riano2.pdf

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(THE BAR LECTURES SERIES) Updated Edition

BY

WILLARD B. RIANO Bar Reviewer in Remedial Law, Commercial Law and Civil Law Author: Fundamentals of Civil Procedure; Evidence, (A Restatement for the Bar); Civil Procedure (A Restatement for the Bar); Evidence (The Bar Lectures Series) Dean, College of Law, San Sebastian College Recoletos-Manila Member, Remedial Law and Commercial Law Committees, U.P. Law Center Professor and Lecturer, Philippine Judicial Academy, Supreme Court of the Philippines

2011

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WILLARD B. RIANO ISBN 978-971-23-6158-6 No portion of this book may be copied or reproduced in books, pamphlets, outlines or notes, whether printed, mimeographed, typewritten, copied in different electronic devices or in any other form, for distribution or sale, without the written permission of the author except brief passages in books, articles, reviews, legal papers, and judicial or other official proceedings with proper citation. Any copy of this book without the corresponding number and the signature of the author on this page either proceeds from an illegitimate source or is in possession of one who has no authority to dispose of the same.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED BY THE AUTHOR

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PREFACE After this work was submitted for publication on January 5, 2011, materials became available which contained court decisions worthy to be recommended for further readings. Foremost of these cases is that of Judith Yu v. Samson-Tatad (G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011), which ended previous speculations as to the applicability of the "fresh-period" rule to appeals in criminal cases. Hence, the need for an updated edition. This edition required the insertion of new case citations within the main chapters as well as the discussion of more recent Court rulings under the heading, Synopsis of Selected Cases. The cases selected were those with facts not involved in those decisions treated in the original edition. The criminal procedure aspects of the Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases were likewise added. In the process of enhancing the current material, some paragraphs which could have possibly given rise to misunderstanding were deleted. Mere matters of opinion were likewise taken out so as not to detract from the instructional purpose of this material. Also, certain portions which are matters of purely substantive law were expunged and only those necessary to explain procedural concepts were retained. Some paragraphs were likewise reworded for greater clarity in the presentation of procedural principles. In some instances, adjustments to editorial oversights in the original edition were effected. It is worth reiterating that this work is written primarily for the bar reviewee and the law student who need to be adequately equipped with the "core" knowledge required to hurdle the bar examinations. It is based on an empirically anchored deep-seated philosophy that passing the bar

V

examinations requires a quick recall of the law and the rules. Hence, topics in this work have been treated with emphasis on the very substance of the Rules of Court, a treatment traditionally referred to by academicians as a 'codal' approach. While the framework of this material is mainly codal- based, it is supported by cases which mirror, not only the current position of the Supreme Court on vital issues in the criminal litigation process but also by significant foreign cases designed to aid the reader to understand a particular rule from a parallel doctrinal perspective. Cases have been judiciously selected to permit the reader to appreciate how the Supreme Court grappled with and settled a wide range of issues arising in the various stages of criminal procedure. The scope of this book reveals its having no pretensions of being an exhaustive treatise on criminal procedure. Honest efforts have been taken to strip it of materials which veer away from what is fundamental and basic to allow a reasonably wide wiggle room for the reader to focus on procedural principles and concepts which have a fairly high probability of being utilized by the examiner in the framing of bar questions. As he goes through the various concepts of procedural law, the student is reminded that the principles underlying criminal procedure, like those of any other procedural rule, are construed liberally to meet the demands of justice. In our academic life we have always been beset by questions on matters involving consistency in the application of the rules. We have actually endeavored to show that there are no inconsistencies, and in order to fully appreciate the wisdom of Court decisions, the student must be aware that each case is decided in accordance with the facts and the issues raised by the parties. While our concern for the academic needs of our law students supplied the motivation for us to start and complete this work, the invaluable participation of Atty. Ernesto C. Salao and Atty. Maria Theresa P. Cabayan in the publication of this work is sincerely acknowledged for without their tremendous encouragement, assistance, and editorial skills, this material would not have seen the light of day.

vi

Lastly, the bar candidate and the law student is asked to consider this work as a humble recognition of their perseverance and their unwavering commitment to their future in the legal profession. WILLARD B. RIANO Quezon City September 15, 2011

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CONTENTS Chapter I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS I. BASIC CONCEPTS Concept of criminal procedure ........................................................................................ 1 The adversarial or accusatorial system........................................................................... 2 Liberal interpretation of the rules.................................................................................... 3 Due process; mandatory .................................................................................................. 3 A. Requisites for the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction .................................................................................................................... 4 Requisites ............................................................................................................................... 4 Jurisdiction over the subject matter versus jurisdiction over the person of the accused............................................................. 4 Jurisdiction over the territory; venue in criminal cases (Bar 1997) ........................................................................................................... 5 When a court has jurisdiction to try offenses not committed within its territorial jurisdiction............................................................. 6 B. Criminal Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter ................................................... 10 Jurisdiction over the subject matter ................................................................................. 10 How jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred ................................................................................................................. 11 How jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined................................................................................................................. 12 Statute applicable to a criminal action............................................................................. 13 Use of the imposable penalty............................................................................................ 14 Principle of adherence of jurisdiction or continuing jurisdiction............................................................................................... 14 Dismissal on jurisdictional grounds; special appearance................................................................................................................. 15 Raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the Supreme Court....................................................................................... 16 C. Criminal Jurisdiction Over the Person of The Accused (Bar 2008) .................................................................................................... 17

ix

II.

D. Injunction To Restrain Criminal Prosecution (Bar 1999) ................................................................................................................... 19 E. Mandamus to Compel Prosecution (Bar 1999).............................................................. 20 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS A.

III.

Criminal Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)....................................................................... 21 B. Criminal Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court (RTC) ................................................................................................................. 23 C. Criminal Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (P.D. 1606, R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249)...................................................................... 24 Offenses subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (Bar 1997)....................................................................................... 28 Officials and employees with a salary grade of "27" or higher ........................................................................................................ 29 Officers falling below salary grade '27".................................................................. 30 Salary grade alone does not determine jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan .......................................................................... 33 A student regent of a state university is a public officer............................................................................................................... 34 Offenses committed in relation to the office ........................................................ 34 When the actual specific allegations of the intimacy between the offense and the official duties of the accused need not appear in the information ..................................................................................................... 38 Anti-Money Laundering cases................................................................................. 40 Forfeiture cases.......................................................................................................... 40 Summary procedure in criminal cases................................................................... 40 Prohibited pleadings, motions and petitions in summary procedure (Bar 2004); civil and criminal case ............................................................................................. 42 SYNOPSIS OF THE CRIMINAL LITIGATION PROCESS Initial contact with the criminal justice system ......................................................................... 43 Filing of the information or complaint and other processes .................................................................................................................... 47 Implied institution of the civil action .......................................................................................... 48 Availment of provisional remedies ............................................................................................ 49 Bail .................................................................................................................................................. 49 Arraignment; bill of particulars; suspension of arraignment ............................................................................................................... 50 Quashal of complaint or information......................................................................................... 51

XXV

Pre-trial................................................................................................................................ Trial; demurrer.................................................................................................................... Judgment............................................................................................................................ Post-judgment remedies ................................................................................................. Entry of judgment .............................................................................................................

51 52 53 53 54

Chapter II PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES (RULE 110) I.

INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS

II.

Purpose of a criminal action .............................................................................................. 55 How criminal actions are instituted (Bar 1999)............................................................... 55 Institution of criminal actions in Manila and other chartered cities .................................................................................................. 56 No direct filing in the Regional Trial Court and Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and other chartered cities .................................................................................................................... 56 Effect of the institution of the criminal action on the prescriptive period (Bar 1993) ........................................................................................... 57 Illustration of the above rules............................................................................................ 57 Rule on prescription for violations of special laws and municipal ordinances.................................................................................................. 59 PROSECUTION OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION

III.

Who must prosecute the criminal action; who controls the prosecution (Bar 1990; 2000) ...................................................................... 67 Appearance of a private prosecutor................................................................................. 68 Effect of filing of an independent civil action on the right of the offended party to intervene in the prosecution of the offense................................................................................................. 68 Consequences of the rule that a criminal action is prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor ..................................................................................................... 69 Prosecution of a criminal action in the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court ...................................................................... 74 Prosecution for violation of special laws.................................................... ..................... 74 INTERVENTION OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION Intervention of the offended party................................................................................... 75 When a private prosecutor may prosecute a case even in the absence of the public prosecutor................................................................. 76

xi

IV.

Extent of the authority given to the private prosecutor when duly authorized to prosecute the action ............................................................................................................................. 77 PROSECUTION OF "PRIVATE CRIMES"

V.

Prosecution of adultery and concubinage....................................................................... 77 Prosecution of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness.................................................................................................................. 78 Effect of R.A. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) ............................................................................................................. 78 Prosecution of Defamation................................................................................................ 79 THE COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION Meaning of'complaint' ..................................................................................................... In whose name and against whom filed........................................................................ Meaning of 'information' (Bar 1994,1995,1996) .......................................................... Distinctions between a complaint and an information (Bar 1999)........................................................................................... Infirmity in signature in the information........................................................................ Sufficiency of the complaint or information.................................................................. Test for sufficiency of the complaint or information.................................................... Questioning the insufficiency of the complaint or information ......................................................................................................... Objections as to form........................................................................................................ Date of the commission of the offense.......................................................................... Determination of the nature and character of the crime.................................................... ........................................................ How to state the name of the accused .......................................................................... How to state the name of the offended party who is a natural person................................................................................................... How to state the name of the offended party which is a juridical person.................................................................................................. Rule if the name of the offended party is unknown in offenses against property.................................................................................. Designation of the offense ............................................................................................... Effect of failure to designate the offense by the statute or failure to mention the provision violated...................................................... Effect of failure to specify the correct crime .................................................................. Statement of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances (Bar 2001)............................................................................. Cause of the accusation.................................................................................................... How to state the date of the commission of the offense ................................................................................................ Duplicity of the offense (Bar 2005) .................................................................................

xii

79 80 80 81 81 81 82 82 83 83 84 84 85 85 85 86 87 88 88 92 96 97

VI. VENUE OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS Rule where offense is committed in a train, aircraft or vehicle .................................................................................................................. Rule where offense is committed on board a vessel ................................................... Rule when the offense is covered by Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code ................................................................................................ How to state the place of the commission of the offense........................................................................................................... VII. AMENDMENT OR SUBSITUTION OF THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION Amendment of the information or complaint

99 99 100 100

before plea; no need for leave (Bar 2001; 2002).......................................................... 100 When leave of court is required even if the amendment is made before plea .......................................................................................................... 100 Rule as to amendment made after the plea of the accused.................................................................................................................... 101 When an amendment is formal or substantial (Bar 1997) ........................................................................................................................... 101 Substitution of complaint or information (Bar 2002)............................................................. 104 Distinction between substitution and amendment (Bar 1994) ........................................................................................................................... 104

Chapter III PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION (RULE 111) Implied institution of the civil action with the criminal action.............................................................................................................................. 107 Purposes of the criminal and civil actions................................................................................. 108 Judgment of conviction includes a judgment on the civil liability .................................................................................................................................... 109 Who the real parties in interest are in the civil aspect of the case..................................................................................................................................... 109 Rule applicable.............................................................................................................................. 109 When a civil action may proceed independently; independent civil actions and quasi-delicts (Bar 2005)...................................................................................................................................... 109 Consequences of the independent character of actions under Articles 32,33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code ................................................................... Ill When there is no implied institution of the civil action.......................................................... 112 Reservation of the civil action..................................................................................................... 113 No reservation of the civil action in Batas Pambansa Big. 22 (Bar 2001; 2002) .......................................................................................... 113

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When the separate civil action is suspended ............................................................................114 Consolidation of the civil action with the criminal action ........................................................115 Suspension of the period of prescription ................................................. ................................116 When no reservation is required; when civil action is not suspended.................................................................................................... Counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party claim in a criminal action ................................................................................................................... Rules on filing fees .........................................................................................................................118 Effect of death of the accused on the civil action ......................................................................118 Novation: extinguishment of criminal liability ..........................................................................120 Effect of acquittal or the extinction of the penal action on the civil action or civil liability .................................................................... Effect of payment of the civil liability ..........................................................................................124 Effect of judgment in the civil case absolving the defendant.................................................................................................................... Subsidiary liability of employer....................................................................................................125 Concept of a prejudicial question (Bar 1999).......................................................................... 125 Reason for the principle ................................................................................................................126 Requisites for a prejudicial question (Bar 1999)................................................................ ....... 126 Effect of the existence of a prejudicial question; suspension of the criminal action (Bar 1995; 1999; 2010).............................................................................................. . Suspension does not include dismissal................................................................................. 129 Where to file the petition for suspension ..................................................................................129 Case illustrations ............................................................................................................................130

116 117

120

124

128

Chapter IV PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION Nature of preliminary investigation; purpose (Bar 1985; 1986; 1991; 1998; 2004)................................................................................ Nature of the right to a preliminary investigation ....................................................................145 Right to a preliminary investigation; waivable .......................................................................... 150 Preliminary investigation vs. preliminary examination (preliminary inquiry) ......................................................................................................... Probable cause in preliminary investigation.............................................................................. 150 Kinds of determination of probable cause ................................................................................ 152 Cases requiring a preliminary investigation; when not required (Bar 2004)........................................................................................................... Procedure for cases not requiring a preliminary investigation....................................................................................................................... Direct filing with the prosecutor .................................................................................................. 155 Direct filing with the Municipal Trial Court ................................................................................156

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143

150

154 155

When preliminary investigation is not required even if the offense is one which normally requires a preliminary investigation......................................................................................................... 157 Person arrested lawfully without a warrant may ask for a preliminary investigation................................................................................................... 158 Bail for a person lawfully arrested during the preliminary investigation............................................................................................................ 159 Questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation..................................................................... 160 Absence of preliminary investigation; effect on jurisdiction of the court............................................................................................................... 162 Absence of preliminary investigation; not a ground for motion to quash .................................................................................................................... 162 Inquest proceedings.................................................................................................................................. 162 Possible options of the inquest prosecutor........................................................................................... 163 The inquest must pertain to the offense for which the arrest was made ................................................................................................................... 164 Who may conduct preliminary investigation and determine existence of probable cause....................................................................................................... 168 The procedure for preliminary investigation must be strictly followed ...................................................................................................................... 171 Initial steps in preliminary investigation; filing of the complaint for preliminary investigation................................................................................... 174 Dismissal of the complaint or issuance of a subpoena........................................................................ 175 Filing of counter-affidavit by the respondent; no motion to dismiss ...................................................................................................................................... 176 Action to be taken if the respondent does not submit his counter-affidavit .................................................................................................................... 176 Clarificatory hearing if necessary; no right of cross examination .......................................................... ...................................................................... 177 Determination by the investigating officer............................................................................................ 177 Discretion of prosecutor in filing of a criminal complaint or information (Bar 1999)........................................................................................ 177 Resolution of investigating prosecutor; certification of preliminary investigation ....................................................................................................... 178 Effect of the absence of the required certification (Bar 1998)...................................................................................................................................... 179 Forwarding of the records of the case for action; need for approval before filing or dismissal ...................................................................................... 179 Rule when recommendation for dismissal is disapproved ................................................................ 179 Motion for reconsideration ..................................................................................................................... 180 Appeals to the Secretary of Justice; filing a petition for review...................................................................................................................................... 180 Rules of Court provisions when resolution is reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice .................................................................................... 183 XXV

Power of the Secretary of Justice to reverse resolutions of prosecutors.......................................................................................................... 183 Assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice; petition for review under Rule 43 not allowed; Petition for certiorari under Rule 65.................................................................................... 184 Appeal to the Office of the President.................................................................................................... 187 Appeals under Rule 43 and Rule 45 ...................................................................................................... 189 Records supporting the information or complaint filed in court .................................................................................................................................. 189 Action of the judge upon the filing of the complaint or information .............................................................................................................................. 189 When warrant of arrest is not necessary ................................................................................191' Withdrawal of the information already filed in court (Bar 1990; 2003) ........................................................................................................................... 192 Some judicial pronouncements on preliminary investigation ................................................................................................................................. 196

Chapter V ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE I. ARREST (RULE 113) Arrest; how arrest made................................................................................................... Requisites for the issuance of a warrant of arrest........................................................ Preliminary inquiry (examination) versus preliminary investigation ...................................................................................... Method of arrest with a warrant; warrant need not be in possession of the officer ....................................................................... No unnecessary violence ................................................................................................. Authority to summon assistance .................................................................................... When person to be arrested is inside a building........................................................... When a warrantless arrest is lawful (Bar 1988; 1989; 1996; 1997; 2000; 2004; 2010) ............................................... Who may make warrantless arrest; duty of officer; citizen's arrest.......................................................................................................... The basis of the in flagrante delicto exception; requisites ................................................................................................................. Existence of an overt act of a crime in the presence of the person making the arrest........................................................................... The hot pursuit exception (Bar 1997; 2004) ................................................................. Method of arrest without a warrant ............................................................................. Time of making an arrest................................................................................................. Rights of a person arrested (R.A. 7438) ......................................................................... xvi

201 202 208 209 210 210 210 211 212 213 214 220 222 223 223

Custodial investigation; expanded concept .................................................................. Penalties under R.A. 7438................................................................................................. Effect of an illegal arrest on jurisdiction of the court .............................................................................................................. Effect of admission to bail on objections to an illegal arrest.............................................................................................................. Waiver of the illegality of the arrest; effect of illegal arrest (Bar 2000; 2001)................................................................................ Persons not subject to arrest ...........................................................................................

224 224 224 225 225 227

II. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (RULE 126) Nature of search warrant (Bar 1994).............................................................................. The Constitutional provision............................................................................................ Arrest distinguished from search and seizure............................................................... Definition of a search warrant under the Rules............................................................ Application for a search warrant; where to file ............................................................. Search warrants involving heinous crimes and others................................................................................................................ Ex parte application for a search warrant.................................................................. Property subject of a search warrant ............................................................................. Requisites for the issuance of a search warrant ........................................................... Probable cause in search warrants................................................................................. Probable cause to arrest and probable cause to search................................................................................................................... How the examination shall be conducted by the judge... Particular description of place or person ....................................................................... Particular description of the items to be seized; general warrants (Bar 2005)..................................................................... Ownership of property seized not required.................................................................. Extent of the search .......................................................................................................... Search of third persons not named in the warrant...................................................... Issuance and form of the search warrant...................................................................... Duration of the validity of a search warrant ................................................................. Time of making the search................................................................................................ Manner of making the search ......................................................................................... Rule if the officer is refused admittance; "knock and announce rule"................................................................................................ Duties of the officer after the search and seizure; delivery and inventory ........................................................................................... Duty of the judge; return and other proceedings......................................................... Duty of the custodian of the log book............................................................................ Objection to issuance or service of a warrant............................................................... Where to file a motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence ......................................................................................... xvii

228 229 230 231 231 231 233 233 234 235 238 239 241 245 251 252 253 253 254 254 254 255 256 256 257 257 258

Who may assail the issuance of a search warrant ....................................................... Petition for certiorari for unwarranted quashal of a search warrant................................................................................................. Exceptions to the search warrant requirement (Bar 1988; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2008)...................................................................... Search incident to a lawful arrest (Bar 2003) ............................................................... Parameters of a search incident to a lawful arrest; immediate possession and control rule.............................................................. Searches of moving vehicles............................................................................................ Check points....................................................................................................................... Buy bust operations; warrant not needed (Bar 2003)................................................. Entrapment and instigation............................................................................................. Applicable tests in a buy-bust operation; adoption of the 'objective test' ............................................................................. Effect of absence of prior surveillance before a buy-bust operation................................................................................................. Effect of absence of record in police blotter.................................................................. Plain view doctrine (Bar 2007; 2008).............................................................................. The 'inadvertence' requirement under the plain view doctrine........................................................................................................... Other cases......................................................................................................................... Terry searches or stop and frisk; history of the doctrine (Bar 1995; 2003) ...................................................................................... Summary of the Terry doctrine....................................................................................... Terry search vs. a search incident to a lawful arrest............................................................................................................. Bond to ensure the return of the seized items ............................................................. Consented Searches.......................................................................................................... Effect of an illegal search and seizure; fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine (Bar 2005) .......................................................... Civil damages; criminal liability........................................................................................ Authority of the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judge re search warrants in Manila and Quezon City......................................................................................................

258 259 260 262 263 270 271 273 274 275 277 278 278 283 284 290 293 296 297 298 298 300

300

Chapter VI BAIL (RULE 114) Meaning, nature and purpose of bail (Bar 1998)....................................................................... 302 Constitutional basis of the right to bail....................................................................................... 304 Bail in the military .............................. . .......................................................................................... 306 Bail in extradition proceedings .............................................................................................................. 306 Exception to the "no bail rule" in extradition proceedings ...................................................... 308

xviii

Purganan case re-examined..........................................................................................................309 Bail in deportation proceedings....................................................................................................310 Who furnishes the bail ...................................................................................................................312 Obligation and right of the bondsman; arrest without a warrant ............................................................................................................. 312 The applicant for bail must be in custody....................................................................................313 Bail to guarantee appearance of witnesses (Bar 1999).............................................................315 Bail for those not yet charged .......................................................................................................315 Effects of failure to appear at the trial......................................................................................... 316 Court cannot require arraignment before the grant of bail......................................................................................................................... 317 Forms of bail (Bar 1999) .................................................................................................................320 Guidelines in fixing the amount of bail (Bar 1999) .................................................................... 323 Duration of the bail.........................................................................................................................324 No release or transfer of person in custody; exceptions...........................................................325 When bail is not required ..............................................................................................................325 When bail is not allowed ...............................................................................................................327 When bail is a matter of right (Bar 1999; 2006; 2008)...............................................................328 Remedy when bail is denied ........................................................................................................ 329 When bail is a matter of discretion (Bar 1999; 2006; 2008) ...................................................................................................... 329 Where application for bail is to be filed when bail is a matter of discretion and after conviction by the Regional Trial Court ........................................................................................................... 331 When application for bail after conviction by the RTC shall be denied ................................................................................................................... 332 Bail pending appeal where penalty imposed exceeds six years ............................................................................................................................... 333 Hearing of application for bail in offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment; burden of proof in bail application.................................................................................. 334 Duties of the trial judge in a petition for bail in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death............................................................................................................................... 337 Evidence in bail hearing are automatically reproduced at the trial ............................................................................................................................ 339 Capital offenses ...............................................................................................................................339 Effect of Republic Act No. 9346 on the graduation of penalties ......................................................................................................................... 339 Where application or petition for bail may be filed (Bar 2002) ................................................................................................................... 341 Increase or reduction of bail ......................................................................................................... 343 Bail for accused originally released without bail ........................................................................343

xix

Forfeiture of bail ............................................................................................................................ 343 Cancellation of the bail; remedy ................................................................................................. 344 Application for or admission to bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation........................... 345

Chapter VII RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (RULE 115) Rights of the accused at the trial (Bar 1992; 1996; 1998; 2004) ........................................................................................... 347 Presumption of innocence (Bar 2005) ........................................................................................ 348 Prima facie presumptions of guilt................................................................................................ 349 Proof beyond reasonable doubt.................................................................................................. 351 Prosecution must rest on its own merits.................................................................................... 354 Effect of failure to identify the perpetrator ................................................................................ 355 Failure to comply with post-seizure procedures set by law ............................................................................................................................ 357 The equipoise rule.......................................................................................................................... 359 Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation.... 360 Right to counsel of the accused and of persons arrested, detained or under custodial investigation; Republic Act No. 7438 (Bar 1990; 1991; 1998; 2002) ................................................... 368 Meaning of custodial investigation; extended meaning.......................................................... 369 Rights of persons under custodial investigation; custodial investigation report.......................................................................................... 369 Right to choose a counsel is not plenary; right may be waived................................................................................................................... 372 Competent and independent counsel....................................................................................... 373 Right to counsel in administrative cases..................................................................................... 376 Extrajudicial confessions; rights of persons under custodial investigation (Bar 2006)................................................................................... 377 Right to speedy trial; speedy disposition of cases (Bar 1996; 2002; 2007)..................................................................................................... 381 When right to speedy disposition of cases is violated .............................................................. 383 Purpose of time limits set by law or the rules; principle of speedy trial is a relative term ...................................................................... 388 Remedy for a violation of the right to speedy trial.................................................................... 390 Factors for granting continuance ................................................................................................. 391 Guidelines to determine violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases; balancing test ........................................................... 391 Approaches to speedy trial ........................................................................................................... 393

XXV

The privilege against self-incrimination (Bar 1996; 1998; 2004; 2005) ........................................................................................... The privilege applies only to natural persons............................................................................. The privilege protects a person from testimonial compulsion or evidence of a communicative nature .................................................. Force re-enactments ...................................................................................................................... Meaning of compulsion................................................................................................................. Writing exemplars or samples...................................................................................................... Questions which the witness may refuse to answer ................................................................ Privilege extends to lawyers advising a witness to invoke the privilege ...................................................................................................... Persons who are mere custodians of documents cannot claim the privilege ................................................................................................ Proceedings in which the privilege may be asserted ................................................................ Distinctions between the claim of the privilege by an accused and by a mere witness ...................................................................................... Waiver of the privilege................................................................................................................... The privilege will not apply when witness is given immunity from prosecution ............................................................................................ Immunity statutes; examples....................................................................................................... The right to defend himself; right to be heard ........................................................................... The right to testify as a witness..................................................................................................... The right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him ......................................................................................................................... Right to use testimony of a deceased witness ........................................................................... Right to compulsory process............................................................ ........................................... Right to appeal ................................................................................................................................

396 399 400 405 406 406 410 411 412 413 414 416 416 418 421 422 423 425 425 426

Chapter VIII ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA (RULE 116)

A. BASIC CONCEPTS

Meaning and importance of arraignment (Bar 2007) ................................................. Duty of the court before arraignment ........................................................................... Options of the accused before arraignment and plea................................................. Plea made before a court with no jurisdiction.............................................................. Arraignment under an amended information; substituted information .........................................................................................

428 429 429 432 432

B. HOW ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA ARE MADE Where arraignment is to be made .................................................................................. How arraignment is made ................................................................................................ When arraignment is to be made....................................................................................

xxi

433 433 433

Arraignment after submission of the case for decision.............................................................................................................. Record of arraignment...................................................................................................... Presence of the accused ................................................................................................... Presence of the offended party....................................................................................... When a plea of'not guilty' shall be entered (Bar 1992; 1993; 1996)........................................................................................... Plea of guilty is a judicial confession; effect on aggravating circumstances ................................................................................... Exception to the admission of aggravating circumstances .................................................... ................................................... Plea of guilty to a lesser offense; plea bargaining (Bar 1995; 2002) ...................................................................................................... Requisites for a plea of guilty to a lesser offense .......................................................... Plea of guilty to a lesser offense after arraignment; plea bargaining during the trial proper ............................................................... No need for amendment of information/complaint................................................... When plea of guilty to a lesser offense is not mitigating ......................................................................................................... Plea of guilty to a capital offense (Bar 1995).................................................................. Meaning of "searching inquiry" ...................................................................................... Plea of guilty to a non-capital offense............................................................................. Improvident plea of guilty ................................................................................................ Production or inspection of material evidence .............................................................

434 436 436 436 436 439 440 440 441 442 442 443 443 445 448 448 449

Chapter IX MOTION TO QUASH (RULE 117) Time for filing the motion to quash........................................................................................... 451 Form and contents of the motion to quash............................................................................. 451 Motion to quash is not a demurrer to evidence; distinctions.................................................................................................................................... 451 Court shall consider only those grounds stated in the motion................................................................................................................................ 453 Motion to quash; grounds for a motion to quash (Bar 1987; 1990; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2009; 2010) ................................................................................................................................... 453 Execution of an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for a motion to quash ................................................................................................................. 454 Absence of probable cause not a ground to quash an information ............................................................................................................................. 455 Matters of defense are not grounds for a motion to quash......................................................................................................................................... 455

xxii

Absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash an information................................................................................................... 455 Test in appreciating a motion to quash................................................................................................. 456 Effect of failure to assert any ground of a motion to quash ........................................................................................................................................ 457 Grounds not waived ................................................................................................................................ 458 Denial of a motion to quash ................................................................................................................... 458 When court shall order the amendment of the information or complaint................................................................................................. 459 Order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution; exceptions (Bar 1994) ...................................................................... 459 Double jeopardy....................................................................................................................................... 460 Effects of double jeopardy; on criminal and civil aspects ........................................................................................................................... 462 Double jeopardy; requisites.................................................................................................................... 465 Court must have competent jurisdiction.............................................................................................. 466 Curing an erroneous acquittal; grave abuse discretion of amounting to lack jurisdiction ................................................................................................... 469 Preliminary investigation; double jeopardy not applicable............................................................................................................................... 474 Res judicata and double jeopardy; res judicata in prison grey (Bar 2010).;........................................................................................................... 475 Administrative cases; double jeopardy not applicable ...................................................................... 475 Valid complaint or information (Bar 2002; 2004) ................................................................... 477 Accused should have pleaded to the charge (should have been arraigned) (Bar 2002; 2003).................................................................................... 479 The accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or terminated without his express consent ..................................................................................................................... 482 Dismissal or termination must be without the express consent of the accused ............................................................................................................... 485 Dismissals equivalent to acquittal even with the consent of the accused; speedy trial; demurrer to evidence............................................................... 487 Double jeopardy in quasi offenses ........................................................................................................ 491 When double jeopardy shall not apply despite a prior conviction (Bar 2005) .................................................................................................................. 495 Meaning of same offense; when not the same (Bar 1993; 1994)........................................................................................................................... 496 Provisional dismissal; requisites (Bar 2003).......................................................................................... 503 Time bar rule; when provisional dismissal becomes permanent.................................................................................................................................... 506 Effect of People v. Lacson............................................................................................. .......................... 507 Withdrawal of information distinguished from a motion to dismiss ........................................................................................................................ 510 xxiii

Chapter X PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE (RULES 118-119) A.

PRE-TRIAL (RULE 118) (Bar 1986; 1989; 2004; 2008)

B.

Courts in which pre-trial is mandatory.......................................................................... Matters to be considered during the pre-trial; purposes.................................................................................................................. When pre-trial shall be held............................................................................................. Non-appearance in the pre-trial conference; consequences.......................................................................................................... Duty of the Branch Clerk of Court ................................................................................... Recording of the minutes................................................................................................. Duty of the judge before the pre-trial conference ....................................................... Duty of the judge when plea bargaining is agreed upon; prosecution and offended party agree to the plea .................................................................................................... Duty of the judge when plea bargaining fails................................................................ Asking questions during the pre-trial ............................................................................. Pre-trial agreements; signing of admissions made ...................................................... Pre-trial order ..................................................... . ............................................................. Pre-trial in a civil case vs. pre-trial in a criminal case ............................................................................................................ Effect of pre-trial order...................................................................................................... Judicial dispute resolution (JDR); purposes ................................................................... Stages in the judicial proceeding with JDR; confidentiality.......................................................................................................... Cases subject to mediation for JDR................................................................................. Salient features of the suggested JDR process .............................................................. Court-annexed mediation guidelines............................................................................. Discovery procedures in criminal cases.......................................................................... TRIAL (RULE 119)

511 511 512 512 513 513 513

513 514 514 514 515 515 516 517 517 518 519 521 524

When trial shall commence ...................................................................................................... 526 Summary of periods .................................................................................................................. 527 Time to prepare for trial ............................................................................................................ 527 Effect of not bringing the accused to trial within the prescribed period....................................................................................................... 528 Delays to be excluded from computing the period for commencement of the trial; some examples ................................................................................................................. 528 When delay or suspension of trial is justified by reason of the absence of a witness........................................................................... 529

xxiv

Continuous trial.................................................................................................................. Trial period.......................................................................................................................... Postponement or continuance ....................................................................................... Factors to be considered for granting continuances or postponements ......................................................................... Prohibited grounds for a continuance............................................................................ Conditional examination of witnesses even before trial................................................................................................................ How to secure appearance of a material witness (Bar 1994; 1999) ...................................................................................................... Discharge of accused to be a state witness; requisites (Bar 1988; 1990; 1994; 2006)............................................................... Evidence adduced during the discharge hearing...................................................................................................................... Effect of discharge of an accused to be a state witness; acquittal........................................................................................... Mistake in charging the proper offense ......................................................................... Order of trial ....................................................................................................................... Modification of the order of trial; reverse trial (Bar 2007) ................................................................................................................. Reopening of the proceedings......................................................................................... Trial in absentia (Bar 1998)............................................................................................... Instances when the presence of the accused is required................................................................................................................. Some rules on witness' credibility................................................................................... Comments and questions of the judge during the trial...................................................................................................................... Corpus delicti in criminal cases; murder or homicide .............................................................................................................. Lack of formal offer of evidence during the trial........................................................... C. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE (RULE 119)

530 530 531 531 531 531 532 533 534 534 534 535 535 535 536 537 538 538 539 540

Demurrer to evidence (Bar 1991; 1994; 1996; 2001; 2003; 2004; 2007; 2009)................................................................................................... 540 Demurrer to evidence with leave of court (Bar 2003) ........................................................................................................................... 541 Demurrer to evidence without leave of court ........................................................................ 542 Not every motion to dismiss is a demurrer to evidence......................................................................................................................... 543 Granting of demurrer is an acquittal ........................................................................................ 544 Demurrer to evidence in a civil case vs. demurrer to evidence in a criminal case (Bar 2007)....................................................................... 545

XXV

Chapter XI JUDGMENT, REMEDIES AFTER JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES I.

JUDGMENT (RULE 120)

II.

Meaning of judgment ...................................................................................................... Requisites of a judgment ................................................................................................. Contents of a judgment of conviction; contents of judgment of acquittal ........................................................................................ Rule when there are two or more offenses in a single information or complaint (duplicitous complaint or information) .................................................................................... Judgment rendered by judge who did not hear the case..................................................................................................................... Variance doctrine; variance between the allegation and proof (Bar 1993; 2004)................................................................................... When an offense includes or is included in another.................................................... Variance in the mode of the commission of the offense... Promulgation of judgment (Bar 1997)........................................................................... How accused is to be notified of the promulgation..................................................... Rule if the accused fails to appear in the promulgation of judgment.................................................................................... Modification of judgment (Bar 1989) ............................................................................ When judgment becomes final ...................................................................................... Entry of judgment ............................................................................................. ............... NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION (RULE 121)

III.

546 546 548

549 550 550 551 551 552 552 553 554 554 554

Filing a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration ....................................................................................................... 554 Grounds for a new trial .................................................................................................... 555 Requisites for newly discovered evidence .................................................................... 555 Grounds for reconsideration of the judgment ............................................................. 556 Form of the motions; notice............................................................................................ 556 Notice of the motion ........................................................................................................ 556 When hearing of the motion is required....................................................................... 557 Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration ........................................................ 557 The Neypes rule ............................................................................................................ 557 APPEALS (RULES 122,124,125) (Bar 1991; 1992; 1993; 1998) Appeal not a natural right.......................................................................................................... 558 Who may appeal......................................................................................................................... 559 Subject matter for review on appeal ....................................................................................... 560

xxvi

Change of theory on appeal ............................................................................................ Factual findings; credibility of witnesses......................................................................... Where to appeal ................................................................................................................ How to appeal .................................................................................................................... When appeal is to be taken.............................................................................................. Service of notice of appeal................................................................................................ Transmission of the papers to appellate court (RTC).................................................... Withdrawal of appeal ....................................................................................................... Appeal not mooted by accused's release on parole..................................................... Effect of appeal by any of several accused (Bar 1998)................................................. Appeal from the civil aspect ............................................................................................. Period to apply for probation........................................................................................... Stay of execution............................................................................................................... Power of the Court of Appeals to receive evidence ..................................................... Dismissal of appeal by the Court of Appeals................................................................. Ground for reversal of judgment or its modification.................................................... Review of decisions of the Court of Appeals.................................................................. Applicability of the rules on appeal in the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.............................................................. Rule if the opinion of the Supreme Court en banc is equally divided .................................................................................. When preliminary attachment is available....................................................................

561 561 563 564 565 566 566 566 567 567 568 568 569 569 569 570 570 570 570 572

IV. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES Availability of provisional remedies ................................................................................

571

Synopsis of Selected Cases............................................................................................................

574

Criminal Procedure Aspect of the Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases....................................................................................................

600

Case Index .......................................................................................................................................

609

xxvii

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS I. BASIC CONCEPTS Concept of criminal procedure 1. Criminal procedure treats of the series of processes by which the criminal laws are enforced and by which the State prosecutes persons who violate the penal laws. In the clear language of the Court, criminal procedure "regulates the steps by which one who committed a crime is to be punished" (People v. Lacson, 400 SCRA 267). While criminal laws define crimes and prescribe punishment for such crimes, criminal procedure lays down the processes by which an offender is made to answer for the violation of the criminal laws. 2. Criminal procedure is "a generic term to describe the network of laws and rules which governs the procedural administration of justice" (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 1979). The procedure starts with the initial contact of the alleged lawbreaker with the justice machinery including the investigation of the crime and concludes either with a judgment exonerating the accused or the final imposition of a penalty against him. 3. The enforcement of the criminal laws of the state inevitably leads to governmental intrusions into an individual's zones of privacy and how these intrusions can be reconciled with constitutional and statutory tenets protecting individual rights is an inescapable theme tackled in criminal procedure. Thus, in the prosecution for the violation of the penal laws,

l

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

criminal procedure has the imposing task of balancing clashing societal interests primarily between those of the government and those of the individual. Hence, a common thread among innumerable treatises on the subject is the tendency to describe criminal procedure in relation to its ultimate goal of harmonizing the governmental functions of maintaining and promoting law and order law while at the same time protecting the constitutional rights of its citizens. The adversarial or accusatorial system 1. The system of procedure in our jurisdiction is accusatorial or adversarial. It contemplates two contending parties before the court which hears them impartially and renders judgment only after trial (Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52). The system has a two-sided structure consisting of the prosecution and the defense where each side tries to convince the court that its position is the correct version of the truth. In this system, the accusation starts with a formal indictment called in our jurisdiction as a complaint or an information, the allegations of which must be proven by the government beyond reasonable doubt. The government and the accused present their evidence before the court which shall decide either on acquittal or conviction of the accused. In its decision-making process, that court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The court in this system therefore, has a passive role and relies largely on the evidence presented by both sides to the action in order to reach a verdict. 2. The adversarial system should be distinguished from the inquisitorial system where the court plays a very active role and is not limited to the evidence presented before it. The court may utilize evidence gathered outside the court and a judge or a group of judges under this system actively participates in the gathering of facts and evidence instead of mere passively receiving information or evidence from the parties. The judge steers the course of the proceedings by directing and supervising the gathering of the evidence and the questioning of the witnesses to the case. The counsels in the

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

3

inquisitorial system have a less active role than in the adversarial system. Liberal interpretation of the rules 1. The rules on criminal procedure, being parts of the Rules of Court, shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding" (Sec. 6, Rule 1, Rules of Court). 2. In a case, petitioner's former counsel erroneously appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals instead of to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner pleaded that Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court which mandated the dismissal of cases erroneously appealed to the Court of Appeals be relaxed and the Court 6f Appeals be directed to forward the records of the case to the Sandiganbayan. The Supreme Court, in granting petitioner's prayer held that since the appeal involved a criminal case and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty due to a procedural lapse is great, a relaxation of the Rules was warranted. The rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided (Cenita M. Cariaga v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180010, July 30, 2010). Due process; mandatory Due process in criminal proceedings is mandatory and indispensable and cannot be met without the proverbial "law which hears before it condemns and proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." (Quotation from Albert vs. University Publishing House, G.R. No. L-19118, January 30,1965) Monte v. Savellano, Jr., 287 SCRA 245, enumerates the requirements of due process in a criminal proceeding, to wit: (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

4

(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c)

that the accused is given opportunity to be heard; and

(d)

that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. A. Requisites For The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction

Requisites A reading of jurisprudence and treatises on the matter discloses the following basic requisites before a court can acquire jurisdiction over criminal cases (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 388 SCRA 72): (a)

Jurisdiction over the subject matter;

(b)

Jurisdiction over the territory; and

(c)

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter versus jurisdiction over the person of the accused 1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter refers to the authority of the court to hear and determine a particular criminal case. One case, Antiporda, Jr. v. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551, mandates that the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of. 2. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused refers to the authority of the court, not over the subject matter of the criminal litigation, but over the person charged. This kind of jurisdiction requires that "the person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court" (Antiporda v. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551; Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 388 SCRA 72; Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 300 SCRA 367).

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

5

Jurisdiction over the territory; venue in criminal cases (Bar 1997) 1. This element requires that the offense must have been committed within the court's territorial jurisdiction (An- tiporda, Jr. v. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551). This fact is to be determined by the facts alleged in the complaint or information as regards the place where the offense charged was committed (Fullero v. People, 533 SCRA 97). In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where anyone of the essential ingredients took place. Hence, if any one of these elements is proven to have occurred, let us say, in Pasay City, the proper court in that city has jurisdiction (Barrameda v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 477). 2. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Hence, for jurisdiction to be acquired by a court in a criminal case, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. It is in that court where the criminal action shall be instituted (Sec. 15 [a], Rule 110, Rules of Court; Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9,2009). 3. It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element of jurisdiction, and that the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. The rule that the criminal action be instituted and tried in the court of the territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred is a fundamental principle, the purpose of which is not to compel the defendant to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place (Campanano, Jr. v. Datuin, 536 SCRA 471, October 17, 2007; Bonifacio, et al. v. Regional Trial Court ofMakati, et al., G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010).

6

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

4. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory and if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction (Macasaet v. People, 452 SCRA 255; Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009). It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element of jurisdiction, and that the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or the information (Campanano, Jr. v. Datuin, 536 SCRA 471; Macasaet v. People, 452 SCRA 255). 5. The concept of venue in actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional — for jurisdiction to be acquired in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court (Isip v. People, 525 SCRA 735). Similarly, it has been held that the RTC of Manila has no authority to issue a search warrant for offenses committed in Cavite (Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Supergreen, Inc., 518 SCRA 750). When a court has jurisdiction to try offenses not committed within its territorial jurisdiction The rule that the offense must be prosecuted and tried in the place where the same was committed admits of certain exceptions. 1. Where the offense was committed under the circumstances enumerated in Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is cognizable before Philippine courts even if committed outside of the territory of the Philippines. In this case, the offense shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed (Sec. 15[d], Rule 110, Rules of Court). Under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be enforced not only within

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

7

the Philippine Archipelago but also outside of its jurisdiction against offenders who: Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship; Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these Islands of the obligations and securities mentioned above; While being public officers and employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations. Included in crimes against national security are the crimes of (i) treason, (ii) conspiracy and proposal to commit treason, (iii) misprision of treason, (iv) espionage, (v) inciting to war and giving motives for reprisal, (vi) violation of neutrality, (vii) correspondence with hostile country, and (viii) flight to enemy's country (Articles 114-121, Revised Penal Code). Crimes against the law of nations are piracy and mutiny described under Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code and qualified piracy under Article 123 thereof.

2. Where the Supreme Court, pursuant to its constitutional powers orders a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice (Section 5[4J, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines). 3. Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle in the course of its trip, the criminal action need not be instituted in the actual place where the offense was committed. It may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where said train, aircraft, or vehicle passed during its trip. The crime

8

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

may also be instituted and tried in the place of departure and arrival (Section 15[b], Rule 110, Rules of Court). 4. Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried not necessarily in the place of the commission of the crime. It may be brought and tried in the court of the first port of entry, or in the municipality or territory where the vessel passed during the voyage (Section 15[c], Rule 110, Rules of Court). 5. Where the case is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the jurisdiction of which depends upon the nature of the offense and the position of the accused (Subido v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122641, January 20, 1997), the offense need not be tried in the place where the act was committed but where the court actually sits in Quezon City. Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 8249 (An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan), when the greater convenience of the accused and of the witnesses, or other compelling considerations so require, a case originating from one geographical region may be heard in another geographical region. For this purpose, the presiding justice shall authorize any divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila and, where the interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial boundaries of the Philippines. 6. Where the offense is written defamation, the criminal action need not necessarily be filed in the RTC of the province or city where the alleged libelous article was printed and first published. It may be filed in the province or city where the offended party held office at the time of the commission of the offense if he is a public officer, or in the province or city where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense in case the offended party is a private individual (Article 360, Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 1289 and Republic Act No. 4363; Bar 1995J. 7. The case of Agbayani v. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699, restated Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (written defamation) as follows:

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

9

(a) Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action maybe filed in the Court of First Instance (RTC) of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. (b) If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance (RTC) of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. (c) If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance (RTC) of Manila. (d) If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance (RTC) of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense (Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009). One recent case held that if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass. In a case pertaining to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet, the place where the material was first accessed cannot be equated with "printing and first publication." This interpretation would, said the Court, "spawn the very ills that the amendment to Art. 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the website's author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the

10

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website. For the Court to hold that the amended information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the x x x website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed" (Bonifacio, et al. v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, et al., G.R. No. 184800, May 5,2010). Merely alleging that "the newspaper is a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" did not establish that the said publication was first printed and first published in Iloilo City (Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9,2009). Also, merely alleging that the offended party is a physician and medical practitioner in a particular place does not clearly and positively indicate that said person is residing in such place at the time of the commission of the crime. One who transacts business in a place and spends a considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein (Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9,2009). B. Criminal Jurisdiction Over The Subject Matter Jurisdiction over the subject matter 1. Generally, jurisdiction is the right to act or the power and authority to hear and determine a cause — it is a question of law (Gomez v. Montalban, 548 SCRA 693). The term imports the power and authority to hear and determine issues of facts and of law, the power to inquire into the facts, to apply the law and to pronounce the judgment (21 C.J.S., Courts, § 2, 1990). Specifically, criminal jurisdiction is the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it (Antiporda, Jr. v. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551). 2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

11

proceedings in question belongs (Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil 484). It is the power to deal with the general subject involved in the action, and means not simply jurisdiction over the particular case then occupying the attention of the court but jurisdiction of the class of cases to which the particular case belongs (21 C.J.S., Courts, § 10,1990). How jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred 1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law (Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121106, February 20,2000; Magno v. People, G.R. No. 171542, April 6, 2011). It is the law that confers jurisdiction and not the rules (Padunan v. DARAB, G.R. No. 132163, January 28, 2003). The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of law shall be inquired into (Soller v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 144261-62, May 9, 2001). When the law confers jurisdiction, that conferment must be clear. It cannot be presumed. It must clearly appear from the statute or will not be held to exist (De Jesus v. Garcia, 19 SCRA554). 2. Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the will of the parties nor can it be acquired or diminished by any act of the parties. In determining whether or not a case lies within or outside the jurisdiction of a court, reference to the applicable statute on the matter is indispensable (Tolentino v. Social Security Commission, 138 SCRA 428; De la Cruz v. Moya, 160 SCRA 838). 3. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law (Fukuzume v. People, 474 SCRA 570). 4. Since jurisdiction is conferred by law, it is not conferred by mere administrative policy of any trial court (Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173).

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

How jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined 1. While jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law, jurisdiction over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. Hence, "(I)n order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint or information must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by law for such acts fall within the jurisdiction of the court in which the criminal action is filed. If the facts set out in the complaint or information are sufficient to show that the court has jurisdiction, then that court indeed has jurisdiction" (Mobilia Products v. Umezawa, G.R. No. 149357, March 4,2005). 2. The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information and once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case (Macasaet v. People, 452 SCRA 255; Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009). It is the averments in the information which characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried (Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51). 3. "The jurisdiction of the court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence, the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial" (Larson v. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298). It was held however, that if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction (Macasaet v. People, 452 SCRA 255 as cited in Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009). Thus, in criminal cases, the court must examine the complaint for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out and the punishment provided by law for such act,

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

13

fall within the jurisdiction of the court (U.S. v. Jimenez, 41 Phil. 1; U.S. v. Mallari, 24 Phil. 366). 4. In cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, both the nature of the offense and the position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non before the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case (Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 312 SCRA 77). 5. In complex crimes, jurisdiction is with the court having jurisdiction to impose the maximum and most serious penalty imposable on the offense forming part of the complex crime (Cuyos v. Garcia, 160 SCRA 302; Bar 2003;. Statute applicable to a criminal action 1. It is a hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and not during the arraignment of the accused (Palana v. People, 534 SCRA 296, September 28, 2007). 2. The statute in force at the time of the institution of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter and not at the time of its commission even if the penalty that may be imposed at the time of its commission is less and does not fall under the court's jurisdiction (People v. Logon, 185 SCRA 442; People v. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212). Other decisions have similarly and consistently held that it is well established that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action (People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267; Sogod v. Sandiganbayan, 312 SCRA 77; De la Cruz v. Moya, 160 SCRA 838) and not at the time of the commission of the offense (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009; People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010). 3. Where the offense was allegedly committed on or about December 19,1995 and the filing of the information was on May 21,2004, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institu

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

tion of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The applicable law therefore, in the case against the public officer is Presidential Decree 1606 as amended by Republic Act No. 7975 on May 16,1995 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 8249 on February 5,1997 (People v. San- diganbayan and Victoria Amante, G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009). Use of the imposable penalty 1. In determining whether or not the court has jurisdiction over an offense, we consider the penalty which may be imposed upon the accused and not the actual penalty imposed after the trial (People v. Purisima, L-40902, February 18,1976; People v. Savellano, L-39951, September 9,1982). 2. The jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the offense, on the basis of the facts alleged in the information or complaint (People v. Buissan, 105 SCRA 547; People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 341). Principle of adherence of jurisdiction or continuing jurisdiction 1. The jurisdiction of the court is referred to as "continuing" in view of the general principle that once a court has acquired jurisdiction, that jurisdiction continues until the court has done all that it can do in the exercise of that jurisdiction (20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 147, 1965). The jurisdiction once vested, cannot be withdrawn or defeated by a subsequent valid amendment of the information (People v. Chupeco, L-19568, March 31, 1964). It cannot also be lost by a new law amending the rules of jurisdiction (Rilloraza v. Arciaga, L-23848, October 31,1967). For instance, in Flores v. Sumaljag, 290 SCRA 568, the court was held not to have lost jurisdiction over the case involving a public official by the mere fact that the said official

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

15

ceased to be in office during the pendency of the case. The court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. 2. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over a controversy, it shall continue to exercise such jurisdiction until the final determination of the case and it is not affected by the subsequent legislation vesting jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. A recognized exception to this rule is when the statute expressly so provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate upon actions pending before its enactment. However, when no such retroactive effect is provided for, statutes altering the jurisdiction of a court cannot be applied to cases already pending prior to their enactment (People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267; Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 647; Palana v. People, 534 SCRA 296). As a result of the above rule, once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or continuance rests on the sound discretion of the court (Jalandoni v. Drilon, 327 SCRA 107; Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA 292) and even if the prosecution files a motion to withdraw the information, the court may grant or deny the same in the faithful exercise of judicial prerogative (Pilapil v. Garchitorena, 299 SCRA 343). The Court has been steadfast in declaring that when a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the case is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its enactment (Palana v. People, 534 SCRA 296, September 28, 2007). Dismissal on jurisdictional grounds; special appearance 1. The rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter

16

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may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal (Fukuzume v. People, 474 SCRA 570; Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009). 2. A special appearance before the court to challenge the jurisdiction of the court over the person is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver of the objection and is not a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12,2009). Raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the Supreme Court 1. An accused is not precluded from raising the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged because the issue may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law (Fukuzume v. People, 474 SCRA 570; Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9,2009). 2. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Antiporda, Jr. v. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551). After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. While the jurisdiction of a tribunal may be challenged at any time, sound public policy bars one from doing so after their having procured that jurisdiction, speculating on the fortunes of litigation (People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 278). The rule is the same as in civil cases. In Tijam v. Sibong- hanoy, 23 SCRA 29, the Court earlier ruled that a party may be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

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for reasons of public policy as when he initially invokes the jurisdiction of the court and then later on repudiates that same jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of estoppel laid down in Tijam is an exception and not the general rule and the rule still stands that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. Hence, even on appeal, and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case (Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51). "Estoppel in questioning the jurisdiction of the court is only brought to bear when not to do so will subvert the ends of justice. Jurisdiction of courts is the blueprint of our judicial system without which the road to justice would be a confusing maze. Whenever the question of jurisdiction is put to front, courts should not lightly brush aside errors in jurisdiction especially when it is liberty of an individual which is at stake" (Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51). For Tijam v. Sibonghanoy to be applied to a criminal case, the factual circumstances which justified the application of the bar by laches, must be present in the case (Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009 citing Fukuzume v. People, supra). C. Criminal Jurisdiction Over The Person of the Accused (Bar 2008) 1. It was held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant, or his voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court (Valdepehas v. People, 16 SCRA 871; Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 4). As a general rule, seeking affirmative relief is deemed to be a submission to the jurisdiction of the court (Sapugay v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 464). The voluntary submission of the accused to the jurisdiction of the court may be effected

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by filing a motion to quash, appearing for arraignment, participating in the trial or by giving bail (Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633; Antiporda, Jr. v. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551; Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377). 2. The assertion that the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused because the warrant of arrest issued is null and void because no probable cause was found by the court issuing it, cannot be sustained because he posted a bail. The giving or posting of a bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Even if it is conceded that the warrant issued was void, the defendant waived all his rights to object by appearing and giving a bond (Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 300 SCRA 367; Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 677). Note: To be read in relation to Sec. 26 of Rule 114). By submitting oneself to the jurisdiction of the court as shown by entering into a counsel-assisted plea, the active participation in the trial and presenting evidence for the defense, the accused is deemed to have waived his constitutional protection against illegal arrest (People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 177741, August 27,2009). 3. However, not all acts seeking affirmative relief would constitute a voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Making a special appearance in court to question the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused is not a voluntary appearance as when in a criminal case a motion to quash is filed precisely on that ground. There is likewise no submission to the jurisdiction of the court when the accused files a motion to quash the warrant of arrest because it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest (Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31,2006). 4. Being in the custody of the law is not necessarily being under the jurisdiction of the court. "One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

19

by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention" (Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006). D. Injunction To Restrain Criminal Prosecution (Bar 1999) As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With more reason will injunction not lie when the case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. However, in extreme cases, the Court laid the following exceptions: (1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is subjudice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Camanag v. Guerrero, 335 Phil. 945, 970-971 [1997], citing Paderanga v. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86 [1991]; Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183; Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 [1987]; Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 594, 598 [1995] cited

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in Samson v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 123504, December 14, 2000). E. Mandamus To Compel Prosecution (Bar 1999) 1. Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved which shall be issued when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station." The writ of mandamus is not available to control discretion. Neither may it be issued to compel the exercise of discretion. Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine which persons appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However, the moment he finds one to be so liable, it becomes his inescapable duty to charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation, the rule loses its discretionary character and becomes mandatory (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Rogelio Reynaldo and Jose C. Adrandea, G.R. No. 164538, August 9,2010). If despite the sufficiency of the evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the corresponding information against the person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount to a deliberate refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, would gravely abuse his discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime as acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latter's finding and proceeded with the questioned resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of probable cause. To be sure, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse but a case like this calls for the application of an exception (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Rogelio Reynaldo and Jose C. Adrandea, G.R. No. 164538, August 9,2010). 2. "Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investiga

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

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tion. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law" (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Rogelio Reynaldo and Jose C. Adrandea, G.R. No. 164538, August 9,2010). II. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS A. Criminal Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the MTC shall exercise the following criminal jurisdiction: 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction (Batas Pambansa Big. 129, Section 3211); Republic Act No. 7691); 2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other im- posable or accessory penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount (B.P. 129, Sec. 32[2]; R.A. 7691); This rule disregarding the amount of the fine and other accessory penalties in determining jurisdiction applies where the offense is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both but not when the offense is punishable by fine only. Note that the jurisdiction of the MTC is qualified by the phrase "Except in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and of the SandiganbayanThis indicates that the MTC does not at all times have jurisdiction

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over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years if jurisdiction is vested by law either in the RTC or Sandiganbayan. Based on Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, the MTC has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by up to the maximum of prision correccional which shall not exceed six (6) years. There are however, offenses which even if punishable by prision correccional are not cognizable by the MTC because of an express provision of law like libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Under this provision, libel by means of writings or similar means shall be punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from P200 to P6,000 pesos or both. Nevertheless, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the criminal action as well as the civil action for such offense shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the CFI (now RTC). Also, some forms of direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code which are punishable by prision correccional in its medium period, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of P.D. 1606 as amended. Indirect bribery, a felony punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code are likewise cognizable by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of P.D. 1606 as amended. 3. Where the only penalty provided for by law is a fine, the amount thereof shall determine the jurisdiction of the court under the original provisions of B.P. 129 (Sec. 32[2]) which provided that the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses punishable with a fine of not more than Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos; 4. Exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence (B.P. 129, Sec. 32[2]; RA. 7691); 5. Violations of B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) (A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC, March 25,2003);

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

6.

Summary procedure in the following cases: a. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, violations of the rental law; and violations of municipal or city ordinances; b. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (PI,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom; c. Offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos P10,000.00 (The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure [Sec. IB]). 7. Special jurisdiction to decide on applications for bail in criminal cases in the absence of all RTC judges in a province or city (B.P. 129 [Sec. 35]). B. Criminal Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court (RTC) 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (B.P. 129 [Sec. 20]); 2. Appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the MTC within its territorial jurisdiction (B.P. 129 [Sec. 22]); 3. Special jurisdiction to handle exclusively criminal cases as designated by the Supreme Court (B.P. 129 [Sec. 23]); 4. Jurisdiction over criminal cases under specific laws such as: (a) Written defamation (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code); (b) Jurisdiction of designated courts over cases in violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 {RA. No. 9165) as provided under Sec. 90 thereof;

23

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(c) Violations of intellectual property rights [A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC 2003-06-17, Effective July 1, 2003 implementing the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines [R A. 8293]). The public prosecutor has the authority to file a criminal information for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 957 and the Regional Trial Court has the power to hear and adjudicate the action, the penalty being a P20,000.00 fine and imprisonment of not exceeding 10 years or both such fine and imprisonment. This penalty brings the offense within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (Victoria P. Cabral v. Jacinto Uy, et al, G.R. No. 174584, January 22,2010). 5. Jurisdiction in Money Laundering Cases. — The Regional Trial Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all cases on money laundering. Those committed by public officers and private persons who are in conspiracy with such public officers shall be under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (Sec. 5, RA. 9160, Anti-Money Laundering Act of2001). C. Criminal Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (PJ). 1606, RA. 7975 and RA. 8249) 1. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. 1606 as amended and not by R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as amended (Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22,2008). 2. The applicable law provides: u

Section 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (italics supplied)

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25

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsody city treasurer, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations (Note: See People v. Morales, G.R. No. 166355, May 30,2011). (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

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(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection "a" of this section in relation to their office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Note: The Sandiganbayan also exercises civil jurisdiction (Antiporda v. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551). "In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as amended. "The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. "The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. "The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. "In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in governmentowned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them." xxx

3. Prior to R.A. 8249, the law which governed the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was R.A. 7975 amending P.D. 1606. R.A. 7975 conferred jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan over certain specified offenses "where one or more of the principal accused" are officials occupying the positions enumerated in the law. A significant amendment introduced by R.A. 8249 was the removal of the word principal before the word accused thus transforming the phrase to read: "where one or more of the accused" (Sec. 4[a]ofP.D. 1606 as amended). Thus, as the law is now written, one of the accused no longer has to be a principal accused and may simply be an accomplice or an accessory. Also, not all of the accused need be those officials mentioned in the said law. It is sufficient that at least one of them be an official occupying any of the positions enumerated.

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Offenses subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (Bar 1997) 1. The phraseology of the governing law discloses that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is not confined to violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Specifically, the following offenses are subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Section 4[a] of Presidential Decree 1606 as amended). b. Violations of Republic Act No. 1379 or otherwise known as the Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee (Sec. 4[a] of P.D. 1606 as amended). c. Violations of Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (Sec. 4[a] ofP.D. 1606 as amended). These offenses refer to the law on bribery in all its forms including corruption of public officers (Articles 210-212, Revised Penal Code). d. Other offenses or felonies (aside from the above), whether simple or complexed with other crimes, committed by public officials mentioned in letter "a" of Sec. 4 in relation to their office (Please refer to the enumeration of these officials earlier made under the topic 'Criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan' above). The terms "offenses or felonies" in letter "d" above are so broad in meaning and are not restricted to the laws earlier mentioned. These offenses however, must be those committed by officials *in relation to their office." Thus, in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008, the Court declared in no uncertain terms, that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. The court further held that estafa is one of those

CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

felonies and the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction if (a) the offense is committed by a public official or an employee mentioned in Sec. 4, paragraph "a;" and (b) the offense is committed in relation to his office. In another case, the accused argues that the crime of falsification as defined under Articles 171 and 172 of the RPC is not within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. He also points out that nowhere under Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379, or in Title VII, Book II of the RPC is "falsification of official document" mentioned. The Court struck down the argument and ruled that falsification of public document under the RPC is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (Pactolin v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161455, May 20,2008). e. Civil and criminal offenses filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,14 and 14-A issued in 1986 (Sec. 4[c] P.D. 1606 as amended). These executive orders refer to orders on sequestration cases. Officials and employees with a salary grade of "27" or higher 1. Should one or more of the officials charged have a salary grade of "27" or higher for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over the case? It is submitted that the query be answered in the negative. The law mentions salary grade "27" only in relation to the following officials: (a) Officials of the executive branch, occupying the position of regional director and higher (Section 4[a][l]); (b) Members of Congress or officials thereof (Section 4[a][2J); and (c) All other national and local officials (Section 4[a][5]). These officials are those who are not enumerated in letters "a" to "g" of Sec. 4(a)(1). The salary grade of "27" has no reference for example to provincial governors, vice governors or members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, directors or

29

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managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, city mayors, vice mayors, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, trustees of state universities, and other officials enumerated in Section 4(a) (l)from letters "a" to "g" of Presidential Decree 1606 as amended. Those enumerated are subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade (Inding v. Sandiganbayan, 434 SCRA 388). Thus, if the accused does not belong to the national and local officials enumerated, in order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the offense, the same must be committed by officials classified as Grade 27 and higher, aside from other officials, expressly covered. 2. Instructive is the ruling of the Court in Inding: "Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these officials regardless of their salary grades, to be specifically included within the Sandiganbayan's original jurisdiction, for had it been otherwise, then there would have been no need for such enumeration (italics supplied). xxx "This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the officials enumerated in "a" to "g" are not classified as SG 27 or higher under the x x x Position Titles and Salary Grades of the Department of Budget and Management x x x." Officers falling below salary grade "27" 1. Geduspan v. People, 451 SCRA 187, raised the issue on whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The petitioner assumed a negative view in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court. The Office of the Special Prosecutor argued otherwise, a view shared by the Sandiganbayan.

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The records showed that, although the petitioner was a Director of Region VI of the Philhealth, she was not occupying the position of Regional Director but that of Department Manager A in accordance with her appointment papers. It is petitioner's appointment paper, held the Court and the notice of salary adjustment that determine the classification of her position, that is, Department Manager A of Philhealth. The petitioner admitted that she holds the position of Department Manager A of Philhealth. She, however, contended that the position of Department Manager A is classified under salary grade 26 and therefore outside the jurisdiction of respondent court. The Court found that the petitioner held the position of Department Director A of Philhealth at the time of the commission of the offense and that position is among those enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of R.A. 8249 over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction and which provision includes "Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations" (italics supplied). It is of no moment, added the Court, that the position of petitioner was merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of Sec. 4 of P.D. 1606 covers only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof "specifically includes" other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. 2. In a relatively recent case, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of a city was charged for allegedly criminally failing to liquidate certain cash advances he made in violation of the Auditing Code of the Philippines. The core issue raised in this case of People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010, was whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing

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Code of the Philippines. The Court held in the affirmative, citing the provisions of R.A. 8249 and those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. In resolving the issue in favor of the People, the Court explained: "Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sang- guniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher, Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" (People of the Philippines v.

Sandiganbayan and Rolando Plaza, G.R. No. 169004, September 15,2010).

3. The earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009, was decided under facts substantially similar to those in the other case of People v. Sandiganbayan cited in the immediately preceding number. The issue presented to the Court for resolution in the case involving the respondent was whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under salary grade 26 who was charged with violation of the Auditing Code of the Philippines for failure to liquidate cash advances falls within the juris

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diction of the Sandiganbayan. Earlier, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against the accused for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to the filing of the case in the proper court. The People sought to have the dismissal reversed and set aside by the Supreme Court. Those that are classified as grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided they hold the position enumerated in the law. As in the other case, the Court held that Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, "x x x those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4(a) of PD1606 as amended may not only be charged with violations of R.A. 3019 (Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act), R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office, x x x as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance x x x of his official functions x x x the accused is held to have been indicted in relation to his office" (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 167304, August 25,2009). Salary grade alone does not determine jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended. While the first part of Sec. 4(a) of the law covers only officials with salary grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be with salary grade 27 or higher but who are by express provision of the law placed under the jurisdiction of

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said court (Geduspan v. People, G.R. No. 158187, February 11, 2005; Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008; People u. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004, September 15,2010). A student regent of a state university is a public officer The petitioner in one case contended that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent she claimed she was not a public officer since she merely represented the students of the institution, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was just a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent and thus could not fall under any salary grade. The argument that she was not a public officer was struck down by the Court. The petitioner is a public officer whose position is covered by the law vesting jurisdiction over the Sandiganbayan. The provisions of Sec. 4(a)(1)(g) of P.D. 1606 as amended, explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. The petitioner, as a student regent falls under this category. The board of Regents of the University of the Philippines performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of the law, the petitioner declared the Court, is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. 1606. The Court added that compensation is not an essential element of a public office and is merely incidental to the public office (Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22,2008). Offenses committed in relation to the office 1. As a rule, to make an offense one committed in relation to the office, "the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office." In other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined by statute, such as for instance, the crimes defined

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and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised Penal Code {Montilla v. Hilario, 90 Phil. 49), like direct bribery, frauds against the public treasury, malversation of public funds and property, failure of an accountable officer to render accounts, illegal use of public funds or property or any of the crimes from Articles 204 to 245 of the Revised Penal Code. 2. Public office is not an element of the crime of murder, since murder may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a private citizen (Cunanan v. Arceo, 242 SCRA 88). Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant (Montilla v. Hilario, 90 Phil. 49). There is also no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office (Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627). 3. However, even if the position is not an essential ingredient of the offense charged, if the information avers the intimate connection between the office and the offense, this would bring the offense within the definition of an offense "committed in relation to the public office" (Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627). 4. An offense maybe said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions even if public office is not an element of the offense charged. It is important however, that the information must allege the intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties because the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. If the information lacks the required specific factual averments to show the intimate connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official functions, it was ruled that the

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Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction over the case (Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, 453 SCRA 236; People v. Montejo 108 Phil. 613). 5. In Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, 453 SCRA 236, the accused filed motions to quash the two informations filed against him for acts of lasciviousness allegedly perpetrated by him against a female casual employee assigned to his office. The accused argued that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged since the alleged acts imputed to him were not committed in relation to his office as a judge. When the motion to quash and the subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied, he brought the issue of jurisdiction before the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65. The Supreme Court sustained the Sandiganbayan because the information alleged with clarity that the accused used his official position to commit the acts charged. As alleged in the information, the victim was constrained to approach the accused because it was the latter whose recommendation was necessary for her appointment as a casual employee but the accused imposed the condition that she has to become his girlfriend first and report to his office daily for a kiss. While it is true, explained the Court, that public office is not an element of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, nonetheless, he could not have committed the crimes charged were it not for his being the judge of the court where the victim was working. Taken together with the fact that the accused had the authority to recommend the appointment of the victim as an employee, the crimes committed were therefore, intimately connected with his office. 6. In the much earlier but significant and frequently cited case of People v. Montejo, 108 Phil. 613, involving a city mayor accused of murder, one issue sought to be resolved was whether or not the accused committed the murder in relation to his office. Examining the allegations in the information, the Court found that the information sufficiently indicated the existence of acts and events intimately connected to the public office of the accused. The information clearly alleged that the murder was a consequence of his act as a mayor;

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that he organized armed patrols and civilian commandos and provided them with arms. Also acting as the city mayor and leader of the patrols, he ordered the arrest and maltreatment of the victim who died as a consequence. While public office is not an element of murder, the offense as alleged shows its commission while the accused was in the performance of his official functions and that the offense could not have been committed had he not held his office. Public office is not, of course, an element of the crime of murder, since murder may be committed by any person. However, the averments of the information could bring the offense within the meaning of an "an offense committed in relation to the public office'' and thus, the offense would fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (Cunanan v. Arceo, 242 SCRA 89). 7. The previously cited cases require that the information must contain the specific factual allegations that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the official duties of the accused and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. This requirement however, was not met in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298. While the amended information for murder against the several accused was alleged to have been committed "in relation to their official duties as police officers," it contained no specific allegations of facts that the shooting of the victim was intimately related to the discharge of the official functions of the accused. Lacson held that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the court. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information. Declared the Court in lucid terms: "The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not

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satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense charged was committed x x x in relation to his office is not sufficient. The phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties." xxx

When the actual specific allegations of the intimacy between the offense and the official duties of the accused need not appear in the information 1. It would appear from a reading of jurisprudence that if public office is a constituent element of the crime charged as provided for by statute, there is no need for the information to state the specific factual allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime charged, or that the accused committed the crime in the performance of his duties. These crimes are those in which the public office is a constituent element as defined by statute and the relation between the crime and the offense is such that, in a legal sense, the offense committed cannot exist without the office like malversation of public funds or property defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and the illegal use of public funds or property defined and penalized by Article 220 of the same Code. In these felonies, public office of the accused is a constituent element in both felonies. 2. In those cases where public office is not a constituent element of the offense charged, the information has to contain specific factual allegations showing the intimate connection between the offense charged and the public office of the accused, and the discharge of his official duties or functions — whether improper or irregular. The requirement is not complied with if the information merely alleges that the accused committed the crime charged in relation to his office because such allegation is merely a conclusion of law (Barriga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 161784-86, April 26,2005; Escobal v. Garchitorena, 422 SCRA 45).

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Barriga further elucidates: "x x x There are two classes of public office-related crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249: first, those crimes or felonies in which the public office is a constituent element as defined by statute and the relation between the crime and the offense is such that, in a legal sense, the offense committed cannot exist without the office; second, such offenses or felonies which are intimately connected with the public office and are perpetrated by the public officer or employee while in the performance of his official functions, through improper or irregular conduct. The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes and felonies under the first classification. Considering that the public office of the accused is by statute a constituent element of the crime charged, there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in the Information specific factual allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime charged, or that the accused committed the crime in the performance of his duties. However, the Sandiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes or felonies committed by the public officers and employees enumerated in Section (a) (1) to (5) under the second classification if the Information contains specific factual allegations showing the intimate connection between the offense charged and the public office of the accused, and the discharge of his official duties or functions — whether improper or irregular. The requirement is not complied with if the Information merely alleges that the accused committed the crime charged in relation to his office because such allegation is merely a conclusion of law."

3. In summary, an offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the public office of the accused when, (a) such office is an element of the crime charged, or (b) when the offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of the accused. Even if the position is not an essential ingredient of the offense charged, if the information avers the intimate connection between the office and the offense, this would bring the

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offense within the definition of an offense "committed in relation to the public office." Where the information averred facts showing that the accused took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor when he aimed his gun and threatened to kill a councilor during a public hearing, clearly the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of official functions (Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, 338 SCRA 485). Anti-Money Laundering cases Those money laundering cases committed by public officers and private persons who are in conspiracy with such public officers shall be under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (Sec. 5, RA. 9160, Anti-Money Laundering Act of2001). Forfeiture cases A forfeiture case under R.A. 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under R.A. 1379 is the disproportion of respondent's properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired such properties (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 171381, October 12,2009). Summary procedure in criminal cases 1. The Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases falling under summary procedure committed within their jurisdiction (Sec. 1, The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure). 2. The following cases are subject to summary procedure: (a) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

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(b)

Violations of the rental law and BP 22;

(c)

Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

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(d) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (PI,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. (e) Offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) (Sec. 1[B], The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure). 3. The filing of criminal cases under summary procedure may be either by complaint or information. In Metro Manila and other chartered cities, the filing shall be by information except when the offense is one which cannot be prosecuted de officio (Sec. 11, The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure). The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the court's files. This requirement has to be complied with within five (5) days from the filing of the case, otherwise the same may be dismissed (Sec. 11, The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure). 4. Should the court find no cause or ground to hold the accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case. If there is a ground to hold the accused for trial, the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial. (Sec. 13, The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure). 5. Before conducting the trial, the court shall call the parties to a preliminary conference during which the following may be done: (a) entering into a stipulation of facts; (b) considering the propriety of allowing the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense; or

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(c) taking up such other matters to clarify the issues and to ensure a speedy disposition of the case (Sec. 14, The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure). 6. If the accused refuses to stipulate or fails to do so, such refusal or failure shall not prejudice the accused. Also, any admission of the accused made during the preliminary conference must be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and his counsel. If this requirement is not met, such admission shall not be used against him (Sec. 14, The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure). 7. During the trial, an actual direct examination of the witnesses is not required because the affidavits submitted shall constitute their direct testimonies. The witnesses however, may be subjected to a cross-examination, re-direct examination or re-cross examination. Should the affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as competent evidence for the party presenting the affidavit. However, the adverse party may utilize the same for any admissible purpose (Sec. 15, The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure). 8. The court is mandated not to order the arrest of the accused except where the ground is his failure to appear when required by the court. If he is arrested, he may be released on bail or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court (Sec. 16, The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure). 9. Where a trial has been conducted, the court shall promulgate the judgment not later than thirty (30) days after the termination of the trial (Sec. 17, The 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure). Prohibited pleadings, motions and petitions in summary procedure (Bar 2004); civil and criminal cases 1. Motion to quash the complaint or information except if the ground is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or failure to comply with the barangay conciliation proceedings;

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2. Motion for bill of particulars; 3. Motion for new trial, or for consideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial; 4. Petition for relief from judgment; 5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper; 6. Memoranda; 7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court; (Bar 2004) 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Motion to declare the defendant in default; Dilatory motions for postponement; Reply; Third-party complaints; Interventions (Sec. 19,1991 Rule on Summary Procedure) III. SYNOPSIS OF THE CRIMINAL LITIGATION PROCESS

Initial contact with the criminal justice system 1. The criminal litigation process presupposes the prior commission of a crime or at least the perception that a crime has been committed. There can be no criminal action unless a crime is believed to have been committed. When a crime is committed, there is an offender and generally, there is a victim. The victim may be a private person who may be either a natural or a juridical person. The crimes of homicide, murder or parricide for instance, are crimes committed against a private individual and classified as crimes against persons. Crimes may however, also be committed against juridical or artificial persons as when the offender commits theft or robbery against the property of such juridical persons. Sometimes the offense is not committed against a private

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person as when the offense is committed against public interest like counterfeiting the great seal of the Government of the Philippine Islands or committed against public order like rebellion, sedition or disloyalty of public officers and employees. Crimes may be committed against national security like treason and other related offenses. A crime may also be committed by the mere possession of goods or things prohibited by law. 2. No matter how or against whom the offense is committed, the mere commission of a crime does not automatically trigger the application of the rules of criminal procedure. The rules come into operation only when acts are initiated that would put the offender in contact with the law. This contact with the law is normally effected when the criminal act is brought to the attention of duly constituted authorities. For instance, the offended party may file a written complaint before the barangay or in proper cases a sworn complaint before the prosecuting arm of the government. In certain cases, the aggrieved party may initiate the filing of a complaint directly with the Municipal Trial Court. Contact with the law may also occur when law enforcement officers search a place under the control of the alleged offender and seize goods, articles or things found therein. This initial contact may likewise happen when an offender is arrested in flagrante delicto or by virtue of a "hot pursuit." 3. There are violations of laws or ordinances which require compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings originally provided for under Presidential Decree 1508 and now under R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code). Compliance with the procedure set by these proceedings will set in motion the initial contact of the parties with the criminal justice system. R.A. 7160 establishes the rule that the referral of a case to the Lupon for conciliation or settlement is required before a complaint, petition or action is filed in court. The invocation of judicial authority shall be allowed only if a certification is issued by the proper barangay official that judicial intervention may

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now be availed of because the desired conciliation or settlement was not reached or when after a settlement previously forged was repudiated by a party. With the certification to file action, the case is now said to be ripe for filing in court. 4. Not all cases however, require barangay conciliation. In those cases beyond the ambit of the barangay conciliation process or where for instance, the penalty prescribed by law for the allege offense is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the rules on criminal procedure begin to grind when a complaint in affidavit form is filed before an authorized officer for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation, an inquiry aimed at determining whether a crime has been committed and that the person complained of is probably guilty thereof and hence, must be held for trial. Under current rules, the filing of a complaint for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation is a way of instituting a criminal action. After the required preliminary investigation has been completed, the investigating prosecutor may either recommend the dismissal of the complaint or the filing of an information in court with an accompanying resolution to that effect prepared by the prosecutor. Such resolution is subject to further action by a higher officer in the prosecution hierarchy without whose written authority or approval no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor. Such action may be further reviewed by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with the Rules of Court and existing DOJ rules on appeal. The Secretary may reverse or modify the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or of the chief state prosecutor. 5. There are cases which do not require a preliminary investigation because the penalty is less than four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day. In these cases, the complaint or information may be filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court and such filing, pursuant to the Rules, is one of the recognized ways of instituting a criminal action. The Municipal Trial Court may dismiss the same for lack of probable cause

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after an evaluation of the evidence consisting of the affidavits and other supporting documents of the complainant and his witnesses or after following the process required in the examination of the complainant and his witnesses. If the court finds probable cause, the court shall issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if the accused has already been previously taken into custody although the judge may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused in custody. In places like Manila and other chartered cities which require that the complaint be filed directly with the prosecutor, the said officer shall act on the complaint based on the supporting affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant and his witnesses. The prosecutor may either dismiss the complaint or file the complaint or information in court. 6. The initial contact with the law may also occur when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant either by a peace officer or by a private person. The arrest is deemed lawful when, for instance, the person arrested has committed, was actually committing or was attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the person effecting the arrest at the time the arrest was made. The arrest is likewise lawful when the arrest was made after a crime has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts and circumstances which engenders in him a belief that there is probable cause that the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In any of the cited grounds for a warrantless arrest, the rule mandates that the person arrested shall without delay be delivered to the nearest police station or jail. When the accused is lawfully arrested without a warrant, he shall not, as a rule, undergo a preliminary investigation even if under the Rules, the offense involves a penalty which normally would require such investigation. The complaint or information may nevertheless, be filed by the prosecutor after an inquest has been conducted. Where an inquest prosecutor is not available, the complaint may be filed by the

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offended party or a peace officer directly with the court on the basis of the affidavit of the party or arresting officer or person. Under existing rules of the Department of Justice, the inquest prosecutor may, instead of filing the criminal action, release the person for further proceedings. This occurs when for instance, the prosecutor finds that the arrest made does not comply with the rules on a valid arrest. The person arrested is then released to be notified later on of a subsequent preliminary investigation. The rule that a complaint or information may be filed against the person lawfully arrested without need for a preliminary investigation is not absolute because before such complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation after validly signing a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail even before he is charged in court. Even after the filing of the complaint or information, the rule allows the person arrested to ask for a preliminary investigation within five (5) days from the time he learns of the complaint or information being filed and with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense. 7. The wheels of the criminal justice system could also start grinding when law enforcement authorities are in possession of information on possible criminal activities. The authorities may initiate a search and a seizure by virtue of a search warrant duly issued. The search and seizure may also be conducted without a warrant under well-recognized exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant. When the search yields property or effects constituting a crime or subjects of a crime or are means to commit a crime, the appropriate criminal action shall be instituted. Filing of the information or complaint and other processes 1. A criminal action is commenced by the filing of a complaint or an information in court and shall be prosecuted

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under the control and direction of the public prosecutor although in special cases, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the chief of the prosecution office or the regional state prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court 2. The complaint or information is required by the Rules to be in writing. The caption of a criminal case contains at least two names. The first name refers to the party that brought the action and this party is denominated as the "People of the Philippines." This is because a crime is deemed to have been committed against the "People" and under whose name a crime must be prosecuted. The second name refers to the person named as offender. He is the party against whom the action is brought. The complaint or information must state the name of the accused (or under a fictitious name when his true name is alleged to be unknown), the name of the offended party, the designation of the offense, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and the specific qualifying and aggravating circumstances involved. The complaint or information must also state the cause of the accusation against the accused so he may know the offense for which he is charged and also to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The cause of the accusation necessarily includes the attendant qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The date of the commission of the offense which need not be the precise date unless the same is a material ingredient of the offense, shall be stated in the complaint or information. Implied institution of the civil action 1. When the criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged shall also be deemed instituted with the criminal action. However, when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute the same separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, the civil action is not deemed instituted with the criminal action.

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2. Also not deemed instituted are those civil actions which although may arise from the same acts constituting the offense charged, are denominated as independent civil actions because they do not legally arise from the offense charged and are independent sources of liability. 3. After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising from the offense, cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action. Also, if the criminal action is filed after the civil action has already been instituted, the civil action shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. Independent civil actions however, are not suspended and shall proceed independently of the criminal action. 4. The suspension of the civil action when the criminal action is commenced does not also apply to a situation which poses a prejudicial question. Instead, it is the criminal action which may be suspended upon a proper petition on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. This question exists when the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Availment of provisional remedies When the complaint or information is filed and the civil action arising from the offense charged is properly instituted in accordance with the Rules, the offended party may avail of the provisional remedies available in civil actions. For instance, the offended party may have the property of the accused attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered from the accused when circumstances arise justifying the attachment as when the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled by the accused. Bail 1. A person under the custody of the law may gain his release from confinement by availing of the constitutional right to bail which may be given in the form of corporate

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surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. He may apply for bail before or after he is formally charged and as a rule, the application shall be made in the court where his case is pending but no bail shall be allowed after a judgment of conviction has become final. If before such finality, the accused applies for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail. 2. It is not however, correct to assume that bail may be availed of only after the filing of the complaint or information. A person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. 3. An application for bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest. 4. Bail may be a matter of right or a matter of judicial discretion. Even a person charged with a capital offense may be allowed bail when evidence of his guilt is not strong. That the evidence of guilt is strong is one which the prosecution has the burden of proving. Arraignment; bill of particulars; suspension of arraignment 1. Whether or not the accused is under detention or out on bail, the court shall thereafter set the case for arraignment. Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Without arraignment, the accused is not deemed to have been informed of such accusation. If before his arraignment, the accused escapes, the court has no authority to try him in absentia. 2. The accused is to be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. It is made in open court by the judge or clerk and consists of furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information and the reading of the same in a language he understands. He is then asked whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. 3. During the date set for arraignment, the accused need not enter his plea outrightly because before the arraign

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ment and plea the accused has several options. The accused may move for a bill of particulars if there are defects in the information or complaint which prevent him from properly pleading to the charge and preparingfor trial. He may also move for the suspension of the arraignment when justifiable reasons do exist for its suspension as when among others, the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. The accused may likewise, at any time before entering his plea, move to quash, i.e., to dismiss the complaint or information. Quashal of complaint or information An accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the grounds provided for by the Rules. For instance, he may move to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense or that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or over the person of the accused. A motion to quash is a written motion signed by the accused or his counsel which is supposed to distinctly specify both its factual and legal grounds. The motion is filed before the accused enters his plea. If the complaint or information is not dismissed or quashed, and a subsequent plea of not guilty is entered, the machinery of the criminal justice system shall proceed to its natural course. Pre-trial 1. After the arraignment of the accused and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the accused, the court shall order the mandatory trial conference to consider certain matters including plea bargaining, stipulation of facts, the marking of the evidence, the waiver of objections to admissibility, a possible modification of the order of the trial and such other matters that will help promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. 2. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated and

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the evidence marked. The pre-trial order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified to prevent manifest injustice. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. Trial; demurrer 1. Within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the pretrial order, trial shall commence. The rule is that once the trial is commenced, it shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated but it may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause. 2. Normally, the trial begins with the prosecution presenting its evidence but when the accused admits the act or omission charged but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified. 3. When the prosecution rests its case, the accused may now present his evidence to prove his defense and the damages he may have sustained arising from any provisional remedy issued in the case. However, the accused may, instead of presenting his evidence, opt to move to dismiss the case by presenting a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. This demurrer may be presented with or without leave of court. The court may, for the same reason, dismiss the case on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard. If the demurrer filed with leave of court is denied, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense but shall waive the right to present evidence if the demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court is denied. The prosecution and the defense may, in the same order present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence. Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.

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Judgment 1. After trial, the judgment of the court shall follow. A judgment is the adjudication by the court on the guilt or innocence of the accused and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It is required to be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. 2. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered unless it is for a light offense in which case the judgment maybe pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. Post-judgment remedies 1. Before the judgment of conviction becomes final or before an appeal is perfected, the accused may file a motion for the modification of the judgment or for the setting aside of the same. 2. Also, at any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the accused may move for a new trial or a reconsideration. A motion for new trial shall be predicated upon errors of law or irregularities during the trial and the discovery of new or material evidence. Within the same period, a motion for reconsideration may also be filed on the grounds of errors of law or fact in the judgment. The court also may, on its own motion with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration. 3. Before the finality of the judgment, the accused may also appeal from a judgment of conviction in accordance with the procedure set forth in the Rules. Notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the court may allow the appellant, upon proper motion to withdraw the appeal already perfected before the record has been forwarded by the clerk of court to the proper appellate court. An appeal may even be withdrawn upon proper motion of the appellant before the rendition of the

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judgment of the case on appeal in which case the judgment of the court of origin shall become final and the case shall be remanded to the latter court for execution of the judgment. 4. Cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court or the Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall be appealed to the Regional Trial Court. Cases decided by the Regional Trial Court shall be appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided for by law. Cases decided by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court. 5. The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. 6. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42. 7. The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the RTC is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be by notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 122. A review of the case by the Court of Appeals is necessary before the same is elevated to the Supreme Court. 8. Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Entry of judgment When all remedies have been exhausted and the judgment has become final, the same shall be entered in accordance with existing rules.

- oOo -

Chapter II PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES (Rule 110) I. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS Purpose of a criminal action The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state (Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos v. Court of Appeals, 169711, February 8, 2010). How criminal actions are instituted (Bar 1999) 1. The institution of a criminal action generally depends upon whether or not the offense is one which requires a preliminary investigation (Sec. 1, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Where a preliminary investigation is required, a criminal action is instituted by filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation (Sec. 1, Rule 110, Rules of Court). 2. Where a preliminary investigation is not required, a criminal action is instituted in either of two ways: (a) by filing the complaint or information directly with the Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court; or

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(b) by filing the complaint with the office of the prosecutor (Sec. 1, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Institution of criminal actions in Manila and other chartered cities In Manila and other chartered cities, a special rule prevails. In these places, the rule is that "the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters" (Sec. 1, Rule 110, Rules of Court). No direct filing in the Regional Trial Court and Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and other chartered cities 1. There is no direct filing of an information or complaint with the Regional Trial Court under Rule 110 because its jurisdiction covers offenses which require preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation is to be conducted for offenses where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day (Sec. 1, Rule 112, Rules of Court). The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over an offense punishable with imprisonment of more than six (6) years, a period way above the minimum penalty for an offense that requires a preliminary investigation. On the other hand the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years (Sec. 32[2], Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 [B.P. 129]). Note: Please refer however, to the last sentence of the first paragraph of Sec. 6 of Rule 112. 2. There is likewise no direct filing with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila because in Manila, including other chartered cities, the complaint, as a rule, shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor, unless otherwise provided by their charters (Sec. 1, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Although in Manila and other chartered cities the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor, in case of a conflict between a city charter and a provision of the Rules of Court, the former, being substantive law, shall prevail.

CHAPTER II PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES (Rule 110)

Effect of the institution of the criminal action on the prescriptive period (Bar 1993) The present rule categorically provides that the "institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws9 (Sec. 1, Rule 110, Rules of Court; italics supplied). Since one way of instituting a criminal action is by filing a complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation for offenses where a preliminary investigation is required (Sec. l[a], Rule 110, Rules of Court), the filing of the complaint with the proper officer for such purpose, would, under the Rules of Court, interrupt the period of prescription. The exception is when a different rule is provided for in special laws. For offenses where a preliminary investigation is not required, the filing of the information or complaint directly with the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or with the office of the prosecutor, shall likewise interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged because it is a mode by which a criminal action is instituted under Sec. 1 of Rule 110, unless of course, there be a special law which provides otherwise. In Manila and other chartered cities, the filing of the complaint with the office of the prosecutor shall also operate to interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged, unless also provided otherwise in special laws. Illustration of the above rules 1. One case which is illustrative of the rule on the effect of the institution of the criminal action on the prescriptive period of the offense charged is People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168641, April 27, 2007, a case involving physical injuries. Here, the Supreme Court did not agree with the view of the Court of Appeals and of the respondent that upon approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of

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an information against respondent, the period of prescription began to run again. It is a well-settled rule, declared by the Court, that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the prescriptive period. The proceedings against respondent were not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court. 2. The issue as to when the prescriptive period of an offense is interrupted has been the subject of various contending views interpreting some laws relating to prescription particularly Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code and Act No. 3326 as amended. 3. The diversity of opinions started with the interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which partly provides: "x x x The period of prescription shall commence to run . . . and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information..." The early case of People v. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, ruled that the 'complaint' or 'information' referred to in Art. 91 is the one filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party before the fiscal's office or with the justice of the peace court for preliminary investigation (See also People v. del Rosario, L-15140, December 29,1960; People v. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963 and cited in Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538). Arrayed against the ruling in Tayco are the opposite views expressed in various decisions (People v. Uba, L-131106, October 16, 1959; People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588) which consider the filing of the complaint before the justice of the peace (municipal judge) for preliminary investigation as sufficient to interrupt the prescriptive period for the offense.

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Tayco was not followed in the subsequent case of People v. Olarte, L-13027, June 30 1960, where the Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation interrupted the running of the statute of limitations. In the other case of People v. Olarte, G.R. No. L-22465, February 28,1967, the rule became more clear. The Court in Olarte gave the following justifications for its ruling: First, the words "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed in court merely for preliminary investigation or for "action on the merits;" Second, the filing of the complaint for preliminary investigation already represents the initial step of the proceedings against the offender; Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The pronouncements in Olarte were subsequently confirmed in Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538, to be the "true doctrine." Thus, the filing of a denuncia or complaint for intriguing against honor, changed later to grave oral defamation, even in the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Quoting Olarte, the Court in Francisco held that after reexamining the question and after mature consideration, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that: . .the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits."

Rule on prescription for violations of special laws and municipal ordinances 1. Act No. 3326 as amended, is the law which governs the period for prescription for violations penalized by special acts and municipal ordinances. Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277, a case involving an offense punishable by a municipal ordinance, held that when

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Act No. 3326 says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person," the proceedings referred to are "judicial proceedings" and not administrative proceedings. Accordingly, the prescriptive period in these cases is governed by Act No. 3326 and is interrupted only by the institution of judicial proceedings because Sec. 2 of the law provides that prescription begins from the commission of the crime or from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. Zaldivia further declared that if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the latter must yield because the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under the Constitution and that"... Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right." 2. Recent cases however, appear not to strictly adhere to the line toed by Zaldivia in cases involving violations of special laws. For instance, Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, G.R. No. 168662, February 19, 2008, a case involving a violation of the Intellectual Property Code, a special law, ruled differently from Zaldivia. The case involves as the petitioner, Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese corporation which owns the copyright of various animated characters such as "Hello Kitty," "Little Twin Stars," "My Melody," "Tuxedo Sam" and "Zashikibuta" among others. While it is not engaged in business in the Philippines, its products are sold locally by its exclusive distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated (GGI). Sometime in 2001, due to the deluge of counterfeit Sanrio products, GGI asked IP Manila Associates (IPMA) to conduct a market research. The research's objective was to identify those factories, department stores and retail outlets manufacturing and/or selling fake Sanrio items. After conducting several test-buys in various commercial areas, IPMA confirmed

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that Respondent's Orignamura Trading in Tutuban Center, Manila was selling imitations of petitioner's products. Upon application by the petitioner, a search warrant was duly issued. On the same day the warrant was issued, agents of the NBI searched the premises of Orignamura Trading and seized various Sanrio products. The petitioner, Sanrio filed a complaint-affidavit with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) against Respondent for violation of Section 217 (in relation to Sections 177 and 178) of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC). The TAPP dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence. The petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, it filed a petition for review in the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ. The Office of the Chief State Prosecutor affirmed the TAPP's resolution and the petition was dismissed for lack of reversible error. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which likewise dismissed the petition among others, on the ground of prescription. It based its action on Sees. 1 and 2 of Act 3326 which state: Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years; Provided, however, That all offenses against any law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall prescribe after five years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

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Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same may not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy, (underscoring for em-

phasis supplied).

The Court of Appeals ruled that because no complaint was filed in court within two years after the commission of the alleged violation, the offense had already prescribed. The petitioner disagreed, and in the Supreme Court, petitioner averred that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the alleged violations of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC) had prescribed because it had actually filed a complaint with the corresponding Task Force of the DOJ. It contended that said filing tolled the running of the prescriptive period for the offense. The Supreme Court found the contention meritorious. It likewise confirmed that under Section 2 of Act 3326, the prescriptive period for violation of special laws starts on the day such offense was committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings against respondent (i.e., the accused). It also found that the petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit with the TAPP of the DOJ before the alleged violation had prescribed. The Court categorically ruled that the prescriptive period for the prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by petitioner's timely filing of the complaint-affidavit before the TAPP. 3. In Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008, the issue raised was whether or not the filing of a complaint for violation of B.P. Big. 22 before the Office of the Prosecutor interrupts the running of the prescriptive period for the offense. Here, the Assistant City Prosecutor dis

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missed the complaint against the respondent because the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations of laws as those penalized by B.P. Big. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. Accordingly, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored and the filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that more than four (4) years had already elapsed from the dishonor of the check and no information had as yet been filed against the respondent, the alleged violation of B.P. Big. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed. The DOJ affirmed the resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor and held in favor of the respondent. Subsequently, the DOJ, this time through the Undersecretary, ruled in favor of the petitioner/complainant declaring that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against the respondent for violation of B.P. Big. 22. The informations were filed. Later, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Big. 22. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Big. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder. The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., 211 SCRA 277, wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's office.

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Aggrieved, the petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the latest resolution of the DOJ but the petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on technical grounds. In the Supreme Court, the DOJ reiterated its earlier argument that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Big. 22. It argued that under B.P. Big. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326. The respondent also claimed that the offense of violation of B.P. Big. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. On the other hand the petitioner assailed the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes, a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, 338 Phil. 1061, wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also noted that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In resolving the issue, the Court declared: X X X

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Big. 22. An offense under B.P. Big. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Big. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

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The Court also explained, that when Act No. 3326 was passed, preliminary investigation could be conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment x x x." We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor x x x signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus, effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under

4. A significant pronouncement which confirms the rule that the filing of a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility, was made by the Court in the case of SEC v. Interport Resources Corporation, G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008. This case relates to a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals enjoining the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from taking cognizance of or initiating any action against the respondent corporation, Interport Resources Corporation (IRC) and members of its board of directors with respect to Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Respondents have taken the position that this case is moot and academic, since any criminal complaint that may be filed against them resulting from the SEC's investigation of this case has already prescribed. They point out that the prescription period applicable to offenses punished under special laws, such as violations of the Revised Securities Act, is twelve years under Section 1 of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and Act No. 3763, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run." Since the offense was committed in 1994, they reasoned that prescription set in as early as 2006 and rendered this case moot.

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Ruling against the respondent, the Court held it to be an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts the prescription period. A preliminary investigation is essentially a determination whether an offense has been committed, and whether there is probable cause for the accused to have committed an offense. Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is entitled Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to "make such investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of the law. After a finding that a person has violated the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution." The Court added that while the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and entails substantially similar duties as the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot simply be disregarded. The Court further ruled that a criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The Court observed that the Securities Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1. Indubitably, declared succinctly by the Court, the prescription period is interrupted by commencing the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused. In criminal cases, this

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is accomplished by initiating the preliminary investigation. The prosecution of offenses punishable under the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint with the SEC or by an investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio. Only after a finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate a preliminary investigation. Thus, the investigation that was commenced by the SEC, soon after it discovered the questionable acts of the respondents, effectively interrupted the prescription period. Given the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the SEC, which is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, such investigation would surely interrupt the prescription period. Note that the cases of Sanrio, Panaguiton and SEC, cited above all involved violations of special laws. Uniformly in these cases, the Court had declared that the filing of the affidavit of complaint for preliminary investigation interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. II. PROSECUTION OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION Who must prosecute the criminal action; who controls the prosecution (Bar 1990; 2000) 1. A criminal action is prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. This is the general rule and this applies to a criminal action commenced either by a complaint or an information (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court; Uy v. People, G.R. No. 174899, September 11,2008). All criminal actions covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor (Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, February 9, 2007; Adasa v. Abalos, G.R. No. 168617 February 19, 2007). Even if there is a private prosecutor, the criminal action is still prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. 2. The rationale for the rule that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public

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prosecutor is that since a criminal offense is an outrage against the sovereignty of the State, it necessarily follows that a representative of the State shall direct and control the prosecution thereof (Chua v. Padillo, G.R. No. 163797, April 24,2007). The mandate that all criminal actions, either commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor, is founded on the theory that a crime is a breach of the security and peace of the people at large, an outrage against the very sovereignty of the State (Baviera v. Paglinawan, G.R. No. 168380, February 8,2007). Appearance of a private prosecutor 1. The appointment of a private prosecutor is done by the offended party and is the mode by which the latter intervenes in the prosecution of the offense. This intervention is however, only allowed where the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 (Sec. 16, Rule 110, Rules of Court). 2. Hence, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense through a private prosecutor if the offended party (a) waives the civil action, (b) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Effect of the filing of an independent civil action on the right of the offended party to intervene in the prosecution of the offense 1. The institution of an independent civil action does not deprive the offended party of the right to intervene in the civil action through a private prosecutor. 2. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, "When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action ..

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3. Note however, that pursuant to said provision, only the civil liability of the accused arising from the offense charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Those not arising from the offense charged like the independent civil actions referred to in Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are not deemed instituted with the criminal action. These actions, according to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court shall proceed independently of the criminal action. Thus, the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions because they are separate, distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution even if based on the same act which also gave rise to the criminal action. 4. Thus, it was ruled that as one of the direct consequences of the independent character of actions brought under Arts. 32,33,34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, even if a civil action is filed separately, "the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may — subject to the control of the prosecutor — still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein" (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People, G.R. No. 147703, April 14,2004). Consequences of the rule that a criminal action is prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor 1. The public prosecutor, in the exercise of his functions, has the power and discretion to: (a) determine whether a prima facie case exists, (b) decide which of the conflicting testimonies should be believed free from the interference or control of the offended party, and (c) subject only to the right against self-incrimination, determine which witnesses to present in court. (Chua v. Padillo, G.R. No. 163797, April 24, 2007). The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case to the private prosecutor, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may at any time, takl*

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over the actual conduct of the trial (People v. Tan, G.R. No. 177566, March 26,2008). The executive department of the government is accountable for the prosecution of crimes. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors (Gonzalez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 164904, October 19,2007). 2. The power to prosecute includes the initial discretion to determine who should be utilized by the government as a state witness (People v. Fajardo, 512 SCRA 360, January 23, 2007). 3. The prosecution is also entitled to conduct its own case and to decide what witnesses to call to support its charges. The non-presentation of a witness by the prosecution cannot be construed as suppression of evidence where the testimony is merely corroborative (Ritualo v. People, G.R. No. 178337, June 25, 2009). 4. Not even the Supreme Court can order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case — the only possible exception to the rule is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor (Chua v. Padillo, G.R. No. 163797, April 24,2007). 5. In one case, three informations were filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. One information pertains to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares. The other informations involve the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares. d.- Petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charges.

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Subsequently, the trial court ruled that the delays which attended the proceedings of one of the petitioner's cases were vexatious, capricious and oppressive, resulting in violation of the petitioner's right to speedy trial and hence, ordered its dismissal. The dismissal was later on reversed by the Court of Appeals and reinstated the. case previously dismissed. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals and filed a motion for inhibition of the Justices who decided the case but both motions were denied. The petitioner hence, filed a petition for review on certiorari, raising among others the issue that the certificate of non- forum shopping attached to the People's petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals should have been signed by the Chairman of the SEC as complainant in the cases instead of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez. The Court found the petitioner's argument futile holding that the Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the authority of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas Gutierrez to sign the certification. The Court went on to say that it must be stressed that the certification against forum shopping is required to be executed by the plaintiff. Although the complaint-affidavit was signed by the Prosecution and Enforcement Department of the SEC, the petition before the Court of Appeals originated from Criminal Case No. 119830, where the plaintiff or the party instituting the case was the People of the Philippines. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court leaves no room for doubt and establishes that criminal cases are prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines, the offended party in criminal cases. Moreover, pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (2) of the Revised Administrative Code, the DOJ is the. executive arm of the government mandated to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system. It is the DOJ, through its prosecutors, which is authorized to prosecute criminal cases on behalf of the People of the Philippines. Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to

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review by the Secretary of Justice. Since it is the DOJ which is the government agency tasked to prosecute criminal cases before the trial court, the DOJ is best suited to attest whether a similar or related case has been filed or is pending in another court or tribunal. Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez, being the head of the DOJ, therefore, had the authority to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping for the criminal case which was filed on behalf of the People of the Philippines (Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009). 6. In a case, the accused argues that he can no longer be charged because he was left alone after either the death or acquittal or the failure to charge his co-conspirators. The accused likewise argues that his prosecution, to the exclusion of others, constitutes unfair discrimination and violates his constitutional right to equal protection of the law. He says that the dismissal of the case against his co-accused was not appealed by the prosecution and some who should be accused were not charged. The Court considered the argument erroneous. A conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. As long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense. The Court also held that the accused was not unfairly discriminated against and his constitutional right to equal protection violated. The Court explained that the manner in which the prosecution of the case is handled is within the sound discretion of the prosecutor, and the non-inclusion of other guilty persons is irrelevant to the case against the accused. A discriminatory purpose is never presumed. The facts show that it was not solely the respondent who was charged, but also five others. Further, the fact that the dismissal of the dase against his co-accused was not appealed is not sufficient to cry discrimination. This is likewise true for the non-

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inclusion of the two persons. Mere speculation, unsupported by convincing evidence, cannot establish discrimination on the part of the prosecution and the denial to respondent of the equal protection of the laws (People v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 168918, March 2, 2009). 7. Another case lucidly illustrates the consequences of the rule that the prosecution of a crime is under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, in the case of Pinote v. Ayco, A.M. No-RTJ-05-1944, December 13, 2005, the trial judge allowed the defense to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of the prosecutor charged with prosecuting the case. The prosecutor at the time was undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City. Maintaining that the proceedings conducted in his absence were void, the prosecutor, on the subsequent hearings of the case, refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by the judge. After manifesting to the court the reason for his absence, a reason earlier relayed to the court on the day of the hearing in question, he reiterated his position that the act of the judge of allowing the defense to present evidence in his absence was erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed that he should not be "coerced" to cross-examine those two defense witnesses and that their testimonies be stricken off the record. The judge, nevertheless considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross- examine the two defense witnesses. An administrative complaint was then lodged by the prosecutor against the judge for "gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct." On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), citing Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, found respondent judge to have breached said rule and accordingly recommended that he be reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same 05 similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

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Adopting the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator, the Court ruled that a violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account, held the Court, that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people. The act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses. Added the Court: "Respondent's intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State."

Prosecution of a criminal action in the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court A criminal action in a Municipal Trial Court or in a Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall also be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court). However, when the prosecutor assigned is not available, the action may be prosecuted by (a) the offended party, (b) any peace officer, (c) or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated (OCA Circular No. 39- 2002, August 21,2002). Prosecution for violation of special laws Where the offense is a violation of a special law, the same shall be prosecuted pursuant to the provisions of said law (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court).

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III. INTERVENTION OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION Intervention of the offended party 1. A fundamental principle in criminal law is the rule that "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable" (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Thus, generally, a person convicted of a crime is both criminally and civilly liable. 2. The civil liability for a crime includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification for consequential damages (Article 104, Revised Penal Code). Except when the civil liability is extinguished, the offender shall be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, even if he has already served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reasons (Article 113, Revised Penal Code). 3. It is because of the existence of a civil liability involved in a crime, that the offended party is allowed to intervene in the prosecution of the offense. Thus, Sec. 16 of Rule 110 provides that "xxx Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense." 4. By virtue of Sec. 16 of Rule 110 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111, for the offended party to acquire the right to intervene in the prosecution of the offense, it is necessary that the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability be instituted with the criminal action. If the civil liability has been waived, or the civil action to recover the civil liability has been reserved or has been instituted prior to the criminal action, there is no civil liability which would supply a basis for the intervention of the offended party through his counsel or private prosecutor. The presence of a private prosecutor in thp criminal action may be objected to by the prosecution.

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5. There are however, cases where the criminal action also gives rise to an independent civil action as in crimes involving physical injuries, fraud or defamation or when the act constituting a crime also constitutes a quasi-delict. These situations give rise to distinct civil liabilities to wit: The one arising from the offense charged under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and the civil liabilities arising from quasi-delicts or independent civil actions. Worthy of note is the principle that the latter sources of civil liabilities do not arise from the offense charged. By virtue of its independent character as a distinct source of civil liability, the filing of a suit based on a quasi- delict theory during the pendency of the criminal proceeding, should not prevent the intervention by the offended party in the prosecution of the offense because there still exists a civil liability under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the civil liability arising from the offense charged which would be the basis for the intervention. This is because the civil liability arising from a quasi-delict "is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code" (Article 2177, Civil Code of the Philippines). Also, in the case of independent civil actions, they "may proceed independently of the criminal action" (Sec. 3, Rule 111, Rules of Court). 6. It needs to be emphasized that the civil liabilities arising from independent civil actions and a quasi-delict do not arise from the felony or crime, and have distinct sources from the law or the Civil Code. They are not hence, covered by the provision of the Revised Penal Code declaring that persons liable for a felony are also civilly liable. Such civil actions "may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter" (Article 31, Civil Code of the Philippines). When a private prosecutor may prosecute a case even in the absence of the public prosecutor 1. A private prosecutor may prosecute the criminal action up to the end of the trial even in the absence of the

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public prosecutor if he is authorized to do so in writing. This written authorization shall be given by either the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor. The written authorization in order to be given effect must however, be approved by the court (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court; A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC, April 10,2002 effective May 1,2002). 2. The written authorization to the private prosecutor shall be given because of either of the following reasons: (a) the public prosecutor has a heavy work schedule or, (b) there is a lack of public prosecutors (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court; A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC, Effective May 1,2002). Extent of the authority given to the private prosecutor when duly authorized to prosecute the action Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court; A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC, April 10, 2002 effective May 1,2002). IV. PROSECUTION OF "PRIVATE CRIMES" Prosecution of adultery and concubinage 1. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court). The rule is clear: The prosecutor cannot prosecute the case where no complaint is filed by the offended spouse. The same rule also provides that the action cannot be instituted against one party alone. It must be instituted against both guilty parties, unless one of them is no longer alive (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court). 2. The offense of adultery and concubinage may not be instituted if it is shown that the offended party has consented to the offense or has pardoned the offenders (Sec. 5, Rule

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110, Rules of Court). Since the rule does not distinguish, the consent or pardon may be either expressed or implied. Prosecution of seduction, abduction and acts of lascivious- ness 1. The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasci- viousness shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by any of them (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Note that the pardon must be expressly made. It is clear that an implied pardon is not contemplated under this provision. However, if the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court). In the order of those who may file the complaint, the State is the last and may only do so in the absence of the persons mentioned in Sec. 5 of Rule 110. 2. Also, under Sec. 5 of Rule 110, the offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the offense, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian except if she is incompetent or incapable of doing so (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Where the minor fails to initiate the prosecution of the offense, the complaint may be filed by the minor's parents, grandparents or guardian. (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Effect of R.A. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) Under Sec. 27 of R. A. 7610, complaints on cases of unlawful acts mentioned in the law committed against children, may be filed by the following: (a) offended party; (b)

parents or guardians;

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ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity; officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution; officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development; barangay chairman; or at least three (3) concerned, responsible citizens where the violation occurred.

Prosecution of defamation 1. The defamation under this rule (Sec. 5, Rule 110) consists in the imputation of the offenses of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court). 2. The criminal action for defamation under the rule shall be brought at the instance of and upon the complaint filed by the offended party (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court). This rule clearly provides that only the offended party can initiate the criminal action. V. THE COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION Meaning of 'complaint' 1. A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer, charged with the enforcement of the law violated (Sec. 3, Rule 110, Rules of Court). 2. A complaint is not a mere statement. It is a statement charging a person with an offense. As a statement it must be "sworn" and "written." Be it noted too that the complaint is subscribed only by any of the persons specified in the rule, namely, the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated.

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In whose name and against whom filed 1. The complaint is not filed in the name of a private person, natural or juridical. It is filed in the name of the People of the Philippines and is filed against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved (Sec. 2, Rule 110, Rules of Court). 2. Private offended parties have limited roles in criminal cases. They are only witnesses for the prosecution. Thus, a private offended party may not appeal the dismissal of a criminal case or the acquittal of an accused because the aggrieved party is the People of the Philippines. However, the offended party may appeal the civil aspect of the case and may, thus, file a special civil action for certiorari questioning the decision/action of the court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the private offended party cannot bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines, but must prosecute the same in his own personal capacity. The dismissal made by the RTC of the criminal case can only be appealed by the OSG. The private offended party has no legal personality to do so. Here, the Supreme Court applied the general rule under Sec. 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provided that only the OSG can bring and/or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the people or the State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the CA (Elvira O. Ong v. Jose Casim Genio, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009). Note: Any appeal is subject to the rule against double jeopardy (Sec. 1, Rule 122). Meaning of 'information' (Bar 1994,1995,1996) An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court (Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; People v. Cinco, G.R. No.186460, December 4,2009). 2. While an information is an accusation in writing, it is not required to be "sworn" unlike a complaint. Only a public officer described by the Rules of Court as a "prosecutor" is 1.

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authorized to subscribe to the information (Sec. 4, Rule, 110, Rules of Court). 3. Like a complaint, an information is filed in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved (Sec. 2, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Distinctions between a complaint and an information (Bar 1999) 1. A complaint must be "sworn" hence, under oath. By the clear terms of Sec. 3 of Rule 110, it is a "sworn written statement." An information requires no oath. Sec. 4 of Rule 110 merely requires that it be an accusation "in writing." This is because the prosecutor filing the information is acting under the oath of his office (Estudillo v. Baloma, 426 SCRA 83). 2. A complaint or information is subscribed by (a) the offended party, (b) any peace officer, (c) or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated (Sec. 3, Rule 110, Rules of Court). On the other hand, an information is subscribed by the prosecutor (Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Infirmity of signature in the information It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent (Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173). Sufficiency of the complaint or information (Bar 1994; 2001) 1. A complaint or an information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) The name of the accused; if the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information; o

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The designation of the offense given by statute; offense;

The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the The name of the offended party;

and

The approximate date of the commission of the offense;

The place where the offense was committed (Sec. 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court; People v. Canares, G.R. No. 174065, February 18,2009). 2. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed (Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007; People v. Canares, G.R. No. 174065, February 18, 2009; People v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 172372, December 4, 2009; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011). Test for sufficiency of the complaint or information 1. The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged (Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122, March 13,2009) because the purpose of the requirement for the information's validity and sufficiency is to enable the accused to suitably prepare for his defense, since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense (People v. Cinco, G.R. No. 186460, December 4,2009). Questioning the insufficiency of the complaint or information The sufficiency of an information may be assailed but the right to question the sufficiency of the same is not absolute. "An accused is deemed to have waived this right if he fails to object Upon his arraignment or during trial. In either case, evidence

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presented during trial can cure the defect in the information." An accused is deemed to have waived his right to assail the sufficiency of the information when he voluntarily entered a plea when arraigned and participated in the trial (Frias v. People, G.R. No. 171437, October 4,2007). Objections as to form Objections relating to the form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. The accused-appellant should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars or for the quashal of the information. Having failed to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have waived his objections to any formal defect in the information (The People of the Philippines v. Romar Teodoro y Vallejo, G.R. No. 172372, December 4,2009). Date of the commission of the offense 1. Sec. 11 of the same Rule also provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when the date of commission is a material element of the offense. The offense may thus be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. At the minimum, an indictment must contain all the essential elements of the offense charged to enable the accused to properly meet the charge and duly prepare for his defense (Sec. 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court; People v. Canares, G.R. No. 174065, February 18,2009; People v. Cinco, G.R. No. 186460, December 4,2009; People v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 172372, December 4,2009). In rape cases for instance, the failure to specify the exact dates or times when the rape occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. The precise time when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need noli

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be stated with absolute accuracy (People v. Cinco, G.R. No. 186460, December 4,2009). Determination of the nature and character of the crime 1. The character of the crime is determined neither by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the information. Consequently, even if the designation of the crime in the information was defective, what is controlling is the allegation of the facts in the information that comprises a crime and adequately describes the nature and cause of the accusation against the accused (People v. Anguac, G.R. No. 176744, June 5,2009).

2. It is axiomatic that the nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the designation of the specific crime, but by the facts alleged in the information. Controlling in an information should not be the title of the complaint or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited (People v. Quemeggen, G.R. No. 178205, July 27,2009). How to state the name of the accused 1. Sec. 7 of Rule 110 establishes the following rules in designating the name of the accused: (a) The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has been or is known. (b) If his name cannot be ascertained, he must be described under a fictitious name. A description of the accused under a fictitious name must be accompanied by a statement that his true name is unknown.

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(c) If later his true name is disclosed by him or becomes known in some other manner, his true name shall be inserted in the complaint or information and in the records of the case. 2. A mistake in the name of the accused is not equivalent, and does not necessarily amount to, a mistake in the identity of the accused especially when sufficient evidence is adduced to show that the accused is pointed to as one of the perpetrators of the crime (People v. Amodia, G.R. No. 173791, April 7, 2009). However, the identity of the accused must be proven (People v. Tumambing, G.R. No. 191261, March 2, 2011). How to state the name of the offended party who is a natural person The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the offended party or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. However, if there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name. If later on, the true name of the offended party is disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted (Sec. 12, Rule 110, Rules of Court). How to state the name of the offended party which is a juridical person If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name or any name or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without need of averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law (Sec. 12[c], Rule 110, Rules of Court). Rule if the name of the offended party is unknown in offenses against property In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged (Sec. 12[a], Rule 110, Rules of Court). In Sayson v. People, G.R. No.

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L-51745, October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA 680, the Court ruled that in case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified (Cited in Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, February 9,2007). Designation of the offense 1. It is settled that it is the allegations in the information that determine the nature of the offense, not the technical name given by the public prosecutor in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth (Matrido v. People, G.R. No. 179061, July 13,2009). The specific acts of the accused do not have to be described in detail in the information as it is enough that the offense be described with sufficient particularity to make sure the accused fully understands what he is being charged with. The particularity must be such that a person of ordinary intelligence immediately knows what the charge is. Moreover, reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices (Guy v. People, G.R. Nos. 166794-96, March 20,2009). 2. In designating the offense, the following rules must be observed: (a) The designation of the offense requires, as a rule, that the name given to the offense by statute must be stated in the complaint or information. If the statute gives no designation to the offense, then reference must instead be made to the section or 1 subsection punishing it (Sec. 8, Rule 110, Rules of Court).

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(b) To be included in the complete designation of the offense is an averment of the acts or omissions constituting the offense (Sec. 8, Rule 110, Rules of Court). (c) The complaint or information must specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of the offense (Sec. 8, Rule 110, Rules of Court; See People v. Ogarte, G.R. No. 182690, May 30,2011 for suggested reading). Effect of failure to designate the offense by the statute or failure to mention the provision violated 1. The failure to designate the offense by the statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act or an erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged (Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007). There is no law which requires that in order that an accused may be convicted, the specific provision which penalizes the act charged be mentioned in the information (Licyayo v. People, G.R. No. 169425, March 4,2008). 2. In Licyayo v. People, G.R. No. 169425, March 4,2008, the information accuses the accused of the crime of homicide but does not categorically state that he is being charged with homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused argues that the specification in the information of the law violated is necessary to enable him to adequately prepare for his defense, and to convict him under such defective information would allegedly violate his constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. The Court ruled that the fact that the information does not specifically mention Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code as the law which defines and penalizes homicide, does not make the information defective. There is nothing in the Rules of Court which specifically requires that the information must state the particular law under which the accused is charged in order for it to be considered sufficient and valid. Although the information does not specifically mention Article 249 of the

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Revised Penal Code, it nonetheless narrates that the accused stabbed the victim with a bladed weapon during the incident which caused the latter's death. The allegations, according to the Court, unmistakably refer to homicide which is the unlawful killing of any person other than murder, homicide or infanticide. The Court likewise held in the same case that the sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Court in the case asserted that the character of the crime is determined neither by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the information Effect of failure to specify the correct crime The failure to specify the correct crime committed will not bar conviction of an accused. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information or by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated. The crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information (Briones v. People, G.R. No. 156009, June 5, 2009). Statement of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances (Bar 2001) 1. Every information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty (People v. Tampus, et al, G.R. No. 181084, June 16,2009; %p. 8, Sec. 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court).

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The rationale for the requirement was elucidated in a much earlier case. In People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 132923-24, June 6, 2002, the accused was found guilty by the trial court of two counts of rape, each qualified by the use of a deadly weapon. The informations however, did not allege that the rapes were committed with the use of a deadly weapon. The Court was emphatic when it declared that the accused cannot be convicted of rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon and be made to suffer a higher penalty since that circumstance was not alleged in the information. Not having been alleged and having been charged with simple rape only, the accused cannot be convicted of qualified rape. He cannot be held liable for an offense graver than that for which he was indicted. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape, on which he was arraigned, and be convicted of qualified rape punishable by death. 2. In one information for arson, there was no allegation that the house intentionally burned by petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited that "accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of the [offended party] to the latter's damage and prejudice." Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances, otherwise stated, the accused will not be convicted of the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in the information Hence, he can only be liable for simple arson and not arson of an inhabited dwelling which carries a higher penalty (Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28,2008). Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the

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commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts could no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance had been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. Also, even if the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt, the accused cannot be convicted of qualified rape but only with simple rape because the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the information (People v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009; People v. Alfredo, G.R. No. 188560, December 15, 2010). 3. The qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as "qualifying" or "qualified by7' to properly qualify an offense. It is not the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher category (People v. Rosas, G.R. No. 177825, October 24, 2008). 4. In one case brought to the Supreme Court, both the accused contend that the information did not contain any allegation of conspiracy, either by the use of the words conspire or its derivatives and synonyms, or by allegations of basic facts constituting conspiracy that will make them liable for the acts of their co-accused. The Court considered the contention untenable. It is true as it is settled, declared the Court, that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred in the information. The Court however, found that while a perusal of the information readily shows that the words "conspiracy," "conspired" or "in conspiracy with" do not appear in the information, this however, does not necessarily mean that the absence of these words would signify that conspiracy was not alleged in the information. After carefully reading the information, the Court concluded that indeed conspiracy was properly

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alleged in the information. The accusatory portion reads in part: "all the above-named accused, with evident intent to defraud the government of legitimate taxes accruing to it from imported articles, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly participate in and facilitate the transportation, concealment, and possession of dutiable electronic equipment and accessories with a domestic market value of P20,000,000.00 contained in container van No. TTNU9201241, but which were declared in Formal Entry and Revenue Declaration No. 118302 as assorted men's and ladies' accessories x x x." The Court ruled that "We find the phrase "participate in and facilitate" to be a clear and definite allegation of conspiracy sufficient for those being accused to competently enter a plea and to make a proper defense." Both accused were charged because they assisted in and facilitated the release of the subject cargo without the payment of the proper duties and taxes due the government by omitting certain acts in the light of glaring discrepancies and suspicious entries present in the documents involved in the subject importation (Francisco v. People, G.R. No. 177430, July 14, 2009; Ojeda v. People, G.R. No. 178935, July 14, 2009). 5. A similar pronouncement was made by the Court in a fairly recent case. In People v. Ubifia, G.R. No. 176349, July 10, 2007, the Court declared that the twin circumstances of minority and relationship under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty. As special qualifying circumstances they must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information. "If the offender is merely a relation — not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or common law spouse of the mother of the victim — the specific relationship must be alleged in the information, i.e., that he is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as the case may be] within the third civil degree." The Court found that the information in Ubifia only mentioned accused/appellant as the victim's uncle, without specifically stating that he is a relative within the third civil

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degree, either by affinity or consanguinity. Even granting that during trial it was proved that the relationship was within the third civil degree either of consanguinity or affinity, still such proof cannot be appreciated because appellant would thereby be denied of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Appellant cannot be charged with committing the crime of rape in its simple form and then be tried and convicted of rape in its qualified form. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded the qualifying circumstance of relationship. Cause of accusation 1. The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and an accused's right to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the information cannot be waived. No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. To convict him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights (Matrido v. People, G.R. No. 179061, July 13,2009). 2. In informing the accused of the cause of accusation against him, it is not necessary to employ the words used in the statute alleged to have been violated. It is sufficient for the complaint or information to use ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the following (Sec. 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court): (a)

the offense being charged;

(b) the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; and di (c) the qualifying and aggravating circumstances.

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What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against the accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint, and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint, nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated they being conclusions of law (Nombrefia v. People, G.R. No. 157919, January 30, 2007). 3. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the requirement of alleging all the elements of the crime in the information is to inform an accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare for his defense. Another purpose is to enable the accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense (Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 29,2003). 4. The accused will not be convicted of the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in the information. If the information charges a violation of a law (Sec. 3, Par. 2 ofP.D. No. 1613) that requires an intentional burning of a house or dwelling but the same information does not allege that there was an intentional burning of such dwelling, there cannot be a conviction under the said law because of an insufficiency in the allegations of the information. The failure to make the required allegations is fatal to a charge of arson under the applicable law (Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28,2008). 5. In another case, the victim was raped by the accused while she was under the custody of law enforcement authorities who were members of the PNP-CIDG at the time of the rape. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the

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penalty for rape committed through force and intimidation is reclusion perpetua. The same provision also states that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim was raped while under the custody of the police authorities, or when the rape is committed by any member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) or any law enforcement agency. This circumstance was not however, specifically alleged in the information. The Court held that it cannot therefore, be appreciated even if subsequently proved during the trial. The RTC, ruled the Court, was correct in imposing only reclusion perpetua (People v. Aure, G.R. No. 180451, October 17,2008). 6. Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to the victim, either as the victim's parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order for them to serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the information, and even though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that would serve to increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, every information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Since in the case at bar, the information did not state that the accused is the mother of the victim, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. She may only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua (People v. Tampus, G.R. No. 181084, June 16,2009).

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Similarly, in People v. Mejia, G.R. No. 185723, August 4, 2009, the qualifying circumstance of minority which was not alleged in the information was appreciated by the trial court in convicting the accused of rape. Sustaining the Court of Appeals which disregarded the qualifying circumstance, the Court ruled that the said circumstance cannot be considered in fixing the penalty because minority, though proved, was not alleged in the information. As regards relationship, the same was alleged and proved. Pursuant, however, to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in order to fall within subparagraph 1 of said provision, both circumstances of minority and relationship must be alleged in the information. The twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur to qualify the crime of rape. In the instant case, only relationship was duly alleged and proved. The Court clearly explained: "Jurisprudence dictates that when the law specifies certain circumstances that will qualify an offense and thus attach to it a greater degree of penalty, such circumstances must be both alleged and proven in order to justify the imposition of the graver penalty. Recent rulings of the Court relative to the rape of minors invariably state that in order to justify the imposition of death, there must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused. A duly certified certificate of live birth accurately showing the complainant's age, or some other official document or record such as a school record, has been recognized as competent evidence. "In the instant case, we find insufficient the bare testimony of private complainants and their mother as to their ages as well as their kinship to the appellant, x x x [ W e ] cannot agree with the solicitor general that appellant's admission of his relationship with his victims would suffice. Elementary is the doctrine that the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of a crime, including the qualifying circumstances. In sum, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon appellant."

(citation omitted)

1 >r

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7. In People v. Begino, G.R. No. 181246, March 20, 2009, where the qualifying circumstances of relationship was not properly pleaded, the accused was not convicted of rape in the qualified form. The failure to so allege such relationship means that the accused was not properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The main purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense and he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 8. In another case, the information charging the petitioners with violation of R.A. No. 6539, as amended, did not allege that the carnapping was committed by means of violence against, or intimidation of, any person, or force upon things. The Court emphasized that while these circumstances were proven at the trial, they cannot be appreciated because they were not alleged in the information. Thus, the lower courts erred when they took these circumstances into account in imposing the penalty which they pegged at seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years imprisonment. In the absence of these circumstances, the charge against the petitioners is confined to simple carnapping whose imposable penalty should have been imprisonment for not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, and not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months (Andres v. People, G.R. No. 185860, June 5,2009). How to state the date of the commission of the offense 1. Sec. 11 of Rule 110 establishes the general rule that it is not necessary to state the precise date the offense was committed because the offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. 2. The same rule provides by way of exception that it is necessary to state the precise date the offense was committed when it is a material ingredient of the offense (Sec. 11, Rule HO, Rules of Court; People v. Cinco, G.R. No. 186460, December 4,2009; People v. Dion, G.R. No. 181035, July 4, 2011).

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3. Sec. 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the approximate date of the commission of the offense will suffice, while Sec. 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime (People v. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2,2009; People v. Fragante, G.R. No. 182521, February 9, 2011; Suggested readings: People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, May 30, 2011). Duplicity of the offense (Bar 2005) 1. The general rule is that a complaint or an information must charge only one offense. More than one offense may however, be charged when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court). 2. An objection must be timely interposed whenever a complaint or information charges more than one offense. Failure of the accused to interpose an objection on the ground of duplicity of the offenses charged in the information constitutes waiver (People v. Tabio, G.R. No. 179477, February 6,2008). When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information, the accused must object to such fact before trial. If he does not so object, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense (Sec. 3, Rule 120, Rules of Court; People v. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16,2011). 3. There should also be no problem in convicting an accused of two or more crimes erroneously charged in one information or complaint, but later proven to be independent crimes, as if they were made the subject of separate complaints or informations. As worded, the information sufficiently alleged all the elements of both felonies. Needless to state, appellants failed, before their arraignment, to move for the quashal of the information, which appeared to charge more than one offense. They have thereby waived any objection thereto, and may thus be found guilty of as many offenses as

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those charged in the information and proven during the trial (People v. Quemeggen, G.R. No. 178205, July 27,2009). VI. VENUE OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS 1. As a rule, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory (a) where the offense was committed, or (b) where any of its essential ingredients occurred. This rule is however, subject to existing laws (Sec. 15[a], Rule 110, Rules of Court). 2. In cases of written defamation, whether the offended party is a public official or a private individual, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. There are however, additional venues. If the offended party is a private individual, the action may also be filed in the CFI (now RTC) of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. If the offended party is a public officer holding office in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the CFI (now RTC) of Manila. If the public officer holds office outside Manila, the action may be filed in the CFI (now RTC) of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense (Agbayani v. Sayo, 178 Phil. 579; Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9,2009). Thus, if the criminal information is filed in the place where the defamatory article was printed or first published, then the information must so state that the libelous material was either printed or first published in the place of the filing of the information. Merely alleging that the paper or magazine is of general circulation in the place where the action is instituted does not confer territorial jurisdiction upon the court. A conviction under this kind of information should be set aside for want of jurisdiction. 3. In one case, an information for written defamation was filed in Iloilo City but the information merely alleged that the newspaper where the alleged defamatory article

CHAPTER II PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES (Rule 110)

appeared had "considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region." The Court ruled that the allegations did not establish where the said publication was printed or first published (Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9,2009). Similarly, in another case, the information filed in Manila merely alleged that the defamatory article was published in "Smart File," a magazine of general circulation in Manila. A perusal of the information, explained the Court, show that the allegations did not establish the printing of the magazine in Manila where the criminal action was instituted (Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 514 SCRA 279). Also, an information which merely alleged that the libelous article "was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer," a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City, did not sufficiently show Baguio City to be the proper venue of the printing and first publication of the newspaper (Agustin v. Pamintuan, 467 SCRA 601). Rule where offense is committed in a train, aircraft or vehicle Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or vehicle, whether public or private, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft, or other vehicle passed during its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival. Note that this rule applies when the offense is committed in the course of the trip of the train, aircraft or vehicle (Sec. 15[b], Rule 110, Rules of Court). Rule where offense is committed on board a vessel Where an offense is committed on board a vessel, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in (a) the court of the first port of entry, or (b) of the municipality or territory where the vessel passed during its voyage. This rule applies when the offense is committed during the voyage of the vessel and is subject to the generally accepted principles of international law (Sec. 15[c], Rule 110, Rules of Court).

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Rule when the offense is covered by Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed (Sec. 15[d], Rule 110, Rules of Court). How to state the place of the commission of the offense The statement of the place of commission of an offense is sufficient if it can be understood from the allegations of the complaint or information that the offense was committed or some of its essential elements occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court (Sec. 10, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Where the particular place where the offense was committed is however, an essential element of the offense or is necessary for its identification, it is implied from the rule that the description of the place of commission of the offense must be specific. VII. AMENDMENT OR SUBSTITUTION OF THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION Amendment of the information or complaint before plea; no need for leave (Bar 2001; 2002) If the amendment is made before the accused enters his plea, the complaint or information may be amended in form or in substance, without the need for leave of court (Sec. 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court). When leave of court is required even if the amendment is made before plea 1. Leave of court is required even if made before plea if: (a) the amendment downgrades the nature of the offense charged, or (b) the amendment excludes any accused from the complaint or information (Sec. 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court).

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2. Aside from leave of court, the above amendments, require a motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party (Sec. 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court). 3. The court is mandated by the rule to state its reasons in resolving the motion of the prosecutor and to furnish all parties, especially the offended party, of copies of its order (Sec. 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Rule as to amendment made after the plea of the accused 1. If the amendment is made after the plea of the accused and during the trial, any formal amendment may only be made under two conditions, namely: (a) leave of court must be secured; and (b) the amendment does not cause prejudice to the rights of the accused (Sec. 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Since the rule makes reference only to a formal amendment after the plea, the phraseology of the rule seems to indicate that an amendment in substance is, as a rule, clearly not allowed at this stage. 2. In a case, however, the Court held that before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused (Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, February 9,2007 citing Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 736). When an amendment is formal or substantial (Bar 1997) 1. Thus, it has been held that the test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the

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nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. Thus, the substitution of the private complainant is not a substantial amendment where the substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to the other party. More so if the documentary evidences involved in the case remained the same, and all are available to the other party before trial (Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, February 9,2007). 2. On the other hand, the following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged (Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, February 9,2007). 3. One case which illustrates the distinction between a formal and substantial amendment particularly well is Pacoy v. Judge Afable Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, September 28,2007. Here, upon arraignment, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide. However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the information to murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the information which the judge considered as having qualified the crime to murder.

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Acting upon such order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide" and instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original information for homicide. On the date scheduled for the re-arraignment of the accused for the crime of murder, the counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his homicide case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As the accused refused to enter his plea on the amended information for murder, the public respondent judge entered for him a plea of not guilty. One of the issues sought to be resolved in the Supreme Court was whether or not the amendment from homicide to murder is a substantial one. In resolving the issue, the Court ruled, that the change of the offense charged from homicide to murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution. The Court ratiocinated that while the amended information was for murder, a reading of the information shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder." There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original information for homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to the accused. Thus, the Court found the amendment made in the caption and preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal. Sec. 14, Rule 110 explained the Court, also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether

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the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended information are identical with those of the original information for homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner (Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, September 28,2007). Substitution of complaint or information (Bar 2002) 1. A complaint or information may be substituted if it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. In such a case, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information once the new one charging the proper offense is filed provided the accused will not be placed in double jeopardy. (Sec. 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court). 2, The dismissal of the original complaint or information is subject to the provisions of Sec. 19 of Rule 119. Under this provision, if it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or of any other offense necessarily included therein, as when a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court nevertheless, shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense by requiring the filing of the proper information. The accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. After the proper information is filed, it shall dismiss the original case. Distinction between substitution and amendment (Bar 1994) The pronouncements in Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007 citing Teehankee v. Madayag, G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134, which distinguish

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between amendment and substitution under Sec. 14 of Rule 110, are illuminating: "The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects: 1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge; 2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed; 3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and 4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy. In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the

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second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter."

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Chapter III PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION (Rule 111) Implied institution of the civil action with the criminal action 1. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action (Sec. 1 [a], Rule 111, Rules of Court). The reason for the implied institution of the criminal action is the principle that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the criminal. The civil aspect is based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in the instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation (Cruz v. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, April 27,2007). 2. A separate civil action would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil (Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, February 9,2007).

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The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of suits. Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the offended party benefits from such result and is able to collect the damages awarded to him (Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169711, February 8,2010). 3. The rule on implied institution of the civil action does not apply before the filing of the criminal action or information. Hence, it was ruled in one case that when there is no criminal case yet against the respondents as when the Ombudsman is still in the process of finding probable cause to prosecute the respondent, the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted along with the criminal action unless the offended party: (a) waives the civil action, (b) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, is not applicable (ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 133347, October 15,2008). Purposes of the criminal and civil actions The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. The sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused (Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, February 9,2007).

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Judgment of conviction includes a judgment on the civil liability Because of the rule that the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any and if the filing of the civil action has not been reserved, previously instituted or waived (Hun Hyung Park v. Eun Wong Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12,2007). Who the real parties in interest are in the civil aspect of the case The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused. Hence, either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor generally has no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he is concerned (Hun Hyung Park v. Eun Wong Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12, 2007). Rule applicable One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit (Hun Hyung Park v. Eun Wong Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12,2007). When a civil action may proceed independently; independent civil actions and quasi-delicts (Bar 2005) 1. The 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. Under the Rules, only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed included in a crimi

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nal action. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution which may be based on the same act (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703, April 14,2004). Thus, if the employee/driver of a common carrier, by his negligent act causes serious injuries to a pedestrian, the former is not only civilly liable as a result of the felonious act (reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries) but is likewise liable under a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana pursuant to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Such civil liability even if resulting from the same negligent act is separate and independent of the crime. 2. Another possible legal basis for the institution of a civil action against the driver separate from the civil action flowing from the offense is Article 33 of the Civil Code. Because the act of the driver has caused physical injuries, "a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal act, may be brought by the offended party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence" (Article 33, Civil Code of the Philippines). 3. By the clear terms of Article 2177 of the Civil Code, the responsibility arising from a quasi-delict "is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code " The same rule in Article 2177 of the Civil Code finds support from Article 31 of the same Code, thus: "When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the results of the latter." Article 2176 arises from a source of obligation distinct from a crime while Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code are sources of obligations arising from direct provisions of

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law. The civil actions arising from these articles do not arise from the acts or omissions constituting a felony hence, are not impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Only the civil action to recover the civil liability flowing from or arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. 4. The civil actions arising from Articles 2176, 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code may be filed independently and separately from the criminal action because they do not arise from the offense charged. What the law proscribes is double recovery. Article 2177 of the Civil Code declares that "the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant The same prohibition on double recovery is reiterated in the Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule 111), thus: "x x x In no case however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."

5. A criminal case based on defamation, fraud or physical injuries gives rise to an independent civil action arising not from the crime charged but from Article 33 even if caused by the very same defamatory or fraudulent act. This civil action is also distinct from the civil action which is the consequence of the alleged criminal act. The same principle applies to all those actions based on Articles 32, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code which may arise from the very same act that gave rise to the crime. Consequences of the independent character of actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code The following are some of the consequences of the separate and distinct character of civil actions arising not from the offense charged but from Articles 32,33,34 and 2176 of the Civil Code: 1. The right to bring the civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action (Sec. 3, Rule 111, Rules

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of Court) and regardless of the results of the latter (Article 31, Civil Code of the Philippines). (Bar 2005) 2. The quantum of evidence required is preponderance of evidence (Sec. 3, Rule 111, Rules of Court). 3. (a) The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein. (b) The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring an independent civil action. (c) Even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may — subject to the control of the prosecutor — still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein (See also Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703, April 14,2004). When there is no implied institution of the civil action 1. There is no implied institution of the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense charged in any of the following instances: (a) When the offended party waives the civil action; (b) When the offended party reserves the right to institute the civil action separately; or (c) When the offended party institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action (Sec. 1 [a], Rule 111, Rules of Court). The above rule has no application to independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. 2. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense

CHAPTER in PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION (Rule 111)

charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action. Hence, it is correct to argue that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect of the criminal case, it follows that the civil case arising from grave threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect (Cruz v. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, April 27,2007). Reservation of the civil action If the offended party desires to reserve the right to institute the civil action after the criminal action has been instituted, the reservation shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence. The reservation is to be made under circumstances that would afford the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation (Sec. l[a], Rule 111, Rules of Court). No reservation of the civil action in Batas Pambansa Big. 22 (Bar 2001; 2002) 1. While the rule allows the offended party to reserve the right to institute the civil action, such right does not apply to a prosecution of a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, which is the law on bouncing checks. The criminal action in this case shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. Upon the filing of the joint and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. This amount shall also be considered as the actual damages claimed (Sec. l[b], Rule 111, Rules of Court). It should be observed that what the rule prohibits is the filing of a reservation to file the civil action arising from Batas Pambansa Big 22. It does not prohibit the waiver of the civil action or the institution of the civil action prior to the criminal action. 2. Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case (Lo Bun Tiong v. Balboa, G.R. No.

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158177, January 28, 2008). Quoting the earlier case of Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp. (465 SCRA 454) the Court noted in Lo Bun Tiong: w

x x x This rule [Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure] was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit grab's and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners' rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted." (Emphasis supplied)

When the separate civil action is suspended 1. After the criminal action is commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action (Sec. 2, Rule

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111, Rules of Court). The rule indicates that preference is given to the resolution of the criminal action. 2. It is submitted that even if the right to institute the civil action separately has been reserved, the separate civil action cannot however, be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action previously instituted. Also, if the civil action was commenced before the institution of the criminal action, the civil action shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits, once the criminal action is filed. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action (Sec. 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court). This rule however, does not apply to independent civil actions discussed earlier and covers only civil actions arising from the offense charged. Consolidation of the civil action with the criminal action 1. It is clear that the above rule, as it stands, gives precedence to the resolution of the criminal action and will necessarily result in a delay in the disposition of the civil action which may have been already filed or of the action the right to the filing of which has been reserved. However, the rule also affords a remedy to avoid such a delay. The offended party may move for the consolidation of the civil action with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. The motion for consolidation by the offended party is to be filed before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly (Sec. 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court). 2. If the civil action was commenced ahead of the criminal action and evidence had already been adduced in the civil action even before the institution of the criminal action, the evidence so adduced shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right to cross- examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case. The consolidation shall not likewise prejudice the right of the parties to present additional evidence (Sec. 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court).

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Suspension of the period of prescription Where there is no consolidation of the civil action with the criminal action and the civil action is suspended or the civil action cannot be instituted separately until after final judgment is rendered in the criminal action, the prescriptive period of the civil action shall be tolled during the pendency of the criminal action (Sec. 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court). When no reservation is required; when civil action is not suspended 1. When the act constituting a crime is at the same time a violation of Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code, there is no need to reserve the filing of a separate civil action. The civil actions under the said articles do not arise from the offense but from violations of specific provisions of the Civil Code. Specific attention need be given to the tenor of Sec. 1 of Rule 111. Under said rule, only the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action. Actions based on Articles 32,33, and 34 arise from the law and are commonly called 'independent civil actions' while those based on Article 2176 arise from quasi-delicts. They do not arise from the offense or crime charged and hence, are not deemed instituted with the filing of the criminal action. Article 1156 of the Civil Code considers law' and 'quasidelicts' as sources of obligations separate and distinct from a crime (acts or omissions punished by law). Under Article 31 of the Civil Code, "when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." 2. Article 31 of the Civil Code is reinforced by the Rules of Court, thus: "In the cases provided in Articles 32,33,34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action... In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice

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for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action" (Sec. 3, Rule 111, Rules of Court).

To reiterate: Under Sec. 1 of Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability "arising from the offense charged." Actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code (Casupanan v. Laroya, 388 SCRA 28). In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court further held that what is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi- delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People, 427 SCRA 456). 3. Article 31 of the Civil Code as well as Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court both support the conclusion that the civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines are not suspended by the commencement of the criminal action because they may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings. Counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party claim in a criminal action 1. A court cannot entertain counterclaims, cross-claims and third party complaints in the criminal action. A criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainant's civil liability. A court trying a criminal case is limited to determining the guilt of the accused, and if proper, to determine his civil liability. It cannot award damages in favor of the accused (Maccay v. Nobela, 454 SCRA 504). 2. The rule is explicit: No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject

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thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action (Sec. l[a], Rule 111, Rules of Court).

Rules on filing fees Filing fees apply when damages are being claimed by the offended party. The following summarizes the rule on filing fees: (a) There are no filing fees required for actual damages claimed (Sec. l[a], Rule 111) unless required by the Rules. Examples: In Batas Pambansa Big. 22 cases, the filing fees shall be paid based on the amount of the check and shall be paid in full ("Sec. l[b], Rule 111, Rules of Court); In estafa cases, the filing fees shall be paid based on the amount involved (Sec. 21[a], AM. No. 04-2-04, August 16,2004). (b) Filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing of the criminal action in court where he seeks for the enforcement of the civil liability of the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages but other than actual damages, and where the amount of such damages is specified in the complaint or information. If the amount is not specified in the complaint or information but, any of the damages is subsequently awarded, the filing fees assessed in accordance with the Rules, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages (Sec. l[a], Rule 111, Rules of Court). Effect of death of the accused on the civil action 1. If the accused dies after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action, the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime is extinguished but the independent civil actions mentioned in Sec. 3 of Rule 111 and civil liabilities arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against the estate as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs (Sec. 4, Rule 111, Rules of Court).

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The court shall forthwith order the legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice (Sec. 4, Rule 111, Rules of Court). 2. If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed but the offended party may file the proper civil action against the estate of the deceased (Sec. 4, Rule 111, Rules of Court). 3. The Court in ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 133347, October 15, 2008), on the basis of existing jurisprudence like People v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007, September 2,1994), reiterated some rules which may be summarized as follows: (a) The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability "ex delicto in senso strictio- re." But the claim for civil liability predicated on a source of obligation other than a delict survives notwithstanding the death of the accused. This source of obligation may be from law, contract, quasi-contract or quasi-delict. In other words, the civil liability based solely on the criminal action is the one that is extinguished. (b) Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action.The separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based (ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 133347, October 15,2008). 4. The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal with the Supreme Court totally extinguished his criminal liability. Such extinction is based on Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The death of the accused likewise extinguished the civil liability that was based exclusively on the crime for which the accused was convicted {i.e., ex delicto),

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because no final judgment of conviction was yet rendered by the time of his death. Only civil liability predicated on a source of obligation other than the delict survived the death of the accused, which the offended party can recover by means of a separate civil action CPeople of the Philippines v. Bringas Bunay y Dam-at, G.R. No. 171268,, September 14,2010). Thus, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely thereon {People v. Jaime Ayochok y Tauli, G.R. No. 175784, August 25,2010). Novation: extinguishment of criminal liability It is best to emphasize that "novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability." In la catena of cases, it was ruled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or novation of contract. The crime of estafa, reimbursement or belated payment to the offended party of the money swindled by the accused does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. Also, "criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion even though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended party." In estafa, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amount misappropriated after the commission of the crime affects only the civil liability of the offender, and not his criminal liability (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Rogelio Reynaldo and Jose C. Adrandea, G.R. No. 164538, August 9,2010; Citations omitted). Effect of acquittal or the extinction of the penal action on the civil action or civil liability 1. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not

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exist (Sec. 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court). The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Wong Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12, 2007). 2. In case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where such acquitted is based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, since only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases (Ching v. Nicdao, 522 SCRA 316, April 27, 2007; Box v. People, 532 SCRA 284, September 5, 2007). 3. Similarly, it was again held that when the trial court acquits the accused or dismisses the case on the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal action and appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability (Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos, G.R. No 169711, February 8,2010). 4. Thus, under Section 2 of Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, a trial court, in case of acquittal of an accused, is to state whether the prosecution absolutely failed to prove his (accused) guilt or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and in either case, it shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. If after a perusal of the decision of the trial court it shows that it found that the acts or omissions from which the civil liability of respondents might arise did not exist,

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there is no basis to award any civil liability to the private complainants (Ramon Garces v. Simplicio Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 180761, August 18,2010). 5. A more recent case is illustrative of the principle subject of this topic. Here, the petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the Municipal Trial Court. After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged. Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of earning capacity. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court contending that the Municipal Trial Court erred in holding him civilly liable in view of his acquittal but the Regional Trial Court affirmed the judgment appealed from in toto. Refusing to give up, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. Left with no other recourse, petitioner now argued in the Supreme Court that his acquittal should have freed him from payment of civil liability. Emphatically, the Court declared: "We disagree. "The rule is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Every crime gives rise to (1) a criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party and (2) a civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses. However, the reverse is not always true. In this connection, the relevant portions of Section 2, Rule 111 and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provide:

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Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. —

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, (emphasis supplied) "Sec. 2. Contents of the judgment. — xxx In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, (emphasis supplied)

Thus, the rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Courts can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages in the same case. It is not even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted. In this case, the MTC held that it could not ascertain with moral certainty the wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus in view of the condition of the highway where the accident occurred and the short distance between the bus and the taxi before the collision. However, it categorically stated that while petitioner may be acquitted based on reasonable doubt, he may nonetheless be held civilly liable. The RTC added that there was no finding by the MTC that the act from which petitioner's civil liability may arise did not exist. Therefore, the MTC was correct in holding petitioner civilly liable to the heirs of the victims of the collision for the tragedy, mental anguish and trauma they suffered plus expenses they incurred during the wake and interment.

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In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, we agree with the conclusion of the CA that petitioner was acquitted not because he did not commit the crime charged but because the RTC and the MTC could not ascertain with moral conviction the wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of the accident. Put differently, petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, his civil liability for the death, injuries and damages arising from the collision is another matter. While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by preponderance of evidence. In other words, the failure of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable. Thus, the MTC (as affirmed by the RTC and the CA) correctly imposed civil liability on petitioner despite his acquittal. Simple logic also dictates that petitioner would not have been held civilly liable if his act from which the civil liability had arisen did not in fact exist" (Romero v. People, G.R. No. 167546July 17,2009). Effect of payment of the civil liability Payment of civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability (Cabieo v. Dimaculangan-Querijero, 522 SCRA 300, April 27, 2007). While there may be a compromise upon the civil liability arising from the offense, such compromise shall not extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty (Art. 2034, Civil Code of the Philippines). Effect of judgment in the civil case absolving the defendant A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving a defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for the same act or omission subject of the civil action (Sec. 5, Rule 111, Rules of Court).

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Subsidiary liability of employer The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they apply. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. Nonetheless, before the employers' subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate evidence must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) they are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. These conditions may be determined in the same criminal action in which the employee's liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment (Rolito Calang and Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 190696, August 3,2010). Concept of a prejudicial question (Bar 1999) 1. A prejudicial question is an issue involved in a civil case which is similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action, the resolution of which determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. To constitute a prejudicial question, the rule also requires, aside from the related issues, that the civil action be instituted previously or ahead of the criminal action (Sec. 7, Rule 111, Rules of Court). 2. A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in that case. Because the jurisdiction to try and resolve the prejudicial question has been lodged in another tribunal, the applicable rule is that the proceedings in the second case may be suspended to await the resolution of the prejudicial question in the first case (Suggested readings: Omictin v. Court of Appeals, 512 SCRA 70; People v. Sandiganbayan, 485 SCRA 473; Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., 560 SCRA 518; Coca-cola Bottlers [Phils.], Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 560 SCRA 719).

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Reason for the principle The reason behind the principle of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions in the civil case and in the criminal case (Jose v. Suarez, 556 SCRA 773; Sy Thiong Siou v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, March 30,2009). Requisites for a prejudicial question (Bar 1999) 1. Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides: "Sec. 7. Elements of a prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed" (Jose v. Suarez, 556 SCRA 773).

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal (Magestrado v. People, G.R. No. 148072, July 10, 2009). 2. The phraseology of Sec. 7 presupposes the existence of two actions — one civil and the other criminal. Hence, strictly speaking, a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 may not be invoked in any of the following situations: (a) both cases are criminal, (b) both civil, (c) both cases are administrative, (d) one case is administrative and the other civil, or (e) one case is administrative and the other criminal. To employ the word "prejudicial" in any of these situations is to use the same not as a strict legal term but as a mere journalistic device. 3. The same phraseology of Sec. 7 also discloses that even if one case is civil and the other criminal, the principle of a prejudicial question will not arise if the criminal case was

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instituted prior to the civil case. It does not arise because the rule does not merely refer to an instituted civil action but specifically to a "previously instituted* civil action. Neither does it refer to a previously instituted criminal action. That the civil action must have been instituted ahead of the criminal action is confirmed by the same rule which makes reference to a "subsequent criminal action " 4. It was affirmed that under the amendment to the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. If the criminal information was filed ahead of the complaint in the civil case, no prejudicial question exists (Torres v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 153666, December 27,2002). 5. The tenor of Sec. 7 likewise presupposes that the issue that leads to a prejudicial question is one that arises in the civil case and not in the criminal case. It is the issue in the civil case which needs to be resolved first before it is determined whether or not the criminal case should proceed or whether or not there should be, in the criminal case, a judgment of acquittal or conviction. 6. In unmistakable terms, it was stressed that a prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed. The issue raised in the civil action would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case (Sy Thiong Siou v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009). 7. Another vital element of a prejudicial question is one which has something to do with the issues involved. It is worth remarking that not every issue raised in the civil action will result in a prejudicial question. The rule clearly implies that

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it is not enough that both cases involve the same facts or even the same or similar issues to make the civil case prejudicial to the criminal case. The mere claim that the issues in both cases are intimately related will not necessarily make the issue in the civil case prejudicial to the resolution of the issue in the criminal case. It is critical to show that the issue in the civil case is 'determinative' of the issue in the criminal case. In the words of the rule: "x x x the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed" (Sec. 7, Rule 111, Rules of Court). It is apparent that the exact parameters of what is 'determinative* has not been defined by the rule thus, leaving to the court the task of adjudicating upon the existence or non-existence of that vital factor in the application of the principle. Nevertheless, one consequence appears quite clear: If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other, that is, the criminal action can proceed without waiting for the resolution of the issues in the civil case. Effect of the existence of a prejudicial question; suspension of the criminal action (Bar 1995; 1999; 2010) 1. A petition for the suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed (Sec. 6, Rule 111, Rules of Court). Under the clear terms of Sec. 6, it is worth remembering that the rule requires the filing of a petition before the suspension of the criminal action. The rule therefore, as it appears, precludes a motu proprio suspension of the criminal action. 2. The need for the filing of a petition finds support in jurisprudence which declares that since suspension of the proceedings in the criminal action may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge or the investigating prosecutor, the latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of a

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prejudicial question without a petition to suspend being filed. Since a petition to suspend can be filed only in the criminal action, the determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the civil action (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24,2010). 3. It also needs to be stressed that when there is a prejudicial question, the action to be suspended is the criminal and not the previously instituted civil action. When there is a prejudicial question, the criminal case may be suspended pending the final determination of the issues in the civil case. A prejudicial question accords a civil case a preferential treatment and constitutes an exception to the general rule that the civil action shall be suspended when the criminal action is instituted. The general rule provides that if the civil action was commenced before the institution of the criminal action, the civil action shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits, once the criminal action is commenced. "The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action." A prejudicial question is an exception to this rule. The principle of prejudicial question is not within the ambit of this general rule under Sec. 2 of Rule 111. Suspension does not include dismissal The rule authorizing the suspension of the criminal case does not prescribe the dismissal of the criminal action. It only authorizes its suspension. The suspension shall be made upon the filing of a petition for suspension. A case was emphatic in reiterating this principle. The case of Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625, stressed that the rule says "suspension, and not dismissal." Where to file the petition for suspension 1. The filing for a petition for suspension does not require that the criminal case be already filed in court.

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It is sufficient that the case be in the stage of preliminary investigation as long as there has already been a previously instituted civil case. Also, the petition for suspension is not to be filed in the civil case but in the criminal case. 2. The rule provides therefore, that a petition for the suspension of the criminal action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests (Sec. 6, Rule 111, Rules of Court). Case illustrations 1. The case oiPimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010, lucidly illustrates when the principle of prejudicial question does not apply. Here, the private respondent filed an action for frustrated parricide against the petitioner. Several months after, the private respondent filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage. The petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the court where the criminal case was pending on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. The petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him. When the case reached the Court of Appeals, the court concluded against the existence of a prejudicial question. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals continued that even if the marriage

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between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed and all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting. The Supreme Court sustained the conclusion of the Court of Appeals with an added reason — that the facts show that the criminal case was filed ahead of the case for declaration of nullity. The rule is clear, wrote the Court, that for a prejudicial question to exist, the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. The Court added that the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. While the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner's will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in the civil case is granted will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time

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of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. 2. The case of Magestrado v. People G.R. No. 148072, July 10,2009, is likewise illuminating. Here, the private respondent filed a criminal complaint for perjury against the petitioner for executing an affidavit of loss of a certificate of title of a parcel of land despite allegedly knowing that no loss of the certificate occurred because the petitioner had actually delivered the same to the private respondent as security for a loan which the petitioner contracted from the private respondent. After an information for perjury against the petitioner was instituted, he filed a motion for suspension of the proceedings based on a prejudicial question. He alleged that a case filed against him by the private respondent for recovery of a sum of money is pending before another court. He further alleged that another civil case is also pending before another branch of the same court when he filed against private respondent a complaint for cancellation of mortgage, delivery of title and damages. The issues in the said civil cases according to petitioner are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action. As to whether it was proper to suspend the criminal case in view of the pending civil cases, the Supreme Court observed that the pending civil cases are principally for the determination of whether a loan was obtained by the petitioner from the private respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the private respondent. On the other hand, the criminal case involves the determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title. The Court went on to hold that it is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the

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land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss. 3. Another case on the other hand, demonstrates the application of the concept of "determinativeness" as a critical element under the principle of prejudicial question. In Omictin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2009, the petitioner, operations manager of a corporation filed a complaint for two counts of estafa against the private respondent. He alleged that the private respondent, despite repeated demands, refused to return the two company vehicles entrusted to him when he was still the president of the corporation. The private respondent avers that the demands are not valid demands, the petitioner not having the authority to act for the corporation in view of the invalidity of his appointment. The investigating prosecutor however, recommended the indictment of the private respondent and was charged with the crime of estafa. The private respondent then filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a prejudicial question because of the then pending case with the Securities and Exchange Commission (later transferred to the RTC), a case involving the same parties. It appears that earlier, the private respondent filed a case for the declaration of nullity of the respective appointments of the petitioner and other individuals as corporate officers. The case likewise involved the recovery of share in the profits, involuntary dissolution and the appointment of a receiver, recovery of damages and an application for a temporary restraining order and injunction against the corporation and some of its officials. The case filed by the private respondent also alleged that the appointment of certain officers were invalid because it was in derogation of the corporate by-laws requiring that the president must be chosen from among the directors, and elected by the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the board of directors. Since the appointment of the officer responsible for appointing the petitioner was

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invalid, the petitioner's appointment as operations manager was likewise allegedly invalid. Thus, private respondent claims, the petitioner neither has the power nor the authority to represent or act for the corporation in any transaction or action before any court of justice. Citing as a reason the absence of a board resolution authorizing the continued operations of the corporation as a corporate entity, the private respondent allegedly retained possession of the office equipment of the company in a fiduciary capacity as director of the corporation pending its dissolution and/or the resolution of the intracorporate dispute. On the issue of whether or not a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the resolution of the intra-corporate controversy in the RTC, the Court sustained the theory of the private respondent that the resolution of the issues raised in the intracorporate dispute will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent in the crime of estafa filed against him by the petitioner. One of the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code is "a demand made by the offended party to the offender x x x." Under the circumstances, since the alleged offended party is the corporation, the validity of the demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the person making such a demand on the company's behalf. In the civil cases, the private respondent was challenging the petitioner's authority to act for the corporation in the corporate case pending before the RTC. Taken in this light, added the Court, if the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper. 4. Batas Pambansa Big. 22 controversies present a special class of cases with remarkably consistent rulings against the appreciation of a prejudicial question. One case worthy of note and which demonstrates an absence of a prejudicial question is Yap v. Cabales, G.R. No. 159186, June 5,2009. Here, the petitioner issued bouncing checks to the payee which were later rediscoiinted in favor of private respondents.

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When the checks were dishonored, the private respondents then filed civil actions to collect sums of money with damages against the petitioner in the RTC. Subsequently informations were also filed against the petitioner for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved. The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists because the civil cases for collection earlier filed against him for collection of sum of money and damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. He further argued that, in the pending civil cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. For if the court rules that there is no valid consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows that he could not also be held liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. The court denied the motions for lack of merit. The subsequent motions for reconsideration were likewise denied. Ruling on the issue on appeal to it, the Court explained t h a t " x x x The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Big. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether the private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from the payee." For the Court, the resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases. Citing the earlier case of Lozano v. Martinez (146 SCRA 323), the Court added that in a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, it is the mere issuance of worthless

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checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks which constitutes the offense. As a consequence, even if the accused is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. 5. Another case similarly decided is that of Sps. Jose v. Sps. Suctrez, G.R. No. 176795, June 30,2008. The respondents who are spouses, are the debtors of the petitioners, also spouses under an agreement which required the respondents to pay a daily interest on their debts but which interest was later on increased. It was the practice for petitioners to give the loaned money to the respondents and the latter would deposit the same in the petitioners' account to cover the maturing postdated checks they had previously issued in payment of their other loans. The respondents would then issue checks in favor of petitioners in payment of the amount borrowed from them with the agreed daily interest. Respondents later filed a complaint against petitioners seeking the declaration of "nullity of interest of 5% per day, fixing of interest, recovery of interest payments" and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that the interest rate of 5% a day is iniquitous, contrary to morals, done under vitiated consent and imposed using undue influence by taking improper advantage of their financial distress. They claimed that due to serious liquidity problems, they were forced to rely on borrowings from banks and individual lenders, including petitioners, and that they had to scramble for funds to cover the maturing postdated checks they issued to cover their other borrowings. Thereafter, several cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 were filed against one of the respondents who in turn filed motions to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question, on the theory that the checks subject of the Batas Pambansa Big. 22 cases are void for being contra bonos mores or for having been issued in payment of the iniquitous and unconscionable interest imposed by

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petitioners. The suspension order issued by the lower court was later on upheld by the Court of Appeals which concluded that if the checks subject of the criminal cases were later on declared null and void, then said checks could not be made the bases of criminal prosecutions under Batas Pambansa Big. 22. In other words, ruled the Court of Appeals, the outcome of the determination of the validity of the said checks is determinative of guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prejudicial question theory of the respondents must fail. For the Court, the prejudicial question posed by respondents is simply whether the daily interest rate of 5% is void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest are likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for Batas Pambansa Big. 22 will no longer prosper. The Court stressed that the validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of respondents in the criminal cases because the reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under Batas Pambansa Big. 22. What Batas Pambansa Big. 22 punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved. Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the Batas Pambansa Big. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing the Batas Pambansa Big. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached, that is, if a bouncing check has been issued. 6. A similar result was reached in yet another more recent case, where the High Court rejected respondent's' contention that the novation of the credit line agreement was a prejudicial question in the prosecution for violation

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of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. According to the Court, the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an accommodation, is covered by Batas Pambansa Big. 22. The agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, the gravamen of the offense being the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. Thus, even if it will be subsequently declared that a novation took place between respondents and petitioner, respondents are still not exempt from prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 for the dishonored checks (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ramon P. Jacinto, G.R. No. 154622, August 3,2010). 7. The earlier case of Sabandal v. Tongco, G.R. No. 124498, October 5, 2001, involves a petition to suspend the criminal proceedings in the court where the petitioner is charged with eleven counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 filed in 1992. It appears that three years sifter the institution of the criminal actions, the petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint against the private respondent a case for specific performance, recovery of overpayment and damages. The issue raised reaching the Supreme Court is whether a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the trial of the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 against petitioner until after the resolution of the civil action for specific performance, recovery of overpayment, and damages. The Court predictably rejected the posturings of the petitioner. There is no prejudicial question wrote the Court, because the issue in the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 is whether the accused knowingly issued worthless checks. The issue in the civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages is whether the petitioner overpaid his obligations to the private respondent. If, after trial in the civil case, the petitioner is shown to have overpaid respondent, it does not follow, added the Court, that he cannot be held liable for the bouncing checks he issued for the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the

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insufficiency of funds to support the checks is itself an offense. Note: The Supreme Court in this case did not deal with the matter of the criminal action having been filed ahead of the civil action. The rule at the time the cases were filed did not require a "previously" instituted civil action. The requirement that the civil case be filed ahead of the criminal case is a result of the amendment of the rules of criminal procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. 8. The effect of a prejudicial question presents an interesting study when the principle is invoked in marriage relationships. One representative case is that of Marbella- Bobis v. Bobis. In 1985, the respondent contracted his first marriage. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with the petitioner. Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against the respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case. The issue sought to be resolved later in the Supreme Court was whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy. In holding that the civil action for declaration of the nullity of the marriage was not determinative of the issue in the bigamy case, the Court placed emphasis on Art. 40 of the Family Code which requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. Without a judicial declaration of its nullity, explained the Court, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. The Court found that the respondent was, for all legal intents and purposes,

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regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, observed the Court, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. The Court then concluded that a decision in the civil case was not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question (Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 336 SCRA 747). A case decided before the Family Code became effective had a substantially similar holding. Landicho v. Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, February 23,1968, a frequently cited case, held that a party cannot judge by himself the nullity of his first marriage to justify a second marriage before the dissolution of the first marriage and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared by the courts can it be held as void. 9. An action for a declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question to a concubinage case. This was the gist of the holding of the Court in one remarkable case. The facts of the case began when the petitioner married his wife in 1973. In 1997, the petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Alleging that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with another woman, the wife of the petitioner subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. Petitioner then filed a motion to defer the proceedings in the criminal case arguing that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife. Petitioner likewise harped on the possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. The Court rejected the contentions of the petitioner when the issue was presented before it for resolution. Unequivocally,

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the Court ruled that the pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. "With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void is not a defense" (Beltran v. People, G.R. No. 137567 June 20,2000). 10. Another interesting case involved a petitioner and a private respondent who were married in 1988. In 1990, while the marriage was still subsisting, the petitioner contracted a second marriage with another woman. When private respondent learned of the marriage, she filed a complaint for bigamy and on the basis of her complaint an information charging bigamy was duly filed. The month before however, the petitioner had already filed an action to annul his marriage with the private respondent on the ground that he was merely forced to marry her, that she concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of the marriage and that she was incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. Subsequently, the private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) for the revocation of engineering licenses of the petitioner and the second woman. Petitioner then filed with the PRC a motion to suspend the administrative proceedings in view of the pendency of the civil action for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and the bigamy case. Although the matters raised had become moot and academic when the Supreme Court finally decided the case

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because of the termination of the civil case, it nevertheless discussed the matter of prejudicial question and ruled: (a) That the outcome of the civil case for annulment of marriage had no bearing upon the determination of the petitioner's innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time of the marriage. The prevailing rule is found in Art. 40 of the Family Code which requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity before the void character of the first marriage maybe invoked. (b) The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. Hie filing of a civil case does not necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings. There is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other civil (Te v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, November 29,2000).

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Chapter IV PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION Nature of preliminary investigation; purpose (Bar 1985; 1986; 1991; 1998; 2004) 1. Sec. 1 of Rule 112 provides: " x x x Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding the purpose of which is to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial x x x"

2. The definition lucidly declares that a preliminary investigation is a mere inquiry or a proceeding. It is not therefore, a trial and so does not involve the examination of witnesses by way of direct or cross-examinations. Its purpose is not to declare the respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only to determine first, whether or not a crime has been committed and second, whether or not the respondent is "probably guilty" of the crime. The question to be answered in a preliminary investigation is not: "Is the respondent guilty or is he innocent?" More accurately, the question sought to be answered is: "Is the respondent probably guilty and therefore, should go to trial?" As jurisprudence puts it: "Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. The validity and merits of a party's accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence,

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are better ventilated during the trial proper" (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135703, April 15,2009). 3. In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of respondent. A prosecutor merely determines the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so (De Chavez v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 168830-31, February 6, 2007). Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence to justify a conviction (Manebo v. Acosta, G.R. No. 169554, October 28,2009). 4. Stated otherwise, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof (Spouses Balanguan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008; The Presidential AD-Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans [FFCBL] v. Desierto, G.R. No. 136225, April 23,2008). For instance, whether the facsimile message is admissible in evidence and whether the element of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are matters best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not during the preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a fullblown trial on the merits. In fine, the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during

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the trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level (Samuel Lee, et al. v. KBC Bank N.V. [Formerly Kredietbanky N.V.I G.R. NO. 164673, January 15,2010). 5. The purposes of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof (Manebo v. Acosta, G.R. No. 169554, October 28,2009). However, the ultimate purpose of a preliminary investigation "is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive prosecutions" (Sales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001; Albay Accredited Constructions Association, Inc. v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133517, January 30 2006, 480 SCRA 520). It is designed to free a respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himselfTherself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed upon in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent officer designated by law for that purpose (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656). Nature of the right to a preliminary investigation 1. The holding of a preliminary investigation is not required by the Constitution. It is not a fundamental right and is not among those rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. The right thereto is of a statutory character and may be invoked only when specifically created by statute (Marinas v. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423). But while the right is statutory rather than constitutional, since it has been established by statute, it becomes a component of due process in criminal justice (Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354; Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721; Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 470 SCRA 7). When so granted by statute, the right is not a mere formal or technical right. It is a substantive right. To deny

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the claim of the accused to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process (Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721). 2. There exist decisions holding that a preliminary investigation is essentially a judicial inquiry and that in a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor or investigating officer acts as a quasi-judicial officer. Although a preliminary investigation is, according to the Court, not a trial, and is not intended to usurp the function of a trial court, it is not a casual affair but is, in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. These cases also ruled that the authority of a prosecutor or an investigating officer to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge and that while the investigating officer is not a "judge," by the nature of his functions, he is and must be considered to be a quasi-judicial officer. A preliminary investigation has been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes a judicial proceeding when there is an opportunity to be heard and for the production of and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon (Cruz v. People, 233 SCRA 439; Sales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802, November 16,2001). It is worth remarking that the concept of a preliminary investigation as essentially a judicial inquiry as declared in the 1994 case of Cruz v. People was adopted by the Department of Justice. The DOJ Manual for Prosecutors citing Cruz describes a preliminary investigation as "essentially a judicial inquiry since there is the opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision rendered on the basis of such evidence. In this sense, the investigating prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer" (See Sec. 1, Part III, Manual for Prosecutors). 3. Under a different set of facts and issues, a pronouncement was later made in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, July 6, 2001, where it was held that a preliminary investigation is "very different from other" quasi-judicial proceedings. Accordingly, the prosecutor in a preliminary in

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vestigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. Bautista further holds that the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body. Necessarily, its decisions approving the filing of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 as are the decisions of quasi-judicial bodies enumerated therein. Bautista however, concedes that there are cases which held that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial function and that the power to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. Bautista clarified that this statement holds true only in the sense thatr like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. But here is where the similarity ends. A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. 4. A similar pronouncement was made a few years later, in Santos v. Go, G.R. No. 156081, October 19,2005. This case held that a public prosecutor does not perform acts of a quasi-judicial body. The Court described a quasi-judicial body as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which performs adjudicatory functions. Said body affects the rights of private parties either through adjudication or rule-making. Its awards, when performing adjudicatory functions, determine the rights of the parties and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a

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court. Such is not the case, according to the Court, when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation. The main issue for resolution in Santos v. Go was whether a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal case. In the course of this determination, the Court had to consider whether the conduct of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor is a quasi-judicial function. Note that Rule 43 is the mode of appeal from the awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agencies enumerated in said Rule in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Court observed that Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not among the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Thus, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. Reiterating its ruling in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, the Court proceeded to declare that it cannot agree with petitioners' submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. 5. Also, a much later case affirmed previous rulings that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause (Spouses Balanguan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008).

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One of the issues that was sought to be resolved in Spouses Balanguan was whether or not the DOJ is covered by the constitutional injunction embodied in Sec. 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. This provision requires that "No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." Also, drawing heavily from the earlier case of Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, July 6, 2001, the more recent case of Spouses Balanguan stressed that a preliminary investigation is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. Though some cases, added the Court, describe the prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of the court, and the similarity ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former's order or resolution. The Court concluded that since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body, Sec. 14, Article VIII of the Constitution finds no application. 6. An earlier pronouncement was more clear and direct.: " x x x A preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and

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embarrassment of trial is the function of the prosecutor. Preliminary investigation is an executive, not a judicial function. Such investigation is not part of the trial x x x " (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda, 338 SCRA 254). Right to a preliminary investigation; waivable The right to a preliminary investigation may be waived for failure to invoke the right prior to or at the time of the plea (People v. Gomez, 117 SCRA 73; People v. Bulusan, 160 SCRA 492; Go v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138). Preliminary investigation vs. preliminary examination (preliminary inquiry) 1. A preliminary investigation is conducted by the prosecutor to ascertain whether the alleged offender should be held for trial, to be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial or if the offender is to be released. A preliminary inquiry or a preliminary examination is conducted by the judge to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. This is a judicial function (People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788; AAA v. Carbonnel, 524 SCR 496). 2. Preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecutor's job. Preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. Sound policy supports this distinction. Otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary investigation and examination of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656; Co v. Republic, 539 SCRA 147). Probable cause in preliminary investigation 1. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on

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opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence to justify a conviction (Manebo v. Acosta, G.R. No. 169554, October 28, 2009). Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended party. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested (Manebo v. Acosta, G.R. No. 169554, October 28, 2009; Roberto B. Kalalo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 158189, April 23,2010). 2. Probable cause need not be based on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. While probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspects to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt (De Chavez v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 168830-31, February 6,2007; Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174350, August 13,2008; Manebo v. Acosta, G.R. No. 169554, October 28, 2009). 3. Probable cause implies only probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require

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a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence. It is enough that in the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, credence is given to the finding and determination of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice in a preliminary investigation (Ricaforte v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154438, September 5,2007). 4. "The term probable cause does not mean 'actual and positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or commission complained of constitutes the offense charged.... In order that probable cause to file a criminal case may be arrived at, or in order to engender the well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, the elements of the crime charged should be present. This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be — at the most — no criminal offense (Sy Thiong Shiou v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009). Probable cause does not also mean that guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt (Heirs of Jose Sy Bang v. Sy, G.R. No. 114217, October 13,2009). For instance, the test in a malicious prosecution case should be whether sufficient facts exist which show that, in bringing the criminal action, complainant acted with probable cause, defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that the person charged and prosecuted in a criminal case is probably guilty of the crime or wrongdoing (Limanch-0 Hotel and Leasing Corporation, et al. v. City ofOhgapo, et al., G.R. No. 185121, January 18,2010). Kinds of determination of probable cause 1. The Court held that there are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. "The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that

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properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge in turn should not override the public prosecutor's determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge's determination of probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be issued against

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the accused" (People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 171188, June 19, 2009). 2. Probable cause to warrant an arrest which is made by the judge refers

to "facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested. Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of reasonable caution or the term ordinarily prudent and cautious man. The terms are legally synonymous and their reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but the average man on the street. It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance" (Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652; Domalanta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125586, June 29, 2000). Cases requiring a preliminary investigation; when not required (Bar 2004)

1. A preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the law prescribes a penalty of at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine (Sec. 1, Rule 112, Rules of Court; Tabujara v. People, G.R. No. 175162, October 29,2008). Sec. 1 of Rule 112 is clear: " x x x Except as provided in Sec. 7 (now Sec. 6) of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine."

2. Before the amendatory provisions of R.A. 7691 took effect, preliminary investigations were conducted only for offenses cognizable by Regional Trial Courts. Because the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts has been expanded by

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R.A. 7691, certain offenses formerly within the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts came under the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts. Consequently, some offenses which before were not covered by the required preliminary investigation are now subject to preliminary investigation even if such offenses are cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts as long as the same are punishable by at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day. Procedure for cases not requiring a preliminary investigation 1. Where a preliminary investigation is not required because the penalty prescribed by law for the offense involves an imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, there are two ways of initiating a criminal action. (a) First, by filing the complaint directly with the prosecutor; or (b) Second, by filing the complaint or information with the Municipal Trial Court; (Sec. 8, Rule 112, Rules of Court; Tabujara v. People, G.R. No. 175162, October 29,2008). Direct filing with the prosecutor 1. If the complaint is filed with the prosecutor (also as in Manila and other chartered cities), the procedure prescribed in Sec. 3(a) of Rule 112 shall be observed. This means that the complaint shall comply with the following: (a) The address of the respondent shall be indicated in the complaint; (b) To establish probable cause, the complaint shall be accompanied by: (i) the affidavit of the complainant; and (ii) the affidavits of the complainant's witnesses. (iii) other supporting documents;

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(c) The appropriate number of copies of the above as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file must be submitted; and (d) The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oaths, or in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. 2. The prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days from its filing (Sec. 8, Rule 112, Rules of Court). Since only Sec. 3(a) of Rule 112 applies, the respondent need not be issued a subpoena or required to submit counter-affidavits. Direct filing with the Municipal Trial Court 1. If the complaint or information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court because the complaint involves an offense punishable by imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in Sec. 3(a) of Rule 112 and the requirements therein shall be observed (Sec. 8[b], Rule 112, Rules of Court) in the same way as when the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor. 2. If within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause, he shall dismiss the same. Before the dismissal, the judge shall personally evaluate the evidence or personally examine in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers (Sec. 8[b], Rule 112, Rules of Court). The evaluation is to be done personally where the complaint or information is directly filed with the MTC. The examination shall also be done personally. 3. If the judge desires to further determine the existence of probable cause, he may, require the submission of additional evidence within ten (10) days from notice (Sec. 8[b], Rule 112, Rules of Court).

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If the judge still finds no probable cause, despite the additional evidence, the judge shall dismiss the case within ten (10) days from the submission of additional evidence or expiration of said period (Sec. 8[b], Rule 112, Rules of Court). 4. If the judge finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. If the accused has already been arrested, the court shall instead issue a commitment order. A warrant of arrest may not also be issued if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, in which case, the court may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest (Sec. 8[b], Rule 112, Rules of Court). The issuance of a warrant of arrest is not mandatory and is to be issued if there is a necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody but a judge gravely abuses his discretion if he issues a warrant based solely on the statement of a witness who was not even personally examined in writing and under oath and in the form of searching questions and answers (Tabujara v. People, G.R. No. 175162, October 29, 2008). When preliminary investigation is not required even if the offense is one which normally requires a preliminary investigation 1 . I f a person is arrested lawfully without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, i.e., the penalty is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, an information or complaint may be filed against him without need for a preliminary investigation (Formerly Sec. 7, now Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court as amended by AM. No. 05-08-26-SC, August 30, 2005). Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without a warrant (Ladlad v. Velasco, 523 SCRA 218; Sec. 6 Rule 112, Rules of Court). Thus, i f a person is arrested by a police officer in flagrante delicto while robbing the victim through violence or intimidation, the arrest is a lawful one (Sec. 5[a] of Rule 113, Rules of Court) and a preliminary investigation is not required even

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if the penalty for robbery is more than four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day. Under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code, the minimum penalty for robbery is prision correctional in its maximum period which is six (6) years under Article 27 of the same code. The offense is one which involves a penalty higher than four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day and the arrested person would normally be entitled to a preliminary investigation. In this case however, a preliminary investigation does not apply because he was validly arrested. 2. If he has been arrested in a place where an inquest prosecutor is available, an inquest will be conducted instead of a preliminary investigation. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed directly with the proper court by the offended party or a peace officer on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person (Formerly Sec. 7, now Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 05-08-26-SC, August 30, 2005). Note: The direct filing under this rule may be deemed an additional situation in which a direct filing in court may be done. Person arrested lawfully without a warrant may ask for a preliminary investigation 1. Under Sec. 6 (formerly Sec. 7) of Rule 112, although an inquest is the proceeding which shall normally apply when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant, such person may nevertheless, ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with Rule 112, before the complaint or information is filed but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. The preliminary investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception (Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court). Thus, the fact that a person was lawfully arrested without a warrant does not bar him from availing of a preliminary investigation. It is worth remembering however, that before he is granted the preliminary investigation asked for by him,

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he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court). This Revised Penal Code provision imposes a penalty upon a public officer or an employee who, although having detained a person for some legal ground, fails to deliver the person arrested to the proper judicial authorities within the periods of twelve (12), eighteen (18) or thirty six (36) hours as the case may be. 2. Be it noted that by virtue of R.A. 7438, any waiver by the person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing, signed by such person in the presence of his counsel, otherwise such waiver shall be null and void (Sec. 2, RA. 7438). 3. Observe that the person lawfully arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation before the filing of the information. This is not however, to be taken to mean that the filing of the complaint or information bars him from asking for a preliminary investigation. Under current rules, if an information or complaint has already been filed, the person arrested who is now an accused, may still ask for a preliminary investigation within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense under Rule 112 (Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court). It is evident that because the complaint or information has already been filed, the court has now assumed jurisdiction over the case. Hence, the accused should address the motion for the holding of a preliminary investigation to the court. While lawyers traditionally call the motion a "motion for re-investigation," the term seems to be a misnomer because it presupposes that a prior investigation had been held. A "motion to conduct a preliminary investigation" appears to be a more appropriate term, although the title is of lesser significance when compared to the essence of the motion. Bail for a person lawfully arrested during the preliminary investigation 1. The waiver by the person lawfully aires ted of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code does not

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preclude him from applying for bail (Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court). Note that while a preliminary investigation is undertaken, the person arrested is still under detention. To effect his release, he may apply for bail notwithstanding the waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court) and even if no information has yet been filed against him. His right to bail is supported not only by Sec. 6 of Rule 112 but also by Sec. 17(c) of Rule 114 which declares: "Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held." 2. The bail must however, be applied for and issued by the court in the province, city, or municipality where the person arrested is held. In one case, the accused was arrested lawfully without a warrant for carnapping and detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. He asked for a preliminary investigation and signed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the assisting judge of a Marikina Regional Trial Court approved the bail bond for the accused who was being held in Quezon City. The Supreme Court held that while a person lawfully arrested and detained and not yet formally charged can apply for bail, the application must be filed in the province, city or municipality where the person arrested is held. In this case, the bail application should have been filed with a Quezon City court which has the authority to grant bail and not a Marikina court (Ruiz v. Beldia, Jr., 451 SCRA 402). Questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation 1. An accused who wants to question the regularity or absence of a preliminary investigation must do so before he enters his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial. An

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application for or admission of the accused to bail does not bar him from raising such question (Sec. 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Failure to invoke the right before entering a plea will amount to a waiver (People v. Gomez, 117 SCRA 73). 2. The rule on waiver is not new. The Court has consistently held long ago that after a plea of not guilty is made, an accused is deemed to have forgone the right to raise the absence of a preliminary investigation or any irregularity that surrounds it (People v. Monteverde, 142 SCRA 668; Zacarias v. Cruz, 30 SCRA 728, People v. Beltran, 32 SCRA 71; People v. Arbola, L-16936, Aug 5, 1985; All cases cited in People v. Bulosan, 160 SCRA 492; People v. Buluran, 325 SCRA 476). 3. A motion to quash is not the proper remedy because the absence of a preliminary investigation is not one of the grounds for a motion to quash under Sec. 3 of Rule 117. It was thus, held that if there is no preliminary investigation and the accused before entering his plea calls the attention of the court to his deprivation of the required preliminary investigation, the court should not dismiss the information. It should remand the case to the prosecutor so that the investigation may be conducted (Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 581). For instance, in an early graft case, where the accused were deprived of a full preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the informations against them, the Court emphasized that such fact does not warrant the quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate the proceedings already had. Neither is the court's jurisdiction nor validity of an information adversely affected by deficiencies in the preliminary investigation. Instead, the Sandiganbayan is to hold in abeyance any further proceedings therein and to remand the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for the completion of the preliminary investigation, the outcome of which shall then be indorsed to the Sandiganbayan for its appropriate action (Vasquez v. Hobilia-Alinio, 271 SCRA 67).

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Absence of preliminary investigation; effect on jurisdiction of the court The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise, render it defective (Rodis v. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618; People v. Deang, 338 SCRA 657; Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773; People v. Buluran, 325 SCRA 476; Enriquez v. Sarmiento, Jr., 498 SCRA 6). If absence of a preliminary investigation does not render the information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case (Budiongan, Jr. v. De la Cruz, Jr., 502 SCRA 626). Absence of preliminary investigation; not a ground for motion to quash The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground for a motion to quash. Such ground is not provided for in Sec. 3 of Rule 117, the provision which enumerates the grounds for a motion to quash a complaint or information (Budiongan, Jr. vs. De la Cruz, Jr., 502 SCRA 626). Inquest proceedings 1. An inquest proceeding is conducted when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving even also an offense which requires a preliminary investigation (Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court; Crispin Beltran v. People and Secretary Gonzalez, G.R. No. 175013, June 1, 2007). An inquest is not a preliminary investigation. It is a summary investigation and which does not follow the procedures set forth in Sec. 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. An inquest is an investigation conducted by a prosecutor in criminal cases where a person has been lawfully arrested and detained without a warrant of arrest. It is informal and summary and its purpose is to determine whether or not the person detained should remain under custody and then charged in court (Sec. 1, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors).

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2. The inquest is conducted by a public prosecutor who is assigned inquest duties as an Inquest Officer and is to discharge his duties, unless otherwise directed, only at the police stations/headquarters of the PNP in order to expedite and facilitate the disposition of inquest cases (Sec. 2, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors). 3. The inquest proceedings shall be deemed commenced from the time the Inquest Officer receives the complaint and referral documents from the law enforcement authorities. These documents include the (a) affidavit of arrest, (b) the investigation report, (c) the statements of the complainant and the witnesses; and (d) other supporting evidence gathered. The affidavit of arrest and the statements or affidavits of the complainant and the witnesses shall be subscribed and sworn to before the Inquest Officer by the affiants (Sec. 3, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors). 4. The detained person should be present during the inquest proceedings unless reasons exist that would dispense with his presence like confinement in a hospital, detention in a place requiring maximum security or his presence is not feasible by reason of age, health or similar factors (Sec. 6, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors). If necessary, the Inquest Officer shall require the presence of the complaining witnesses and subject them to an informal and summary investigation or examination for purpose of determining the existence of probable cause (Sec. 11, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors). Possible options of the inquest prosecutor 1. The Inquest Officer has an initial duty. This duty is to determine if the detained person has been arrested lawfully in accordance with Sec. 5 (a) and (b), of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. For this purpose, the Inquest Officer may summarily examine the arresting officers on the circumstances surrounding the arrest or apprehension of the detained person (Sec. 8, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors). 2. Should it be found that the arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules of Court, the Inquest Prosecutor

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shall not proceed with the inquest proceedings. Instead, he shall recommend the release of the detainee, note down the disposition on the referral document, prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action he took and forward the same together with the record of the case, to the Gity of the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action (Sec. 9, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors). When the recommendation is approved, the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee so the latter may be released. The officer shall also serve upoi^the detainee a notice of preliminary investigation if the evidence on hand warrants the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation. In such an event, the detainee shall be also released for further investigation. The detainee shall be furnished copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavits or sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence (Sec. 9, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors). 3. Should it be found that the arrest was properly effected, the inquest shall proceed but the Inquest Officer shall first ask the detained person if he desires to avail himself of a preliminary investigation and if he does, he shall be made to execute a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code with the assistance of a lawyer. The preliminary investigation may be conducted by the Inquest Officer himself or by any other Assistant Prosecutor to whom the case may be assigned (Sec.10, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors). If the Inquest Prosecutor finds that probable cause exists, he shall prepare the corresponding information with the recommendation that the same be filed in court (Sec. 13, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors). If no probable cause is found, he shall recommend the release of the detained person (Sec. 15, Part II, Manual for Prosecutors). The inquest must pertain to the offense for which the arrest was made The inquest conducted must be for the offense for which the detainee was arrested. This basic rule is exemplified by the case of Beltran v. People (G.R. No. 175013, June 1,2007).

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The case involved petitioners in the consolidated petitions who were incumbent congressmen and representatives of party-list groups while the others were private individuals. The petitions sought the issuance of writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin the prosecution of the petitioners for rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and prosecution of petitioners' cases. One of the petitioners was Crispin Beltran who was arrested without a warrant following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency." When he was arrested, Beltran was not informed of the crime for which he was arrested. On the evening of his arrest, Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltran's arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally. The joint affidavit of Beltran's arresting officers stated that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant, for Inciting to Sedition. The inquest prosecutor indicted Beltran and filed the corresponding Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC). Several days after the first inquest, he was again subjected to a second inquest but this time for rebellion allegedly committed with a certain 1st Lt. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan). The inquest was allegedly based on the letters of CIDG investigators claiming that Beltran and San Juan were allegedly the leaders and promoters of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party of tl\e Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipiflas (MKP), which have formed a "tactical alliance."

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The panel of prosecutors from the DOJ which conducted the second inquest subsequently issued a resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and San Juan as "leaders/ promoters" of the alleged rebellion. The panel then filed an Information with the RTC Makati. Beltran moved that the RTC make ajudicial determination of probable cause against him but the court sustained the finding of probable cause against Beltran. Beltran sought reconsideration but the Judge like the first judge of the court in which the case was originally filed, also inhibited herself from the case without resolving Beltran's motion. The new Judge of the court to which the case was re-raffled denied the motion for reconsideration of Beltran. Hence, the petition to set aside the orders finding probable cause and the denial of the motion for reconsideration and to enjoin the prosecution of Beltran. The petition likewise raised the validity of the inquest proceedings against Beltran. The Supreme Court held that the inquest proceedings against Beltran for rebellion is void. Inquest proceedings, declared the Court are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without a warrant. This is clear from Sec. 6 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The joint affidavit of Beltran's arresting officers states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant, for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted — as he did conduct — an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran's arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and^heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on a certaifi date

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but the affidavits did not make reference to acts constituting rebellion. The Court pointed out that under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993, the initial duty of the inquest officer is to determine if the arrest of the detained person was conducted in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sec. 5, Rule 113. If the arrest was not properly effected, the inquest officer should proceed under Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which provides: *Where Arrest Not Properly Effected. — Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall: a)

recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;

b)

note down the disposition on the referral document;

c)

prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and

d)

forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.

"Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence."

For the failure of Beltran's panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Sec. 6, Rule 112 in relation to Sec. 5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, Beltran's inquest was declared void (Crispin. Beltran v. People and Secretary Gonzalez, G.R. No. 175013; June 1, 2007).

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Who may conduct preliminary investigation and determine existence of probable cause 1. The following are authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation: (a) (b)

Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(c)

Other officers as maybe authorized by law.

The authority of the above to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdiction (A.M. 05-06-26, SC, August 30,2005, effective October 3,2005). Before the amendments, judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts were allowed to conduct preliminary investigations (Mago v. Pefialosa-Fermo, 582 SCRA 1). Judges of first level courts are no longer allowed to conduct preliminary investigations (Sibulo v. Toledo- Mupas, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1686, June 12,2008). 2. The following are also authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation: (a) Under the amendments to the Omnibus Election Code, the Commission on Elections, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute the same (Sec. 265, B.P. 881, Omnibus Election Code, as amended by RA. 9369, Sec. 43). It has been held in a relatively recent case that "A public prosecutor exceeded the authority delegated to him by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to prosecute election-related cases when he filed amended informations in court against the respondent even after he had been directed by the Legal Department fcf the COMELEC to suspend the implementation of hi& joint

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resolution (which found that the respondent should be indicted) but before his delegated authority had been revoked by the COMELEC en bane. "The Constitution, particularly Sec. 20, Article IX, empowers the COMELEC to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election cases. Furthermore, under Section 265 of the OEC, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct the preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the OEC and to prosecute the same. Under Section 265 of the OEC, the COMELEC may avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the continuing delegation of authority to other prosecuting arms of the government, which authority, however, may be revoked or withdrawn at anytime by the COMELEC in the proper exercise of its judgment. Sec. 10 of the same Rule 34 gives the COMELEC the power to motu proprio revise, modify and reverse the resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors. "Clearly, the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same. However, such authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime by the COMELEC either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good or where it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the COMELEC, provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in derogation ftf the resolutions, directives or orders of the COMELEC in relation to election cases where it had been deputized

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to investigate and prosecute by the COMELEC. As mere deputies, provincial and city prosecutors acting on behalf of the COMELEC must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority (Bievenido Difvo and Renato Comparativo v. Pablo Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 4,2009). Note: This case had been filed in 2004 before the amendment introduced by R.A. 9369 in January 23, 2007 and should now be interpreted in accordance with the amendment. Under Sec. 43 thereof, the power of the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses is now concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government. The other prosecuting arms of the government, it is humbly submitted no longer need to be deputized by the COMELEC. The original provision of Art. 265 of the Omnibus Election Code provided that the COMELEC, through its legal officers, "have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses...The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government..." The difference between the original Art. 265 and its amended version warrants a modification of existing case law on the matter. (b) The Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases (Sec. 15[1], R.A. 6770). In appropriate cases, the Office of the Ombudsman has full authority to issue subpoenas, including subpoena duces tecum, for compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and informatiori relat

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ing to matters under its investigation. The grant of this authority, however, is not unlimited, as the Ombudsman must necessarily observe and abide by the terms of the Constitution and our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable jurisprudence on the issuance, service, validity and efficacy of subpoenas. Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates under the requirements of reasonableness and relevance. For the production of documents to be reasonable and for the documents themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in the first place, be one that the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon (Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11,2010 of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C Office of the Ombudsman, AM. No. 101-13-SC, March 2,2010). (c) The Presidential Commission on Good Government with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies is empowered to investigate, file and prosecute cases investigated by it (Executive Order No. 14, May 7,1986). The procedure for preliminary investigation must be strictly followed One case is illustrative. A preliminary investigation of the rebellion charges against Ladlad and Maza was held before a panel of DOJ prosecutors on the basis of the unsubscribed letters of CIDG investigators alleging that the petitioners have committed acts constituting rebellion. During the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the CIDG presented a masked man, who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners in a complaint for rebellion. The man subscribed to his affidavit before one of the respondent prosecutors who then gave copies of the affidavit to media members present during the proceedings. The-panel of prosecutors gave petitioners 10 days within which to file their counter-affidavits but the petitioners were

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furnished the complete copies of documents supporting the CIDG's letters much later. Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel for lack of impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners' case, and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation. The DOJ panel of prosecutors denied petitioners' motion as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Petitioners sought the nullification of the orders of the DOJ panel and for the issuance of an injunctive writ. Acting on petitioners' prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ, the Court issued a status quo order. Prior to this, however, the panel of prosecutors, issued a resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioners and 46 others with rebellion. The prosecutors filed the corresponding Information with RTC Makati, Consequently, the petitioners Ladlad and Maza filed a supplemental petition to enjoin the prosecution of the criminal case because of irregularities in the preliminary investigation. In deciding the petition, the Court started by outlining the procedure for the preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by at least four years, two months and one day as embodied in Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court found that instead of following this procedure scrupulously, so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage, respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it. Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Sec. 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment, must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their

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absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of the officers of CIDG-PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Sec. 3(a) of Rule 112. Further, Sec. 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to the respondents." Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on a certain date "to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments." During the investigation, respondent prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked man who subscribed to an affidavit before the respondent prosecutors. Copies of the affidavit of the man were distributed, not to petitioners or their counsels, but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. Respondent panel of prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days. It was only four days later, that petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments to the CIDG letters. "These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors' statement that the preliminary investigation "was done in accordance with the Revised Rules o[f] Criminal Procedure." Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainant's antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness' affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners' claim that the entire proceeding was a sham." The Court stressed: A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an individual ' rr

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the difference between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not "a mere formal or technical right" but a "substantive" one, forming part of due process in criminal justice. This especially holds true here where the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may be non-bailable for those accused as principals (Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, June 1, 2007; Maza v. Gonzalez, G.R. Nos. 172074-76, June 1,2007).

Initial steps in preliminary investigation; filing of the complaint for preliminary investigation 1. It is the filing of the complaint with the investigating prosecutor that starts the preliminary investigation process. In actual application, the complaint is normally initiated through an affidavit of complaint. This complaint is required to state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by (a) the affidavits of the complainant, (b) the affidavits of his witnesses and, (c) other supporting documents. These affidavits and supporting documents are required in order to establish probable cause. The number of copies to be filed shall be in such number as there are respondents plus two (2) copies for the official file (Sec. 3[a], Rule 112, Rules of Court). Notethatthecomplaintfiledforthepurposeofpreliminary investigation differs from the complaint filed for the purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution. The latter refers to the complaint defined in Sec. 3 of Rule 110 and which is in the name of the People of the Philippines. It has also been held that the complaint referred to in a preliminary investigation is not just the affidavit of the complainant because his affidavit is treated as a component of the complaint (See Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice, 543 SCRA 70). 2. The rule establishes a hierarchy with respect to the persons before whom the affidavits may be subscribed and sworn to.

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The affidavits that shall accompany the complaint shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor and not necessarily before the investigating prosecutor. It may also be subscribed before any government official authorized to administer oaths. In their absence or in case they are unavailable, the affidavits may be subscribed and sworn to before a notary public (Sec. 3[a], Rule 112, Rules of Court). 3. The prosecutor, official or notary public before whom the affidavits were subscribed and sworn to does not perform a mere perfunctory or mechanical duty. He is obligated to conduct a personal examination of the affiants and corollarily, to certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. (Sec. 3[a], Rule 112, Rules of Court). Dismissal of the complaint or issuance of a subpoena 1. From the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer has ten (10) days within which to decide which of the following options to take: (a) To dismiss the complaint if he finds no ground to conduct the investigation; or (b) To issue a subpoena to the respondent in case he finds the need to continue with the investigation, in which case the subpoena shall be accompanied with a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents (Sec. 3[b], Rule 112, Rules of Court). 2. The respondent to whom the subpoena was issued shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense. Objects as evidence need not be furnished to a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party (Sec. 3[b], Rule 112, Rules of Court).

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Filing of counter-affidavit by the respondent; no motion to dismiss 1. The respondent who receives the subpoena, the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents, is not allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit. Instead, within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena, he is required to submit his counter-affidavit, the affidavits of his witnesses and the supporting documents relied upon for his defense (Sec. 3 [c], Rule 112, Rules of Court). 2. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or before any government official authorized to administer oaths. In their absence or in case they are unavailable, the affidavits may be subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. The officer or notary public before whom the affidavits were subscribed and sworn to must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits (Sec. 3[c], Rule 112, in relation to Sec. 3[a], Rule 112, Rules of Court). Note: While the rule does not specifically mention other affidavits, it is a common practice to allow the filing of a reply to the counter-affidavit usually denominated as a reply-affidavit. The respondent may likewise rebut the reply-affidavit through a rejoinder-affidavit. Action to be taken if the respondent does not submit his counter-affidavit If despite the subpoena, the respondent does not submit his counter-affidavit within the ten-day period granted him, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant. The same rule shall apply in case the respondent cannot be subpoenaed (Sec. 3[d], Rule 112, Rules of Court). This situation would have the effect of an ex parte investigation because the respondent cannot or does not participate in the proceedings. Note: Since the Rules of Court are to be liberally construed, the respondent should be allowed, through a proper motion, to have the proceedings reopened to allow him to submit his

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counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses and other evidence he may present. The motion however, should be done before the prosecutor has issued a resolution in the case. Further, such motion should contain an explanation for the failure to timely file the counter-affidavit Clarificatory hearing if necessary; no right of cross-exami- nation 1. Within ten (10) days from the submission of the counter-affidavit, other affidavits and documents filed by the respondent, or within ten (10) days from the expiration of the period for their submission, a hearing may be set by the investigating officer, if there are facts and issues to be clarified either from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but do not have the right to examine or cross- examine each other or the witnesses. If they have questions to ask, they shall submit the questions to the investigating officer who shall ask the questions to the party or witness concerned. The hearing shall be terminated within five (5) days (Sec. 3 [e], Rule 112, Rules of Court). 2. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation. Under Sec. 3(e) of Rule 112, it is within the discretion of the investigation officer whether to set the case for further hearings to clarify some matters (De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71; Racho v. Miro, 567 SCRA 213; Sierra v. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 7549, August 29,2008). Determination by the investigating officer Within ten (10) days from the termination of the investigation, the investigating prosecutor shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial (Sec. 3 [fl, Rule 112, Rules of Court). Discretion of prosecutor in filing of a criminal complaint or information (Bar 1999) 1. The determination of probable cause during a pre- liminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an

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executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to prosecute when after investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the discharge of this function (Dupasquier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112089, January 24,2001 citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207, People v. Navarro 337 Phil. 122, Pono v. NLRC, 341 Phil. 615). Since discretion is involved in the determination of probable cause, mandamus as described in Rule 65, will not, as a rule, lie to compel the filing of a complaint or information. 2. A prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is convinced that there is not enough evidence to support its averments, or that the evidence at hand, to his mind, necessarily leads to a different conclusion (Ilusorio v. Ilusorio, 540 SCRA 182). Resolution of investigating prosecutor; certification of preliminary investigation

1. If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare both the resolution and information. If he does not find probable cause, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint (Sec. 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court). 2. The information shall contain a certification by the investigating officer under oath in which he shall certify to the following: (a) that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses, (b) that there is a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, (c) that the accused is probably guilty thereof, (d) that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him, and

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(e) that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence (Sec. 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court). Effect of the absence of the required certification (Bar 1998) Definitely settled is the rule that notwithstanding the absence in the information of a certification as to the holding of a preliminary investigation, the information is nonetheless considered valid for the reason that such certification is not an essential part of the information itself and its absence cannot vitiate it as such (People v. Marquez 27 SCRA 808; Estrella v. Ruiz, 58 SCRA 779; People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 24; all cases cited in Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 220 SCRA 55). What is not allowed is the filing of the information without a preliminary investigation having been previously conducted (People v. Lapura, 255 SCRA 85). Forwarding of the records of the case for action; need for approval before filing or dismissal 1. Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action (Sec. 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court). 2. The reason for the immediately preceding paragraph is the rule that no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy (Sec. 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court). Thus, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor may be reversed or affirmed by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or the Ombudsman. Rule when recommendation for dismissal is disapproved Where the investigating prosecutor, recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is disap

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proved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter, may by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation (Sec. 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court). Motion for reconsideration The aggrieved party under current practice is not precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration within 15 days from receipt of the assailed resolution. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may appeal within fifteen (15) days from the denial of the motion for reconsideration (Sec. 3, 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, DO J Department Circular No. 70). Appeals to the Secretary of Justice; filing a petition for review 1. In cases subject of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, an appeal may be brought to the Secretary of Justice from the resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor, Regional State Prosecutors and Provincial/City Prosecutor (Sec. 1, Department Circular No. 70, NPS Rule On Appeal, Department of Justice, July 3,2000). The Secretary of Justice has the ultimate authority to decide which of the conflicting theories of the complainants and the respondents should be believed (Community Rural Bank of Guimba [N.E.], Inc. v. Talavera, 455 SCRA 34). 2. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed resolution. If a motion for recon- sideration/reinvestigation has been filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed resolution, the appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation (Sec. 3, Department Circular No. 70). Note: Under the same provision, only one motion for reconsideration is allowed. 3. The appeal is made by filing a petition for review with the Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice. This

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petition must be verified and copies of the same must be furnished the adverse party and the Prosecution Office issuing the appealed resolution (Sec. 4, Department Circular No. 70). The petition must contain the matters mandated under Sec. 5 of Department Circular No. 70 and failure to comply with the same shall constitute sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition (Sec. 6, Department Circular No. 70). Within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the copy of the petition, the adverse party may file a verified comment. The investigating/reviewing/approving prosecutor need not submit any comment except when directed by the Secretary of Justice (Sec. 8, Department Circular No. 70). If no comment is filed within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be resolved on the basis of the petition (Sec. 8, Department Circular No. 70). Note: The appeal does not hold or prevent the filing of the corresponding information in court based on the finding of probable cause in the appealed resolution, unless the Secretary of Justice directs otherwise, but the appellant and prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance (Sec. 9, Department Circular No. 70). Note also that the party filing a petition for review is allowed to file a motion for the suspension of the arraignment. Under Sec. 11(c) of Rule 116, upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended, among others, if a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending. 4. If the Secretary of Justice finds the same to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration, he may dismiss the petition outright (Sec. 7, Department Circular No. 70). If pursuant to the appealed resolution, an information has already been filed and the accused has already been arraigned prior to the filing of the petition, the petition shall

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not be given due course (Sec. 7, Department Circular No. 70). If the accused has been arraigned after the filing of the petition, any arraignment shall not bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of review (Sec. 7, Department Circular No. 70). 5. The Secretary of Justice may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may also dismiss the petition for review motu proprio or upon motion on any of the following grounds: (a) That the petition for review was filed beyond the period prescribed; (b) That the prescribed procedure and requirements provided in Department Circular No. 70 were not complied with; (c) That there is no showing of any reversible error or that the accused was already arraigned when the appeal was taken; (d) That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature, except when it suspends the proceedings based on the alleged existence of a prejudicial question; (e) That the offense has already prescribed; and (f) That there are other legal and factual grounds that exist to warrant a dismissal (Sec. 12, Department Circular No. 70). The Secretary however, has another option. He may order the reinvestigation of the case. If the Secretary of Justice finds it necessary to investigate the case, the reinvestigation shall be made by the investigating prosecutor, unless for compelling reasons, another prosecutor is designated to conduct the same (Sec. 11, Department Circular No. 70). 6. The party aggrieved by the decision of the Secretary of Justice may file a motion for reconsideration within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution on appeal. Copies of such motion and proof of service thereof shall be served upon the adverse party, and

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the Prosecution Office concerned. No further or second motion for reconsideration shall be entertained (Sec. 13, Department Circular No. 70). Rules of Court provisions when resolution is reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice The action of the provincial or city prosecutor of chief state prosecutor is not the final say on the case. If upon petition by a proper party or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor of chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties (Sec. 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court). Power of the Secretary of Justice to reverse resolutions of prosecutors 1. It has been held that the Secretary of Justice, upon petition by a proper party, can reverse his subordinates' resolutions finding probable cause against suspects of crimes. He has the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. While it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons who, according to evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime, the Secretary of Justice is likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false or serious prosecutions. He would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he orders or sanctions the filing of charge sheets based on complaints where he is not convinced that the evidence would warrant the filing of an action in court. He has the ultimate power to decide which between the conflicting theories of the parties should be believed. Thus, in Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon, G.R. No. 108946, January 28,1999, (302 SCRA 225) the Court affirmed the DOJ Secretary's power of control over the authority of a state prosecu

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tor to conduct preliminary investigations on criminal actions. Thus, it held: "In reviewing resolutions of prosecutors, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from considering errors, although unassigned, for the purpose of determining whether there is probable cause for filing cases in court. He must make his own finding of probable cause and is not confined to the issues raised by the parties during preliminary investigation. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse."

2. It is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals decision may then be appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari (Asetre v. Asetre, G.R. No. 171536, April 7, 2009). Assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice; petition for review under Rule 43 not allowed; Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 1. The rule is that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause and that its findings are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals in a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court (Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, July 6,2001; Santos v. Go, G.R. No. 156081, October 19,2005). Rule 43 is an improper remedy. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 (Levi Strauss [Phil.], Inc. v. Lim, 573 SCRA 25). 2. In Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 164715, September 20, 2006, the threshold issue that confronted the Court was whether or not the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was the proper remedy of respondent against the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.

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In Alcaraz, the Court agreed with petitioner's contention that respondent resorted to an improper remedy when he filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It was stressed that in the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, the executive branch of government has full discretionary authority. Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the private respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the Investigating Prosecutor and ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch. Alcaraz further explained that the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such prosecutor. Thus, while the CA may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. It bears stressing, declared the Court, that the Resolution of the Justice Secretary affirming, modifying or reversing the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is final. Under the 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals (now the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeals), resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations from the Justice Secretary's resolution, the aggrieved party has no more remedy of appeal except to file a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since there is no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course of law. In Alcaraz, the respondent filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, assailing the resolutions

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of the Justice Secretary. Instead of dismissing the petition, however, the CA gave due course to it and thereafter granted the petition on its finding that the Justice Secretary erred in reversing the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor which found probable cause against petitioner for attempted homicide. Patently, ruled the Court, the ruling of the CA is incorrect. 3. A corollary rule is the adoption by the Court of a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against the supposed offender. But as in every rule, there are settled exceptions. The principle does not apply when there is a grave abuse of discretion which would authorize the aggrieved person to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Sy Thiong Shiou v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009). 4. In a case, the Respondents argue that the findings of the DOJ in affirming, modifying or reversing the recommendations of the public prosecutor dismissing certain criminal complaints cannot be the subject of certiorari or review of the Court of Appeals because the DOJ is not a quasijudicial body within the purview of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the same case, the Court conceded that a preliminary proceeding is not a quasi-judicial function and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause but whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is the function of the prosecution. The Court further declared that it has adopted a policy of noninterference in the conduct of preliminary investigations and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient

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evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against the supposed offender. However, the Court also held: "As in every rule, however, there are settled exceptions. Hence, the principle of non-interference does not apply when there is grave abuse of discretion which would authorize the aggrieved person to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, x x x As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ gravely abused its discretion x x x " (Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009).

5. In another case it was similarly ruled that while it is generally the Secretary of Justice who has the authority to review the decisions of the prosecutors, the same precedential principles apply in full force and effect to the authority of the Court of Appeals to correct the acts tainted with grave abuse of discretion by the prosecutorial officers notwithstanding the filing of the informations (Filemon A. Verzano, Jr. v. Francis Victor D. Paro, G.R. No. 171643, August 8,2010). Appeal to the Office of the President 1. While judicial pronouncements do not allow an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 from the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the appeal referred to in such pronouncements evidently pertains only to a judicial appeal. 2. An administrative appeal is not proscribed by the previously cited jurisprudence. Likewise, Memorandum Circular No. 58 dated June 30, 1993 provides that appeals from or petition for review of "decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases are entertained by the Office of the President" under the following conditions which have to be established as jurisdictional facts: (a) The offense involved is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death (Angeles v. Gaite, G.R. No. 176596, March 23, 2011);

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(b) New and material issues are raised which were not previously presented before the Department of Justice and were not hence, ruled upon; (c) The prescription of the offense is not due to lapse within six (6) months from notice of the questioned resolution; and (d) The appeal or petition for review is filed within thirty (30) days from notice. If the appeal does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, the appeal shall be dismissed outright. If the lack of jurisdiction is not readily apparent, the appellant/petitioner shall be ordered to prove the necessary jurisdictional facts. 3. In the event of an adverse decision against the appellant, a verified petition for review may be taken to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from notice of the final order of the Office of the President and following the procedure set forth under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147932, January 25, 2006, the OSG contends that instead of filing a Rule 65 petition with the Supreme Court, the petitioner should have availed of Rule 43 in the case under consideration. Thus, the OSG argues that the petition should be dismissed outright for being a wrong mode of appeal. On the other hand, assuming Rule 65 applies, the OSG points out that the petition for certiorari should be filed with the Court of Appeals. De Ocampo held that based on Memorandum Circular No. 58 the resolution of the DOJ Secretary is appealable administratively to the Office of the President since the offenses charged in this case are punishable by reclusion perpetua. The Court further explained that even assuming that the DOJ Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed resolutions, the petitioner should have filed the instant petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Hence, on the issue alone of the propriety of the remedy sought by petitioner, the petition for certiorari must fail. fin

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Appeals under Rule 43 and Rule 45 1. From the Office of the President, the aggrieved party may file an appeal with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 43. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 43, the final orders or resolutions of the Office of the President is appealable to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review following the procedure set by Sec. 5 and 6 of Rule 43. 2. The party aggrieved by the judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals may avail of an appeal by certiorari (petition for review on certiorari) to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. Records supporting the information or complaint filed in court 1. It is not only the complaint or the information that is filed in court. The rule requires in the clearest of terms that an information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case (Sec. 7[a], Rule 112, Rules of Court).

2. The record of the preliminary investigation shall not form part of the record of the case. This rule applies not only to the preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor but also to a preliminary investigation made by other officers as may be authorized by law. Although not part of the record of the case, the court, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, may order the production of the record or any of its part when the court considers it necessary in the resolution of the case or any incident therein, or when it is introduced as an evidence in the case by the requesting party (Sec. 7[b], Rule 112, Rules of Court). Action of the judge upon the filing of the complaint or information

1. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the reso

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lution of the prosecutor. In conducting the evaluation of the resolution, the judge shall look into its supporting evidence (Sec. 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court). 2. The judge may make some findings after personally evaluating the resolution of the prosecutor. The judge may find that the evidence (a) fails to establish probable cause; (b) establishes probable cause; or (c) engenders a doubt as to the existence of probable cause. If the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, the judge may immediately dismiss the case. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. If a complaint or information was already filed pursuant to a lawful warrantless arrest under Sec. 6 of Rule 112, the court shall issue a commitment order instead of a warrant of arrest. The same rule applies if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant previously issued. In case the judge doubts the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecution to submit additional evidence within five (5) days from notice. The issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information (Sec. 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court as amended by AM. 05-08-26-SC, August 30,2005). 3. Jurisprudence reiterates the rule thus: The options available to the RTC upon the filing of an information before it by the public prosecutor or any prosecutor of the Secretary of Justice, are the following: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if the RTC finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within 5 days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information. The Supreme Court held that dismissal of the case by the RTC judge in a case did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. Rather, it clearly showed his compliance with his duty to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence

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(Elvira O. Ongv. Jose Casim Genio, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009). When warrant of arrest is not necessary 1.

A warrant of arrest is not required in the following instances: (a) When a complaint or information has already been filed pursuant to a lawful warrantless arrest, i.e., if the accused is already under detention and was lawfully arrested without a warrant and a complaint or information has been filed pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 112 (Sec. 5[c], Rule 112, Rules of Court); also when a warrant has already been issued by the MTC judge pursuant to Sec. 5[b] of Rule 112 and the accused is already detained (Sec. 5(c), Rule 112). (b) When the accused is charged for an offense punishable only by fine (Sec. 5[c], Rule 112); or (c) When the case is subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 16, 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure). 2. It is within the discretion of the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of an accused in a criminal case. A judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. However, if he finds probable cause, then he is mandated by law to issue such warrant. While before it was mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused if he found probable cause, the rule is that the investigating judge's power to order the arrest of the accused is limited to instances in which there is a necessity for placing him in custody "in order not to frustrate the ends of justice." The arrest of the accused can be ordered only in the event that the prosecutor files the case and the judge of the RTC finds probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest (Pangan v. Ganay, 445 SCRA 574 citing Concerned Citizens of Maddela v. De la Torre-Yadao, 39&SCRA 217).

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Withdrawal of the information already filed in court (Bar 1990; 2003) 1. In Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, the issue raised is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits. Grappling with the issue, the Court unequivocally held that the rule in this jurisdiction is that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive control and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court which has the option to grant or deny the same. Crespo likewise ruled that it does not matter if this is done before or after arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. The court, in the exercise of its discretion may deny the motion and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. 2. It is vital to bear in mind that in resolving a motion to dismiss the case or to withdraw the information filed by the public prosecutor on his own initiative or pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice, either for insufficiency of the evidence or for lack of probable cause, the trial court should not rely solely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed or that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. The triaLeourt must make an independent evaluation or assessment tff the

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merits of the case and the evidence on record of the prosecution (Santos v. Orda, Jr., 437 SCRA 504). The dismissal cannot be merely based on the findings of the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed. Reliance cannot be placed solely on the conclusion of the prosecution that there is no sufficient evidence against the accused. The grant of the motion to dismiss cannot be based upon considerations other than the judge's own and personal conviction that there was no case against the accused. In other words, the judge himself must be convinced that there was, indeed, no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution (Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 575; Gandarosa v. Flores, G.R. No. 167910,17July 2007,527 SCRA 776; Co v. Lim, G.R. Nos. 164669-70, October 30,2009; Harold V. Tamargo v. Romulo Awingan, Lloyd Antiporda and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010; Leonardo U. Flores v. Hon. Raul S. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188197, August 3,2010). 3. The trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed (Santos v. Orda, Jr., 437 SCRA 504). The trial court has the option to grant or deny the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656). It may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case (Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc. v. Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No. 163741, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 274). 4. Once a criminal action has been instituted by the filing of the Information with the court, the latter acquires jurisdiction and has the authority to determine whether to dismiss the case or convict or acquit the accused. Where the prosecution is convinced that the evidence is insufficient to establish the guilt of an accused, it cannot be faulted for

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moving for the withdrawal of the Information. However, in granting or denying the motion to withdraw, the court must judiciously evaluate the evidence in the hands of the prosecution. The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no satisfactory evidence against the accused and this conclusion can only be reached after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution (Ramos v. People, G.R. No. 171565, July 13,2010). 5. The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. The judge must not also ignore relevant pieces of evidence necessary to resolve the motion and must look at everything made available to the judge such as affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents or evidence appended to the information, the records of the public prosecutor or any evidence already adduced before the court at the time the motion is filed (Tamargo v. Awingan, G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010). 6. It bears emphasizing that when the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of compliance to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice, but in sound and faithful exercise of its judicial prerogative. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or after the arraignment of the accused. The prior determination of probable cause by the trial court does not in any way bar a contrary finding upon reassessment of the evidence presented before it (Ramos v. People, G.R. No. 171565, July 13,2010). 7. In a fairly recent case, a motion to withdraw an information filed by the city prosecutor was denied by the trial court. Without moving for a reconsideration of the order denying the motion, the accused filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to seek a reversal of the order of the trial court. The Court also ruled, as it had done in past cases, that the trial court, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable

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cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion (Hipos, Sr. v. Bay, G.R. No. 174813-15, March 17, 2009; Baltazar v. Chua, G.R. No. 177583, February 27, 2009). 8. In Lee v. KC Bank, N.V., G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2010, the trial court was confronted with a motion to withdraw an information for estafa filed against the respondents. The court granted the motion in an order stating that it had made "an in-depth scrutiny of the arguments raised by the prosecution and private complainant" and that it "finds the contentions of the prosecution to be sufficient and meritorious." An order of this tenor was ruled to be insufficient. The Supreme Court declared the judge must in his order, positively state that the evidence presented against the respondents was insufficient for a prima facie case. It must include a discussion of the merits of the case based on an evaluation or assessment of the evidence on record, look at the basis of the recommendation of the prosecution, and state the reasons for granting the motion to withdraw the information and must embody the assessment in the order. If these requirements are not complied with, Lee v. KC Bank, N.V., concludes that a dismissal of the case would then be based upon considerations other than the judge's own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the respondents and showed that the trial judge improperly relinquished the discretion that he was bound to exercise. 9. In another case, the petitioner laments the trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the investigating prosecutor due to the latter's finding of lack of probable cause to indict him. He argues that such denial effectively deprived him of his substantive rights. Still, petitioner's argument fails to persuade. There is nothing procedurally improper on the part of the trial court in disregarding the result of the preliminary investigation it itse]|jordered. Judicial action on the motion rests in the sound exercise of judicial discretion. In denying the motion, the

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trial court just followed the jurisprudential rule laid down in Crespo v. Judge Mogul, 235Phil. 465, that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound discretion of the court (Evangelista v. People, G.R. No. 163267, May 5,2010). 10. The basic rule is simple: While the Secretary of Justice has the power to alter or modify the resolution of his subordinate and thereafter direct the withdrawal of the case, he cannot, however, impose his will on the court (Dumlao v. Ponferrada, 508 SCRA 426). 11. In a case on appeal, petitioner argues that the filing of the informations in the MTCC had already removed the cases from the power and authority of the prosecution to dismiss the same in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Crespo v. Mogul (Crespo). In denying the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that Crespo does not foreclose an appeal made of the resolution of a prosecutor in the determination of probable cause notwithstanding that informations had already been filed in court. The Supreme Court clarified that Crespo did not foreclose the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Supreme Court recognized that in Crespo, the action of the investigating fiscal or prosecutor in the preliminary investigation is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Thereafter, it may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice. The justice secretary's power of review may still be availed of despite the filing of an information in court (FilemonA. Verzano, Jr. v. Francis Victor D. Paro, G.R. No. 171643, August 8, 2010). Some judicial pronouncements on preliminary investigation 1. One case (Sierra v. Lopez, A.C. 7549, August 29, 2008) makes important judicial pronouncements on preliminary investigation. In Sierra the complainant in an administrative case^filed a complaint with the Supreme Court for dereliction of duty and

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gross ignorance of the law against certain prosecutors. The complainant raised the following questions of law: (1) whether the parties must appear together before the investigating prosecutor during preliminary investigation; (2) whether the counter-affidavits of the respondents should be sworn to only before the investigating prosecutor; and (3) whether the investigating prosecutor erred in denying the request of the complainant for clarificatory questioning. Ruled the Court: "We find no merit in the complaint. Rule 112, particularly Section 3 of the Rules of Court, lays down the basic procedure in preliminary investigation x x x "This provision of the Rules does not require a confrontation between the parties. Preliminary investigation is ordinarily conducted through submission of affidavits and supporting documents, through the exchange of pleadings. xxx "Since confrontation between the parties is not imperative, it follows that it is not necessary that the counter-affidavit of respondent be sworn to before the investigating prosecutor himself. It can be sworn to before another prosecutor. In fact, this is specifically provided in paragraph (c) of Sec. 3, which states that the "counter- affidavit shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section x x x;" and paragraph (a), provides: the affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official or in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public xxx.

"Lastly, we hold that the investigating prosecutors did not abuse their discretion when they denied the request of the complainant for the conduct of clarificatory questioning. Under paragraph (e) of Section 3 above, the conduct of clarificatory questioning is discretionary upon the prosecutor. Indeed, we already held in Webb v. De Leon (G.R. Nos. 121245 & 121297, August 23,1995), that the decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions

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is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator, and the investigator alone" (Sierra v. Lopez, A.C. 7549, August 29,2008).

2. The principle of estoppel was once applied in a preliminary investigation in the Ombudsman in a much earlier case (Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136082 May 12, 2000). In Bautista, an anonymous, unverified and unsigned let- ter-complaint purportedly emanating from certain named associations, was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman against the petitioner for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of R.A. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for among others, causing the hiring of one hundred and ninety-two (192) casual employees in the municipal government for political considerations and that the payment of their honoraria and salaries was charged to the peace and order fund despite meager savings of the municipality. The petitioner was directed to submit his counter-affidavit to the letter-complaint which petitioner did. Thereafter, an information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of R.A. 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner assailed the Ombudsman for failing to direct the complainants to reduce their evidence into affidavits before requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit. Petitioner invoked Sec. 4, Rule II, of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman which requires that for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation, the complainant must submit his affidavit and those of his witnesses before respondent can be required to submit his counter-affidavit and other supporting documents. Conformably with such rule, the petitioner argued that the Ombudsman should have first required the associations to submit their respective affidavits before requiring him as respondent to submit his counter-affidavit, especially since the letter-complaint was unsigned and unverified; hence, there was no valid cause of action against petitioner. The arguments ofthe petitioner failed to impress the Court. While it was true that he was directed to submit his counter-

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affidavit thereto without requiring the complainants to verify their letter-complaint, however, despite the Ombudsman's noncompliance with the affidavit requirement, the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit and answered the charges against him. Hence, according to the Court, having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and having allowed the proceedings to go on until the preliminary investigation was terminated and the information filed at the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner was deemed to have waived whatever right he may otherwise have to assail the manner in which the preliminary investigation was conducted. Consequently, petitioner was likewise estopped from questioning the validity of the information filed before the Sandiganbayan (Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136082, May 12, 2000). 3. May a complaint affidavit notarized in a foreign jurisdiction be the basis for a preliminary investigation? This question was answered by the Court in Sasot v. People, G.R. No. 143193, June 29,2005. The case involved a criminal prosecution against petitioners for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, filed before the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners were alleged to be engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit "NBA" garment products. In a Special Power of Attorney the President of NBA Properties, Inc., constituted a local law firm, as the company's attorney-in-fact, to act for and its behalf in the filing of criminal, civil and administrative complaints, among others. The Special Power of Attorney was notarized by a notary public of New York County and certified by the County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. A Philippine Consul of the Consulate General of the Philippines in New York, authenticated the certification. The company president also executed a Complaint-Affidavit before the same notary public of the State of New York. Before they entered their pleas, the petitioners moved to quash the information arguing among others, that the fiscal should have dismissed the complaint filed during the

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preliminary investigation because under the rules, the complaint must be sworn to before the prosecutor. The trial court sustained the prosecution and denied petitioners' motion to quash. The special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was dismissed. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition but the same was likewise denied. The petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed before the Supreme Court now reiterates the argument that the complaint filed is defective and should have been dismissed by the fiscal because it should have been personally sworn to by the complainant before the investigating prosecutor. The petition was denied by the Supreme Court, which declared emphatically that a complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainant's affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before the prosecutor. The Court added that the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits. Note: The case was decided under Sec. 3 of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which has substantially the same provisions as Sec. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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Chapter V ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE I. ARREST (RULE 113) Arrest; how arrest made Law enforcement officers are entrusted with the power to conduct investigations, make arrests, perform searches and seizures of persons and their belongings, and occasionally use lethal force in the line of duty. This authority must be exercised within the boundaries of the law because when officers exceed those boundaries, they jeopardize the admissibility of any evidence collected for prosecution. 1. An arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense (Sec. 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court). Under this definition, a person is arrested for a specific and definite purpose — to make him answer for the commission of an offense. 2. To make an arrest, a person need not be actually restrained by the person making the arrest. Under the Rules of Court, a submission to the custody of the person making the arrest already constitutes an arrest (Sec. 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court). Whichever means is used to make an arrest, the term necessarily implies control over the person under custody and as a consequence, a restraint on his liberty to the extent that he is not free to leave on his own volition. 3. Knowing whether or not an arrest has been made is oftentimes crucial to the analysis of the legality of the acts of the arresting officer. For instance, if an arrest has actually

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been made and at the time of the apprehension a crime has already been committed, the arrest may be deemed infirm unless it be based on a probable cause that the person arrested committed the offense. Sec. 5(b) of Rule 113 further requires that the probable cause must be based on the personal knowledge by the arresting officer of facts and circumstances that the arrestee is indeed the perpetrator of the criminal act. If the act of the officer does not amount to an arrest, the requirements of probable cause and personal knowledge of facts and circumstances will certainly not be prerequisites to the legality of the said act and said act would be reviewed on the basis of some other standards. As will be seen later, the legality of an arrest is of vital importance when subsequent to the arrest a seizure of evidence follows because the admissibility of the evidence would hinge on the legality of the prior arrest. It is not surprising that most criminal cases reaching the Supreme Court involve prayers for the suppression of evidence obtained after alleged illegal arrests. Requisites for the issuance of a warrant of arrest Sec. 2 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution of the Philippines in part declares: "Sec. 2 . . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

1. It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon finding of probable cause personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he/ she may produce, and particularly describing the person to be seized (Tabujara III v. People, G.R. No. 175162, October 29, 2008).

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An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State (Borlongan v. Peha, G.R. No. 143591, May 5, 2010). Probable cause in connection with the issuance of a warrant of arrest, assumes the existence of facts that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a crime has been committed and that it was likely committed by the person sought to be arrested. The test for issuing a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused (People v. Tan, G.R. No. 182310, December 9, 2009). It is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction (People v. Gabo, G.R. No. 161083, August 3, 2010). 2. While it seems to appear that the constitution requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses under oath by asking searching questions, the case of AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007, is enlightening. In AAA v. Carbonell, the petitioner, the alleged victim, assailed the orders of the trial court dismissing the rape case filed against the private respondent for lack of probable cause and another order denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The facts show that after an information for rape was filed with the trial court, the accused filed a motion for the determination of probable cause. The court granted the motion and directed the petitioner and her witnesses to

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take the witness stand. But instead of taking the witness stand, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the documentary evidence already sufficiently established the existence of probable cause. The petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. She argues that the respondent should have taken into consideration the documentary evidence as well as the transcript of stenographic notes which sufficiently established the existence of probable cause. The respondent judge in his comment submitted to the Highest Court, argued that the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor is not binding or obligatory upon him. He claimed that he was justified in requiring the petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand in order to determine probable cause since under Section 2, Article HI of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause "to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce " He contended that the refusal of the petitioner to sit on the stand and be examined negated the existence of probable cause. The records, as discovered by the Court, disclosed that the respondent judge dismissed the case without evaluating the evidence in support of the resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the convened Panel of Prosecutors, and the Department of Justice which all sustained a finding of probable cause against the accused. The respondent judge's finding of lack of probable cause was premised only on the complainant's and her witnesses' absence during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of probable cause. The Supreme Court found the respondent to have committed a grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the criminal case on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply with his orders to take the witness stand.

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Citing the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. Nos. L-82585, L-82827, November 14, 1988, the Court explained that this constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. The argument that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest is not an accurate interpretation. The Court adds: "What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Fol- lowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. "Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.'Tunderscoring supplied)

We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 653, where we held that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence

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of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. X X X

True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge's personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof." (underscoring supplied) Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 150185, May 27, 2004, we stressed that the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. If the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be conducted, x x x." 3. Talingdan v. Eduarte, 366 SCRA 559 declares in categorical terms: "Interpreting the words personal determination ... it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves, x x x. Rather what is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to

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satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause, x x x. What he is never allowed to do is follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of probable cause .. (See also Lim, Sr. v. Felix, 194 SCRA 292). 4. In Borlongan v. Pefia, G.R. No. 143591, May 5,2010, reiterating the case of Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 293, it was ruled that the words "personal determination," in the Constitution, does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require thus would be to unduly laden them with preliminary examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end, he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. What he is never allowed said the Court, is to follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of probable cause. Much more is required by the constitutional provision. Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification. Although the extent of the judge's personal examination depends on the circumstances of each case, to be sure, he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is because the warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it. He should even call for the complainant and the witnesses to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances warrant. 5. In yet another recent case, respondents questioned the alleged lack of personal determination of probable cause by the judge in issuing the warrants for their arrest. The

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Court explained that the duty of the judge to determine probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest as mandated by Sec. 2, Article HI of the 1987Philippine Constitution does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. This means that the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the information (People of the Philippines v. Gray, G.R. No. 180109, July 26,2010). 6. If the complaint or information is directly filed with the MTC under Sec. 8(b) of Rule 112 in relation to Sec. 1(b) of Rule 110, the judge shall personally evaluate the evidence or personally examine in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. Preliminary inquiry (examination) versus preliminary investigation 1. There is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged — is the function of the investigating prosecutor (AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8,2007).

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2. A more recent case supports the declarations in AAA v. Carbonell and holds that "it is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged — is the function of the investigating prosecutor. "The task of the presiding judge when the information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial" (People v. Gabo, G.R. No. 161083, August 3,2010). Method of arrest with a warrant; warrant need not be in possession of the officer 1. When a warrant of arrest is issued by a judge, the warrant is delivered to the proper law enforcement agency for execution. The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reasons for its non-execution (Sec. 4, Rule 113, Rules of Court). 2. When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall (a) inform the person to be arrested of the cause of his arrest, and (b) inform him of the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest. The information need not be made when the person to be arrested (a) flees, (b) forcibly resists, or

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(c) the giving of the information will imperil the arrest (Sec. 7, Rule 113, Rules of Court). 3. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest. However, after the arrest, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable, if the person arrested so requires (Sec. 7, Rule 113, Rules of Court). 4. The officer assigned to execute the warrant of arrest has the duty to deliver the person arrested to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay (Sec. 3, Rule 113, Rules of Court). No unnecessary violence An underlying rule whenever an arrest is made is that no violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention (Sec. 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court). Authority to summon assistance It sometimes happens that an officer cannot on his own effectively make the arrest. Hence, the authority to effect an arrest carries with it an authority to orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person summoned by an officer is required to give the assistance requested provided he can do so without detriment to himself (Sec. 10, Rule 113, Rules of Court). The duty of the person summoned does not arise when rendering assistance would cause harm to himself. (Sec. 10, Rule 113, Rules of Court). When person to be arrested is inside a building If the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be within any building or enclosure, the Rules authorize the officer, in order to make an arrest, to break into any building or enclosure in case he is refused admittance after announcing his authority and purpose (Sec. 11, Rule 113, Rules of Court).

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After entering the building or enclosure, he may break out from said place if necessary to liberate himself from the same place (Sec. 12, Rule 113, Rules of Court). When a warrantless arrest is lawful (Bar 1988; 1989; 1996; 1997; 2000; 2004; 2010) 1. The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant (Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159). Hence, the doctrine is that a warrant of arrest is required before an arrest is made. A warrantless arrest is the exception. 2. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made: "Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (in flagrante exception); b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it {hot pursuit exception); and c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another" (escapee exception). A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempt

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ing to commit an offense (People v. Garcia, 529 SCRA 519, August 8,2007). 3. Section 5 of Rule 113 provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been committed (called hot pursuit.); (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. There is another ground for a warrantless arrest other than those provided for under Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. That ground is when a person previously lawftdly arrested escapes or is rescued. Under the Rules, any person may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines (Sec. 13, Rule 113, Rules of Court). 4. A bondsman may arrest an accused for the purpose of surrendering him to the court. Also, an accused released on bail may be re-arrested without a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending (Sec. 23, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Who may make the warrantless arrest; duty of officer; citizen's arrest 1. The warrantless arrest may be made not only by a peace officer but also by a private person. When the latter makes the arrest under the circumstances provided for under the Rules, the arrest is called "citizen's arrest" A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (People v. Garcia, 529 SCRA 519, August 8,2007). 2. When an accused is caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers are not only authorized but are duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

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The basis of the in flagrante delicto exception; requisites 1. Under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113, mere "suspicion" and "reliable information" are not justifications for a warrantless arrest. The rule requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. 2. The basis of this rule is the exception provided for in Sec. 5(a), Rule 113, thus: " * * * When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense * * * "

3. For a warrantless arrest of a person caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer (People v. Racko, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010; People v. Laguio, G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007; Zalameda v. People, G.R. No. 183656, September 4,2009). 4. Section 5(a) provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In flagrante delicto means caught in the act of committing a crime. This rule, which warrants the arrest of a person without warrant, requires that the person arrested has just committed a crime, or is committing it, or is attempting to commit an offense, in the presence within view of the arresting officer (People v. Alunday, G.R. No. 181546, September 3, 2008). For instance, the rule is settled that an arrest made after an entrapment

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does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court (People v. Cabugatan, 515 SCRA 537, February 12,2007). Existence of an overt act of a crime in the presence of the person making the arrest 1. Consider an experienced officer who upon noticing the characteristic outlines of the handle of a pistol bulging from the waistline of a pedestrian, stops him in the street, introduces himself as a policeman and without asking any questions immediately arrests him, cuffs him and forces him inside a waiting patrol car. Inside the car, the officer fishes out the firearm from the arrestee's waist, asks him whether or not he has a license to possess and a permit to carry the firearm, and after an admission from the person arrested that his gun has neither a license nor any other permit, books him for illegal possession of firearms. Whether or not the acts of the officer are permissible under the law and the Rules will necessarily be determined by the requisites provided for by Sec. 5(a) of Rule 113. The crucial issue to be laid before the court would be whether or not having the butt of a pistol bulge from one's waist plainly within the view of the officer conclusively constitutes an overt act of the crime of illegal possession of firearm which would justify an immediate arrest. The defense counsel would certainly argue that mere carrying of a pistol does not in itself indicate a violation of the law since illegal possession of a gun cannot be inferred from its mere possession. When the apprehension was made, the officer had no awareness that a crime is being committed in his presence since he had no prior knowledge that the person carrying the same had no license for the firearm, a knowledge that came to him only after the arrest. In short, it may be argued that there was absolutely nothing under the facts that would show an overt act of a crime other than the mere suspicion that the gun was unlicensed at the time of the arrest. The gun, under the circumstances may become a "fruit of the poisonous tree" and would possibly be held inadmissible in evidence.

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On the other hand, the prosecutor may insist on the application of the "plain view" doctrine to convince the Court to render a verdict of guilty. A hypothetical situation like the above indicates that sometimes a thin line exists between a legal and an illegal arrest and search. 2. Thus, it was ruled that a flagrante delicto arrest is not justified when no one among the accused was committing a crime in the presence of the police officers, more so if the police officers did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches conducted cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007). 3. A 1988 case, People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, demonstrates the legal infirmity of an arrest for noncompliance with the requisites of the flagrante delicto exception. Here, more than two days before the arrest, constabulary officers received a tip from an informer that the accused was on board an identified vessel on a particular date and time and was carrying marijuana. Acting on the information, they waited for the accused and approached him as he descended the gangplank of the ship and arrested him. A subsequent inspection of his bag disclosed the presence of three kilos of marijuana leaves. The Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in the possession of the accused as a product of an illegal search since it was not an incident to a lawful arrest. Emphatically, the Supreme Court declared that the accused was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. He was merely descending the gangplank of the ship and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other

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passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became a suspect and so subject to apprehension. The court added that from the information received by the officers, they could have obtained a warrant since they had at least two days to apply for the same but the officers made no efforts to comply with the bill of rights. They chose to ignore the law. Then too, in People v. Molina, 352 SCRA 174, the conviction by the trial court was reversed and set aside when the Supreme Court declared as invalid an arrest made merely on the basis of reliable information that the persons arrested were carrying marijuana. The accused were arrested while inside a pedicab despite the absence of any outward indications of a crime being committed. Similarly, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159, the Supreme Court declared that a warrantless arrest cannot be justified where no crime is being committed at the time of the arrest because no crime may be inferred from the fact that the eyes of the person arrested were "moving fast" and "looking at every person" passing by. 4. A classic case that illustrates an invalid arrest and a subsequent illegal search and seizure is People v. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174. The issue on the legality of the arrest, search and seizure stemmed from a telephone call to the police from an alleged informer that suspicious looking men were at a street corner in Tondo shortly before noon. The police operatives dispatched to the place saw three men one of whom who turned out to be Mengote, was "looking from side" to side clutching his abdomen. The operatives approached the three men and introduced themselves as policemen. Two of them accordingly tried to run away but the attempt was foiled. The search yielded a revolver in the possession of Mengote and a fan knife in the pocket of another. Mengote contends that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because its seizure was a product of an illegal search and made not as an incident to a lawful arrest.

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Speaking through Justice Isagani A. Cruz, the Court ruled that the requirements of a warrantless arrest were not complied with. There was no offense which could have been suggested by the acts of Mengote of looking from side to side while holding his abdomen. Observed the Court: "These are certainly not sinister acts. * * * He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun. * * * By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence." 5. A much later case People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007, and which drew much from the ruling in Aminnudin likewise aptly illustrates the application of the doctrine. In this case, two men were arrested while they were about to hand over a bag of shabu to a policer officer. Questioned, the arrested men told the officers that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu by their employer, WW early the following morning and that he could be found at a certain apartment building in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for WW to shed light on the illegal drug activities of his alleged employees and proceeded to the location of the apartment and placed the same under surveillance. When WW came out of the apartment towards a parked car, two other police officers approached him, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was WW, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the car. When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of WW an unlicensed pistol with live ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the operatives searched the car and found inside it were the following items: (a) transparent plastic bags with shabu; (b) cash in the amount of P650,000.00; (c) electronic and mechanical scales; and (d) another unlicensed pistol with magazine. Then and there, WW resisted the warrantless arrest and search.

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The Supreme Court, in very lucid terms, declared that the facts and circumstances surrounding the case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of WW that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from the apartment and was about to enter a parked car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled, said the Court that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest (Citing People v. Binad Sy Chua, 444 Phil 757 and People v. Molina, 352 SCRA 174). What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers said the Court, is that WW was arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of the two men who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. They did not in fact identify WW to be their source of the shabu when they were caught with it in flagrante delicto. Upon the duo's declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day and that WW may be found in an apartment building in Malate, the arresting officers conducted what they termed was a "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person who will match the description of WW, the employer of the arrested men. The conclusion of the trial court that the warrantless arrest was illegal and that ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful, was sustained by the Supreme Court. 6. Warrantless arrests were upheld in some cases. The much earlier case of People v. Anita Claudio, 160 SCRA 646, is an example of a warrantless arrest made under the in flagrante delicto exception. Here the accused who was carrying a woven

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buri-like plastic bag which appeared to contain camote tops, boarded a bus bound for the province. Instead of placing the bag by her side, which is the usual practice of a traveler, she placed the same on the back seat where a trained anti- narcotics agent was seated. Since the act of the accused was unusual for a traveler, the suspicion of the agent was aroused. Feeling that something was unusual, the agent inserted his finger inside the bag where he felt another plastic bag in the bottom from which emanated the smell of marijuana. Right after she got off the bus, the agent arrested the accused. 7. Not all cases were however, decided in the mold of Amminudin. People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220, is a case with facts which do not fall squarely with the standards set by Amminudin, because of the differences in circumstances. In this case, two police officers together with a barangay tanod were conducting surveillance operations in a bus station allegedly to check on persons who may be "engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers." They noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who "was acting suspiciously." When asked to open the bag, the accused did so only after the officers identified themselves. Found in the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic and weighing about one kilogram. Upon these facts, it was ruled that there was a valid warrantless arrest and a valid warrantless search. The Court pronounced Tangliben to be different from Aminnudin. In the latter, the "urgency" presented by Tangliben were not present. In Tangliben, the Court found that the officers were faced by an "on-the-spot" information which required them to act swiftly. In People v. Maspil, G.R. No. 85177, August 20, 1990, because of confidential reports from informers that two persons would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana, officers set up a checkpoint in Benguet to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles bound for Baguio City. A couple of hours after midnight, a jeepney was flagged down in the checkpoint. On board were the persons identified by the informers who were also with the policemen manning the checkpoint. When the sacks and tin cans inside the jeepney were opened,

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they contained what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen then placed the two accused under arrest. Again, the court distinguished Maspil from Aminnudin. In the latter, the officers were aware of the identity of the accused, his planned criminal enterprise and the vessel he would be taking. Further, in Aminnudin, the Court found that the officers had sufficient time to obtain a search warrant. In Maspil, the officers had no exact description of the vehicle of the accused, and no idea of the definite time of its arrival. The Court explained that a jeepney on the road is not the same as a passenger boat the route and time of arrival of which are more or less certain and which ordinarily cannot deviate or alter its course or select another destination. The hot pursuit exception (Bar 1997; 2004) 1. This exception found in Sec. 5(b) of Rule 113 which authorizes a warrantless arrest provides: "* * * When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it * * *."

2. The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (People v. Agojo, G.R. No. 181318, April 16,2009). Under this exception a warrantless arrest made, one year after the offense was allegedly committed is an illegal arrest. (Bar 1997; 2004) 3. This exception does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds are reasonable when the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported

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by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest (Abelita v. Doria, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009). In Abelita III v. Doria, the petitioner alleged that he was arrested based merely on information relayed to the police officers about a shooting incident and that they had, at the time of the arrest, no personal knowledge of the facts. The Court found that as soon as the police received a phone call about a shooting incident, a team was dispatched to investigate. The investigation disclosed that a victim was wounded and that the witnesses tagged the petitioner as the one involved and that he had just left the scene of the crime. After tracking down the petitioner, he was invited to the police headquarters but the petitioner who initially agreed sped off prompting the authorities to give chase. The Court ruled that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities to the existence of a probable cause. 4. A case decided long before Abelita III vividly illustrates the application of the exception. In People v. Acol, 232 SCRA 406, two robbers divested the passengers of a jeepney of their belongings including the jacket of one passenger. The passengers immediately sought the help of police officers which formed a team to track down the suspects. One of the passengers who went with the responding police officers, saw one of the robbers casually walking in the same vicinity and wearing his jacket. The warrantless arrest of the accused was sustained by the Court as well within the hot pursuit exception. 5. In People v. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756, the Valenzuela police station received a report of a mauling incident which resulted in the death of the victim who received a massive skull fracture caused by a hard and heavy object. Right

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away the officers went to the crime scene and found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two pouches of marijuana. A witness told the police that the accused was one of those who killed the victim. They proceeded to the house of the accused and arrested him. The Court ruled that based on their knowledge of the circumstances of the death of the victim and the report of an eyewitness, in arresting the accused, the officers had personal knowledge of facts leading them to believe that it was the accused who was one of the perpetrators of the crime. Method of arrest without a warrant 1. Arrest by an officer — When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his (a) authority, and (b) the cause of his arrest. This information need not be given (a) if the person to be arrested is engaged in the commission of an offense, (b) is in the process of being pursued immediately after its commission, (c) escapes or flees, or (d) forcibly resists before the officer has the opportunity to so inform him, or (e) when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest (Sec. 8, Rule 113, Rules of Court). The rules applicable to an arrest with a warrant also apply to an arrest without a warrant. Hence, the officer may summon assistance to effect the arrest, break into a building or an enclosure or break out from the same (Sees. 11-12, Rule 113). 2. Arrest by a private person — When a private person makes an arrest, he shall inform the person to be arrested not of his authority to arrest, but of his intention to surest him and the cause of his arrest. This information need not be given under the same conditions as when it is an officer who makes the arrest (Sec. 9, Rule 113, Rules of Court). The right to break into a building or an enclosure specifically refers to an 'officer' and not to a private person (Sec. 11, Rule 113, Rules of Court). 3. Where a warrantless arrest is made under the in flagrante and hot pursuit exceptions, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest

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police station or jail (Sec. 5, last paragraph, Rule 113). (Bar 2007) Time of making an arrest An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night (Sec. 6, Rule 113, Rules of Court). Rights of a person arrested (R.A. 7438) 1. The rights of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation are spelled out by Republic Act No.7438. These rights are: (a) The right to be assisted by counsel at all times (Sec. 2[a], RA. 7438); (b) The right to remain silent (Sec. 2[b], RA. 7438); (c) The right to be informed of the above rights (Sec. 2[b], RA. 7438); and (d) The right to be visited by the immediate members of his family, by his counsel, or by any non-governmental organization, national or international (Sec. 2[f}, RA. 7438). 2. The counsel must be one who is independent and competent. He shall be allowed to confer at all times with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided by the investigating officer with a competent and independent counsel (Sec. 2[b], R.A. 7438). 3. In the absence of a lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Sec. 3, RA. 7438). Also, any waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, shall be in writing, and signed by the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation in the presence of his counsel, otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect (Sec. 2[e], RA. 7348). (Bar 2004; 2006)

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4. Any extrajudicial confession made shall also be in writing and signed by the person, detained or under custodial investigation in the presence of his counsel, or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding (Sec. 2[d], RA. 7438). (Bar 1996) Custodial investigation; expanded concept R.A. 7438 expanded the meaning of custodial investigation. Under Sec. 2(f) of the Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law. Penalties under R.A. 7438 R.A. 7438 provides penalties for its violations. For instance, any arresting officer or investigating officer who fails to inform any person, arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, shall suffer a penalty consisting of a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer or any member of the immediately family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation or those who under the law are entitled to visit such person, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00) (Sec. 4, RA. 7438). Effect of an illegal arrest on jurisdiction of the court The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an

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illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010). Effect of admission to bail on objections to an illegal arrest An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued, provided that he raises the objection before he enters his plea. The objection shall be resolved by the court as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case (Sec. 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Waiver of the illegality of the arrest; effect of illegal arrest (Bar 2000; 2001) 1. A warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection to it is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection. If the appellants are questioning their arrest for the first time on appeal, they are, therefore, deemed to have waived their right to the constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches (People v. Aminola, G.R. No. 178062, September 8,2010). The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed waived (Zalameda v. People, G.R. No. 183656, September 4, 2009; Sec. 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court). It has been ruled time and again that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before his arraignment. Any objection involving the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the

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objection is deemed waived (People v. Tan, G.R. No. 191069, November 15,2010). 2. Since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. It was also held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused (People v. Alunday, G.R. No. 181546, September 3,2008; Dolera v. People, G.R. No. 180693, September 4,2009). Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over his or her person, should be raised in a motion to quash at any time before entering her plea, and failure to timely raise this objection amounts to a waiver of such irregularity, resulting in concomitant submission to the trial court's jurisdiction over his or her person (Eugenio v. People, 549 SCRA 433, March 26,2008). 3. An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue, or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground, before arraignment. In a case, the appellant was already arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty and actively participated in his trial. He raised the issue of the irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to the Court of Appeals. He is therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court through his counsel-assisted plea during the arraignment, by actively participating in the trial, and by not raising the objection before his arraignment (People of the Philippines v. Nelson PalmayHangad, G.R. No. 189279, March 9, 2010; Diamante v. People, G.R. No. 180992, September 4,2009; Zalameda v. People, GH. No. 183656, September 4,2009; People v. Amper, G.R. No.172708, May 5,2010). 4. The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning the illegal arrest or the lack of or irregular preliminary investigation applies only if the

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accused voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto. There must be clear and convincing proof that the accused had an actual intention to relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause (Jose Antonio C. Leviste v. Hon. Elmo M. Alameda, et al., G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010; Borlongan v. Pena, G.R. No. 143591, May 25,2010). 5. In one case, the petitioner claimed that his warrantless arrest is illegal. However, nowhere in the records can it be found in which the petitioner interposed objections to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived (Salvador Valdez Rebellion v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175700, July 5,2010). In the above case, the records disclosed that the petitioner was duly arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused (Salvador Valdez Rebellion v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175700, July 5,2010). Persons not subject to arrest 1. Sec. 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: "A senator or member of the House of representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six

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years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session * * *."

The privilege of a senator or a congressman will not apply when the offense is punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years even if Congress is in session (People v. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000). Also, the privilege does not apply if Congress is not in session (Sec. 11, Art. VI, Philippine Constitution). 2. Under generally accepted principles of international law, sovereigns and other chiefs of state, ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resident, and charge d'affaires are immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the country of their assignment and are therefore immune from arrest (II Hyde, International Law, 2nd Ed). 3. RA. 75 prohibits the arrest of duly accredited ambassadors, public ministers of a foreign country, their duly registered domestics (Sec. 4, RA. 75), subject to the principle of reciprocity (Sec. 7, RA. 75). II. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (RULE 126) Nature of a search warrant (Bar 1994) 1. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court (Sec. 1, Rule 126, Rules of Court). 2. A search warrant is not a criminal action nor does it represent a commencement of a criminal prosecution even if it is entitled like a criminal action. It is not a proceeding against a person but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some respects with what is commonly known as

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John Doe proceedings (United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574 citing Bevington v. United States, 35 F2d 5841929; State v. Keiffer, 187 NW164 1922). A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the state to procure relevant evidence of a crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power (United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574 citing Lodyga v. State, 179 NE1641931; C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 63). It has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights. It concerns the public at large as distinguished from ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons and may only be applied for the furtherance of public prosecutions (Ibid.; citing State v. Derry, 56 NE 482 1908; Lodyga v. State, 179 NE 164 1931) 3. The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested with the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial functions (Skechers, USA v. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation, 509 SCRA 395). The Constitutional provision 1. Like an arrest, the laws and rules governing a search warrant is based upon constitutional guarantees. The pertinent constitutional provision provides: "Sec. 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized" (Sec. 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines).

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2. The following provision solidifies the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures by providing for an exclusionary rule, thus: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding (Sec. 3, par. 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines).

Arrest distinguished from search and seizure 1. The rules on arrest are concerned with the seizure of a person. It involves the taking of a person in custody. A search may follow an arrest but the search must be incident to a lawful arrest. The rules on searches and seizures cover a wider spectrum of matters on the search of both persons and places and the seizure of things found therein. 2. A probable cause to arrest does not necessarily involve a probable cause to search and vice versa. Probable cause to arrest involves a different determination from probable cause to search. In order to determine probable cause to arrest, the judge (not the prosecutor) must have sufficient facts in his hands that would tend to show that a crime has been committed and that a particular person committed it. Probable cause to search requires facts to show that particular things connected with a crime are found in a specific location. 3. The judge is not necessarily required to make a personal examination before issuing a warrant of arrest (Borlon- gan v. Pena, G.R. No. 143591, May 5, 2010, citing Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 293). The judge must, before issuing the search warrant, personally examine the complainant and the witnesses he may produce in determining probable cause (Sec. 5, Rule 126, Rules of Court; Santos v. Pryce Gases, G.R. No. 165122, November 23,2007). 4. An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night (Sec. 6, Rule 113, Rules of Court). A search

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warrant is generally served in the day time, unless there be a direction in the warrant that it may be served at any time of the day or night (Sec. 9, Rule 126, Rules of Court). Definition of a search warrant under the Rules A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court (Sec. 1, Rule 126, Rules of Court). Application for a search warrant," where to file 1. As a rule, an application for a search warrant shall be filed before any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed (Sec. 2[a], Rule 126, Rules of Court). 2. There are exceptions to the above general rule. These are:

(a) The application may be made before any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known (Sec. 2[b], Rule 126, Rules of Court). (b) The application may also be filed before any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced (Sec. 2[b], Rule 126, Rules of Court). Note: In both exceptions, filing in such courts requires compelling reasons stated in the application. (c) The application shall be made only in the court where the criminal action is pending, if the criminal action has already been filed (Sec. 2, last paragraph, Rule 126, Rules of Court).

Search warrants involving heinous crimes and others 1. The above rules in Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court have been deemed modified by A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC dated January 25, 2000, in cases involving heinous crimes,

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illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms. Under the aforementioned issuance by the Supreme Court, the following are authorized to act on all applications for search warrants involving any of the above crimes: The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) with the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. The applications shall be personally endorsed by the Heads of said agencies, for the search of places to be particularly described therein, and the seizure of property or things as prescribed in the Rules of Court, and to issue the warrants of arrest, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts. The authorized judges shall keep a special docket book listing the details of the applications and the results of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued. 2. In Spouses Marimla v. People, G.R. No. 158467, October 16, 2009, the petitioners filed a motion to quash the search warrant and to suppress the evidence illegally seized. It was contended among others, that the application for search warrant was filed and the warrant was issued by the RTC of Manila which is a court outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the courts of Angeles City and Porac, Pampanga where the alleged crime was committed. It was also argued that the application for search warrant was not personally endorsed by the head of the NBI as required by "AM. No. 99-10-09-80." The Supreme Court observed that the cases against petitioners involved a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law of 1972 (R.A. 6425). As such, the application for search warrant may be filed by the NBI in the City of Manila and the warrant

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issued may be served outside of Manila pursuant to "A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC." The Court likewise held that as to the claim that the application for the warrant was defective for not having been personally endorsed by the head of the NBI, the Court held that "nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits" the head of the NBI and of the other law enforcement agencies mentioned from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application to their assistant heads. Besides, under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. Ex parte application for a search warrant An application for a search warrant is heard ex parte. It is neither a trial nor a part of the trial. Action on these applications must be expedited for time is of the essence. Great reliance has to be accorded by the judge to the testimonies under oath of the complainant and the witnesses. (Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 214 Phil. 332; Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 165122, November 23,2007). Property subject of a search warrant 1. The property subject of a search warrant is personal property, not real property. A search warrant may be issued not only for the search but also for the seizure of the following: (a) Personal property subject of the offense; (b) Personal property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) Personal property used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense (Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court). 2. The rule is, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities. In People v. Nunez, (G.R. No. 177148, June 30, 2009), Search Warrant No. 42 specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine

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hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of ejusdem generis, the Court explained, where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement which would repel such inference. Certainly, the lady's wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in appellant's residence they believed were "proceeds of the crime" or "means of committing the offense." This, said the Court, is absolutely impermissible. In the same case, the Court declared: "The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant should be restored to appellant. Requisites for the issuance of a search warrant 1. The following are the requisites for a search warrant under the Rules of Court: (a) There must be probable cause in connection with one specific offense; (b) The presence of probable cause is to be determined by the judge personally;

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(c) The determination by the judge must be made after an examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; (d) The warrant must specifically describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines (Sec. 4, Rule 126, Rules of Court; Santos v. Pryce Gases, G.R. No. 165122, November 23,2007; People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11,2010). 2. The absence of the following requisites for a search warrant's validity, will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized (Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 165122, November 23,2007). 3. Inherent in the court's power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants already issued. After a judge has issued a warrant, he is not precluded to subsequently quash the same, if he finds upon re-evaluation of the evidence that no probable cause exists (Manly Sportwear Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dadodette Enterprises, 470 SCRA 384; Skechers, USA, Inc. v. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation, 509 SCRA 395). Probable cause in search warrants A search warrant can be issued only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for search warrant means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched (Kho v. Lanzanas, 489 SCRA 445; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687). The facts and circumstances being referred thereto pertain to facts, data or information personally known to the

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applicant and the witnesses he may present. The applicant or his witnesses must have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense being complained of. "Reliable information'' is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses (Yao, Sr. v. People, 525 SCRA 108) because in the determination of probable cause, the court must resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance of the search warrant (Skechers, USA, Inc. v. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation, 509 SCRA 395). Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable cause is not concerned with the question of whether the offense charged has been or is being committed in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but only whether the affiant has reasonable grounds for his belief. The requirement is less than certainty of proof, but more than suspicion or possibility (Kho v. Lanzanas, 489 SCRA 445). 3. There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the findings or opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Skechers, USA, Inc. v. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation, 509 SCRA 395). It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate's determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is. paid with great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination (People v. Mamaril, G.R. No. 171980, October 6,2010). Although the term "probable cause" has been said to have a well-defined meaning under the law, the term is exceedingly difficult to define with any degree of precision and one which would cover every state of facts which may arise. As to what acts constitute probable cause, there is no exact test (Kho v. Lanzanas, 489 SCRA 445). The question whether or not probable cause exists is one which must be decided in the light

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of the conditions obtaining in given situations (Central Bank v. Morfe, 20 SCRA 507). 4. One case gives a reminder by declaring that 'probable cause' is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical, non-traditional probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required (United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574, citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,103 S. Ct. 15351983). 5. Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses, the findings of the judge deserves great weight. The reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason (Yao, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 168306, June 19, 2007). However, the probable cause must also be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. In determining its existence, the examining magistrate must make a probing and not merely routine or pro forma examination of the complainant and the witnesses (Nola v. Barroso, Jr., 408 SCRA 529; Betoy, Sr. v. Coliflores, 483 SCRA 435). In determining probable cause, the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant of the existence of probable cause (Kho v. Lanzanas, 489 SCRA 445). 6. In a case, the trial court retracted its earlier finding of probable cause because the seized items were accordingly incomplete or insufficient to charge petitioner with a criminal offense, thus, negating its previous determination of probable

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cause. The Court disagreed because in quashing the search warrant, it would appear that the trial court had raised the standard of probable cause to whether there was sufficient cause to hold petitioner for trial. In so doing, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. However, the findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 165122, November 23,2007). Probable cause to arrest and probable cause to search A probable cause to arrest does not necessarily involve a probable cause to search and vice versa. Probable cause to arrest involves a different determination from probable cause to search. In order to determine probable cause to arrest, the judge (not the prosecutor) must have sufficient facts in his hands that would tend to show that a crime has been committed and that a particular person committed it. Probable cause to search requires facts to show that particular things connected with a crime are found in a specific location. Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 653 expounds: . .each requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances, and thus one can exist without the other. In search cases, two conclusions must be supported by substantial evidence; that the items sought are in fact sizeable by virtue of being

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connected to criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched. It is not also necessary that a particular person be implicated. By comparison, in arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime was committed and that the person to be arrested has committed it, which of course can exist without any showing that evidence of the crime will be found at the premises under a person's control. Worthy of note, our Rules of Court do not provide for a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of a warrant of arrest and search warrants..."

How the examination shall be conducted by the judge 1. Aside from the requirements mandated by Sec. 4 of Rule 126, the rule requires the judge to comply with a specific procedure in the conduct of the examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The required procedure involves the following: (a) The examination must be personally conducted by the judge; (b) The examination must be in the form of searching questions and answers; (c) The complainant and the witnesses shall be examined on those facts personally known to them; (d) The statements must be in writing and under oath; and (e) The sworn statements of the complainant and the witnesses, together with the affidavits submitted, shall be attached to the record (Sec. 5, Rule 126, Rules of Court). 2. The facts and circumstances to be testified to by the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, being referred thereto pertain to facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. The applicant or his witnesses must have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense being complained of. "Reliable information" is insufficient.

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Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses (Yao, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 168306, June 19, 2007). An application for a search warrant if based on hearsay cannot, standing alone, justify issuance of a search warrant. It is necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the applicant's claims (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687). 3. Section 5 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, prescribes the rules in the examination of the complainant and his witnesses when applying for search warrant, to wit: "SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted."

The foregoing provisions require that the judge must, before issuing the warrant make a personal examination under oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce in accordance with Sec. 5 of Rule 126. "Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus, not sufficient. Aside from the examination under oath, "...The examining judge has to make searching questions and elicit answers of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce in writing and to attach them to the record." Thus, in Balayon v. Dinopol, 490 SCRA 547, the Court found an RTC judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for failure to observe the mandate of the rules because the Court found that there was no record of searching questions and answers attached to the records of the case. 4. The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge should conduct his investigation, it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely

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routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application (Yao, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 168306, June 19, 2007; Betoy, Sr. v. Coliflores, 483 SCRA 435). 5. In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant (Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36). Particular description of place or person 1. The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had been issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the compound described in the affidavit (Yao, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 168306, June 19,2007). The standard for determining the legality of a warrant directed against a person is whether the person has been

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sufficiently described with particularity sufficient to identify him with reasonable certainty. Even if his name is unknown or erroneously written, the description of the person with certainty to identify him and set him apart from others is enough to lend validity to the warrant (United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381, 3d Cir. 1971). Nowhere in Section 4, Rule 126 or any other provision of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is it required that the search warrant must name the person who occupies the described premises (Quelnan v. People, 526 SCRA 653, July 6, 2007). 2. The determining factor as to whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity is not whether the description is technically accurate in every detail but rather whether the description is sufficient to enable the officer to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and whether there is any reasonable probability that another premises may be mistakenly searched and not the one intended to be searched under the warrant (United States v. Darensbourg, 520 F.2d 985,987; 5th Cir. 1975; Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S. Ct. 414, 416, 69 L.Ed. 757, 760). The prevailing doctrine is that the warrant "must sufficiently describe the premises to be searched so that the officer executing the warrant may, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended" (People v. Peck, 1974, 38 CA 3d 993,1000,113 CR 806). 3. In United States v. Darensbourg (520 F.2d 985, 987 5th Cir. 1975), the warrant as well as the affidavit supporting it gave an erroneous street address but with the right apartment number in a four-building apartment complex. Since there was no other apartment in the entire complex that had the same apartment number as that described in the warrant, the description was upheld. The court, in a California case, applying the same principle, sustained the validity of a warrant which gave the wrong lot number or address but referred to the house to be searched as that one occupied by the accused (People v. Superior Court [Fish], 1980,101 Cal. App. 3d 216,161 Cal. Rptr. 547).

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4. In another American case, the place to be searched was described as u313 West 27th Street, a dwelling. The apartment of Melvin Lloyd Manley." The place was actually a multi-occupancy dwelling with sub-units or individual apartments. The defendant assailed the validity of the warrant on the ground that his apartment or unit was not sufficiently described. Here the court ruled that a search warrant directed against a multiple occupancy structure, although does not specify the sub-unit to be searched would not be considered invalid where it adequately specifies the name of the occupant of the sub-unit against which the warrant is directed and thus provides the searching officers sufficient information to identify the place intended by the warrant. The warrant, said the Court, must make reasonably clear what place is to be searched. Where the particular place to be searched is described by the affidavit of the officer as a single living unit in an entire building, a warrant describing an entire building and thus authorizing the search of the building is too broad (People v. Govea, 1965, 235 CA2d 285, 300; 45 CR 253; People v. Estrada, 1965 234 CA2d 136,146 CR 165). 5. In People v. Estrada, 1965, 234 CA2d 136, 146, 44 CR 165, a building had four apartments, and one of them located in the second floor was occupied by the accused. The warrant referred to:"The apartment house occupied by Manuel Estrada at 18 S. 19th Street, San Jose, the second story of a white house ..." The court ruled that by referring to Estrada, the warrant, identified the particular unit to be searched and the warrant was not overly broad. Estrada further held that if the description in the warrant limits the search to a particular part of the premises either by a designation of the area or other physical characteristics of such part or by a designation of its occupants, the business conducted there, the warrant will meet constitutional standards in respect to the description of the place to searched. 6. In Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36, the caption of Search Warrant A-l indicates the address of the petitioner as "Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City9 while the body of the same warrant states the address as "Hernan Cortes St.,

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Mandaue City" The Court did not consider the discrepancy as sufficient to consider the warrant constitutionally infirm. It was not shown that there was a street with the same name in Cebu City nor was it established that the officers enforcing the warrant had difficulty locating the premises of the petitioner. Uy explained that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. 7. A John Doe warrant which does not name the person subject of the same, is the exception rather than the rule. Hence, in one case, a warrant was voided to the extent that it was issued against fifty (50) John Does none of which could be identified by the witnesses (Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599). 8. The police on the other hand, should not be hindered in the performance of their duties by superficial adherence to technicality or farfetched judicial interference. While the rule requires it necessary to express the name or give some description of a party subject of a warrant, the principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party whose name is unknown. In such a case, the best possible description of the person is to be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place of his residence or other circumstances by which he can be identified. The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. Thus, in the early case of People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the Club, the police

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could identify John Doe. Further, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to be searched and the description was a sufficient designation of the premises. 9. The person to be searched must be described with reasonable particularity (Lohman v. Superior Court, 69 Cat. App. 3d 894). He can even be identified by a name which others use in calling him, even if it is not his real name (People v. Mclean, 56 Cal. 2d 660) because the standard for determining the legality of a warrant directed against a person is whether the person has been sufficiently described with particularity sufficient to identify him with reasonable certainty. Even if his name is unknown or erroneously written, the description of the person with certainty to identify him and set him apart from others is enough to lend validity to the warrant (United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381, 3rd Cir. 1971). Nowhere in Section 4, Rule 126 or any other provision of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is it required that the search warrant must name the person who occupies the described premises (Quelnan v. People, 526 SCRA 653, July 6,2007). 10. There is also compliance with the law when the person although not particularly named, is described as the one occupying and having control of a specific address (People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169). Particular description of the items to be seized; general warrants (Bar 2005) 1. The provision requiring a particular description of the items or things to be seized is designed to prevent general searches and avoid the seizure of a thing not described in the warrant and also so nothing is to be left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant (United States v. Marron, 275 U S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. 231, 237). The requirement of particularity is designed to prevent general exploratory searches which reasonably interfere with a person's right to privacy (People v. Schilling, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1021). Warrants which do not describe the things to be seized

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with the required particularity have been traditionally called general warrants. 2. The requirement of particularity is said to be satisfied if the warrant imposes a "meaningful restriction" upon the objects to be seized (Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238; People v. Tockgo, 145 Cal. App. 3d 635). A "meaningful restriction" is one that leaves nothing to the discretion of the officer who conducts the search (Marron v. United States, 275 US, 192,196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 Ed 231). Corollarily, "a warrant may not authorize a search broader than the facts supporting its issuance." Hence, a warrant authorizing the search and seizure of "papers showing or tending to show the trafficking of cocaine9 is invalid because the affidavit supporting the issuance made no reference to the existence of such papers (People v. Holmsen, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1045). 3. The Philippine Supreme Court declares that the purpose of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those described in the search warrant and to leave the officers of the law no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize so abuses may not be committed (Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886). 4. The common denominator among decisions on "particularity" regard descriptions of a generic nature as failing to impose a meaningful restriction on the officer conducting the search. Descriptions of the things to be searched and seized as "stolen goods," "obscene materials," or "other articles of merchandise too numerous to mention," have been held inadequate (Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1708, L.Ed. 2d 1127). The phrase, "any and all other stolen items" was impermissibly vague (United States v. Townsend, 394 F. Supp. 736 E.D. Mich, 1975). In People v. Tockgo, 145 Cal. App. 3d 635, the officers had information about certain unique markings of stolen cigarettes, but the description did not include the markings to permit the officers to differentiate the object of the search from those which were not stolen. The words: *cigarettes... and any and all goods..." were deemed inadequate.

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In a leading Philippine case, a warrant was deemed illegal, thus:

"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,, and other documents and papers showing all business transactions, including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profits and loss statements*

is too broad and general because it authorizes the search and seizure of records "pertaining to all business transactions of petitioner herein, regardless, of whether the transactions were legal or illegal" (Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. 19550, June 19,1967).

6. Also held inadequate for constitutional compliance is the following description of the things to be searched and seized: "...Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewind- ers, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines used or intended to be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale, rental I lease, distribution of the above- mentioned video tapes which she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described" (20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 655).

The above articles and appliances, said the Court, are generally connected with or related to a legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Including them without particularity makes the search warrant too general which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store. 7. A high degree of particularity is required for items such as books, films, recordings, or other materials that have not yet been adjudged obscene. Since these materials are at this stage, still deemed to be constitutionally protected, the requirement of particular description "must be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude" and when the bases for their seizure are the ideas which they contain (Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325, 99S.Ct. 2319, 2324, 60 L. Ed.2d

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920, 9271979; Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S. Ct. 506, 511-12,13 L.Ed.2d 431, 4361965). 8. Some decisions (State v. Brown, 470 P.2d 815, 819- 20 Kan. 1970), in the United States have sometimes allowed a general description when specificity is difficult and where a technical description would have required the experience of a trained surgeon. For instance, the following description for purposes of a warrant was upheld: "Various instruments and tools in performing abortion, which were instrumentalities of such offense " In People v. Schmidt, (473 P. 2d 698, 700, Co. 1970), the court allowed a description reading: "marijuana...dangerous drugs, stimulant drugs and hallocinogenics...together with such vessels, implements, furniture in which drugs are found and the vessels, implements and furniture used in connection with the manufacture, production and dispensing of such drugs..." In United States v. Appoloney, 761 F. 2d 520 (9th Cir. 1985), the validity of the following description of gambling paraphernalia was allowed: "wagering paraphernalia such as betting slips, bottom sheets and owe sheets, and journals and schedules of sporting events" A warrant describing the property to be seized as "deer or elk meat illegally possessed" was considered adequate because a more particular description was not possible. The meat to be seized had no brand names or serial numbers (Dunn v. Municipal Court, 220 Cal. App. 2d 858). 9. In the Philippines, general descriptions have likewise been allowed in some cases when dictated by the nature of the things to be seized on the theory that the description must be specific insofar as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384). The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities (Too, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 168306, June 19,2007).

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But the use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant is allowed only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is not available. Thus, the mere use of terms like "multiple set books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records" and similar general descriptions, is unacceptable considering the circumstances where the petitioner is alleged to have committed tax fraud and smuggling. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of the documents because he was furnished copies of the documents sought to be seized. As regards the terms "unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase and sales invoices," these need not be identified specifically. It is not possible to do so considering these are unregistered. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles described, no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given because of the difficulty in describing the contents of the same

(Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36). 10. In Kho v. Makalintal, 306 SCRA 70, the petitioners claim that the search

warrants issued were general warrants prohibited by the constitution because the things to be seized were not described and specified. One warrant for instance, directing the search and seizure of firearms, did not list the firearms to be seized and were not classified as to size, make, caliber. The subject warrant merely stated:

Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and ammunitions for the said firearms..." In brushing aside the contention of the petitioner, the Court observed that the law enforcement officers could not have been in the position to know beforehand the exact caliber or make of the firearms to be seized. In the process of surveillance conducted at a distance, they had no way of knowing the caliber and make of the firearms unless they get a close view of the weapons and thus, could not be expected to know the detailed particulars of the objects to be seized including the communications equipment. The court likewise considered the use of the words, "and the like" of no moment and did not make the warrants in question, general warrants.

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11. In Yao v. People, the petitioners argued that the search warrants did not indicate with particularity the items to be seized since the search warrants merely described the items to be seized as LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE without specifying their sizes. The contention found no merit with the Court holding that a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. "While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; otherwise it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or specie would suffice. "Measured against this standard, we find that the items to be seized under the search warrants in question were sufficiently described with particularity. The articles to be confiscated were restricted to the following: (1) LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE; (2) Machines and equipments used or intended to be used in the illegal refilling of GASUL and SHELLANE cylinders. These machines were also specifically enumerated and listed in the search warrants; (3) Documents

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which pertain only to the production, sale and distribution of the GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and (4) Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. WTE-527, XAM970 and WFC-603, hauling trucks, and/or other delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used or intended to be used for the purpose of selling and/or distributing GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders. Additionally, since the described items are clearly limited only to those which bear direct relation to the offense, i.e., violation of Section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293, for which the warrant was issued, the requirement of particularity of description is satisfied. "Given the foregoing, the indication of the accurate sizes of the GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary" (Yao v. People, G.R. No. 168306, June 19,2007). 12. The description "an undetermined amount of marijuana or Indian hemp" satisfies the requirement of particularity in a search warrant. By reason of its character and the circumstances under which it would be found, said article is illegal. A further description would be unnecessary and impossible except as to such character, the place and the circumstances. The description therein is (1) as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the peace officers may be guided in making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to be seized which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. Such warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it prevents exploratory searches, which might be violative of the Bill of Rights (People v. Tee, 395 SCRA 419).

Ownership of property seized not required The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control and possession of the property sought to be seized (Yao v.

People, G.R. No. 168306,

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June 19, 2007). In an American decision involving a search of newspaper offices, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant is directed to the seizure of things and not the seizure of persons and hence, the critical element is not ownership but whether there is a reasonable cause to believe that the things to be seized are located in the place to be searched (Zurcher v.

The Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,556,98 S.Ct. 1970,1977,56 L.Ed.2d 525, 535). Extent of the search

1. A fair reading of jurisprudence discloses that the reasonableness of both the seizure and the search does not exclusively refer to the manner by which the warrant was procured. It refers also to the reasonableness of the manner the warrant was executed including the time and place of its execution. Also, for the search to be reasonable, the object of the search must be the one properly described in the warrant. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S.Ct., 1927, in holding that officers cannot seize property not specified in the warrant, found that a search warrant describing only intoxicating liquors should not include ledgers and bills of account within the searched premises. Where the warrant is unambiguous and limited only to a particular place like a store described in the warrant the search does not extend to the apartment units located at the back of the store even if the sketch submitted to the judge include the apartments. It is neither fair nor licit to allow officers to search a place not described in the warrant because the place not described is what the officers had in mind (People v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400).

2. A warrant which authorizes the search of weapons includes the authority to open closets, drawers, chests and containers in which the weapons might be found. These containers must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task when a legitimate search is underway and when its purpose and limits have been precisely

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defined. If the warrant is to search a vehicle, every part of that vehicle which may contain the object to be seized may be searched. In other words, the lawful search of the premises particularly described extends to the areas in which the object may be found (United States

v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798).

3. It has been held that when a search warrant authorizes the search of a place particularly described, a justified search would include all the things attached to or annexed to the land if the place described be land (United States v. Meyer, 417 F. 2d 1020, 8th Cir. 1969). Courts have also generally allowed a search of vehicles owned or controlled by the owner of the premises and at the same time found in the premises (United States v.

Percival, 756F.2d 600 7th Cir. 1985).

Search of third persons not named in the warrant 1. Assume that a search warrant for a described place of a named owner is being executed, may a person who just happens to be in the premises be also searched? The prevailing American general rule is that a warrant to search a place does not extend to the authority to search all persons in the place because the police have no probable cause to search and detain a person not particularized in the warrant. Thus, in Ybarra v. Illinois (444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct, 338 62 L.Ed.2d 238 1979), the U.S. Supreme Court, struck down as invalid a search of a mere patron in a bar. 2.

There have been cases where the Court upheld the search of things belonging to

third persons while in the place validly searched as when the officers had no knowledge that the same belongs to a third person (Carman v. State, 602 P.2d 1255, Alaska 1979).

Issuance and form of the search warrant The warrant shall be issued when the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is a probable cause to believe that they exist. The form of the search warrant must be substantially in the form prescribed by the Rules (Sec. 6,

Rule 126, Rules of Court).

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Duration of the validity of a search warrant A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void

(Sec. 10, Rule 126, Rules of Court). Time of making the search

The warrant shall be served in the daytime and such fact must be so directed by the warrant. However, if the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, the warrant may insert a direction that it may be served at any time of the day or night (Sec. 9, Rule 126, Rules of Court). Hie rule on issuance of search warrants allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the time within which the warrant may be served, subject to the statutory requirement fixing the maximum time for the execution of a warrant (People v. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 453).

Manner of making the search 1. The search shall be made in the presence of the lawful occupant of the house, room or any other premises, or any member of the lawful occupant's family. In the absence of the latter, the search shall be made in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. The rule in this regard is emphatic. No search shall be made except in the presence of the persons mentioned in the Rules (Sec. 8, Rule 126, Rules

of Court).

2. In Panuncio v. People, G.R. No. 165678, July 17, 2009, the petitioner assailed the validity of the search which was allegedly conducted while she was not in the house. The petitioner alleges that since the search warrant was defective, the items seized during the search could not be used in evidence against her. The Court categorically ruled that even assuming that the petitioner or any lawful occupant of the house was not present when the search was conducted, the search was done in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Clearly, the require

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ments of Sec. 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were complied with by the police authorities who conducted the search. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses — No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. 3. The officer seizing the property must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property (Sec. 11, Rule 126, Rules of Court).

Rule if the officer is refused admittance; "knock and announce rule" 1. Being armed with a warrant does not justify outright entry or barging into the place to be searched. An officer should knock, introduce himself and announce his purpose and only in exceptional cases may he forego the same like when his safety is in danger of being jeopardized or when evidence is about to be destroyed (Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S.

927).

2. The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein provided the following requisites are complied with: (a)

The officer gives notice of his purpose and authority;

(b)

He is refused admittance to the place of directed search despite the notice;

and (c) The purpose of breaking is to execute the warrant or to liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein (Sec. 7, Rule 126,

Rules of Court).

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Duties of the officer after the search and seizure; delivery and inventory (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant; (b) The officer must, together with the delivery of the property also deliver a true inventory of the property seized. Such inventory must be duly verified under oath

(Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). (c)

Note: A violation of the above rules shall constitute contempt of court

(Sec.12, Rule 126, Rules of Court).

Duty of the judge; return and other proceedings 1. Under Sec. 12(b) of Rule 126, the judge issuing the search warrant has the following duties: (a) The judge who issued the warrant shall ascertain if the return has been made. He shall do so ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant. (b) If no return has been made, the judge shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. (c) If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether Sec. 11 of Rule 126 (giving of a receipt for the property seized) was complied with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall also see to it that subsection "a" of Sec. 12 of Rule 126 (delivery of the property seized and true inventory) has been complied with. 2. A judge should know that his duty as a magistrate does not end when the warrant is issued. When the evidence shows that the judge who issued the search warrant did not require the officers executing the warrant to make an accurate and complete inventory of the things seized and submit the same to him, he is guilty of gross ignorance of the law (Betoy v.

Coliflores, 483 SCRA 435). 3. In Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 165122, November23,2007, the Court found that the Court of Appeals,

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in reversing the order of the trial court granting the motion to quash, erred in ordering the return of the seized items to respondent. The Court held that Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly mandates the delivery of the seized items to the judge who issued the search warrant to be kept in custodia legis in anticipation of the criminal proceedings against petitioner. The delivery of the items seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and accurate inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of said items by interested parties. The judge who issued the search warrant is mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for (1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property received, (2) delivery of the seized property to the court, together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items seized. Any violation of the foregoing constitutes contempt of court.

Duty of the custodian of the log book 1. The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court) A violation of the above rules shall constitute contempt of court

Rules of Court).

(Sec.12, Rule 126,

Objection to issuance or service of a warrant 1. Any objection concerning the issuance or service of a warrant or a procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived (Buenaventura v. People, 529 SCRA 500, August 7, 2007).

2. The constitutional right of appellant against warrantless arrest and search was not violated when the appellant failed to assail the legality of the arrest and the seizure of the sachet of shabu prior to arraignment or at any stage in the proceedings of the trial court. The arrest was pursuant

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to a buy-bust operation which is a valid form of entrapment of felons in the execution of their criminal plan; and that the search conducted on appellant was incidental to a lawful arrest

(People v. Maeatingag, G.R. No. 181037, January 19, 2009).

Where to file a motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence 1. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained by virtue of the warrant may be filed and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. 2. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court (Sec. 14, Rule 126, Rules of Court).

Who may assail the issuance of a search warrant 1. Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties (Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 165122, November 23,2007). 2. The manager of an establishment is a real party-in- interest to seek the quashal of

the search warrant for the obvious reason that the search warrant, in which the manager was solely named as respondent, was directed against the premises and articles over which he had control and supervision. The manager, who is at the same time the petitioner was directly prejudiced or injured by the seizure of the gas tanks because petitioner was directly accountable as manager to the purported owner of the seized items. When the application for a search warrant averred that petitioner had in his possession and control the items subject of the alleged criminal offense, the interest of the manager/petitioner becomes obvious.

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The corporation does not have the exclusive right to question the seizure of items belonging to the corporation on the ground that the latter has a personality distinct from the officers and shareholders of the corporation. Assuming arguendo that the corporation was the owner of the seized items, petitioner, as its manager had the authority to question the seizure of the items belonging to the corporation. Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only through properly delegated individuals; namely, their officers and/or agents

(Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 165122, November 23,2007).

Petition for certiorari for unwarranted quashal of a search warrant In one case, after issuing a search warrant, the RTC of Iloilo made a turnaround and granted the motion to quash filed by the petitioner. The RTC likewise issued an order for the return of the items seized to the petitioner. After a denial of its motion for reconsideration, the respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the search warrant. The petition essentially questioned the quashal of the search warrant despite a prior finding of probable cause. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the orders of the lower court. The petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied. One of the issues raised in the subsequent petition for review on certiorari before the

Supreme Court was whether or not the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals by respondent was the proper remedy to assail the orders of the trial court. The Court held that the special civil action for certiorari was the proper recourse availed by respondent in assailing the quashal of the search warrant. An unwarranted reversal of an earlier finding of probable cause constituted grave abuse of discretion. In any case, the Court had allowed even direct recourse to the Court or to the Court of Appeals via a special

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civil action for certiorari from a trial court's quashal of a search warrant (Santos

Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 165122, November 23,2007).

v. Pryce

Exceptions to the search warrant requirement (Bar 1988; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2008) 1. As a general rule, the procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual. To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution clearly declares in Section 3(2), Article III, that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding." (Bar 1998) Thus, the 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding (People v. Racho, G.R.

No. 186529, August 3, 2010).

2. There are however, instances when securing a warrant before effecting a search and a seizure would not serve the ends of an orderly society. The time and effort required to secure a warrant may sometimes actually frustrate the effective enforcement of the laws and encourage criminal activities. On the other hand, the rule requiring a warrant protects citizens from the overzealousness of law enforcement officers who hold as personal dogma that the means justify the end. To harmonize these conflicting perspective, Courts have developed certain exceptions to the warrant requirement in order to authorize warrantless searches and seizures with the end of striking out a balance between the need to safeguard the rights of citizens and the need to avoid emasculating the powers of the state to maintain a well-ordered society. Although embedded within the rule on search warrants is the general rule that searches and seizures shall be valid

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only when carried out by virtue of a search warrant, this rule however, is subject to certain judicially formulated exceptions. 3. It has always been recognized that the rule requiring a warrant is not however, absolute. There are wellrecognized instances where searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant under any of the following circumstances (Dimacuha v. People, 516 SCRA 513; People

v. Nuevas, 516 SCRA 463; People v. Tuazon, 532 SRA 152; Epie, Jr. v. Ulat-Marredo, 518 SCRA 641; Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009): (a)

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful ar-

(b)

Seizure of evidence in "plain view." (Bar 2008)

rest;

The elements of the plain view exception are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; (c) Search of a moving vehicle — Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; (d)

Consented warrantless search;

(e)

Customs search;

(f)

Stop and frisk or Terry searches (People v. Mo-

lina, 352 SCRA 174; Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25,2010). (Bar 1995) (g) Exigent and emergency circumstances (People v. Bohol, 560 SCRA 232, July 28, 2008; People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3,2010).

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(h)

Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]

(i) Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations. (Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

164815, September 3,2009).

4. In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured (Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, September 3,

2009; People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010; Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010).

Search incident to a lawful arrest (Bar 2003) 1. The "search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest" exception is authorized by Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides: "Sec. 13. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." 2. The application of the above rule presupposes that the person searched was previously arrested lawfully. Hence, a person illegally arrested cannot be validly searched without a warrant under this provision. For an arrest to be lawful, the arrest may either be by virtue of a warrant lawfully procured or by virtue of a warrantless arrest authorized under Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and other applicable provisions such as Sec. 13 of the same rule. 3. Recent Court pronouncements hold that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a

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search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Thus, we have to determine first whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. If what prompted the police to apprehend the accused, even without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive carrying shabu, this circumstance gives rise to another question of whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest. The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. There is no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine (People v.

Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3,2010).

Parameters of a search incident to a lawful arrest; immediate possession and control rule 1. Sec. 13 of Rule 126 specifically enumerates the allowable scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest. The provision limits the search to the following: (a)

For dangerous weapons;

(b)

For anything which may have been used in the commission of an offense;

(c)

For anything which constitute proof in the commission of an offense.

or 2. Is the search confined to the search of the person lawfully arrested? How about the search of the premises where he was arrested? The phraseology of Sec. 13 of Rule 126, at first glance, suggests that it is only the person lawfully arrested who is to be searched. The provision partly reads: "... A person lawfully arrested may be searched . 3. The Court has however, ruled on several occasions that: " x x x When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the

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arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the arresting officer to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect but also within the permissible area within the latter'8 reach, x x x a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in the drawer in front of the person arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested x x x " (People v.

Leangsiri, 252 SCRA 213; People v. Cubcubin, Jr., 360 SCRA 690; People v. Estella, 395 SCRA 553; Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, September 3,2009; emphasis supplied). Thus, when the person arrested was brought out of the room with his hands tied, a cabinet which is locked could no longer be considered as part of "an area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him (Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815,

September 3, 2009).

4. A search and a seizure incident to a lawful arrest is not limited to things related to the reason for the arrest. If for instance, a person is legally arrested for illegal possession of drugs, the search is not confined to things used in the commission of the crime. To protect the arresting officer, the search extends to weapons like a gun or a knife with no actual connection to the crime of illegal possession of the drugs. If in the course of the search, evidence is found constituting proof of another offense, like an illegally possessed weapon, *it is

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submitted that the phraseology of the rule does not prevent the seizure of the evidence. The provisions of Sec. 13 of Rule 126 are consistent with the ruling in Adams v. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, that a person arrested may be searched for weapons and all unlawful articles in his person and within his immediate control may be seized. American decisions categorically declare that an arresting officer may seize evidence of crimes other than the crime which was the reason for the arrest. In one case, the accused was arrested pursuant to a warrant for possession and transportation of explosives but during the search there was discovered an item the possession of which is illegal. The discovery of objects unrelated to the arrest does not render the seizure invalid (United States v. Simpson, 453

F.2d 102810th Cir. 1972).

5. Sec. 13 of Rule 126 allows the warrantless search of the "person lawfully arrested" as an incident to a lawful arrest in a manner similar to American rulings allowing a full search of the body of the person. The cases of United States v. Robinson (414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, (414 U.S. 260, 94 S.Ct.488,38 L.Ed.2d 456 1973), allowed the search of the cigarette case of a person arrested for a traffic violation. Illegal drugs were discovered in both instances. A full search means searching any property associated with the arrestee's body like clothing, jewelry, watches and others attached to the person in a permanent or semi-permanent capacity. The search includes inspecting the clothing of the person arrested for bloodstains, fingerprints or even serial numbers. Others cases have similarly held that the right without a search warrant to contemporaneously search persons lawfully arrested and to search the place where the arrest is made to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or by the means it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to escape from custody is not to be doubted

(Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 making reference to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 and Weeks v. United States,

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232 U.S. 383, 392). But while the U.S. Supreme Court had broadened the search from the "person" to the "place," such place should be one where the arrest was made. The house for instance, where the arrest was made may be searched when such searches and seizures naturally appertain to and attend such arrests. Thus, in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, the Court ruled that because the officers had made a valid search and arrest in the premises, they had a right without a warrant to contemporaneously search the place for evidence of the criminal enterprise. In Marron, the Court suggested that the search should be confined to the offender's immediate possession and control, a concept made clearer in

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752.

But the right does not extend to other places such as a house several blocks away from the place where an arrest was made. In this case, the search would no longer be incident to a lawful arrest (Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 citing Silverthome

Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391; People v. Conway, 225 Mic. 151 and Gamble v. Keyes, 35 S.D. 645, 650). 6. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the

extent of a search incident to a lawful arrest. In this case, the police officers, armed with an arrest warrant but not a search warrant, were admitted to petitioner's home by his wife, where they awaited petitioner's arrival. When he entered, he was served with the warrant. Although he denied the officers' request to "look around," they conducted a search of the entire house "on the basis of the lawful arrest." The officers looked through the entire house including the attic, the garage and a small workshop. At petitioner's trial on burglary charges, items taken from his home were admitted over the objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. His conviction was affirmed by the California appellate courts, which held, despite their acceptance of petitioner's contention that the arrest warrant was invalid, that, since the arresting officers had procured the warrant "in good faith," and since, in any event, they had sufficient information to constitute probable cause for the

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arrest, the arrest was lawful. The courts also held that the search was justified as incident to a valid arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court found the search of the entire house unreasonable. It categorically ruled in Chimel that assuming the arrest was valid, the warrantless search of petitioner's house cannot be constitutionally justified as an incident to that arrest. An arresting officer may search the arrestee's person to discover and remove weapons and to seize evidence to prevent its concealment or destruction, and may search the area within the immediate control of the person arrested, meaning the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. For the routine search of rooms other than that in which an arrest occurs, or for searching desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself, absent well recognized exceptions, a search warrant is required. A reasonable distinction is to be made between a search of the person arrested and the area within his reach and immediate control on one hand and more extensive searches in other areas on the other. The ruling in Chimel clarified previous cases (like United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US. 56) which made vague references to the search of areas considered to be in the "possession" and "control" of the person arrested allowing searches of places not necessarily within the actual physical control of a person but within his constructive control and giving free reign to law enforcers in determining what to be searched. Chimel limited the search to the arrestee's person and "within his immediate control." Thus, following

Chimel, the arresting officers validly seized two revolvers within the

reach of the person arrested for being involved in an armed robbery (People v. Spencer, 99

Cal.Rptr 681 Col. App. 1972).

7. The Chimel tradition found expression for instance, in the Philippine case of People v. Leangsiri (252 SCRA 213). Here Leangsiri was arrested at the NAIA for bringing heroin into the country. Later, the persons involved in the smuggling of heroin were arrested in the hotel room of Leangsiri in an

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entrapment operation. Questioning of the persons arrested disclosed that one of them was occupying a room in the same hotel where Leangsiri was billeted. Without a search warrant, the other room was searched and incriminating evidence was seized. Clearly said the Court, citing Chimel, the search of the latter room was illegal and the evidence obtained therein is inadmissible, the place searched being not within the immediate control of the person arrested. 8. In a leading Philippine case, Nolasco v. Patio, 139 SCRA 152, the accused who were at large for rebellion and subversion, were arrested by constabulary officers at the intersection of two streets in Quezon City at 11:30 A.M. On the same day at 12:00 noon, another team of officers searched the house of one of the accused under a warrant procured earlier in the day. After charges were filed against one of the accused for illegal possession of subversive documents, a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the house was filed. The motion was anchored on the alleged void character of the search warrant for its failure to particularly describe the things to be seized and for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witnesses. The Supreme Court held the warrant void in a later proceeding but did not order the return of the items confiscated because the search of the house could have accordingly been validly effected even without a warrant. Accordingly, considering that the accused has been charged with rebellion, which is a crime against public order, the warrant for her arrest not having been served for a considerable period of time, and the search having been made just within half an hour after her arrest, "we are of the opinion" said the Court, that the search . . . did not need a search warrant: this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order." What must be considered according to the Court is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. To the majority pronouncement which justified a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest, a dissenting

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opinion was interposed by Justice Teehankee, calling the majority decision "patently against the constitutional proscription and settled law and jurisprudence." While the Rules of Court allows a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested, the rule, in the opinion of Justice Teehankee, is limited to his person at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. "Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest...To hold that her dwelling could be searched without a warrant is to sanction an untenable violation, if not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures." Justice Cuevas and Justice Abad Santos likewise lodged strong dissents. Justice Cuevas, with whom Justice Teehankee concurred, on his part opined that the lawful arrest justifying the validity of the warrantless search must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time and place of the arrest. "As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof for the commission of the offense. . .With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search.. .it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. ...to be valid it must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested." Justice Cuevas added: " . . . in addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest and the search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise it is not incident to the arrest"

(citations omitted).

Acting on a partial motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision, the Court reconsidered and ordered the return of the items seized to the petitioner. In doing so, the Court adopted the rationale in the dissent of Justice Teehankee CNolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA

509).

9. Espano v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558, is one of the cases which drives home the point on the concept of a

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search incident to a lawful arrest. Here, police officers arrested the accused in flagrante delicto selling marijuana in a street corner. The search of his person yielded two cellophane bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more, he admitted he had marijuana in his house. The policemen then proceeded to the house of the accused and made a search which yielded ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. The Court held that the articles seized from the accused during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of a search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The search may extend beyond the person of the person arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. The warrantless search however, of the house of the accused which yielded marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, the house of the accused was beyond his reach and control. 10. Earlier in People v. Lua, 256 SCRA 539, a similar pronouncement was made by

the Court. The accused in Lua was arrested outside his house in flagrante delicto in a buybust operation. The Court found nothing objectionable in the body search of the person arrested

and the confiscation of the bags of marijuana and a paltik revolver in his person. However, the subsequent search of the house of the arrestee was found invalid and the marijuana found therein considered inadmissible. The search of the house according to the Court is not within the contemplation of a "search incident to a lawful arrest." The house, at the time of his arrest was not within the reach and control of the arrestee.

Searches of moving vehicles 1.

A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not

practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought" (People v. Tuazon, 532 SCRA 152,

September 3,2007). 2.

When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a

warrantless search has been held

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to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched (People v. Tuazon, 532 SCRA 152, September 3,

2007; See Carrol v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132).

3. "Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust which could amount to outright harassment. Surely, the policy consideration behind the exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of the police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the warantless search of a vehicle (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424

Phil. 224 as cited in People v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 175783, September 3,2007). Check points

1. In the famous case of Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990, the Court declared that nowhere in its decision did the Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances and what it declared was that the checkpoints are not illegal per se. The Court went on to hold that "under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain, x x x For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search."

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Citing American jurisprudence, the court added that routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive and are permissible. Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. Also, automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office (Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160, 93 L Ed 1879, 69 S Ct 1302 [1949]; Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed 543,45 S Ct 280,39 ALR 790 [1925]). The cases so holding have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search (Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24,1990). 2. Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of a vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable searches (People v. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004,420SCRA280). 3. A more recent case affirming De Villa and Vinecario holds that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists' right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area,

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are even less intrusive (Abenes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007). Buy bust operations; warrant not needed (Bar 2003) 1. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment legally employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an offense. This police operation has judicial sanction as long as it is carried out with due respect to constitutional and legal safeguards (People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 180508, September 4, 2009; People v. Tion, G.R. No. 172092, December 16, 2009; People v. Sembrano, G.R. No. 185848, August 16,2010) although there are no rigid or textbook methods on the right or proper way of conducting such operations (People of the Philippines v. Joey Tion y Cabadu, G.R. No. 172092, December 16,2009). 2. A search warrant or warrant of arrest is not needed in a buy-bust operation because here the accused is caught in flagrante delicto (People v. Araneta, G.R. No. 191064, October 20, 2010; People v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 190179, October 20, 2010). It catches the violator in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime (People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008; People v. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008; People v. Guiara, 600 SCRA 310; People v. Macatingag, G.R. No. 181037, January 19,2009). Similar pronouncements have been made in other cases. Hence, it was ruled that an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court (People v. Bohol, G.R. No. 171729, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 232). When an arrest is made during an entrapment operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line with the provisions of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court allowing warrantless arrests. Under the said rule, a peace officer or a private person may, without

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a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (People v. Michael Sembrano y Castro, G.R. No. 185848, August 16,2010; People v. Araneta, G.R. No. 191064, October 20, 2010). The accused is caught in the act and must be apprehended on the spot. (People of the Philippines v. Elizabeth Marcelino y Reyes, G.R. No. 189278, July 26,2010). 3. In one case where the accused assailed the validity of a buy-bust operations, it was ruled that from the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal. The illegal drug seized is not the "fruit of the poisonous tree" as the defense alleges. The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid, and a warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it (People of the Philippines v. Elizabeth Marcelino y Reyes, G.R. No. 189278, July 26,2010). Entrapment and instigation 1. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. On the other hand, instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. One form of entrapment is the buy-bust operation. It is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken (People of the Philippines v. Victorio Pagkalinawan, G.R. No. 184805, March 3, 2010; People v. Dansico, G.R. No. 178060, February 23,2011). 2. Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention to commit, in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of ways and means in order to trap or capture a lawbreaker. Instigation presupposes that the criminal intent

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to commit an offense originated from the inducer and not the accused who had no intention to commit the crime and would not have committed it were it not for the initiatives by the inducer. In entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused; the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes. In instigation, the law enforcers act as active co-principals. Instigation leads to the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment does not bar prosecution and conviction (People v. Dansico, G.R. No. 178060, February 23, 2009; Suggested related readings: People v. Naelga, G.R. No. 171018, September 11, 2009; People v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009). In the Philippines, entrapment is not a defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is available as a defense and is an absolutory cause (People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 694). Applicable tests in a buy-bust operation; adoption of the 'objective test' 1. There is no rigid or textbook method in conducting a buy-bust operation (People v. Tion, G.R. No. 172092, December 16, 2009). However, in determining the occurrence of entrapment, two tests have been developed: the subjective test and the objective test (22 C.J.S. CRIMLAW § 77). 2. Under the "subjective" view of entrapment, the focus is on the intent or predisposition of the accused to commit a crime. Under the "objective" view, on the other hand, the primary focus is on the particular conduct of law enforcement officials or their agents and the accused's predisposition becomes irrelevant (See People v. Smith, 31 Cal. 4th 1207, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 80 P.3d 662 [2003]; State v. Vallejos, 1997- NMSC-040, 123 N.M. 739, 945 P.2d 957 [1997]; Elders v. State, 321 Ark. 60, 900 S.W.2d 170 [1995]; State v. Babers, 514 N.W.2d 79 [Iowa 1994]; State v. Nehring, 509 N.W.2d 42 [N.D. 1993]; State v. Nakamura, 65 Haw. 74, 648 P.2d 183 [1982]; State v. Little, 121 N.H. 765, 435 A.2d 517 [1981]; State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533 [N.D. 1979]; People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947

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[1979]). The government agent's act is evaluated in the light of the standard of conduct exercised by reasonable persons generally and whether such conduct falls below the acceptable standard for the fair and honorable administration of justice (Keaton v. State, 253 Ga. 70, 316 S.E.2d 452 [1984]; Bruce v. State, 612 P.2d 1012 [Alaska 1980]). 3. It appears that Philippine courts have leaned towards the adoption of the "objective" test in upholding the validity of a buy-bust operation. In People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, the Court stressed that, in applying the "objective" test, the details of the purported transaction during the buy-bust operation must be clearly and adequately shown, i.e., the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, and the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. It is further emphasized that the "manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the 'buy-bust' money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense" (People v. Lim, G.R. No. 187503, September 11, 2009; People v. Cortez, G.R. No. 183819, July 23,2009). 4. The "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the

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conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement (People v. Araneta, G.R. No. 191064, October 20, 2010; People of the Philippines v. Victorio Pagkalinawan, G.R. No. 184805, March 3,2010). Effect of absence of prior surveillance before a buy-bust operation 1. Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-bust operation can be carried out after a long period of planning (People of the Philippines v. SP03 Sangki Ara y Mirasol, et al., G.R. No. 185011, December 23,2009) but no rule requires a prior surveillance of the suspected offender before conducting a buy-bust operation (People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 185381, December 16,2009). In People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008, the Court explained that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. Also, the failure of the operatives to record the boodle money will not render the buy-bust operation illegal. The recording of marked money used in a buy-bust operation is not one of the elements for the prosecution of sale of illegal drugs. The recording or non-recording thereof in an official record will not necessarily lead to an acquittal as long as the sale of the prohibited drug is adequately proven. 2. Quinicot v. People, G.R. No 179700, June 22, 2009, also declares that a prior surveillance, much less a lengthy

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one, is not necessary, especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police work and that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance (See also People of the Philippines v. Danilo Cruz y Culala, G.R. No. 185381, December 16,2009). Effect of absence of record in police blotter In relation to prosecution for illicit drugs, the non- recording of the buy-bust money in the police blotter will not affect the validity of the operations. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires that the buy-bust money be entered in the police blotter. The "non-recording of the buy-bust operation and buy-bust money in the police blotter is not essential, since they are not elements in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs." The only elements necessary to consummate the crime is proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the dangerous drug seized as evidence (People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804, June 18,2009). Plain view doctrine (Bar 2007; 2008) 1. A theoretical example could illustrate the principle particularly well. For instance, a policeman flags down a car for a traffic violation. When the officer approaches the car, he sees in the front seat of the car a sub machinegun and two hand grenades, items not normally issued to civilians. After a few inquiries and having determined the absence of a license for the items, the officer now has a reasonable ground to seize the object without a warrant. Also, assume that an officer goes to a residence to execute a warrant to search a house for particularly described stolen antique images. As the officers look around in the living room of the house, they see on a table, plastic sachets containing crystalline substances, which based on their training and experience are illegal drugs. Since the illegal" drugs are "in plain view," seizing them would not be an invalid warrantless seizure.

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2. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure (Judge Felimon Abelita, III v. P/Supt. German Doria and SP03 Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009; Zalameda v. People, G.R. No. 183656, September 4, 2009). Stated in another way, the plain view doctrine permits an officer, while lawfully engaged in an activity and lawfully present in a particular place, to seize an apparently illicit object without first obtaining a warrant authorizing him to do so. It is founded on a common sense rule that when a police officer has seen or observed an object in 'plain view,' to require the officer to secure a warrant would be to engage in a needless exercise because failure to seize the object once observed might involve danger to the public and to the officer. The rule allows a law enforcement officer to make a seizure without obtaining a search warrant if evidence of criminal activity or the product of a crime can be seen without entry or search. As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), "whatever a person knowingly exposes to public view, even in their own home or office, is not private." In the context of searches and seizures, the principle provides that objects perceptible by an officer who is rightfully in a position to observe them can be seized without a search warrant and are admissible as evidence. 3. In one case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the fire

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arms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms (Abelita v. P/Supt. German Doria and SP03 Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14,2009). 4. In another case, the police were investigating a reported homicide. The police looked into the car of the accused and from the window they saw a pillowcase, backseat and a briefcase, all covered with blood. The police secured a warrant to search the car. In the course of enforcing the warrant, they saw inside the car a blood-soaked sock and a floormat. They took the things. The accused assailed the validity of the taking of the items as have been illegally taken since they were not mentioned in the affidavit supporting the application for the warrant. The Court ruled that the seizure was constitutional. The items seized were in plain view found during a search supported by a warrant (Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 1973). 5. Foreign cases have frequently given as an example of the applicability of the 'plain view* doctrine, a situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character (Cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 [51 S.Ct. 153,158, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931)]; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 [52 S.Ct. 420, 423, 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932)]; Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 [45 S.Ct. 414, 69 L.Ed. 757 (1925)]; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571 [89 S.Ct. 1243, 1251,22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969)]). 6. The doctrine has been applied to a situation where the police officers inadvertently come across evidence while in 'hot pursuit' of a fleeing suspect (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,87 S.Ct. 1642,18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)]; cf. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 [44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924)]). The doctrine has also been applied when an incriminating object comes into view during a search incident to a lawful arrest and thus, could be searched without a warrant (Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 [89 S.Ct. 2034,2039-2040 (1969)]).

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7. The 'plain view' doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object (Harris v. United States, 390 US. 234 [88 S.Ct. 992,19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968)]; Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 [89 S.Ct. 1420,22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969)]; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. [23J 43 [83 S.Ct. 1623,1635,10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963)]. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view (People v. Nuevas, 516 SCRA 463, February 22, 2007). 8. The fact that the evidence is in plain view is not alone sufficient to justify a warrantless seizure. American courts which have extensively discussed the principle have held that the seizure be based also on the "immediately apparent" element. This means that the officer must have probable cause to believe that the object is evidence of a crime. Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the object is evidence of a crime CBrinegar v. U.S. 338 U.S. 160,175-176 [U.S. Supreme Court 1949]). Not only must the item be in plain view. Its incriminating character must also be "immediately apparent" (Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321). This principle has also been followed in Philippine decisions (Abelita v. Doria, G.R. No. 170672, August 14,2009). 9. The principle is well illustrated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,91 S.Ct. 2022,29L.Ed.2d 564, where the State endeavored to justify the seizure of the automobiles in plain view and their subsequent search at the police station. The cars were obviously in plain view, but whether or not they were evidence of a crime remained uncertain until after the interiors were swept and examined microscopically. The incriminating nature of the car was not therefore immediately

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apparent. The Court hence, held that the police, in seizing two automobiles parked in plain view on the defendant's driveway in the course of arresting the defendant, violated the constitutional right of the accused and accordingly, particles of gunpowder that had been subsequently found in vacuum sweepings from one of the cars could not be introduced in evidence against the defendant. 10. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347, is equally illustrative. Hicks fired a bullet into the floor of his apartment. The bullet struck a person in the room apartment directly below. Responding police officers entered the apartment of Hicks and though they did not find him, they found three weapons and a stocking-cap mask. An officer noticed two sets of expensive stereo equipment, which seemed out of place inside the squalid, rundown and ill- appointed four-room apartment and suspected that the stereo components were stolen. He recorded their serial numbers. In the process,he had to move a turntable which was in the way. That they were stolen and taken during an armed robbery were later confirmed. Hicks was subsequently arrested. The state trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals granted the motion to suppress all the evidence seized on the ground that the seizure was unconstitutional. When the Arizona Supreme Court denied review, the United States Supreme Court accepted the prosecutors' request for a hearing. In Arizona v. Hicks, the Supreme Court first ruled that the warrantless entry by the officers, under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, was valid. Next, the Court held that the mere recording of serial numbers of appliances and equipment did not constitute a seizure under the constitution, since it did not meaningfully interfere with respondent's possessory interest in either the numbers recorded or the stereo equipment. However, the moving of the equipment was a "search" separate from the search that was the lawful objective of entering the apartment. That the items were stolen were not immediately apparent and that there exists no separate justification for moving the equipment.

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The 'inadvertence' requirement under the plain view doctrine 1. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, one of the leading American decisions on the plain view doctrine is enlightening. In this case, a California police officer executed a search warrant only for the proceeds of the crime of robbery. He did not find stolen property in the premises but in the course of his search, he did find weapons in plain view which he seized. During the trial, the accused moved to suppress the evidence as to the weapons on the ground that the weapons were not discovered inadvertently but on purpose and their search and seizure were not included in the warrant. The trial court refused and the accused was convicted of robbery. The California Court of Appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court held in the case that the constitution does not require that the discovery of the evidence be inadvertent because this element is not a necessary condition of a warrantless seizure of things in plain view even if inadvertence have been mentioned as a characteristics in other legitimate plain view seizures. Accordingly, Justice Stewart's analysis of the "plain-view" doctrine in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, where he declared that there must be an element of inadvertence, did not command a majority, and a plurality of the Court has since made clear that the discussion is "not a binding precedent" (Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737, 103 S.Ct. 1535,1541, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 [1983] [opinion ofRehnquist, J.]). The suggestion that the inadvertence requirement is necessary to prevent the police from conducting general searches, or from converting specific warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive because that interest is already served by the requirements that no warrant issue unless it "particularly describ[es] the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized" (Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79,84,107 S.Ct. 1013,1016, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 [1987]; Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S.Ct. 414, 416, 69 L.Ed. 757). 2. The "inadvertence" requirement, like in Coolidge, appears however, to be the consistent norm in Philippine juris

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prudence (United Laboratories v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574; Abenes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156320, February 14,2007). The requirement of inadvertence means that the officer must not have known in advance of the location of the evidence and discovery is not anticipated (United Laboratories v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574; Judge Felimon Abelita, III v. P/Supt. German Doria and SP03 Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009). Emphatically, it was ruled that the plain view doctrine does not apply where the police officers did not just accidentally discover the evidence but actually searched for it (Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, September 3,2009). Other cases 1. Abenes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007, illustrates the doctrine within the context of Philippine jurisprudence. Here, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of high powered firearms and ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866 (P.D. No. 1866) and under another information for violation of the election gun ban. Accordingly, the prosecution convincingly established that the unlicensed .45 caliber pistol, tucked into the right waist of the petitioner, was readily visible, and, therefore, could be seized without a search warrant under the "plain view" doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court because notwithstanding the absence of a search warrant, the policemen may validly seize the firearm and the same is admissible in evidence against the accused pursuant to the "plain view doctrine." The petitioner raised before the Supreme Court the issue of violation of his constitutional right against an unlawful search and seizure. The Court, in finding against the petitioner declared that under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The "plain view" doctrine, stressed the Court, applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement

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officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. All the foregoing requirements have been determined to be present in the instant case. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the enforcement of the gun ban and were properly in a position from which they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the vehicle. 2. In a case, the police who had just tracked down the petitioner and who were informed of the involvement of the petitioner in a shooting incident which just happened, saw the firearms inside the said vehicle as he opened the door of his car and got off the same. The court observed that the police authorities were in the place because it was where they caught up with the petitioner who sped up in his vehicle after initially giving his agreement to go to the police headquarters to shed light on the shooting incident. They saw the firearms when the petitioner opened the door of the car. Since a shooting just took place, and it was reported that the petitioner was involved, it was apparent to the authorities that the firearms may be evidence of the crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms under the plain view doctrine (Abelita, III v. Doria, G.R. No. 170762, August 14, 2009). 3. When a police officer sees a person placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view (Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25,2010). 4. In another case, the arrest was legally made in flagrante delicto. In the course of the arrest, the police, aside from seeing the arrestee throw away a tooter, also

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saw various drug paraphernalia scattered on top of his bed. These circumstances, according to the Court, were sufficient to justify the warrantless search and seizure because objects falling in the 'plain view* of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure (Zalameda v. People, G.R. No. 183656, September 4,2009). 5. In cases where the search is made pursuant to a duly issued warrant, the Court allows the seizure of objects, articles or papers not even described in the warrant when they are in the plain view of the officer. But when not described in the warrant, such objects seized are not presumed to be in plain view. "The State is required to adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply among which is that the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently9 (United Laboratories v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574). 6. That it must be immediately apparent to the officer that the items observed may be an evidence of a crime is another important element of the doctrine. This requirement means that the incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent if the officer, at the moment of seizure had probable cause to connect it to a crime without the benefit of an unlawful search or seizure. To be immediately apparent, the rule does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of the evidence. "It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a viewed object and criminal activity" (United Laboratories v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574). United Laboratories explains in unequivocal language that the plain view doctrine is not an exception to the warrant requirement but merely serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The Court significantly stressed that the plain view doctrine cannot be made to extend to a

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general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. The doctrine is a recognition however, of the fact that when executing police officers come across immediately upon incriminating evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating or evidence of some other crime because it would be needless to require the police to obtain another warrant. Under the plain view doctrine, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy and there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution. 7. In one case, the Court gave no credence to the claim that the plain view doctrine applies. In 1996 the accused, Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms and later was convicted by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On petition for review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court with finality. Undaunted, the accused implored the Court through a Letter-Appeal to once more take a contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in which it changed it previous position on the case and instead recommended the acquittal of the accused. The OSG claimed that after a second look at the evidence presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense more credible and concluded that the subject was obtained by the police officers in violation of his constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. After considering anew arguments through the Letter- Appeal, together with the OSG's position recommending his acquittal, and that substantial rights must ultimately

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reign supreme over technicalities, the Court was swayed to reconsider. The Court found that the accused was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, he was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room and tied his hands and then put him under the care of a police officer. The other police officers remained inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet where they found the subject firearm and ammunition. With such discovery, the accused was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. From the foregoing narration of facts, the Court concluded that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from the accused. They placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which was locked and forcibly opened could no longer be considered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him. The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of the accused as well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. The Court amplified: "It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. In >

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the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valeroso's immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest. Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view doctrine." The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. x x x What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valeroso's children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso. Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso's right against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said

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right is inadmissible in evidence against him" (Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009).

Terry searches or stop and frisk; history of the doctrine (Bar 1995; 2003) 1. Suppose a police officer is on a routine patrol duty and he observes two people outside a variety store. Both his experience and training tell him that their acts are consistent with acts of people with criminal designs although he has no concrete facts showing probable cause that a crime has been committed or that it is actually being committed. He knows that mere suspicion is not sufficient to make a valid arrest but his instincts honed by years of experience in the streets tell him something untoward is imminent. May he briefly stop the persons, ask them questions and engage in a protective search for a concealed weapon short of a full scale arrest? The Supreme Court of the United States addressed a similar situation in 1968 in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 2. In the middle of the afternoon of October 31, 1963, veteran Police Officer Martin McFadden was in his usual beat in downtown Cleveland, a place he had covered for 30 years as member of the Cleveland police force. McFadden saw two unknown men who later were identified as Terry and Chilton, and who by their acts appeared to him to be engaged in an elaborate yet casual reconnaissance of a store. At one point, a third man, later on identified as Katz, came to confer with the first two, then disappeared and then rejoined the other two. Suspecting them to be armed, and fearing that the three were preparing to rob the store, McFadden approached the men, identified himself as a police officer and asked them to identify themselves. When they simply mumbled an answer and did not get a clear and audible response, he patted down the outer garment of Terry and felt a gun in his pocket and removed the same. A gun was also recovered from Chilton. Terry was subsequently convicted for carrying a concealed weapon. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Ohio Supreme Court declined to hear the case, claiming that no

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"substantial constitutional question" was involved. The U.S. Supreme Court then took cognizance of the case. In the Supreme Court, Terry contended that there existed no probable cause for his arrest, that since the "stop" was an arrest and that the "frisk" was a search under America's Fourth Amendment (Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures), probable cause is required. The argument was rejected by the Supreme Court. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Warren declared: "The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFadden's taking steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was justification for McFadden's invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation. We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties * * *." The Court held that the acts of Officer McFadden were acts which a reasonably prudent man would have done in believing that Terry was armed and that he presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior. The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with McFadden's hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery which reasonably would have been carried out with a deadly weapon. Nothing in their conduct from the time he first noticed them until the time he confronted them and identified himself as a police officer gave him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis. Mumbling an unclear response to the officer's distinct question did nothing to clear up the suspicion. The record, observed the Court, evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course

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of an investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger, and he took limited steps to do so. The Court likewise noted that Officer McFadden's actions were not invasive and overly intrusive. He patted down the outer clothing of Terry and his two companions. He did not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he had felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns. He never did invade Katz' person beyond the outer surfaces of his clothes, since he discovered nothing in his pat down which might have been a weapon. Officer McFadden confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons. He did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find. The Court concluded that the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence against him. At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he sought. The Court held that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in the light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search and any

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weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken. Justice Harlan who wrote a concurring opinion explained: The facts of this case are illustrative of a proper stop and an incident frisk. Officer McFadden had no probable cause to arrest Terry for anything, but he had observed circumstances that would reasonably lead an experienced, prudent policeman to suspect that Terry was about to engage in burglary or robbery. His justifiable suspicion afforded a proper constitutional basis for accosting Terry, restraining his liberty of movement briefly, and addressing questions to him, and Officer McFadden did so * * *" "I would affirm this conviction for what I believe to be the same reasons the Court relies on. I would, however, make explicit what I think is implicit in affirmance on the present facts. Officer McFadden's right to interrupt Terry's freedom of movement and invade his privacy arose only because circumstances warranted forcing an encounter with Terry in an effort to prevent or investigate a crime. Once that forced encounter was justified, however, the officer's right to take suitable measures for his own safely followed automatically."

Summary of the Terry doctrine 1. The Terry doctrine is of two parts: the "stop" and the "frisk." A valid "stop" by an officer requires that he has a reasonable and articulable belief that criminal activity has happened or is about to happen. The "frisk" made after the "stop" must be done because of a reasonable belief that the person stopped is in possession of a weapon that will pose a danger to the officer and others. The "frisk" must be a mere pat down outside the person's outer garment and not unreasonably intrusive. 2. The gist of the ruling in Terry considered as constitutionally permissible a stop and frisk despite the lack of a probable cause to make a fUll scale arrest. While conceding that the search was a search as defined by the constitution, it did not agree with the accused that the constitutional pro

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hibition on unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when he was stopped and frisked without a probable cause. The test of the conduct of an officer under similar circumstances, was not the existence of probable cause because no full arrest is made. The test instead was reasonable belief (called a genuine reason in a Philippine decision) Because of the important interest in protecting the safety of police officers, the Court held that a law enforcement officer has the authority to stop someone and do a quick surface search of their outer clothing for weapons. This is allowed if the officer has a reasonable belief based on a genuine reason and in the light of the officer's experience and the surrounding circumstances, that a crime has either taken place or is about to take place and the person to be stopped is armed and dangerous. This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts" and not merely upon the officer's bare suspicion or hunch.Terry emphasized that a reasonable belief for making a stop may also be followed by a frisk which is equally reasonable which means it should not be broader than is necessary to find weapons in the person briefly stopped. The ruling that probable cause is not required in a stop and frisk situation is Terry's significant contribution to jurisprudence. 3. Terry v. Ohio, did not justify every "stop." Before an officer stops a private citizen in the street, the act must be justified by concrete facts pointing at the least towards a possible criminal activity, where no crime is still apparent to the officer. Terry calls these concrete facts as the "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." A mere deep suspicion by an experienced officer that criminal activity could take place is not sufficient for the application of the Terry doctrine. He must support his conclusion by particularizing the acts that led to his conclusion. 4. In Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010, the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts when POl Cruz saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette case. Given his training as a law

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enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity Citing previous jurisprudence, the Court in Esquillo elucidated on what includes "stop-and-frisk" operation and how it is to be carried out. The court declared that the operation is the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter's outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him (Citing People v. Chua, G.R. No. 136066-67, February 4,2003). 5. A reading of numerous jurisprudence discloses that "the "stop-and-frisk" principle serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection; and (2) the safety of the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could be used against him. This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in a case where policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, the validity of the search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk" was upheld. The Court also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the accused after considering the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons w[h]ere roaming the vicinity. "What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and

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surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk" practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer" (Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010) To repeat: A stop- and-frisk situation is limited to the person's outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Terry search and a search incident to a lawful arrest 1. A Terry search or a "stop' and "frisk" is not to be confused with a search incident to a lawful arrest. Although they result in a warrantless search, they differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope (Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159; People v. Chua, 396 SCRA 657). 2. A Terry stop is not a full arrest. A Terry doctrine as originally formulated, does not require a probable cause and the person is not under a full scale arrest but under a mere brief, investigative "stop" followed by a surface, non-intrusive pat down of one's outer garments to determine the presence of weapons. A search incident to a lawful arrest presupposes the existence of a probable cause for the arrest, where the person is taken under the custody of the arresting officer. The search is of the person and the area within his control. It is thus, more intrusive and is conducted not only for the purpose of finding weapons but also for the purpose of searching for

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evidence, any fruit of a crime or of things which may provide the person arrested with the means of escape. 3. A Terry stop and frisk has a limited scope compared to a full scale arrest and search. The Terry doctrine therefore, is not judged by the more stringent requirement of probable cause which concededly applies only to an arrest and a search. What applies in a Terry stop and frisk is the reasonableness of the act of the officer. This "reasonable standard" while not sufficient to validate an arrest or a search, justifies a "terry stop and frisk."

As a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure constitutes derogation of a constitutional right (Epie, Jr. v. XJlat-Marredo, 518 SCRA 641, March 22,2007). The Constitution does not provide a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures — rather, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that, between persons and the police, there must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with the power to issue or refuse such search warrant. The responsibilities of the magistrate do not end with the granting of the warrant, but extends to the custody of the articles seized (Summerville General Merchandising Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 158767, June 26,2007). Where the articles seized have already been found not to be the "subject of the offense" and the purpose of presenting them as evidence is no longer served, there is no justification for severely curtailing the rights of a person to his property (Summerville General Merchandising Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158767, June 26,2007). Bond to ensure the return of the seized items An order requiring the owner of seized property to file a bond to ensure the return of the seized items should the Department of Justice find probable cause against it has no

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basis in law (Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Bright Future Technologies, Inc., 516 SCRA 62, February 15,2007). Consented Searches 1. The consent to a warrantless search must be voluntary, that is, it must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given (Valdez v. People, 538 SCRA 611, November 23,2007). 2. Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obstrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (People v. Nuevas, 516 SCRA 463, February 22,2007). A peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law (People v. Nuevas, 516 SCRA 463, February 22,2007). Effect of an illegal search and seizure; fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine (Bar 2005) 1. The effect of an illegal search and seizure is expressed in the following constitutional provision: "Sec. 3 (2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."

2. A search warrant illegally obtained or secured or which is issued in violation of the constitution or the rules may be quashed through the proper motion as in a motion

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to quash the search warrant. Also, when evidence is illegally obtained, a motion to suppress the evidence is in order. 3. The general rule is that all searches and seizures made without a warrant are invalid. The illegality of a search and a seizure occurs not only from the failure to obtain a warrant when required but also from the failure to comply with the procedures for obtaining a warrant and in the execution of the same. Such failure will result in the application of the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule prevents, upon proper motion or objection, the admission of evidence illegally obtained. Thus, the most important effect of an illegal search and seizure is the exclusion of the evidence obtained from being used against the person whose rights were violated by the search, the evidence being the proverbial and jurisprudential "fruit of the poisonous tree " The violation of an individual's rights also inevitably result into civil, criminal and administrative charges against the officer responsible for the violation. (Bar 2005) 4. The prior rule embodied in Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil. 2, held that the unconstitutionality of the searches and seizures does not affect the admissibility of the evidence obtained because "the criminal should not be allowed to go free because the constable has blundered." The non-exclusionary rule in Moncado was anchored on the theory that the citizen is protected by other provisions of the laws and has means of redress other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained such as actions for damages against the erring officers and the person who procured the warrant. This theory however, was subsequently rejected in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383). As Stonehill declared: " . . . the non-inclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. X X X

"We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned..."

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Civil damages; criminal liability 1. The proceedings under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court do not provide for the filing of counterclaims for damages against those who may have improperly sought the issuance of the search warrant. However, these aggrieved have the right to seek damages, if the circumstances warranted, by separate civil action for the wrong inflicted on them by an improperly obtained or enforced search warrant (Arthur Del Rosario, et al. v. Hellenor D. Doanto, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 180595, March 5,2010). 2. There is civil liability based on the concept of an independent civil action for violation of a person's right to be secure in his persons, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article 32[9], Civil Code of the Philippines). This liability is separate and distinct from any criminal liability that may arise from the Revised Penal Code like (a) violation of domicile (Article 128, Revised Penal Code), (b) search warrant maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained (Article 129, Revised Penal Code), or possibly (c) searching domicile without witnesses (Article 130, Revised Penal Code). Authority of the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judge re search warrants in Manila and Quezon City 1. A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC dated January 25, 2000 authorizes the Executive Judges of the RTC's of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF), and Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT- TF) (Marimla v. People, G.R. No. 158467, October 16,2009). The applications shall be personally endorsed by the Heads of said agencies, for the search of places to be particularly described therein and the seizure of properly or things as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The warrants issued may

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be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts (A.M. No. 99-20-09 SC, January 25,2000). 2. Although A.M. No. 99-20-09 SC provides a personal endorsement of the application by the "Heads" of the agencies mentioned, it was held that nothing in the rule prohibits such heads from delegating the ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrants to their assistant heads (Marimla v. People, G.R. No. 158467, October 16,2009).

-oOo-

CHAPTER VI BAIL (Rule 114) Meaning, nature and purpose of bail (Bar 1998) 1. Under the Rules of Court, bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under certain specified conditions (Sec. 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 2. The term bail under the Rules of Court distinguishes it from the bondsman who furnishes the security given for the provisional release of the person in custody of the law. 3. The rule clearly specifies that the purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of a person before any court when so required (Sec. 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court). That the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court or by the Rules is also one of the conditions in all kinds of bail (Sec. 2[b], Rule 114, Rules of Court). A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements (People v. Manallo, 400 SCRA 129). 4. The right to bail is a constitutional right (Sec. 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines). It is personal in nature and is therefore, waivable (Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741; Go v. Bongolan, 311 SCRA 99). 5. The right to bail springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after the trial he

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would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt (Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741). 6. Since bail is the security for the release of a person under custody of the law (Sec. 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court), it is evident that it is not intended to cover the civil liability of the accused in the same criminal case. The money deposited as bail may however, be considered not only as bail. It may also be applied to the payment of fines and costs while the excess if any shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit (Sec. 14, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 7. The question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him or her from eluding punishment in the event of conviction. The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by final judgment (Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos v. Court of Appeals and Johnny Co y Yu, G.R. No. 169711, February 8,2010). 8. When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention (People v. Honorable Maceda, 323 SCRA 45 cited in Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., 556 SCRA 471). 9. The presumption of innocence is not a reason for the detained accused to be allowed to hold office or practice his profession. Such presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights (Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., 556 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008).

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Constitutional basis of the right to bail

1. "All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required" (Sec. 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines). 2. on bail:

The Constitution lays down the following principles

(a) All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable. This is the general rule which makes the right to bail a constitutional right. Excepted from this general rule are those who are charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. The person accused of such offense however, shall be entitled to bail when evidence of guilt is not strong. (b) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not impair the right to bail. (c)

Excessive bail is not to be required.

3. The Constitutional provision denying bail to those charged with reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong finds reiteration in the Rules of Court. "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution" (Sec. 7, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The provision of the Rules apply, for instance, to rape or even coup d'etat cases since both are punishable by reclusion perpetua. No distinction is made as to the political complexion of or the moral turpitude involved in the crime charged (Trillanes

IV v. Pimentel, Sr., G.R. No. 179817, June 27,2008).

4. The grant or denial of bail to a person charged with an offense punishable by at least reclusion perpetua is made

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dependent on whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. (Bar 2002) The Court has described this quantum of evidence by employing the terms "Proof evident," "Evident proof and "Presumption great." The first two terms were held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that the accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that the accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused. The test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such, the court is ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are present which would show evident guilt or presumption of guilt (People v. Cabral, G.R. No. 131909, February 18, 1999). The word "strong" does not mean "proof beyond reasonable doubt" (Pareja v. Gomez, 5 SCRA 830). 5. The rule is very explicit as to when admission to bail is discretionary on the part of the respondent Judge. In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, the accused has no right to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, if the accused had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the bail should have been cancelled, instead of increasing it as respondent Judge did. The act of the Judge in increasing the bail bond of the accused instead of canceling it is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of the judge but a patent disregard of well-known rules (Dip- atuan v. Mangotara, AM. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23,2010). 6. Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive, otherwise

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the right to bail becomes meaningless. Thus, in an old case where the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder and that the Department of Justice itself did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses, nothing can be clearer, therefore, that fixing the amount of PI,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted is clearly violative of the constitutional provision (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA1). Bail in the military

The right to bail invoked has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians (Comendador v. Villa, G.R. No. 93177, August 2,1991). Bail in extradition proceedings

1. In Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623, one of the issues presented for resolution was whether or not a person facing extradition is entitled to bail. The respondent maintained that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be extradited, the only exception being a person who is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also

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maintained that the granting of bail would, among others, be consistent with Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which provides when bail is a matter of right. On the other hand, the petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant. The Court agreed with the petitioner and advanced the following reasons: (a) The use of the word "conviction," in the constitutional provision on bail in Section 13 of Art. Ill of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, suggests that bail applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. (b) The constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows, ruled the Court, "that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue." (c) Extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature but sui generis, a class in itself. Since it is not a criminal proceeding, it will not call into operation all the rights of an accused under the Bill of Rights and does not involve a determination of guilt or innocence. The Court however, did not hold that bail never applies in extradition cases. It instead explained that" xxx bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to pro

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tect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." Exception to the "no bail rule" in extradition proceedings

In establishing an exception to the "no bail rule," the Court in Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623, ratiocinated: "Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community:; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein. "Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while the Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations."

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Purganan case re-examined

Five (5) years after, on April 19, 2007, in Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470, the Court ruled anew on the issue of whether or not bail applies to extradition cases in a petition which assailed the order of the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, granting bail to a person subject of extradition proceedings. The Court in Hongkong v. Olalia, Jr., reexamined its own ruling earlier made in Purganan. While admitting that the ruling in the previous case of U.S. Gov't, v. Purganan falls squarely to the private respondent's case, the Court in Hongkong v. Olalia, Jr., viewed the issue in the light of the modern trend in international law placing primacy on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Specifically, the court pointed out such trends, which it claims it "cannot ignore." x x x "(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of th[e] Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other." The Philippines, added the Court, along with the other members of the family of nations, is committed to uphold fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. The country has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court and to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. In reexamining Purganan, the Court made the following observations:

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"First, that the exercise of the State's power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights." Noting that bail had in the past been granted in deportation proceedings, the Court reasoned that if bail can be granted in deportation cases, it sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, explained the High Court, "the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion, and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired." Bail in deportation proceedings 1. "Aliens in deportation proceedings, as a rule, have no inherent right to bail" (Prentis v. Manoogian, 16 F. 2d. 422; U.S. ex rel. Papis v. Tomlinson, 45 F. Supp. 447; U.S. ex rel. Iaonnis v. Garfinkle 44 F. Supp. 518); and it has been held that a person arrested or detained cannot be released on

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bail, unless that right is granted expressly by law (Bengzon v. Ocampo, et al, 84 Phil 611). Section 37(9) (e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 (Com. Act No. 613, as amended) provides that: "Any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration."

"Note that this provision confers upon the Commissioner of Immigration the power and discretion to grant bail in deportation proceedings, but does not grant to aliens the right to be released on bail. The use of the word 'may* in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory or obligatory on the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (U.S. ex rel Zapp et al. v. District Director of Immigration and Naturalization, 120 F. 2d. 762; Ex parte Perkov, 45 F. Supp 864; Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17). The determination as to the propriety of allowing an alien, subject to deportation under the Immigration Act, to be released temporarily on bail, as well as the conditions thereof, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner, and not in the courts of justice. The reason for this is that the courts do not administer immigration laws" (Go Tian Chai v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20645, September 22,1966). 2. In the case of In The Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Harvey, et al. v. Defensor-Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, the denial by the respondent Commissioner of Immigration of the petitioners' release on bail, was challenged by them. The denial was found to be in order by the Court because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. "Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of

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Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-9700, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 442). ^Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to provisional liberty on baiT (Tiu Chun Hai, et al. v. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang v. Commissioner of Immigration, supra; cited in Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago, supra). 3. Since deportation proceedings do not constitute criminal actions, and an order of deportation is not a punishment for a crime, the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution may not be invoked by an alien in said proceedings (Ong See Hang v. Commissioner of Immigration, No. L-9700, February 28,1962, 4 SCRA 442; citations omitted). Who furnishes the bail

The bail may be furnished by the bail applicant himself or by a bondsman (Sec. 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Obligation and right of the bondsman; arrest without a warrant

1. The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final judgment (Sec. 2[d], Rule 114). For the purpose of surrendering the accused, the bondsman may arrest him or, upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion (Sec. 23, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 2. An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart

CHAPTER VI BAIL (Rule 114)

from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending (Sec. 23, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 3. The authority of the bondsman to arrest or cause the arrest of the accused springs from the old principle that once the obligation of bail is assumed, the bondsman or surety becomes the jailer of the accused and is subrogated to all the rights and means which the government possesses to make his control over him effective (U.S. v. Addison and Gomez, 27 Phil. 562; People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-12056, January 24, 1959). The applicant for bail must be in custody

1. If bail is the security for the release of a person under custody, bail cannot be availed of by someone outside the custody of the law. A freeman therefore, is not entitled to bail. 2. The rule considers bail as applicable only to a person in "custody of the law" and does not cover a person who is in the enjoyment of his physical liberty. A fugitive therefore, may not apply for bail unless he gives himself up first so he may be placed under the custody of the law. Thus, it would be incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed (Docena-Caspe v. Bagtas, 400 SCRA 37; Maguddatu v. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 362). 3. Custody of the law is required before the court can act on an application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant (Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377). Hence, an application for admission to bail by one who is at large is premature (Guillermo v. Reyes, 240 SCRA 154). A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. The judge therefore, should diligently ascertain the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed has jurisdiction over the body of

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the accused before considering the application for bail (Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 215 SCRA 421; Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377). As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him is acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. It would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free (Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 241). The rationale behind this rule is to discourage and prevent the practice where the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance (Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377). 4. A person is said to be in custody if he is arrested by virtue of a warrant or even without a warrant pursuant to the Rules of Court or if he voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court as when he surrenders to the proper authorities (People v. Gako, Jr., 348 SCRA 334). A person is deemed to be under the custody of the law either when he has been arrested or has surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court. The accused who is confined in a hospital may be deemed to be in the custody of the law if he clearly communicates his submission to the court while confined in a hospital (Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115407, August 28, 1995; Defensor-Santiago v. Vazquez, 217 SCRA 633). 5. In Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from serious physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings." On the basis of said ex-parte motion

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and the peculiar circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration. Bail to guarantee appearance of witnesses (Bar 1999)

1. While the rule is that bail does not apply to a person who is not in custody of the law, the bail required to secure the appearance of a material witness constitutes an exception to the rule because he may he ordered to post bail even if he is not under detention. Bail may thus be required to guarantee the appearance of a material witness other than that of the accused (Sec. 14, Rule 119, Rules of Court). "When the court is satisfied, upon proof or oath, that a material witness will not testify when required, the court, may, upon motion of either party, order the witness to post bail in such sum as may be deemed proper." If he refuses to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken. 2. Also, "If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense" as long as the accused is not placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial (Sec. 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Bail for those not yet charged

1. What entitles a person to bail is his being under the custody of the law. Hence, "any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held" (Sec. 17[c], Rule 114, Rules of Court). A person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information

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is filed against him (Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28,2003). 2. The application for bail shall be made with any court in the province, city or municipality where the person arrested is held. In Ruiz v. Beldia, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1731, February 16, 2005, the person arrested was detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City, pending the filing of formal charges in court. Upon inquest, the arrestee executed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the then applicable 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Inquest Prosecutor thus set the hearing of the preliminary investigation. However, a day before the preliminary investigation, the arrestee obtained an Order of Release signed by the respondent judge who was then detailed as assisting judge of Branch 272, Regional Trial Court of Marikina City. The Certificate of Detention issued by the PNP-TMG- SOD shows that the arrestee was detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. The Court ruled that as correctly pointed out by the Office of the Court Administrator, the application for bail should have been filed before the proper Quezon City court and not in Marikina City. 3. It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no authority to grant bail to an accused arrested outside of his territorial jurisdiction (Barbero v. Dumlao, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1682, June 19,2008). Effects of failure to appear at the trial

1. The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present and the trial may proceed in absentia (Sec. 2[c], Rule 114, Rules of Court). 2. The bondsman may arrest the accused for the purpose of surrendering the accused. The bondsman may also cause the accused to be arrested by a police officer or any other

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person of suitable age and discretion upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking (Sec. 23, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Court cannot require arraignment before the grant of bail

1. In Lavides v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled on the issue of whether an accused must first be arraigned before he may be granted bail. Lavides involved an accused charged with violation of Section 5(b) Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The accused therein assailed the trial court's imposition of the condition that he should first be arraigned before he is allowed to post bail. It was held in Lavides that the grant of bail should not be conditioned upon the prior arraignment of the accused. In cases where bail is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused will be precluded from filing a motion to quash which is to be done before arraignment. If the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would be no need for the arraignment of the accused. To condition the grant of bail on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release until his motion can be resolved because prior to its resolution, he cannot be arraigned, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail (Lavides v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, February 1,2000). 2. In Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003, the prosecution argued that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be commenced, because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. Accord

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ingly, it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he file a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty to the charge, there would be no more need for him to file said petition. The prosecution further argued that "since it is during arraignment that the accused is first informed of the precise charge against him, he must be arraigned prior to the bail hearings to prevent him from later assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of the charge against him, especially considering that, under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence presented during such proceedings are considered automatically reproduced at the trial. Likewise, the arraignment of an accused prior to bail hearings diminishes the possibility of an accused's flight from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because trial in absentia may be had only if an accused escapes after he has been arraigned." It was likewise argued that "the conduct of bail hearings prior to arraignment would extend to an accused the undeserved privilege of being appraised of the prosecution's evidence before he pleads guilty for purposes of penalty reduction." The contention of the accused petitioner that the arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail was sustained. It was ruled that a person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. It is not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The Court stressed that its ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be "authorized"

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under the circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail The Court in Serapio however, clarified that its pronouncements in Lavides should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him. The Court cautioned that its pronouncements in Lavides should be understood in the light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. Hence, the ruling that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between filing a motion to quash and foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. Another related issue decided in Serapio was whether or not a motion to quash may be filed during the pendency of a petition for bail, that whether or not the motion and the petition are not inconsistent and may proceed independently of each other. Ruling on the issue, the Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and the filing of a motion to quash. "x x x Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial. As stated earlier, a person may apply

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for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. An accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment. These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an accused to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the Information charging him with such offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic." Forms of bail (Bar 1999)

1.

Bail may be given in the following forms: (a)

corporate surety,

(b)

property bond,

(c)

cash deposit, or

(d) recognizance (Sec. 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 2. Corporate surety — This is bail furnished by a corporation. Under the Rules of Court, any domestic or foreign corporation which is licensed as a surety and authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer of the corporation duly authorized by the board of directors (Sec. 10, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Act No. 536 enacted on November 25, 1902 prescribes the

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conditions before corporations could be allowed to act as sureties for bonds and undertakings. 3. Property bond — A property bond is an undertaking constituted as lien on the real property given as security for the amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days from the approval of the bond, the accused shall cause the annotation on the certificate of title on file with the Registry of Deeds. If the land is unregistered, it is annotated in the Registration Book on the space provided therefore in the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. The registration is likewise made on the corresponding tax declaration in the office of the provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned. Within ten (10) days from the performance of the above acts, the accused shall submit his compliance to the court. His failure to do so shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond, his re-arrest and detention (Sec. 11, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The sureties in a property bond must have the following qualifications: (a) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines; (b) Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the amount of the undertaking; (c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than that expressed in the undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums must be equivalent to the whole amount of the bail demanded. In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over and above all just debts, obligations and properties exempt from execution (Sec. 12, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Every surety is also required to justify by affidavit taken before the judge that he possesses the qualifications of a surety also describing the property and all relevant matters required to be so stated by the Rules of Court. No bail shall be approved unless the surety is qualified (Sec. 13, Rule 114, Rules of Court).

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4. Cash deposit — Bail may also be in the form of a cash deposit. The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer or the clerk of court where the case is pending, the amount of bail fixed by the court or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. The accused shall be discharged from custody upon submission of the certificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit (Sec. 14, Rule 114, Rules of Court) The deposit must be made with the persons enumerated in the rule. Irrefragably, only the collector of internal revenue, city or provincial, city or municipal treasurer is authorized to receive bail in cash. A judge is not one of those authorized to receive a deposit of cash bail; nor should such cash be kept in the judge's office, much less in his own residence (Agulan v. Fernandez, 356 SCRA 162; Naui v. Mauricio, 414 SCRA 11; Lachica v. Tormis, 470 SCRA 206). 5. Recognizance — This is an obligation of record entered into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual condition in criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for trial. A person in custody may be released on recognizance whenever allowed by law or by the Rules of Court (Sec. 15, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The release may be either on the recognizance of the accused himself or that of a responsible person (Sec. 15, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 6. Release on recognizance may be ordered by the court in the following cases: (a) When the offense charged is for violation of an ordinance, a light felony, or a criminal offense, the impos- able penalty of which does not exceed six (6) months im

CHAPTER VI BAIL (Rule 114)

prisonment and/or P2,000 fine, under the circumstances provided in R.A. No. 6036; (b) Where a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the imposable principal penalty, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, in which case, the court may allow his release on his own recognizance, or on a reduced bail, at the discretion of the court (Sec. 16, Rule 114, Rules of Court); (c) Where the accused has applied for probation, pending finality of the judgment but no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one (P.D. 968, Sec. 7; Sec. 24, Rule 114); and (d) In case of a youthful offender held for physical and mental examination, trial, or appeal, if he is unable to furnish bail and under the circumstances envisaged in P.D. 603, as amended (Espiritu v. Jovellanos, 280 SCRA 579). (e) In summary procedure, when the accused has been arrested for failure to appear when required. His release shall be either on bail or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court (Sec. 16,1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure). Guidelines in fixing the amount of bail (Bar 1999) 1. The basic rule in fixing the amount of bail is that excessive bail shall not be required (Sec. 13, Art. Ill, Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines; Sec. 9, Rule 114, Rules of Court).

In fixing bail, the amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when such presence is required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Another principle to consider is the good of the public as well as the rights of the accused. The inability of the accused to secure bail in a certain amount is not solely to be considered and this fact does not by itself make bail excessive. When an

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accused has no means to bail himself out, any amount fixed, no matter how small would fall into the category of excessive bail (Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312). 2. The judge who issued the warrant or who granted the application for bail shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors: (a)

Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

(b)

Nature and circumstances of the offense;

(c)

Penalty for the offense charged;

(d)

Character and reputation of the accused;

(e)

Age and health of the accused;

(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused; (g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) Forfeiture of other bail; (i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail (Sec. 9, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 3. The existence of a high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be subject, of course, to the provision that excessive bail shall not be required (San Miguel v. Maceda, 520 SCRA 205). Duration of the bail

1. The undertaking under the bail shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it (Sec. 2[a], Rule 114, Rules of Court).

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good standing in the community a sworn statement binding himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of the Court hearing his case periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in its discretion and with the consent of the person charged, require further that he be placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a responsible citizen in the community who may be willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case, the affidavit herein mentioned shall include a statement of the person charged that he binds himself to accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by the Court. The Clerk of Court shall immediately report the presence of the accused person to the Court. Except when his failure to report is for justifiable reasons including circumstances beyond his control to be determined by the Court, any violation of this sworn statement shall justify the Court to order his immediate arrest unless he files bail in the amount forthwith fixed by the Court." When bail is not allowed

Bail is not allowed in the following cases: 1. A person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be not admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution (Sec. 7, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 2. Bail shall not be allowed after a judgment of conviction has become final (Sec. 24, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The rule is that no bail shall be allowed after a judgment of conviction has become final. If before finality of the judgment, the accused applies for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community (Sec. 24, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 3. Bail shall not be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence (Sec. 24, Rule 114, Rules of Court).

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When bail is a matter of right (Bar 1999; 2006; 2008) 1. The general rule is that all persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right. This rule applies to the following situations:

(a) before conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court; (b) after conviction by the courts mentioned in letter "a;" and (c) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment (Sec. 4, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 2. When the records show that the accused was charged with violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425 which is punishable by prision correctional, following the provisions of the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, complainant is entitled to bail as a matter of right (San Miguel v. Maceda, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749, April 4,2007). Where bail is a matter of right and prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be subject, of course, to the other provision that excessive bail shall not be required. The recourse of the judge is to fix a higher amount of bail and not to cancel the same (San Miguel v. Maceda, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749, April 4,2007). 3. Bail is not a matter of right to a person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. He shall not be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution (Sec. 7, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Thus, before conviction of the accused by the Regional Trial Court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua

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or life imprisonment, bail may or may not be given depending upon the strength of the evidence of guilt. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter to be determined by the court after a hearing to be conducted (Sec. 8, Rule 114, Rules of Court) with notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or a requirement for him to submit his recommendation (Sec. 18, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong (Sec. 8, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 4. The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. The court should first conduct a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court to determine the existence of strong evidence or the lack of it. This hearing is to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented and merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. In a bail hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits of the case (People v. Plaza, G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009). 5. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (Valerio v. Court of Appeals, 535 SCRA 453). Remedy when bail is denied The remedy of the petitioner from the order of the trial court denying a petition for bail is to file a petition for certiorari if the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said order (People v. Gomez, 325 SCRA 61). When bail is a matter of discretion (Bar 1999; 2006; 2008)

1. In Sec. 4(b) of Rule 114, recall that bail is a matter of right before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life

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imprisonment. But when the accused has been convicted in the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the admission to bail becomes discretionary (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Since the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, a hearing must be conducted whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence and the prosecutor must be notified to require him to submit his recommendation. This notice of hearing applies in all cases whether bail is a matter of right or a matter of discretion (Zuno v. Cabebe, 444 SCRA 382 citing Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1). 2. If the grant of bail becomes discretionary when the accused has been convicted in the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court), it follows that if the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail should be denied because this means that the reason for the conviction is that the evidence of guilt against him is strong. Thus, in the early case of People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283, the Court clearly declared that if an accused is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of guilt is strong. People v. Nitcha clearly declares: "x x x The clear implication therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong — which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction — it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction."

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3. It is a misconception that when an accused is charged with the crime of murder, he is not entitled to bail at all or that the crime of murder is non-bailable. The grant of bail to an accused charged with an offense that carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua is discretionary on the part of the trial court. In other words, the accused is still entitled to bail but no longer "as a matter of right." Instead, it is discretionary and calls for a judicial determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong in order to grant bail. The prosecution is accorded ample opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong (Eduardo San Miguel v. Maceda, A.M. No. RTJ-03- 1749, April 4, 2007, citing Andres v. Beltran, 415 Phil 598). Where application for bail is to be filed when bail is a matter of discretion and after conviction by the Regional Trial Court

1. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court even if a notice of appeal has already been filed provided that the trial court has not yet transmitted the original record to the appellate court (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Corollarily, if the original record has already been transmitted to the appellate court, then the application shall be filed with the said appellate court. 2. The rule allowing the filing of the application for bail in the trial court prior to the transmission of the original record is consistent with Sec. 6 of Rule 120. The second sentence of the second paragraph of said Section provides that: " x x x The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal xxx." 3. If the decision of the RTC convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Sec. 6 of Rule 120 has a similar provision thus: " x x x i f the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed

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the nature of the offense from non-bailahle to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court" 4. If the application for bail is granted, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail. This rule is however, subject to the consent of the bondsman 6Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The consent of the bondsman shall be required to have provisional liberty under the same bail because of the rule in Sec. 2(a) of Rule 114, that the "undertaking shall be effective x x x until promulgation of judgment of the Regional Trial Court x x x." When application for bail after conviction by the RTC shall be denied

1. If the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail should be denied since the conviction indicates strong evidence of guilt based on proof beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283). 2. Even if the penalty imposed by the trial court is not any of the above but merely imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail already allowed shall be cancelled, if the prosecution shows the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That the accused is a recidivist or a quasi-recid- ivist, a habitual delinquent or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That the accused has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That the accused committed the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court).

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The court is not authorized to deny or cancel the bail ex parte. The rule requires "notice to the accused" (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The resolution of the Regional Trial Court denying or cancelling the bail may be reviewed by the appellate court motu proprio or on motion of any party after notice to the adverse party in either case (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Bail pending appeal where penalty imposed exceeds six years

1. In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal does not mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (Jose Antonio Leviste v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010). 2. The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph not beingpresent. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances. In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Thus, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail.

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Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach (Jose Antonio Leviste v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 189122, March 17,2010). 3. The appellant has no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal from the tried court's judgment where his conviction carries a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years and there is a justification for the cancellation of his bail pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d) and (e) of Rule 114. The inexcusable non-appearance in court of the appellant not only violated the condition of his bail that he "shall appear" before the court "whenever required" by the court or the Rules. It also showed the probability that he might flee or commit another crime while released on bail (Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140842, April 12,2007). Hearing of application for bail in offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment; burden of proof in bail application

1. A hearing of the application for bail is to be conducted when a person is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. In the hearing, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong (Sec. 8, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Bail in this type of offense is not a matter of right. When the granting of bail is not a matter of right or is merely discretionary, as when the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. 2. A summary hearing is defined as "such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to

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the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross examination." Reliance by the judge on the alleged "voluminous records" of the case does not suffice because the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since he knew that the crime charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is worth stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process. Another compelling reason why a hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is to determine the amount of bail based on the guidelines set forth in Sec. 6 (now Sec. 9), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Without the required hearing, the bail which may be granted to the accused would be arbitrary and without basis (People v. Gako, Jr., 348 SCRA 334; See also for suggested reading, People v. Cabral, 303 SCRA 361; People v. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489; Basco v. Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220). 3. A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is strong. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases. The judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case because it has the effect of ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. The duty to exercise discretion on the matter is not reposed upon the prosecutor because judicial discretion is the domain of the judge (Narciso v. Santa Romana-Cruz, 328 SCRA 505).

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4. The bail hearing is mandatory in order to give the prosecution reasonable opportunity to oppose the application by proving that the evidence of guilt is strong (Tolentino v. Camano, Jr., 322 SCRA 559; Enriquez v. Sarmiento, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011, August 7,2006). 5. In Narciso v. Santa Romana-Cruz, 328 SCRA 505, the petitioner was charged with parricide, an offense which is punishable with reclusion perpetua. He argued before the Court of Appeals that he was entitled to bail because the evidence of his guilt was not strong as indicated by the prosecutor's conformity to his motion for bail. This conformity, argued the petitioner, was tantamount to a finding that the prosecution evidence against him was not strong. The Court of Appeals disagreed because the records show that no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the motion by the accused and the order granting bail. This period, according to the appellate court was not sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and stressed the duty of a judge to determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong. The Supreme Court held: "When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the veiy nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal x x x.

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"Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. A summary hearing means

such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process." 6. It is a mandatory duty to conduct a hearing despite the prosecution's refusal to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail or when the prosecution chooses to just file a comment (Goodman v. De la Victoria, 325 SCRA 658; Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1). The fact that the prosecutor interposed no objection to the application for bail by the accused does not relieve the judge of the duty to set the motion for bail for hearing (Managuelod v. Paclibon, Jr., 426 SCRA 377). Duties of the trial judge in a petition for bail in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death

1. Summarizing earlier jurisprudence, Narciso v. Santa Romana-Cruz enumerated the following duties of the trial judge in a petition for bail in offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment: (a) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation;

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(b) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (c) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; (d) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise, the petition should be denied.

"x x x The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof. Additionally, the court's grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail" (Narciso v. Santa Romana-Cruz, 328 SCRA 505; People v. Cabral, 303 SCRA 361; People v. Gako, Jr., 348 SCRA 334). 2. Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great (People v. Sandiganbayan, 529 SCRA 764). 3. A grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits (People v. Sandiganbayan, 529 SCRA 764, August 10, 2007).

CHAPTER VI BAIL (Rule 114)

Evidence in bail hearing are automatically reproduced at the trial

The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial. However, any witness during the bail hearing may, upon motion of either party, be recalled by the court for additional examination except if such witness is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify (Sec. 8, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Capital offenses

1. A capital offense is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and of the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death (Sec. 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 2. It is clear from the Rules of Court that the capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law and not the penalty to be actually imposed (Bravo v. De Borja, 134 SCRA 466). 3. The imposition of the death penalty is now prohibited by R.A. 9346 enacted into law on June 24, 2006. Sec. 2 of R.A. 9346 provides that "in lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed: "(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or "(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code." Effect of Republic Act No. 9346 on the graduation of penalties

In People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006, the Court was confronted by the question of whether or not the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 resulted in the statutory interdiction of the death penalty. Giving rise to the issue was the sentence of reclusion temporal imposed on the accusedappellant by the Court of Appeals for the two counts of

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attempted qualified rape committed against a minor by a relative mentioned in the law. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. The concern of the accused-appellant is whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua. This is because Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that instead of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when appropriate shall be imposed. The Court found no doubt as to the validity this sentence at the time it was meted prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9346. The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum. The critical question according to the Court is whether R.A. No. 9346 intended to delete the word "death" as expressly provided for in the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. The Court ruled in the affirmative and found R.A. No. 9346 to unequivocally bar the application of the death penalty, as well as to expressly repeal all such statutory provisions requiring the application of the death penalty. Such effect explained the Court, necessarily extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Hence, the

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Court added, that it cannot find basis to conclude that R.A. No. 9346 intended to retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in our penal laws. People v. Bon, however, stressed that the debarring of the death penalty through R.A. No. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as "heinous." The amendatory effects of R.A. No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty but not to the definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still, what remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes, by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by themselves. Accordingly, R.A. No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous crimes. Having pronounced and determined the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through R.A. No. 9346 and the corresponding modification of penalties other than death through that statute, the penalty of "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. Hence, in the case of accused-appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor. Where application or petition for bail may be filed (Bar 2002)

1. As a general rule, the application for bail may be filed with the court where the case is pending. If the judge thereof is absent or unavailable, then the application may be filed with any Regional Trial Court judge, Metropolitan Trial Court judge, Municipal Trial Court judge, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge in the province, city, or municipality (Sec. 17[a], Rule 114, Rules of Court).

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Where there is no showing that the judge of the court where the criminal case is pending is unavailable, another judge who entertains a bail application despite knowledge of the pendency of the case in another court is clearly in error (Savella v. Ines, 521 SCRA 417). Judges who approve applications for bail of accused whose cases are pending in other courts are guilty of gross ignorance of the law (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit in RTC Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, 536 SCRA 313). 2. Where the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, the application for bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place. If no judge thereof is available, then with any Metropolitan Trial Court judge, Municipal Trial Court judge or Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge in the said place (Sec. 17[a], Rule 114, Rules of Court). When bail is filed with the court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reasons, require a different one to be filed (Sec. 19, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The failure of a judge who granted the bail to transmit the order of release and other supporting papers to the court where the case is pending constitutes violation of the rules (Savella v. Ines, 521 SCRA 417). 3. Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending, on trial, or appeal (Sec. 17[b], Rule 114, Rules of Court). 4. When a person is in custody but not yet charged, he may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held (Sec. 17[c], Rule 114, Rules of Court). In Ruiz v. Beldia, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1731, February 16, 2005, the Certificate of Detention of the person lawfully arrested without a warrant issued by the PNP-TMG-SOD

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shows that he was detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. The application for bail should have been filed before the proper Quezon City court and not in Marikina City. Increase or reduction of bail 1. Even after the accused is admitted to bail, the amount of bail may either be increased or reduced by the court upon good cause (Sec. 20, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 2. The increased amount must be given within a reasonable period if the accused wants to avoid being taken into custody. The rule is clear: "xxx When increased, the accused may be committed to custody if he does not give bail in the increased amount within a reasonable period" (Sec. 20, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Bail for accused originally released without bail

If upon the filing of the complaint or information the accused is released without bail, he may later be required to give bail in the amount fixed by the court whenever at any subsequent stage of the proceedings a strong showing of guilt appears to the court. If he does not give bail he may be committed into custody (Sec. 20, Rule 114, Rules of Court). Forfeiture of bail

1. One of the conditions of the bail is for the accused to appear before the proper court whenever required (Sec. 2[b], Rule 114, Rules of Court). When his presence is required, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time (Sec. 21, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 2. If he fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited. The bondsmen shall be given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of the bail. The bondsmen must, within the period: (a) produce the body of their principal or give the reasons for his non-production; and

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(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so. Failing in these two requirements, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail (Sec. 21, Rule 114, Rules of Court). If the bondsmen move for the mitigation of their liability, the court is required not to reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted (Sec. 21, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 3. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded by an order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so. An order of forfeiture is interlocutory and merely requires the bondsmen "to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond." The order is different from the judgment on the bond which is issued if the accused was not produced within the 30-day period (Mendoza v. Alarma, G.R. No. 151970, May 7,2008). Cancellation of the bail; remedy

1. Cancellation by application of the bondsmen — Bail may be cancelled upon application of the bondsmen with due notice to the prosecutor (a) upon surrender of the accused, or (b) proof of his death. 2. Automatic cancellation — The bail may also be deemed automatically cancelled upon (a) acquittal of the accused, (b) dismissal of the case, or (c) execution of the judgment of conviction (Sec. 22, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 3. Sec. 5 of Rule 114 allows the cancellation of bail where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years if any of the grounds in the said section is present as when the circumstances indicate the probability of flight. The same section authorizes the appellate court to motu proprio or on motion of any party review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

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4. It was held in Chua v. Court of Appeals, 520 SCRA 729, that from the last paragraph of the above provision, the appropriate remedy against the trial court's order canceling the bail is by filing with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said order in the same regular appeal proceedings which the appellant himself initiated, such motion being an incident to his appeal. The filing of a separate petition via a special civil action for certiorari before the appellate court is proscribed and contravenes the rule against multiplicity of suits and constitutes forum shopping (Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140842, April 12, 2007). Application for or admission to bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation

1. The application or admission of the accused to bail shall not bar him from challenging both the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. It shall not likewise bar the accused from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him provided the same is raised before he enters his plea (Sec. 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case (Sec. 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court). 2. Sec. 26 of Rule 114 is a new rule intended to modify previous rulings that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule is curative in nature because precisely it was designed to curb evils in procedural rules. Procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity (Okabe v. Gutierrez, 429 SCRA 685; Borlongan v. Pefia, G.R. No. 143591, May 5,2010). 3. The former ruling that the posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of

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arrest, has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto (Borlongan v. Pena, G.R. No. 143591, May 5,2010). — oOo —

Chapter VII RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (Rule 115) Rights of the accused at the trial (Bar 1992; 1996; 1998; 2004)

1. The rights of the accused are normally treated in Constitutional Law specifically under the topic on the Bill of Rights. The discussion in this treatise shall be confined to selected rights of an accused. 2. Sec. 1 of Rule 115 enumerates the rights of the accused "at the trial." It provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:" (a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. (b) To be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. (c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused however, may waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion,

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the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel. (d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him. (e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself. (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him. (g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf. (h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial. (i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. Presumption of innocence (Bar 2005)

1. The presumption of innocence under the Rules is of a constitutional origin and a mere substantial reiteration of Sec. 14(2) of Art. Ill of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which provides: "Sec. 14 (2) x x x In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved x x x."

2. An accused in criminal prosecutions is to be presumed innocent until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable

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doubt. This constitutional guarantee cannot be overthrown unless the prosecution has established by such quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption of innocence and prove that a crime was committed and that the accused is guilty thereof. Under our Constitution, an accused enjoys the presumption of innocence. And this presumption prevails over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty (People v. Sy, G.R. No. 185284, June 22, 2009; People v. Frondozo, G.R. No. 177164, June 30, 2009; See People v. Alivio, G.R. No. 177771, May 30,2011 for related reading). 3. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence (People v. Ong, 432 SCRA 470; People v. Paloma, G.R. No. 178544, February 23, 2011). Sec. 3(m) of Rule 131, establishes the disputable presumption that"official duty has been regularly performed " Hence, as a general rule, the testimony of the police officers who apprehended the accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. However, when the performance of their duties is tainted with irregularities, such presumption is effectively destroyed. While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity is merely just that—a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth (People v. Cantalejo, G.R. No. 182790, April 24, 2009; See People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 176350, August 10,2011). Prima facie presumptions of guilt May the Rules or the law provide for a presumption of guilt?

An example of this presumption is found in Sec. 3(j) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. Under this provision, "a person

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found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act x x x." An answer to the question may be gleaned from a case decided several years ago. In that case, the petitioners were convicted of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance penalized under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. They challenge the provision of P.D. No. 704 which provides: "The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical compounds containing combustible elements, or obnoxious or poisonous substance, or equipment or device for electric fishing in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman shall constitute a presumption that the same were used for fishing in violation of this Decree, and the discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught or killed by the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or by electricity shall constitute a presumption that the owner, operator or fisherman were fishing with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity." Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt under the Fisheries Decree violates the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. Citing previous pronouncements, the Court held that the validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It is generally conceded that the legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the guilt of the accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused provided there is a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. To avoid any constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from proof of the other must not be arbitrary and unreasonable. In fine, the presumption must be based on facts and these facts must be part of the crime when committed. The challenged provision of P.D. No. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved and hence, is not con

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stitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or devices for electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and poisonous substances, explosives or electricity in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman evidence that the owner and operator of the fishing boat or the fisherman had used such substances in catching fish. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or the fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a natural inference from the fact proved. The Court however, stressed that the statutory presumption is merely prima facie. It cannot, under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the accused from presenting his defense to rebut the main fact presumed. At no instance can the accused be denied the right to rebut the presumption (Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517). Proof beyond reasonable doubt

1. The presumption of innocence is not meant to be forever. It ends when it is overcome in a final conviction. There is only one type of quantum of evidence which overcomes the presumption — proof beyond reasonable doubt. Without such quantum of evidence, the accused is entitled to an acquittal (Sec. 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court). Proof beyond reasonable doubt is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence (People v. Montenegro, 436 SCRA 33; People v. Labagala, G.R. No. 184603, August 2,2010; See People v. Campos, G.R. No. 176061, July 4,2011 for related reading). 2. "x x x Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" (Sec. 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court).

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3. The Court in Mupas v. People, G.R. No. 172834, February 6, 2008, describes reasonable doubt as "that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest each upon the certainty of guilt." 4. The presumption of innocence requires that before the accused is convicted, his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Sec. 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court does not provide that for proof to be deemed beyond reasonable doubt, absolute certainty of his guilt is required. The rule merely requires moral certainty. In criminal cases, the prosecution is not required to show the guilt of the accused with absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is demanded, or that degree of proof which, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. With that, the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of the accused with moral certainty (People v. Malate, G.R. No. 185724, June 5,2009). The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on the strength of its own evidence and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet its burden of proof, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In such cases the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted (People v. Angus, G.R. No. 178778, August 3,2010). 5. The constitutional presumption of innocence can be accorded to the accused only in the absence of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That constitutional presumption cannot be upheld in the face of the overwhelming and incontrovertible evidence for the prosecution irresistibly pointing to the conclusive culpability of the accused (People v. Cabacaba, G.R. No. 171310, July 9,2008). 6. In prosecution of cases involving illegal possession of prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish with moral certainty the elemental act of possession of a prohibited

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substance coupled with the fact that such possession is not authorized by law. Essential, however, in a drug-related case is that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction, it behooves upon the prosecution to establish and prove with certainty that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same item recovered from his possession (Julius Cacao y Prieto v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180870, January 22,2010). 7. Does the presumption of innocence end upon conviction by the trial court even if the conviction is appealed? This was answered by the Court in the negative in one case. Here, the RTC of Quezon City rendered a decision convicting a judge, the respondent in this case, for two counts of child abuse or violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610. The convictions were however, appealed to the CA. A Senior State Prosecutor of the DO J wrote a letter to the then Chief Justice inquiring whether it is possible for the Supreme Court, in the public interest, to motu proprio order the immediate suspension of the judge in view of the aforementioned RTC decision. The letter argued that "Although the conviction is not yet final, the presumption of innocence x x x enjoyed during the pendency of the trial has already been overcome by its result. The presumption today is that she is guilty and must clear her name of the charges." The matter was referred by the Court for comment and recommendation to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), before which an administrative complaint against the same judge was pending. The OCA recommended that the administrative case be given due course and that the respondent judge be indefinitely suspended pending the outcome of the case. The Second Division of the Supreme Court through a Resolution, approved the recommendations, thus, suspending the respondent judge from performing judicial functions while awaiting the final

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resolution of the criminal convictions appealed from or until further orders from the Court. The respondent judge filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Resolution. The motion claimed that the suspension order was issued without affording respondent judge the opportunity to be heard and that the suspension is essentially unjust because the two criminal cases are still on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and the suspension clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt. The Court ruled that it cannot fully agree with the recommendations of the OCA. The fact of respondent's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant the suspension. Since the convictions are currently on appeal before the CA, the same have not yet attained finality. As such, the respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be remembered, explained the Court, that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues and until a promulgation of final conviction is made, this constitutional mandate prevails (Re: Conviction of Judge AAA, AM. No. 06-9-545-RTC, January 31, 2008). Prosecution must rest on its own merits

1. In establishing the guilt of the accused, jurisprudence requires that the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. In fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the presumption of innocence shall prevail and hence, the accused shall be acquitted. However,

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once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused (Mupas v. People, G.R. No. 172834, February 6,2008). 2. For example, in reviewing rape cases, the Supreme Court has constantly been guided by certain principles among which is that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense (People v. Lagarde, G.R. No. 182549, January 20, 2009; People v. An, G.R. No. 169870, August 4, 2009). Effect of failure to identify the perpetrator

What is the effect of the failure to identify the accused as perpetrator of the offense charged? In one case of robbery with homicide, the accused- appellants argued that in criminal prosecutions, the State has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has to prove the identity of the accused as the malefactor, as well as the fact of the commission of the crime for which he is allegedly responsible. They argued that it can be gleaned from the records of the case that the prosecution relied mainly on the testimony of the alleged eyewitness who did not even point to them as the malefactors and she only did so upon the instructions given her in a police camp. They pointed out that they were invited allegedly for violation of the anti-drugs law and were appalled to learn that they were charged with a different crime and the alleged witness was coached to identify them. Evidently, they stressed, their guilt has not been proved with the required quantum of evidence. They asserted that where the people's evidence fails to meet the quantum required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence, the accused is entitled to acquittal regardless of the weakness of his defense of denial and uncorroborated alibi, for it is better to acquit a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proven beyond the required quantum of evidence.

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On the other hand, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that findings of fact of the trial court are generally upheld on appeal and the accused- appellants are assailing the correctness of the findings of fact of the trial court by impugning the credibility of the prosecution witness. The prosecution claimed that contrary to the accused-appellants' claim that the police officers taught the witness to point to them as the perpetrators, her testimony is straightforward and direct. After review, The Court found that the accused-appellants should be acquitted. Declared the Court: "It is settled that when the issue is the evaluation of the testimony of a witness or his credibility, this Court accords the highest respect and even finality to the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that it committed palpable mistake, misappreciation of facts or grave abuse of discretion. It is the trial court which has the unique advantage of observing first-hand the facial expressions, gestures and the tone of voice of a witness while testifying. "The well-entrenched rule is that findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. "Factual findings of trial courts, when substantiated by the evidence on record, command great weight and respect on appeal, save only when certain material facts and circumstances were overlooked and which, if duly considered, may vary the outcome of the case. "In this case, the material fact and circumstance that the lone alleged eyewitness, x x x was not able to identify the accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, varies the outcome of this case. "One, they were not arrested for the crime of robbery with homicide but were arrested during a buy-bust operation.

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"Apparently, the accused-appellants were arrested without a warrant during a buy-bust operation x x x transferred to Camp Karingal under dubious circumstances, and made to stand in a police line-up and identified bv an eyewitness who failed to identify them three times. These circumstances were ignored by the trial court who gave too much credence on the positive identification of the accused-appellants by the same eyewitness during direct examination. "Trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses but to the totality of evidence before them. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It should not confine itself to oral testimony during the trial " (People v. Olivo, G.R. No. 177768, July 27,2009; Underscoring supplied for emphasis).

Failure to comply with post-seizure procedures set by law What is the effect of the failure of the arresting officers to comply with post-seizure procedures set by law?

This has been answered in various decisions of the Court. For instance, In People v. Frondozo, G.R. No. 177164, June 30, 2009, the accused-appellant assailed his conviction by the Court of Appeals for violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) which among other illegal acts, penalizes the sale and trading of dangerous drugs. The appeal contended that the evidence showed that the arresting officers have not complied with the requirements for establishing the chain of custody under Sec. 21 of the law. To establish the identity of the shabu seized, the procedures laid down in R.A. No. 9165 should be complied with. It was pointed out that Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the post-seizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. It states: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or

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his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof (Underscoring supplied).

The Court held that what is material in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. Prosecutions for illegal sale of prohibited drugs necessitate that the elemental act of possession of prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Therefore, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be shown beyond doubt by complying with the law. In this case, declared the Court, the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs as prescribed by R.A. No. 9165. The arresting officers did not mark the shabu immediately after they arrested the accused. Further, while there was testimony regarding the marking of the shabu after it was turned over to the police investigator, no evidence was presented to prove that the marking thereof was done in the presence of the accused. Also, fatal in the prosecution's case is the failure of the arresting officers to take a photograph and make an inventory of the confiscated materials in the presence of the accused or there was no mention that any representative from the media, DOJ or any elected public official had been present during the inventory or that any of these persons had been required to sign the copies of the inventory. Clearly, none of the statutory safeguards mandated by R.A. No. 9165 was observed. Hence, the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedure in the custody of the seized drugs raises doubt as to its origins. Nevertheless, while the seized drugs may be admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily follow that the same should be given evidentiary weight if the procedures provided by

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R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with. The admissibility of the seized dangerous drugs in evidence should not be equated with its probative value in proving the corpus delicti. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Finally, ruled the Court, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty relied upon by the lower courts cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As a rule, the testimony of police officers who apprehended the accused is accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. However, when the performance of their duties is tainted with irregularities, such presumption is effectively destroyed (See also Mallilin v. People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30,2008; People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009; People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494; Catuiran v. People, 175647, May 8, 2009; People v. Barba; G.R. No. 182420, July 23,2009; People v. Gatlabayan, G.R. No. 186467, July 13,2011). The equipoise rule

1. The presumption of innocence has given rise to a jurisprudential rule referred to as the'equipoise rule' which is well-settled in this jurisdiction and which is a consequence of such presumption. The application of the rule is triggered by a situation where the court is faced with conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense and where the evidence, facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt. This situation cannot fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The court then will have to resort to the equipoise rule. "The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the

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accused" (People v. Erguiza, G.R. No. 171348, November 26, 2008). If the inculpatory testimony is capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused persons and the other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction (People v. Navarro, G.R. No. 173790, October 11, 2007; People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494, March 17,2009). 2. There is, therefore, no equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced. Said rule is not applicable where the evidence presented is not equally weighty. The equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming (Malana v. People, G.R. No. 173612, March 26, 2008). Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation

1. In order to inform the accused of the nature and cause of accusation against him, it is necessary for the complaint or information to contain those matters required by the statute or by the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) To state the name and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has been or is known and if his name cannot be ascertained, to describe him under a fictitious name (Sec. 7, Rule 110, Rules of Court). (b) To state the name and surname of the offended party or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known and if there is no other way of identifying him, to describe him under a fictitious name (Sec. 12, Rule 110, Rules of Court); if the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified (Sec. 12[c], Rule 110, Rules of Court). (c) To state with sufficient clarity and in an ordinary and concise language, the acts or omissions constituting the offense to enable the accused to know the offense he is being charged with (Sec. 9, Rule 110, Rules of

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Court); to state the designation of the offense given by statute unless there is no such designation in which case it is sufficient to make reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing the offense (Sec. 8, Rule 110, Rules of Court). (d) To state also in ordinary and concise language, the qualifying and aggravating circumstances attending the acts imputed to the accused (Sees. 8, 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court); (e) To sufficiently allege that the crime was committed or its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court (Sec. 10, Rule 110, Rules of Court); (f) To allege the date of the commission of the acts or omissions constituting the offense, which date may be one as near as possible to the actual date of the commission of the offense, except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense (Sec. 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court); (g) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be described with such particularity to properly identify the offense charged (Sec. 12[a], Rule 110, Rules of Court). 2. It is a basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. It would be a denial of accused-appellant's basic right to due process if he is charged with simple rape and consequently convicted with certain qualifying circumstances which were not alleged in the information (People v. Lagarde, G.R. No. 182549, January 20,2009). 3. In Lagarde, the accused-appellant was charged with rape in an information which reads: "That on or about the 27th day of December, 2001, in the municipality of San Miguel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent with

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lewd designs and by use of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [AAA], 11 years old, against her will to her damage and prejudice. CONTRARY TO LAW."

The RTC found AAA's testimony credible, noting that at her age, it is inconceivable for her to concoct a tale of having been raped. Thus, the trial court convicted accused-appellant of rape aggravated by minority of the victim, use of bladed weapon and force, and uninhabited place in view of the location of the offense. The appellate court upheld the trial court's findings of fact and judgment of conviction. With regard to the penalty, however, the CA ruled that the trial court erred when it imposed the death sentence on the basis of the following aggravating circumstances: minority, use of bladed weapon, and uninhabited place. Aside from the abolition of the death penalty, the CA held that: "It is basic in criminal procedure that the purpose of the information is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or the charge against him so as to enable him to prepare a suitable defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and convicted of its qualified form punishable by death although the attendant circumstances qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment were not set forth in the indictment on which he was arraigned."

Accused-appellant also questioned the death penalty imposed on him, arguing that the aggravating circumstances of minority, use of a bladed weapon, and uninhabited place were not specifically alleged in the information. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, agreed with the judgment of conviction but not with the death penalty for the same reasons submitted by accused-appellant.

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The Court sustained the Court of Appeals. Said the Court: "We agree with the appellate court that the death penalty is not warranted by the alleged aggravating circumstances, i.e., victim's minority, use of bladed weapon, and uninhabited place. First, the death penalty was abolished under Republic Act No. 9346. Second, the use of a bladed weapon and uninhibited place cannot be appreciated here because these were not specifically alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. It is a basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. It would be a denial of accused-appellant's basic right to due process if he is charged with simple rape and consequently convicted with certain qualifying circumstances which were not alleged in the information. The appellate court correctly ruled that the use of a bladed weapon and uninhabited place are not circumstances that would call for the imposition of the death penalty. The victim's minority does not also qualify the offense to merit the death penalty. To warrant a death sentence, the victim must be under seven (7) years of age. The applicable provisions, therefore, are the following: Art. 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. —

XXX Art. 266-B Penalties x x x The death penalty shall be imposed x x x 5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) r r years old."

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4. May the accused be convicted of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 if the check described in the information is not the check allegedly issued and admitted in evidence? In Dico v. Court of Appeals, 452 SCRA 441, the accused was charged with three (3) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 (B.P. Big. 22) involving among other checks, FEBTC Check No. 364903 for P100,000 as described in the information. During his appeal to the Supreme Court following his conviction by the lower courts, the Court discovered a discrepancy between the checked marked as exhibit and the check described in the information. The information filed by the public prosecutor described the check as FEBTC Check No. 364903 dated 12 May 1993 in the amount of P100,000 payable to Equitable Banking Corporation. However, the parties, including the lower courts, overlooked the fact that the check being identified in court was different from that described in the information. The prosecution marked as its Exhibit "B" FEBTC Check No. 369403 (not FEBTC Check No. 364903), dated 12 May 1993 in the amount of P100,000 payable to Equitable Banking Corporation. The issue as to the identity of the check, though not raised as an error, should according to the Court, be considered in favor of the accused. The variance in the identity of the check nullifies the conviction of the accused. The identity of the check enters into the first element of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. Big. 22 — that a person draws or issues a check on account or for value. There being a discrepancy in the identity of the checks described in the information and that presented in court, petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged will be violated if his conviction is upheld. 5. Where the date of the check and the amount thereof as stated in the information vary with the exhibits submitted by the prosecution, the inconsistencies violate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed. Without a sufficient identification of the dishonored check in the information, the

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conviction of the accused should be set aside (Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA 465). 6. A violation of the right under discussion is exemplified by Gutierrez v. Hernandez, 524 SCRA 1, June 8, 2007, where the judge set a criminal case for arraignment and hearing knowing fully well that no preliminary investigation had been conducted and no information had yet been filed before his court. He justified his actions as "pursuant to his judicial functions as presiding judge..." Calling the act as "a clear display of x x x," the Court declared said act as having clearly violated the right of the accused to due process, to be informed of the accusation against him, and to have a copy of the Information before arraignment (Gutierrez v. Hernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1628, June 8, 2007). 7. In yet another case, the petitioners were charged with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1992) before the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan. The information did not allege that the alleged felonious act of the petitioners was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things. In other words, the information was only for simple carnapping the penalty for which under Sec. 14 of the law shall not exceed seventeen years and four months. After trial, petitioners were sentenced to suffer the penalty of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years imprisonment, a penalty in excess of that provided for simple carnapping. The penalty meted is actually equivalent to the imprisonment imposable when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; The petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision with modification, as follows: xxx "MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants shall suffer the indeterminate prison term of SEVENTEEN YEARS AND FOUR MONTHS, as minimum, to THIRTY YEARS, as maximum." The petitioners moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied their motion. In the Supreme Court, the petitioners

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raised as error, among others, the imposition upon them of the penalty of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years. The petitioners also contended that assuming they were guilty of the crime charged, the penalty imposed by the lower courts was erroneous. They argue that the information failed to allege any circumstance that would warrant the imposition of a higher penalty. The Court agreed with the petitioners with respect to the erroneous penalty imposed. The Court noted that the information charging the petitioners with violation of R.A. No. 6539, as amended, did not allege that the carnapping was committed by means of violence against, or intimidation of, any person, or force upon things. While these circumstances were proven at the trial, they cannot be appreciated because they were not alleged in the information. Thus, the lower courts erred when they took these circumstances into account in imposing the penalty which they pegged at seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years imprisonment. In the absence of these circumstances, the charge against the petitioners is confined to simple carnapping whose imposable penalty should have been imprisonment for not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, and not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months (Andres v. People, G.R. No. 185860, June 5,2009). 8. In implementing the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, the Rules of Court specifically require that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, including the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language, not necessarily the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged and the attendant qualifying and aggravating circumstances present, so that the accused can properly defend himself and the court can pronounce judgment. To broaden the scope of the right, the Rules authorize the quashal, upon motion of the accused, of an information that fails to allege the acts constituting the offense (Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 178429, October 23,2009).

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9. Does conviction for the sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) violate the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and causes of the accusations against him if the fact that was established and proven during trial was the sale and possession of ephedrine, a regulated drug? The Supreme Court answered in the negative, ruling that the chemical formula of ephedrine is CIO H15 NO, whereas that of methamphetamine is CIO H15 N. The only difference between ephedrine and methamphetamine is the presence of a single atom of oxygen in the former. The removal of the oxygen in ephedrine will produce methamphetamine. With ephedrine containing fifty percent (50%) of methamphetamine hydrochloride if the oxygen content in the former is removed, the nearly 680 grams of ephedrine seized from the appellant contains about 340 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride. The offenses designated in the Informations are for violations of Sections 15 and 16 of R.A. 6425, which define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and possession of regulated drugs. The allegations in the Informations for the unauthorized sale and possession of "shabu" or methamphetamine hydrochloride are immediately followed by the qualifying phrase "which is a regulated drug." Thus, it is clear that the designations and allegations in the Informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs. Ephedrine has been classified as a regulated drug by the Dangerous Drugs Board in Board Resolution No. 2, Series of 1988. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, can be applied by analogy in convicting the appellant of the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes proved. Under these provisions, an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. At any rate, a minor variance between the information and the evidence does not alter the nature of the offense, nor does it determine or qualify the crime or penalty, so that even if a discrepancy exists, this cannot be pleaded as a ground for acquittal. In other words, his right to be informed of the charges against him has not

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been violated because where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime, but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein. (People of the Philippines v. Joselito Noque y Gomez, G.R. No. 175319, January 15,2010). 10. When the counsel of the accused actively participated in the proceedings this indicates that the accused was fully aware of the charges against him, otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of the blunder (People v. Pangilinan, 518 SCRA 358). But the failure to file a motion to quash the information cannot amount to a waiver of the constitutional right to be informed (Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, 413 SCRA 385). Right to counsel of the accused and of persons arrested, detained or under custodial investigation; Republic Act No. 7438 (Bar 1990; 1991; 1998; 2002)

1. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of counsel to an accused (Sec. 14[2]), Article III, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines). Under Sec. 1(c) of Rule 115, the accused has the right to "x x x defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment" (Italics supplied). "In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel" (Hilario v. People, G.R. No. 161070, April 14,2008). 2. One need not however, be an accused to avail of the right to counsel and the right to counsel does not commence only during the trial. Every person under custody of the law enjoys the right. Republic Act No. 7438 (Sec. 2) provides that "Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel."

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Meaning of custodial investigation; extended meaning 1. Custodial investigation is the stage "where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements" (People v. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624). (Bar 2006)

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements, that the rule begins to operate (Aquino v. Paiste, G.R. No. 147782, June 25,2008). 2. Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7438 has however, redefined the concept of 'custodial investigation' and has extended this constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning. Specifically, Sec. 2 of R.A. 7438 provides that "custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the 'inviting' officer for any violation of law (Sec. 2[ff, R.A. 7438). Rights of persons under custodial investigation; custodial investigation report

1. Republic Act No. 7438 provides for the following requisites for a valid custodial investigation report: (a) officer;

The report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating

(b) If the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel in the language or dialect known to such arrested

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or detained person. This is to be done before the report is signed. If this procedure is not done, the investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever (Sec. 2[c], RA. 7438). 2. The importance of the right to counsel is so vital that under existing law, "In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code" (Sec. 3[c]), RA. 7438). Republic Act No. 7438 also clearly mandates that a counsel "shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation x x x" (Sec. 2[b], RA. 7438). The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting a confession (People v. Duefias, Jr., 426 SCRA 666). 3. Even a person under investigation for an offense has the right to have a "competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice." Included in this right is the right to be informed of his right to counsel (Sec. 12[1], Art. Ill, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines; Sec. 2[b], RA. 7438). The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a confession that leads suspects to make self- incriminating statements. In order to comply with the constitutional mandate, there should likewise be meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the suspect, as opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof (People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596, April 4, 2007). The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed (People v. Guillermo, 420 SCRA 326).

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Failure to inform the suspect of her right to counsel during custodial investigation attains significance only if the person under investigation makes a confession in writing without aid of counsel and which is then sought to be admitted against the accused during the trial. In such case, the tainted confession obtained in violation is inadmissible in evidence against the accused (Eugenio v. People 549 SCRA 433). 4. The suspect must also be advised that he has the option to reject the counsel provided for him by the police authorities, which fact must similarly appear in the extrajudicial confession. Where the participation of a lawyer in the proceedings was confined to the notarization of the suspect's confession, the same is not considered, in legal contemplation, the kind of legal assistance that should be accorded to the suspect (People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596). 5. Aside from the rule that the counsel must be competent and independent and preferably the choice of the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer is "any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes" (Sec. 3, RA. 7438). 6. Jurisprudence supports the view that a mere inquiry on the commission of a crime by law enforcement authorities does not automatically trigger the application of the right to counsel. "x x x It is only after the investigation ceased to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements, that the Miranda Rule begins to operate, though R.A. No. 7438 has extended this constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning" (Aquino v. Paiste, 555 SCRA 255, June 25, 2008). The moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the

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latter should, at this juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel (People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596). 7. A police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest since the accused at that stage is not yet being investigated. In the line-up, the right to counsel does not yet attach (People v. Tolentino, 423 SCRA 448). 8. It has also been held that a barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Art. Ill of the Philippine Constitution. Thus, a suspect's uncounselled statement before the barangay chairman is admissible (People v. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374). 9. The right to counsel applies in certain pre-trial proceedings that can be deemed "critical stages" in the criminal process like in a preliminary investigation. This investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution (People v. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624). Right to choose a counsel is not plenary; right may be waived

1. There is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio is appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte, or in this case the regular counsel de oficio, pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system. The choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded from appointing a de oficio counsel, which it considers competent and independent, to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused, to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case (People v. Siongco, G.R. No. 186472, July 5,2010).

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2. The right to counsel may be waived but to insure that the waiver is voluntary and intelligent, the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of the counsel of the accused (People v. Del Castillo, 439 SCRA 601). The right to a competent and independent counsel is one of the rights of the accused guaranteed under Sec. 12(1) of Art. Ill of the Philippine Constitution. As the proviso declares: " xx x These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.3* Competent and independent counsel

1. The meaning of "competent counsel" and its standards were explained in People v. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 as follows: "The lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would be merely giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, th[e] Court stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel "contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition." Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many

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areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. x x x The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview CPeople v. Rapeza, G.R. No. 169431, April 3,2007). 2. Lumanog, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 182555, September 7, 2010 states: "The modifier competent and independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer (People v. Suela, 373 SCRA 163; People v. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626, People v. Santos, 283 SCRA 443). An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent" (People v. Labatan, 320 SCRA 140). Citing previous decisions, Lumanog further declares: "The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The lawyer's role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent

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counsel. Where the prosecution failed to discharge the State's burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value (People v. Peralta, 426 SCRA 472, citing People v. Binamird, 277 SCRA 232; People v. Ordono, 334 SCRA 673; People v. Rodriguez, 341 SCRA 645, 653; People v. Rayos, 351 SCRA 336, 344; and People v. Patungan, 354 SCRA 413; Lumanog, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 182555, September 7,2010). 3. An extrajudicial confession executed by a suspect assisted by a counsel who failed to meet the exacting standards of an independent and competent counsel is deemed an un- counseled confession and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence (People v. Tomaquin, 435 SCRA 23). 4. In the case of People v. Bermas, 306 SCRA 135 three PAO lawyers were assigned to an accused who was charged with raping his own daughter. The records show that the first lawyer without sufficient reason did not cross-examine the private complainant and thus, effectively waived the right to cross-examination. He subsequently asked to be relieved of his duties as counsel. The second lawyer who was appointed by the court, missed several dates and could no longer be located. A third reluctant lawyer was appointed by the court and later ceased to appear for the accused. This Court held that: "The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case and his knowing

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the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation" (People v. Nadera 324 SCRA 490). 5. Where the participation of the lawyer in the proceedings was confined to the notarization of the suspect's confession, the same is not considered, in legal contemplation, the kind of legal assistance that should be accorded to the suspect (People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596). 6. The right to counsel involves more than the mere presence of a lawyer. It means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation (People v. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624). Right to counsel in administrative cases

1. There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be assisted by counsel in an administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of counsel is not indispensable in administrative proceedings (Perez v. People, G.R. No. 164763, February 12,2008). 2. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service (Perez v. People, G.R. No. 164763, February 12,2008; See also

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Lastimoso v. Asayo, 517 SCRA 522 and Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 11,563 SCRA293). Extrajudicial confessions; rights of persons under custodial investigation (Bar 2006) 1. A confession is admissible in evidence if it is satisfactorily shown to have been obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution (People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596, April 3,2007).

2.

Section 12, Art. Ill thereof states in part, to wit:

"SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. "(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited." (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him." "(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as compensation for the rehabilitation of victims of tortures or similar practices, and their families." 3. The extrajudicial confession must also be tested for voluntariness, that is, if it was given freely by the confessant without any form of coercion or inducement (People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596, April 3,2007). The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details — which could only

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be supplied by the accused — reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary. A confession is not voluntary if the alleged confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the investigators themselves (People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596, April 4,2007). 4. The practice of inducing suspects to sign receipts for property allegedly confiscated from their possession is unusual and violative of the constitutional right to remain silent as when the accused was made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by signing a receipt and to sign a receipt for the P20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried marijuana leaves he sold to a police officer. Obviously, in a situation like this, the accused was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is a violation of the constitutional right of the accused to remain silent whereby he was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence. The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative of appellant's custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the manner by which the raiding team conducted the search of appellant's residence (People v. Del Castillo, 439 SCRA 601; People vs. Casimiro, G.R. No. 146277, June 20, 2002). (Bar 2009) 5. Republic Act No. 7438 (Sec. 2[d]) provides for the following requisites for the validity of an extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation: (a) It shall be in writing and signed by the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation; (b) It must be signed in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver;

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(c) In the event of a valid waiver, it must be signed in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him. If there is any waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the waiver must: (a) be in writing; and (b) signed by the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation; and (c) such person must sign the waiver in the presence of his counsel. If the above is not complied with, "the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect" (Sec. 2[e], RA. 7438). Thus, even if the police officers claimed that upon arresting the accused, they informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the right to a competent and independent counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided with one, any waiver of his rights could not have been valid since these rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel. The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating statements (Lumanog, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 182555, September 7, 2010). 6. Admissions under custodial investigation made without the assistance of counsel are barred as evidence. A suspect's confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when tak

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en without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of such coercion, the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if such confession were gospel truth (People v. Ador, 432 SCRA 1). 7. Summarizing jurisprudential and statutory pronouncements, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing (People v. Bagnate, 428 SCRA 633; People v. Rapeza, G.R. No. 169431, April 3, 2007; People v. Tuniaco, G.R. No. 185710, January 19,2010). 8. Assuming that all constitutional and statutory safeguards have been complied with, "An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti" (Sec. 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court). 9. While the Supreme Court has consistently stricken out the extrajudicial confession extracted in violation of constitutionally enshrined rights and declared it inadmissible in evidence, the accused will not be entitled to an acquittal if his conviction was not based on the evidence obtained during such custodial investigation and if even without the extrajudicial confession of the accused, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record could establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Lumanog, G.R. No. 182555, September 7, 2010). 10. The accused's confession to a ubantay bayan" is inadmissible in evidence if the same was done without the assistance of his lawyer and without waiver of his right to counsel (People v. Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010). The Supreme Court held in this case that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the

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local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level and any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Section 12, Article III, of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken without counsel was inadmissible in evidence (People v. Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010). Right to speedy trial; speedy disposition of cases (Bar 1996; 2002; 2007)

1. The right to a speedy trial is explicitly guaranteed by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. Thus " x x x In criminal cases, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to have a speedy, impartial and public trial x x x" (See People v. Anonas, G.R. No. 156847, January 21,2007). The same right is echoed and reinforced in Sec. 1(h) of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court declaring that one of the rights of an accused at trial is "To have a speedy, impartial and public trial." Nowhere is the guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases more significant and meaningful than in criminal cases where not only the fortune, but the life and liberty of the accused as well, are at stake (Cabarles v. Maceda, 516 SCRA 303). On the other hand, the right to a speedy disposition of cases is provided for under Section 16, Article III, of the Constitution which provides that, "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies 2. This right to a speedy trial has consistently been defined by the Court substantially "as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its purpose being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt

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determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose." It bears stressing that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, it is a flexible concept. Due regard must be given to the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial," "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory (Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154155, August 6,2008; Lumanog, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 182555, September 7,2010). The right does not preclude justifiable postponements and delay when warranted by the situation. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case (Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, 476 SCRA 496). Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial. A genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration before ruling on important questions, and a zealous regard for the just administration of law are some of the qualities of a good trial judge, which are more important than a reputation for hasty disposal of cases (Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong, A.M. No. 08- 19-SB-J, April 12, 2011 citing State Prosecutors v. Muro, 251 SCRA 111). +1

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3. Under the Constitution, the right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice (Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154155, August 6,2008). 4. The essence of the judicial function is that justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay (Re: Complaint Against Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals, 518 SCRA 512). When right to speedy disposition of cases is violated

1. It has been held that the right to speedy disposition of cases is considered violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible (Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 424 SCRA 236; Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA 121; Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 440 SCRA 423; Cabarles v. Maceda, 516 SCRA 303; Tilendo v. Ombudsman, 533 SCRA 331, September 13, 2007; Gaas v. Mitmug, G.R. No. 165776, April 30, 2008; Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, April 21,2009). 2. Although courts have reiterated time and time again that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy his right to a speedy trial, the rule finds itself violated in some instances. People v. Anonas, G.R. No. 156847, January 31,2007, for example is one case which aptly demonstrates a clear disregard of the right. Here, the respondent, a police officer assigned to the Western Police District, was apprehended by his colleagues during a raid in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The apprehending police officers claimed that he and four other persons were sniffing methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as

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shabu, a regulated drug, and that he was in possession of an unlicensed .38. caliber revolver. Two separate informations were filed against the respondent, one for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and another for illegal possession of firearm. Respondent filed with the trial court a motion for reinvestigation on grounds that he was apprehended without a warrant of arrest and that no preliminary investigation was conducted. The trial court granted the motion and a prosecutor was designated to conduct the reinvestigation who was later appointed judge of the RTC in Iloilo. Apparently, he did not inform the prosecutor who took his place about the pending reinvestigation. Meanwhile, respondent has remained in detention. Almost five years after, the respondent filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the informations, contending that the delay in the reinvestigation violated his right to due process. The trial court heard the motion to dismiss. It turned out that the prosecutor who took over the case was not aware of the pending reinvestigation. The trial court then directed him to terminate the reinvestigation within thirty (30) days. Within the period granted him, the prosecutor manifested before the trial court that the reinvestigation had been terminated and that evidence exist to sustain the allegations in the informations against respondent. The trial court then issued an Order denying respondent's motion to dismiss the informations. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to dismiss both informations. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the Order of the trial court and dismissed the criminal charges against respondent. The Court of Appeals ruled that having been made to wait for the resolution of his motion for reinvestigation for almost five years while being detained, the right of respondent to due process was violated. The Court of Appeals

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then ordered that respondent be released from custody. The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, moved for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same. Citing previous cases, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that accused persons are guaranteed a speedy trial by the Bill of Rights and that such right is denied when an accused person, through the vacillation and procrastination of prosecuting officers, is forced to wait many months for trial. It called on all courts to be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of the courts to see to it that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody of the law. "The preliminary investigation of the respondent for the offenses charged took more than four years. He was apprehended for the offenses charged on November 19, 1996. Having been arrested without a warrant of arrest and not having been afforded a formal investigation, he prayed for reinvestigation of the cases. The trial court, in an Order dated January 28,1997 ordered a reinvestigation which was terminated only on February 16, 2001. In fact, even the Solicitor General admitted it took some time for the City Prosecutor to terminate and resolve the reinvestigation. There can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by the delay, having to be confined for more than four oppressive years for failure of the investigating prosecutors to comply with the law on preliminary investigation. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals, respondent's right to due process had been violated." 3. In Angcangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA. 301, the Court found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases (Cited in People v. Anonas, supra). 4. In Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, 307 SCRA 149, it was held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discre

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tion in not quashing the Information filed six years after the initiatory complaint, thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case (People v. Anonas, supra). 5. Similarly, in Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman, 307 SCRA 104, the Court ruled that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him. The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation of an accused violates his constitutional right to due process. Thus, in Roque v. Sandiganbayan, 307 SCRA 104, the Court, restating the pronouncement in Ta- tad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70, held: We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.

Not only under the broad umbrella of due process clause, but under the constitutional guaranty of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of

the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and fac- '

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tual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving [of] unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case (Emphasis supplied; People v. Anonas, supra).

6. A judge's illness should not be an excuse for his failure to render the corresponding decision or resolution within the prescribed period. The demands of public service cannot abide by his illness. In case of poor health, the judge concerned needs only to ask the Supreme Court for an extension of time to decide cases, as soon as it becomes clear to him that there would be delay in his disposition of cases (Balajedeong v. Del Rosario, 524 SCRA 13). 7. Also, the designation of a judge to preside over another sala is an insufficient reason to justify delay in deciding a case (Bernaldez v. Avelino, 527 SCRA 11). A heavy work load due to additional work, as acting presiding judge in other courts, is not sufficient justification for the delay because judges are allowed, upon motion or letter-request, extensions of the reglementary period in deciding cases (Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in MTCs of Bayom- bong & Solano & MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, 535 SCRA 224). 8. The absence of a branch clerk of court should not affect the prompt disposition of cases. It is the duty of the judge to recommend to the Supreme Court the immediate appointment of a branch clerk of court (Office of the Court Administrator v. Laron, 527 SCRA 45). Even the non-submission of the transcript of stenographic notes by stenographers would not relieve judges of their duty to render a decision within the required period as judges are directed to take down notes of salient portions of the hearing and proceed in the preparation of decisions without waiting for the transcribed stenographic notes (Office of the Court Administrator v. Janolo, Jr.

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534 SCRA 262). The incompleteness of the transcript of stenographic notes is not a ground for delay (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, 536 SCRA 313). 9. The defects in a motion are not reasons for a judge not to act on the same. If a judge believes that the motions pending before him were defective, he could have simply acted on the said motions and indicated the supposed defects instead of just leaving them unresolved (Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2170, December 16, 2009). Purpose of time limits set by law or the rules; principle of speedy trial is a relative term

As a general principle, rules prescribing the .time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business (Balajedeong v. Del Rosario, 524 SCRA 13; Galanza v. Trocino, 529 SCRA 200). As a rule, failure to resolve cases within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of the Constitution (Petallar v. Pullos, 419 SCRA 434). It is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions (Office of the Court Administrator v. Legaspi, Jr., 512 SCRA 570; Re: Complaint Against Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals, 518 SCRA 512; Pacquing v. Gobarde, 521 SCRA 464; Office of the Court Administrator v. Go, 534 SCRA 156). An unwarranted slow down in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute (Biggel v. Pamintuan, 559 SCRA 344). Various decisions like Olbes v. Buemio, G.R. No. 173319, December 4, 2009, have held that the principle of "speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily involves a degree of flexibility. Thus, in spite of the prescribed time limits,

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jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of "speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept and that while justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. The Court explained that it cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice hence, a balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation (Olbes v. Buemio, G.R. No.173319, December 4, 2009). The Supreme Court in Jacob v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010, emphasized that "the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure also include provisions that ensure the protection of such right" like Section 1(h) of Rule 115 which provides that the accused shall have the right to a "speedy, impartial, and public trial." Also, Sec. 2 of Rule 119 further provides that "x x x Trial, once commenced, shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause." Citing previous decisions, the Court however, cautioned that the concept of speedy trial "is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered, in view of the entirety of the proceedings. Indeed, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum." In Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009, no objection was interposed by his defense counsel when at

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the preliminary hearing the prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for the other two cases against the petitioner and not on the case where he claims a violation of his right to speedy trial. His failure to object to the prosecution's manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. In fact, petitioner's acquiescence is evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial presentation of the People's evidence in the other cases. In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee. More importantly, in failing to interpose a timely objection to the prosecution's manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto. The Court hence, found that there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioner's right to speedy trial (Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009). Remedy for a violation of the right to speedy trial

1. The trial court may dismiss a criminal case on a motion nolle prosequi if the accused is not brought to trial within the prescribed time and is deprived of his right to a speedy trial or disposition of the case on account of unreasonable or capricious delay caused by the prosecution (Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA 294). 2. A dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to an acquittal and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal is with the consent of the accused. It would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense (Condrada v. People, 398 SCRA 482; Esmena v. Pogoy, G.R. No. 54110, February 20, 1981). To exercise the right to speedy trial, the accused should ask for the trial of the case first instead of moving for its dismissal outrightly. If the prosecution cannot produce its witnesses or evidence and its

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motion for postponement is denied, then the accused should move for the dismissal of the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal (People v. Cacdac, L-45650, March 29,1982). Factors for granting continuance

1. The factors, among others, which a justice or judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance are as follows: (a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice. (b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this Act (Sec. 11, Speedy Trial Act). 2. No continuance under letter "f' of Section 10 of the Act shall be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor (Sec. 11, Speedy Trial Act). Guidelines to determine violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases; balancing test

1. In determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the Court has laid down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay (Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154155, August 6, 2008; Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, April 21,2009; Olbes v. Buemio, G.R. No.173319, December 4, 2009). 2. The above guidelines are confirmations of the guidelines declared in the famous American case of Barker< v.

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Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), a case in which the United States Supreme Court concededly made the most comprehensive discussion of the right to speedy trial. Here, the petitioner and his alleged accomplice, were accused and tried with the murder of an elderly couple in a county in Kentucky. Since the prosecution believed that it had a stronger case against the petitioner's co-accused, it presented evidence against the latter first who was tried ahead of the petitioner. It was the hope of the prosecution that after his conviction he would be utilized as a witness against the petitioner. The co-accused was tried several times because of hung juries and a series of appeals. When he was convicted and it was time to hold the trial for the petitioner, the chief investigating officer became ill and could not testify. In all, the petitioner had waited more than five years for his trial. He then raised the issue of the violation of his right to a speedy trial. The U.S. Supreme Court held that determinations of whether or not the right to a speedy trial has been violated or denied must be made on a case to case basis. Accordingly: "A defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial can be determined only on an ad hoc basis in which the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant are weighed and balanced; among factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right are length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." It proceeded to explain that none of the factors mentioned is by itself determinative. All must be considered and weighed together under what is now known as the "balancing test." While it appeared that in Barker, the delays were due to continuances or postponements initiated by the prosecution, the petitioner failed to timely assert his right to a speedy trial. The records show that he raised his right only after a series of sixteen (16) continuances made by the prosecution. Coupled with the absence of a showing that he was actually prejudiced, the U.S. Supreme Court held that despite the delays, the petitioner's right to a speedy trial has not been violated.

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3. In Perez v. People, G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008, the accused claimed a violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case because the decision of the Sandigan- bayan was handed down after the lapse of more than twelve years. "The years that he had to wait for the outcome of his case were allegedly spent in limbo, pain and agony." The Court rejected the contention of the petitioner finding no serious prejudice caused upon him by the alleged delay. The Court likewise found that the petitioner himself did not want a speedy disposition of his case. Petitioner was duly represented by counsel de parte in all stages of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan until his conviction The records do not however, show that petitioner has filed any motion or manifestation which could be construed even remotely as an indication that he wanted his case to be dispatched without delay. For this, the Court concluded that the petitioner "has clearly slept on his right." The Court further explained that "the matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those twelve years, petitioner had shown signs of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or at least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that he was not waiving that right." Approaches to speedy trial

Perez v. People heavily relied on Barker v. Wingo in disposing of the issue of speedy trial declaring that in that case the United States Supreme Court was confronted for the first time with two "rigid approaches" on speedy trial, namely as "ways of eliminating some of the uncertainty which courts experience protecting the right." These are: (a) The "fixed-time period" which holds the view that the Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time period. (b) The "demand-waiver rule9 which provides that a defendant waives any consideration of his right to speedy trial for any period prior to which he has not demanded trial. Under this rigid approach, a prior de

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mand is a necessary condition to the consideration of the speedy trial right. "The fixed-time period was rejected because there is no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial can be quantified into a specific number of days or months." The demand-waiver rule was likewise rejected because aside from the fact that it is inconsistent with this Court's pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights, "it is insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental." xxx The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the 'balancing test* in which the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed. The test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis where courts should assess and identify certain factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. xxx The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge. Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper

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the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. We have already discussed the third factor, the defendant's responsibility to assert his right. Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. The defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown."

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The privilege against self-incrimination (Bar 1996; 1998; 2004; 2005)

1.

The privilege is expressed in the following provisions:

(a) "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself" (Sec. 17, Art. Ill, Philippine Constitution).

(b) "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights x x x (e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself" (Sec. l[e], Rule 115, Rules of Court). 2. The privilege is intended to prevent the State, with all its coercive powers, from extracting from the suspect testimony that may convict him and to avoid a person subject to such compulsion to perjure himself for his own protection (People v. Besonia, 422 SCRA 210). 3. "The privilege rests upon the principle that "forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with 'the fundamentals of a republican government;' that [i]t may suit the purposes of despotic power but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom, x x x The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, was not uncommon even in England. While the admissions of confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press, the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state tri

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als, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment CBrown v. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed., 819, 821V Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in the early days "in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack." An old Philippine case [1904] speaks of this constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the United States;" as having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person;" and as having been adopted in the Philippines "to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the offenses with which they were charged." So it is then that this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court;' it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court of the United States (January 29,1968), speaking thru Mr. Justice Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted." xxx

Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may

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a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will" (Cited in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29169, August 19,1968; Citations omitted; Underscoring supplied). 4. The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time (People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7,1989; U.S. v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424). The assertion of the privilege against self incrimination must be raised in response to each specific inquiry or it is waived. Each assertion of the privilege rests on its own circumstances. Blanket assertions of the privilege are not permitted (See, United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (5th Cir. 1979). 5. The right prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty (People v. Ayson, G.R. Nol 85215, July 7,1989).

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The privilege applies only to natural persons 1. Does the term "person" include juridical persons? In other words, may juridical persons invoke the right against self-incrimination?

The U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694 has construed the right in the following terms: "The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals." Because it is a personal privilege, the papers and effects which the privilege protects must be the private property of the person claiming the privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity. Hence, stated U.S. v. White, a labor union official cannot refuse to produce books and records of the union in his custody and required by the court to be produced. He cannot invoke the privilege against self-incrimination by contending that the production of the books and records would tend to incriminate himself and the organization. 2. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 had a similar interpretation when it ruled that since corporate existence implies amenability to legal powers, a subpoena duces tecum may be directed to a corporation which is under a duty to produce records, books, and papers in its possession when they may be properly required in the administration of justice. An individual may not invoke the privilege to refuse to produce corporate records when the subpoena is directed to the corporation. Wilson adds that a subpoena duces tecum which is suitably specific and properly limited in its scope does not violate the unreasonable search and seizure provisions of the constitution; the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be raised by a corporate officer having possession of corporate documents for his personal benefit. A case decided after U.S. v. White sustained the conviction for contempt of the petitioner who testified that she had been the Treasurer of the Communist Party of Denver and had

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been in possession of its records, which she later had turned over to another person. When asked to identify the person to whom she had delivered the records, she refused the order of the court. When she was charged with contempt, she asserted her privilege against self-incrimination. Her claim of privilege was overruled and she was convicted of contempt (Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367). Rogers held that since the privilege against self-incrimi- nation is solely for the benefit of the witness, petitioner's original refusal to answer could not be justified by a desire to protect another from punishment, much less to protect another from interrogation by a grand jury. Also, books and records kept in a representative, capacity cannot be the subject of the privilege against self-incrimination, even though production of them might tend to incriminate their keeper personally since the books were not held in a personal capacity. The privilege protects a person from testimonial compulsion or evidence of a communicative nature

1. The famous case of Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, held that the privilege against self-incrimination protects a person only from testimonial compulsion or a compelled testimony of a communicative nature without however, declaring that the privilege applies only to cases where a testimonial evidence is extracted from the lips of the witness or from a strictly oral testimony. Schmerber originated from an automobile accident involving the petitioner who was driving a car. A police officer who smelled liquor on his breath and noticed he was drunk, placed him under arrest and informed him of his Miranda rights. A physician was directed by the officer to extract a blood sample from petitioner despite the petitioner's refusal. The chemical analysis of the blood sample indicated an intoxication which subsequently became the basis for his conviction for driving while intoxicated and the chemist's report was admitted in evidence despite his objection. He was convicted and said conviction was affirmed on appeal. The appellate court rejected

CHAPTER VII RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (Rule 115)

his claim of denial of the privilege against self-incrimination, among others. Deciding on whether or not the withdrawal of the blood sample and the admission in evidence of the analysis involved in this case violated petitioner's privilege, the Court emphatically held that "the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial of a communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends." xxx "In the present case, however, no such problem of application is presented. Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical analysis. Petitioner's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone. Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds." 2. In a case decided before Schmerber, the U.S. Supreme Court in Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 was confronted with the question whether or not the accused prior to trial, could be required to wear a particular clothing over his protest to facilitate his identification by the witness. The accused contended that to submit to the demand of authorities is to violate the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court rejected the claim describing the same as "based upon an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment." The Court went on to state: "[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of

401

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the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The objection in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in proof." 3. In U.S v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, the accused was placed in a lineup in which each person was made to wear strips of tape on his face, as the robber allegedly had done, and, on direction, repeated words like those the robber allegedly had used. Two bank employees identified the accused as the perpetrator both in the line up and in the trial. Urging that the conduct of the lineup violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination the accused sought for his acquittal. The trial court convicted the accused. The Wade court explained that neither the lineup itself nor anything required therein violated respondent's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since merely exhibiting his person for observation by witnesses and using his voice as an identifying physical characteristic involved no compulsion of the accused to give evidence of a testimonial nature against himself. "The Fifth Amendment protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature...." The Court explained further that the prohibition compelling a person to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material and that "compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person for observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial significance. It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have. It is no different from compelling Schmerber to provide a blood sample or Holt to wear the blouse, and, as in those instances, is not within the cover of the privilege. Similarly, compelling Wade to speak

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within hearing distance of the witnesses, even to utter words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not compulsion to utter statements of a "testimonial" nature; he was required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic, not to speak his guilt. We held in Schmerber, that the distinction to be drawn under the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination is one between an accused's "communications," in whatever form, vocal or physical, and "compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of real or physical evidence." The Court stressed: "x x x both federal and state courts have usually held that. . . [the privilege] offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photography, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. None of these activities becomes testimonial within the scope of the privilege xxx" (Underscoring supplied). 4. The principles explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in previous cases including that in Wade and Schmerber were applied to cases like United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 2, where the petitioner refused to comply with an order from a special grand jury to furnish it with samples of his voice recordings. It appeared that the grand jury received in evidence certain voice recordings that had been previously obtained through court orders. Dionisio and other witnesses refused to furnish the voice exemplars invoking, among others, the Fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The district Court later adjudged him in civil contempt due to his persistent refusal. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the contention that the compelled production of the voice exemplars would violate the Fifth Amendment since it has long been held that the compelled display of identifiable physical characteristics infringes no interest pro-

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tected by the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Citing Holt, the Court explained that "the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." Citing Schmerber, the Court once again declared that the privilege offers "no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture." 5. The early case of Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62, decided by the Philippine Supreme Court was decided on the theory that "the kernel of the privilege" was the prohibition against "testimonial compulsion and rejected the arguments of a woman accused of adultery that to compel her to submit to a physical examination to determine her pregnancy was a violation of her right against self-incrimination. 6. In United States v. Ong Siu Hong, (36 Phil. 735), the Court admitted in evidence morphine that was forced out of the mouth of the accused because it involved no testimonial compulsion. 7. In U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145, the Supreme Court rejected a claim of the privilege when the accused in a criminal action for acts of lasciviousness was stripped of his clothing after his arrest and in his body was found a substance consistent with gonorrhea, a disease from which his alleged seven-year old victim was suffering from. 8. In People v. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244, it was held that there is no infringement of the privilege when a person is required to put on clothings or shoes for size or for measuring or photographing. Neither is it a violation of the privilege to require a person to place his foot over a footprint found in the crime scene as held in U.S. v. Zara, 42 Phil. 308. 9. In Herrera v. Alba, 460 SCRA 197, the Court emphasized that obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case, will not

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violate the right against self-incrimination since the privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence. 10. Philippine decisions on the privilege against self- incrimination basically mirror those of their American counterparts although the former have been found to be more succinct and less susceptible to misinterpretations. Forced re-enactments

People v. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092, September 30, 1987, for instance, is an exemplar of a very lucid summary of the essence of the privilege when it declared that forced re-enact- ments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self- incrimination. Thus, all evidence based on such a re-enactment are to be deemed in violation of the Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence. Justice Sarmiento in People v. Olvis goes on to declare that the "constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion, but this has since been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature" acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This was the lesson learned from the ancient days of the inquisition in which accusation was equivalent to guilt. Thus, an act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution. People v. Olvis continues: "This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. This includes requiring the accused to submit to a test to extract virus from his body, or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his mouth or making her submit to a pregnancy test or a footprinting test, or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases. In each case, the accused does not

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speak his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore, that he be provided with the guiding hand of counsel. But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused is not merely required to exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal responsibility against his will. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession" (People v. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092, September 30,1987). Meaning of compulsion

Compulsion as it is understood does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." (State v. Wolfe, 266 N.W. 116,125 cited in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968). Writing exemplars or samples

1. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, the petitioner was convicted of armed robbery and the murder of a police officer by a jury which imposed the death penalty. The petitioner alleges that his conviction was attended by constitutional errors like, among others, in the admission of handwriting exemplars taken from him after arrest. The contention was brushed aside by the Court and held that the taking of handwriting exemplars did not violate petitioner's constitutional rights. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination reaches compulsory communications, but a mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast with the content of what is written, is an identifying physical characteristic outside its protection. 2. Under different set of facts, the Philippine Supreme Court in the 1929 case of Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570, ruled against the furnishing of written exemplars.

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Beltran stemmed from an order of the respondent judge requiring the petitioner to appear before the provincial fiscal to take a dictation in his own handwriting. The purpose of the order was for the court to have a basis for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and of determining whether or not it was he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. In a petition for prohibition, the petitioner sought to prevent the enforcement of the order by seeking refuge in the constitutional privilege against self- incrimination. The court explained in Beltran that as to its scope, the privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to the giving or furnishing of evidence. It went on to declare: "The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of crimes shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold. xxx "Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention: and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which

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does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier (Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570; Underscoring supplied). Comparing Beltran with Villaflor, the Court ratiocinated:" "In the case of Villaflor v. Summers (41 Phil. 62), it was plainly stated that the court preferred to rest its decision on the reason of the case rather than on blind adherence to tradition. The said reason of the case there consisted in that it was the case of the examination of the body by physicians, which could be and doubtless was interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner therein to furnish evidence by means of testimonial act. In reality she was not compelled to execute any positive act, much less a testimonial act; she was only enjoined from something preventing the examination; all of which is very different from what is required of the petitioner of the present case, where it is sought to compel him to perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparison. Besides, in the case of Villamor v. Summers, it was sought to exhibit something already in existence, while in the case at bar, the question deals with something not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously incriminate him." 3. Not every act of affixing one's signature is within the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination as the Court found in Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 109242, January 26,1999. In a petition for review after his conviction, the petitioner raised, as one of the issues on appeal the fact that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the letters signed by him because he was asked to sign them during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel and that his affixing of this signature during custodial investigation violated the constitutional provision that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."

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Petitioner's counsel argued that the signing of petitioner's and his co-accused's names was not a mere mechanical act but one which required the use of intelligence and therefore constitutes self-incrimination presumably having in mind, said the Court, the ruling in Beltran v. Samson "to the effect that the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against himself extends to any attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparing it with the handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and attention." The Court however, made a distinction between the use of the specimen handwriting in Beltran. In that case, the purpose was to show that the specimen handwriting matched the handwriting in the document alleged to have been falsified and thereby show that the accused was the author of the crime (falsification). In Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, the purpose for securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him..." Thus, the invocation of the right against self- incrimination was not upheld. In Marcelo however, the Court explained that when the signatures of the accused were affixed, such signatures were actually evidence of admission obtained from petitioner and his co-accused under circumstances constituting custodial investigation. Under the Constitution, among the rights of a person under custodial investigation is the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if the person cannot afford the services of counsel, that he must be provided with one. It is on this ground that the letters with the signature of the accused could be excluded. "However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The Letters were validly seized from petitioner x x x as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that petitioner's admission that the letters in question were those seized from

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him and his companion x x x is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of the crime validly seized during a lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the possession of petitioner and his companion and seized from them was shown by the testimonies x x x." Thus, in effect the Court meant that the signatures affixed were irrelevant to the admissibility of the letters as the items seized from the accused. Questions which the witness may refuse to answer

1. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, illustrates the wide ranging scope of the kinds of questions which a witness may refuse to answer. In this case, the petitioner refused to answer certain questions asked of him in a federal grand jury investigation pertaining to his occupation, the names of his contacts and the whereabouts of a person who is sought by the same grand jury and for whom a bench warrant has been issued. Despite the order for him to answer the questions, he refused and was subsequently convicted of contempt. In reversing the conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination extends not only to answers that would in themselves support a conviction but also to those which would furnish "a link in the chain of evidence" needed to prosecute the claimant of the privilege. To compel the petitioner to answer the questions as to his contacts and connections and his knowledge of the whereabouts of the witness being sought might have exposed him to the perils of a prosecution under existing laws on obstruction and conspiracy. Hoffman obviously accorded a liberal interpretation to the privilege and allowed a refusal to answer questions which may tend to incriminate the witness. Citing previously decided cases, Hoffman however, cautioned that this protection must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer. The witness is not exonerated from answiering merely because he declares that, in so doing he

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would incriminate himself. What he says does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if "it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken. However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, is to be required to prove the hazards posed by his answers he would actually be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked. The privilege should be sustained unless it clearly appears that the claim is mistaken, i.e., unless it is perfectly clear from careful consideration of all circumstances that the witness is mistaken and the answer cannot possibly have incriminating effect." 2. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, is an authority of the rule that it is not necessary that a witness explain how his answer will tend to incriminate him, since this would compel him to surrender the protection to which the privilege is designed to guarantee. The test for determining if the privilege is validly asserted was clearly set out in Malloy. It is: "To sustain the privilege, it need only be evidenced from the implication of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosures would result. In applying that test, the judge must be perfectly clear from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case that the witness is mistaken and that the answers cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate." Privilege extends to lawyers advising a witness to invoke the privilege

The issue is whether in a civil proceeding a lawyer may be held in contempt for counseling a witness in good faith to refuse to produce court-ordered materials on the ground that the materials may tend to incriminate the witness in another proceeding. It was held that the lawyer may not be penalized even though his advice caused the witness to disobey the court's order. To hold otherwise would deny the constitutional

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privilege against self-incrimination the means of its own implementation, since, when a witness is so advised the advice becomes an integral part of the protection accorded the witness by the Fifth Amendment (Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449). Persons who are mere custodians of documents cannot claim the privilege

1. In Fischer v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, certain taxpayers who were under investigation for possible violations of federal income tax laws, obtained from their respective accountants documents relating to the accountants' preparation of their tax returns. These were transferred by the taxpayers to their lawyers hired to assist them in the investigations. The lawyers refused to produce the documents when summoned by the Internal Revenue Service. The government filed suit to compel the production of the documents. Both the District Court ordered the summons enforced holding that the taxpayers had never acquired a possessory interest in the documents and that the documents were not immune from production in the attorney's hands. Fischer upheld the lower court. The compelled production of the documents in question from the attorneys did not implicate the privilege against self- incrimination. The Court explained that enforcement of the summons against the lawyers did not require or compel the taxpayers to perform an act and could not result in compelling the taxpayers to testify against themselves, the Fifth Amendment on the privilege against self-incrimination being limited to prohibiting the use of physical or moral compulsion against one who exercises the privilege. This is true even if the lawyers were agents of the taxpayers because the lawyers were not the accused. 2. In Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, the Court did not consider the subpoena of a taxpayer's records from his accountant directed to the latter as a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination of the accountant. It is the accountant who is compelled to do an act and he makes no claim that he may tend to be incriminated by the production.

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Neither does the subpoena implicate a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination of the taxpayer since the subpoena and the demand for the information sought was directed to the accountant and not the taxpayer. In the present case, no "shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused" is involved. Proceedings in which the privilege may be asserted

1. The privilege can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory (Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449; Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441). Privilege against self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment "applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it" (McCarthy v. Amdstein, 266 U.S. 34). The right is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding (People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7,1989). The Philippine Supreme Court enunciated the same rule when it ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used (Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994, citing Kastigar vs. U.S., 406 US 441). 2. It is important to reiterate that privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him (Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322). 3. The meaning of the constitutional provision is not merely that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution against himself, but its object is to insure that a person shall not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony

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which may tend to show that he himself has committed a crime (Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547; Italics supplied). "xxx The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it (McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34; Underscoring supplied). Distinctions between the claim of the privilege by an accused and by a mere witness

1. The leading case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. L-29169, August 19, 1968, clearly spelled out the distinction between the scope of the privilege of an accused and that of an ordinary witness. Chavez stated that an accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may he compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial. In Chavez, the petitioner was the accused in a criminal case. He was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case allegedly to testify for the prosecution. He objected claiming refuge under the privilege of self-incrimination. The judge did not heed his protestations and asserted that "there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense counsel"could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." Because of the hard stance of the judge, petitioner had to take the stand.

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The Court in Chavez observed that in compelling the accused to take the stand, the judge also compelled the petitioner to create evidence against himself. Emphatically, the Court held that under the circumstances, the petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. Thus, it could not be considered that the petitioner has waived his right since he did not volunteer to take the stand and even in his own defense he did not offer himself as a witness. If the petitioner, observed the Court, nevertheless answered the questions, this was because of the fear of being accused of perjury or being put under contempt. His testimony therefore, was not of his own choice. In declaring that the circumstances clearly presented a case of compelled submission the Court described Chavez as "a cowed participant in the proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent" (Underscoring supplied). 2. The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself." In other words — unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him — the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him" (Italics supplied). xxx "It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of which he is accused, he may

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decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against self-incrimination x x x . Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular question which might implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say, estafa" (People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989). Waiver of the privilege

1. The privilege against self-incrimination may be waived. It is a rule that an accused may refuse to testify. However, if he testifies in his own behalf, he may be cross-examined on matters covered by the direct examination (Sec. l[d], Rule 115Rules of Court). 2. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim, a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence." A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Accordingly, courts do not presume a waiver of fundamental rights and in fact. The "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights (Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29169, August 19,1968). 3. In the case of Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 the petitioner had freely answered self-incriminating questions relating to her connection with the Communist Party. Having done so, the petitioner could not refuse to answer further questions which would possibly subject her to a danger of further incrimination. The privilege will not apply when witness is given immunity from prosecution

1. Under American common law, a witness maybe immunized from prosecution. Immunity from prosecution occurs

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when the government, under an authorizing law, grants immunity to a witness in exchange for a testimony favorable to the prosecution. This immunity embodies an understanding that the prosecutor essentially agrees to refrain from prosecuting the witness. The government may grant immunity in one of the two following two forms: (a) Transactional immunity also known as "blanket" or "total" immunity completely protects the witness from future prosecution for crimes related to his or her testimony; (b) "Use and derivative use" immunity prevents the prosecution only from using the witness's own testimony or any evidence derived from the testimony against the witness. However, should the prosecutor later on acquire evidence of a crime committed by the witness, independently of the witness's testimony, the witness may then be prosecuted for the crime (See Kastigar v. United States 406 U.S. 441). 2. Recognized in this jurisdiction is the American common law concept of statutory criminal immunity available to a witness. A Philippine Supreme Court decision categorizes the forms of immunity into: (a) transactional immunity; and (b)

use-and-derivative-use immunity.

Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction to which the testimony relates. In contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution (Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141675- 96, November 25, 2005). 3. Transactional immunity derives from common-law tradition, which gives greater deference to the weight of judicial precedents since the codification of laws by the legislature is atypical in practice. In our jurisdiction though, the definition of crimes and provision of criminal penalties are in-

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eluctably within the sole province of the legislative branch of government. It thus follows that this prerogative necessarily empowers the legislative to enact conditions under which a class of persons may be immune from criminal or civil prosecution. Since the legislature possesses sole discretion to enact statutes to such effect, it is not obliged to conform with judge- made standards, or even traditional modalities concerning the grant of criminal immunity. The solitary limitation on legislative grant of immunity, as with all other legislative acts, is adherence to the Constitution (Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141675-96, November 25,2005). Immunity statutes; examples

1. Immunity statutes seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify. The existence of these statutes reflects the importance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime (Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26,1994). 2. (a) The most well-known immunity provision is the one found in Article XVI, Section 3 which provides that "the State may not be sued without its consent." (b) Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution also grants parliamentary immunities. The provision reads: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." (c) Sec. 18[8], Art. XIII, of the Philippine Constitution provides that one of the powers and functions of the Commission on Human Rights is to "Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to

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determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority." (d) Sec. 17 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides for immunity, thus: XXX 'Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office. "Any refusal to appear or testify pursuant to the foregoing provisions shall be subject to punishment for contempt and removal of the immunity from criminal prosecution." (e) Sec. 5, Executive Order No. 14 as amended grants the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) the authority to grant immunity to informants or witnesses, thus: "Sec. 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such Commission, to establish the unlawful manner by which any respondent, defendant or accused has accumulated the property or properties in question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove his guilt or civil liability. The

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immunity granted thereby shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats the testimony before the Sandi- ganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the commission." (f) P.D. 749 provides immunity from prosecution for informants, thus: Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Articles 210, 211, 212 of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 3019, as amended; Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other provisions of the said codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned; and other laws, rules and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse; and who willingly testified, such violator shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his information and testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided, That this immunity may be enjoyed even in cases where the information and the testimony are given against a person who is not a public official but who is a principal or accomplice, or accessory in the commission of any of the above-mentioned violations: Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness notwithstanding that he offered or gave bribe or gift to the public official or is an accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving; And, Provided, finally, That the following conditions concur: i. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the above-mentioned provisions of law, rules and regulations; ii. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused public officer; iii. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State; iv. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; and

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v. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. (g) Republic Act 6981 also known as the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act provides in Sec. 12 thereof: "Section 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. — The certification of admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required not to include the Witness in the criminal complaint or information and if included therein, to petition the court for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a State Witness. The Court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused from the information. "Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used and all the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof." The right to defend himself; right to be heard

1. An accused is accorded the right to defend himself either in person or by counsel. As a consequence of such right, he has the right to be present at the trial at every stage of the proceedings from arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment (Sec. l[c], Rule 115, Rules of Court). Upon motion, the accused may be allowed by the court to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel (Sec. l[c], Rule 115, Rules of Court). 2. Pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, the accused has the right to waive his presence at the trial but he shall be required to be at the trial, if his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification (Sec. l[c], Rule 115, Rules of Court). 3. The waiver of the right of the accused to be present at the trial may be inferred from his absence without justifiable

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cause provided he had prior notice of the said trial (Sec. l[c], Rule 115, Rules of Court). 4. In case the accused is under custody and he escapes, his act shall be deemed to be a waiver to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained (Sec. lie], Rule 115, Rules of Court). 5. If the accused is absent during the trial after his arraignment, trial may proceed despite his absence provided that he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear is unjustified (Sec. 14[2], Art. Ill, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines). 6. When the accused filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the trial court, and the demurrer was eventually denied the trial court should give the accused the opportunity to present his evidence. To be denied the opportunity to be heard is procedurally unfair and a miscarriage of justice (People v. Alcanzado, 428 SCRA 681). Be it noted that under Sec. 23 [2nd par.] of Rule 119, "If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense." The right to testify as a witness

1. The accused has the right to testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by the direct examination (Sec. l[d], Rule 115, Rules of Court). 2. The questions that may be asked of the accused in a cross-examination is limited to the matters covered by the direct examination. This is in contrast to the much wider scope of the cross-examination of an ordinary witness (who is not the accused). Under Sec. 6 of Rule 132, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party not only as to any matter stated in the direct examination or those connected with the matters stated in the direct examination but the cross examiner is given "sufficient fullness and freedom" to ask questions that would test the accuracy and truthfulness of

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the witness, his freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse. The witness may even be asked questions for the purpose of eliciting all important facts bearing upon the issue even if they were not covered by his direct examination as long as the question has relevance to the issues of the case. 3. If the accused does not want to testify in his behalf and choses to remain silent, his silence "shall not in any manner prejudice him" (Sec. l[d], Rule 115, Rules of Court). The right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him

1. The right to confront the witnesses against him and cross-examine them are basic constitutional rights embodied in Sec. 14 (2) of Art. Ill of the Philippine Constitution.

2. The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her accuracy, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him (People v. Ortillas, 428 SCRA 659). 3. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. It is, however, equally true that the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record (Equitable PCI Banking Corporation v. RCBC Capital Corporation, G.R. No. 182248, December 18,

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2008; People v. Abatayo, 433 SCRA 562). The waiver to cross- examine may take various forms but jurisprudence suggests that a waiver may occur when the party fails to cross-examine the witnesses against him despite opportunity to do so. Thus, it was held that where a party has had the opportunity to cross examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record (Vertudes v. Buenaflor, 478 SCRA 210) because the right to cross- examination requires not really an actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross examine if desired (People v. Escote, Jr., 400 SCRA 603).

4. Under the present Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right of confrontation does not apply in a preliminary investigation. The investigating officer during preliminary investigation may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or witness. However, while the parties are allowed to be present at the hearing, they are "without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned" (Sec. 3[e], Rule 112, Rules of Court). 5. Where the adverse party is deprived of the right to cross-examine the persons who executed the affidavits, said affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay (Estrella v. Robles, Jr., 538 SCRA 60). In the absence of a cross-examination, the direct examination of the witness should be expunged from the records. If the witness is the lone witness, the trial court would not have a basis to deny a demurrer to evidence (People v. Ortillas, 428 SCRA 659). 6. If one is deprived of the opportunity to cross- examine without fault on his part, it is generally held that he is entitled to have the direct examination stricken from the record (People v. Sefieris, 99 SCRA 92).

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Right to use testimony of a deceased witness

1. Either party (the prosecution or the defense), may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, provided they involve the same parties and subject matter and the adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine him (Sec. l[f], Rule 115, Rules of Court). 2. A similar provision is found under the Rules of Evidence, as an exception to the rule which bars hearsay evidence. Thus, "The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him" (Sec. 47, Rule 130, Rules of Court). For the provision in Rule 130 to apply the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative between the same parties or representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case (Samalio v. Court of Appeals, 454 SCRA 462). Right to compulsory process

1. This right may be invoked by the accused to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of witnesses in his behalf. This is a constitutional right embodied in Sec. 14(2), Art. Ill of the Bill of Rights.

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2. In connection with this right, the accused may move the court for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to the provisions of Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. In case of the unjustified failure of the witness to comply, the court or judge issuing the subpoena, upon proof of the service of such subpoena and proof of his failure to attend, may issue a warrant for his arrest (Sec. 8, Rule 21, Rules of Court). Right to appeal

1. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner prescribed by law (Hilario v. People, 551 SCRA 191; Sec. l[i], Rule 115, Rules of Court). 2. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review and the appellate court may correct even unassigned errors (Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005; Guy v. People, G.R. Nos. 166794-96, March 20, 2009; People v. Montinola, 543 SCRA 412; People v. Jabiniax), Jr., 553 SCRA 769; Lao v. People, 556 SCRA 120; People v. Tambis, 560 SCRA 343). The above rule is in contrast to the rule in a civil case. In a civil case, as a rule, an unassigned error will not be considered by the appellate court unless such error affects the jurisdiction of the court, affects the validity of the judgment appealed from, or the error is closely related to or dependent upon the assigned error properly argued in the brief, or when the error is simply plain or clerical (Sec. 8, Rule 51, Rules of Court). 3. An established rule in appellate review is that the trial court's findings, its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from the actual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect (People v. Casta, 565 SCRA 341) unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been

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overlooked and, if considered, would affect the result (People v. Sison, 555 SCRA 156; People v. Tormis, 574 SCRA 903). Generally, the findings of the trial court relative to the credibility of the witness are normally respected and not disturbed on appeal (People v. Coja, 555 SCRA 176). - oOo -

CHAPTER VIII ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA (Rule 116) A. BASIC CONCEPTS Meaning and importance of arraignment (Bar 2007) 1. An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him (Brig Gen. [Ret.] Jose Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 172476- 99, September 15,2010).

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (People v. Pangilinan, 518 SCRA 358, March 14, 2007). Arraignment is not an empty ritual that should be taken lightly (Gamas v. Oco, 425 SCRA 588). 2. Arraignment is an indispensable requirement of due process. It consists of the judge's or the clerk of court's reading of the criminal complaint or information to the defendant. At this stage, the accused is granted, for the first time, the opportunity to be officially informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation. Thus, arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily (People v. Espinosa, 409 SCRA 256). 3. Without a prior arraignment, the accused cannot invoke double jeopardy (Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377). Note too that if the accused has not been arraigned, he

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cannot be tried in absentia (Sec. 14[2], Art. Ill, Philippine Constitution). Duty of the court before arraignment

1. Before arraignment, the court shall (a) inform the accused of his right to counsel; (b) ask him if he desires to have one; and (c) must assign a counsel de officio to defend him unless the accused (i) is allowed to defend himself in person; or (ii) has employed a counsel of his choice (Sec. 6, Rule 116, Rules of Court). This duty is mandatory and the only instance when the court can arraign without the benefit of counsel is if the accused waives such right and the court, finding the accused capable, allows him to represent himself in person. If the accused informs the court that he cannot afford a lawyer, and the court has not allowed the accused to represent himself or the accused is incapable of representing himself, the judge has the duty to appoint a counsel de oficio to give meaning and substance to the constitutional right of the accused to counsel (Gamas v. Oco, 425 SCRA 588). The insistence of the accused to be arraigned without representation is no reason for the judge to accede readily to his wishes (Gamas v. Oco, 425 SCRA 588). 2. The court shall appoint as counsel de officio members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. In localities where members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused (Sec. 7, Rule 116, Rules of Court). 3. The counsel de officio shall be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused as to his plea before proceeding with the arraignment (Sec. 8, Rule 116, Rules of Court). Options of the accused before arraignment and plea

1. Before arraignment and plea, the accused may avail of any of the following:

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(a) Bill of particulars — The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall (a) specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information, and shall (b) specify the details desired (Sec. 9, Rule 116, Rules of Court). If the accused for instance, finds the information defective as it bears only the month and year of the incident complained of, he should file a motion for bill of particulars, as provided under Rule 116, before he enters his plea (People v. Jalbuena, 526 SCRA 500, July 4, 2007). (b) Suspension of arraignment — Upon motion, the proper party may ask for the suspension of the arraignment in the following cases: (i) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose; Aside from suspension of the arraignment, the trial court is mandated to order the confinement of an accused who is mentally unsound at the time of the trial in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted (People v. Mala, 411 SCRA 327). (ii) There exists a prejudicial question; and (ill) There is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor which is pending at either the Department of Justice, or of the Office of the President. The period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office (Sec. 11, Rule 116, Rules of Court). Section 11(c), Rule 116, which directs the trial court to suspend the arraignment where there is a pending pe

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tition with the Department of Justice (DO J) or the Office of the President (OP), is qualified by the proviso stating that the period of suspension shall not exceed 60 days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office (See Adasa v. Abalos, 516 SCRA 261, February 19, 2007 for related reading). Jurisprudence is clear that with the arraignment of the accused, the DOJ Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal or petition for review because petitioner had already waived or abandoned the same (Gandarosa v. Flores, 527 SCRA 776, July 17,2007). (c) Motion to quash — At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the grounds provided for under Sec. 3 of Rule 117, in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 117. (d) Challenge the validity of arrest or legality of the warrant issued or assail the regularity or question the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge (Sec. 26, Rule 114, Rules of Court) — An objection against an arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused should be made at or before the arraignment, otherwise the objection is deemed waived (People v. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494; People v. Bagsit, 409 SCRA 350). The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during the trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto (Borlongan, Jr. v. Pena, G.R. No. 143591, May 5,2010 cited in Leviste v. Alameda, G.R. No. 182677, August 3,2010). The arraignment of the accused constitutes a waiver of the right to preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of probable cause (Adasa v. Abalos, 516 SCRA 261; Gandarosa v. Flores, 527 SCRA 776). 2. In a case, the Supreme Court rejected petitioner's contention that his second motion for reconsideration before

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the Ombudsman should have suspended his arraignment. According to the Supreme Court, the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman allows the filing of an information in court pending a motion for reconsideration of the finding of a probable cause; hence, if the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information. Petitioner failed to show any of the grounds for suspension of arraignment as provided under Sec. 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner's arraignment, as mandated by Sec. 7 of R.A. 8493 (Brig Gen. [Ret.] Jose Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 172476-99, September 15,2010). Plea made before a court with no jurisdiction

A plea made before a court that has no jurisdiction over the criminal action does not give rise to double jeopardy (Zapatos v. People, 411 SCRA 148). Arraignment under an amended information; substituted information

1. Where the accused has been already arraigned and subsequently, the information was substantially amended, an arraignment on the amended information is mandatory because the accused has the constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him and more so because the accused had repeatedly called the attention of the court to the absence of arraignment. If he is not arraigned and is convicted under the second information, the conviction constitutes reversible error (Cabangangan v. Concepcion, 95 Phil. 87). 2. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking

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of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information (Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 207 SCRA 134). B. HOW ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA ARE MADE Where arraignment is to be made

The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial (Sec. l[a], Rule 116, Rules of Court). How arraignment is made

The arraignment is made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty (Sec. l[a], Rule 116, Rules of Court). When arraignment is to be made

1. Under the Rules of Court, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided by a special law or a Supreme Court Circular (Sec. l[g], Rule 116, Rules of Court). In computing the period, the following shall be excluded: (a) the time of the pendency of a motion to quash; (b) the time for the pendency of a bill of particulars; or (c) other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment (Sec. l[g], Rule 116, Rules of Court). 2. The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. (Sec. 7 of The Speedy Trial Act of1998 [.R.A.8493]).

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If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence (Sec. 7 of The Speedy Trial Act of 1998 [RA. 8493]). 3. When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from the date of the raffle and the pre-trial conference shall be held within ten (10) days after arraignment (Sec. l[e], Rule 116, Rules of Court). Arraignment after submission of the case for decision

May arraignment be made after a case has been submitted for decision? The question was answered by the Supreme Court in the affirmative. In a case, accused appellant assailed his conviction because he claimed that he was not properly arraigned. Since it appeared that he was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, he contended that this procedural error was tantamount to a denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. He further argued that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the time the petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person. Brushing aside the contentions, the Court emphatically stated: xxx "Appellant is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the

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rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he was arrested x x x . His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person. Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him. Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision. The question is: Were appellant's rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of the proceedings? We do not think so. Appellant's belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel's active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow it. x x x Since appellant's rights and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated" (People v. Pangilinan, 518

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SCRA 358 citing People v. Cabale, 185 SCRA 140, People v. Atienza, 86 Phil. 576; Underscoring supplied). Record of arraignment The arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity of the proceedings (Sec. l[b], Rule 116, Rules of Court). Presence of the accused The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea (Sec. l[b], Rule 116, Rules of Court). Presence of the offended party 1. The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for the following purposes: (a) plea bargaining, (b) determination of civil liability, and (c) other matters requiring his presence (Sec. l[f], Rule 116, Rules of Court).

2. In case the offended party fails to appear despite due notice, the court may allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone (Sec. l[f], Rule 116, Rules of Court). When a plea of 'not guilty' shall be entered (Bar 1992; 1993; 1996)

1. Aside from an actual plea of not guilty, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for the accused if (a) he refuses to plead; (b) he makes a conditional plea (Sec. l[c], Rule 116, Rules of Court)', (c) when he pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence in which case the guilty plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered (Sec. l[d], Rule 116, Rules of Court). 2. The accused, by entering a plea of not guilty, submits himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest (People v. Pua, 415 SCRA 540).

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3. When the accused admits the facts in the information but alleges that he performed the acts as charged because he feared for his life, it is proper to enter a plea of not guilty (People v. Baetiong, 2 Phil. 126). 4. When the accused pleads guilty but it can be inferred from the arguments made by his counsel and in his appeal brief that the accused is asking that a certain penalty be imposed upon him in view of some mitigating circumstances, this is a conditional plea and is equivalent to a plea of not guilty (People v. Madraga, 344 SCRA 628). It appears that this holding presupposes that the plea of guilty is conditioned upon the imposition of a lesser penalty due to mitigating factors and not a mere request to be meted a lesser penalty after a plea of guilty. It is submitted that the latter is not a conditional plea but is to be construed as an emotional appeal for leniency in the imposition of a penalty. Thus, in People v. Comendador, G.R. No. L-38000, September 19, 1980, the accused pleaded guilty to robbery with homicide but asked the court to impose upon him a lesser penalty other than death. The Court held that while it is true that accused-appellant requested for a lesser penalty, such does not make his plea of guilty conditional. It remains to be an admission of the facts alleged in the information charging robbery with homicide. At most, said plea for a lesser penalty is an appeal to emotion as it does not assail, restrict or qualify the information. The Court observed that the accused-appellant intended his plea of guilty to be unconditional because he did not bother to adduce any evidence in his favor and merely submitted the case for decision. Although he had an opportunity to do so after the prosecution rested its case, he did not avail of the same. He remained resolute in his decision to own the crime. His claim, therefore, that his plea of guilty is conditional is inconsistent with his candor, spontaneity and insistent admission of guilt in the trial court. Clearly, added the Court, this change in his stand is merely a belated and unconvincing effort to avoid conviction.

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5. When the accused pleads guilty and bargains for a lesser penalty, it is not a plea to a lesser offense. It is a plea that made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him. Hence, an accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. Hence, the trial court should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional plea of guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered (People v. Magat, 332 SCRA 517). 6. An accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court in the sense that he admits his guilt provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. Likewise, a formal plea of not guilty should properly be entered if an accused admits the truth of some or all the allegations of the information, but interposes excuses or additional facts which, if duly established would exempt or relieve him in whole or in part of criminal responsibility (People v. Albert, 251 SCRA 136; People v. Bello 316 SCRA 804). 7. In People v. Stephen Douglas Strong, L-38626, March 14,1975, the Court observed that although the accused pleaded guilty to the charge, every time he was asked about the specific allegations of the information, he denied the specific allegations about the killing of the victim. When interrogated further to explain why he answered in the negative considering that he had entered a guilty plea, he manifested that he did not do any of those acts attributed to him. He consistently answered "no" every time to each question on whether or not he did the acts mentioned in the information. It is well-settled, continued the court, that when a plea of guilty is not definite or ambiguous, or not absolute, the same amounts to a plea of not guilty.

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8. In People v. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 1119, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the trial court should have required him to plead anew on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. Since this was not done, it follows that in effect there was no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal. There can be no double jeopardy since there was no plea. Plea of guilty is a judicial confession; effect on aggravating circumstances

1. As a rule, a plea of guilty is a judicial confession of guilt — an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances alleged (People v. Comendador, G.R. No. L-38000, September 19,1980; Citing People u. Corachea, L-30101, July 16,1979). A plea of guilty admits the truth of all the material facts alleged in the information, including all the aggravating circumstances mentioned therein (People v. Koloh Pohong, G.R. No. L-32332, August 15, 1973). A judicial confession of guilt embraces all the material facts alleged in the information, including all the aggravating circumstances listed therein (People v. Busa, G.R. No. L- 32047, June 25,1973). 2. It is submitted that conclusions of law are not admitted by a plea of guilty because conclusions of law are not facts. 3. In one case, while the accused pleaded guilty to the information, "such plea, as pointed out in the return of the Solicitor General, constituted only an admission of the facts alleged in the information, but was not an admission that the acts charged were unlawful, nor did it have the effect of curing the defect in the Court's jurisdiction" (Cadimas v. The Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-9725, October 19, 1955 citing People v. Santos Lopez, 45 O.G. [No. 5] 2089).

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Exception to the admission of aggravating circumstances

1. While the rule is that a judicial confession of guilt admits all the material facts alleged in the information including the aggravating circumstances listed therein, if such circumstances are disproved by the evidence, it should be disallowed in the judgment. Thus, the Court ruled that when an accused, who lacks instruction, pleads guilty to the crime of parricide described in the information as having been committed with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation and his testimony given under oath before the trial court fails to show the existence of such aggravating circumstances, his plea of guilty shall be understood as being to the admission of having committed the crime of parricide, not of having done so with treachery and evident premeditation (People v. Comendador, G.R. No. L-38000, September 19, 1980 citing People v. Gungab, 64 Phil. 779). 2. A plea of guilty "cannot be held to include treachery and evident premeditation where the evidence adduced does not adequately disclose the existence of these qualifying circumstances" (People v. Gravino, G.R. No. L-31327-29, May 16,1983). 3. The evidence may disprove the existence of aggravating circumstances despite the plea of guilty because a plea of guilty does not dispense with the presentation of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence to determine the penalty to be imposed pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 116. If the plea is to a capital offense the prosecution shall be required to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability as mandated by Sec. 3 of Rule 116. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense; plea bargaining (Bar 1995; 2002)

1. Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser

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offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge (Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28,2008). Requisites for a plea of guilty to a lesser offense

1. At the arraignment, the accused may plead guilty to a lesser offense. The court shall allow the plea provided the following requisites concur: (a) The lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense charged; and (b) The plea must be with the consent of both the offended party and the prosecutor (Sec. 2, Rule 116, Rules of Court). The consent of the offended party will not be required if said party, despite due notice, fails to appear during the arraignment (Sec. l[fj, Rule 116, Rules of Court). 2. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court (Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008 citing People v. Villarama, 210 SCRA 246). 3. Sec. 2 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court present the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilty should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however, used the word may in the second sentence of Sec. 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused (Daan v. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 550 SCRA 233, March 28, 2008). 4. An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the

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former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter — and vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter (Daan v. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 550 SCRA 233, March 28, 2008 citing Pacho v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116).

Plea of guilty to a lesser offense after arraignment; plea bargaining during the trial proper 1. The rule allows a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, not only "at arraignment" but also "[AJfter arraignment" and after his prior plea is withdrawn, but Section 2 of Rule 116 provides that the same be made "before trial" (Sec. 2, Rule 116, Rules of Court). 2. Also, the rule on the provisions on Pre-Trial in Rule 118, indicates that plea bargaining is one of the matters to be considered during the pre-trial stage, a proceeding conducted before the trial (Sec. l[a], Rule 118, Rules of Court). It has been held, however, that it may also be considered during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. It is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pretrial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses (Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008 citing People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51). Note: For suggested reading. 3. It is incumbent upon a trial judge to ascertain and be fully convinced that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and its consequences fully comprehended by the accused (People v. Ceredon, 542 SCRA 550, January 28, 2008).

No need for amendment of information/complaint When there is a plea of guilty to a lesser offense and the same was allowed by the court, there is no need to amend the information or complaint (Sec. 2, Rule 116, Rules of Court; Sec. 4, Circ. 38-98). A conviction under this plea shall be

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equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy (People v. Magat, G.R. No. 130026, May 31, 2000). When plea of guilty to a lesser offense is not mitigating

1. A plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as mitigating (People v. Ibanez, 407 SCRA 406). 2. In a case, an information for murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation was filed against the accused. When first arraigned, he pleaded not guilty but during the pre-trial he offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide but was rejected by the prosecution, hence, the case proceeded to trial. The accused was found by the trial court guilty of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced to death. The accused argues that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty despite the attendance of mitigating and alternative circumstances in his favor. He avers that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty because he earlier pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. The Court disagreed. It went on to state that while the accused offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, he was charged with murder for which he had already entered a plea of not guilty. An offer to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense cannot be considered as an attenuating circumstance under the provisions of Art. 13 of The Revised Penal Code because to be voluntary, the plea of guilty must be to the offense charged (People v. Dawaton, G.R. No. 146247, September 17, 2002). Plea of guilty to a capital offense (Bar 1995)

1. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, it is not proper for the court to immediately render judgment on the basis of the guilty plea. Instead, the court is mandated to perform the following acts:

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(a) To conduct a searching inquiry (i) to ascertain the voluntariness of the plea, and (ii) to ascertain whether or not the accused has full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (b) To require the prosecution to prove the following: (i) the guilt of the accused, and (ii) the precise degree of his culpability; and (c) To ask the accused if he wishes to present evidence and allow the accused to present evidence in his behalf when he so desires (Sec. 3, Rule 116, Rules of Court; See People v. Bernas, 377 SCRA 391; People v. Principe, 381 SCRA 642; People v. Murillo, 434 SCRA 342; People v. Ebio, 439 SCRA 421; People v. Espidol, 442 SCRA 360). The process is mandatory and absent any showing that that it has been duly observed, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been aptly undertaken (People v. Oden, 427 SCRA 634). A mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient (People v. Principe, 381 SCRA 642). The tenor of the rule clearly precludes the court from determining the guilt of the accused from his plea of guilty even if the court has ascertained that the plea was voluntary and with full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The court shall still require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge and understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the information as well as the consequences of his plea. It is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged (People v. Mendoza, 231 SCRA 264). 2. When a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, there are three (3) conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilty by the accused—(1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his

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plea, (2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and (3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires (People v. Gumimba, 517 SCRA 25, February 27, 2007; People v. Ernas, 408 SCRA 391). The court must still require the introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant because a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability (People v. Espidol, 442 SCRA 360). 3. As the rule now stands, "even in cases in which the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the prosecution is still required to present evidence to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his culpability." In other words, notwithstanding the plea of guilty, evidence must be adduced to determine the precise participation of the accused in the perpetuation of the capital offense—whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory—as well as the presence or absence of modifying circumstances. And "the accused may also present evidence in his behalf either to rebut the prosecution's evidence or to show the presence of mitigating circumstances (People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 192818, November 17,2010). An earlier case likewise held that when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea (People v. Baun, 562 SCRA 584, August 20,2008). Meaning of "searching inquiry"

1. In the case of People v. Talusan, G.R. No. 179187, July 14, 2009, a case involving a conviction for kidnapping with rape of a minor where the accused pleaded guilty, the lone assignment of error of the accused is the alleged failure of the trial court "to judiciously follow" the guidelines set forth in People v. Pastor, 379 SCRA 181, a case where the Court ruled that "there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial

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judge must conduct a 'searching inquiry,'" but nevertheless came up with the following guidelines: (a) Ascertain from the accused himself (1) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (2) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (3) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is accordingly intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes. (b) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. (c) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty. (d) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, observed the Court, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment. (e) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure

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of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process. (f) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter. (g) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details (People v. Pastor, 379 SCRA 181; People v. Mira, 535 SCRA 543). The Court found in People v. Talusan that the guidelines were complied with in the case under consideration and that there was no improvident guilty plea under the circumstances as it reiterated the rule that while there is thus no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry" as long as the voluntary intent of the accused and his full comprehension of the consequences of his plea are ascertained, the accused's plea of guilt is to be sustained. The Court in Talusan continued to state that even assuming arguendo that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilty when arraigned, there is no compulsion to remand the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence. While the Court has set aside convictions based on improvident pleas of guilty in capital offenses, which pleas had been the sole basis of the judgment, where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether the accused erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea is made loses legal significance if the conviction is, independently of the plea, based on evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged. In the present case, declared the Court, even without the plea of guilty of appellant, the evidence presented by the prosecution supports his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 2. Thus, while the convictions based on pleas of guilty to capital offenses have been set aside because of the improvidence of the plea, the same holds true only when such plea is

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the sole basis of the judgment (People v. Ceredon, 542 SCRA 550, January 28, 2008).

Plea of guilty to a non-capital offense 1. When the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed (Sec. 4, Rule 116, Rules of Court). Notice that the duty imposed upon the court under this section is not as stringent as the duty imposed upon it when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. Thus, in People v. Madraga, 334 SCRA 628, it was ruled that when the accused did not plead guilty to a capital offense, he cannot invoke Sec. 3 of Rule 116 requiring the court to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. 2. There is no rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction automatically follows. Additional evidence independent of the plea may be considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently made. When the accused pleads guilty to a noncapital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed. This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to persist in holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the evidence points to his acquittal. Additional evidence independent of the plea may be considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently made (People v. Mendoza, 231 SCRA 264).

Improvident plea of guilty 1. At any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty (Sec. 5, Rule 116, Rules of Court).

2. Where the trial court failed in its duty to conduct the prescribed "searching inquiry" into the voluntariness of

CHAPTER VIII ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA (Rule 116)

the accused's plea of guilty and full comprehension thereof, the plea of guilty is deemed made improvidently and rendered inefficacious (People v. Gumimba, 517 SCRA 25). 3. In one case, the appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences of his guilty plea. In fact, as argued by appellant, "the trial court should have informed him that his plea of guilty would not affect or reduce the imposable penalty, which is death as he might have erroneously believed, that under Art. 63, the death penalty, being a single indivisible penalty, shall be applied by the court regardless of any mitigating circumstances that might have attended the commission of the deed." Moreover, the trial court judge failed to inform appellant of his right to adduce evidence despite the guilty plea. With the trial court's failure to comply with the guidelines, appellant's guilty plea is deemed improvidently made and thus rendered inefficacious (People of the Philippines v. Oscar Documento, G.R. No. 188706, March 17, 2010). 4. When there is an improvident plea of guilty, it does not mean that the case should be remanded to the trial court. This course of action is appropriate only when the appellant's guilty plea was the sole basis for his conviction. On the other hand, if the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained (.People of the Philippines v. Oscar Documento, G.R. No. 188706, March 17, 2010). Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilty are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment (People v. Salamillo, 404 SCRA 211; People v. Ceredon, 542 SCRA 550). The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the offense charged (People v. Oden, 427 SCRA 634). Production or inspection of material evidence

1. Rule 116 allows a mode of discovery aside from those allowed in other parts of the Rules of Court. Sec. 10 thereof authorizes the court, to issue an order to the prosecution to

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produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any written statement given by the complainant and other witnesses in any investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or other investigating officers, as well as any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things not otherwise privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case and which are in the possession or under the control of the prosecution, police or other law investigating agencies (Sec. 10, Rule 116, Rules of Court). 2. The production or inspection of material evidence in possession of the prosecution shall be allowed upon motion of the accused with notice to the parties (Sec. 10, Rule 116, Rules of Court). 3. The purpose of the rule in allowing the production or inspection of material evidence in possession of the prosecution is to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration of the evidence (Sec. 10, Rule 116, Rules of Court).

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CHAPTER IX MOTION TO QUASH (Rule 117) Time for filing the motion to quash

1. The motion to quash may be made at any time before the accused enters his plea (Sec. 1, Rule 117, Rules of Court). 2. A motion to quash is generally not allowed in a summary procedure except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or failure to comply with the barangay conciliation proceedings mentioned in Sec. 18 of the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure (Sec. 19, Rule on Summary Procedure). (Bar 1989) Form and contents of the motion to quash

The rule does not permit an oral motion to quash. The motion shall be in writing. The motion must comply with the following requisites: (a) The motion shall be in writing; (b) (c)

The motion shall be signed by the accused or his counsel; and The motion shall distinctly specify the factual and legal grounds of the motion (Sec. 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court).

Motion to quash is not a demurrer to evidence; distinctions

1. A motion to quash a complaint or an information is filed before the accused enters a plea (Sec. 1, Rule 117, Rules of Court). A demurrer to evidence in a criminal case is filed after the prosecution rests its case (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of

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Court) and hence, presupposes that the accused has already entered his plea and is in fact already going through a trial. Rule 117 does not require a prior leave of court for the filing of a motion to quash. Under Rule 119, a demurrer to evidence may be filed by the accused either with leave or without leave of court. The grounds for a motion to quash are not grounds for a demurrer to evidence. Under Sec. 23 of Rule 119, the ground for a demurrer to evidence is "insufficiency of evidence." Such ground is not a basis for filing a motion to quash. The ground for a motion to quash may be based on the matters found on the face of the complaint or information as when it is alleged that the facts charged do not constitute an offense or that the complaint or information does not conform to the prescribed form. A demurrer to evidence would necessarily be predicated upon matters outside of the complaint or information such as the evidence or lack of it. When a motion to quash is granted, a dismissal of the case will not necessarily follow. The court may even order the filing of a new complaint or information because an order sustaining the motion is generally not a bar to another prosecution (Sec. 5, Sec. 6, Rule 117). The grant of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is, by jurisprudence, deemed an acquittal and would preclude the filing of another information or an appeal by the prosecution (Condrada v. People, 398 SCRA 482; People v. Laguio, Jr., 518 SCRA 393). If the court, in denying the motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies (Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan [First Division], G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009; Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147026-27September 11, 2009). As expressly provided under the last paragraph of Sec. 23 of Rule 119, the order denying the motion for leave to file a demurrer or the demurrer itself "shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." This is however, only a general rule.

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Court shall consider only those grounds stated in the motion

Rule 117 expresses the general rule in Sec. 2 thereof that in resolving the motion to quash filed by the accused, the court shall consider no grounds other than those stated in the motion. The only ground which the court may consider even if not stated in the motion to quash is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged (Sec. 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court). Hence, even if a reading of the information indicates the presence of averments which if true would constitute a legal justification for the acts of the accused, such ground shall not be considered by the court if it was not stated or invoked in the motion to quash. Motion to quash; grounds for a motion to quash (Bar 1987; 1990; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2009; 2010)

1. A complaint or information may be subject to a motion to quash on any of the following grounds (Sec. 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court): (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (Bar 1987) (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (Bar 2000) (e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (Bar 1996; 2005) (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

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(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent (Sec. 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court). (Bar 2002; 2004; 2010) Execution of an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for a motion to quash

1. The execution by the offended party of an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for a motion to quash a complaint or an information. It is not one of those enumerated in the Rules of Court. 2. An affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in court (People v. Ramirez, G.R. Nos. 150079-80, June 10,2004; People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 181900, October 20, 2010). 3. In People v. Salazar, the accused-appellant claims that the case should have been dismissed by the trial court, considering that the alleged victim had executed an affidavit of desistance exonerating him from the crimes charged. The Court rejected the argument of the accused-appellant. As a rule, explained the Court, a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that it would later on be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable (People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 181900, October 20, 2010; People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 174372, January 20,2009; People of the Philippines v. Roy Alcazar y Miranda, G.R. No. 186494, September 15,2010). At most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative value (People of the Philippines v. Roy Alcazar y Miranda, G.R. No. 186494, September 15,2010).

CHAPTER IX MOTION TO QUASH (Rule 117)

Absence of probable cause not a ground to quash an information 1. The absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ground for the quashal of the information but is a ground for the dismissal of the case (People v. Sandiganbayan, 439 SCRA 390). 2. In the same case, the Court defined the term "to quash" to mean "to annul, vacate or overthrow," implying that quashing an information does not necessarily mean its dismissal (People v. Sandiganbayan, 439 SCRA 390). Note that when a motion to quash is sustained, the court may in fact, order that another complaint or information be filed under the conditions set forth in Sees. 5 and 6 of Rule 117. Matters of defense are not grounds for a motion to quash

1. As a rule, matters of defense are not grounds for a motion to quash. Thus, if the accused files a motion to quash the information for homicide because he only acted in selfdefense, and such fact is not alleged in the information, the court should proceed with the case and determine the validity and truth of the defense in a full-blown trial. Thus, it was held that facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against the charge under the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense (Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 159517-18, June 30,2009). 2. Observe however, there are defenses allowed by the rule to be grounds for a motion to quash like double jeopardy or extinguishment of the criminal liability (Sec. 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court). Absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash an information The absence of a preliminary investigation or inability to participate in the preliminary investigation is not a

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proper ground for a motion to quash but for a petition for reinvestigation (Rodis v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 7140409, October 26, 1988). Thus, in an early graft case where the accused were deprived of a full preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the informations against them, the Court emphasized that such fact does not warrant the quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate the proceedings already had. Neither is the court's jurisdiction nor validity of an information adversely affected by deficiencies in the preliminary investigation. Instead, the Sandiganbayan is to hold in abeyance any further proceedings therein and to remand the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for the completion of the preliminary investigation, the outcome of which shall then be indorsed to the Sandiganbayan for its appropriate action (Vasquez v. Hobilia-Alinio, 271 SCRA 67 citing Torralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 101421-22, February 10,1994). Test in appreciating a motion to quash

1. When the ground relied upon is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the determinative test in appreciating a motion to quash under Sec. 3(a) of Rule 117 is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by law without considering matters aliunde. An information needs only to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged amounted to undue injury or damage — matters that are appropriate for trial. The information, in other words, must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged (Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122, March 13,2009; Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 178429, October 23,2009). For instance, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of

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R.A. No. 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under R.A. No. 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code (Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636). 2. However, since, Sec. 2 of Rule 117 requires that a motion to quash shall distinctly specify not only its legal but also factual grounds, it "is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Sec. 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds ..." (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 678). Effect of failure to assert any ground of a motion to quash

1. The failure to assert any ground of a motion to quash before a plea to the complaint or information shall be deemed a waiver of any objections. This failure to assert a ground may either be because: (a) the accused did not file a motion to quash, or (b) the accused filed a motion to quash but failed to allege the ground in said motion (Sec. 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court). 2. Failure of the accused to interpose an objection on the ground of duplicity of the offense charged in the information constitutes waiver (People v. Tabio, 544 SCRA 156, February 6, 2008; Sec. 3, Rule 120, Rules of Court).

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Grounds not waived

Although the rule is that those grounds not asserted in the motion to quash are waived, the following objections are not waived: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Sec. 3[a], Rule 117); (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged (Sec. 3[b], Rule 117); (c) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished (Sec. 3[g], Rule 117); and (d) double jeopardy (Sec. 3[i], Rule 117). Denial of a motion to quash

1. Well established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash (Serana v. Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA 225, January 22,2008). 2. The general rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy against an order denying a motion to quash. Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the investigating prosecutor or any other officer authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigation, the court as a rule must defer to said officer's finding and determination of probable cause (Boiser v. People, 543 SCRA 436, January 31, 2008). The remedy is for the movant to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in the motion to quash. This remedy however, is subject to exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies (Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan [First Division], G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009; Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147026-27, September 11,2009).

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When court shall order the amendment of the information or complaint

1. The existence of a valid ground for sustaining a motion to quash will not necessarily result in the dismissal of the information or complaint. If the motion to quash is based on the alleged defect of the complaint or information, and the defect can be cured, the court shall order that an amendment be made (Sec. 4, Rule 117, Rules of Court). If the motion is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. However, if despite such opportunity, the prosecution (a) fails to make the amendment, or (b) if despite the amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect, the court shall grant the motion to quash (Sec. 4, Rule 117, Rules of Court). 2. Even if an information may be defective because the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the dismissal of the case will not necessarily follow. The prosecution should be given a chance to correct the defect and the court can order the dismissal only upon the prosecution's failure to do so. It would constitute an arbitrary exercise of power correctible by certiorari if the trial court would not provide the prosecution the opportunity to correct the defect (Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 178429, October 23,2009). Order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution; exceptions (Bar 1994)

1. When a motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed unless the ground relied upon is either (a) extinction of the criminal liability, or (b) on the ground of double jeopardy as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 117 (Sec. 5, Rule 117, Rules of Court). This is because an order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless based on the ground that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished or there is double jeopardy (Sec. 6, Rule 117, Rules of Court).

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2. If the order to file another complaint or information is made, the accused who may be in custody, shall not be discharged or released, except if he is admitted to bail (Sec. 5, Rule 117Rules of Court). If no order to file is made or if such order is made but no new complaint or information is filed within the time specified in the order, the accused, if in custody shall be discharged. He shall however, not be discharged if he is in custody for another charge (Sec. 5, Rule 117, Rules of Court). 3. To emphasize, an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the following grounds: That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished (Sec. 3[g], Rule 117); or That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted or the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent (double jeopardy) (Sec. 3[i], Rule 117). Double jeopardy

1. Sec. 21, Art. Ill of the Constitution of the Philippines emphasizes that: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law or an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act."

2. The essence of the constitutional provision is specifically reiterated in the Rules of Court thus: " x x x When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecu-

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tion for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." (Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court).

3. "Jeopardy" in the legal sense, is the "danger of conviction and punishment which the defendant in a criminal action incurs when a valid indictment has been found..." (Han- ley v. State, 83 Nevada 461 cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, p. 749). The constitution does not prohibit placing a person in jeopardy. What it prohibits is putting an accused in "double jeopardy" in which he is put in danger of punishment for the same offense more than once. The constitutional provision against double jeopardy guarantees that the state shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing that possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty (Co v. Lim, G.R. Nos. 164669-70, October 30,2009). At the heart of the policy on double jeopardy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument for oppression (Co v. Lim, G.R. Nos. 164669-70, October 30,2009). 4. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12, 2009). Also called as "res judicata in prison grey," the right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution for a crime of which he has been previously convicted or acquitted (Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54). (Bar 2010) Hence, double jeopardy presupposes that a first jeopardy has already attached prior to the second jeopardy and such

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jeopardy has already been terminated either because the accused has already been convicted, or acquitted or the case against him has been dismissed or terminated without his express consent. If despite the termination of the first jeopardy or danger, he is put in danger anew for the same offense as in the first, then double jeopardy arises. This is the very situation prohibited by the Constitution. Hence, if the accused has been acquitted of frustrated homicide, he can no longer be accused of the same offense or of an offense necessarily included in frustrated homicide like attempted homicide. Similarly, a person convicted of attempted homicide can no longer be tried, as a rule, under an information for frustrated homicide against the same victim, because the second offense includes the offense charged in the first information. Effects of double jeopardy; on criminal and civil aspects

1. When double jeopardy exists, "the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court). Hence, as a rule, an acquittal rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction after trial on the merits is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy (People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, Abelardo P. Panlaqui, et al., G.R. No. 173396, September 22, 2010; See People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 174504, March 21,2011 for related reading). 2. A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also immediately executory and the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the

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government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant's culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant's already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant's guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government's power and resources are once again employed against the defendant's individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience. Thus, the absolute and inflexible rule is that the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal through either a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, or an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules (People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009). 3. The accused may appeal from a judgment of conviction but when the accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives his right to the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to review by the appellate court (People v. Caraang, 418 SCRA 321; Oriente v. People, 513 SCRA 348; G.R. No. 155094, January 30,2007). Also, when an accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment against him, double jeopardy cannot be invoked by him because by filing the motion, he waived his right not to be placed in double jeopardy (People v. Astudillo, 401 SCRA 723).

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4. Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion orf when there was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy (Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23,2008). 5. A reading of jurisprudence discloses the rule that the acquittal of the accused does not affect the right of the offended party to appeal the civil aspect of the case. Hence, it has been said that while a judgment of acquittal cannot be appealed by the prosecution, "either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused" (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 388 SCRA 72). While the prosecution cannot appeal from a judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy, the aggrieved party who may be the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case (Salazar v. People, 411 SCRA 598). 6. The offended party and the accused may appeal the civil aspect of a judgment because the concept of double jeopardy evidently has reference only to a criminal case and has no effect on the civil liability of the accused. The employment of the terms, "punishment," "offense," "conviction" and acquittal" in the Constitution (Sec. 21, Art. Ill), and the employment of the words "convicted," "acquitted," "information," "prosecution" and "attempt to "commit or frustration thereof in Sec. 7 of Rule 117, leave no doubt as to the concept's non-application to a civil case. Thus, in the same vein, the extinction of the criminal liability will not necessarily give rise to the extinction of the

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civil liability. Under Sec. 4 of Rule 111, if the accused dies before his arraignment, while the criminal case shall be dismissed because of its extinction, such dismissal is without prejudice and shall not be a bar to any civil action which the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased. The estate therefore, cannot invoke double jeopardy. Similarly, under the same provision, even if the civil liability arising from the delict or criminal act is extinguished when the accused dies after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action, the independent civil action arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate of the deceased. Double jeopardy; requisites

1. In the language of the Supreme Court, in order to successfully invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof (Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173; People v. Es- pinosa, 409 SCRA 256; Cerezo v. People, G.R. No. 185230, June 1,2011). In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the following elements: (a) The accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him was dismissed or terminated without his express consent; (b) That the conviction, acquittal or dismissal was made by a court of competent jurisdiction;

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(c) There is a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance' to sustain a conviction; (d) The accused has pleaded to the charge; and (e) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense which is the same as the former complaint or information or for any attempt of the same or a frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court; Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173; People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009; Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147026-27, September 11, 2009; Co v. Lim, G.R. Nos. 164669-70, October 30, 2009; People v. Tan, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010; Heirs of Jane Honrales v. Jonathan Honrales /People of the Philippines and Heirs of Jane Honrales v. Jonathan Honrales, G.R. No. 182651 /G.R. No. 182657, August 25, 2010; Cerezo v. People, G.R. No. 185230, June 1,2011). Court must have competent jurisdiction 1. For double jeopardy to attach, the court which rendered a judgment of conviction or acquittal or the court which terminated or dismissed the case be one vested with "competent jurisdiction" (Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court).

Assume that a criminal action for robbery that occurred in the City of Makati was filed in a Quezon City court. Because the Quezon City court realized that it had no jurisdiction over the action, it dismissed the case over the objections of the accused. A subsequent information filed before the proper Makati court will not successfully give rise to a defense anchored on double jeopardy because the first court, the Quezon City court, had no jurisdiction over the case. Hence, no jeopardy attached when the case was filed in Quezon City. 2. Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or acquittal existed where the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the theory being that a defendant before such a court was not actually placed in jeopardy. Hence, any

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acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first place (People v. Joven de Grano, et al., G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009). There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction (Zapatos v. People, 411 SCRA 148). 3. A case decided during the early period of the American occupation of the country and "which recognized the application of the principle of double jeopardy in the Philippine Islands," ruled that "A person is not put in second jeopardy unless his prior acquittal or conviction was by a court having jurisdiction to try him for the offense charged" (Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333). For instance, where an information for murder was filed and tried in the Municipal Trial Court and the case was later on dismissed despite objections from the accused, a subsequent indictment for the same offense in the Regional Trial Court will not constitute double jeopardy. The Municipal Trial Court which earlier tried the case is bereft of jurisdiction over the offense of murder which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused therefore, could not claim being "twice put in jeopardy for the same offense" because there never was a first jeopardy. One could not be validly convicted or acquitted by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter. 4. If a case which pertains to the Sandiganbayan was filed in the Regional Trial Court, jurisdiction never attached to the latter court. It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint or information with one court which has no jurisdiction over it does not prevent the prosecution from filing the same complaint later with the competent court. There is no estoppel from doing so simply because it made a mistake before in the choice of the proper forum. In such a situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put the accused in double jeopardy even though there was a plea of "not guilty" to the information earlier filed in the

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RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction. The remedy therefore, \yas not to move for the quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy. The remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65). 5. It is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction because jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy. However, the first jeopardy could not attach if the action was filed in a court of the place which was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173 citing People v. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77 and Agbayani v. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699). 6. A court initially with jurisdiction may, in the course of the proceedings, be ousted of that same jurisdiction, an event which would bar any invocation of double jeopardy. Illustrative is one case where the prosecution informed the court that it had other witnesses to present. The court, aside from not allowing the other prosecution witnesses to testify, also prematurely terminated the presentation of further evidence for the prosecution and dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence. In sustaining the order of the Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by the trial court, the Court ruled that the reinstatement of the case does not violate the rule on double jeopardy. It went on to hold that one of the elements of double jeopardy is a competent court but the trial court in this case was ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to complete

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the presentation of its evidence. Hence, the first jeopardy had not been terminated. Explained the Court: "Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. "The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. xxx "Respondent Judge's dismissal order x x x being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy" (Saldana v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88889, October 11, 1990 citing People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166; Serino v. Zosa, 40 SCRA 433; People v. Gomez, 20 SCRA 293; People v. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 1119; Aducayen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 78). Curing an erroneous acquittal; grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction

1. May an erroneous acquittal be cured without offending the principle against double jeopardy? As a rule, an acquittal rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction after trial on the merits is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy (People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, Abelardo P. Panlaqui, et al., G.R. No. 173396, September 22,2010). The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as

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/

where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice (People v. Tan, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010). A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process of law is void, does not exist in legal contemplation and thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal (People v. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 559 SCRA 449). 2. In our jurisdiction, availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal may be allowed in cases where petitioner has clearly shown that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, but if the petition merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, we would run afoul of the constitutional right against double jeopardy (People v. Terrado, 558 SCRA 84, July 14,2008). 3. A more recent case unequivocally ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In People v. Asis, G.R. No. 173089, August 25, 2010, the accused was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder in the Regional Trial Court. The trial court found no treachery and evident premeditation. Thus, in its decision, the RTC held the accused liable only for serious physical injuries for shooting one victim and less serious physical injuries with regard to the other victim. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused. With respect to the complaint of smother victim, the accused was acquitted. The OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA assailing as constituting a grave abuse of discretion the findings of the RTC for holding the accused guilty of lesser

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crimes than for which he was charged and acquitting him on the other charge as well as in appreciating four (4) mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused. The CA, dismissed the petition outright. According to the appellate court, the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. As the State was questioning the verdict of acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy, declared the CA should have been an appeal. Moreover, the petition for certiorari placed the accused in double jeopardy. The Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition outright. Held the Court in no uncertain terms: "A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in People v. Louel Uy,471 SCRA 668, the Court has held: Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. [Underscoring supplied].

In People v. Laguio, Jr., 518 SCRA 393, where the acquittal of the accused was via the grant of his demurrer

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to evidence, the Court pointed out the propriety of resorting to a petition for certiorari. Thus: By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused's demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated."

The Court explained further that in the petition, the OSG claimed that the acquittal of the accused was improper. Since appeal could not be taken without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy of the accused, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It was a serious error by the CA, ratiocinated the Court, to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of that remedy. However, while holding that certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. Citing the significant case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43, the Court reiterated that the rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction and for this reason, the judgment is void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy. Note: While the Court finally set aside the resolution of the CA dismissing the petition for certiorari, it denied the petition upon ruling on the same on the merits because the prosecution failed to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process and that the petition raised errors of judgment.

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4. In yet another case, from the decision of the RTC acquitting the accused of the charge of murder after a motion for reconsideration of an earlier judgment of conviction, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA arguing, among others, that the petitioner had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy, considering that the State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. Petitioner alleged and argued that a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not only reversible errors of judgment, but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. Consequently, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy. The prosecution hinged its arguments, among others, in the fact that when the earlier decision of conviction was promulgated, only one of the several accused was present and the other accused were not. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, they joined the present accused in a Joint Motion for Reconsideration, an act done in clear disregard of the rule in Sec. 6, Rule 120 that in case of a judgment of conviction and the accused failed to appear without a justifiable cause, he loses the remedies available under the Rules and the court shall order his arrest. Accordingly, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion. They were in fact later acquitted. The prosecution was sustained by the Supreme Court holding that by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In which event, the accused cannot be

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considered at risk of double jeopardy (People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, June 5,2009). 5. When the trial court, in allowing the withdrawal of the information, glaringly failed to conduct its own determination of a prima facie case, to independently evaluate and assess the merits of the case against the accused and simply adopted the resolution issued by the Secretary of Justice, there is a violation of the complainant's right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The accused was not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fourth requisite on the conviction and acquittal of the accused in the dismissal of the case, without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in (Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc. v. Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No. 163741, August 7,2007). Preliminary investigation; double jeopardy not applicable

1. A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty therefor, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy (Tandoc v. Resultan, 175 SCRA 37; Italics supplied). Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial function. It does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy (Torres v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 164268, June 28, 2005). Hence, a preliminary investigation is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches (Icasiano v. Sandiganbayan, 209 SCRA 377). 2. It is settled that the dismissal of a case during its preliminary investigation stage does not constitute double jeopardy since a preliminary investigation is not part of the trial and is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display

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of the parties' evidence (Vincoy v. Court of Appeals, 432 SCRA 36; Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 539 SCRA 415). Res judicata and double jeopardy; res judicata in prison grey (Bar 2010)

Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings (Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 539 SCRA 415) even if double jeopardy has been described as ures judicata in prison grey" (Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74989, November 6,1989; Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166038, December 4, 2007). Administrative cases; double jeopardy not applicable

1. Icasiano v. Sandiganbayan, 209 SCRA 377, is one of several jurisprudential authorities which upholds the principle that the rule on double jeopardy does not apply to administrative cases. Here, the Court sustained the Sandiganbayan when the latter held that double jeopardy does not apply in a controversy when one case was administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case also against the same petitioner was criminal in nature. All the elements for the application of double jeopardy do not apply vis-d-vis an administrative case. Hence, the petitioner cannot successfully claim that the dismissal of his administrative case entitles him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. The principle of double jeopardy finds no application in administrative cases. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. These elements were not present in the proceedings before the Board of Medicine, as the proceedings involved in the instant case were administrative and not criminal in nature. The Court has already held that double

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jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases (Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete, G.R. No. 159132, December 18, 2008, citing De Vera v. Layague, 395 Phil. 253, 261 [2000], citing Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 191 [1999]). 2. A single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability (Paredes v. Court of Appeals, 528 SCRA 577, July 30,2007). This principle may successfully prevent any assertion of the principle of double jeopardy in administrative cases. 3. "It has also been ruled that the dismissal of the criminal case does not result in the dismissal of the administrative case because there exists a difference between those two remedies. The Court in various cases has stressed the distinct and independent character of the remedies available to an offended party against any impropriety or wrongdoing committed by a public officer. Significantly, there are three kinds of remedies available against a public officer for impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative. These remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies. Defeat of any of the three remedies will not necessarily preclude resort to other remedies or affect decisions reached thereat, as different degrees of evidence are required in these several actions. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed, whereas a mere preponderance of evidence will suffice in civil cases. In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required. It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each other. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the first two will not inevitably govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily, administrative cases

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may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings" (Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano, G.R. No. 177580, October 17, 2008 citing Vide Paredes v. Court of Appeals, 528 SCRA 577; Barillo v. Gervacio, 500 SCRA 561; Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, 379 Phil. 21; Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 322 Phil. 709; Tan v. Commission on Elections, 237 Phil. 353, 359). Valid complaint or information (Bar 2002; 2004)

1. For double jeopardy to be invoked, Sec. 7 of Rule 117 requires that "there must be a valid complaint or information or formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction." The sufficiency of the complaint or information or the formal charge is dependent on whether the same could sustain a conviction. If it could not sustain the conviction desired, then the charge is not a valid one which would preclude double jeopardy. Assume that it is averred that an information alleges facts which taken together do not constitute an offense. The Court agreed and ordered the amendment of the information to correct the defect. Will the filing of the new corrected information trigger the application of double jeopardy? The answer is "no" because there never was a first jeopardy under the first information. If there was no first jeopardy, there could be no double jeopardy. 2. A complaint or information may not be considered valid if does not contain the basic requisites for the sufficiency of a complaint. Sec. 6 of Rule 110 provides that a complaint or information is sufficient "if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed." A complaint or information which does not comply with these requirements would not be sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction.

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3. It is submitted that the charges are not to be deemed valid because conviction will not be possible where the formal charges for adultery and concubinage are not subscribed by the offended party but by the public prosecutor. Section 5 of Rule 110 clearly mandates that "The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party. Also, unless the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated and she has no known parents, grandparents or guardians, a public prosecutor cannot subscribe to or sign the formal charge for seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness. These offenses by express provision of the Rules, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardians" (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Similarly, a criminal action for defamation consisting in the imputation of any of the offenses of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction or acts of lasciviousness shall not be brought except upon a complaint filed by the offended party. 4. Likewise, the accused will not be placed in jeopardy of conviction where the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not constitute an offense. This defect is in fact, a ground for a motion to quash under Sec. 3(a) of Rule 117. 5. Thus, the Court once declared that there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution (Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173). 6. Where the officer who filed the information has no authority to do so, the information is indeed defective and could not sustain a conviction. In Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173, for instance, the Court found that an information

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was filed by the City Prosecutor of Angeles City for a crime committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Citing the pertinent provisions of P.D. 1275 in relation to the Administrative Code of 1987, the Court ruled that the City Prosecutor had no authority to file an information in a place beyond the jurisdiction of his office. It is the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, according to the Court, who should prepare the information for an offense committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. (Bar 2002; 2004) Accused should have pleaded to the charge (should have been arraigned) (Bar 2002; 2003)

1. The application of the rule against double jeopardy requires that the accused "had pleaded to the charge." The rule on arraignment and plea in Rule 116 governs this requirement. Hence, if before arraignment, the prosecutor withdrew an information charging theft and later on filed another information for theft or robbery against the same accused, double jeopardy cannot be invoked because, the accused was never arraigned under the first information. (Bar 2002) It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 77). 2. It has always been the rule that the accused should have been arraigned and had pleaded to the charge. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned. Hence, there is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment and upon his express motion (Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006 citing People v. Montiero, 192 SCRA 548). 3. For double jeopardy to attach, the plea must be valid. An invalid plea is demonstrated in People v. Magat, G.R. No.

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130026, May 31, 2000. Here, the accused pleaded guilty to the rape of his daughter but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant's mother and the public prosecutor, agreed with the plea bargain. He was sentenced to ten years for each count of rape. After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on the ground that the penalty imposed was "too light." As a consequence, accused-appellant was re-arraigned and he entered a new a plea of guilty. After the required proceedings for capital offenses and convinced of accused's voluntariness of his plea of guilty, the court rendered a judgment of conviction and imposed the death penalty. On appeal, the accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in re-arraigning him and proceeding into trial despite the fact that he was already convicted based on his plea of guilty. He also argues that when the court rendered judgment convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor move for reconsideration or took steps to set aside the order. Consequently, the conviction having attained finality can no longer be set aside or modified even if the prosecution later realizes that the penalty imposed was too light. Accused- appellant likewise posits that the re-arraignment and trial on the same information violated his right against double jeopardy. The Court disagreed with the accused-appellant. The order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his own plea of guilty and sentencing him to a light penalty was void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant's plea was not the plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense. Here, the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilty to a lesser penalty. The Court emphasized that under the facts, the accused- appellant did not plead guilty to a lesser offense but pleaded

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guilty to the rape charges as alleged in the information. He only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. It is the essence of a plea of guilty, explained the Court, that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him. Hence, an accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. The accused-appellant's plea of guilty was undoubtedly a conditional plea. Since it was a conditional plea, the trial court should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty and which would require a full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered. In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since the judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will not lieJVofe: In Magat, the accused was re-arraigned and he entered a new plea, thus correcting the procedural infirmity. 4. The much earlier but more famous case of People v. Balisacan, G.R. No. L-26376, August 31, 1966, demonstrates an error in the procedure followed by the trial court which justified an appeal by the prosecution without violating the rule against double jeopardy. In Balisacan, the accused was charged with homicide and upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. Before the sentencing, he was allowed to prove mitigating circumstances but ended up justifying the killing by showing that he acted in self-defense. Convinced by the facts, the court rendered a verdict of acquittal. The people appealed from the judgment of acquittal contending that the accused should not have been acquitted.

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When the case reached the Supreme Court, the appeal was sustained. The Court then described a plea of guilty as "an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances (People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563)." Since the accused was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty, the testimony could not be taken as a trial on the merits to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court however, added that since the accused asserted self-defense in his testimony, said assertion of self- defense had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty. The trial court should have required him to plead anew to the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him and conducted a trial on the merits. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal of the prosecution. In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court a quo not only erred in procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard (People v. Balisacan., G.R. No. L-26376, August 31,1966 citing People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October23,1956; People v. Bao, L-12102, September 29, 1959; People v. De Golez, L-14160, June 30,1960; People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth, 124 Fed. 2d. 445). The accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or terminated without his express consent

1. For the accused to invoke double jeopardy, it must be shown that in the prior charge, he had been either convicted or acquitted. He may also show that the case against him had been dismissed or terminated without his express consent (Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court). The meaning is clear from the very tenor of the rule. The application of the rule presupposes that the first case

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had been validly terminated in any of the following ways: (a) conviction, (b) acquittal, or (c) dismissal or termination without the express consent of the accused. In other words, the rule contemplates that the first jeopardy had been validly terminated and because of such termination, the accused could no longer be exposed to another jeopardy. Since the rule against double jeopardy is intended to shield the accused from a second trial for the same offense, the rule suggests that when the first case has not yet been terminated, double jeopardy cannot be invoked in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. It is the jeopardy of being convicted anew that precludes the farther prosecution of the accused for the offense. Hence, even if two sets of information for homicide are filed involving the same victim and the case under the first information has not yet been terminated either by conviction, acquittal or dismissal, it is highly doubtful for the filing of the second information to give rise to double jeopardy. Thus, it was once held that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his express consent. It is the conviction or jeopardy of being convicted or the acquittal of the accused or termination of the case that bars further prosecution of the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Tangan v. People, 155 SCRA 435; Citations omitted). 2. It has been repeatedly ruled that a verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal

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doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal (People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159261, February 21, 2007). The above rule however, assumes that the judgment of acquittal was made in accordance with law and procedure because where the proceedings were rigged, and a sham and a mock trial held with a pre-determined judgment of acquittal, the proceedings are unlawful and void ab initio. It is a settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against the setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. Any judgment or decision rendered may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head." In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy (Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43). 3. Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 of Rule 117 presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case. And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal. In one case, the order of the judge was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the information from homicide to murder but not to dismiss the same. The facts show that it was the same original information that was amended by

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merely crossing out the word 'homicide' and writing the word 'murder,' instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case. There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. Despite the arraignment of the accused to the information for homicide, there is no double jeopardy (Pacoy v. Judge Cajigal, 534 SCRA 338). Dismissal or termination must be without the express consent of the accused

1. For the protection against double jeopardy to inure in favor of the accused, the case against the accused must have been previously "dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent" As a general proposition therefore, a dismissal or termination of the case with the express consent of the accused will not prevent another prosecution for the same offense. This conclusion is plain from the phraseology of Sec. 7 of Rule 117 and does not call for any other construction. Hence, if an accused moves for the dismissal alleging that the crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the same was dismissed, the dismissal is with the express consent of the accused and cannot be the basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The dismissal must be without his express consent for double jeopardy to operate (People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722). The motion by the accused which indicates express consent operates as a waiver of his constitutional right against double jeopardy for the reason that he effectively prevents the trial court from proceeding to trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him. The same reasoning applies when the accused moves for dismissal because of the insufficiency of the information to sustain a conviction (Caniza v. People, G.R. No. L-53766, March 18,1988,159 SCRA 16; People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722). 2. Jurisprudence holds that the consent that would preclude another prosecution in order to be deemed an express one should be "positive, direct, unequivocal and requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning" (People v. Vergara, 221 SCRA 567).

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3. The rule is not a new one. In Andres v. Cacdac, L-45650, March 29, 1982, for instance, all the accused claimed that the provisional dismissal of their case should be considered a bar to the subsequent filing of another information against them for the same offense on the ground of double jeopardy. The Court did not find their stance tenable because the records disclose that the accused and their counsel not only consented but also asked for the provisional dismissal of the case. Their act operates as a waiver of their defense of double jeopardy in the second prosecution for the same offense. The Court explained that "When a criminal case is dismissed upon the application and express consent of the accused and his counsel, the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy as he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering judgment of conviction against him." Also, where it appears that the trial court's initial order of dismissal was upon motion of petitioner's counsel hence, made with the express consent of petitioner and that the dismissal was not predicated on a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the accused cannot invoke the right against double jeopardy (Almario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127772, March 22,2001). 4. People v. Espinosa, G.R. Nos. 153714-20, August 15, 2003, well illustrates a successful invocation of the right against double jeopardy because of a dismissal without the express consent of the accused. The antecedent facts disclose that the accused before his arraignment, sought the permission of the court to travel abroad pending the results of the reinvestigation of his cases before the Ombudsman. Before granting its permission, the court required that the accused be "conditionally arraigned." The accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty and thereafter the court granted his Motion to Travel. Subsequently, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the Ombudsman moved to withdraw ex parte the two cases against the accused. The

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court granted the motion to withdraw. When the cases were sought to be reinstated through the filing of informations for malversation, the accused filed a motion to quash invoking double jeopardy and arguing that he had already been arraigned in the previous estafa cases and that the withdrawal of those cases had been granted without his express consent. He also proved that he learned of the motion to withdraw only after the cases had been dismissed. That the accused was not notified of the motion was not disputed by the People. To these arguments, the People countered that the arraignment for the two previous cases was merely "conditional," because it was made solely for the purpose of accommodating the request of the accused to travel abroad while the cases were pending reinvestigation and that by the conditional plea, the accused has waived his right to invoke double jeopardy. The anti-graft court dismissed the criminal cases against the accused on the ground of double jeopardy. In resolving the issue of double jeopardy brought before it by the People, the Supreme Court stressed that a waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy must be clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent. Corollary to this rule, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be simple and unconditional. The Court found that the plea of the accused during arraignment was simple and unconditional punctuated with no other unusual ceremony and stating further that the practice of allowing a conditional plea is not part of the Rules. It is clear, declared the Court unequivocally, that since the dismissal was secured by the People without the express consent of the accused, there is no waiver of the right against double jeopardy in the case. Dismissals equivalent to acquittal even with the consent of the accused; speedy trial; demurrer to evidence

1. Jurisprudence has established the rule that not every dismissal with the consent of the accused would preclude the invocation of the protection against double jeopardy.

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A dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to an acquittal. A waiver of double jeopardy will not apply even if the accused expressly moved for the termination of the proceedings (People v. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142). If the dismissal was predicated on the unreasonable delay in the proceedings in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial, double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused (Condrada v. People, 398 SCRA 482; Esmena v. Pagay, 102 SCRA). The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense (Esmena v. Pogoy, G.R. No. 54110, February 20, 1981 citing Salcedo v. Mendoza, L-49375, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 811; Lagunilia v. Hon. Reyes, etc. and Motas, 111 Phil. 1020 citing People v. Tacneng, 105 Phil. 1298 and People v. Robles, 105 Phil. 1016; See Taladua v. Ochotorena, L-25595, February 15, 1974, 55 SCRA 528; Acebedo v. Sarmiento, L-28025, December 16, 1970, 36 SCRA 247; Baesa v. Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, L-30363, January 30,1971, 37 SCRA 437; People v. Cloribel, 120 Phil. 775; People v. Abafio, 97 Phil. 28; People v. Labatete, 107 Phil 697). The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra v. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela v. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299 cited in Esmena v. Pogoy, G.R. No. 54110, February 20,1981). 2. The invocation of the right to speedy trial should be preceded by insisting on a trial. It was thus held that if the accused wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask not for the dismissal, but ask for the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for postponement of trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the defendant's

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guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant (Andres v. Cacdac, L-45650, March 29,1982). In this regard, Esmeha v. Pogoy, G.R. No. 54110, February 20, 1981, is a classic. In Esmeha, the counsel for the accused told the court that his clients, the accused, are insisting that the case be heard on that day and that they are invoking the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial of the case. Because the fiscal could not present evidence and since the case "had been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" the judge issued an order dismissing the case "provisionally" as to the accused present but not as to the accused who did not appear at the hearing. Twenty-seven days later, the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case arguing that a provisional dismissal with the conformity of the accused lacks "the impress of finality" and, therefore, the case could be revived without the filing of a new information. The judge granted the motion to revive the case but the accused who benefited from the earlier order of dismissal filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. They pointed out that they did not consent to the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the provisional dismissal amounted to an acquittal. Its revival would place them in double jeopardy. The court denied the motion to dismiss. When the order denying the motion to dismiss was assailed by the accused, the Solicitor General agreed with the accused that the revival of the case would place the accused in double jeopardy since the provisional dismissal of the case without their consent was in effect an acquittal. The Court made the observation that in Esmeha, the accused were insisting on a trial. They relied on their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in court. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy but even if the accused, after

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invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal (Citing Es- guerra v. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela v. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299). 3. The discharge of an accused to be a state witness shall amount to an acquittal and shall be a bar to a future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge (Sec. 18, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 4. When the court grants a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, the dismissal amounts to an acquittal. Hence, it was ruled in an early case that "Double jeopardy will apply even if the dismissal is made with the express consent of the accused, or upon his own motion, only if it is predicated on either of two grounds, i.e., insufficiency of the evidence or denied of the right to a speedy trial. In both cases, the dismissal will have the effect of an acquittal. Since the dismissal in this case does not fall under either of these two instances and it was made with the express consent of the accused, it would not thereby be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense" (People v. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142; Condrada v. People, 398 SCRA 482). The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164577, July 5,2010; People v. Tan, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010).

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Double jeopardy in quasi offenses

1. The case of Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17,2010, illustrates the recent application of the doctrine of double jeopardy in quasi offenses governed by Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Here, as a result of a vehicular mishap, Ivler, the petitioner was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court with the following two separate offenses in two informations: (a) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by the respondent (Criminal Case No. 82367); and (b) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the death of the husband of the respondent and damage to the vehicle (Criminal Case 82366). Subsequently, the petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Following the conviction, and invoking said conviction, the petitioner moved to quash the other information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) denied the motion to quash the information on the ground that there is no identity of offenses in the two cases. After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, the petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) through a petition for certiorari after the MeTC denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of the petitioner's absence during the arraignment, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. The petitioner sought

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reconsideration but as of the filing of the petition in the Supreme Court, the motion remained unresolved. Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, the respondent moved to dismiss the pending petition for certiorari in the RTC on the ground of the loss of standing of the petitioner to maintain the suit due to his arrest. Petitioner contested the motion but the RTC dismissed the petition narrowly grounding its ruling on the petitioner's forfeiture of standing to maintain the petition and thus, effectively affirmed the MeTC. The petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. In the Supreme Court, the petitioner lamented the RTC's failure to decide on the merits of his petition for certiorari. The petitioner argued that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense barred his prosecution in the second information having been previously convicted in the other criminal case for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The respondent argues that there is no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC's decision forfeiting petitioner's standing to maintain his petition for certiorari. On the merits, the respondent calls the Court's attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g., slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g., homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge for the slight physical injuries from the charge for homicide and damage to property. One issue sought to be resolved in the Supreme Court was whether or not the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner: The Court explained: "The accused's constitutional right not to be 'twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense' protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid infor

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mation. It is not disputed that petitioner's conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the 'same offense.' Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property 'as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.'" In Ivler, the Court emphasized that the two charges against petitioner, arose from the same facts and were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Art. 365 defining and penalizing qua- si-offenses. The doctrine is that reckless imprudence under Art. 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes. Hence, conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts. Relying on early cases starting with People v. Diaz, 94 Phil. 715 decided in 1954, the Court as in People v. Diaz ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative. The court explained that its consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection of double jeopardy in quasi offenses is not new. And that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not

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be prosecuted again for that same act because the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would he punishable as a felony. The law penalizes the negligent or careless act and not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty and it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions. 2. The ruling in Ivler is not novel. In People v. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954 (also cited in Ivler), the riding was that the dismissal by the Municipal Court of the information alleging acts constituting reckless driving, barred a second information of damage to property through reckless imprudence based on the same negligent act of the accused. 3. In People v. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, "where as the result of the same vehicular accident one man died, two persons were seriously injured while another three suffered only slight physical injuries, [th]e [Court] ruled that the acquittal on a charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution for homicide through reckless imprudence" (Cited in People v. Buan, L-25366, March 29,1968). In People v. Buan, L-25366, March 29,1968, the accused was indicted for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace Court. The charge resulted in his acquittal after a trial on the merits. Before his acquittal, he was charged with serious physical injuries in the Court of First Instance and damage to property through reckless imprudence. There was a consensus that both charges referred to the same incident. The accused moved to quash the information in the CFI on the ground that since he had already been previously acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court, he is now under the protection of

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the rule against double jeopardy. The CFI did not quash the information to which the Court disagreed. Ruled the Court in Buan: "Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions, x x x In People v. Belga, 100 Phil. 996, dismissal of an information for physical injuries through needless imprudence as a result of a collision between two automobiles was declared, to block two other prosecutions, one for damage to property through reckless imprudence and another for multiple physical injuries arising from the same collision. The same doctrine was reasserted in Yap v. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30,1959. In none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court regard as material that the various offenses charged for the same occurrence were triable in Courts of differing category, or that the complainants were not the individuals." When double jeopardy shall not apply despite a prior conviction (Bar 2005)

1. The rule against double jeopardy precludes another prosecution "for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged." Hence, as a rule a conviction for attempted murder will bar a subsequent

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prosecution for frustrated murder of the same person. This is however, only the general rule. 2. Under Sec. 7 of Rule 117, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: (a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge; (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or (c) the plea of guilty to a lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as otherwise provided in Sec. 1(f) of Rule 116. 3. If the accused has already served in whole or in part the judgment under the previous complaint or information, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense (Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court). 4. For instance, if the accused had been convicted of serious physical injuries but after the conviction, the victim died as a result of the very same injuries for which the accused was convicted, double jeopardy cannot be raised as a defense in the prosecution for a graver offense because of Sec. 7(a) of Rule 117. For this provision to apply the graver offense which "supervened" must have arisen out of the same act or omission constituting the former charge. Double jeopardy does not exist because one cannot be in jeopardy for an offense which did not as yet exist at the time of the filing of the first information. Meaning of same offense; when not the same (Bar 1993; 1994)

1. To be in jeopardy, the case against the accused must be terminated by means of a final conviction, acquittal or

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dismissal without his express consent. If the case is not yet terminated, then jeopardy does not set in. After the accused has been put in jeopardy, the filing against him of another charge for the same offense or for an attempt or frustrated stage thereof or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included in the offense originally charged places him in double jeopardy (In the Matter of Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Bernabe Buscayno, Jose Maria Sison and Juliet Sison v. Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, G.R. No. L-58284, November 19,1981). The pronouncements in the cited case are mere reiterations of the principle enunciated in the Rules of Court that the bar under the rule on double jeopardy refers to "another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court). 2. In the context of the rules, "same offense" means the offense charged, or an attempt to commit it or a frustrated stage thereof, or "any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." (In the Matter of Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Bernabe Buscayno, Jose Maria Sison and Juliet Sison v. Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, G.R. No. L-58284, November 19,1981). 3. A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense, x x x Two or more offenses arising from the same act are not the same" "if one provision of law requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the

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other" (Loney v. People, G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006 citing other cases; Italics supplied). 4. In Suero v. People, G.R. No. 156408, January 31, 2005, the Court stressed that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one. Thus, even if the case arose out of the same incident or transaction, the dismissal of one case would not constitute double jeopardy against the accused in the other case if the quantum of evidence required to sustain both cases are not similar. For instance a prosecution under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code and under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 would not infringe the rule against double jeopardy because a comparison of the elements of the crime of falsification of a public document, provided for in Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, and those of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 shows that there is neither identity nor exclusive inclusion between the offenses. Among others, the latter case requires the element of damage while in Falsification of Public Document, damage is of no consequence (Suero v. People, G.R. No. 156408, January 31, 2005). 5. The following are some examples of identical acts but constitute different offenses: (a) Theft of electricity under the Revised Penal Code and violation ofP.D. 401 as amended — Two separate criminal actions were instituted against the accused, one for theft of electricity, and the other, for Violation ofP.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Big. 876. Theft of electricity is a felony defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, while Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Big. 876, is an offense punished by a special law. What generally makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter a crime is the special law enacting it. In addition, the elements of the two (2) offenses are different from one

CHAPTER IX MOTION TO QUASH (Rule 117)

499

another. In theft, the elements are: (1) intent to gain; (2) unlawful taking; (3) personal property belonging to another; (4) and absence of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. On the other hand, the crime of Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Big. 876, is mala prohibita. The criminal act is not inherently immoral but becomes punishable only because the law says it is forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary. While the institution of separate criminal actions under the provisions of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Big. 876, and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on theft may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses; and where there is variance or difference between the elements of an offense in one law and another law, as in the case at bar, there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited; what is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. (Nierras v. Dacuycuy, G.R. Nos. 59568-76, January 11,1990 cited in Diaz v. Davao Light and Power Co., Inc., G.R. No. 160959, April 3, 2007). (b) Illegal recruitment and estafa (Bar 1994) It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is imperative. Estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications,

500

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior/to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud (People v. Comila, G.R. No. 171448, February 28,2007). A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may also be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code provided the elements of estafa are present. Estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage (People of the Philippines v. Nida Adeser y Rico, G.R. No. 179931, October 26,2009). (c) Violation ofB.P. Big. 22 and estafa Will the conviction of an accused for estafa be a bar to a prosecution for violation of B.P. Big. 22 for issuing the same bouncing checks? The Supreme court in a host of cases answered the query in the negative because of the difference in the elements of the two offenses. Deceit and damage are essential elements in Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, but are not required in B.P. Big. 22. To constitute estafa under the Revised Penal Code, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation; as such, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check, whether postdated or not. It must be shown that the person to whom the check was delivered

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CHAPTER IX MOTION TO QUASH (Rule 117)

501

would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the other party. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a preexisting obligation. Under B.P. Big. 22, the mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence, punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523) which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under B.P. Big. 22 even if he had issued the same for Si pre-existing obligation, while under Art. 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of B.P. Big. 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of B.P. Big. 22 are mala prohibita (Nierras vs. Daeuycuy, 181 SCRA 1). While the filing of the two sets of information under the provisions of B.P. Big. 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited.

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What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy (Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 citing People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570; People v. Crescencia, 228 SCRA 13). (d) Direct bribery defined and punished under Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code and those of violation of Section 3(b) ofR.A. 3019 One may be charged with violation of R.A. 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Revised Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of R.A. 3019 and the Revised Penal Code. The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and those of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 (Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to in-

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CHAPTER IX MOTION TO QUASH (Rule 117)

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tervene under the law), shows that there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses. The violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do. Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance between the elements of the offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy proceeds from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one (Meren- cillo v. People, G.R. Nos. 142369-70, April 13,2007). Provisional dismissal; requisites (Bar 2003)

1. The concept of a provisional dismissal contemplates that the dismissal of the criminal action is not permanent and can be revived within the period set by the Rules of Court. 2. "The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the State and

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the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings (Citing United States v. Mann, 201 F. Supp. 208; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514). It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor, (Citing United States v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620) especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire. "The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or non-availability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult (Citing Dickey v. State of Florida, 398 U.S. 30). The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime. "On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence.

CHAPTER IX MOTION TO QUASH (Rule 117)

He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system" (People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003). 3. Sec. 8 of Rule 117 has two parts divided into two paragraphs, thus: First paragraph: "A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party." Second paragraph'. "The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived." 4. The application of the second paragraph referred to by the Supreme Court as the "time-bar" requires compliance with the requisites mandated by the first paragraph. Thus, under the Rules of Court, for a case to be provisionally dismissed, that is, for the case to be considered as having been provisionally dismissed, the following requisites mentioned in the first paragraph should concur: (a)

There must be express consent of the accused;

(b)

There must be notice to the offended party.

5. Note again, that without complying with the above requisites, the dismissal will not trigger the operation of the "time-bar" rule in the second paragraph of Sec. 8 of Rule 117. The case may thus be revived even after the periods stated in the second paragraph of Sec. 8, Rule 117 subject of course to the defense of prescription or the defense of double jeopardy if applicable under the circumstances.

505

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The requirement that there be an "express consent of the accused" is obviously intended to prevent any objection based on the rule on double jeopardy when the provisionally dismissed case is revived. Note that under Sec. 7 of Rule 117, double jeopardy will apply only if the case is dismissed without the express consent of the accused. Time bar rule; when provisional dismissal becomes permanent under Rule 117

1.

The dismissal shall become permanent if:

(a) the case is not revived within one (1) year after the issuance of the order of provisional dismissal with respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount or both; or (b) the case is not revived within two (2) years after the issuance of the order of provisional dismissal with respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years (Sec. 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court). Thus, within the periods stated, the prosecution has to revive the case if it desires to prevent the provisional dismissal becoming permanent and the revival of the case being time- barred. 2. The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or another crime necessarily included therein. He is spared from the anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses in any new indictments. The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year periods provided that there

CHAPTER IX MOTION TO QUASH (Rule 117)

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is a justifiable necessity for the delay (People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1,2003). Effect of People v. Lacson

1. People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1,2003 has interpreted and in effect expanded the requisites under Sec. 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the following requirements are conditions sine qua non for the application of the time-bar rule: (a) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional ([sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (b) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (c) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; (d) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. 2. People v. Lacson made the following rulings: (a) "The raison d' etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. xxx (b) "Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance ^ereo/*without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. (c) Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent." Note: Lacson and his co-accused, according to the Court, could not benefit from the "time-bar" under Sec. 8 of Rule 117 because Sec. 8 of Rule 117 was not complied with. Hence, there was no provisional dismissal to speak of. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. Not even the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss. What the accused filed was a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses. This motion cannot be construed as indicative of an express consent to the dismissal. Notably, the Court found that the heirs of the victims were not even notified thereof prior to the hearing on the motion filed by respondent. (d) "A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods

CHAPTER IX MOTION TO QUASH (Rule 117)

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subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations. (e) "The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation." However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter- affidavits and evidence. After all, "the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute" (People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003) Suggested readings: Sy v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 334; Lava v. Gonzales, 11 SCRA 650; Bandiala v. CFI of Misamis Occidental, 35 SCRA 237; Luciano v. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187; Teehankee v. Madayag, 207 SCRA 134. (f) "x x x Sec. 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce,

510 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

and diminish the State's substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder." Withdrawal of information distinguished from a motion to dismiss

A motion filed by a prosecutor to withdraw an information differs from a motion to dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court, their legal effect varies. The order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon reinvestigation. On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves finality. A motion to dismiss when filed thus puts into place the time-bar rule on provisional dismissal. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is provisional dismissal when a motion filed expressly for that purpose complies with the following requisites, viz.: (1) It must be with the express consent of the accused; and (2) There must be notice to the offended party. Sec. 8, Rule 117 contemplates the filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw information. Thus, the rule on provisional dismissal does not apply to a motion to withdraw an information (Torres v. Aguinaldo, 461 SCRA 599).

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Chapter X PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE (Rules 118-119) A. PRE-TRIAL (RULE 118) (Bar 1986; 1989; 2004; 2008) Courts in which pre-trial is mandatory

In all criminal cases, pre-trial is mandatory in the following courts: (a) Sandiganbayan, (b) Regional Trial Court, (c)

Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (Sec. 1, Rule 118, Rules of Court).

Matters to be considered during the pre-trial; purposes

The pre-trial is held for the purpose of considering the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c)

marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and

511

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case (Sec. 1, Rule 118, Rules of Court; Sees. 2 and 3, Cir. 38- 98). When pre-trial shall be held

1. Pre-trial shall be held after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court (Sec. 1, Rule 118, Rules of Court). 2. After the arraignment, the Court shall set the pretrial conference within thirty (30) days from the date of arraignment, and issue an order containing the following: (a) Requiring the private offended party to appear for purposes of plea bargaining and for other matters requiring his presence, except in cases for violations of the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002; (b) Referring the case to the Branch Clerk of Court, if warranted for a preliminary conference to be set at least three (3) days prior to the pre-trial to mark the documents or exhibits to be presented by the parties and copies thereof to be attached to the records after comparison and to consider other matters as may aid in its prompt disposition; and (c) Informing the parties that no evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial other than those identified and marked during the pre-trial except when allowed by the court for good cause shown. In mediatiable cases, the judge shall refer the parties and their counsel to the PMC unit for purposes of mediation if available (I-B[2J, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective August 16, 2004). Non-appearance in the pre-trial conference; consequences If the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear in the pre-trial conference, the court may impose the

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proper sanctions or penalties, if the counsel or prosecutor absent does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation (Sec. 3, Rule 118, Rules of Court; Sec. 4, Speedy Trial Act of1998). Duty of the Branch Clerk of Court

During the preliminary conference, the Branch Clerk of Court shall (a) assist the parties in reaching a settlement of the civil aspect of the case, (b) mark the documents to be presented as exhibits and copies thereof attached to the records after comparison, (c) ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents marked as exhibits, and (d) consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the case (I-B[3J, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective August 16, 2004). Recording of the minutes

The proceedings during the preliminary conference shall be recorded in the Minutes of Preliminary Conference to be signed by both parties and counsel. The minutes and the exhibits shall be attached by the Branch Clerk of Court to the case record before the pre-trial (I-B[3J, AM. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective August 16,2004). Duty of the judge before the pre-trial conference

Before the pre-trial conference, the judge must study the allegations of the information, the statements in the affidavits of witnesses and other documents which form part of the record of the preliminary investigation (I-B[4], A.M. No. 03-1- 09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective August 16,2004). Duty of the judge when plea bargaining is agreed upon; prosecution and offended party agree to the plea

1. During the pre-trial, the trial judge shall consider plea-bargaining arrangements, except in cases for violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (I-B[5], A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13,2004, effective August 16,2004).

514

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

2. If a plea bargaining is agreed upon, the court shall (a)

issue an order to that effect;

(b) proceed to receive evidence on the civil aspect of the case; and (c) render and promulgate judgment of conviction, including the civil liability or damages duly established by the evidence (I-B[5], A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective August 16,2004). Duty of the judge when plea bargaining fails

When plea bargaining fails, the judge shall adopt the minutes of the preliminary conference as part of the pre-trial proceedings, confirm the markings of exhibits, admissions of genuineness and due execution of documents, list object and testimonial evidence, scrutinize every allegation in the information, scrutinize affidavits and documents forming parts of the records of the preliminary investigation, define factual issues, ask parties to agree on specific dates for the trial, require the parties to submit the names, addresses and contact numbers of witnesses to be summoned, consider modification of the trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense (I-B[5-6J, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective August 16,2004). Asking questions during the pre-trial

During the pre-trial, the judge shall be the one to ask the questions on issues raised therein and all questions must be directed to him to avoid hostilities between the parties (IB[7], A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective August 16, 2004). Pre-trial agreements; signing of admissions made

1. All agreements and admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be (a) reduced in writing, and (b) signed by the accused and counsel. If this is not followed, such admissions cannot be used against the accused (I-B[8], A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective August 16,2004).

CHAPTER X PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND DEMURRER (Rules 118-119)

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All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded, the transcripts prepared and the minutes signed by the parties and/or their counsels (I-B[9], A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective August 16,2004). 2. The same rule is embodied in Sec. 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court. Under said provision all agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall (a) be reduced to writing, (b) signed by both the accused and counsel, and (c) must be approved by the court if the agreement covers the matters under Sec. 1 of Rule 118 (Sec. 2, Rule 118, Rules of Court). If these requirements in "a" and "b" are not complied with, said agreements or admissions cannot be used against the accused (Sec. 2, Rule 118, Rules of Court). Pre-trial order

Within ten (10) days after the termination of the pretrial, the trial judge shall issue a Pre-trial Order setting forth the actions taken during the pre-trial conference, the facts stipulated, the admissions made, the evidence marked, the number of witnesses to be presented and the schedule of the trial. The Pre-trial order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of the action during the trial unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice (I-B[10J, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, effective August 16, 2004; Sec. 4, Rule 118, Rules of Court; Sec. 5, Speedy Trial Act of1998). Pre-trial in a civil case vs. pre-trial in a criminal case

1. The pre-trial in a civil case is preceded by a motion ex parte filed by the plaintiff to set the case for pre-trial (Sec. 1, Rule 18, Rules of Court). Such motion is not required from the prosecution in a criminal case (Rule 118, Rules of Court). 2. The pre-trial in a civil case is set by the court after the requisite motion from the plaintiff after all pleadings have been served and filed (Sec. 1, Rule 18, Rules of Court). In a criminal case, the pre-trial shall be held after arraignment

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and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court (Sec. 1, Rule 118, Rules of Court). 3. The purposes of pre-trial in a civil case are not identical with the purposes of a pre-trial in a criminal case, the most significant of which is the purpose of considering the possibility of amicable settlement or of submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution (Sec. 2[aJ, Rule 18, Rules of Court). Such is not a purpose of a pre-trial in a criminal case under Sec. 1 of Rule 118. 4. In a civil case, the sanction for non-appearance is imposed upon the non-appearing party (Sec. 5, Rule 18, Rules of Court). In a criminal case, the sanction is upon the counsel or the prosecutor upon whom "proper sanctions or penalties" may be imposed for non-appearance in case of failure to offer an acceptable excuse for lack of cooperation (Sec. 3, Rule 118, Rules of Court). 5. In a civil case, the parties are required to file and serve their respective pre-trial briefs (Sec. 6, Rule 18, Rules of Court). In a criminal case, Rule 118 does not mention the submission of pre-trial briefs. 6. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, issued on July 13, 2004, and made effective on August 16, 2004, all proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded. The minutes of each pre-trial conference shall contain matters taken up therein more particularly admissions of facts and exhibits and shall be signed by the parties and their counsel. In a criminal case, there is a strict warning. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 118, all agreements or admissions made or entered shall not only be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel but it further provides that"otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused"(I-B[8], A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC). Effect of the pre-trial order

The pre-trial order shall (a) bind the parties, (b) limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and (c) control the course of

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the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice (Sec. 4, Rule 118, Rules of Court; Sec. 5, Speedy Trial Act of1998). Judicial dispute resolution (JDR); purposes

1. The explanatory note of A.M. No. 04-1-12-SC-Philja declares that "Despite the priority given Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the amicable settlement of cases, most judges go through the function of exploring settlement perfunctorily for various reasons, including fear of being disqualified if he goes into the process more intensively. Thus, it is the intention of the JURIS Project to restore the importance of this priority and install innovative procedures that will remove such apprehension." 2. The concept of Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) is an innovative concept in the judicial system and by it "it is hoped that mediation and conciliation at the level of the judge would contribute significantly to the resolution of mediatable cases, thereby increasing the satisfaction of litigants in the court process and also helping to decongest the dockets of the judiciary." Another goal is to strengthen conciliation during the pre-trial stage in order to expedite the resolution of cases. Stages in the judicial proceedings with JDR; confidentiality

Judicial proceedings shall be divided into two stages, namely: (a) from the filing of a complaint, to the conduct of CAM (Court-Annexed Mediation) and JDR during the pre-trial stage; and (b) pre-trial proper to trial and judgment. 2. The judge to whom the case has been originally raffled shall preside over the first stage. He shall be called the JDR judge. Parties will be more spontaneous once they are assured that the JDR judge will not be the one to try the case. As such, the general rule is that the JDR shall not preside over the trial of the same case when mediation did not succeed.

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As a mediator and conciliator, the judge facilitates the settlement discussions between parties and tries to reconcile their differences. As a neutral evaluator, the judge assesses the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party's case and makes a non-binding and impartial evaluation of the chances of each party's success in the case. On the basis of his neutral evaluation, the judge persuades the parties to reconsider their prior reluctance to settle their case amicably. The entire process comprises JDR (A.M. No. 04-1-12-SC- Philja. — Re: Philja Resolution No. 06-22, Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of an Enhanced Pre-Trial Proceeding under the JURIS Project, as Amended, August 29,2006). 3. The mediation process is designed to be confidential. In order to safeguard the confidentiality of mediation proceedings, the JDR judge shall not pass on any information obtained in the course of conciliation, early neutral evaluation, or mediation to the trial judge or to any other person. All JDR conferences shall be conducted in private. The JDR judge may, however, confer in confidence with the mediator who previously mediated the case, merely for the purpose of determining unresolved issues (A.M. No. 04-1-12-SC-Philja. — Re: Philja Resolution No. 06-22, Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of an Enhanced Pre-Trial Proceeding under the JURIS Project, as Amended, August 29, 2006). Cases subject to mediation for JDR

(a) All civil cases, settlement of estates, and cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, except those which by law may not be compromised; Criminal cases like violation of traffic rules and regulations and violation of municipal or city ordinances although included in the list of cases under summary procedure should not be mediated because they cannot be compromised and might be a source of corruption if mediation pushes through. (b) Cases cognizable by the Lupong Tagapamayapa under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law;

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(c) The civil aspect of B.P. Big. 22 cases; (d) The civil aspect of quasi-offenses under Title 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Examples of quasi offenses: (i) Cases covered are acts committed by reckless or simple imprudence or negligence resulting for example in slight, less serious or serious physical injuries; (ii) Imprudence resulting in damage to property; and, (iii) Reckless or simple imprudence with violation of the motor vehicle law. (e) The civil aspect of estafa and libel under the proposed circular amending A.M. No. 04-1-12-SC; (f) The civil aspect of theft, under Art. 308 of the Revised Penal Code, as part of the cases for referral to mediation. Salient features of the suggested JDR process

1. The judge conducting the JDR is called the JDR judge instead of pre-trial judge because under the revised guidelines, pre-trial proper is resumed after JDR, but this time, to be conducted by the trial judge instead of the judge who conducted the JDR but the JDR judge may preside over the trial proceedings upon joint request of both parties. The JDR acts as the mediator, conciliator and neutral evaluator as the conditions may warrant, in order to effect a settlement of the case. 2. Taking of notes is strictly limited for the personal consumption of the judge and should not form part of the records of the case, to preserve confidentiality. 3. The timeline for mediation is 60 days for the second level courts and 30 days for the first level courts.

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4. If the judge feels that the lawyers are not fully convinced about the settlement process but there is a great chance of settlement, the judge may talk to the parties first without their lawyers. Talking to each party separately (caucus) may also be employed if the parties seem to be reaching an impasse. 5. The plaintiff (preferably, and in his own words) would tell his side of the story and the defendant (preferably, and in his own words) would tell his side of the story. 6. Based on their stories, the judge would try to summarize the main issues in contention, and try to probe the various interests of the parties at play. The judge could facilitate the creation of options that would provide solutions to the dispute, or even actively propose solutions or options. 7. Where a settlement is reached, the parties immediately comply with the agreement. This usually happens if the dispute involves a money claim and the defendant opts to pay the sum in full at once. In this event, the parties through their counsel may choose to submit a manifestation on the satisfaction of claims and the mutual withdrawal of the complaint and counterclaim. The judge could then dismiss the case based on this fact. 8. Where the parties agree to settle and comply in the future and compliance of the settlement is for compliance at some future date, then a compromise agreement is secured. The following steps may be followed: a. Drafting of a compromise agreement by the parties, with the assistance of their lawyers; b. Prior to the signing, the judge may opt to explain the contents to the parties and make sure that they understand what they are signing, to obviate repudiation at some future date; c. Signing of the compromise agreement and the filing of a joint motion to approve the compromise; d. Judge approves the compromise agreement and renders a judgment based on compromise;

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e. Copy of the judgment based on compromise is sent to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) for statistical purposes. In the criminal cases covered by mediation, where settlement on the civil aspect has been reached but the period of payment in accordance with the terms of settlement exceeds one (1) year, the case may be archived upon motion of the prosecution with concurrence of the private complainant and approval by the judge. 9. If there is no settlement reached after the JDR, the judge issues an order returning the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court for raffling and the clerk raffles the case to another judge who will conduct the pre-trial proper and trial, until the case is decided. 10. A copy of the order referring the case to the Office of the Clerk of court raffle should be furnished the Philippine Mediation Center for statistical purposes (Operations Manual For Judicial Dispute Resolution [JDR] in the First And Second Level Courts of the Philippine Judicial System, Feb. 10, 2006; A.M. No. 04-1-12-SC — Guidelines for the Implementation of an Enhanced Pre-trial Proceeding through Conciliation and Neutral Evaluation; A.M. No. 04-1-12-SC-Philja. — Re: Philja Resolution No. 06-22, Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of an Enhanced Pre-Trial Proceeding under the JURIS Project, as Amended, August 29, 2006). Court-annexed mediation guidelines

In a Resolution dated March 9, 2004, the Supreme Court adopted A.M. No. 04-3-05-SC Re: Guidelines for Parties' Counsel in Court-Annexed Mediation. The guidelines are thus quoted as follows: 1. "Re-orientation of attitudes towards dispute" Litigation is based on the attitude that disputes involve rights and remedies that are fought through the adversarial system of justice for which lawyers have been specially trained for. When litigation is shifted to mediation, a different attitude

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is called for that would view the dispute as a problem-solving opportunity for lawyers to assist the parties resolve their differences in ways that are productive for their future lives. 2. "Re-orientation of lawyer's role in mediation" "It is important to stress that the lawyer's role as counsel for a party radically changes as the mode of dispute resolution shifts from adjudication to mediation. The premise must be accepted that counsel must drop his combative role in adjudication and view his new role in mediation as a collaborator with the other counsel in working together toward the common goal of helping their clients resolve their differences to their mutual advantage. Whereas he is clearly dominant injudicial trials, he must now accept a less directive role to allow the parties more opportunities to craft their own agreement. He must shift gears and accept the role of an adviser or consultant. After understanding and accepting his new role in the mediation process, he must help the client also comprehend and appreciate the mediation process and its benefits, as well as the client's greater personal responsibility for the success of mediation in resolving the dispute. 3. " Preparation for participation in mediation9 "Upon receipt from the trial court of the order to proceed to mediation, counsel shall confer and discuss with his client the following: (a) the mediation process as essentially a negotiation between the parties assisted by their respective counsel, and facilitated by a mediator, stressing its difference from litigation, its advantage and benefits, the client's heightened role in mediation and responsibility for its success and explaining the new role of the lawyer. as:

(b)

the substance of the upcoming mediation, such

(i) the substantive issues involved in their dispute with the other party and their prioritization in terms of importance to client.

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(ii) study of the other side's position in relation to the issues with a view to understanding the underlying fears, concerns and needs underneath said position. (iii) information or facts to be gathered or sought from the other side or to be exchanged that are necessary for informed decision making. (iv) possible bargaining options but stressing the need to be open-minded about other possibilities. (v) the best, worst, and most likely alternatives to a negotiated agreement. 4. *Participation in the mediation sessions" During the initial mediation session (before the court- accredited mediator) when the mediator introduces the parties to the process of mediation, it is helpful for the lawyers to give support to the mediator so that their clients fully understand the rules and processes of mediation. To contribute to the success of mediation, the lawyers must allow their clients to take responsibility for making decisions during the negotiations within the mediation process. The lawyers must restrain themselves from dominating the process and instead allow their clients to take the initiative in discussions and create various options that are relevant to their own personal interests. However, if the client is unable to bargain effectively and it appears that he is on the short-end of the power imbalance, and the mediator is not doing enough to even up this imbalance, the lawyer may have to take a somewhat more active role in the process. Where necessary, a lawyer may ask for a recess, as often as may be necessary, in order to give advice or suggestions to client in private. Should mediation before the court-accredited mediator fail, and the case is referred back to the Court, the lawyer may have to take a more active role during the mediation proceedings before the judge.

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5. "Assistance in preparing a compromise agreement or withdrawal of complaint and satisfaction of claim" The lawyers shall assist the mediator in putting in writing the terms of the compromise agreement that the parties have entered into and seeing to it that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy so that the same may be approved by the trial court for a judgment based upon a compromise. The lawyers shall pay particular attention to issues of voluntary compliance with what has been agreed upon or otherwise, to issues of enforcement. Where applicable, the lawyers shall assist in the preparation of a manifestation of mutual satisfaction of claims and counterclaims as basis for the court to issue an order of dismissal. Discovery procedures in criminal cases

1. There is no rule which precludes the use of relevant modes of discovery in a criminal case. The modes of discovery are applicable no doubt to civil proceedings which necessarily include the civil aspect of a criminal case. Be it noted that a person criminally liable for a felony, is by the terms of Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code, also civilly liable. Be it further noted that provisional remedies are available in connection with the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action pursuant to Rule 127. No cogent reason exists to exclusively confine the use of modes of discovery to civil cases. An examination of the provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure disclose that the rules allow the production and inspection of material evidence in possession of the prosecution under Sec. 10 of Rule 116 (Arraignment). This provision is substantially equivalent to Rule 27, a mode of discovery on the production or inspection of documents or things. In Sec. 11 of Rule 116, arraignment may be suspended, among others if the accused appears to be suffering from an

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unsound mental condition. Where one issue in the criminal case is the mental condition of the accused, an examination could be conducted under the spirit of Rule 28, another mode of discovery. The tenor of Sec. 11 of Rule 116 clearly confers an authority upon the court to order a mental examination of the accused and to order his confinement if necessary. Determining the mental condition of the witness through an examination is no doubt a discovery procedure. A further examination of the Rules of Court will likewise reveal that the rule on depositions in Sec. 1 of Rule 24 allows the perpetuation of one's own testimony or that of another person regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of the Philippines. The terms, "any matter" are sufficiently broad to cover criminal proceedings cognizable by Philippine courts. To claim that such matters have reference to civil cases only is to stretch the rules of logic too far. 2. In the case of People v. Hubert Webb, 312 SCRA 573, the Court ruled that the taking of depositions in criminal cases is addressed to judicial discretion. In this case, the respondent filed a motion to take the testimony by oral deposition of several witnesses in the United States but the motion was denied by the trial court on the ground that the same is not allowed by the Rules. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Dissatisfied, respondent elevated his cause to the Court of Appeals. In a decision predicated upon the constitutional grounds of due process and the right of an accused to present his evidence and for the production of evidence in his behalf and also on the theory that the modes of discovery likewise applies to criminal cases, the CA set aside the ruling of the trial court. The Supreme Court did not directly make pronouncements on whether or not the modes of discovery apply to criminal proceedings. Neither did it also declare that the modes of discovery cannot be employed in criminal cases. The Court's decision initially centered on the reasoning that the depositions proposed to be taken from the U.S. based

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witnesses "would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in denying respondent's motion to take them, the trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record." It recognized the power of a court "to stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive." Needless to state, explained the Court, the trial court can not be faulted with lack of caution in denying respondent's motion considering that under the prevailing facts of the case, respondent had more than ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense. The Court continued: "The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The deposition taking cannot be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons. Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. There is no indication in this case that in denying the motion of respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in a biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. Grave abuse of discretion . . . implies such capricious, and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act all in contemplation of law" (Underscoring supplied). B. TRIAL (Rule 119) When trial shall commence

1. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order (Sec. 1, Rule 119, Rules of Court).

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2. If the accused is to be tried again pursuant to an order for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from notice of the order granting a new trial. This period may be extended to one not exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days from notice of the order if the period becomes impractical due to unavailability of witnesses and other factors (Sec. 5, Rule 119, Rules of Court). Summary of periods

1. Arraignment — Within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the accused but the time of the pendency of the motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period (Sec. l[g], Rule 116, Rules of Court). When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the complaint or information. The accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from the date of the raffle (Sec. I[B]I, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, Sec. 1(e), Rule 116). 2. Pre-trial — After arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court (Sec. 1, Rule 118, Rules of Court). If the accused is under preventive detention, the pre-trial shall be held within ten (10) days after arraignment unless a law provides for a shorter period (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, IB[1J). 3. Trial — The general period applicable is thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order (Sec. 1, Rule 119, Rules of Court). Time to prepare for trial

After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial (Sec. 1, Rule 119, Rules of Court).

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Effect of not bringing the accused to trial within the prescribed period

1. If the accused is not brought to trial in accordance within the time limit set by the Rules of Court, the information may be dismissed upon motion of the accused. The ground for the dismissal is the denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall however, have the burden of proving the ground for his motion. On the other hand, the prosecutor shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish that the delay belongs to the exclusion of time mentioned in Sec. 3 of Rule 119. Note that in case of dismissal on the ground of denial of the right to speedy trial, the dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy (Sec. 9, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 2. The motion for dismissal must be made prior to trial, otherwise the failure to do so shall be deemed a waiver of the right to have the charge dismissed (Sec. 9, Rule 119, Rules of Court). Delays to be excluded from computing the period for commencement of the trial; some examples

There are certain delays which should not be included in counting the period for commencement of a trial. Such delays include but are not limited to the following: (a) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the accused; (b) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the accused; (c) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders; (d) Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; provided that the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days; (e) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

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(f) Delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a prejudicial question; (g) Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement; (h) Delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness; an essential witness is considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. He shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; (i) Delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical inability of the accused to stand trial; (j) Delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge if the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense; (k) Delay which is reasonable when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or, as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for separate trial has been granted; (1) Delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial (Sec. 3, Rule 119, Rules of Court). When delay or suspension of trial is justified by reason of the absence of a witness 1. Under Sec. 3 of Rule 119, certain periods of delay are excluded in computing the time within which trial must

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commence. These exclusions would actually justify suspension of the trial. One of these exclusions refers to the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness as described in Sec. 3, (b) of Rule 119. 2. To justify the delay, the witness cannot be just any witness. The rule describes such witness as an "essential" witness. "Essential" means 'indispensable,' 'necessary' or 'important in the highest degree' (Black's Law dictionary, 5th Edition, p. 490). 3. "Absence" and "unavailability" are not considered synonymous. The rule in Sec. 3(b) of Rule 119 considers an essential witness absent in either of the following situations: (a) his whereabouts are unknown; or (b) his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. A witness, on the other hand, shall be considered unavailable even if his whereabouts are known provided that his presence for the trial cannot be obtained by due diligence (Sec. 3[b], Rule 119). Continuous trial

As a rule, once commenced, the trial shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated but it may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause. To ensure speedy trial, the court shall set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time. The court shall do so after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel (Sec. 2, Rule 119, Rules of Court). Trial period

In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court (Sec. 2, Rule 119, Rules of Court).

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Postponement or continuance

A continuance may, among others, be granted if continuing the proceeding is impossible or would result in a miscarriage of justice (Sec. 4[a], Rule 119, Rules of Court). Factors to be considered for granting continuances or postponements

Postponements are subject to judicial discretion. There are certain factors, among others, which the court shall consider in determining whether or not to grant a continuance. These are: (a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance would likely make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice; or (b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established therein (Sec. 4, Rule 119, Rules of Court). Prohibited grounds for a continuance

The rule prohibits a continuation based on the following grounds: (a) congestion of the court's calendar or due to lack of diligent preparation; or (b) failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the prosecutor (Sec. 4, Rule 119, Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 3[fl, Rule 119). Conditipnal examination of witnesses even before trial

1. Witnesses for the accused may be conditionally examined even before the trial of the case. A witness for the accused may for instance, be sick or infirm and there is no reasonable ground to believe that he will be able to attend the trial because of his condition. The witness, although not sick or infirm, may reside more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial and has no means to attend the trial or

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there are other circumstances that exist that would make him unavailable during the trial or prevent him from attending the same. Under any of above conditions, the accused may file a motion, with notice to the other parties, to have his witness conditionally examined. The motion shall state: (a) the name and residence of the witness; (b) the substance of his testimony; and (c) the reason or reasons for his inability to attend the trial. If the court is satisfied that the examination of the witness is necessary, it shall issue an order to that effect and a copy of said order shall be served on the prosecutor at least three (3) days before the scheduled examination. If the prosecutor does not appear despite notice, the examination shall proceed notwithstanding his absence. The examination shall be taken before a judge, or if not practicable, before a member of the bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order. It may also be taken before an inferior court if the order is made by a court of superior jurisdiction. A written record of the testimony shall be taken (Sec. 12, 13, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 2. The prosecution may also have its witness conditionally examined if it satisfactorily appears that the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning. The conditional examination shall be made before the court where the case is pending and shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. It shall be made in the presence of the accused who shall be notified of the same. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after due notice shall be considered a waiver and the statement taken therein may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused (Sec. 15, Rule 119, Rules of Court). How to secure appearance of a material witness (Bar 1994; 1999)

1. Either party may, upon motion, secure an order from the court for a material witness to post bail for such sum as

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may be deemed proper, if the court is satisfied upon either (a) proof, or (b) oath that a material witness will not testify when required (Sec. 14, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 2. If the witness refuses to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken (Sec. 14, Rule 119, Rules of Court). Discharge of accused to be a state witness; requisites (Bar 1988; 1990; 1994; 2006)

1. When two or more accused are jointly charged for an offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the court upon motion of the prosecutor or any accused, orders a separate trial for one or more of the accused (Sec. 16, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 2. One or more of the accused tried jointly with the others, may however, be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state. For this purpose, the prosecutor shall comply with the following: (a) file a motion for the discharge of the accused; and (b) file the motion before the prosecution rests its case (Sec. 17, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 3. The court upon receipt of the motion shall require the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness. The court shall conduct a hearing in support of the discharge. The court, after hearing may direct that one or more of the accused be discharged, if the court is satisfied that: (Bar 2006) (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) That there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

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(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude (Sec. 17, Rule 119, Rules of Court; Salvanera v. People, 523 SCRA 147, June 21, 2007). (Bar 1990; 1994) 4. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime (Salvanera v. People, 523 SCRA 147, June 21, 2007). Evidence adduced during the discharge hearing

The evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial (Sec. 17, Rule 119, Rules of Court). If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 17, Rule 119, Rules of Court). Effect of discharge of an accused to be a state witness; acquittal

The discharge of an accused shall amount to an acquittal and shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, except if the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co- accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge (Sec. 18, Rule 119, Rules of Court). Mistake in charging the proper offense

Sec. 19 of Rule 119 contemplates a situation where there has been a mistake in charging the proper offense and this mistake has become manifest at any time before judgment. Because of this mistake, the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or any other offense necessarily included therein. The accused shall not be discharged if there is good cause to detain him. The original case shall be dismissed upon the filing of the proper information and the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense. (Sec. 19, Rule 119, Rules of Court).

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Order of trial

The trial shall proceed in the following order: 1. The prosecution shall present its evidence first (a) to prove the charge, and (b) to prove the civil liability in the proper case. Note: In Dangerous Drugs Cases, it is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete picture detailing the buy- bust operation—from the initial contact between the poseur- buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale (People v. Ong, 544 SCRA 123, February 6,2008). 2. The accused will then present his evidence to prove his defense and the damages he sustained, if any, arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case; 3. The prosecution may present its rebuttal evidence unless the court the court allows it to present additional evidence bearing on the main issue; 4. The accused may present sur-rebuttal evidence, unless the court allows him to present additional evidence bearing on the main issue; 5. Upon submission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda (Sec. 11, Rule 119, Rules of Court). Modification of the order of trial; reverse trial (Bar 2007)

The order of the trial may be modified when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense. (Sec. life], Rule 119, Rules of Court; Sec. l[e], Rule 118, Rules of Court). Reopening of the proceedings

1. At any time before the finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a

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miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it (Sec. 24, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 2. A motion to reopen the case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from long, established usage. This lack of a specific provision was remedied by the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Sec. 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order (Cabarles v. Maceda, 516 SCRA 303, February 20,2007). 3. Participation by the defense counsel in cross-examining the witness for the prosecution and in the proceedings after the case was reopened by the judge without prior hearing does not amount to a waiver of the accused's objection to the order reopening the case — to be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal (Cabarles v. Maceda, 516 SCRA 303, February 20,2007). Trial in absentia (Bar 1998)

1. An accused need not always be present in every hearing although it is his right to -be present if he so desires from arraignment to the rendition of the judgment. This right to be present is subsumed under his constitutional right to meet the witnesses against him face to face and other rights of the accused guaranteed in Sec. 14(2) of the Bill of Rights. 2. While the right to be present may be waived like any other right, the rule should not be taken to mean that the accused may, as a rule, be tried in his absence (trial in absentia). He can only be tried in absentia when the following requisites concur:

CHAPTER X PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND DEMURRER (Rules 118-119)

(a) the accused has already been arraigned; (b) the accused has been duly notified of the trial or hearings; and (c) the absence of the accused or his failure to appear is unjustified (Sec. 14[2], Art. Ill, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines; Bernardo v. People, 520 SCRA 332, April 4,2007). Instances when the presence of the accused is required

1. In the following instances, the presence of the accused is required: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and

(c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived (People v. J oven de Grano, et al., G.R. No. 167710, June 5,2009). 2. Recall that Sec. 1(b) of Rule 116 requires that the "accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea.n Also, a judgment is promulgated by reading it "in the presence of the accused x x x . The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision." The presence of the accused would not be required in a conviction for a light offense. In which case the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative (Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court; Italics supplied). Common reason suggests that the prosecution must be afforded the right to identify the accused as the perpetrator

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of the offense and the very person named or described in the complaint or information because rights during the trial are not designed to be for the accused alone. Due process is meant for both the People and the accused and identification of the accused in open court is one of the essential elements in proving the People's case. Some rules on witness' credibility

1. It is settled that contradictions between the contents of an affiant's affidavit and his testimony in the witness stand do not always militate against the witness' credibility. Affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate (Resayo v. People, 522 SCRA 391, April 27,2007). 2. It is axiomatic that truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. While the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessarily with the greatest number (Ceniza-Manantan v. People, 531 SCRA 364, August 28,2007). Comments and questions of the judge during the trial

1. On this matter, the case of Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, declared: "The Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But not only should his examination be limited to asking clarificatory questions, the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of trial... hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta.... The °cold neutrality of an impartial judge* requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peral-

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ta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate... A substantial portion of the TSN was incorporated in the majority opinion not to focus on "numbers" alone, but more importantly to show that the court questions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from the common standard of fairness and impartiality." (emphasis added) 2. In a case, the accused contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to an impartial tribunal, quoting extensively the sarcastic remarks that the trial court made during the hearing. However, the Supreme Court stated that although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and comments, the same did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial trial. A perusal of the transcript as a whole would show that the remarks do not reflect any partiality on the trial court. The remarks were not made out of context. Most probably, the trial judge was peeved at the strategy adopted by the accused. The trial judge cannot be faulted for having made those remarks, notwithstanding the sarcastic tone it impressed. Sarcasm alone cannot lead to the conclusion that the judge had taken the side of the prosecution (People of the Philippines v. Benancio Mortera, G.R. No. 188104, April 23,2010). Corpus delicti in criminal cases; murder or homicide

Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance of a crime. The evidence of a dead body with a gunshot wound on its back would be evidence that murder has been committed. Corpus delicti has two elements: (a) that a certain result has been established, for example, that a man has died, and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for it. The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence. But corpus delicti need not be proved by an autopsy report of the dead victim's body or even by the testimony of the physician who examined such body. While such report or testimony is useful for understanding the nature of the injuries the victim suffered, they are not

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indispensable proof of such injuries or of the fact of death. Nor is the presentation of the murder weapons also indispensable since the physical existence of such weapons is not an element of the crime of murder (People of the Philippines v. Romulo Tuniaco, et al, G.R. No. 185710, January 19,2010). Lack of formal offer of evidence during the trial

Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value pursuant to the express mandate that 'the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.' Consequently, as in this case, any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected. In a case, the High Court modified the accused's conviction from qualified rape to simple rape since both medical certificate and AAA's birth certificate, although marked as exhibits during the pre-trial, were not formally offered in evidence pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. According to the Court, a formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility (People of the Philippines v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 181829, September 1, 2010).

C. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE (Rule 119) Demurrer to evidence (Bar 1991; 1994; 1996; 2001; 2003; 2004; 2007; 2009)

1. A demurrer to evidence, is actually a motion to dismiss that is filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested its case. (Bar 1994)

CHAPTER X PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND DEMURRER (Rules 118-119)

After the prosecution rests its case, a demurrer to the evidence may be filed by the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The court may on its own initiative dismiss the action without waiting for a demurrer from the accused also on the ground of insufficiency of evidence but the court shall do so only after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 2. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law to make out a case or sustain the issue (Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, 544 SCRA 324, February 11,2008). Demurrer to evidence with leave of court (Bar 2003)

1. The demurrer to evidence filed by the accused may be (a) with leave or court, or (b) without leave of court (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of Court). The power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings (People v. Crespo, G.R. No. 180500, September 11,2008). 2. The motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to the evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 3. If the court grants the leave to file a demurrer to evidence, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer within a similar period from its receipt. The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall not be reviewable by appeal or certiorari before judgment (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 4. If the court grants the demurrer, the case is dismissed and the accused is as good as acquitted.

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If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. The order denying the demurrer shall not be reviewable by appeal or certiorari before judgment (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of Court). Demurrer to evidence without leave of court

1. A demurrer to evidence may also be filed by the accused without leave of court. If the demurrer is granted, the case is dismissed and the effect is an acquittal. 2. If the demurrer is denied, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of Court). When an accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court and the same is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution (People v. Tolentino, 546 SCRA 671, February 26,2008). The general rule prevailing is that certiorari does not he to review an order denying a demurrer to evidence, which is equivalent to a motion to dismiss, filed after the prosecution has presented its evidence and rested its case. However, certiorari may be availed of when the denial of a demurrer to evidence is tainted with grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial authority (Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, 544 SCRA 324). 3. When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12,2007).

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Not every motion to dismiss is a demurrer to evidence 1. A demurrer to evidence must contain what is so fundamental in every demurrer. It must make reference to the insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution and must make references to the evidence on record. Hence, a motion to dismiss not grounded upon the insufficiency of the evidence, is not a demurrer under Sec. 23 of Rule 19.

2. The case of Cabador v. People, G.R. No. 186001, October 2, 2009, clearly illustrates the above rule. Here, the petitioner is the accused in an information for murder. He filed a motion to dismiss complaining of a turtle-paced proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to speedy trial. Unknown to him, the RTC granted four days before he filed his motion, the motion of the prosecution for extension of time to make a formal offer of its evidence. The motion to dismiss was denied and was treated by the RTC as a demurrer to evidence and since it was filed without leave of court, the RTC declared the petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. The issue presented before the Court is whether or not the motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, with the effect that he waived his right to the presentation of his evidence. The Court held that in order to determine whether the motion filed is a demurrer to evidence or just a motion to dismiss, the following must be considered: (1) the allegations in it must be made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it. In resolving the issue, the Court noted that the pertinent portions of the petitioner's motion to dismiss took pains in pointing out how the trial in the case had painfully dragged on for years. The gap between proceedings were long, with hearings often postponed because of the prosecutor's absence. This was further compounded by the prosecution's repeated motions for extension of time to file its formal offer and its failure to file it within such time. The RTC and the CA

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chose to ignore the extensive averments in the motion on how the case was unduly delayed and treated the same as a demurrer merely because of a few observations made by petitioner in some paragraphs regarding the inadequacy of the evidence against him. The motion to dismiss did not even contain references to the evidence of the prosecution to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. The so-called "demurrer" did not touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. It cited no documentary exhibit. In effect, the motion did not contain matters so fundamental to a demurrer to evidence. The Court likewise observed that a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Here, the prosecution's motion for extension of time to make its formal offer was granted by the court before the motion to dismiss by petitioner was filed. The prosecution has not hence, rested its case. In sum, the Court found that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial and not a demurrer to evidence. He cannot therefore, be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense (Cabador v. People, G.R. No. 186001, October2,2009). Granting of demurrer is an acquittal

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamounts to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164577, July 5,2010; People v. Tan, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010). Note: If the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, it may be reviewed

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by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 174504, March 21,2011). Demurrer to evidence in a civil case vs. demurrer to evidence in a criminal case (Bar 2007)

1. A demurrer to evidence in a civil case is anchored upon the failure of the plaintiff to show that upon the facts and the law, he is entitled to relief ("Sec. 1, Rule 33, Rules of Court). A demurrer to evidence in a criminal case is predicated upon insufficiency of evidence (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 2. A demurrer to evidence in a civil case under Rule 33 requires no prior leave of court. Under Sec. 23 of Rule 119, a demurrer to evidence in a criminal case may be filed with or without leave of court. 3. In a civil case when the demurrer is denied, the defendant does not lose his right to present his evidence (Rule 33, Rules of Court). In a criminal case, the accused may adduce his evidence in his defense only when the demurrer that was denied was filed with leave of court. When filed without leave of court and the demurrer is denied, the accused waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 4. In a civil case, if the demurrer to evidence is granted, the plaintiff may appeal and if the dismissal is reversed, the defendant is deemed to have waived his right to present his evidence (Rule 33, Rules of Court). No appeal is allowed as a rule, when a demurrer to evidence is granted in a criminal case because the dismissal is deemed an acquittal. To allow the appeal would be to put the accused in double jeopardy (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010; People v. Tan, G.R. No. 167526, July 26,2010).

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CHAPTER XI JUDGMENT, REMEDIES AFTER JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES I —JUDGMENT (RULE 120) Meaning of judgment

A judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any (Sec. 1, Rule 120, Rules of Court). Requisites of a judgment

1.

The following are the formal requisites of a judgment:

(a) It must be written in the official language; (b) It must be personally and directly prepared and signed by the judge; and (c) It must contain clearly and distinctly a (i) statement of the facts, and (ii) the law upon which it is based (Sec. 1, Rule 120, Rules of Court). 2. The jurisdictional requirements before a judgment may be validly rendered are jurisdiction over the subject matter, the territory and the person of the accused (Antiporda, Jr. v. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551; Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 388 SCRA 72; Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 300 SCRA 367; Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 677).

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3. In connection with the rendition of judgments, the Court recently declared: We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction, notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written; and even if "there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility," provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution's memorandum, but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecution's evaluation of the case. "x x x The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the trial court. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal" (Lumanog, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 182555, September 7, 2010). 4. In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, 375 SCRA 81, the Court had the occasion to state: "x x x We held that though it is not a good practice, we see nothing illegal in the act of the trial court completely copying the memorandum submitted by a party, provided that the decision clearly and distinctly states

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sufficient findings of fact and the law on which they are based. In another case where we upheld the validity of memorandum decisions, we nevertheless took occasion to remind judges that it is still desirable for an appellate judge to endeavor to make the issues clearer and use his own perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the law. No less importantly, he must use his own language in laying down his judgment (Cited in Lumanog, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 182555, September 7,2010).

Contents of a judgment of conviction; contents of judgment of acquittal

1. A judgment of conviction shall state: (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused; (b) the aggravating and mitigating circumstances which attended the commission of the offense; (c) the participation of the accused in the offense whether as (i) principal, (ii)accomplice, or (iii) accessory; (d) the penalty imposed upon the accused; (e) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived (Sec. 2, Rule 120, Rules of Court). Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence (Boac v. People, G.R. No. 180597, November 7,2008). After a judgment of conviction has been rendered by the trial court and cancellation of the bail bond of the accused, his appropriate remedy against the court's order cancelling his

CHAPTER XI JUDGMENT, REMEDIES AFTER JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

bond is by filing with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said order in the same regular appeal proceedings, as an incident of his appeal—the filing of a separate petition via a special civil action or special proceeding questioning such adverse order before the appellate court is proscribed (Chua v. Court Appeals, 520 SCRA 729, April 12,2007). 2. A judgment of acquittal shall: (a) state whether or not the evidence of the prosecution (i) absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused, or (ii) merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (b) determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Sec. 2, Rule 120, Rules of Court). A verdict of acquittal is immediately final (People v. Serrano, 315 SCRA 686; People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159261, February 21,2007). Rule when there are two or more offenses in a single information or complaint (duplicitous complaint or information)

1. When two or more offenses are charged in a single information or complaint, the accused must file a motion to quash (Sec. 3[f], Rule 117, Rules of Court) because of the rule that a complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court). 2. If the accused fails to object before trial for the violation of Sec. 13 of Rule 110, the accused is deemed to have waived the defect and the court may convict him for as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense (Sec. 3, Rule 120, Rules of Court). 3. While Sec. 13 of Rule 110, frowns upon multiple offenses being charged in a single information, the failure to raise this issue during arraignment amounts to a waiver,

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and the objection can no longer be raised on appeal (Abalos v. People, 389 SCRA 135). Judgment rendered by judge who did not hear case

In a relatively recent case, accused-appellant contends that the judge who penned the appealed decision is different from the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses and was, thus, in no position to render a judgment, as he did not observe firsthand their demeanor during trial. The Court did not agree. The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion (People v. Alfredo, G.R. No. 188560, December 15, 2010). Variance doctrine; variance between the allegation and proof (Bar 1993; 2004)

1. The variance referred to in Sec. 4 of Rule 120 is a situation where (a) the offense proved is different from the offense as charged in the complaint or information, and (b) the offense as charged is either included in the offense proved or necessarily includes the offense proved (Sec. 4, Rule 119, Rules of Court). 2. The accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged. He may also be convicted of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved (Sec. 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court). Under Sec. 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved (Con-

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sulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, February 12,2009; People v. Alejandro Rellota y Tadeo, G.R. No. 168103, August 3, 2010). 3. The application of the above rules presupposes that the court rendering the judgment has jurisdiction over the case based on the allegations of the information (Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51). 4. Following the "variance doctrine" embodied in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, an accused charged with qualified rape can be found guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against a child (People v. Sumingwa, G.R. No. 183619, October 13, 2009). 5. The accused may be convicted only of the crime with which he is charged. An exception to this rule is the rule on variance in Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court (Navarrete v. People, 513 SCRA 509, January 31,2007). When an offense includes or is included in another

An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter (Sec. 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court). An offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter (Sec. 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court). Variance in the mode of the commission of the offense

In one case, the testimony of the victim shows that she was roused from sleep with the male organ of the accused inserted in her mouth. Both the RTC and the CA failed to notice the variance between the allegations in the information for rape and that proven at the trial on the mode of committing the offense. The information alleges "force and intimidation" as the mode of commission, while the victim testified during the trial that she was asleep at the time it happened and o'hly

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awoke to find the male organ of the accused inside her mouth. This variance is not fatal to the conviction of the accused for rape by sexual assault. A variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. In this case, the accused did not object to the presentation of evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was stated in the information. The variance is not a bar to his conviction of the crime charged in the information (People v. Corpuz, 482 SCRA 435; People v. Abello, G.R. No. 151952, March 25,2009). Promulgation of judgment (Bar 1997)

1. As a rule, a judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is merely for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. The judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court if the judge is absent or outside the province or city (Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court). 2. If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal. If the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court (Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court). How accused is to be notified of the promulgation

The notice shall be given by the clerk of court personally to the accused or through his bondsman or warden and counsel. Ifrfche accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or

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escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address (Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court). Rule if the accused fails to appear in the promulgation of judgment

1. If the accused fails to appear at the scheduled promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel (Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court). 2. If the judgment is for conviction, and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies. He shall state the reason for his absence and if he proves the absence was justified, he shall be allowed to avail of the remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice (Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court; People v. Joven de Grano, et al., G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009). 3.

Jurisprudence reiterates the rule thus:

"An accused is required to be present before the trial court at the promulgation of the judgment in a criminal case. If the accused fails to appear before the trial court, promulgation of judgment shall be made in accordance with Rule 120, Section 6, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to'wit: In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel. If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules againfet

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the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice" (People v. Taruc, G.R. No. 185202, February 18, 2009). Modification of judgment (Bar 1989)

A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside upon motion of the accused, before the judgment becomes final or before appeal is perfected (Sec. 7, Rule 120, Rules of Court). When judgment becomes final

A judgment becomes final (a) after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or (b) when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or (c) when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or (d) has applied for probation (Sec. 7, Rule 120, Rules of Court). Entry of judgment

After a judgment has become final, it shall be entered in accordance with Rule 36 (Sec. 8, Rule 120, Rules of Court). II- NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION (RULE 121) Filing of a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration

1. The accused may file a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration of the judgment adverse to him. The court however, need not wait for a motion from the accused because it may, at its own instance, grant a new trial or a reconsideration of the judgment but with the consent of the accused (Sec. 1, Rule 121, Rules of Court).

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2. If the accused files a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration, he should file the motion at any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final (Sec. 1, Rule 121, Rules of Court). From the phraseology of the rule, it is evident that a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration applies when the judgment is one of conviction and it is the accused, not the prosecution which avails of the same. Grounds for a new trial

1. Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment (Estino, et al. v. People, G.R. Nos. 163957-58, April 7,2009). 2. Under the Rules of Court, a new trial shall be granted on any of the following grounds: (a) That errors of law have been committed during the trial; (b) That irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial; or (c) That new and material evidence has been discovered (Sec. 2, Rule 121, Rules of Court). Requisites for newly discovered evidence

1. Under the Rules, for a newly discovered evidence to be a justifiable ground for a new trial, the following need concur: (a) The evidence must have been discovered after the trial; (b) It could not have been previously discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; M (c) It is a new and material evidence;

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(d) If introduced and admitted, it would probably change the judgment (Sec. 2, Rule 121, Rules of Court). 2. Elaborating on the requisites, jurisprudence held that for new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below. The determinative test is the presence of due or reasonable diligence to locate the thing to be used as evidence in the trial (Briones v. People, G.R. No. 156009, June 5, 2009). Grounds for reconsideration of the judgment

A reconsideration of the judgment shall be granted on any of the following grounds: (a) Errors of law in the judgment which requires no further proceedings; and (b) Errors of fact which also requires no further proceedings (Sec. 3, Rule 121, Rules of Court). Form of the motions; notice

The motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. If based on newly-discovered evidence, the motion must be supported by affidavits of witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given or by duly authenticated copies of documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence (Sec. 4, Rule 121, Rules of Court). Notice of the motion

I. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor (Sec. 4, Rule 121, Rules of Court).

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When hearing of the motion is required

A hearing shall be conducted when the motion for new trial calls for a resolution of a question of fact. The court may hear evidence on the motion by affidavits or otherwise (Sec. 5, Rule 121, Rules of Court). Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration

The effects would depend upon the ground availed of in granting the new trial, thus: (a) When the new trial was granted on the grounds of errors of law or irregularities during the trial, all the proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be (a) set aside, and (b) taken anew and the court, in the interest of justice, may allow additional evidence. (b) When the new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence already adduced shall stand. The newly-discovered evidence together with other evidence which the court may allow in the interest of justice, shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record (Sec. 6, Rule 121, Rules of Court). (c) In all cases, when a new trial or a reconsideration is granted, the original judgment shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment shall be rendered accordingly (Sec. 6, Rule 121, Rules of Court). The Neypes rule

1. On September 14, 2005, in a civil case, the Supreme Court speaking through then Associate Justice Corona explained the period of appeal in civil cases. Invoking Sec. 3 of Rule 41, the Court emphasized that the period for appeal is not only within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment but also within fifteen (15) days from notice of the final order appealed from. If a motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial is denied, such denial is to be deemed as the final order. From receipt of such notice of denial, the movant has another "fresh period" within which to appeal. Obviously,

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added the Court, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period from notice of the judgment. The court held: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. "Henceforth, this 'fresh period rule' shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution" (Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14,2005). 2. On February 9, 2011, the Supreme Court held in the case of Judith Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170179, February 9, 2011, that the Neypes Rule applies to appeals in criminal cases. Please refer to Synopsis of Selected Cases. Ill - APPEALS (RULES 122,124,125) (Bar 1991; 1992; 1993; 1998) Appeal not a natural right

The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised

CHAPTER XI JUDGMENT, REMEDIES AFTER JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law (Estarija v. People, G.R. No. 173990, October 27, 2009). Once it is granted by law, its suppression would be a violation of due process (Hilario v. People, G.R. No. 161070, April 14, 2008). Who may appeal

1. Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy (Sec. 1, Rule 122, Rules of Court). Observe that the subject of the appeal is a judgment or a final order. Since the rule refers to "any party," the prosecution may appeal provided the accused will not be placed in double jeopardy. This is the clear implication of Sec. 1 of Rule 122. 2. The accused may appeal from a judgment of conviction (Philippine Rabbit v. People, 427 SCRA 456). When he appeals his conviction, he waives the protection on the prohibition against double jeopardy and runs the risk of being sentenced to a penalty higher than that imposed by the trial court. 3. In the case of the People of the Philippines, only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court (Carifio v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 688, 696; People v. Puig, G.R. Nos. 173654-765, August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 564, 575; Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169711, February 8, 2010). The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Solicitor General (People v. Duca, G.R. No. 171175, October 9,2009). In criminal cases, the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and should be given the opportunity to be heard in behalf of the People. Where the appellate court failed to notify the Solicitor General of its resolution on a petition filed by the accused and to require it to file its comment, this failure has deprived the

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prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case (People v. Duca, G.R. No. 171175, October 9,2009). Hence, the conformity of the Assistant City Prosecutor to a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is insufficient as the rule and jurisprudence mandate that the same should be filed by the Solicitor General who is solely vested with the authority to represent the people in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court. Also, while a private prosecutor may be allowed to intervene in criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, his participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, hence, he cannot be permitted to adopt a position contrary to that of the Solicitor General (Carino v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176084, April 30,2008). Subject matter for review on appeal

1. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors or even reverse the trial court's decision on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors (Dico v. CA, G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005; Ferrer v. People, G.R. No. 143487, February 22, 2006; People v. Montinola, 543 SCRA 412; People v. Laguio, Jr., 518 SCRA 393; Guy v. People, G.R. Nos. 166794-96, March 20, 2009). An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review. The appellate court can correct errors unassigned in the appeal (People v. De la Torre, G.R. No. 176637, October 6, 2008; People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3,2010). 2. It is settled that in a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subject of the assignment of errors or not (People v. Michael Lindo y Vergara, G.R. No. 189818, August 9,2010). 3. The above rule is in contrast with the general rule in civil cases where as a rule, no error will be considered by the appellate court unless stated in the assignment of errors estept when (a) the error affects the jurisdiction of the court

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In lieu of the death penalty, the law imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code or life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Code (Sec. 2, RA. 9346; People v. Abon, 545 SCRA 606, February 15, 2008). 6. When the appeal is from the decision of the Court of Appeals, the appeal is generally made by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court (Sec. 3[e], Rule 122, Rules of Court), because the procedure for the review by the Supreme Court of decisions in criminal cases rendered by the Court of Appeals shall be the same as in civil cases (Sec. 2, Rule 125, Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court). In cases however, where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, the judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals (Sec. 13[c], Rule 124, Rules of Court). Hence, the review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari. A petition for review raises only questions of law and should raise the errors of the CA and not those of the RTC (Batistis v. People, G.R. No. 181571, December 16,2009). Under Section 3(e), Rule 122, of the Rules of Court, "except as provided in the last paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45" (Sable v. People, G.R. No. 177961, April 7,2009). When appeal is to be taken

An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or

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reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run (Sec. 6, Rule 122, Rules of Court; See also Sec. 39 ofB.P. Big. 129 as amended). Service of notice of appeal

Notice of appeal should be served upon the adverse party or his counsel by personal service. If this type of service cannot be made, service may be done by registered mail or by substituted service pursuant to Sec. 7 and 8 of Rule 13 (Sec. 4, Rule 122, Rules of Court). Transmission of the papers to appellate court (RTC)

1. Within five (5) days from the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of court with whom the notice of appeal was filed must transmit to the clerk of court of the appellate court, the complete record of the case, together with the notice of appeal. The original and three copies of the stenographic notes shall also be transmitted. A copy of the transcript shall remain in the lower court (Sec. 8, Rule 122, Rules of Court). 2. If the appellate court is the Regional Trial Court, upon receipt of the complete record of the case, transcripts and exhibits, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact (Sec. 9[b], Rule 122, Rules of Court). Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said notice, the parties may submit memoranda or briefs, or may be required by the Regional Trial Court to do so. After the submission of such memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same, the Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire records of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed (Sec. 9[c], Rule 122, Rules of Court). Withdrawal of appeal

1. If an appeal has been perfected from the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the appeal may be

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withdrawn when so allowed by the Municipal Trial Court as long as the record has not been transmitted or forwarded to the appellate court (Regional Trial Court). When the appeal is withdrawn, the judgment becomes final (Sec. 12, Rule 122, Rules of Court). The court which approves the withdrawal at this stage is the Municipal Trial Court. Note: Same rule applies to the RTC. 2. If the withdrawal is sought when the case is already on appeal, the Regional Trial Court may allow the appellant to withdraw his appeal provided (a) a motion to withdraw is filed, (b) the motion is filed before the Regional Trial Court renders judgment on the appeal. Note that at this stage, the court which allows the withdrawal is the Regional Trial Court and the withdrawal is addressed to the sound discretion of the court (Sec. 12, Rule 122, Rules of Court). Note: The judgment of the court of origin will now become final and the case shall be remanded to the court of origin for execution. Appeal not mooted by accused's release on parole

Appeal was not mooted by accused-appellant's release on parole. Parole refers to the conditional release of an offender from a correctional institution after he serves the minimum term of his prison sentence. Parole is not one of the modes of totally extinguishing criminal liability under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code (People v. Abesamis, 531 SCRA 300, August 28,2007). Effect of appeal by any of several accused (Bar 1998)

1. An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter (People v. Gandia, G.R. No. 175332, February 6, 2008; Garces v. People, 527 SCRA 827). Under Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the present Rules on Criminal Procedure, an "appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except in so far as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter (Olalia, Jr. v. People, 562 SCRA 723, August 20,2008).

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2. "Although the rule states that a favorable judgment shall benefit those who did not appeal, we have held that a literal interpretation of the phrase 'did not appeal* will not give justice to the purpose of the provision. It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable. "In fact, the Court has at various times applied the foregoing provision without regard to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co-accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him. In such cases, the co-accused already withdrew his appeal, failed to file an appellant's brief, or filed a notice of appeal with the trial court but eventually withdrew the same. Even more, in these cases, all the accused appealed from the judgment of conviction but for one reason or another, their conviction had already become final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused x x x * (Constantino v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140656, September 13, 2007). Appeal from the civil aspect

The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not affect the criminal aspect of the judgment or order appealed from (Sec. ll[b], Rule 122, Rules of Court). The appeal period accorded to the accused should also be available to the offended party who seeks redress of the civil aspect of the decision—the period to appeal granted to the offended party is the same as that granted to the accused (Ching v. Nicdao, 522 SCRA 316). Period to apply for probation

An application for probation must be made within the period for perfecting an appeal which is, under Sec. 6 of Rule 122, within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from, and the gjjng of the application after the time of appeal has lapsed

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is injurious to the recourse of the applicant (Sable v. People, G.R. No. 177961, April 7,2009). Stay of execution

1. Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or final order appealed from shall be stayed as to the appealing party (Sec. 11 [c], Rule 122, Rules of Court). 2. The benefit of the stay of execution afforded to a co-accused who timely files an appeal cannot be extended to those who failed to file the same. It is too strained to construe the exception in Sec. 11, Rule 122 as including procedural consequences of a pending appeal although it may be beneficial to the accused (Lubrica v. People, 516 SCRA 674; February 26, 2007). Power of the Court of Appeals to receive evidence

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trial and further proceedings. Trials or hearings conducted in the Court of Appeals, must be continuous and must be completed in three months, unless extended by the Chief Justice (Sec. 12, Rule 124, Rules of Court; Sec. 9, B.P. Big. 129 as amended). Dismissal of appeal by the Court of Appeals

Sec. 8, paragraph 2, Rule 124, of the Rules of Court allows the Court of Appeals, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, to dismiss the appeal of the accused-appellant who eludes the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Section 8 provides: "The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio. The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,

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dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal" (People v. Taruc, G.R. No. 185202, February 18, 2009; Italics supplied). Ground for reversal of judgment or its modification

The Court of Appeals is mandated not to reverse or modify a judgment unless it finds after an examination of the record and the evidence that error has been committed which injuriously affects the substantial rights of the appellant (Sec. 10, Rule 124, Rules of Court). Review of decisions of the Court of Appeals

The procedure for the review by the Supreme Court of decisions in criminal cases rendered by the Court of Appeals shall be the same as in civil cases (Sec. 2, Rule 125, Rules of Court). Applicability of the rules on appeal in the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court

Although Section 8, Rule 124, particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended to the Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads: "Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the procedure in the Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of Appeals" (People v. Taruc, G.R. No. 185202, February 18, 2009). Rule if the opinion of the Supreme Court en banc is equally divided

When the Supreme Court en banc is equally divided in opinion or the necessary majority cannot be had on whether to acquit the appellant, the case shall again be deliberated upon and if no decision is reached after re-deliberation, the judgment of conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted (Sec. 3, Rule 125, Rules of Court).

CHAPTER XI JUDGMENT, REMEDIES AFTER JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

IV — PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES Availability of provisional remedies 1. The provisional remedies in civil actions, insofar as they are applicable, may be availed of in connection with the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action (Sec. 1, Rule 127, Rules of Court).

2. It is worth remarking that as a rule, when a criminal action is instituted, the criminal action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, except of course when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action (Sec. 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court). Now, since there is a civil action that goes with the criminal action, provisional remedies may be availed of in connection with the civil action. To avail of a provisional remedy in a criminal action, it must be one with a corresponding civil liability. If there is a civil liability, the civil action must be one arising from the offense charged and which is instituted in the said criminal action. Hence, if the civil action has been waived, reserved or instituted separately, the provisional remedy applicable may not be availed of in the criminal action. Instead, the provisional remedy should be applied for in the separate civil action instituted. 3. Since provisional remedies are available in connection with the civil action properly instituted in the criminal action, the offended party may have the property of the accused attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered from the accused (Sec. 2, Rule 127, Rules of Court). 4. The reference to provisional remedies in Rule 127 is made in general terms hence, it is submitted that the provisional remedies like preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, replevin or support pendente lite may

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be availed of in connection with the civil action in so far as they are applicable. 5. For instance, in a criminal action where the civil liability includes support for the offspring as a consequence of the crime, and the civil aspect thereof has not been waived, reserved or instituted separately, the accused may be ordered to provide support pendente lite to the child born to the offended party (Sec. 6, Rule 61, Rules of Court). 6. For reasons connected with the offended party's availment of a provisional remedy, the accused, during the trial, may prove not only his defense but also the damages he may have sustained arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case (Sec. ll[b], Rule 119, Rules of Court). When preliminary attachment is available

1. Preliminary attachment is available in a criminal case when the civil action is properly instituted in the criminal action as provided in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and in the following cases: (a) When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines; (b) When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a public officer, officer of a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty; (c) When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or is about to do so; and (d) When the accused resides outside the Philippines (Sec. 2, Rule 127, Rules of Court). 2. Observe that the grounds for a preliminary attachment in a criminal case are not as varied as the grounds for preliminary attachment in a civil case. Sec. 1 of Rule 57 gov

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erning civil cases are anchored on some other grounds aside from those cases provided for in a criminal case under Sec. 2 of Rule 127. 3. In letter "b" of Sec. 2, preliminary attachment may be availed of without the need for a showing that the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property or is about to do so. Instead, what need to be shown are the following: (a) The criminal case is founded upon a claim that money or property was embezzled, fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused; and (b) That the accused occupies any of the positions mentioned in Sec. 2 of Rule 127 or that he committed a willful violation of duty (Sec. 2, Rule 127, Rules of Court). — oOo -

SYNOPSIS OF SELECTED CASES Lejano v. People, G.R. No. 176389 People vs. Webb, G.R. No. 176864 January 18,2011 Facts

On December 14,2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong, on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. "On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses." Issue

May a judgment of acquittal be reconsidered? Ruling "x x x [A]s a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. xxx To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and

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capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight. xxx Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 (Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 676, 683-684). Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court "must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence." But he has not specified the violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His claim that "the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the decision" is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal perception. Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan (228 Phil. 42,1986) as authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the government proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was "dictated, coerced and scripted." It was a sham trial. Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not really go through the process. Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Court's appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses' credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Court's finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt

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to secure Webb, et al.'s conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al. is final and can no longer be disturbed" (Citations of the Court were inserted). Judith Yu v. Samson-Tatad G.R. No. 170979, February 9,2011

Facts An information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC which convicted the petitioner as charged on May 26,2005. Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9,2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted. The respondent judge denied the petitioner's motion for new trial for lack of merit in an order dated October 17, 2005 but which was received by the petitioner on November 3,2005. On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal. On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being belatedly filed, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases. It then filed a motion for execution of the decision. The petitioner filed a petition in the SC for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecution's motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision. The petitioner argued that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution's motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes. The People through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that Neypes applies to criminal actions since the evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal period provided in the Rules. In view of the OSG's manifestation, the Court required the private complainants to comment on the petition. In their comment,

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they averred that "the petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred to the interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e., Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure among others. They contended that nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases, Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned." Issue Does the "fresh period" rule apply to appeals in criminal cases? Rilling Speaking through Justice Brion, the Court ruled in the affirmative. Thus spoke the Court: XXX "The raison d'etre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court's pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons: First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that a[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final

B

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order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no

distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction. Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned — the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed. Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure x x x." xxx "Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently. Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in , Neypes and make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage em

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absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case - a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law — Quod est ineonveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege. "Thus, we agree with the OSG's view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of liberty cannot be overstated. In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial" (Citations omitted). The Court directed the trial court to "cease" and "desist" "from further exercising jurisdiction over the prosecution's motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision." The respondent Judge was also directed by the Court "to give due course to the petitioner's appeal and x x x to elevate the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the appealed decision on the merits." People vs. Bokingo G.R. No. 187536, August 10,2011 Facts

The accused were both found guilty as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

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It appeared that during the preliminary investigation, one of the accused mentioned their plan to kill the victim. The admission was made without the assistance of counsel. Issue

One issue brought before the Supreme Court was whether or not an admission made in the preliminary investigation requires the assistance of counsel in order for the admission to be admissible against the accused. Ruling Referring to the early case of People vs. Sunga, 447 Phil. 776 (2003), the Court held: XXX "x x x the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed 'critical stages' in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution." In said case, Sunga made an uncounselled admission before the police. He later acknowledged the same admission before the judge in a preliminary investigation. Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the tatter's lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga's rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled admission was held inadmissible. In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his confession was taken before a judge." People vs. Dion G.R. No.181035, July 4,2011

Facts In a rape case, the accused disputes the validity of the complaint for allegedly having grossly violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him

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because it failed to state the exact date or at least the approximate date when the alleged rape was committed. Because of such omission, he argues that "he was not able to intelligently prepare for his defense and persuasively refute the indictment against him." Issue

Is the statement of the precise date of the commission of the crime an essential requirement for the validity of an information? Ruling

xxx "Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, we are reproducing here Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: SEC. 11. Date ofcommission of the offense. — It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing that the requirement of indicating in the complaint or information the date of the commission of the offense applies only when such date is a material ingredient of the offense. In People v. Espejon, 427 Phil. 672 (200), we elucidated on this rule, to wit: An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of it. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The failure to specify the exact date or time when it was committed does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. In People v. Cantomayor, 441 Phil. 840, we explained when the time of the commission of the crime becomes relevant: [T]he time of the commission of the crime assumes importance only when it creates serious doubt as to the

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commission of the rape or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. The date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant's narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime." xxx "Applying this principle in a statutory rape case, we held: We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime. It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an

essential element. What is important is that the information alleges that the victim was a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if the accused did not use force or intimidation on her or deprived her of reason. (Emphasis ours; Some citations of the court, inserted)"

A case with a related principle involved is that of People vs. Cristobal, G.R.No. 159450, March 30,2011. Here the petitioner submits that the information charged her with qualified theft that allegedly transpired on December 29,1995, but the evidence at trial could not be the basis of her conviction because it actually proved that the taking had transpired on January 2, 1996; and that the discrepancy would unduly prejudice her rights as an accused to be informed of the charges as to enable her to prepare for her defense. The Court considered the petitioner's submission as untenable. The Court held: "x x x As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the time or date of the commission of the offense, Section 6 and Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rules applicable, provide: "Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended parly; the approximate time of

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the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed.

xxx "Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. — It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. Conformably with these rules, the information was sufficient because it stated the approximate time of the commission of the offense through the words "on or about the 2nd of January, 1996, and the accused could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which she was charged from a reading of its contents as well as gather by such reading whatever she needed to know about the charge to enable her to prepare her defense. The information herein did not have to state the precise date when the offense was committed, considering that the date was not a material ingredient of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission." Abellana v. People G.R. No. 174654, August 17,2011 Facts

In Abellana, the petitioner was charged under an information accusing him of estafa through falsification of public documents. The information alleged that with intent to defraud the private respondents (spouses), the accused falsified a public document consisting of a deed of absolute sale making it appear that the latter have signed the deed conveying a parcel of land to the petitioner. After the document was falsified, the accused allegedly caused the transfer of the title of said land to his name. The evidence, according to the trial court, did not show that the petitioner intended to defraufl the private respondents. On the contrary, the evidences indicate that he extended a loan to the

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private respondents and that after the latter failed to pay their obligation, the petitioner prepared a deed of absolute sale which the private respondents actually signed although the deed of sale was notarized without the spouses personally appearing before the notary public. Hence, the trial court held, that the petitioner can only be held guilty of falsification of a public document by a private individual and not estafa through falsification of public document as charged in the information. Civil liability was however, imposed upon the petitioner. On appeal, the petitioner raised the issue of whether an accused who was acquitted of the crime charged may nevertheless be convicted of another crime or offense not specifically charged and alleged and which is not necessarily included in the crime or offense charged. The Court of Appeals agreed, ruling that the petitioner cannot be held guilty of a crime that is different from that charged in the information since to so hold would infringe on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The civil liability imposed by the trial court was however, affirmed by the appellate court. Issue

The petitioner, in a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court, raised the lone issue of whether he could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal of the crime charged. Ruling The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious and did not agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals imposing civil liability against the accused.

Citing the early case of Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., 240 Phil. 326, 331 (1987), the Court explained that a felonious act gives rise to a civil liability "not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. xxx "Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to the spouses ... it must be

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proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses." The facts reveal, observed the Court, that no damage was caused to the spouses, private respondents. The petitioner did not commit fraud against the private respondents because contrary to the allegations of the information, the private respondents indeed signed the document and that their signatures were genuine and not forged. Even if it is to be assumed that they did not personally appear before the notary public for the notarization of the deed of absolute sale, "the same does not necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties' transaction. Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed." "To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the deed must be upheld. And since the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties x x x to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the x x x the issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses x x x." Note: In Abellana, the Court had the occasion to reiterate a basic procedural principle, in Sec. 2 of Rule 120, thus: "It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the; fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist" (Citations omitted).

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People v. Pinic G.R. No. 186395, June 8f 2011 Facts

An information for rape reads: "That on or about the month of April[J 2001, in the municipality of xxx, province of xxx, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Ito Pinic], did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously [had] carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a seven (7) year old girl, by means of force and against the tatter's will and consent

The evidence showed that while the victim and other children were playing bahay-bahayan, the accused summoned her to a house and while inside, the accused who was armed with a bolo, threatened to cut her ears with his bolo. Thereafter, he undressed her, removed her panty, took off his own pants and inserted his penis into her vagina several times. After consummating the act, the accused sent her home with a warning not to report the incident to anyone. Issue

In the determination of the imposable penalty, may the court consider the use by the accused of a bolo in committing the alleged rape? Ruling The Supreme Court answered in the negative. Declared the Court in the clearest of terms:

"It is a requisite, however, that the use of a deadly weapon be alleged in the information because such circumstance is also in the nature of a qualifying circumstance that increases the range of the penalty .. . Otherwise, it cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance even if the prosecution proves the same. Unfortunately, the use of a deadly weapon was not specifically alleged in the Information. Appellant cannot, therefore, be convicted of the crime of qualified rape x x x " People v. Morales G.R. No. 166355, May 30,2011 Facts

Then President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the declaration

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of Philippine Independence and thereby created the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998 (Committee). In 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128 (EO 128), entitled "Reconstituting the Committee for the Preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998." EO 128 renamed the Committee as the "National Centennial Commission" (NCC). The mandate of the NCC was to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress." The late Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as NCC Chairman. On March 10, 1996, the NCC and the Bases Conversion Development Authority {BCDA) organized the Philippine Centennial Expo '98 Corporation or Expocorp whose primary purpose was to operate, administer, manage and develop the Philippine Centennial International Exposition 1998 {Expo '98). The Philippine Centennial project was allegedly marred by numerous allegations of anomalies. The investigation that followed resulted in the filing in 2001 of an Information by the Ombudsman's Fact-Finding and Investigation Bureau against respondent Luis J. Morales {Morales), the acting president of Expocorp for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019. In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, Morales moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction over his person and over the offense charged. He alleged that Expocorp is a private corporation and that he is not a public employee or official. He also alleged that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over his person or the offense charged as he is a private individual who has not been charged jointly with other public officials or employees. He added that Expocorp is not a government-owned or controlled corporation because it was not created by a special law, it did not have an original charter, and a majority of Expocorp's capital stock is owned by private individuals. He claimed that he did not receive any compensation from the government as defined in Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 3019, and the compensation he received as Expocorp's acting president was paid from Expocorp's funds. In its comment to Expocorp's motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, representing the People, insisted that Expocorp is a government-owned corporation sinfce its articles of incorporation showed that of its ten listed subscribers, BCDA held stocks valued at

588 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

P99,999,100.00, while the stocks held by the rest of the subscribers had a total value of P900.00. The People further argued, that NCC Chairman Laurel was a public officer; thus, Morales was likewise a public officer since his appointment flowed from the former's exercise of his authority as chairman of both NCC and Expocorp. In his reply, Morales averred that upon Expocorp's incorporation, BCDA owned essentially all of Expocorp's stocks. Two months after its incorporation, however, the Board of Directors of Expocorp issued a resolution declaring all its unissued and unsubscribed shares open for subscription. Global Clark Assets Corporation (Global) subscribed to essentially all of these unissued and unsubscribed shares; thus, Global became the majority owner with 55.16% of Expocorp's stocks, while BCDA was left as minority stockholder with 44.84% of Expocorp's stocks. Morales concluded that since Expocorp is a private corporation and an entity distinct from NCC, he, as its president, is not a public officer. Issues

Is Expocorp a government owned- or controlled corporation? Is the case against the accused within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan? Ruling "Expocorp is a private corporation. It was not created by a special law but was incorporated under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is also not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Although BCDA, which owned 999,991 shares of its shares, was one of Expocorp's original incorporators, the Board of Directors of Expocorp allowed Global to buy 1,229,998 of its unused and unsubscribed shares two months after its incorporation. With the BCDA as a minority stockholder, Expocorp cannot be characterized as a government- owned or controlled corporation. In Dante V. Liban, et al. v. Richard J. Gordon, 593 SCRA 68, we pointedly said:

"A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. xxx "Since Expocorp is a private corporation, not a government-owned or controlled corporation, Morales,

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as Expocorp's president who now stands charged for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in this capacity, is beyond the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction." People v. Tumambing G.R. No. 191261, March 2,2011 Facts

The city prosecutor charged the accused with rape in the Regional Trial Court. He was convicted by the trial court and the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The records however, indicate serious doubts regarding the true identity of the rapist. Issue

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA and the trial court erred in finding that the accused raped the victim despite the existence of doubt as to the identity of the rapist. Ruling

Where the victim shows uncertainty in the identity of the rapist, the accused cannot be convicted. "A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the offender's identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties." People v. Cristobal G.R. No. 159450, March 30,2011 Facts

After the State rested its case against the accused, in a case of qualified theft, the defense counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence, praying for the dismissal of the charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did not suffice to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision

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and because the demurrer to evidence was filed without express leave of court, the accused had waived the right to present evidence. Thereafter, a decision was rendered finding the accused guilty. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Issue

Did the CA err in affirming the ruling of the trial court that the accused had waived her right to present her evidence-in-chief despite the expressed motion to defer its presentation when the demurrer to evidence was filed? Ruling

"x x x As to whether or not the trial court correctly ruled that appellant waived the presentation of her evidence when she filed her "Demurrer To Evidence and Motion to Defer Evidence" without prior leave of court, We rule in the affirmative. Appellant's theory that prior leave of court had been requested because her demurrer was, at the same time, also a motion to defer defense evidence, cannot be sustained. A motion to defer evidence does not constitute a request for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In fact, such motion indicates that appellant wanted the Trial Court to consider the demurrer before proceeding to hear her evidence. Furthermore, there is nothing in appellant's Demurrer from which it can be inferred that appellant was asking the Trial Court permission to move for the dismissal of the case. Section 15 (now Sec. 23), Rule 119 of the Rules' of Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 15. Demurrer to Evidence. — After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court. If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied.)

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Clearly, when the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. In such a case, the waiver of the right to present defense evidence is unqualified." People v. Cristobal G.R. No. 159450, March 30,2011 Facts

The information charged the accused, a bank teller with qualified theft of money belonging to the bank, the employer of the accused. The evidence against the accused included a handwritten letter written by her to the bank president explaining the loss of the various amounts on various occasions to a man who approached the counter and threatened her safety and those of her children. Issue

One issue concerns the admissibility of the accused's letter explaining the shortage of her dollar collection as bank teller. The accused submits that the letter was inadmissible for being in reality an uncounselled extrajudicial confession, and for not being executed under oath.

Ruling xxx "The submission lacks persuasion. The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being executed with the assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party admission under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that was admissible against her. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitter's fault if the admission does not. By virtue of its being made by the party himself, an admission is competent primary evidence against the admitter. Worth pointing out is that the letter was not a confession due to its not expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft. Under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt for the offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein.

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Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she wrote the letter because she spontaneously made it while not under custodial investigation. Her insistence on the assistance of a counsel might be valid and better appreciated had she made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial investigation, or under coercion by the investigating authorities of the Government. The distinction of her situation from that of a person arrested or detained and under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense derived from the clear intent of insulating the latter from police coercion or intimidation underlying Section 12 of Article III {Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. To reiterate, the rights under Section 12, supra, are available to "any person under investigation for the commission of an offense." The phrase does not cover all kinds of investigations, but contemplates only a situation wherein "a person is already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if he is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty * The situation of the accused was not similar to that of a person already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if she is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty."

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People v. Ng Yik Bun, et al. G.R. No. 180452, January 10, 2011 Facts

The accused appellant were indicted for transporting, delivering and distributing, prohibited drugs without authority of law after they were arrested by police officers while loading the drugs in a van. Acting on a prior information, it appeared that police officers were able to observe from a distance of around 50 meters six Chinese- looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white van. Having been noticed, the police captain asked one accused- appellant what they were loading on the van. He admitted it was shabu and pointed, to the other accused-appellant as the leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated. The RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. In the Court of Appeals, some of the accused-appellants raised the lone issue of whether the trial court erred in ruling that there was a valid search and arrest despite the absence of a warrant. They asserted that no in flagrante delicto arrest was made before the seizure and "that the police officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even when there was no evidence that an offense was being committed. Since there was no warrant of arrest, they argue that the search sans a search warrant subsequently made on them was illegal. They contend that a seizure of any evidence as a result of an illegal search is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose." The appellate court however, affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. The Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence disclosed that the accused-appellants were first arrested in flagrante delicto before the seizure of the contraband was made. The CA agreed with the prosecution that the urgency of the situation meant that the buy- bust team had no time to secure a search warrant. Moreover, the CA also found that the warrantless seizure of the transparent plastic bags can likewise be sustained under the plain view doctrine. Issue Was there a valid arrest and seizure? Ruling

xxx

594

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

"x x x A settled exception x x x is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warranty arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (Emphasis supplied.) xxx Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-appellants — who were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amended — is valid. x x x we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In the instant case, it can plausibly be argued that accused- appellants were committing the offense of possessing shabu and were in the act of loading them in a white van when the police officers arrested them. As aptly noted by the appellate court, the crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers." Note: The accused appellants in this case, raised the issue of illegality of their arrest after their plea thus, the "accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea."

APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES

595

Angeles v. Gaite G.R. No. 176596, March 23, 2011 Facts

A case was filed against the petitioner for 21 counts of Child Abuse under Republic Act (RA) No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary ordered the withdrawal of the Information against the petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner filed with the DOJ an administrative complaint for gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, incompetence and manifest bad faith against the respondent, a State Prosecutor, who earlier conducted the preliminary investigation of the case. The administrative complaint was dismissed by the DOJ. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DOJ Secretary also denied. The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the Office of the President (OP) assailing the DOJ's resolutions dismissing the administrative complaint filed against the respondent. The OP asked the respondent to file his comment thereto. On the basis of the allegations in the comments of the respondent, the petitioner filed a complaint for four counts of libel against the former before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, claiming that the comments constituted a direct attack on the petitioner's reputation as a public officer. The complaint was dismissed and a subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the DOJ Secretary a Petition for Review assailing the dismissal of her complaint for libel as well as her motion for reconsideration. The Petition for Review was dismissed by the Chief State Prosecutor. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration with a motion for inhibition of the Chief State Prosecutor which the DOJ later denied with finality. Subsequently, a Petition for Review before the Office of the President (OP) questioning the DOJ Resolutions dismissing her petition was filed by the petitioner but the petition was dismissed by the OP. The subsequent petition for reconsideration was likewise denied. Thereafter, the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 assailing the orders of the Office of

596

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

the President. The petition was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals, among others, for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Issues

1. Was the petition for review filed by the petitioner in the OP assailing the orders of the DOJ the proper remedy? 2. Was the petition filed in the CA assailing the orders of the OP, filed out of time? Ruling

1. "After petitioner's receipt of the DOJ Secretary's resolution denying her motion for reconsideration of the resolution dismissing her petition for review of the prosecutors' resolutions dismissing her complaint for libel, she filed a petition for review before the Officer of the President (OP) on the pretext that she should first exhaust administrative remedies. Unfortunately, such action was fatal to her case, since Memorandum Circular No. 58 (MC No. 58) prohibits the filing of such petition with the OP. As provided under MC No. 58, no appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/ resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua te death. Clearly, there was no need for petitioner to file her petition with the OP. xxx 2. The facts show that petitioner filed an appeal with the DOJ Secretary, but the appeal was dismissed. The motion for reconsideration which the petitioner filed was also dismissed. As there was no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course of law, the remedy "was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.-However. petitioner failed to file a petition for certiorari within 60 days from receipt of the DOJ resolution denying her motion for reconsideration.'' Hence, declared the Court, the petitioner's "filing of the petition for review with the OP, x x x did not toll the running of the reglementary period for filing a petition with the CA." and the DOJ resolutions became final and executory after the lapse of the period for assailing the same in the CA. Thus, no reversible error could be

APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES

597

attributed to the CA in dismissing the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. People v. Taroy G.R. No. 192466, September 7,2011

Facts The public prosecutor charged the accused with two counts of rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet. When the RTC found the accused guilty of two counts of rape and sentenced him accordingly, the accused challenged the Benguet RTC's jurisdiction over the crimes charged, he having testified that their residence when the alleged offenses took place was in Pucsusan Barangay, Baguio City. The RTC held, however, that the testimony that their residence was in Baguio City did not strip the court of its jurisdiction since he waived the jurisdictional requirement. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC holding that the prosecution has sufficiently established the jurisdiction of the RTC through the testimony of the witnesses.

Issue Did the trial court have jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases of rape against the accused?

Ruling " x x x Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor subjected to stipulation. The right venue must exist as a matter of law. Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to attach, the criminal action must be instituted and tried in the proper court of the municipality, city, or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place. "The Informations filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes were committed in the victim and the offender's house in City Limit, Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Province of Benguet. This allegation conferred territorial jurisdiction over the subject offenses on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. The testimonies of the witnesses as well as the affidavit of arrest point to this fact. Clearly, the uncorroborated assertion of the accused that the subject offenses took place in Baguio City is not entitled to belief. Besides,

598

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

he admitted during the pre-trial in the case that it was the RTC of La Trinidad that had jurisdiction to hear the case. Taken altogether, the RTC's jurisdiction to hear the case is beyond dispute. Panlilio v. RTC Manila (Branch 51) G.R. No. 173846, February 2,2011

The petitioners as corporate officers of a corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a petition for Suspension of Payments and Rehabilitation. The court, finding the petition sufficient in form and substance issued an order staying all claims against the corporation. At the time of the filing of the petition for rehabilitation, there were a number of criminal charges pending against petitioners initiated by the respondent, Social Security System for alleged violations of the SSS Law. Consequently, petitioners filed with the court handling the criminal cases a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings arguing that the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court should also apply to their pending criminal charges. The petitioners prayed for the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the petition for rehabilitation was finally resolved. The trial court denied the motion to suspend the proceedings ruling that the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court did not cover criminal proceedings. The subsequent petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners in the Court of Appeals was dismissed holding that the violation of the provisions of the SSS law was a criminal liability and was, thus, personal to the offender. The appellate court held that the criminal proceedings against the petitioners should not be considered a claim against the corporation and, consequently, not covered by the stay order. Issue

The issue as put by the Court: "xxx does the suspension of "all claims" as an incident to a corporate rehabilitation also contemplate the suspension of criminal charges filed against the corporate officers of the distressed corporation?" Ruling:

The Court ruled in the negative with the following pertinent declarations:

xxx

APPENDIX OF SELECTED CASES

"x x x The rehabilitation of x x x and the settlement of claims against the corporation is not a legal ground for the extinction of petitioners' criminal liabilities. There is no reason why criminal proceedings should be suspended during corporate rehabilitation, more so, since the prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order, "x x x it would be absurd for one who has engaged in criminal conduct if he could escape punishment by the mere filing of a petition for rehabilitation by the corporation of which he is an officer. The prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending rehabilitation of the corporation, especially since they are charged in their individual capacities. Such being the case, the purpose of the law for the issuance of the stay order is not compromised, since the appointed rehabilitation receiver can still fully discharge his functions as mandated by law. It bears to stress that the rehabilitation receiver is not charged to defend the officers of the corporation. If there is anything that the rehabilitation receiver might be remotely interested in is whether the court also rules that petitioners are civilly liable. Such a scenario, however, is not a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings, because as aptly discussed, x x x should the court prosecuting the officers of the corporation find that an award or indemnification is warranted, such award would fall under the category of claims, the execution of which would be subject to the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court. The penal sanctions as a consequence of violation of the SSS law, in relation to the Revised Penal Code can therefore be implemented if petitioners are found guilty after trial. However, any civil indemnity awarded as a result of their conviction would be subject to the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court. Only to this extent can the order of suspension be considered obligatory upon any court, tribunal, branch or body where there are pending actions for claims against the distressed corporation." (citations omitted)

599

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ASPECT OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES PART IV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 9 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

SECTION 1. Who may file. — Any offended party, peace officer or any public officer charged with the enforcement of an environmental law may file a complaint before the proper officer in accordance with the Rules of Court. SEC. 2. Filing of the information. — An information, charging a person with a violation of an environmental law and subscribed by the prosecutor, shall be filed with the court. SEC. 3. Special prosecutor. — In criminal cases, where there is no private offended party, a counsel whose services are offered by any person or organization may be allowed by the court as special prosecutor, with the consent of and subject to the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. RULE 10 PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged, shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the complainant waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Unless the civil action has been instituted prior to the criminal action, the reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made during arraignment. In case civil liability is imposed or damages are awarded, the filing and other legal fees

600

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ASPECT OF THE RULE OF PROCEDURE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

601

shall be imposed on said award in accordance with Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, and the fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment award. The damages awarded in cases where there is no private offended party, less the filing fees, shall accrue to the funds of the agency charged with the implementation of the environmental law violated. The award shall be used for the restoration and rehabilitation of the environment adversely affected. RULE 11 ARREST

SECTION 1. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or an individual deputized by the proper government agency may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense; or (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. Individuals deputized by the proper government agency who are enforcing environmental laws shall enjoy the presumption of regularity under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court when effecting arrests for violations of environmental laws. SEC. 2. Warrant of arrest. — All warrants of arrest issued by the court shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the information filed with the issuing court. RULE 12 CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OF SEIZED ITEMS, EQUIPMENT, PARAPHERNALIA, CONVEYANCES AND INSTRUMENTS SECTION 1. Custody and disposition of seized items. — The custody and disposition of seized items shall be in accordance with the applicable laws or rules promulgated by the concerned government agency. SEC. 2. Procedure. — In the absence of applicable laws or rules promulgated by the concerned government agency, the following procedure shall be observed:

602 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

(a) The apprehending officer having initial custody and control of the seized items, equipment, paraphernalia, conveyances and instruments shall physically inventory and whenever practicable, photograph the same in the presence of the person from whom such items were seized. (b) Thereafter, the apprehending officer shall submit to the issuing court the return of the search warrant within live (5) days from date of seizure or in case of warrantless arrest, submit within five (5) days from date of seizure, the inventory report, compliance report, photographs, representative samples and other pertinent documents to the public prosecutor for appropriate action. (c) Upon motion by any interested party, the court may direct the auction sale of seized items, equipment, paraphernalia, tools or instruments of the crime. The court shall, after hearing, fix the minimum bid price based on the recommendation of the concerned government agency. The sheriff shall conduct the auction. (d) The auction sale shall be with notice to the accused, the person from whom the items were seized, or the owner thereof and the concerned government agency. (e) The notice of auction shall be posted in three conspicuous places in the city or municipality where the items, equipment, paraphernalia, tools or instruments of the crime were seized. (f) The proceeds shall be held in trust and deposited with the government depository bank for disposition according to the judgment. RULE 13 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES SECTION 1. Attachment in environmental cases. — The provisional remedy of attachment under Rule 127 of the Rules of Court may be availed of in environmental cases. SEC. 2. Environmental Protection Order (EPO); Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) in criminal cases. — The procedure for and issuance of EPO and TEPO shall be governed by Rule 2 of these Rules. RULE 14 BAIL SECTION 1. Bail, where filed. — Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ASPECT OF THE RULE OF PROCEDURE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

603

or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein. If the court grants bail, the court may issue a hold-departure order in appropriate cases. SEC. 2. Duties of the court. — Before granting the application for bail, the judge must read the information in a language known to and understood by the accused and require the accused to sign a written undertaking, as follows: (a) To appear before the court that issued the warrant of arrest for arraignment purposes on the date scheduled, and if the accused fails to appear without justification on the date of arraignment, accused waives the reading of the information and authorizes the court to enter a plea of not guilty on behalf of the accused and to set the case for trial; (b) To appear whenever required by the court where the case is pending; and (c) To waive the right of the accused to be present at the trial, and upon failure of the accused to appear without justification and despite due notice, the trial may proceed in absentia. RULE 15 ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA SECTION 1. Arraignment. — The court shall set the arraignment of the accused within fifteen (15) days from the time it acquires jurisdiction over the accused, with notice to the public prosecutor and offended party or concerned government agency that it will entertain plea-bargaining on the date of the arraignment. SEC. 2. Plea-bargaining. — On the scheduled date of arraignment, the court shall consider plea-bargaining arrangements. Where the prosecution and offended party or concerned government agency agree to the plea offered by the accused, the court shall: (a) Issue an order which contains the plea-bargaining arrived at;

and

(b) Proceed to receive evidence on the civil aspect of the case, if any;

604

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

(c) Render and promulgate judgment of conviction, including the civil liability for damages. RULE 16 PRE-TRIAL

SECTION 1. Setting of pre-trial conference — After the arraignment, the court shall set the pre-trial conference within thirty (30) days. It may refer the case to the branch clerk of court, if warranted, for a preliminary conference to be set at least three (3) days prior to the pre-trial. SEC. 2. Preliminary conference. — The preliminary conference shall be for the following purposes: (a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement of the civil aspect of the case; (b) To mark the documents to be presented as exhibits; (c) To attach copies thereof to the records after comparison with the originals; (d) To ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents marked as exhibits; (e) To consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the case; (f) To record the proceedings during the preliminary conference in the Minutes of Preliminary Conference to be signed by the parties and counsel; (g) To mark the affidavits of witnesses which shall be in question and answer form and shall constitute the direct examination of the witnesses; and (h) To attach the Minutes and marked exhibits to the case record before the pre-trial proper. The parties or their counsel must submit to the branch clerk of court the names, addresses and contact numbers of the affiants. SEC. 3. Pre-trial duty of the judge. — During the pre-trial, the court shall:

(a) Place the parties and their counsels under oath;

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ASPECT OF THE RULE OF PROCEDURE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

605

(b) Adopt the minutes of the preliminary conference as part of the pre-trial proceedings, confirm markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents, and list object and testimonial evidence; (c) Scrutinize the information and the statements in the affidavits and other documents which form part of the record of the preliminary investigation together with other documents identified and marked as exhibits to determine further admissions of facts as to: i. The court's territorial jurisdiction relative to the offense(s) charged; ii.

Qualification of expert witnesses; and

iii.

Amount of damages;

(d) Define factual and legal issues; (e) Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates and adhere to the flow chart determined by the court which shall contain the time frames for the different stages of the proceeding up to promulgation of decision; (f) Require the parties to submit to the branch clerk of court the names, addresses and contact numbers of witnesses that need to be summoned by subpoena; and (g) Consider modification of order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense. SEC. 4. Manner of questioning. — All questions or statements must be directed to the court. SEC. 5. Agreements or admissions. — All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel; otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in Section 1, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court shall be approved by the court. SEC. 6. Record of proceedings. — All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded, the transcripts prepared and the minutes signed by the parties or their counsels. SEC. 7. Pre-trial order. — The court shall issue a pre-trial order within ten (10) days after the termination of the pre-trial, setting forth the actions taken during the pre-trial conference, the facts stipulated, the admissions made, evidence marked, the number of

606

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

witnesses to be presented and the schedule of trial. The order shall bind the parties and control the course of action during the trial. RULE 17 TRIAL SECTION 1. Continuous trial. — The court shall endeavor to conduct continuous trial which shall not exceed three (3) months from the date of the issuance of the pre-trial order. SEC. 2. Affidavit in lieu of direct examination. — Affidavit in lieu of direct examination shall be used, subject to cross-examination and the right to object to inadmissible portions of the affidavit. SEC. 3. Submission of memoranda. — The court may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda and if possible, in electronic form, within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from the date the case is submitted for decision. With or without any memoranda filed, the court shall have a period of sixty (60) days to decide the case counted from the last day of the 30-day period to file the memoranda. SEC. 4. Disposition period. — The court shall dispose the case within a period of ten (10) months from the date of arraignment. SEC. 5. Pro bono lawyers. — If the accused cannot afford the services of counsel or there is no available public attorney, the court shall require the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to provide pro bono lawyers for the accused. RULE 18 SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY SECTION 1. Subsidiary liability. — In case of conviction of the accused and subsidiary liability is allowed by law, the court may, by motion of the person entitled to recover under judgment, enforce such subsidiary liability against a person or corporation subsidiarily liable under Article 102 and Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. RULE 19 STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL CASES SECTION 1. Motion to dismiss. — Upon the filing of an information in court and before arraignment, the accused may file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the criminal action is a SLAPP.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ASPECT OF THE RULE OF PROCEDURE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

SEC. 2. Summary hearing. — The hearing on the defense of a SLAPP shall be summary in nature. The parties must submit all the available evidence in support of their respective positions. The party seeking the dismissal of the case must prove by substantial evidence that his acts for the enforcement of environmental law is a legitimate action for the protection, preservation and rehabilitation of the environment. The party filing the action assailed as a SLAPP shall prove by preponderance of evidence that the action is not a SLAPP. SEC. 3. Resolution. — The court shall grant the motion if the accused establishes in the summary hearing that the criminal case has been filed with intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any person, institution or the government has t&ken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights. If the court denies the motion, the court shall immediately proceed with the arraignment of the accused. PART V EVIDENCE RULE 20 PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE SECTION 1. Applicability. - When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it. The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt. SEC. 2. Standards for application. — In applying the precautionary principle, the following factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights of those affected. RULE 21 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

SECTION 1. Photographic, video and similar evidence. — Photographs, videos and similar evidence of events, acts, transactions of

607

608 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

wildlife, wildlife by-products or derivatives, forest products or mineral resources subject of a case shall be admissible when authenticated by the person who took the same, by some other person present when said evidence was taken, or by any other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof. SEC. 2. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. RULE 22 FINAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. Effectivity. - These Rules shall take effect within fifteen (15) days following publication once in a newspaper of general circulation. SEC. 2. Application of the Rules of Court. — The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner, except as otherwise provided herein.

CASE INDEX

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 147,1965 ........................................................................ 14 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 655................................................................247 AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007 ......................... 203, 208, 209 AAA v. Carbonnel, 524 SCR 496 ...........................................................................150 Abalos v. People, 389 SCRA 135...........................................................................550 Abelita v. Doria, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009................................ 221, 281 Abelita v. P/Supt. German Doria and SP03 Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009 ............................................................280 Abenes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007 ............................................................................273, 284 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 133347, October 15, 2008 ...............................................108,119 Acebedo v. Sarmiento, L-28025, December 16,1970, 36 SCRA 247 .................................................................................................488 Adams v. Williams, 47 U.S. 143 ............................................................................265 Adasa v. Abalos, 516 SCRA 261 ............................................................................431 Adasa v. Abalos, 516 SCRA 261, February 19, 2007 ..........................................431 Adasa v. Abalos, G.R. No. 168617 February 19, 2007 ......................................... 67 Aducayen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 78 ...........................................................................469 Agbayani v. Sayo, 178 Phil. 579 .............................................................................. 98 Agbayani v. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699 ................................................................................ 9 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 making reference to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,392 ...............................................266 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,30 citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391 ......................................266 Agulan v. Fernandez, 356 SCRA 162 ....................................................................322 Agustin v. Pamintuan, 467 SCRA 601 .................................................................... 99 Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, 338 SCRA 485 .............................................................. 40 Albay Accredited Constructions Association, Inc. v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133517, January 30 2006, 480 SCRA 520...............................................................................................145 Albert vs. University Publishing House, G.R. No. L-19118, January 30,1965 ............................................................... 3 609

610 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 164715, September 20, 2006........................................................................ 184,185 Almario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127772, March 22, 2001........................................................................................... 486 Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., 287 SCRA 245.....................................................................3 Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 220 SCRA 55............................................................... 179 Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 11, 563 SCRA 293 ..................................................................... 377 Andres v. Cacdac, L-45650, March 29,1982 ............................................486,489 Andres v. People, 185860, June 5, 2009 .............................................................. 96 Andres v. People, G.R. No. 185860, June 5, 2009 ............................................. 366 Angcangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA 301.................................................. 385 Angeles v. Gaite, G.R. No. 176596, March 23, 2011......................................... 187 Antiporda v. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551 ........................................................... 26 Antiporda, Jr. v. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551............................................................. 4, 5,10,16,18, 546 Aquino v. Paiste, 555 SCRA 255, June 25,2008 ................................................. 371 Aquino v. Paiste, G.R. No. 147782, June 25, 2008 ............................................ 369 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321.............................................................................. 281 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347............................... ............................................................ 282 Arthur Del Rosario, et al. v. Hellenor D. Doanto, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 180595, March 5,2010 ..................................................... 300 Asetre v. Asetre, G.R. No. 171536, April 7, 2009............................................... 184 Asian Terminals v. NLRC, 541 SCRA 105............................................................. 561 Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 647........................................................... 15 Baesa v. Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, L-30363, January 30,1971, 37 SCRA 437 ................................................................. 488 Balajedeong v. Del Rosario, 524 SCRA 13 ............................................... 387,388 Balayon v. Dinopol, 490 SCRA 547...................................................................... 240 Baltazar v. Chua, G.R. No. 177583, February 27, 2009..................................... 195 Bandiala v. CFI of Misamis Occidental, 35 SCRA 237 ........................................ 509 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, 375 SCRA 81 ................................. 547 Barbero v. Dumlao, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1682, June 19, 2008 ............................ 316 Barillo v. Gervacio, 500 SCRA 561 ....................................................................... 477 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 ............................................................................. 504 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)...................................................... 392, 393 Barrameda v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 477......................................................5 Barriga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 161784-86, April 26, 2005 .......................................................................................... 38, 39 Basco v. Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220..u.................................................................... 335 Batistis v. People, G.R. No. 181571, December 16, 2009................................. 565

CASE INDEX

611

Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, July 6, 2001 .......................................................... 146,147,148,149,184 Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136082, May 12, 2000.................................................................................... 198,199 Baviera v. Paglinawan, G.R. No. 168380, February 8, 2007 .....................68 Bax v. People, 532 SCRA 284, September 5, 2007 ................................. 121 Beltran v. People, G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000 ................................. 141 Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570..............................................406,407,408,409 Bengzon v. Ocampo, et al., 84 Phil. 611................................................... 311 Bernaldez v. Avelino, 527 SCRA 11........................................................... 387 Bernardo v. People, 520 SCRA 332, April 4, 2007................................... 537 Betoy v. Coliflores, 483 SCRA 435............................................................. 256 Betoy, Sr. v. Coliflores, 483 SCRA 435 ..............................................237, 241 Bievenido Dino and Renato Comparativo v. Pablo Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 4,2009 .............................. 170 Biggel v. Pamintuan, 559 SCRA 344.......................................................... 388 Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65 ..................................................... 468 Boac v. People, G.R. No. 180597, November 7,2008............................. 548 Boiser v. People, 543 SCRA 436, January 31,2008.................................. 458 Bonifacio, et al. v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, et al., G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010 ............................................................ 5 Bonifacio, et al. v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, et al., G.R. No. 184800, May 5,2010 ........................................................... 10 Borlongan v. Pena, G.R. No. 143591, May 25, 2010.......................................................203, 207,227,345, 346 Borlongan v. Pena, G.R. No. 143591, May 5,2010, citing Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 293................................................. 230 Borlongan, Jr. v. Pena, G.R. No. 143591, May 5,2010 cited in Leviste v. Alameda, G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010........................ 431 Bravo v. De Borja, 134 SCRA 466 .............................................................. 339 Brig Gen. [Ret.] Jose Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 172476- 99, September 15,2010...................... ...................... .................... ............428 Brig Gen. [Ret.] Jose Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 172476-99, September 15, 2010 ................................................................................... 432 Brinegar v. U.S. 338 U.S. 160,175-176 [U.S. Supreme Court 1949]........................................................................ 281 Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160, 93 L Ed 1879, 69 S Ct 1302 [1949]..................................................................................... 272 Briones v. People, G.R. No. 156009, June 5, 2009............................. 88,556 Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 ....................................................................19

612

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed., 819,821...................................................................................397 Bruce v. State, 612 P.2d 1012 [Alaska 1980]........................................... 276 Budiongan, Jr. v. De la Cruz, Jr., 502 SCRA 626 ....................................... 162 Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008 ......................... 89,93 Buenaventura v. People, 529 SCRA 500, August 7,2007....................... 257 Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, 413 SCRA 385 ................................................ 368 Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238 .............................................. 246 Cabador v. People, G.R. No. 186001, October 2,2009...................543, 544 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 224 as cited in People v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 175783, September 3, 2007 .....................................................................................271 Cabangangan v. Concepcion, 95 Phil. 87................................................. 432 Cabarles v. Maceda, 516 SCRA 303.................................................. 381,383 Cabarles v. Maceda, 516 SCRA 303, February 20, 2007 ........................ 536 Cabico v. Dimaculangan-Querijero, 522 SCRA 300, April 27,2007 ...............................................................................................124 Cadimas v. The Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-9725, October 19,1955 citing People v. Santos Lopez, 45 O.G. [No. 5] 2089...................................................................................439 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 1973280 .................................................................................. Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54.............................. 461 Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74989, November 6,1989.......................................................................................475 Camanag v. Guerrero, 335 Phil. 945, 970-971 [1997], citing Paderanga v. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86 [1991]........................................19 Campanano, Jr. v. Datuin, 536 SCRA 471, October 17, 2007.....................5 Campanano, Jr. v. Datuin, 536 SCRA 471 .....................................................6 Macasaet v. People, 452 SCRA 255...............................................................6 Caniza v. People, G.R. No. L-53766, March 18,1988, 159 SCRA 16 ................................................................................................485 Carino v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008 ............................ 560 Carino v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 688, 696......................................................................................559 Carman v. State, 602 P.2d 1255, Alaska 1979 ........................................ 253 Carrol v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 ........................................................................ 271 Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed 543, 45 S Ct 280, 39 ALR 790 [1925] .................................................................272 Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008 ................................... 464 Casupanan v. Laroya, 388 SCRA 28 .......................................................... 117 Catuiran v. People, 175647, May 8,2009 ................................................ 359

CASE INDEX

613

Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete, G.R. No. 159132, December 18, 2008, citing De Vera v. Layague, 395 Phil. 253,261 [2000], citing Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 191 [1999] ....................................................... 476 Cenita M. Cariaga v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180010, July 30, 2010 ...................................................................... 3 Ceniza-Manantan v. People, 531 SCRA 364, August 28, 2007 .......................................................................................... 538 Central Bank v. Morfe, 20 SCRA 507 ................................................................... 237 Cerezo v. People, G.R. No. 185230, June 1,2011 .................................... 465,466 Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, 307 SCRA 149 ...................................................... 385 Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 514 SCRA 279........................................................... 99 Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. L-29169, August 19,1968 ..................................................................... 414,415,416 Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29169, August 19,1968 ........................................................................................... 398 Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 214 Phil. 332 ............................................ 233 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 ................................................... 266, 267, 268 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 [89 S.Ct. 2034,2039-2040 (1969)] ............................................................. 280 Ching v. Nicdao, 522 SCRA 316 ............................................................................ 568 Ching v. Nicdao, 522 SCRA 316, April 27,2007 ................................................... 121 Chua v. Court Appeals, 520 SCRA 729, April 12,2007 ....................................... 549 Chua v. Court of Appeals, 520 SCRA 729 ............................................................ 345 Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140842, April 12,2007..................................................................................... 334, 345 Chua v. Padillo, G.R. No. 163797, April 24, 2007 ................................. 68, 69, 70 Co v. Lim, G.R. Nos. 164669-70, October 30, 2009....................... 193,461, 466 Co v. Republic, 539 SCRA 147............................................................................... 150 Coca- cola Bottlers [Phils.], Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 560 SCRA 719....................................................................... 125 Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 300 SCRA 367 ................................................. 4, 546 Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 300 SCRA 367 ................................................. 18 Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17............................................................................ 311 Comendador v. Villa, G.R. No. 93177, August 2,1991....................................... 306 Comilang v. Burcena, G.R. No. 146853, February 13, 2006 ............................. 561 Community Rural Bank of Guimba [N.E.], Inc. v. Talavera, 455 SCRA 34 ..................................................................... 180 Condrada v. People, 398 SCRA 482 .......................................390,452,488,490 Constantino v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140656, September 13, 2007 ................................................................................... 567 Consulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009 ................................. ^50

614 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 .........................................................281, 283 Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA 294...........................................................390 Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1.................................................................................337 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322.......................................................412,413 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 .............................................................414 Crespo v. Judge Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 .................................................................196 Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 ..........................................................................192 Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 [1987] ................................................................ 19 Crispin Beltran v. People and Secretary Gonzalez, G.R. No. 175013, June 1, 2007 ............................................. 162,164,167 Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 388 SCRA 72 ............................................... 4, 464, 546 Cruz v. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007........................................ 107,113 Cruz v. People ........................................................................................................146 Cruz v. People, 233 SCRA 439 ..............................................................................146 Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173 .........................11, 81,465,466,478 Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173 citing People v. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77 and Agbayani v. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699 ................................................................468 Cunanan v. Arceo, 242 SCRA 88 ......................................................................35, 37 Cuyos v. Garcia, 160 SCRA 302 .............................................................................. 13 Daan v. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 550 SCRA 233, March 28, 2008 citing Pacho v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116.................................................442 Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972- 77, March 28, 2008 citing People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51 .................................................................................................442 Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008..........................................................................................441 Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008 citing People v. Villarama, 210 SCRA 246.441 De Chavez v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 168830-31, February 6,2007........................................................................................144, 151 De Jesus v. Garcia, 19 SCRA 554 ............................................................................ 11 De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1.......................................................................306 De la Cruz v. Moya, 160 SCRA 838 ...................................................................11,13 De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71 ..............................................177 De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147932, January 25, 2006..........................................................188 Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633...................................................314 Dikmante v. People, G.R. No. 180992, September 4, 2009 .............................226

CASE INDEX

615

Dickey v. State of Florida, 398 U.S. 30................................................................ 504 Dico v. CA, G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005............................................... 560 Dico v. Court of Appeals, 452 SCRA 441 ............................................................ 364 Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005....................................................................................... 426 Dimacuha v. People, 516 SCRA 513 ................................................................... 261 Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA 121............................................... 383 Dipatuan v. Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010 .............................................................................................. 305 Docena-Caspev. Bagtas, 400 SCRA 37 ............................................................... 313 Dolera v. People, G.R. No. 180693, September 4,2009................................... 226 Domalanta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125586, June 29, 2000 .............................................................................................. 154 Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA 292 .....................................................15 Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, 476 SCRA 496 .................................................. 382 Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354....................................................... 145 Dumlao v. Ponferrada, 508 SCRA 426 ............................................................... 196 Dumo v. Espinas, G.R. No. 141962, January 25, 2006 ..................................... 561 Dunn v. Municipal Court, 220 Cal. App. 2d 858................................................ 248 Dupasquier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112089, January 24, 2001 citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207, People v. Navarro, 337 Phil. 122, Pono v. NLRC, 341 Phil. 615............................................... 178 Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121106, February 20, 2000 .......................................................... 11 Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721......................................................... 145 Eduardo San Miguel v. Maceda, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749, April 4, 2007, citing Andres v. Beltran, 415 Phil. 598 ................................................................................................ 331 Elders v. State, 321 Ark. 60, 900 S.W.2d 170 [1995] ........................................ 275 Elvira O. Ong v. Jose Casim Genio, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009 ............................................................................80,191 Enriquez v. Sarmiento, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011, August 7, 2006 ............................................................................................ 336 Enriquez v. Sarmiento, Jr., 498 SCRA 6 .............................................................. 162 Epie, Jr. v. Ulat-Marredo, 518 SCRA 641............................................................ 261 Epie, Jr. v. Ulat-Marredo, 518 SCRA 641, March 22, 2007 .............................. 297 Equitable PCI Banking Corporation v. RCBC Capital Corporation, G.R. No. 182248, December 18, 2008 .............................. 423 Escobal v. Garchitorena, 422 SCRA 45 ..................................................................38 Esguerra v. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134......................................................... 488,490 Esmena v. Pagay, 102 SCRA ................................................................................ 488

616 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

Esmena v. Pogoy, G.R. No. 54110, February 20,1981 ........................... 390,489 Esmena v. Pogoy, G.R. No. 54110, February 20,1981 citing Salcedo v. Mendoza, L-49375, February 28,1979, 88 SCRA 811 ............................................................... 488 Espano v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558........................................................ 269 Espiritu v. Jovellanos, 280 SCRA 579................................................................... 323 Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010........................................ 261, 262, 285, 294,295, 296 Estarija v. People, G.R. No. 173990, October 27, 2009 .................................... 559 Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, 453 SCRA 236........................................................... 36 Estino, et al. v. People, G.R. Nos. 163957-58, April 7, 2009 ............................. 555 Estrella v. Robles, Jr., 538 SCRA 60...................................................................... 424 Estrella v. Ruiz, 58 SCRA 779 ................................................................................ 179 Estudillo v. Baloma, 426 SCRA 83.......................................................................... 81 Eugenio v. People 549 SCRA 433 ........................................................................ 371 Eugenio v. People, 549 SCRA 433, March 26,2008........................................... 226 Evangelista v. People, G.R. No. 163267, May 5, 2010 ...................................... 196 Ex parte Perkov, 45 F. Supp 864.......................................................................... 311 Ferrer v. People, G.R. No. 143487, February 22, 2006 ..................................... 560 Filemon A. Verzano, Jr. v. Francis Victor D. Paro, G.R. No. 171643, August 8, 2010................................................... 187,196 Fischer v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 ................................................................ 412 Flores v. Sumaljag, 290 SCRA 568 ......................................................................... 14 Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009 ............................................... 5,6,9,10,12,16,98, 99 Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009 citing Fukuzume v. People, supra ............................................................... 17 Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538 ...................................................... 59 Francisco v. People, G.R. No. 177430, July 14, 2009........................................... 91 Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 [89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969)] ..................................................... 281 Frias v. People, G.R. No. 171437, October 4, 2007 ............................................. 83 Fukuzume v. People, 474 SCRA 570 ................................................................11,16 Fullero v. People, 533 SCRA 97................................................................................ 5 Gaas v. Mitmug, G.R. No. 165776, April 30,2008.............................................. 383 Galanza v. Trocino, 529 SCRA 200....................................................................... 388 Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 ................................................ 472,484 Gamas v. Oco, 425 SCRA 588 ................................................................... 428,429 Gandarosa v. Flores, 527 SCRA 776 .................................................................... 431 Gandarosa v. Flores, 527 SCRA 776, July 17, 2007............................................ 431 Gandarosa v. Flores, G.R. No. 167910,17 July 2007, r 527 SCRA 776 ............. 193

CASE INDEX

617

Gandicela v. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299 ...............................................................490 Gandicela v. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299 cited in Esmena v. Pogoy, G.R. No. 54110, February 20,1981 .............................................. 488 Garces v. People, 527 SCRA 827................................................................567 Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 678 ...............................................457 Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12, 2009.........................................................................16, 40, 462 Geduspan v. People, 451 SCRA 187............................................................ 30 Geduspan v. People, G.R. No. 158187, February 11, 2005...................... 34 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263..............................................................406 Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 4 ............................................................. 17 Go Tian Chai v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20645, September 22,1966 ................................................................... 311 Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 178429, October 23, 2009....................................................................366, 456, 459 Go v. Bongolan, 311 SCRA 99 ....................................................................302 Go v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138 .....................................................150 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 [51 S.Ct. 153,158, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931)]............................................. 280 Gomez v. Montalban, 548 SCRA 693 ......................................................... 10 Gonzalez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 164904, October 19, 2007 .....................................70 Goodman v. De la Victoria, 325 SCRA 658...............................................337 Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470............................................................ 309 Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623..........................................................................306, 308,309 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333.....................................................467 Guillermo v. Reyes, 240 SCRA 154............................................................313 Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260,94 S.Ct.488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 1973................................................................................... 265 Gutierrez v. Hernandez, 524 SCRA 1, June 8, 2007.................................365 Gutierrez v. Hernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1628, June 8, 2007 ................................................................................................ 365 Guy v. People, G.R. Nos. 166794-96, March 20,2009 ..............86,426, 560 Hanley v. State, 83 Nevada 461 cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, p. 749................................................................... 461 Harold V. Tamargo v. Romulo Awingan, Lloyd Antiporda and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010......................................................................................... 193 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 [88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968)]............................................................................. 281

618 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

Heirs of Jane Honrales v. Jonathan Honrales/People of the Philip- pines and Heirs of Jane Honrales v. Jonathan Honrales, G.R. No. 182651/ G.R. No. 182657, August 25,2010 ............................................................ 466 Heirs of Jose Sy Bang v. Sy, G.R. No. 114217, October 13, 2009........................................................................................ 152 Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio, 541 SCRA 479......................... ................................................... 561 Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos v. Court of Appeals and Johnny Co y Yu, G.R. No. 169711, February 8,2010 ......................................................................................... 303 Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos v. Court of Appeals, 169711, February 8,2010 .............................................. 55,108,121, 559 Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2170, December 16, 2009.................................................................................... 388 Herrera v. Alba, 460 SCRA 197 ........................................................................... 404 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 [44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924)].................................................................................... 280 Hilario v. People, 551 SCRA 191 ......................................................................... 426 Hilario v. People, G.R. No. 161070, April 14, 2008 ................................. 368,559 Hipos, Sr. v. Bay, G.R. No. 174813-15, March 17, 2009................................... 195 Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517.......................................................... 351 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 ............................................................ 410 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 ................................................ 401,402,404 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 ...................................................................... 283 Hun Hyung Park v. Eun Wong Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12, 2007 ..................................................................109,121, 542 Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., 465 SCRA 454..................................................... 114 Icasiano v. Sandiganbayan, 209 SCRA 377.............................................. 474,475 Ilusorio v. Ilusorio, 540 SCRA 182 ....................................................................... 178 In the Matter of Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Bernabe Buscayno, Jose Maria Sison and Juliet Sison v. Military Commission Nos. 1,2,6 and 25, G.R. No. L-58284, November 19,1981..................................................... 497 In The Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Harvey, et al. v. Defensor-Santiago, 162 SCRA 840 ................................ 311 Inding v. Sandiganbayan, 434 SCRA 388 ..............................................................30 Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, 338 Phil. 1061 ...............................................................64 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, . G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010..............................................................129 ISip v. People, 525 SCRA 735 ................................................................................... 6

CASE INDEX

619

Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010............................................................... 491, 493, 494 Jacob v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010.................................................................................... 389 Jalandoni v. Drilon, 327 SCRA 107 ...............................................................15 Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong, A.M. No. 08- 19-SB-J, April 12, 2011 citing State Prosecutors v. Muro, 251 SCRA 111 .................................................................................. 382 Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147026-27, September 11, 2009 .............................................................. 452, 458, 466 Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon, G.R. No. 108946, January 28,1999, 302 SCRA 225 .............................................................................................. 183 Jose Antonio C. Leviste v. Hon. Elmo M. Alameda, et al., G.R. No. 182677, August 3,2010..................................................... 227 Jose Antonio Leviste v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010.................................................. 333,334 Jose v. Suarez, 556 SCRA 773 .................................................................... 126 Judge Felimon Abelita, III v. P/Supt. German Doria and SP03 Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009 ..................................................................... 279, 284,285 Judith Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170179, February 9, 2011 ......................................................................................... 558 Julius Cacao y Prieto v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180870, January 22,2010................................................. 353,562 Kastigar v. United States 406 U.S. 441 ..................................................... 417 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967) ............................................................... 279 Keaton v. State, 253 Ga. 70,316 S.E.2d 452 [1984] ................................ 276 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. [23,] 43 [83 S.Ct. 1623, 1635,10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963)....................................................................... 281 Kho v. Lanzanas, 489 SCRA 445 ...................................................... 235, 236, 237 Kho v. Makalintal, 306 SCRA 70 ................................................................ 249 Lachica v. Tormis, 470 SCRA 206 .............................................................. 322 Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298 ..................................... 12, 37 Ladlad v. Velasco, 523 SCRA 218 .............................................................. 157 Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, June 1,2007............................ 174 Lagunilia v. Hon. Reyes, etc. and Motas, 111 Phil. 1020 citing People v. Tacneng, 105 Phil. 1298 and People v. Robles, 105 Phil. 1016................................................................ 488 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ramon P. Jacinto, G.R. No. 154622, August 3, 2010 .............................................................. 138 Landicho v. Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, February 23,1968...................... 140 Lao v. People, 556 SCRA 120..................................................................... 426

620 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 581 ........................................................................ 161 Lastimoso v. Asayo, 517 SCRA 522 ......................................................................................... 377 Lava v. Gonzales, 11 SCRA 650................................................................................................ 509 Lavides v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, February 1,2000...................................................................................317,318, 319 Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan [First Division], G.R. No. 180122, March 13,2009 ...................................................................452,458 Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122, March 13,2009............................................................................................................. 456 Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122, March 13,2009............................................................................................................... 82 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656 .................................................. 145,150,193 Lee v. KC Bank, N.V., G.R. No. 164673, Januaiy 15,2010 ........................................................ 195 Lejano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 176389, December 14,2010 ...................................................................................................... 563 Leonardo U. Flores v. Hon. Raul S. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188197, August 3,2010.................................................................................. 193 Levi Strauss [Phil.], Inc. v. Lim, 573 SCRA 25 ........................................................................... 184 Licyayo v. People, G.R. No. 169425, March 4, 2008 ................................................................. 87 Lim, Sr. v. Felix, 194 SCRA 292 ................................................................................................. 207 Limanch-0 Hotel and Leasing Corporation, et al. v. City of Ologapo, et al., G.R. No. 185121, January 18,2010........................................................................................................... 152 Lo Bun Tiong v. Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January 28, 2008.......................................................................................................... 114 Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319,325,99S.Ct. 2319,2324, 60 L. Ed.2d 920, 927 1979 ............................................................................................ 247 Lodyga v. State, 179 NE 1641931 ............................................................................................ 229 Lohman v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 894...................................................................... 245 Loney v. People, G.R. No. 152644, February 10,2006 ............................................................ 498 Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323.......................................................................................... 135 Lubrica v. People, 516 SCRA 674; February 26,2007 .............................................................. 569 Luciano v. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187 ........................................................................................... 509 Lumanog, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 182555, September 7,2010 .............................................. 374,375,379,382, 547, 548 Macasaet v. People, 452 SCRA 255........................................................................................ 6,12 Macasaet v. People, 452 SCRA 255 as cited in Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009 ................................................................ 12 Maccay v. Nobela, 454 SCRA 504............................................................................................ 117 Magestrado v. People, G.R. No. 148072, July 10, 2009 ...................................................................................................126,132 ]\£agno v. People, G.R. No. 171542, April 6,2011 .................................................................... 11

CASE INDEX

621

Mago v. Peiialosa-Fermo, 582 SCRA 1 ..................................................................................... 168 Maguddatu v. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 362 .........................................................313, 325 Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 ...............................................................211, 216 Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159; People v. Chua, 396 SCRA 657 .....................................................................................296 Malana v. People, G.R. No. 173612, March 26, 2008.............................................................. 360 Mallilin v. People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30,2008 .................................................................. 359 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 ..................................................................................................... 411 Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21,2007...................................................... 82, 87 Managuelod v. Paclibon, Jr., 426 SCRA 377............................................................................. 337 Manebo v. Acosta, G.R. No. 169554, October 28, 2009................................................................................. 144,145,151 Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 ................................................................................412, 413 Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441.................................................................................................... 413 Manly Sportwear Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dadodette Enterprises, 470 SCRA 384 ...........................................................................................235 Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26,1994 ...................................................... 418 Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26,1994, citing Kastigar vs. U.S., 406 US 441 ....................................................... 413 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 336 SCRA 747......................................................................139,140 Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 109242, January 26,1999 ..............................................................................................408, 409 Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1708, L.Ed. 2d 1127..........................................................................................246 Marimla v. People, G.R. No. 158467, October 16,2009 .............................................300, 301 Marinas v. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423.............................................................................................. 145 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 .................................................................................... 266 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,48 S.Ct., 1927 ............................................................. 252 Marron v. United States, 275 US, 192,196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 Ed 231...................................................................................................246 Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 575........................................................................... 193 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79,84, 107 S.Ct. 1013,1016,94 L.Ed.2d 72 [1987].................................................................... 283 Matrido v. People, G.R. No. 179061, July 13,2009 ............................................................... 86,92 Maza v. Gonzalez, G.R. Nos. 172074-76, June 1, 2007 ............................................................ 174 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 ........................................................................... 413,414 McCleary v. Hudspeth, 124 Fed. 2d. 445 ................................................................................ 482 Mendoza v. Alarma, G.R. No. 151970, May 7, 2008 ............................................................... 344 Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 440 SCRA 423 .................................................................... 383 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 594, 598 [1995] cited in Samson v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 123504, December 14,2000............................................................................. 19

622 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

Merencillo v. People, G.R. Nos. 142369-70, April 13, 2007 ................................................. 503 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Rogelio Reynaldo and Jose C. Adrandea, G.R. No. 164538, August 9,2010 .............................................................. 20, 21,120 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda, 338 SCRA 254............................................................................................................... 150 Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377 .................................................18,313,314,428, 479 Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006.............................................. 18,19 Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006 citing People v. Montiero, 192 SCRA 548 ................................................................... 479 Mobilia Products v. Umezawa, G.R. No. 149357, March 4, 2005.................................................................................................................12 Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1......................................................................... 299 Montilla v. Hilario, 90 Phil. 49........................................................................................ 35 Mupas v. People, G.R. No. 172834, February 6, 2008 ......................................... 352,355 Narciso v. Santa Romana-Cruz, 328 SCRA 505............................................................................ 335, 336, 337, 338 Naui v. Mauricio, 414 SCRA 11 .................................................................................... 322 Navarrete v. People, 513 SCRA 509, January 31,2007................................................ 551 Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14,2005..................................................................................................... 558 Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, 544 SCRA 324, February 11, 2008........................................................................................... 541, 542 Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 citing People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570............................................................................................ 502 Nierras v. Dacuycuy, G.R. Nos. 59568-76, January 11,1990 cited in Diaz v. Davao Light and Power Co., Inc., G.R. No. 160959, April 3, 2007 .......................................................... 499 Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 ............................................................................... 501 Nola v. Barroso, Jr., 408 SCRA 529............................................................................... 237 Nolasco v. Pano, 139 SCRA 152 ............................................................................ 268,269 Nombrefia v. People, G.R. No. 157919, January 30,2007............................................. 93 Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, 379 Phil. 21 ................................................... 477 Office of the Court Administrator v. Go, 534 SCRA 156.............................................. 388 Office of the Court Administrator v. Janolo, Jr., 534 SCRA 262............................................................................................................... 388 Office of the Court Administrator v. Laron, 527 SCRA 45 ........................................... 387 Office of the Court Administrator v. Legaspi, Jr., 512 SCRA 570............................................................................................................... 388 Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano, G.R. No. 177580, October 17,2008 citing Vide Paredes v. Court of Appeals, 528 SCRA 577.................................................................. 477

CASE INDEX

623

Ojeda v. People, G.R. No. 178935, July 14, 2009 ........................................................... 91 Okabe v. Gutierrez, 429 SCRA 685 ............................................................................... 345 Okabe v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 150185, May 27, 2004 ................................................... 206 Olalia, Jr. v. People, 562 SCRA 723, August 20, 2008................................................... 567 Olbes v. Buemio, G.R. No.173319, December 4, 2009 ............................................................................... 388, 389, 391 Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA 465 ................................................................ 365 Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154155, August 6, 2008 ..................................................................................... 382, 383, 391 Omictin v. Court of Appeals, 512 SCRA 70................................................................... 125 Omictin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2009...........................................................................................................133 Ong Hee Sang v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-9700, February 28,1962,4 SCRA 442 .........................................................................312 Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 470 SCRA 7 ............................................................................. 145 Oriente v. People, 513 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 155094, January 30, 2007...........................................................................................................463 Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007 citing Teehankee v. Madayag, G.R. No. 103102, March 6,1992, 207 SCRA 134 .......................................................................................104 Pacoy v. Judge Afable Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007 ....................................................................................... 102,104 Pacoy v. Judge Cajigal, 534 SCRA 338 .......................................................................... 485 Pacquing v. Gobarde, 521 SCRA 464............................................................................ 388 Pactolin v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161455, May 20, 2008 ..................................................................................................................29 Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741 ............................................... 302,303,314 Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115407, August 28,1995.............................................................................................................314 Padunan v. DARAB, G.R. No. 132163, January 28, 2003 ............................................... 11 Palana v. People, 534 SCRA 296..................................................................................... 15 Palana v. People, 534 SCRA 296, September 28, 2007............................................. 13,15 Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008........................................................................................................62 Pangan v. Ganay, 445 SCRA 574 citing Concerned Citizens of Maddela v. De la Torre-Yadao, 393 SCRA 217................................................................................................................191 Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599 ........................................................................ 244 Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51.................................................... 12,17, 551 Panuncio v. People, G.R. No. 165678, July 17, 2009.................................................... 254 Paredes v. Court of Appeals, 528 SCRA 577, July 30, 2007.......................................... 476 Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 322 Phil. 709 ............................................................... 477

624 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

Pareja v. Gomez, 5 SCRA 830 .................................................................................................. 305 People of the Philippines v. Benancio Mortera, G.R. No. 188104, April 23,2010 ................................................................................... 539 People of the Philippines v. Bringas Bunay y Damat, G.R. No. 171268, September 14, 2010 ........................................................... 120 People of the Philippines v. Danilo Cruz y Culala, G.R. No. 185381, December 16, 2009 ......................................................................... 278 People of the Philippines v. Elizabeth Marcelino y Reyes, G.R. No. 189278, July 26, 2010......................................................................... 274 People of the Philippines v. Gray, G.R. No. 180109, July 26, 2010................................................................................................................. 208 People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, Abelardo P. Panlaqui, et al., G.R. No. 173396, September 22, 2010 ...................................................................................... 462,470 People of the Philippines v. Joey Tion y Cabadu, G.R. No. 172092, December 16,2009 .......................................................................... 273 People of the Philippines v. Joselito Noque y Gomez, G.R. No. 175319, January 15,2010 ............................................................ ................. 368 People of the Philippines v. Nelson Palma y Hangad, G.R. No. 189279, March 9, 2010.................................................................................. 226 People of the Philippines v. Nida Adeser y Rico, G.R. No. 179931, October 26,2009.............................................................................. 500 People of the Philippines v. Oscar Documento, G.R. No. 188706, March 17, 2010................................................................................ 449 People of the Philippines v. Romulo Tuniaco, et al., G.R. No. 185710, January 19, 2010.............................................................................. 540 People of the Philippines v. Roy Alcazar y Miranda, G.R. No. 186494, September 15, 2010 ........................................................................ 454 People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan and Rolando Plaza, G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010 ................................................. 32 People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010 .......................................................................... 31 People of the Philippines v. SP03 Sangki Ara y Mirasol, et al., G.R. No. 185011, December 23,2009 ................................................................ 277 People of the Philippines v. Victorio Pagkalinawan, G.R. No. 184805, March 3,2010 .....................................................................274,277 People of the Philippines v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 181829, September 1, 2010 ...................................................................................................... 540 People v. Abaiio, 97 Phil. 28 .................................................................................................... 488 People v. Abatayo, 433 SCRA 562 ......................................................................................... ..424 People v. Abello, G.R. No. 151952, March 25,2009 ................................................................ 552 People v. Abesamis, 531 SCRA 300, August 28, 2007............................................................. 567

CASE INDEX

625

People v. Abon, 545 SCRA 606, February 15, 2008 ................................................................. 565 People v. Aburque, G.R. No. 181085, October 23, 2009 ......................................................... 563 People v. Acol, 232 SCRA 406 .................................................................................................. 221 People v. Adeser, G.R. No. 179931, October 26, 2009 ............................................................ 562 People v. Ador, 432 SCRA 1 ..................................................................................................... 380 People v. Agojo, G.R. No. 181318, April 16, 2009.................................................................... 220 People v. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008 ....................................................... 273 People v. Albert, 251 SCRA 136 ............................................................................................... 438 People v. Alcanzado, 428 SCRA 681......................................................................................... 422 People v. Alejandro Rellota y Tadeo, G.R. No. 168103, August 3, 2010................................................................................. 551 People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 176350, August 10, 2011 ......................................................... 349 People v. Alfredo, G.R. No. 188560, December 15, 2010........................................................ 550 People v. Alfredo, G.R. No. 188560, December 15, 2010.......................................................... 90 People v. Alipio, G.R., No. 185285, October 5, 2009 ............................................................... 562 People v. Alivio, G.R. No. 177771, May 30, 2011 .................................................................... 349 People v. Alunday, G.R. No. 181546, September 3, 2008 .........................................................................................213, 226 People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 ...............................................................215, 219,220 People v. Aminola, G.R. No. 178062, September 8, 2010....................................................... 225 People v. Amodia, G.R. No. 173791, April 7, 2009 .................................................................... 85 People v. Amper, G.R. No.172708, May 5,2010...................................................................... 226 People v. An, G.R. No. 169870, August 4, 2009....................................................................... 355 People v. Anguac, G.R. No. 176744, June 5, 2009 ..................................................................... 84 People v. Angus, G.R. No. 178778, August 3,2010 .................................................................. 352 People v. Anita Claudio, 160 SCRA 646.................................................................................... 218 People v. Anonas, G.R. No. 156847, January 21, 2007.................................................................. People v. Anonas, G.R. No. 156847, January 31,2007............................................................. 381,383,384,386,387 People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 174372, January 20, 2009........................................................... 454 People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588 ................................................................................................... 58 People v. Araneta, G.R. No. 191064, October 20, 2010 .................................................................................273, 274, 277 People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 24 ................................................................................................. 179 People v. Arbola, L-16936, August 5,1985............................................................................... 161 People v. Asis, G.R. No. 173089, August 25,2010.................................................................... 470 People v. Astudillo, 401 SCRA 723 ........................................................................................... 463 People v. Atadero, G.R. No. 183455, October 20, 2010 .......................................................... 562 People v. Atienza, 86 Phil. 576................................................................................................. 436 People v. Aure, G.R. No. 180451, October 17, 2008.................................................................. 94 People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7,1989..................................................398, 413, 416 People v. Baetiong, 2 Phil. 126................................................................................................. 487

626 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

People v. Bagnate, 428 SCRA 633............................................................................................380 People v. Bagsit, 409 SCRA 350 ...............................................................................................431 People v. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 1119 ............................................................................ 439, 469 People v. Balisacan, G.R. No. L-26376, August 31,1966 ..........................................................481 People v. Balisacan, G.R. No. L-26376, August 31,1966 citing People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23,1956 ........................................................ 482 People v. Bao, L-12102, September 29,1959 ..........................................................................482 People v. Barba; G.R. No. 182420, July 23, 2009.....................................................................359 People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947[1979] ....................................................................... 275 People v. Baun, 562 SCRA 584, August 20, 2008.....................................................................445 People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168641, April 27, 2007..................................................................57 People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2,1994 ........................................................119 People v. Beduya, G.R. No. 175315, August 9, 2010...............................................................562 People v. Begino, G.R. No. 181246, March 20, 2009.................................................................96 People v. Belga, 100 Phil. 996 ..................................................................................................495 People v. Bello 316 SCRA 804 ..................................................................................................438 People v. Beltran, 32 SCRA 71 .................................................................................................161 People v. Bermas, 306 SCRA 135.............................................................................................375 People v. Bernabe, G.R. No. 185726, October 16, 2009 .........................................................562 People v. Bernas, 377 SCRA 391 ..............................................................................................444 People v. Binad Sy Chua, 444 Phil. 757....................................................................................218 People v. Bohol, 560 SCRA 232, July 28,2008..........................................................................261 People v. Bohol, G.R. No. 171729, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 232...............................................................................................................273 People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006................................................... 339,341 People v. Buan, L-25366, March 29,1968.................................................................. 494,495 People v. Buissan, 105 SCRA 547...............................................................................................14 People v. Bulosan, 160 SCRA 492 ............................................................................................161 People v. Buluran, 325 SCRA 476 .............................................................................. 161,162 People v. Bulusan, 160 SCRA 492150 ............................................................................................ People v. Busa, G.R. No. L- 32047, June 25,1973.....................................................................439 People v. Cabacaba, G.R. No. 171310, July 9,2008..................................................................352 People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235 ................................................................482 People v. Cabral, 303 SCRA 361..................................................................................335,338 People v. Cabral, G.R. No. 131909, February 18,1999 ............................................................305 People v. Cabugatan, 515 SCRA 537, February 12, 2007 ........................................................214 People v. Cacdac, L-45650, March 29,1982........................................................................... 391 People v. Campos, G.R. No. 176061, July 4,2011 ....................................................................351 People v. Canares, G.R. No. 174065, February 18,2009................................... ................................................................. 82,83 People v. Cantalejo, G.R. No. 182790, April 24, 2009 .............................................................349

CASE INDEX

627

People v. Caraang, 418 SCRA 321 ............................................................................................ 463 People v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 146277, June 20, 2002 ............................................................... 378 People v. Casta, 565 SCRA 341................................................................................................. 426 People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 171188, June 19, 2009.................................................................. 154 People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267........................................................................................ 13,15 People v. Ceredon, 542 SCRA 550............................................................................................ 449 People v. Ceredon, 542 SCRA 550, January 28, 2008 .................................................442, 448 People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494 ..................................................................................... 359 People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009.......................................................... 360 People v. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011................................................................. 97 People v. Chua, G.R. No. 136066-67, February 4, 2003........................................................... 295 People v. Chupeco, L-19568, March 31,1964 ............................................................................ 14 People v. Cinco, G.R. No. 186460, December 4, 2009........................................................................80,82, 83, 84, 96 People v. Cloribel, 120 Phil. 775............................................................................................... 488 People v. Coja, 555 SCRA 176 .................................................................................................. 427 People v. Combate, G.R. No. 189301, December 15,2010 ..................................................... 562 People v. Comendador, G.R. No. L-38000, September 19,1980 ..................................................................................................... 437 People v. Comendador, G.R. No. L-38000, September 19,1980 citing People v. Corachea, L-30101, July 16,1979................................................................................................... 439 People v. Comendador, G.R. No. L-38000, September 19,1980 citing People v. Gungab, 64 Phil. 779................................................................................................................... 440 People v. Comila, G.R. No. 171448, February 28, 2007........................................................... 500 People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008 .......................................................... 277 People v. Conway, 225 Mic. 151 and Gamble v. Keyes, 35 S.D. 645, 650 ........................................................................................................... 266 People v. Coquia, L-15456, June 29,1963 and cited in Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538 ............................................................ 58 People v. Corpuz, 482 SCRA 435 .............................................................................................. 552 People v. Cortez, G.R. No. 183819, July 23, 2009 .................................................................... 276 People v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400 .............................................................................. 252 People v. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 453 .............................................................................. 254 People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159261, February 21, 2007 ...........................................................................................484, 549 People v. Crescencia, 228 SCRA 13 .......................................................................................... 502 People v. Crespo, G.R. No. 180500, September 11, 2008 ....................................................... 541 People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 185381, December 16, 2009............................................................. 277 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., 360 SCRA 690..................................................................................... 264 People v. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489 ......................................................................................... 885

628

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

People v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 188106, November 25,2009 ............................................ 90, 562 People v. Dansico, G.R. No. 178060, February 23,2009 ......................................................... 275 People v. Dansico, G.R. No. 178060, February 23,2011 ......................................................... 274 People v. Dawaton, G.R. No. 146247, September 17,2002 .................................................. .443 People v. De Golez, L-14160, June 30,1960 ............................................................................ 482 People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, June 5,2009...................................................466,474 People v. De la Torre, G.R. No. 176637, October 6, 2008 ........................................................................................................... 560 People v. Deang, 338 SCRA 657 .............................................................................................. 162 People v. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142 ...............................................................................488,490 People v. Del Castillo, 439 SCRA 601....................................................................................... 373 People v. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 .............................................................................. 373,374 People v. Diaz, 94 Phil. 715 ..................................................................................................... 493 People v. Diaz, L-6518, March 30,1954................................................................................... 494 People v. Dion, G.R. No. 181035, July 4,2011 ............................................................................96 People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668................................................................................................ 276 People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668,694......................................................................................... 275 People v. Duca, G.R. No. 171175, October 9,2009 .................................................... 559, 560 People v. Duenas, Jr., 426 SCRA 666....................................................................................... 370 People v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 168918, March 2,2009 ..................................................................73 People v. Ebio, 439 SCRA 421.................................................................................................. 444 People v. Erguiza, G.R. No. 171348, November 26, 2008....................................................... 360 People v. Ernas, 408 SCRA 391................................................................................................ 445 People v. Escote, Jr., 400 SCRA 603......................................................................................... 424 People v. Espidol, 442 SCRA 360................................................................................ 444,445 People v. Espinosa, 409 SCRA 256 ............................................................................ 428,465 People v. Espinosa, G.R. Nos. 153714-20, August 15, 2003........................................................................................................... 486 People v. Estella, 395 SCRA 553 .............................................................................................. 264 People v. Estrada, 1965,234 CA2d 136,146,44 CR 165 ........................................................... 243 People v. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009 ..............................................................97 People v. Fajardo, 512 SCRA 360, January 23, 2007 ..................................................................70 People v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 190179, October 20, 2010 ........................................................ 273 People v. Fragante, G.R. No. 182521, February 9,2011.............................................................97 People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 192818, November 17,2010 ..................................................................................................... 445 People v. Frondozo, G.R. No. 177164, June 30,2009.................................................349, 357 People v. Gabo, G.R. No. 161083, August 3, 2010.....................................................203,209 People v. Gako, Jr., 348 SCRA 334................................................................... 314, 335, 338 People v. Gandia, G.R. No. 175332, February 6,2008 ............................................................ 567 People v. Garcia, 529 SCRA 519, August 8,2007 ..................................................................... 212 People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 159450, March 30,2011...................................................................82

CASE INDEX

629

People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25,2009 ............................................................ 359 People v. Gatlabayan, G.R. No. 186467, July 13,2011............................................................. 359 People v. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756............................................................................................ 221 People v. Gomez, 117 SCRA 73................................................................................... 150,161 People v. Gomez, 20 SCRA 293................................................................................................ 469 People v. Gomez, 325 SCRA 61................................................................................................ 329 People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-12056, January 24,1959 ......................................................... 313 People v. Govea, 1965,235 CA2d 285,300,45 CR 253 ............................................................. 243 People v. Gravino, G.R. No. L-31327-29, May 16,1983 .......................................................... 440 People v. Guiara, 600 SCRA 310 ............................................................... ............................. 273 People v. Guillermo, 420 SCRA 326 ......................................................................................... 370 People v. Gumimba, 517 SCRA 25........................................................................................... 449 People v. Gumimba, 517 SCRA 25, February 27,2007 ............................................................ 445 People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804, June 18,2009 ............................................................ 278 People v. Holmsen, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1045 ............................................................................. 246 People v. Honorable Maceda, 323 SCRA 45 cited in Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., 556 SCRA 471 .................................................................. 303 People v. Hubert Webb, 312 SCRA 573.......................... ........................................................ 525 People v. Ibanez, 407 SCRA 406............................................................................................... 443 People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 ........................................... .................................................... 150 People v. Jabiniao, Jr., 553 SCRA 769............................................. ....... ................................. 426 People v. Jaime Ayochok y Tauli, G.R. No. 175784, August 25, 2010.................................................. ..................................... . ................ 120 People v. Jalbuena, 526 SCRA 500, July 4,2007......................................... . ........................... 430 People v. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3,2000 ....................................................... 228 People v. Joven de Grano, et al., G.R. No. 167710, June 5,2009. .................................... ........................................................................... 467 People v. Joven de Grano, et al., G.R. No. 167710, June 5,2009 .................................................................................................................. 553 People v. Koloh Pohong, G.R. No. L-32332, August 15,1973 .............................................. ............................................................ 439 People v. Labagala, G.R. No. 184603, August 2,2010.............................................................. 351 People v. Labatan, 320 SCRA 140 ......................................................................... .................. 374 People v. Labatete, 107 Phil. 697..................................... . ................................................ .....488 People v. Lacson, 400 SCRA 267 ............................................. .............................. . ................... 1 People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1,2003 ........................................... 505, 507,508 People v. Lagarde, G.R. No. 182549, January 20,2009 ..............................................................................................355,361 People v. Lagon, 185 SCRA 442.................................................................................................. 13 People v. Laguio, G.R. No. 128587, March 16,2007 ................................................................ 213 People v. Laguio, Jr., 518 SCRA 393 .......................... ............ .......................452,471,560 People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, March 16,2007................................................ . ........ 217

630 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

People v. Lapura, 255 SCRA 85 ................................................................................................179 People v. Lascano, G.R. No. 172605, November 22,2010 ......................................................................................................563 People v. Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010 .................................................. 380, 381 People v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 186418, October 16,2009 .............................................................275 People v. Lazaro, Jr., G.R. No. 186418, October 16,2009 ........................................................562 People v. Leangsiri, 252 SCRA 213............................................................................. 264,267 People v. Lim, G.R. No. 187503, September 11, 2009 ............................................................276 People v. Louel Uy, 471 SCRA 668 ...........................................................................................471 People v. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494..............................................................................................431 People v. Lua, 256 SCRA 539 ...................................................................................................270 People v. Lumanog, G.R. No. 182555, September 7,2010 ........................... ..........................................................................380 People v. Macatingag, G.R. No. 181037, January 19, 2009 ............................................................................................ 258,273 People v. Madraga, 344 SCRA 628 ............................................................................ 437,448 People v. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212 ........................................................................................13 People v. Magat, 332 SCRA 517 ..............................................................................................438 People v. Magat, G.R. No. 130026, May 31,2000 ......................................................443, 479 People v. Mala, 411 SCRA 327.................................................................................................430 People v. Malate, G.R. No. 185724, June 5,2009 ....................................................................352 People v. Mamaril, G.R. No. 171980, October 6,2010 .............................................. 236,561 People v. Man alio, 400 SCRA 129...........................................................................................302 People v. Marquez 27 SCRA 808 .............................................................................................179 People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010.....................................................225 People v. Maspil, G.R. No. 85177, August 20,1990................................................... 219,220 People v. Mclean, 56 Cal. 2d 660.............................................................................................245 People v. Mejia, G.R. No. 185723, August 4,2009.....................................................................95 People v. Mendoza, 231 SCRA 264 ........................................................................... 444,448 People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 132923-24, June 6, 2002........................................................... 89 People v. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174 ..........................................................................................216 People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, May 30,2011 ................................................................. 97 People v. Michael Lindo y Vergara, G.R. No. 189818, August 9,2010..................................... ...........................................560 People v. Michael Sembrano y Castro, G.R. No. 185848, August 16,2010................................................................................274 People v. Mira, 535 SCRA 543 .................................................................................................447 People v. Molina, 352 SCRA 174 .................................................................... 216,218, 261 People v. Montejo 108 Phil. 613 ...............................................................................................36 People v. Montenegro, 436 SCRA 33 ......................................................................................351 People v. Monteverde, 142 SCRA 668 ....................................................................................161 People v. Montinola, 543 SCRA 412.......................................................................... 426, 560

CASE INDEX

631

People v. Morales, G.R. No. 166355, May 30, 2011 ..................................................................24 People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 278...................................................................................................16 People v. Murillo, 434 SCRA 342..............................................................................................444 People v. Musa, G.R. No. 170472, July 3, 2009........................................................................561 People v. Nachor, G.R. No. 177779, December 14, 2010 ........................................................562 People v. Nadera 324 SCRA 490...............................................................................................376 People v. Naelga, G.R. No. 171018, September 11, 2009........................................................275 People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28,2008...................................................................273 People v. Navarro, G.R. No. 173790, October 11, 2007 ..........................................................360 People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009 ............................................................463 People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563 ...................................................................................... ..........482 People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283 ................................................................................. 330, 332 People v. Nuevas, 516 SCRA 463..............................................................................................261 People v. Nuevas, 516 SCRA 463, February 22, 2007 ................................................ 281, 298 People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007 ..........................................................215 People v. Nunez, G.R. No. 177148, June 30,2009 ....................................................................233 People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008 ..................................................................................................... 359 People v. Oden, 427 SCRA 634................................................................................... 444, 449 People v. Ogarte, G.R. No. 182690, May 30, 2011.....................................................................87 People v. Olarte, G.R. No. L-22465, Februaxy 28,1967..............................................................59 People v. Olarte, L-13027, June 30 1960 ............................................................. . .................... 59 People v. Olivo, G.R. No. 177768, July 27, 2009.......................................................................357 People v. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092, September 30,1987................................................ 405,406 People v. Ong, 432 SCRA 470 ...................................................................................................349 People v. Ong, 544 SCRA 123, February 6, 2008......................................................................535 People v. Ordono, 334 SCRA 673 .............................................................................................375 People v. Ortillas, 428 SCRA 659 ................................................................................ 423,424 People v. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244................................................................................................404 People v. Palgan, G.R. No. 186234, December 21, 2009 .........................................................562 People v. Palma, G.R. No. 189279, March 9, 2010... ...............................................................562 People v. Paloma, G.R. No. 178544, February 23,2011...........................................................349 People v. Pangilinan, 518 SCRA 358.........................................................................................368 People v. Pangilinan, 518 SCRA 358 citing People v. Cabale, 185 SCRA 140 ...................................................................................435 People v. Pangilinan, 518 SCRA 358, March 14, 2007 .............................................................428 People v. Pastor, 379 SCRA 181 ................................................................................. 445,447 People v. Patungan, 354 SCRA 413 ..........................................................................................375 People v. Peck, 1974, 38 CA 3d 993,1000,113 CR 806 .............................................................242 People v. Peralta, 426 SCRA 472, citing People v. Binamira, 277 SCRA 232 .............................................................................. 375 People v. Plaza, G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009 .................................................................329

632 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

People v. Principe, 381 SCRA 642 ............................................................................................ 444 People v. Pua, 415 SCRA 540 ................................................................................................... 436 People v. Puig, G.R. Nos. 173654-765, August 28,2008, 563 SCRA 564,575 ........................................................................................................559 People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 341............................................................................. ................ 14 People v. Purisima, L-40902, February 18,1976........................................................................ 14 People v. Quemeggen, G.R. No. 178205, July 27,2009 ........................................................ 84,98 People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010 .................................................... 213,260, 261, 262, 263,560 People v. Ramirez, G.R. Nos. 150079-80, June 10, 2004 ...............................................................................................................454 People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 180508, September 4,2009 .......................................................................................................273 People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596 .................................................................... 371, 372,376 People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596, April 3,2007.......................................................... 377, 378 People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596, April 4, 2007 ....................................................................... 370 People v. Rapeza, G.R. No. 169431, April 3,2007.......................................................374, 380 People v. Rayos, 351 SCRA 336, 344 ....................................................................................... 375 People v. Relos, G.R. No. 189326, November 24,2010........................................................... 561 People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 177741, August 27, 2009................................................................. 18 People v. Rodriguez, 341 SCRA 645,653.................................................................................. 375 People v. Rosas, G.R. No. 177825, October 24,2008 ................................................................ 90 People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 ................................................................................................... 248 People v. Rusiana, G.R. No. 186139, October 5,2009 ............................................................. 563 People v. Salamillo, 404 SCRA 211 .......................................................................................... 449 People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 181900, October 20, 2010............................................................ 454 People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722.................................................................................................... 485 People v. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 559 SCRA 449.................................................... 470 People v. Sandiganbayan and Victoria Amante, G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009 ................................................................................. 14 People v. Sandiganbayan, 439 SCRA 390................................................................................ 455 People v. Sandiganbayan, 485 SCRA 473................................................................................ 125 People v. Sandiganbayan, 529 SCRA 764................................................................................ 338 People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010...........................................................................................490, 544, 545 People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009 ...........................................................................................13, 32, 33 People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010..................................................................................................13,34 People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 174504, March 21, 2011 ...............................................................................................462, 545 People v. Santos, 283 SCRA 443 .............................................................................................. 374 People v. Savellano, L-39951, September 9,1982..................................................................... 14

CASE INDEX

633

People v. Schilling, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1021 ............................................................................... 245 People v. Schmidt, 473 P. 2d 698, 700, Co. 1970..................................................................... 248 People v. Sembrano, G.R. No. 185848, August 16, 2010 ........................................................ 273 People v. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92.................................................................................................. 424 People v. Serrano, 315 SCRA 686............................................................................................. 549 People v. Silva, L-15974, January 30,1962 ............................................................................... 494 People v. Siongco, G.R. No. 186472, July 5, 2010 .................................................................... 372 People v. Sison, 555 SCRA 156................................................................................................. 427 People v. Smith, 31 Cal. 4th 1207, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 80 P.3d 662 [2003] ....................................................................................................... 275 People v. Spencer, 99 Cal.Rptr 681 Cal. App. 1972.................................................................. 267 People v. Stephen Douglas Strong, L-38626, March 14,1975 .............................................................................................................438 People v. Suela, 373 SCRA 163................................................................................................. 374 People v. Sumingwa, G.R. No. 183619, October 13, 2009 ...................................................... 551 People v. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624 .......................................................................369, 372, 376 People v. Superior Court [Fish], 1980, 101 Cal. App. 3d 216,161 Cal. Rptr. 547....................................................................... 242 People v. Sy, G.R. No. 185284, June 22, 2009.......................................................................... 349 People v. Tabio, 544 SCRA 156, February 6, 2008 ................................................................... 457 People v. Tabio, G.R. No. 179477, February 6, 2008 ................................................................. 97 People v. Talusan, G.R. No. 179187, July 14, 2009 .....................................................445,447 People v. Tambis, 560 SCRA 343.............................................................................................. 426 People v. Tampus, et al., G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009 ...................................................... ,.88 People v. Tampus, G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009 .................................................................. 94 People v. Tan, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010 ...................................................................466, 470, 490, 544, 545 People v. Tan, G.R. No. 177566, March 26,2008....................................................................... 70 People v. Tan, G.R. No. 182310, December 9, 2009................................................................ 203 People v. Tan, G.R. No. 191069, November 15, 2010 ............................................................. 226 People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 ......................................................................................... 219 People v. Taruc, G.R. No. 185202, February 18, 2009 ............................................... 554, 570 People v. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509...................................................................................................... 58 People v. Tee, 395 SCRA 419 ................................................................................................... 251 People v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 172372, December 4, 2009.................................................... 82, 83 People v. Terrado, 558 SCRA 84, July 14, 2008........................................................................ 470 People v. Tion, G.R. No. 172092, December 16, 2009............................................... 273, 275 People v. Tockgo, 145 Cal. App. 3d 635 ................................................................................... 246 People v. Tolentino, 423 SCRA 448.......................................................................................... 372 People v. Tolentino, 546 SCRA 671, February 26, 2008 .......................................................... 542 People v. Tomaquin, 435 SCRA 23........................................................................................... 375 People v. Tormis, 574 SCRA 903 .............................................................................................. 427

634 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010................................................................. 235 People v. Tuazon, 532 SCRA 152, September 3, 2007 .............................................. 270, 271 People v. Tuazon, 532 SCRA 152............................................................................................. 261 People v. Tumambing, G.R. No. 191261, March 2, 2011.......................................................... 85 People v. Tuniaco, G.R. No. 185710, January 19,2010 ........................................................... 380 People v. Uba, L-131106, October 16,1959 .............................................................................. 58 People v. Ubina, G.R. No. 176349, July 10,2007 ....................................................................... 91 People v. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374 ................................................................................................... 372 People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 ....................................................................................244,245 People v. Vergara, 221 SCRA 567............................................................................................ 485 People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523......................................................................................... 501 People v. Villasan, G.R. No. 176527, October 9, 2009 ...............................................561, 562 People v. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004,420 SCRA 280 .................................................................................. 272 Perez v. People, G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008................................................376, 393 Petallar v. Pullos, 419 SCRA 434 .............................................................................................. 388 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People, 427 SCRA 456..................................................................................................117, 559 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People, G.R. No. 147703, April 14,2004 ..................................................................................... 69 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004......................................................................110,112 Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 215 SCRA 421.............................................................................. 314 Pilapil v. Garchitorena, 299 SCRA 343....................................................................................... 15 Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13,2010 ..................................................................................................... 130 Pinote v. Ayco, A.M. No-RTJ-05-1944, December 13,2005 ...................................................... 73 Prentis v. Manoogian, 16 F. 2d. 422........................................................................................ 310 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135703, April 15, 2009...............................................................................................................144 Quelnan v. People, 526 SCRA 653, July 6,2007..........................................................242,245 Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52..................................................................................................... 2 Quinicot v. People, G.R. No 179700, June 22,2009................................................................. 277 Racho v. Miro, 567 SCRA 213 .................................................................................................. 177 Ramon Garces v. Simplicio Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 180761, August 18,2010................................................................................ 122 Ramos v. People, G.R. No. 171565, July 13,2010.................................................................... 194 Re: Complaint Against Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals, 518 SCRA 512 ..........................................................383, 388 Re: Conviction of Judge AAA, A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC, January 31, 2008.......................................................................................................... 354

CASE INDEX

635

Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in MTC's of Bayombong & Solano & MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, 535 SCRA 224................................................................................................................387 Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, 536 SCRA 313 ...................................................................................................388 Re: Report on the Judicial Audit in RTC Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, 536 SCRA 313........................................................................342 Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C Office of the Ombudsman, A.M. No. 10- 1-13-SC, March 2, 2010...............................................................................................................171 Resayo v. People, 522 SCRA 391, April 27, 2007.......................................................... 538 Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil 484 ............................................................................................... 11 Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., 560 SCRA 518....................................................... 125 Ricaforte v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154438, September 5, 2007........................................... 152 Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, February 9, 2007................................................................ 67, 86,102,107,108, Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, February 9, 2007 citing Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 736................................................................................................................101 Rilloraza v. Arciaga, L-23848, October 31,1967 ............................................................. 14 Ritualo v. People, G.R. No. 178337, June 25, 2009 ........................................................ 70 Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687.......................................................................... 235, 240 Roberto B. Kalalo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 158189, April 23, 2010....................................................................................151 Rodis v. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618 ....................................................................... 162 Rodis v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 71404- 09, October 26,1988 ...........................................................................................................456 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 424 SCRA 236 ............................................................... 383 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 ................................................................... 400,416 Rolito Calang and Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 190696, August 3,2010..................................................................125 Romero v. People, G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009...................................................... 124 Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman, 307 SCRA 104.................................................... 386 Ruiz v. Beldia, Jr., 451 SCRA 402................................................................................... 160 Ruiz v. Beldia, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1731, February 16, 2005........................................................................................... 316, 342 Sabandal v. Tongco, G.R. No. 124498, October 5, 2001 .............................................. 138 Sable v. People, G.R. No. 177961, April 7,2009.......................................................... 565, 569 Salazar v. People, 411 SCRA 598 .....................................................................................U..464

636

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

Saldana v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88889, October 11,1990 citing People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 ...............................................................................................................469 Sales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001 .....................................................................................................146 Salvador Valdez Rebellion v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175700, July 5, 2010 ......................................................................................227 Salvanera v. People, 523 SCRA 147, June 21, 2007.................................................................534 Samalio v. Court of Appeals, 454 SCRA 462 ...........................................................................425 Samuel Lee, et al. v. KBC Bank N.V. [Formerly Kredietbank, N.V.], G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2010 ..........................................................................................................145 San Miguel v. Maceda, 520 SCRA 205.....................................................................................324 San Miguel v. Maceda, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749, April 4, 2007 .................................................................................................................328 Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 .......................................................................................35 Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, G.R. No. 168662, February 19, 2008 ..........................................................................................................60 Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636 .............................................................................457 Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 ..........................................................................................18 Santos v. Go, G.R. No. 156081, October 19,2005............................................147,148,184 Santos v. Orda, Jr., 437 SCRA 504............................................................................................193 Santos v. Pryce Gases, G.R. No. 165122, November 23, 2007 .....................................................................................................230 Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 165122, November 23, 2007 ................................. 233,235, 238,256, 258, 259, 260 Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice, 543 SCRA 70 ...........................................................174 Sapugay v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 464 .............................................................................17 Sasot v. People, G.R. No. 143193, June 29, 2005 ....................................................................199 Savella v. Ines, 521 SCRA 417 ..................................................................................................342 Sayson v. People, G.R. No. L-51745, October 28,1988, 166 SCRA 680 .................................................................................................................85 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 .......................................400, 401, 402, 403, 404 SEC v. Interport Resources Corporation, G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008 .................................................................................65 Serana v. Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA 225, January 22, 2008 ..........................................................................................................458 Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008 .........................................................................................24, 28, 34, Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003 ..................................................................................316, 317, 319 Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 29, 2003 .......................................................................................................... 93

CASE INDEX

637

Serino v. Zosa, 40 SCRA 433 .....................................................................................................469 Sibulo v. Toledo- Mupas, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1686, June 12, 2008 ............................................................................................................... 168 Sierra v. Lopez, A.C. 7549, August 29, 2008 ............................................................... 196,198 Sierra v. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 7549, August 29, 2008 ........................................................................................................... 177 Skechers, USA v. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation, 509 SCRA 395 ......................................................................................... 229 Skechers, USA, Inc. v. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation, 509 SCRA 395 ............................................................................235, 236 Skechers, USA, Inc. v. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation, 509 SCRA 395 ......................................................................................... 236 Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773 ..............................................................................162 Sogod v. Sandiganbayan, 312 SCRA 77 ......................................................................................13 Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 293 ..........................................................................................207 Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. Nos. L-82585, L-82827, November 14,1988...................................................................................................... 205 Soller v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 144261-62, May 9, 2001 ....................................................11 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Bright Future Technologies, Inc., 516 SCRA 62, February 15,2007.................................................... 298 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Supergreen, Inc., 518 SCRA 750 ....................................................................................................................6 Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 159517-18, June 30, 2009 ............................................................455 Spouses Balanguan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008 ........................................................................ 144,148,149,151 Spouses Marimla v. People, G.R. No. 158467, October 16, 2009 ......................................................................................................... 232 Spouses Romulo v. Layug, G.R. No. 151217, September 8, 2006 ...................................................................................................... 561 Sps. Jose v. Sps. Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, June 30, 2008 ............................................................................................................... 136 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S. Ct. 506, 511-12,13 L.Ed.2d 431, 436 1965................................................................................. 248 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571 [89 S.Ct. 1243, 1251, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969)1....................................................................................... 280 State v. Babers, 514 N.W.2d 79 [Iowa 19941 ..........................................................................275 State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533 [N.D. 1979]...........................................................................275 State v. Brown, 470 P.2d 815,819- 20 Kan. 1970 .....................................................................248 State v. Deny, 56 NE 482 1908..................................................................................................229 State v. Keiffer, 187 NW 164 1922 ...........................................................................................229 State v. Little, 121 N.H. 765, 435 A.2d 517 [1981]....................................................................275 State v. Nakamura, 65 Haw. 74,648 P.2d 183 [1982] ............................................................:.275

638

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES UPDATED EDITION

State v. Nehring, 509 N.W.2d 42 [N.D. 1993].....................................................................275 State v. Vallejos, 1997- NMSC-040,123 N.M. 739, 945 P.2d 957 [1997] ..................................................................................................275 State v. Wolfe, 266 N.W. 116,125 cited in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29169, August 19,1968 ...............................................406 Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S.Ct. 414,416, 69 L.Ed. 757 ...................................................................................283 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 [45 S.Ct. 414, 69 L.Ed. 757(1925)].................................................................................................... 280 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S. Ct. 414,416, 69 L.Ed. 757, 760........................................................................... 242 Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383.............................................................................................299 Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. 19550, June 19,1967 .................................................................247 Subido v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122641, January 20,1997 .................................................................................................................. Suero v. People, G.R. No. 156408, January 31, 2005...............................................................498 Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc. v. Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No. 163741, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 274 .................................................................................. 193 Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc. v. Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No. 163741, August 7, 2007................................................ 474 Summerville General Merchandising Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 158767, June 26, 2007 .................................................... 297 Sy Thiong Shiou v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009 ..............................................................126,127,152,186,187 Sy v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 334......................................................................................509 Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 .............................................................................538 Tabujara III v. People, G.R. No. 175162, October 29, 2008....................................................................................................... 202 Tabujara v. People, G.R. No. 175162, October 29, 2008154,155,157 Taladua v. Ochotorena, L-25595, February 15,1974, 55 SCRA 528 ..............................................................................................................488 Talingdan v. Eduarte, 366 SCRA 559........................................................................................206 Tamargo v. Awingan, G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010 ......................................................194 Tan v. Commission on Elections, 237 Phil. 353,359 ................................................................477 Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009 ................................................................... 72, 383, 389, 390, 391 Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141675- 96, November 25, 2005 ....................................................................................... 417,418 Tandoc v. Resultan, 175 SCRA 37 .........................................................................................474 Tan^an v. People, 155 SCRA 435 .......................................................................................... 483

CASE INDEX

639

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 ........................................................................ 386 Te v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000 ..................................................................................................... 142 Teehankee v. Madayag, 207 SCRA 134 ....................................................................... 509 Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 207 SCRA 134.................................................................. 432 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1........................................................................................290, 294 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737,103 S.Ct. 1535,1541, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 [1983]................................................................................................... 283 The People of the Philippines v. Romar Teodoro y Vallejo, G.R. No. 172372, December 4,2009 .............................................................................. 83 The Presidential AD-Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans [FFCBL] v. Desierto, G.R. No. 136225, April 23, 2008 ............................................................................................................... 144 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 ........................................................................... 16,17 Tilendo v. Ombudsman, 533 SCRA 331, September 13, 2007..................................................................................................... 383 Tiu Chun Hai, et al. v. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]...................................................................................................... 312 Tolentino v. Camano, Jr., 322 SCRA 559...................................................................... 336 Tolentino v. Social Security Commission, 138 SCRA 428 .............................................. 11 Torres v. Aguinaldo, 461 SCRA 599.............................................................................. 510 Torres v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 164268, June 28, 2005 ................................................. 474 Torres v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 153666, December 27, 2002...................................................................................................... 127 Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., 556 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008 ..................................................................... 303, 307 Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 539 SCRA 415 ................................................ 475 Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166038, December 4, 2007 ........................................................................................................ 475 U.S v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218..................................................................................... 402,403 U.S. ex rel Zapp et al. v. District Director of Immigration and Naturalization, 120 F. 2d. 762.......................................................... 311 U.S. ex rel. Iaonnis v. Garfinkle 44 F. Supp. 518........................................................... 310 U.S. ex rel. Papis v. Tomlinson, 45 F. Supp. 447 .......................................................... 310 U.S. v. Addison and Gomez, 27 Phil. 562..................................................................... 313 U.S. v. Jimenez, 41 Phil. 1............................................................................................... 13 U.S. v. Mallari, 24 Phil. 366 ............................................................................................ 13 U.S. v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424.......................................................................................... 398 U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 ....................................................................................... 404 U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694 .......................................................................................... 399 U.S. v. Zara, 42 Phil. 308............................................................................................... 404 United Laboratories v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574 .................................................................284* 286

640 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE BAR LECTURES SERIES / UPDATED EDITION /

United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574 citing Bevington v. United States, 35 F2d 584 1929.............................................................. 229 United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574 citing Lodyga v. State, 179 NE 164 1931 ......................................................................229 United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574, citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S. Ct. 1535 1983.....................................................................................................237 United States v. Appoloney, 761 F. 2d 520 (9th Cir. 1985)...............................................................................................................248 United States v. Darensbourg, 520 F.2d 985, 987 5th Cir. 1975 ..........................................................................................................242 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 ....................................................................................... 403 United States v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 .......................................................................................... 504 United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381, 3d Cir. 1971 .................................................242, 245 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 [52 S.Ct. 420,423, 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932)] ................................................................. 280 United States v. Mann, 201 F. Supp. 208 ................................................................................ 504 United States v. Marron, 275 U.S. 192,196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. 231, 237.................................................................................245 United States v. Meyer, 417 F. 2d 1020, 8th Cir. 1969............................................................ 253 United States v. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735............................................................................ 404 United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600 7th Cir. 1985.............................................................. 253 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 ................................................................................ 267 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 1973.....................................................................................................265 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 ......................................................................................... 253 United States v. Simpson, 453 F.2d 1028 10th Cir. 1972 ........................................................ 265 United States v. Townsend, 394 F. Supp. 736 E.D. Mich, 1975 ................................ ..........................................................................246 United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (5th Cir. 1979) ................................................................................................398 Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886......................................................................................... 246 Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36............................................ 241,243,249 Uy v. People, G.R. No. 174899, September 11, 2008................................................................ 67 Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 312 SCRA 77........................................................................................... 13 Valdepenas v. People, 16 SCRA 871.......................................................................................... 17 Valdez v. People, 538 SCRA 611, November 23, 2007............................................................ 298 Valerio v. Court of Appeals, 535 SCRA 453 ............................................................................. 329 Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, September 3,2009 .........................................................261, 262, 264, 284,290 Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24,1990..................................................271,272 Vasquez v. Hobilia-Alinio, 271 SCRA 67 .................................................................................. 161

CASE INDEX

641

Vasquez v. Hobilia-Alinio, 271 SCRA 67 citing Torralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 101421-22, February 10,1994 ......................................................................................................... 456 Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 677 .................................................................. 18, 546 Vertudes v. Buenaflor, 478 SCRA 210 ...................................................................................... 424 Victoria P. Cabral v. Jacinto Uy, et al., G.R. No. 174584, January 22, 2010 ............................................................................................................ 24 Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62................................................................................. 404, 408 Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 ............................................................................................ 324 Vincoy v. Court of Appeals, 432 SCRA 36................................................................................. 475 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)................................................................................................... 280 Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652..................................................................... 154, 205, 238 Webb v. De Leon, G.R. Nos. 121245 and 121297, August 23,1995 ............................................................................................................ 197 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 ............................................................................................. 255 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 ...................................................................................... 399 Yao, Sr. v. People, 525 SCRA 108.............................................................................................. 236 Yao, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 168306, June 19, 2007....................................................... 237, 240, 241, 248, 250, 251 Yap v. Cabales, G.R. No. 159186, June 5, 2009 ........................................................................ 134 Yap v. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30,1959............................................................................. 495 Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 ...................................................................................................... 129 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,100 S.Ct, 338 62 L.Ed.2d 238 1979 .............................................................................................. 253 Zacarias v. Cruz, 30 SCRA 728................................................................................................... 161 Zalameda v. People, G.R. No. 183656, September 4, 2009.........................................................213, 225, 226, 279, 286 Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 ...................................................................... 59, 60, 63, 64 Zapatos v. People, 411 SCRA 148............................................................................... 432, 467 Zuiio v. Cabebe, 444 SCRA 382 citing Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 .................................................................................................................330 Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556, 98 S.Ct. 1970,1977, 56 L.Ed.2d 525, 535 ....................................................................252