Rheem vs. Ferrer

Rheem of the Philippines  vs. Ferrer G.R. NO. L-22979, JUNE 26, 1967

Background: 

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In re proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo, Oscar R. Ongsiako, and Jose S.  Armonio. The proceeding for contempt is an offshoot of the Court of Industrial Relations’ (CIR) denial of  petitioners’ motion to dismiss the respondent’s complaint.

Facts: 

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 When petitioners lost a case challenging the  jurisdiction of the CIR to hear and determine a case seeking reinstatement with back wages, damages, separation pay, night differential, and premium pay,  Atty. Armonio filed a motion for reconsideration that had a sarcastic tone and insulting implications. The Court ordered counsel to show cause why they  should not be dealt with for contempt of court.

Content of Motion for Reconsideration 

“One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the question as to  whether or not a particular subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, is the tendency of this Honorable Court to rely upon its own pronouncement without due regard to the statutes which delineate the jurisdiction of the industrial court. Quite often, it is overlooked that no court, not even this Honorable Court, is empowered to expand or contract through its decision the scope of its jurisdictional authority as conferred by law.”

Content of Motion for Reconsideration 

“This error is manifested by the decisions of this Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but without making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the Court of  Industrial Relations. This manifestation appears in this Honorable Court’s decision in the instant case.  As a result, the errors committed in earlier cases dealing with the jurisdiction of the industrial court are perpetuated in subsequent cases involving the same issue.”

Facts: 

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In the petitioners’ verified return, they offered their most sincere apologies for the language used and stated that it was not and it has never been their intention to be disrespectful. They submitted, not as an excuse, but as fact, that not one of the partners was able to pass upon the draft or final form of the said motion, and that Atty.  Armonio, an associate, prepared, signed and filed the motion without clearing it with any of the partners of  the firm.

Facts: 

Enrile, Reyna, Montecillo, Belo and Ongsiako assumed full responsibility for what appears in the motion for reconsideration and pledged that it shall never happen again.

Issue: 

 Whether or not Atty.  Armonio’s statements in the motion for reconsideration violated a lawyer’s duty  of respect to courts.

Held: 

 As we look back at the language employed in the motion for reconsideration, there are implications which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into  which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the  jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law  on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court blindly adhere to earlier rulings  without as much as making “any  reference to and analysis of” the pertinent statute governing the  jurisdiction of the industrial court.

Held: 

The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously  repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of  this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They   bring into question the capability of the members and – some former members – of this Court to render justice.

Held: 

The Court concedes that a lawyer may think highly of  his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege.  And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others’ lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court’s decision in words calculated to jettison the timehonored aphorism that courts are the temples of  right. He should give due allowance to the fact that  judges are but men; and men are encompassed by  error, fettered by fallibility.

Held: 

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Furthermore, the Court is not unmindful of  counsel’s statement that the language used was not in any way  meant to slight or offend this Court. Want of intention,  we feel constrained to say, is no excuse for the language employed. For counsel cannot escape responsibility by  claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must have understood them as meaning. At best, it extenuates liability.  Atty. Armonio was admonished with a warning that repetition of this incident will be dealt with accordingly.

Rationale: 

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Rule 138, Section 20(b) of ROC: It is the duty of an attorney to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The first canon of legal ethics states that "it is the duty of  the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of  the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor."

Rationale: 

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Canon 1: A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. The lawyer’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be “with all good fidelity . . . to the courts.” Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by  rendering no service involving any disrespect to the  judicial office which he is bound to uphold.

Surigao Mineral Reservation  vs. Cloribel G.R. NO. L-27072, JANUARY 9, 1970

Facts: 

The Supreme Court rendered a decision against MacArthur International Minerals Corp. and in their third Motion for Reconsideration, Attys. Vicente Santiago and John Beltran Sotto made use of language that are disrespectful and contemptuous to the Court, such as: "it seems many of our judicial authorities believe they are chosen messengers of God", "corrupt in its face“, and insinuating favoritism and partisanship of the members of the Court, notably Chief Justice Concepcion and Justice Castro due to their alleged interest in the case since Castro's brother works for one of the parties. Santiago and Castro wanted for the two justices to inhibit themselves in the MR.

Facts: 

Hence, the Court demanded for Santiago and Sotto to "show cause" why they shouldn't be cited in contempt for the said statements. Santiago insisted that the statements he made were inadvertently  included in the copy sent to the Court, and was just intended to be in the MR's rough draft.

Facts: 

Thereafter, counsel for MacArthur drafted a fourth motion for reconsideration, this time with Atty. Juanito M. Caling as counsel, and again contained language which the Court found disrespectful. The MR assailed the decision penned by CJ Concepcion since he was out of town when the decision was  written and included seeming threats of elevating the issue to the World Court and allegations of rise of  graft and corruption in the judiciary.

Facts: 

The Court demanded Caling to also "show  cause“ and he said that the motion was already prepared by  Santiago when he took the case as was verified by  Morton Meads, an employee from MacArthur.

Issues: 1.  Whether or not Atty. Santiago, Atty. Sotto, Regala

and Associates, and Atty. Uy are guilty of contempt on the filed Third Motion for Reconsideration. 2.  Whether or not Atty. Santiago, Atty. Caling, and

Mr. Morton F. Meads are guilty of contempt on the filed Fourth Motion for Reconsideration.

Held: 1.  Yes, the language employed by Santiago and Sotto degrades the administration of justice which transgresses Rule 71, Sec. 3(d) of the Rules of Court as  well as Rule 138, Sec. 20(f) of the Rules of Court which states that "a lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession". They  are also expected to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers but their acts resulted in the contrary and are intended to create and atmosphere of distrust. The inadvertence of  Santiago's use of words can't be used as a shield to absolve him of any misdeeds.

Held: 

On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto are guilty of  contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds  Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court.

Held: 2.  Yes, even if the idea of the language used in the 4th Motion for Reconsideration came from Meads, both Santiago and Caling should've adhered to Canon 16 of  the Code of Legal Ethics wherein "a lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which a lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing, the lawyer should terminated their relation". Santiago is also liable here since Caling's representation didn't divest him of his capacity as counsel for MacArthur.

Held: 

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On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling are guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty.  Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200. SC held that the use of language tending to degrade the administration of justice constitutes indirect contempt.