Right of Accession Case Digests

PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) – CASE DIGESTS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS) vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES, MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO

for they are not made through the effects of the current of river waters.

FACTS

“To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of waters.” (Emphasis mine.)

Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina Tancinco Imperial, and Mario C. Tancinco (herein respondents) are the registered owners of a parcel of land, which is a fishpond property and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. In 1973, they applied for the registration of three lots (Labeled as 1PSU-131892 2-PSU-131892, AND 3-PSU-131892, respectively), which are adjacent to their fishpond property, under their name before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Evidence would reveal that the said lots are surrounded by dikes and are under river waters, which are approximately two (2) meters deep. In 1974, the Director of Lands opposed the respondents’ application for registration. In 1975, and upon the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the trial court, respondents withdrew their application for registration on the third lot. In 1976, the trial court granted the application for registration of the remaining two (2) lots, stating that said lots are accretions to the fishpond property owned by the respondents. Aggrieved, Bureau of Lands elevated the case to the Supreme Court averring that there was no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because “what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and this, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial, and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the rivers”. ISSUE Whether or not the lots adjacent to the fishpond property of private respondents, which are the subject matter of this dispute, are accretions within the purview of Article 457 of the New Civil Code? HELD No. The two lots adjacent to private respondents’ fishpond property are not accretions under Article 457

As provided for under Article 457:

The Honorable Court held that the above-quoted provision requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites namely: (1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) That such deposit be made through the effects of the current of water; and (3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers. According to the Court “the reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. In this case, the Supreme Court agrees with the submission of the Bureau of Lands that the alleged accretions were man-made and not the exclusive result of the currents of the Meycauayan and Bocaue river waters. Evidence supports the conclusion that respondents built dikes surrounding their property for reclamation purposes and NOT to protect such from the destructive force of the river waters. Ergo, according to the court, the only conclusion that may be deduced is that the alleged alluvial deposits came about only because of the transfer of dikes towards the river. The purported accretion was in reality an

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

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PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) – CASE DIGESTS encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river bed by reclamation1 Premises considered, the Court held that said lots may not be open to registration under the Land Registration Act for they are classified as property of public domain under paragraph 1 of Article 420 of the New Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of their fishponds to their original location and return the disputed property to the river to which it belongs. SO ORDERED.

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The conversion of wasteland into land suitable for use of habitation or cultivation (Wordweb)

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

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PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) – CASE DIGESTS FRANCISCO DEPRA VS. AGUSTIN DUMLAO

HELD

FACTS

No. Depra may not resort to the remotion or the removal of the kitchen built over the 34 sq. meter portion without exercising any of the options provided from him under Article 448 of the New Civil Code.

Francisco Depra, the petitioner in this case is the owner of a land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T3087, known as Lot No 685, located in the Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, and has a land area of 8,870 sq. meters. On the other hand, private respondent Agustin Dumlao owns an a lot adjoining that of Depra’s, known as Lot 683, with an approximate area of 231 sq. meters. In 1972, when Dumlao constructed his house on his lot, his kitchen had encroached on an area of 34 sq. meters of Depra’s property. After Depra’s mother found out of the same during a relocation survey in the same year, she filed an action for Unlawful Detainer in 1973 against Dumlao with the Municipal Trial Court of Dumagans. This complaint was later on amended in order to include Francisco Depra as a party plaintiff. After trial, the Municipal Court held that the Dumlao is a “builder in good faith” under Article 448 of the New Civil Code. Applying said provision of law, the Municipal Court ordered a “forced lease” between the Depra and Dumlao over the disputed area – the 34 sq. meter encroachment upon Depra’s lot. Neither of the parties appealed against the said judgment until the latter had become final and executory. Also, Depra did not accept payment of rentals in lieu of the ordered forced lease so that Dumlao deposited such rentals with the Municipal Court. In 1974, Depra filed a complaint for Quieting of Title against Dumlao before the then Court of Instance (CFI) of Iloilo. The complaint involved the same 34-sq. meter lot. In lieu of Depra’s refusal to either appropriate the kitchen (improvement) built upon the 34 sq. meter portion after payment of indemnification to Dumlao or sell said portion of the land to the latter, CFI rendered a decision that granted Depra the possess of the disputed area and have the kitchen built thereon removed. Aggrieved, Dumlao filed a petition before the Honorable Supreme Court.

ISSUE Whether or not Depra may take possession of the disputed lot area and have the kitchen thereon removed.

Article 448 of the New Civil Code provides: “The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.” Applying the aforementioned provision of law, the Honorable Supreme Court in this case ruled: “Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA has the option either to pay for the encroaching part of DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot to DUMLAO. He cannot refuse to pay for the encroaching part of the building, and to sell the encroached part of his land, as he had manifested before the Municipal Court. But that manifestation is not binding because it was made in a void proceeding. However, the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the Stipulation of Facts in the Court of First Instance. It was thus error for the Trial Court to have ruled that DEPRA is "entitled to possession," without more, of the disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled to have the kitchen removed. He is entitled to such removal only when, after having chosen to sell his encroached land, DUMLAO fails to pay for the same. In this case, DUMLAO had expressed his willingness to pay for the land, but DEPRA refused to sell. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

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PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) – CASE DIGESTS building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot as respondents here did refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land. the other party fails to pay for the same. We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffsrespondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is. furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608[1946]).” (Emphases mine.) The Honorable Court went on in explaining the rationale behind and the fairness of the rule laid down in Article 448. Thus: “Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. (3 Manresa 213; Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico, G.R. No. 49167, April 30, 1949; Article applied: see Cabral, et al vs. Ibanez [S.C.] 52 Off. Gaz. 217; Marfori vs. Velasco, [C.A.] 52 Off. Gaz. 2050).”

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby set aside, and this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for further proceedings

consistent with Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, as follows: 1. The trial Court shall determine a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square meter area of land; b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the kitchen; c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters may have acquired by reason thereof, and d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than that of the kitchen built thereon. 2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional, Trial Court shall render judgment, as follows: a) The trial Court shall grant DEPRA a period of fifteen (15) days within which to exercise his option under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to appropriate the kitchen as his own by paying to DUMLAO either the amount of tile expenses spent by DUMLAO f or the building of the kitchen, or the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters may have acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of said area. The amounts to be respectively paid by DUMLAO and DEPRA, in accordance with the option thus exercised by written notice of the other party and to the Court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in favor of the party entitled to receive it; b) The trial Court shall further order that if DEPRA exercises the option to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial Court, the value of the land is considerably more than that of the kitchen, DUMLAO shall give written notice of such rejection to DEPRA and to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of DEPRA's option to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the Court formal written notice of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the trial Court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease, provided that the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less than Ten Pesos (P10.00)

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

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PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) – CASE DIGESTS per month, payable within the first five (5) days of each calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more than two (2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long period of time since 1952 that DUMLAO has occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year of the forced lease. DUMLAO shall not make any further constructions or improvements on the kitchen. Upon expiration of the two-year period, or upon default by DUMLAO in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months, DEPRA shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover his land, and to have the kitchen removed by DUMLAO or at the latter's expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by DUMLAO to the Court for payment to DEPRA, and such tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the Court. c) In any event, DUMLAO shall pay DEPRA an amount computed at Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of DEPRA's land for the period counted from 1952, the year DUMLAO occupied the subject area, up to the commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding paragraph; d) The periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its Precision shall be inextendible, and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial Court the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for compliance with such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee. No costs, SO ORDERED.

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

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PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) – CASE DIGESTS TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL SEVENTEENTH DIVISION) and EDUARDO UY FACTS Tecngas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation (herein petitioner) is a corporation which happens to be the registered owner of a certain parcel of land located in Barrio San Dionisio, Paranaque, Metro Manila, and is known as LOT 4351-A of Lot 4531 of the Cadastral Survey of Paranaque. In 1970, Tecnogas purchased said land, together with the buildings and wall built thereon, from Pariz Industries, Inc. Meanwhile, Eduardo Uy (herein private respondent) is the owner of a piece of land, known as LOT 4351-B of the same Cadastral Survey, and one which is adjacent to that of Tecnogas’ lot. Uy purchased LOT 4351-B from a certain Enrile Antonio in 1970. A year after such purchase, Uy bought another lot that also adjoins Tecnogas’ lot from a certain Miguel Rodriguez. In 1971, Eduardo Uy, after purchasing his second lot, hired a surveyor to survey all his newly acquired lots. This is when he discovered that a portion of his land, with an area of 770 square meters, was occupied by the buildings and wall owned by Tecnogas. Having been apprised of the same, Tecnogas offered to buy the portion of land encroached. However, Uy declined such offer. In 1980, Eduardo Uy caused the digging of a canal over Tecnogas’ wall, a portion of which collapsed. Tecnogas filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint compelling Eduardo Uy to sell to the former the 770sq.meter of encroached portion of the latter’s lot. The collapse of Tecnogas’ wall, however, let to the filing of a supplemental complaint against Uy, as well as a separate criminal complaint for malicious mischief. With regard to the civil case filed, the Trial Court ordered Eduardo Uy to sell to Tecnogas the portion of land occupied by portions of the latter’s buildings and wall. Appeal was made by Uy to the Court of Appeals, which rendered a decision setting aside and reversing that of the Trial Court’s and requiring the removal of the structures and surrounding walls over the encroached area of Uy’s lot. According to the respondent appellate court, Tecnogas was a “builder in bad faith”. Aggrived, Tecnogas’ interposed a petition before the Honorable Supreme Court.

Tecnogas avers, among other things, that the encroached land be sold to it since the first option given to the landowner under Article 448 of the New Civil Code is not absolute “because an exception thereto, once it would be impractical for the landowner to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e. buy that portion of the house standing on his land, for the whole building might be rendered useless. The workable solution is for him [landowner] to select the second alternative, namely to sell to the builder that part of his land on which constructed a portion of the house.” ISSUES (1) Whether or not Article 448 of the New Civil Code may apply in this case since Tecnogas is not the builder of the offending structures but merely possesses them as a buyer (and thus, successor-in-interest of Pariz Industries, Inc.) (2) And if so, whether or not Tecnogas is a builder in bad faith; and (3) Whether or not Tecnogas may compel Uy to sell the encroached area of the latter’s lot; HELD (1) The Honorable Supreme Court held that this case falls within the purview of Article 448 of the New Civil Code, notwithstanding the fact that Tecnogas was not the builder of the offending structures. The Court appreciated the fact that records do not reveal clearly who actually built the buildings and wall. However, it may be well assumed that Pariz Industries, Inc, Tecnogas’ predecessor-in-interest did so. So much so that when Tecnogas acquired LOT 4351-B, together with the buildings and wall built thereon, from Pariz Industries, Inc., petitioner is deemed to have stepped into the latter’s shoes in regard to all the rights of ownership over the immovable sold. Such right includes the right to compel Eduardo Uy to exercise either of the two options provided under Article 448. (2) As mentioned above, it is assumed that Pariz Industries Inc. was the one that built the buildings and wall on LOT 4351-B, so much so that when Tecnogas bought such lot and

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

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PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) – CASE DIGESTS improvements thereon, the latter is deemed to have stepped in to the shoes of the former. According to the Court, nothing on record would reveal that the offending structures were not built in good faith. Hence, Paris Industries is presumed to have built such structures in good faith. In addition, on the part of Tecnogas, there is no clear showing that it was aware of the encroachment in question. In fact, evidence would point to such lack of awareness by the petitioner. Even Eduardo Uy was not aware of the intrusion until 1971 when the survey of his two lots was done. And finally, upon being apprised of the said encroachment, Tecnogas even offered to buy the area occupied. All these considered, the Court gave credence to the good faith on the part of Tecnogas. (3) However, even though the application of Article 448 is in order, the Honorable Court held that Tecnogas cannot compel Eduardo Uy to sell the land to the former, for the right to choose between the options laid down in the said provision of law is given only to the landowner. Hence, the Supreme Court held in the case of Depra vs. Dumlao, speaking through Madame Justice Melencio-Herrera, “It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.” (Emphasis mine.) WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and the Amended Decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In accordance with the case of Depra vs. Dumlao, this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for further proceedings consistent with Articles 448 and 546 43 of the Civil Code, as follows: The trial court shall determine: a) the present fair price of private respondent's 520 square-meter area of land; b) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 520 square meters may have acquired by reason of the existence of the portion of the building on the area;

c) the fair market value of the encroaching portion of the building; and d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than the fair market value of the portion of the building thereon. 2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the regional trial court shall render judgment as follows: a) The private respondent shall be granted a period of fifteen (15) days within which to exercise his option under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to appropriate the portion of the building as his own by paying to petitioner its fair market value, or to oblige petitioner to pay the price of said area. The amounts to be respectively paid by petitioner and private respondent, in accordance with the option thus exercised by written notice of the other party and to the court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice of the option by tendering the amount to the trial court in favor of the party entitled to receive it; b) If private respondent exercises the option to oblige petitioner to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial court, the value of the land is considerably more than that of the portion of the building, petitioner shall give written notice of such rejection to private respondent and to the trial court within fifteen (15) days from notice of private respondent's option to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the trial court formal written notice of the agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the trial court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease provided that the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) per month, payable within the first five (5) days of each calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more than two (2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long period of time since 1970 that petitioner has occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year of the forced lease. Petitioner shall not make any further constructions or improvements on the building. Upon expiration of the two-year period, or upon default by petitioner in the payment of rentals for

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

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PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) – CASE DIGESTS two (2) consecutive months, private respondent shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover his land, and to have the portion of the building removed by petitioner or at latter's expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by petitioner to the trial court for payment to private respondent, and such tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the said court. c) In any event, petitioner shall pay private respondent an amount computed at two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of private respondent's land for the period counted from October 4, 1979, up to the date private respondent serves notice of its option to appropriate the encroaching structures, otherwise up to the actual transfer of ownership to petitioner or, in case a forced lease has to be imposed, up to the commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding paragraph; d) The periods to be fixed by the trial court in its decision shall be non-extendible, and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial court the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for compliance with such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee. No costs. SO ORDERED.

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

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PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) – CASE DIGESTS LEONOR GRANA AND JULIETA TORALBA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA BONGATO and JARDENIO SANCHEZ

FACTS Records reveal that the 87 square meter parcel of land, which is the subject of dispute in this case, is included as part of the 295-square meter lot belonging to Gregorio Bongato and Clara Botcon by virtue of a cadastral survey conducted in 1909 by the Bureau of Lands in Butuan, Agusan. Such land was registered under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138) issued in favor of Bongato and Botcon in 1923. In 1933, this lot was purchased by spouses Marcos Bongato and Eusebia More, and was inherited by their children (who are half-siblings), Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez, upon their death. On this lot, a portion of the petitioners’ house was constructed.

of P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until they actually vacate the same, plus attorney’s fees and costs. Aggrieved, Grana and Torralba elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC, with the only modification that the award of attorney’s fees be deleted. It also held that while the petitioners do not have a legal and valid claim over the disputed lot, they were builders in good faith. With that, petitioners interposed the present petition before the Honorable Supreme Court.

ISSUE Whether or not the rule under Article 448 of the New Civil Code may be applied to this case.

HELD

On the other hand, petitioners Grana and Torralba assert their claim over the disputed lot as successors-ininterest of one Isidaria Trillo.According to the petitioners, the lands in Butuan were subsequently resurveyed due to the presence of overlapping boundaries. By virtue of this resurvey, the petitioners claim that the disputed lot is included in the property of one Isidaria Trillo, which was designated as Lot no. 310. Since Trillo is petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, they now assert their claim of ownership over the land. However, the records of this case reveal that the petitioners did not present proof to support the existence of said resurvey. Noteworthy as well is the fact that by virtue of the alleged subsequent resurvey, the lot claimed to be part of the lot of the petitioners’ predessor-in-interest has an area of only 65 square meters, which is different from the 87-square meter lot supported by the Torrens Title held by the private respondents.

Yes. The Honorable Court ruled that private respondents, as the owners of the land, may choose to either (1) appropriate the portion of petitioners’ house, which was constructed on the portion of their land, upon payment of the proper indemnity to the former; or (2) sell to that portion of the land encroached upon by the petitioners’ house.

Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez filed a complaint against Lenor Grana and Julieta Torralba for the recovery of the 87 square meter residential land before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan. The Trial Court held that Bongato and Sanchez were the lawful owners of the land in controversy and ordered Grana and Torralba to vacate and deliver to former the land. The Trial Court also ordered Grana and Torralba to pay a monthly rental

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is modified in the sense that respondents are hereby directed to exercise within 30 days from this decision

However, in this case, the Court saw that choosing the first option under Article 448 may be impractical. Thus: “It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for respondents to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing on their land, for in that event the whole building might be rendered useless. The more workable solution, it would seem, is for respondents to sell to petitioners that part of their land on which was constructed a portion of the latter's house.”2

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Note that in the Tecnogas case supra, the same opinion was quoted and used as an argument by petitioner Tecnogas in order to support its position to compel the sale of the encroached portion of Eduardo Uy’s lot. The Supreme Court in said case ruled that the “workable solution” enunciated in Grana and Torralba vs. Court of Appeals may be applied only to the latter case.

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

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PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) – CASE DIGESTS their option to either buy the portion of the petitioners' house on their land or sell to said petitioners the portion of their land and petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate the same and must pay reasonable rent of P10.00 monthly from the time respondents made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the eland is considerably more than the value of the improvement, then petitioners may elect to rent the land, in which case the parties shall agree upon the terms of a lease. Should they disagree, the court of origin is hereby instructed to intervene and fix the terms thereof. Petitioners shall pay reasonable rent of P10.00 monthly up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the curt fixes such terms. So ordered without pronouncement as to costs.

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

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