broadly based analytic test of the theory's most criticaldeductions"(p. ix). Firmly located within the rational-actortradition and decision theory, the undertakingis based on four assumptions:in each case, decisions about war are dominated by a single "strong"leader;such leaders are "rationalexpected utility maximizers"; examined individually, they have differingpersonal orientations toward risk taking; and decision making in these situations is significantly affectedby uncertaintyaboutthe probablebehaviorof otherstatesconfronting the possibilityof war. Such uncertaintiesstem from questionsabout the warmakingcapabilitiesof opponents and of other countriesthat might be drawn into the conflict; the values attached to a particularpolicy by one country as contrasted with the values that the opponent may attach to it; and the 24. Thomas Schelling,Armsand Influence(New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1955);Alexander F. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, The Limits of CoerciveDiplomacy (Boston:Little, Brown, 1971);AlexanderGeorgeand RichardSmoke, Deterrencein American ForeignPolicy:Theoryand Practice(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1974);OranYoung, The Politics of Force: Bargaining during International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1968); Snyder and Diesing, Conflictamong Nations. Riker's applicationof the "size" principleto coalitionaland adversarialbargainingis crucialto the notionof internationalconflict (in Theory of Political Coalitions).

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values attached to possible moves that may be made toward a country-or toward its opponents (pp. 20-21). In developingtestablepropositionsfroman expected-utilitycalculus,Bueno de Mesquita confronts four issues. How do prospectiveinitiatorsof conflict differfrom their opponents?When are conflictslikely to be resolved without escalatinginto open warfare?How does expected utility affectthe costs that nations are willing to endure in pursuingtheir objectives throughwarfare? Who is likely to win an ensuing conflict? In dealing with these issues, he divides initial combatants into three possible combinations: "nonaligned" states, which have revealed virtually no preferenceswith respect to other states;"aligned"states, which have revealedpreferencesregardingthe policy positions of other nations; and two states, one aligned and the other nonaligned.Withinthis framework,he provides "severalsignificant,and several lesser, deductions about the necessaryconditions of war" including"expectations derived from the theory that are often counter-intuitive,"along with specific historicalexamples "to support the propositions"(p. 92). Bueno de Mesquita'stheoryis well-reasoned,parsimonious,and internally consistent but if it were located within our proposed conceptualframework (and it should fit well there) we would have to conclude that it does not constitute the "generaltheory of war" that Bueno de Mesquitaclaims it to be. The theorycannot accommodatesuch relevantphenomenaas escalation, arms races, and other complexities that characterizedthe course of events between the assassinationof ArchdukeFrancisFerdinandand the outbreak of generalwar. Essentially,what Bueno de Mesquita presentsis a theory of decision for or againstwar-the kind of "go/no-go"determinationmade by the Kaiser and other German leaders during 1-2 August 1914. Here our proposed conceptual framework suggests an alternative. The possible applications of bargainingand leverage in both domestic and international political processes have been extended by Riker, Snyder and Diesing, Cyert and March, and others, who see group decision making on any level as a process of forming a coalition around an alternative-with varyingmanifestationsand degreesof rewarding,threatening,coercive, even violent leverages.25Bueno de Mesquita's"strong"leadermight thus be identified as that individual actor in the nation state who is able, by whatever means (coercive, logrolling,or otherwise),to muster a consensus for war. It is bargainingand leverage,in short,that endows the leaderwith the "strength" that Bueno de Mesquita'stheory requires.Thus, while the "strong-leaders" assumption can be maintained in the interests of parsimony,it can also be anchored to a foundation of bargaining,leverage, and-decision making. Although The WarTrapderives from the traditionof basic power-oriented theories of war and peace, Bueno de Mesquita considers such theories in25. Riker, Theory of Political Coalitions, p. 12.; Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations,

p. 349; Cyertand March,BehavioralTheory,pp. 99, 124.

The convergenceeffect 355 sufficientfor understandingdecisions to go to war or to refrainfrom war. Fromanalysisof his datahe concludesthatutility,whichcombinespreferences with power, is the "strongerand more stable predictorof the predilection to initiate a conflict" (p. 156). More recently he reinforcesthis conclusion with the assertion that "any effort to infer anythingabout the likelihood of war from the presenceor absence of a particulardistributionis likely to yield no better results than random guessing."26 This conclusion conflicts with Organski and Kugler's finding that it is unevenness in the size and rates of growth of competing nations that gives rise to war. Three possibleexplanationsfor these divergentconclusionscome to mind. First, differingconceptualizations,definitions, and indicators of powermay have contributedto the discrepancy.Second, Bueno de Mesquita uses a wide arrayof data from many cases over a long span of time whereas Organskiand Kugler confined themselves to "major wars," that is, World War I and World War II. And third, from our perspectivein this article,all acts are the outcome of multiplecombinationsof motivations,dissatisfactions, incentives, gaps, Bueno de Mesquita'sconcept of "preference,"demands or utilities,on the one hand, and specificcapabilities(ratherthan powerdefined as the specific ability to influence) on the other. National leaders seem to be situated at the convergencepoint of internallyand externallygenerated demands, leverages,and perceptionsof shiftingcapabilitiesamong allies and rivals; they may see war as the lesser of evils or as a genuine gain. Our positionthus predisposesus to acceptthe notion that both utility(motivation, demands, will, incentive) and perceptionsof the capabilityof self and other are central and necessaryfactors in virtually all decisions for war. Through time and across cases, however, the relative explanatorystrengthof the two factors may vary considerably. Bueno de Mesquita's "strong leader" confronts a war/no-war decision, like a Hitler contemplatinginvasion of the Low Countries and France, a Roosevelt respondingto Pearl Harbor,a Beginconsideringan incursioninto Lebanon. Such a leader is located at the center of messages and events convergingfrom many directions:from the antagonist,from other countries in the internationalenvironment, from within the "strongleader" him- or herself,from sectors of the leader'sown country, from history, and so forth. Seen from the perspective of an interactive, conceptual framework,such variableshave not "caused"the crisisdirectlybut have affectedthe demands, capabilities,and bargainingand leverage potentials of rival "aggregations" (Beer) or coalitions of coalitions. Deriving from the intersectionof the expandingactivitiesand interestsof two or more nations(Ashley),international often contribute competitions,arms races,and crises(Richardson-Wilkinson) to a situationthat seems to requirea war/no-wardecision.At such a juncture, 26. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Risk, Power Distributions,and the Likelihoodof War," InternationalStudies Quaterly25 (December 1981), p. 566.

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the "strong"leader's calculationof the home nation's utilities, based upon personal preferencesand estimates of probabilitiesof success, will be conditioned by assessment of national capabilities-economic, financial,industrial,military,and so forth-and by feedbacksfrom his or her own initiatives. Outcomes, however, will be determined in large part by the bargainingleverageprocess of one state interactingwith anotherand the abilityof each state to maintain its capabilitiesand the support of its populace. One advantageof the bargainingand leverageapproachto the escalation of conflict is the clear light it sheds upon increasinglycoercive and violent leverages,whether undertakenoffensivelyor defensively, as a centralfactor in the movement of countries from peace toward war. The approachalso places the ultimate responsibilityfor escalatingnegative leverageand other actions leading toward war directly where it belongs: on individuals, individuals in many roles, from the "strong"leaderto constituentson all "levels" without whose support or minimal compliance even a tyrant cannot wage war. If, in the course of an increasinglynegativeexchangeof leverages(a crisis), Buenode Mesquita's"strong"leadershoulddecidein favorof war-a decision that in most instances can be viewed as an interactivegroup decision-the consequencesmay includea radicaltransformationof internationaland global systems with the collapse of one hegemon and the rise of another, the redrawingof boundaries, shifts in capabilitiesand leverage potentials, the rearrangementof alliances,the generationof new demands, and so forth. In this way we see the internationaland global systems as fluid, dynamic, and ever emergingfrom the demands of national leadersand, less directly,from the demands of bureaucratsand the rank-and-file. With respect to the explication of bargainingand leverage aspects of the conceptual framework,one furtherphenomenon of war needs to be taken into account: Schelling has interpreted"all-out" war as "brute force" and "beyond bargaining."27 Organskiand Kugler share this perspective. They write: "In the case of all-out war . .. disagreementbetween the combatants is of such a nature and degree that the goal that each sets for itself is no longerjust to induce the other party to change its mind and course of action but to crush the other's resistanceand control its behavior regardlessof its wishes" (p. 7). Despite Schelling'sand Organskiand Kugler's stipulations, however, all-out war seems to fit both Schelling'sdefinitionof a bargaining situation and our own proposal that bargainingand leverage serve to link conflictualas well as coalition-formingbehaviors at all image levels and at all potential intensities of rewardand punishment. The ability of each side to achieve its objectives still depends upon the decisions and actions of others. Higherlevels of violence may alterthe goals of the adversariessomewhat, but it is rarethat either side wholly abandonsearlierpurposes.Victory 27. Schelling,Strategyof Conflict.

The convergenceeffect 357 for either one depends, in any case, upon the performanceof the other. At the armisticeor peace table, the victor commonly raisesold objectivesalong with new ones and the document that is signedmay be viewed as an ultimate bargainenforced by superiorleverage. All five books work with Waltz's three images of the locus of war:within man, within separate states, and within the system of states. None deals directlywith the fourthor global image. It may thereforebe useful to assess, however briefly, the contributions that the various authors make to our understandingof internationalpolitics. To the extent that, from its own "islandof theory,"each book focuses on a differentsector of the converging influences,it is neithereasy nor profitableto rankthem arbitrarily.Each has its own strengthsand weaknesses,each providesuniqueand valuableinsights, and each deserves to be read by anyone seriouslyinterestedin the field. The Political Economy of Warand Peace contributesmost to the idea of a conceptual framework, however partially. The War Ledger, in spite of case-selectionand relatedproblems,clearlyadds new dimensions of inquiry that fit logicallyinto Ashley's partialframework.It issues methodologicalas well as substantive challenges that need to be picked up and assessed by other investigators.In The War Trap Bueno de Mesquita, while operating within a more conventional framework,deals with utilities, uncertainties, risks, and decisions innovatively and with a fine touch of elegance.His basic equations have possibilities for development well beyond the bilateral,essentially go/no-go application of this study.28In many respects the most specializedapproach,Deadly Quarrelsprovides a compact primerfor those who want an introductionto quantitativeanalysis;it is also a valuablehandbook for the specialist. While falling somewhat short as an integratedcontribution to the literature,Peace against War comes through as a small encyclopediaof unusualperspectivesand promisinginsights.As foundations for a conceptualframework,the Ashley,Organskiand Kugler,and WilkinsonRichardsonapproacheshave dynamicqualitiesthat the other two eitherlack or fail to make theoreticallyor operationallyexplicit. The fourthimage, which tends to be implicitif not alwaysexplicitin these five books, can be conceptualizedin differentways. The most obvious is a simple extension of the internationalsystem as conventionallypresented.A global conceptual frameworksuggestsa somewhat differentset of reference points. Conceived as a set of nested relationships-of individuals, networks,coalitions,coalitionsof coalitions,internationalalliances,adversarialblocs, and so forth-the overall global assembly can be identified as an ecological or environmental system of ever-fluctuating, increasingly interdependent, asymmetrical,adaptive, and potentiallyevolving components;but not, even 28. As a revised edition of the book, now in progress,may demonstrate.

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metaphorically,as a unifiedactor system. As we view it, at least three major considerationsdistinguishsuch a system from a conventionalapproach.First, a global perspective deals with wholes, aggregations,and totals: the whole world and its environment, the total human population, aggregationsof human demands, aggregationsof available resources,and so forth. These wholes, aggregations,and totals mark the boundariesof the global system at any given time. Second, a global approachis concernedwith components such as individualhuman beings,coalitions,and coalitionsof coalitions,and with who and which among them gets what portion of the totals when and how. And third, a global perspectiveidentifiesindividuals,in social contexts and playing a multiplicityof roles in a wide variety of networks,coalitions, and coalitions of coalitions, as the only responsibleactors in the system. Our intent in this article has been to draw upon the five books under review as a way of suggestinghow islands of theory in global politics might be bounded and connected in systematic ways. The variety of phenomena that appear to converge upon and influence an outcome in the field of internationalpolitics, eitherdirectlyor indirectly,is likely to be large.A critical problem, therefore, is how to trace them across conventional islands of theory,to see how they are linked,to ascertainwhichof them possess optimal explanatorypower, and to determinethe extent to which particularizedelements and processes can be merged on more abstract and parsimonious levels of conceptualization.Toward these ends, we have proposed a threestage approach:the identificationof a broad and somewhat loose arrayof phenomena that seem to be likely candidates for necessary and sufficient explanation;the consolidationand integrationof these elementsinto a generic processmodel compatiblewith diverseapproachesand applicableto different levels of organizationfrom the individual to the global environment;and the long-termdevelopmentof familiesof derivativemodels or partialtheories for testing in particularcases and for validating,modifying,and refiningthe "master"model. Bargaining,leverage,and coalition-and adversary-formation are central to this undertaking.