Respondent 2010 - d m harish memorial moot competition

TEAM CODE 

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE   AT THE PEACE PALACE,   T H E   H A G UE ,   N E T H E R L A N D S       G E N E RA L   L I S T   N O .     Y E A R   2010  C A S E   C ON CE R N IN G   T H E   B L OC K A D E   O N   R ON I S T A N   B Y   J OT R I A   A N D   T H E   A T T A CK S   O N   J OT R I A N   I N S T I T U T I O N   B Y   T H E   UC      D.M. HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL M O O T   C OU R T   C OM P E T I T I ON   (2010)   

 

  R E P U B L I C  O F   R ON I S T A N    

/  

THE APPLICANT STATE  

 

 

 

 

     

R E P U B L I C   OF   J O T R I A  

   

T H E   R E S P ON D E N T   S T A T E  

    S U B M I T T ED   I N   T H E   R E G I S T R Y   OF   T H E   C O U R T   ON   B E H A L F   O F   T H E   R E S P ON D E N T   S T A T E  

­R E P U B L I C  O F   J O T R I A   ­

TABLE OF CONTENTS I N D E X O F A U T H O R I T I E S ...........................................................................................I S T A T E M E NT O F J U R I S D I C T I O N ..............................................................................XII S Y N O P S I S O F F A C T S ............................................................................................XIII S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T S ...................................................................................XVI B O D Y O F A R G U M E N T S …......................................................................................1-20

-C ON TE N TI ON S 1. The Applicant State is Responsible for the violation of United Nations Charter as its Actions Amounted to State Sponsored Terrorism……………………..………………………………………...1 1.1. The attacks in the Respondent State can be classified as International terrorism……………………….1 1.2. Appreciation of circumstantial evidence proves the involvement of the UC group in this attack………..1 1.3. In Arguendo, the UC group aided and abetted international terrorism…..………………………….…..2 1.4. The Applicant state was involved in state-sponsored terrorism………………………………………….2 A. The Applicant state provided “State Support” to the terrorist activities……..………………………..…3 B. The Applicant state provided “State Tolerance” to the terrorist activities…………………………………4 1.5. State responsibility is assigned to the Applicant State for this act of state-sponsored terrorism……4

2.

The Applicant State Violated the Duty to Cooperate Assigned by the Binding Security Council Resolution and the Doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare.......................................................................6

2.1. The Security Council resolution being a resolution under Chapter VII was a binding resolution.......6 2.2. Assuming but not conceding that the resolution was not under Chapter VII it is yet binding...................6 2.3. The Applicant state violated the doctrine of aut dedre aut judicare...................................................7 3. The arrests during Emergency by the Applicant State was in violation of International Law......8 3.1. The declaration of emergency was a fictitious exercise of right…………….……………………….8 3.2. The emergency was declared in violation of international law and hence was not valid…………….….8 4. The Changes Brought into the Constitution of the Applicant State Lead to the Suppression of Civil Liberties which is a Violation of International Law.………………………….……...….............…10

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

4.1. The Applicant State has an obligation under International Law to provide for civil and political rights................................................................................................................................................10

4.2. The Respondent State has a right to bring this claim………………………….………………………..11 4.3. Violation of this obligation entails State Responsibility……………………….……………………..…11 -D EF EN C E S 1. Applicant State’s Claim to Challenge “Effective Economic Blockade” is Inadmissible..............12 1.1. The Applicant state’s claim to challenge the Respondent states economic policy is inadmissible.....12 1.2. Assuming but not conceding that the claim is admissible , the changed Economic policy is in compliance with international law.............................................................................................................13 1.3. Arguendo, “Effective Economic Blockade” is justified as Economic Sanctions under International Law.........................................................................................................................................................14 A. Economic Sanction is a justified response to Increase in Military Expenditure.................................15 B. Economic Sanctions are Justified as a Countermeasure under International Law...........................15

2. The Respondent State is not Responsible for the attacks on UC Rally in the Applicant State..........17 2.1. Burden of Proof is on the Applicant State to prove that UC Rally was bombed by the Respondent State....................................................................................................................................................17 2.2. Arguendo, the Attack is an Act of Self-Defence and Thus in Compliance with International Law...17 A. Exercise of Self-Defence in Response to an armed attack..................................................................17 B. The Respondent State was in a State of ‘Distress’ and ‘Necessity’....................................................18

3. The government of the Respondent State is sovereign and is in compliance with international law.......................................................................................................................................................19 3.1. The Applicant State has no locus to challenge the government of Respondent State........................19 3.2. In Arguendo, the Respondent State’s government is in compliance with international law……….19

4. There is No “Threat of War” by the Respondent State and the Request was a Means to Peacefully Settle the Situation...................................................................................................................................20 P R A Y E R & C O N C L U S I O N ...................................................................................XVIII

 

 

INDEX OF AUTHORITY 1.

A. Frowein, Collective Enforcement of International Obligation, (1987) 47 ZaoRv 67

6

2.

A/52/653, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Report of the Sixth

4

Committee available at http:// www.un.org/law/cod/terroris/html 3.

Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International

5

Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89, 98 (1989) 4.

Adam Packer, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 631,

14

634-39 (2000) 5.

Admission of U.S. to U.N., Advisory Opinion, (1948) ICJ Rep. 57

10

6.

Aldana-Pindell, Raquel. “An emerging universality of justiciable victims rights in the

20

criminal process to curtail impunity for state-sponsored crimes”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 26, 2004 7.

Ambateilos Arbitration (Greece v UK), [1956] 12 RIAA 83

11

8.

American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 UNTS

9

123 9.

Amnesty International, The United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms 2002

15

10.

Andre Beirlaen, Economic Coercion and Justifying Circumstances, 18 Revue beige

20

de droit international 58, 68 (1984-85) 11.

Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal. L.

9

Rev. 1823 (2002) 12.

Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure of the

1

Charter Framework, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 735, 740 (2002) 48 13.

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

11

Genocide, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595 14.

Award (1937) 3 UNRIAA p. 1719, at p.1751

8

15.

Baade, The Soviet Impact of International Law (1965)

9

16.

Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, at 33

11

17.

Bassiouni, Cherif, “Searching for peace and achieving justice: The need for

20

accountability”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol 59, No 4, 1996 18.

Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing

19

Conceptions of International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 345 (1997-98) 19.

British Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989

1

20.

British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926): Mcneill Case (1931), Further Dec. &

1

Op. of Com. DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION  

I

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITY 21.

British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926):2 Case (1931),Further Dec. & Op. of

1

Com, 297, Commission (1922) 22.

British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926):The Sonora (Mexico) Plant and Timber

1

Co. Case (1931), Further Dec. & Op. of Com., pg.292 23.

British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926):Cameroon Case (1929) Dec. & Op. of

3

Com.,p.33 24.

British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926); Mexico City Bombardment Claim

3

(1930),Dec. & Op. of Comm., p.100 25.

British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926:Lynch Case (1929), Dec. & Op. of

3

Com.,p.20 26.

Case of Ireland against the United Kingdom, ECHR: ILR 58, 190, Judgment, 1978,

12

¶159 27.

Certain Expenses of United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, (1962) ICJ

6

Rep 163 28.

CFE Treaty, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, 30

15

I.L.M. 1 (1991), art. XIX, ¶ 2, 30 I.L.M. at 22 29.

Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted in General Assembly

12, 13,19

resolution 1974 3281 (XXIX) 30.

Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7

31.

Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals,

6, 15 17, 20 3,8,10,13

1953, p.323 32.

Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law 200 (2d ed.

12

2004) 33.

Chorzow Factory Case (Merits) (Germany v. Poland), (1928) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A)

8

No.17, at p.87 34.

Commission on Human Security, 2003, Human Security Now, New York, p. 135

35.

Conforti, Bedjaoui (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Perspectives (1991),

15 7, 12

467-82 36.

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

7

Punishment 37.

Convention for the Preservation of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and

18

Other Matter (1972), 1046 U.N.T.S. 138 38.

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

9

(European Convention on Human Rights) (“ECHR”)

DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION  

II

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITY 39.

Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits), [1949] ICJ Rep 4

40.

D. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft 13-14 (1985) at 123

15

41.

David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AJIL 817 (2002)

16

42.

David Schewigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the

6

1, 17

UN Charter (2001) 6 43.

Declaration on Friendly Relations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.

5

No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (1970) 44.

Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal

5, 12

Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (1981) 45.

Declaration on the Measure to Eliminate International Terrorism General Assembly

1

Resolution 49/60, Adopted 17 February 1995, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60. 46.

Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 Colum. Hum.

10

Rts L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1997) 47.

Doswald-Beck, Legal Validity; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in

19

the Domestic Affairs of States (1965) 48.

Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities,

18

U.N. Doc. A/56/10 49.

E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal

14

Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1162, 1169 (1987) at 1166 50.

East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90

11

51.

Elettronica Sicula SpA ( E L S I ) Case (U.S. v. Italy) Case, ICJ Reports, 1989, p, 15

12

52.

Emanuel Gross, “Terrorism and the Law: Democracy in the War Against Terrorism--

1

the Israeli Experience” 35 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1161, 53.

European Convention on Human Rights

12

54.

Exparte Ferhut Butt 116 ILR, pp. 607, 614-15 (High Court) and 619 (Court of

12

Appeal) 55.

Fawcett, 31 BY (1954), 452-8

12

56.

Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union on Combating Terrorism

1

of June 2002, Official Journal of the European Committee L 164, 22 June 2002 57.

France-Venzuela Mixed Claims Commission (1902): Burn Case, Ralston’s Report,

3

pg.5 58.

Free Zones Case (Second Phase): Order (France v. Switzerland), (1930) P.C.I.J.

8

DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION  

III

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITY (Ser. A) No.24 59.

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary v Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 7 at 113

10,16,18

10,16,18 60.

Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey j. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered:

14, 15

History and Current Policy 4 (1985) p. 2 61.

George Norman & Joel. P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99

9

AJIL 541 (2005) 62.

Georges Abi-Saab, The Concept of Sanction in International Law, in United Nations

15

Sanctions and International Law 32 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed. 2001) 63.

German Interests Case (Germany v. Poland) (Merits), 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A.) No.7,

8

at p.30 64.

Great Britain v. Russia, Report of February 26, 1905, The Hague Court Reports 403

20

(James Brown Scott ed. 1916) cited in international law casebooks 65.

Great Venezuelan Railroad Case, 1903, Ven. Arb 632

13

66.

Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal

5

Analysis, 19 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 177, 180-81 (1987) 67.

Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force,

4,18

18 Wis. Int'l L.J. 144, 150 (2000) 68.

Grzybowski, Soviet Public International Law (1970)

9

69.

Higgins, Conflict of Interest (1965)

9

70.

I. A. Shearer, Stark’s International Law 31 (1994)

9

71.

Iain Cameron, The Protective Principle Of International Criminal Jurisdiction 2

7

(1994) 72.

ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act,

4, 11, 18

(2001), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 73.

ILC Report on aut dedere aut judicare, Amnesty International Publications, 2009

7

74.

Inter-American Convention on Human Rights

12

75.

Interhandel case, ICT Reports, 1959, p. 27

12

76.

International Convention for the Preservation of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1963),

18

327 U.N.T.S 3 77.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21

9,19

U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171(“ICCPR”) DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION  

IV

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITY 78.

into force on 1 July 1978

12

79.

J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization:

10

International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples' Rights in Africa, 18 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 851, 852 (2003) 80.

Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66

9

U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999) 81.

Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts on Customary International

11

Law, 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 191 (2001) 82.

Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under

5

International Law, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 559, 582 (2002) 83.

Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication 226 (1964)

8

84.

John Alan Cohan, Formulation of a State's Response to Terrorism and State-

1

Sponsored Terrorism, 14 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 77, 93 (2002) 85.

John F. Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and

4

Economic Dimensions, 32-33 (Westview Press) (1989) 86.

John Galtung, On The Effects of International Economic Sanctions, in Dilemmas of

14

Economic Coercion 17, 19 (Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen eds. 1983) 87.

Joy K. Fausey, COMMENT: Does the United Nations' Use of Collective Sanctions to

15

Protect Human Rights Violate Its Own Human Rights Standards?, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L.193, 196(Fall 1994) 88.

Judge Lauterpacht, Sep. Op., Norwegian at 39-41

12

89.

Justin D. Stalls, Economic Sanctions, 11 U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 115, pg.3

13

90.

Keiver, The Pacific Salmon War: The Defense of Necessity Revisited, 21 Dalhousie

18

L.J. 408 (1998) 91.

Kelsen, Principles of International Law, pp. 62-4, 191-2, 196-201

12

92.

Kenneth W. Abbott, Coercion and Communication: Frameworks for Evaluation of

14

Economic Sanctions, 19 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 781, 783, 789 (1987) 93.

Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20 Vand. J.

2,5

Transnat'l L. 289, 298 (1987) 94.

Lagos v Baggianini, [1955] 22 ILR 533

9

95.

Lauritzen et al v Government of Chile, [1956] 23 ILR 70 at 715-16, 729-30

9

96.

Legal Consequences for the States of the Continued presence of South Africa in

6

DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION  

V

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITY Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion), (1971) ICJ Rep 113 at 53 97.

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian

20

Territory, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004, paragraph 163 98.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226

11

99.

Lotus Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10

19

100.

Louis B. Sohn, Speech: The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law

9

101.

Louis B. Sohn, Unratified Treaties as a Source of Customary International Law in

9

Realism in Law-Making: Essays on International Law in Honor of Willem Riphagen 231 (1986) 102.

Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism - Jurisprudential and Definitional

1

Clarifications, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 239, 240-41 (1995) 103.

Lt. Col. James P. Terry, USMC, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-

1

Policy Analysis, 36 Naval L. Rev. 159, 161 (1986). 104.

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Foreword to Treaty Enforcement and International

7

Cooperation in Criminal Matters, at vii, Rodrigo Yepes- Enríquez & Lisa Tabassi eds., 2002 105.

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented

2

Assessment, 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 83, 91 (2002), at 84. 106.

M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A

7

Theoretical Framework, ed., International Criminal Law 3, 5 (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2nd. ed. 1999) 107.

Magalidis Case, (1928) 8 T.A.M 386, at 395

8

108.

Malcolm Shaw, International Law 709 (2005)

16

109.

Marc Henzelin, Le Principe de l’Universalité en Droit Pénal International: Droit et

7

Obligation pour les États de Poursuivre et Juger selon le Principe de l’Universalité, 2000 110.

Maurice Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 Recueil

9

des Cours 155 (1998) 111.

Metzger & Co. Case (U.S. v Haiti), 1901 U.S.F.R 262

8

112.

Mexican-United States General Claims Com

9

113.

Mexican-United States General Claims Commission (1923): North American

10

DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION  

VI

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITY Dredging Company of Texas Case, Op. of Com. 1927, p.21, at p.29 114.

Mexico-U.S General Claims Commission (1923)

17

115.

Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Hatton Case, Op. of Com. 1929,

3

p.6 116.

Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Kling Case (1930), Op. of Com.

3

1931, p.36, at p.49 117.

Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Melczer Mining Co. Case (1929),

3

Op. of Com. 1929, P.228 118.

Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923):Daniel Dillon Case (1928), Op. of

3

Com. 1929, p.61, at p.65 119.

Mexico-U.S. Special Claims Commission (1923)

3

120.

Michael C. Woods, Interpretation of Security Council Resolution, Max Planck

6

Yearbook of United Nations Law 121.

Michael Walzer, Arguing About War 147 (Yale Univ. Press 2006)

20

122.

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical

20

Illustrations (Basic Books 4th ed. 2006) (1977) at 81, 85 123.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep

14 9,10,12,13,16 , 17

124.

Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen, Economic Coercion and Foreign Policy, in

15

Dilemmas of Economic Coercion 2 (Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen eds. 1983) 125.

Mufson, Sanctions Could Be Two-Edged Sword, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1990, at A17,

15

col. 1 126.

Namoi Russell Case (1931), Op. of Com. 1926-1931, p.44, at p.88

3

127.

Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law, 66 AJIL 321 (1972)

19

128.

Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human

11

Rights Violations in International Law, (1990) 78 California Law Review 449 129.

New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), OAU, NEPAD Doc. (2001)

130.

North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark/

19 9,10

Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep 3 131.

Norwegian Loans Case (France v Norway), [1957] ICJ Rep 9

132.

Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatamela), [1955] ICJ Rep 22 [Nottebohm]

11.12 9

DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION  

VII

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITY 133.

Nsongurua J. Udombana, Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in

10

Africa, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1209, 1224 (2003) 134.

Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253

10

135.

Nuclear Tests(New Zealand v. France), I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 4510

10

136.

Obijio for Aginam , Global Village, Divided World: South-North Gap And Global

10

Health Challenges At Century's Dawn, 7 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 603 137.

Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No.10

7

(A/59/10) 138.

Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th Ed. 2001, pg 382,¶118

19

139.

Optional Protocol I, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

12

140.

Oscar Chinl Case (Belgium v. U.K.), (1934) P.C.I.J.(Ser. A/B) No. 63

8

141.

Parker Case, 1926

17

142.

Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative States: International Relations, State

11

Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 839 (2002) 143.

Pleadings, Israel v. Bulgaria, ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 531-2

12

144.

Portendick Case (1843)

14

145.

Portugo-German Arbitration (1919): The Cysne Case (1930), 2 UNRIAA, p.101

1

146.

Prosecutor v. George Ruggio, ICTR-97-32-I.

2

147.

Prosecutor v. Tadic , Appeal on Jurisdiction, 35 ILM 32 (1996)

6

148.

Q.Wright, US Intervention in the Labanon, 53 AJIL (1959)

19

149.

R. Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are binding

7

under Article 25 of the Charter, (1972) 32 ICLQ 269 150.

R.A.Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World, (1968)

19

151.

Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (New Zealand v France), [1987] 23 ILM 1346

18

152.

Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction (2nd Edn., 1961),pp. 407-48, 509-

12

25 153.

Ramudo, The (Soviet) Socialist Theory of International Law (1964)

9

154.

Reporting Form, Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military

15

Expenditures, UNGA Resolution 25/142B in 1980 155.

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 (1987)

10, 11

DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION   VIII

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITY 156.

Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-Cold

14

War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l l. 901, 918 (1995) 157.

Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in Law and Force in

18

the New International Order 52 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds. 1991) 158.

Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on US": International Law and

1,2,3,4,14

Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. Int'l L.J. 153, 162 (1994) [‘Beck & Clerk’] 159.

Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law 25 (1996)

9

160.

Roda Mushkat, Fair Trial as Precondition to Rendition: An International Legal

7

Perspective, (Univ. of H.K. Ctr. for Comparative & Pub. Law, Occasional Paper No. 5, 2002) 161.

Rosenne, Law and Practice, vol. 11, pp. 778-82

12

162.

Rules of International Court of Justice (1978) adopted on 14 April 1978

12

163.

Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 Yale

4

J. Int'l L. 559, 565 (1999) 164.

S. McCaffrey, 'The Forty-First Session of the International Law Commission: 83

5,12

AJIL, 1989, p. 937 Declaration on Inadmissibility 165.

S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., art. 2(a), U.N. Doc.

5

S/RES/1373 (2001) 166.

Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (David Cortright

14

and George A. Lopez eds., 1995) 167.

Security Council Resolution 1368 of 2001, adopted at the 4370th Meeting on 12th

18

September, 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001) 168.

Sierra Leone Telecommunications Co Ltd v Barclays Bank plc [1998] 2 All ER 820

19

169.

Singh v. Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 3317, ¶16

1

170.

Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (1923): Claim I: Rzini (Tetuan Orchards) Case

1

(1924), 2 UNRIAA, p.615 171.

Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Self-defense against the use of force in international law

18

126 (1996) at 188-201 Christine Gray, International law and the use of force 161 (2d ed. 2004) at 126-29 172.

Statute of the ICJ (1945), Art. 38(1)(b)

9

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WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITY 173.

Stefan Talmon, Note and Comment: The Security Council as World Legislature, 99

6

AGIL 175 174.

Stephen M. Schwebel & J. Gillis Wetter, Arbitration and the Exhaustion of Local

12

Remedies, 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 484, 500 (1966) 175.

Stephen Zamora, Economic Relations and Development, in the United Nations and

14

International Law 279 (Christopher C. Joyner ed. 1997) 176.

T. Meron, 'The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies', 25 BYIL,

12

1959, p. 95. Note, in addition, the North American Dredging Co. claim, 4 RIAA, p. 26 (1926) 3 AD, p. 4 177.

Taft Case (1926), Dec. & Op., p.801

1

178.

The American University Washington College of Law Edwin A Mooer Lecture, 34

9

Am.U.L.Rev. 271(1984) 179.

The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] 1 All ER 719

19

180.

The Italian National Re-extradition Case, [1970] 70 ILR 374 at 376-7

9

181.

The Rights of Passage over Indian Territory Case (Portugal v India), [1966] ICJ Rep

9

42 182.

The SS Lotus Case (France v Turkey), [1972] PCIJ Rep Series A No. 10.

9

183.

The State (Duggan) v Tapley, [1951] 18 ILR 109

9

184.

Theodore Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 1

11

(1986) 185.

Tomuschat Report prepared by Christian Tomuschat, at ¶35.

1

186.

Trail Smelter Arbitration, Award 2 (1941), 1935 UNRIAA, p. 1905, at p.1963

10

187.

Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United

15

States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503art. XV, ¶ 2, 23 U.S.T. at 3446, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 12 on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms), June 18, 1979, United States-U.S.S.R., art. XV, 18 I.L.M. 1112, 1134-35 188.

Triska and Sussler, The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties (1962)

9

189.

UNGA Resolution 25/142B in 1980

15

190.

United States Code, 22 U.S.C. § 2656(d) (1)

1

191.

United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979)

7

192.

Ved P. Nanda, Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests: Capital

7

Punishment and Torture, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1369, 1369 (2000) DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION  

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WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITY 193.

Venezuelan Preferential Claims Case (1904) (Germany, Great Britain, Italy v.

8

Venezuela et al), 1 H.C.R 55 194.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,1969

20

195.

Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Customary Law and Articulation Theories: An

11

Economic Analysis, 2 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 201 (2006) 196.

Virginia Morris and M.-Christiane Bourloyannis, Current Development: The Work

20

of the Sixth Committee At The Forty-Eighth Session of The UN General Assembly, 88 A.J.I.L. 343 (1994) 197.

VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 161-70 (4th ed. 1981) at 127

19

198.

Walter F. Smith Case, (1929) P.C.I.J.(Ser. A/B) No. 46, at p.167

8

199.

William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenber, A Public Choice Analysis of the

14

Political Economy of International Sanctions, in Sanctions as Economic Statecraft 162 (Steven Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds. 2000) 200.

William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire with . . . Mire? Civil Remedies and the New War on

5

State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 105, 107-08 (2002), at 162 201.

Wimbeldon Case, (),()1923, PCIJ (Ser. A) No.1 at 37

13

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XI

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The Republic of Ronistan on one side and The Republic of Jotria on the other, have submitted by special agreement the differences between the states case concerning the blockade on Ronistan by Jotria and the attacks on Jotrian institutions by the UC and transmitted a copy there of to the registrar of the court pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Statute of the ICJ. Therefore both parties have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ pursuant to article 36(1) of the Statute of the court.

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XII

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS -IRonistan and Jotria are both developing countries that share a common history and a common boundary. In the 75 years of post colonial history, relations between the two countries have by and large been friendly and the governments of the two nations invested considerable financial and other resources to ensure that the historical social and economic ties continue. -IIRonistan had a model of local democratic governance wherein its Constitution guaranteed its people (and indeed, all human beings) a number of rights and civil liberties. Jotria, on the other hand, had a centralized form of democratic governance and its Constitution also guaranteed a number of rights and civil liberties to its citizens. -IIIHistorical ties between the two countries, provided that people regularly travelled between the two countries and Ronistan natural resources (local communities had rights to these resources) were actively sourced by large businesses in Jotria, in effect creating a situation where payments by Jotrian businesses were made to local communities feeding local development in Ronistan. -IVSharian Ami, a Jotrian by birth and Ronistani by residence, created a human network to drive significant social, economic and most importantly, cultural change and form the HOTWA Political Action Congress (HPAC), a political party. -VHPAC decided to use a provision in the Ronistan Constitution that in effect transformed Ronistan from a country of decentralization to a centralized system. Citizens enjoyed absolute rights when it came to enjoying their cultural and religious freedoms but civil liberties such as free speech and expression could be suspended by the Government if they felt that it was necessary to protect the overall religious and cultural fabric of the country. Ronistan quickly ramped up its annual military expenditure to almost 10% of GDP.

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SYNOPSIS OF FACTS -VIOn the other hand, Ronistan, around 10 years ago went through a massive financial crisis. This affected the credibility of its political class and using the groundswell of emotion in the country, the military of the country staged a coup, temporarily suspended the Constitution for a maximum of 6 months. -VII6 months later, the military rulers lifted the suspension of the Constitution and called for elections. The military supported a number of civilian candidates in these elections; most won and formed a government. -VIIIThe government of Jotria did not have a favourable view of the developments in Ronistan and decided to defocus the long term cultural ties between the nations and worked to move away from their economic dependence on the natural resources of Ronistan which was termed as an "effective economic blockade" of the country by Ronistan. -IXJotria merely maintained that they had the right to take decisions in their economic national interests and believed that "the cocktail of religion, culture and a military in Ronistan" compelled them to take such a decision. -XAll of this lead Sharian Ami decided to use the emergency provisions of the Constitution and arrested a number of people in the country (including leaders of the opposition and a number of Jotrian citizens) in order to "protect the basic structure of Ronistan, the religious and cultural freedom of its people and their way of life". -XIIn August 2007, Sharian Ami retired from active politics and his successor Darsh Panikhet took over. Darsh was famous in Ronistan for a simple political slogan: "Destroy Jotrian economic imperialism." He gave financial support to a number of popular social, economic and cultural groups including a group popularly known as UC. UC believed that Ronistan's success as a country was inversely proportional to the success of Jotria.

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SYNOPSIS OF FACTS -XIIAfter a series of violent attacks on Jotrian institutions (its Supreme Court and Parliament), UC’s Leadership Council openly announced that they had knowledge that these attacks would take place but disclaimed any specific involvement in the actual attacks -XIIICertain allegations were made against UC for the attacks by Jotria and international community. The Prime Minister of Jotria announced that based on its investigations, it had declared UC as a terrorist group. He called upon Ronistan to arrest and handover the UC leadership within 72 hours, the failure of which would be considered an act of war by Ronistan to which Darsh Panikhet reacted immediately and said that he was powerless to act in the absence of any specific evidence linking UC to these attacks and that he would be willing to act if he was provided evidence. -XIVThe 72 hour deadline passed after which due to involvement of international community, the Security Council passed a resolution asking Ronistan to cooperate with Jotria in every way possible and called upon Jotria to exhaust all means available for a peaceful resolution. -XV24 hours later, in a bizarre incident, a public rally (being held by the UC Leadership Council to protest against the "war mongering actions of Jotria") was bombed and the half the leadership of the Council were killed. UC immediately announced that Jotria was behind the attacks based on unconfirmed sightings of Jotrian military personnel crossing the borders of the two nations a few hours earlier. -XVIDarsh Panikhet also made an announcement that Jotria had violated the territorial integrity of Ronistan and that the attack on the public rally amounted to an armed attack on Ronistan. -XVIIFearing that war was inevitable, the Security Council passed a resolution asking the parties to resolve matters expeditiously and in a peaceful manner. On the intervention of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the leadership of Jotria and Ronistan decided to submit the dispute before International Court of Justice.

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS CONTENTIONS 1. The Applicant State is responsible for the violation of United Nations Charter as its actions amounted to State sponsored terrorism. The attacks in the Respondent State can be classified as international terrorism. Appreciation of circumstantial evidence proves the involvement of the UC group in the attack .In arguendo, the UC group aided and abetted international terrorism. The Applicant State was involved in State-sponsored terrorism. The Applicant State provided “State support” to the terrorist activities. The Applicant State provided “State tolerance” to the terrorist activities. Thus State responsibility is assigned to the Applicant State for Statesponsored terrorism. 2. The Applicant State has violated the duty to co-operate assigned by the binding Security Council resolution and has also violated the doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare. The Security Council resolution asking is a resolution under Chapter VII. Thus it was a binding resolution. Assuming but not conceding that the resolution was not under Chapter VII, it is yet binding. The Applicant State has also violated the doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare i.e. the principle which provides that the State was under an obligation either to prosecute or extradite. 3. The arrests of citizens of the Respondent State and other citizens during emergency by the Applicant State were in violation of international law. The declaration of emergency was a fictitious exercise of right.The emergency was declared in violation of international law and hence was not valid. Thus, arrests were not justified. 4. The changes brought into the Constitution of the Applicant State lead to the suppression of civil liberties which is a violation of international law. The Applicant State has an obligation under international law to provide for civil and political rights.The Respondent State has a right to bring this claim.Violation of this obligation entails State responsibility. DEFENSES 1. Applicant State’s claim to challenge “effective economic blockade” is inadmissible. The Applicant State’s claim to challenge the Respondent State’s economic policy is inadmissible.Assuming but not conceding that the claim is admissible, the changed economic policy is in compliance with international law. Arguendo, “effective economic blockade” is justified as economic sanctions under DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION   XVI

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WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

international law as Economic Sanction is a justified response to increase in military expenditure and Economic Sanctions are justified as a countermeasure under international law. 2. Respondent State is not responsible for the attacks on UC Rally in the Applicant State. Burden of Proof is on the Applicant State to prove that UC Rally was bombed by the Respondent State. In Arguendo, the attack is an act of self-defence and thus in compliance with international law. Exercise of self-defence is in response to an armed attack.The Respondent State was in a state of ‘distress’ and ‘necessity’ so as to justify self-defence. 3. The government of Sovereign State is sovereign and is in compliance with international law. The Applicant State has no locus to challenge the government of Respondent State. In Arguendo, the Respondent State’s government is in compliance with international law. 4. There is no “threat of war” by the Respondent State and the request was a means to peacefully settle the situation in accordance with the well-settled principle of international law.

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CONTENTION I THE APPLICANT STATE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLATION OF UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AS ITS ACTIONS AMOUNTED TO STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM.

It is the humble submission of the Respondent State before this Hon’ble Court that the UC group was involved in international terrorism and by supporting and tolerating its activities the Applicant State undertook state sponsored terrorism. 1.1. The attacks in the Respondent State can be classified as international terrorism. If the core of war crimes is extended to peacetime, acts of terrorism may simply be defined as peacetime equivalents of war crimes.1 Keeping this in mind, along with definitions of various States2 and UN resolutions,3 international terrorism incorporates four elements4: (1) use of force or threat of force, (2) in an attempt to cause fear, (3) to bring about a political objective, and (4) targeting of civilians.5 1.2. Appreciation of circumstantial evidence proves the involvement of the UC group in the attack. The instant case in an apt example, where circumstantial evidence should be taken into consideration by this Hon’ble Court. In cases where direct evidence of fact is not available, it is a general principle of law that proof may be administered by means of circumstantial evidence.6 Many a times in disputes of international character, exclusive territorial control exercised by one State within its frontiers has a bearing upon the method of proof available to the victim State to establish the knowledge of that State as to such events. It has been held by this Hon’ble Court that such a victim State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to

                                                             1

Singh v. Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 3317, ¶16. United States Code, 22 U.S.C. § 2656(d) (1); British Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989, at Part 20; Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union on Combating Terrorism of June 2002, Official Journal of the European Committee L 164, 22 June 2002; Emanuel Gross, “Terrorism and the Law: Democracy in the War Against Terrorism--the Israeli Experience” 35 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1161, at p.1165 3 Declaration on the Measure to Eliminate International Terrorism General Assembly Resolution 49/60, Adopted 17 February 1995, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60. 4 Tomuschat Report prepared by Christian Tomuschat, at ¶35. 5 Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on US": International Law and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. Int'l L.J. 153, 162 (1994) [‘Beck & Clerk’]; John Alan Cohan, Formulation of a State's Response to Terrorism and State-Sponsored Terrorism, 14 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 77, 93 (2002); Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure of the Charter Framework, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 735, 740 (2002); 48; Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism - Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 239, 240-41 (1995); Lt. Col. James P. Terry, USMC, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-Policy Analysis, 36 Naval L. Rev. 159, 161 (1986). 6 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits), [1949] ICJ Rep 4 [‘Corfu Channel Case’]; British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926): Mcneill Case (1931), Further Dec. & Op. of Com., pg.96, at pg.100; British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926):The Sonora (Mexico) Plant and Timber Co. Case (1931), Further Dec. & Op. of Com., pg.292, at pg. 296; British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926):2 Case (1931), Further Dec. & Op. of Com, pg. 297, at pg. 298; Hague Commission of Inquiry: The Tubantia (1922) 2 H.C.R., p.135; Germany-U.S. Mixed Claims Commission (1922): Taft Case (1926), Dec. & Op., p.801; Portugo-German Arbitration (1919): The Cysne Case (1930), 2 UNRIAA, p.1011, at p.1056; Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (1923): Claim I: Rzini (Tetuan Orchards) Case (1924), 2 UNRIAA, p.615, at p.654 2

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inferences of facts and circumstantial evidences.7 It is an admitted position that it would be going too far for an international court, in such situations, to insist on direct and visual evidence and to refuse to admit, after reflection, a reasonable amount of human presumption with a view of reaching that state of certainty with which a Court of Justice must be content.8 1.3. In arguendo, the UC group aided and abetted international terrorism. The actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law requires practical assistance, encouragement or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.9 Moreover, such assistance ‘need not constitute an indispensable element that is a condition sine qua non, for the acts of the principle.’10 It is not necessary for an accomplice to share the mens rea, that is ‘knowledge of the assistance he was providing in the commission of the actual offense’11, of the perpetrator, in the sense of a positive intention to commit the crime. Instead, the threshold requirement is merely that the accomplice has knowledge that his actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.12 1.4. The Applicant State was involved in State-sponsored terrorism. It is contended in the present case that the Applicant State provided state support and state tolerance. Nonstate actors carry out "State-sponsored terrorism" with the support, tolerance or sponsorship of a State government.13 State sponsorship of terrorism can range from a State being directly behind the terrorist attacks, to less direct State involvement such as providing training, financing or support one way or another, to even less direct State involvement by "tolerating", while not specifically supporting or approving, a particular terrorist group. Using a State's territory as a location from which to launch terrorist attacks is something that, if tolerated, suggests that the State involved has, in effect, aided and abetted the terrorist group by looking the other way.14

                                                             7

Supra [6] Supra [6] 9 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY, Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999) [ ‘Furundzija’]; Prosecutor v. Musema, IT-96-13-A (ICTR, Jan. 27, 2000) [‘Musema’]; Prosecutor v. George Ruggio, ICTR-97-32-I. 10 Ibid. 11 Musema, Ibid., p.181 12 Furundzija, Supra [9]. 13 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 83, 91 (2002), at 84. 14 Beck & Clerk, Supra [5]; Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 289, 298 (1987) [‘Keneth’]. 8

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BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

A. The Applicant State provided “State support” to the terrorist activities. It is humbly submitted that the Applicant State is responsible for providing “State support” to UC Group. "State support" requires a less significant level of assistance than sponsorship, but includes supply of intelligence, weapons, diplomatic assets, funds, or rhetorical endorsement.15 Sometimes in view of its particular nature, conclusive proof of certain fact is impossible. All that a court can reasonably require in the way of proof in such cases, is prima facie evidence sufficient to satisfy the court, leaving it open to the respondent State to rebut the presumptions by producing evidence to the contrary.16 In case where proof of a fact presents extreme difficulty, a tribunal may thus be satisfied with less conclusive proof, which is prima facie evidence.17 If the Judges acting as reasonable man of the world and bearing in minds the fact of human nature, do feel convinced that a particular event occurred or state of affairs existed, they should accept such things established.18 The absence of evidence in rebuttal is an essential consideration in the admission of prima facie evidence.19 The non-production of countervailing evidence may be taken into account in weighing evidence before a court,20 and in an appropriate case a reasonable adverse inference can be drawn from such a non-production of evidence.21 A claimant’s case should not necessarily suffer by the nonproduction of evidence by respondent.22 While it is an admitted position that it is not a function of the respondent government to make a case for the claimant government, certain adverse inferences, could be drawn from such a non-production of evidence, solely in the possession of the former.23 Where counter proof can be easily produced but its non-production is not satisfactorily explained, it may be assumed that such evidence as could have been produced on this point would not have refuted the charge in relation thereto.24 It is a general principle of law that the situation, as established, by prima facie evidence, coupled with adverse presumption arising from the non-production of available counter evidence, is sufficient to create a moral conviction of truth of an allegation.25 Thus, evidence produced by one party in litigation may

                                                             15

Beck & Clerk, Supra [5]; at 165 British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926:Lynch Case (1929), Dec. & Op. of Com.,p.20 [‘Lynch Case’] 17 Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 1953, p.323 [‘Cheng’] 18 British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926); Mexico City Bombardment Claim (1930),Dec. & Op. of Comm., p.100 19 Lynch Case, Supra [16]; British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926):Cameroon Case (1929) Dec. & Op. of Com.,p.33 20 France-Venzuela Mixed Claims Commission (1902): Burn Case, Ralston’s Report, pg.5 21 Mexico-U.S. Special Claims Commission (1923): Namoi Russell Case (1931), Op. of Com. 1926-1931, p.44, at p.88 22 Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Kling Case (1930), Op. of Com. 1931, p.36, at p.49 23 Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Hatton Case, Op. of Com. 1929, p.6 24 Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Melczer Mining Co. Case (1929), Op. of Com. 1929, P.228 25 Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923):Daniel Dillon Case (1928), Op. of Com. 1929, p.61, at p.65 16

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BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

be supported by legal presumptions, which arise from the non-production of information exclusively in possession of another party.26 In the present case there is prima facie evidence that the Applicant State provided financial aid to the UC Group. Though there is no evidence regarding the knowledge of the Applicant State as to the activities of the UC Group the same can established by prima facie evidence of financial aid coupled with the nonproduction of countervailing evidence of lack of knowledge by the Applicant State. Thus, it is established that the Applicant State provided “State support” to the terrorist activities. B. The Applicant State provided “State tolerance” to the terrorist activities. It is submitted that the complete absence of State action by the Applicant State against the UC Group, even after the attacks in the Respondent State, makes it evident that the Applicant state provided “State tolerance” to the terrorist activities. If the host government has no interest in controlling terrorists under its jurisdiction, the failure to respond could be construed as state sponsorship.27 "State toleration" recognizes an even weaker level of involvement, existing when the State acquiesces to the terrorist group's presence without providing sponsorship or support.28 A host government also engages in State-sponsored terrorism where it merely tolerates the use of its territory as a staging area for terrorist attacks and refuses requests to shut down those operations when it could do so.29 The State tolerates the terrorists operating as such within its borders by making no effort to arrest or oust them, although it does not actively support them. By not ejecting or arresting the terrorists, the State is enabling them to carry on their activities.30 1.5. State responsibility is assigned to the Applicant State for this act of State-sponsored terrorism. Regardless of the limitation imposed by the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, general international law principles of State responsibility provide that States assume responsibility for all violations of international law.31 Therefore, where States violate primary international law, such as the U.N. Charter, they may be held responsible for sponsorship and support of terrorism under

                                                             26

Ibid A/52/653, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Report of the Sixth Committee available at http:// www.un.org/law/cod/terroris/htm; John F. Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and Economic Dimensions, 32-33 (Westview Press) (1989). 28 Beck & Clerk, Supra [5]; at 165 29 Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 559, 565 (1999). 30 Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force, 18 Wis. Int'l L.J. 144, 150 (2000) [‘Travalio’]. 31 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act, (2001), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 [ILC Articles] Article 1 27

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traditional principles of State responsibility.32 Resolution 1373,33 prohibits States from providing terrorists with financial support or protection, and furthermore creates State accountability for acquiescence to a terrorist organization's presence within a State's borders.34 In Resolution 748, the U.N. Security Council recognized that State support of terrorism presents a threat to international peace and security and stated that in accordance with the principle in UN Charter,35 every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts.36 Thus, the international community now recognizes accountability extending to a State whose involvement is limited to tacit approval of terrorist activity within its borders.37 In the Declaration on Friendly Relations, 38 applying the principle that a State's demonstration of force, in any form of aggression,39 violates both international law and the U.N. Charter,40 and creates responsibility under international law,41 to terrorism, the U.N. concluded that international law imposes a duty on States to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts.42 U.N. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States acknowledges the duty of a State to prevent the use of its territory as a means to threaten the integrity of another State and creates State accountability for State provision of territory to terrorist organizations. It also outlaws all State sponsorship, support, and tolerance, for terrorism. 43 Thus, it identified State action supporting terrorism as a violation of the U.N. Charter.44

                                                             32

Ibid, Article 55 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001). 34 William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire with . . . Mire? Civil Remedies and the New War on State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 105, 107-08 (2002), at 162. 35 Article 2(4) 36 S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 42d Sess., 3063d mtg. at 52, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992); Kenneth Supra [14] 37 Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under International Law, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 559, 582 (2002); at 579 38 Declaration on Friendly Relations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (1970) [‘Declaration on Friendly Relations’]. 39 Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89, 98 (1989), at 93. 40 Supra [38] 41 Ibid 42 Supra [38] 43 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (1981) [‘Declaration on the Inadmissibility’]. 44 Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 177, 180-81 (1987)., at 195 33

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CONTENTION II  THE APPLICANT STATE VIOLATED THE DUTY TO COOPERATE ASSIGNED BY THE BINDING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE. 2.1. The Security Council resolution being a resolution under Chapter VII was a binding resolution. It is humbly submitted that the measures taken by the Security Council (“SC”) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, fall under the category of binding decisions.45 Under Article 24 of U.N. Charter, SC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security by virtue of which it can impose on States an explicit obligation of compliance by issuing an order or command under Chapter VII. Such measures are binding upon all the parties and require them to cease the happening of such events.46 The resolutions passed under Chapter VII by SC are issued once it has determined the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or an act of aggression.47 The concept of threat to peace and security is a political concept. The determination of threat to peace requires more than mere normative considerations; it necessitates an analysis of political realities.48 The understanding of what constitutes a threat to peace is broadened considerably from the narrow concept of the absence of the use of armed force to the wider concept of the situation that may lead to use of armed force.49 In cases where SC does not mention the chapter under which a resolution is passed, interpretation is required.50 One of the sources of interpretation of SC resolution is the circumstance of its adoption.51 2.2. Assuming but not conceding that the resolution was not under Chapter VII, it is yet binding. Article 25 of the Charter, states that the members of the U.N. agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the SC in accordance with the Charter.52 It has been settled by ICJ that Article 25 of the Charter applies to other parts besides Chapter VII of the Charter.53 The interpretation that limits the domain of binding decisions to those decisions taken under Chapter VII would render Article 25 superfluous.54 Therefore, it is necessary to look at the wordings and context of a resolution and not the chapter it is issued under, in order

                                                             45

David Schewigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (2001) [‘Schewigman’] 46 Certain Expenses of United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, (1962) ICJ Rep 163 47 Article 39, UN Charter 48 Prosecutor v. Tadic , Appeal on Jurisdiction, 35 ILM 32 (1996) 49 Stefan Talmon, Note and Comment: The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AGIL 175 50 Schewigman, Supra [45] 51 Michael C. Woods, Interpretation of Security Council Resolution, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 52 UN Charter, Article 25. 53 Legal Consequences for the States of the Continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion), (1971) ICJ Rep 113 at 53 54 Ibid.; A. Frowein, Collective Enforcement of International Obligation, (1987) 47 ZaoRv 67

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to determine whether SC intended to issue a decision or recommendation.55 The language of the SC resolution should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In order to determine as to whether the power under Article 25 have in fact been exercised regard must be given to all circumstances that led to the resolution of the SC.56 2.3. The Applicant State violated the doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare. It is humbly submitted that Applicant State’s inaction against UC constitutes a violation of the customary principle aut dedere aut judicare. A State must investigate any allegation that there is a person in its territory who has committed the offence and, if the circumstances so warrant, ensure the person’s presence for the purpose of extradition or prosecution.57 This principle of aut dedere aut judicare is a universally recognized principle and provides an obligation on a State either to extradite or prosecute the offender.58 Under this rule, a State is required either to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with principles of international law for a person suspected of terrorism or to extradite the person to a State able and willing to do so.59 The essential principle on which this doctrine rests is that an alleged offender should not find safe haven in the territory of any State. 60 If detaining State does not extradite, it is under an obligation ‘without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its own authorities for the purpose of prosecution.’61 This principle of aut dedere aut judicare aims to eliminate any hiding place in the territory of any of the parties for persons accused of terrorism.62 The requirement is not to prosecute but ‘to submit the case to its own authorities for the purpose of prosecution’.

                                                             55

R. Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are binding under Article 25 of the Charter, (1972) 32 ICLQ 269 56 Supra, [53] 57 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Foreword to Treaty Enforcement and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters, at vii, Rodrigo Yepes- Enríquez & Lisa Tabassi eds., 2002 58 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No.10 (A/59/10) para.362. 59 ILC Report on aut dedere aut judicare, Amnesty International Publications, 2009; Marc Henzelin, Le Principe de l’Universalité en Droit Pénal International: Droit et Obligation pour les États de Poursuivre et Juger selon le Principe de l’Universalité, 2000; Article 7, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Framework, ed., International Criminal Law 3, 5 (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2nd. ed. 1999). 60 Ved P. Nanda, Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests: Capital Punishment and Torture, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1369, 1369 (2000). 61 Roda Mushkat, Fair Trial as Precondition to Rendition: An International Legal Perspective, (Univ. of H.K. Ctr. for Comparative & Pub. Law, Occasional Paper No. 5, 2002) 62 ILC Report on aut dedere aut judicare, Amnesty International Publications, 2009; United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979); Iain Cameron, The Protective Principle Of International Criminal Jurisdiction 2 (1994).

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CONTENTION III  THE ARRESTS DURING EMERGENCY BY THE APPLICANT STATE WAS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 3.1. The declaration of emergency was a fictitious exercise of right. It is humbly submitted that the Applicant State has fictitiously exercised its sovereign right under the cloak of emergency declaration. The principle of good faith is considered to be the foundation of all laws.63 The principle of good faith ought to govern international relations.64 It cannot be that good faith is less obligatory upon nations that upon individuals in carrying out agreements.65 A State must fulfil its obligations bona fide.66 Good faith thus governs the exercise of rights. These rights must not be exercised fictitiously so to evade such obligations or rules of law, or maliciously so as to injure others. Violations of these requirements of the principle of good faith constitute abuse of rights, prohibited by law.67 The principle of good faith requires every right to be exercised honestly and loyally. Any fictitious exercise of right for the purpose of evading a rule of law is not tolerated under international law. Such an exercise constitutes an abuse of right, prohibited by law.68 Ex re sed non ex nomin is a principle of good faith.69 This principle inter alia precludes the form of law from being used to cover the commission of what in fact is an unlawful act. If international law prescribes certain rights to a State, which can be exercised under certain circumstances for a specific purpose, it is not permissible for that State to exercise such a right under the pretext of that purpose, to achieve a completely distinct unlawful purpose.70 Such an exercise of right would lead to invasion of law amounting to fictitious exercise of right constituting an abuse of rights and thus violating the principle of good faith.71 3.2. The emergency was declared in violation of international law and hence was not valid. It is well established that there are two essential elements of custom in international law, namely, State practice and opinio juris sevi necessitates72. For this purpose, practice must be general, and not completely

                                                             63

Magalidis Case, (1928) 8 T.A.M 386, at 395 Venezuelan Preferential Claims Case (1904) (Germany, Great Britain, Italy v. Venezuela et al), 1 H.C.R 55,at p.60 65 Metzger & Co. Case (U.S. v Haiti), 1901 U.S.F.R 262, at 271 66 Award (1937) 3 UNRIAA p. 1719, at p.1751 67 German Interests Case (Germany v. Poland) (Merits), 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A.) No.7, at p.30; Free Zones Case (Second Phase): Order (France v. Switzerland), (1930) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No.24, at p.12 68 Cheng, Supra [17], p.123 69 Chorzow Factory Case (Merits) (Germany v. Poland), (1928) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No.17, at p.87 [‘Chorzow Factory Case’] 70 Ibid 71 Walter F. Smith Case, (1929) P.C.I.J.(Ser. A/B) No. 46, at p.167; Oscar Chinl Case (Belgium v. U.K.), (1934) P.C.I.J.(Ser. A/B) No. 63, at p.86 72 Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication 226 (1964). 64

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73

universal, in order to constitute an international custom.74 Passage of time is not critical.75 Thus, a practice does not have to be observed as law, either tacitly or expressly, by every State.76 Further, in order for State practice to constitute the necessary opinio juris, the acts concerned must amount to settled practice coupled with the evidence of the belief that it is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.77 This subjective element can be deduced from various sources including the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral treaties.78 The concept of "derogation", which means that States could legally suspend their obligation to respect and enforce the rights contained in the human right convention during times of war, was extended to “other public emergency threatening the life of the nation” only in 1950.79 All the three leading instruments i.e. ECHR, the introducer of the concept; ACHR and the ICCPR, prescribe, broadly speaking, inter alia, two procedural restrictions, on the use of emergency powers.80 These treaties are signed and ratified by majority of the nations. All the nations therefore recognise these controls over State emergency and thus these controls constitute a part of customary international law. The procedural controls relevant in the present situation is a requirement that the details of such emergency, as well as the precise nature of any derogations involved, must be notified to all states through a prescribed authority or atleast to the State which will be affected by the derogation.81

                                                             73

Nicaragua, Ibid, at 98; Restatement of Foreign Relation Laws of the United States § 102 cmt. c (1987) [Restatement]. George Norman & Joel. P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AJIL 541 (2005); Maurice Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 Recueil des Cours 155 (1998); Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law 25 (1996)[ Oppenheim] ; I. A. Shearer, Stark’s International Law 31 (1994). 75 Restatement, Supra [73], Louis B. Sohn, Unratified Treaties as a Source of Customary International Law in Realism in Law-Making: Essays on International Law in Honor of Willem Riphagen 231 (1986) ; Louis B. Sohn, Speech: The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law; The American University Washington College of Law Edwin A Mooer Lecture, 34 Am.U.L.Rev. 271(1984). 76 Triska and Sussler, The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties (1962); Ramudo, The (Soviet) Socialist Theory of International Law (1964); Higgins, Conflict of Interest (1965); Baade, The Soviet Impact of International Law (1965); Grzybowski, Soviet Public International Law (1970). 77 North Sea, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.] 6, pp. 3, 44; Nicaragua, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.], at 109; The Rights of Passage over Indian Territory Case (Portugal v India), [1966] ICJ Rep 42; The SS Lotus Case (France v Turkey), [1972] PCIJ Rep Series A No. 10. 78 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatamela), [1955] ICJ Rep 22 [Nottebohm]; Lagos v Baggianini, [1955] 22 ILR 533 at 536-7; Lauritzen et al v Government of Chile, [1956] 23 ILR 70 at 715-16, 729-30; The State (Duggan) v Tapley, [1951] 18 ILR 109; The Italian National Re-extradition Case, [1970] 70 ILR 374 at 376-7; North Sea, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.], at 25; Nicaragua, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.]. 79 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) (“ECHR”); American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 UNTS 123 (“ACHR”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171(“ICCPR”) 80 ICCPR, Article 4; ACHR, Article 27; ECHR, Article 15. 81 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999) ; Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823 (2002) 74

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CONTENTION IV  THE CHANGES BROUGHT INTO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE APPLICANT STATE LEAD TO THE SUPPRESSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. It is humbly submitted that the sovereign right of the Applicant State does not give it the right to violate international norms. The interdependence of rights and obligations applies not only to treaty obligations but also to obligations derived from general law. Every right is subject to such limitations as are necessary to render it compatible both with the parties’ contractual obligation and with their obligations under general law.82 In this sense, rights can no longer be regarded as absolute,83 but are essentially related.84 The principle of good faith by recognising their independence harmonises rights and obligations of every person as well as within legal order as a whole.85 4.1. The Applicant State has an obligation under International Law to provide for civil and political rights International obligations may be established by a customary rule of international law.86 The delineation of civil and political rights as "first generation human rights" has become standard terminology.87 Through treaty and customary international law, first generation human rights are binding on all nation-states.88 Firstgeneration rights are negative rights, or "immunity claims" by citizens towards the State, in the sense that they limit the power of a government to protect peoples' rights against its power. They relate to the sanctity of the individual and his rights within the socio-political milieu in which he is located. They imply that no government or society should act against individuals in certain ways that would deprive them of inherent political or personal rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, and security of person, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion.89 First generation human rights are superior to economic, social, and cultural rights i.e. second-generation human rights.90 Though human rights, second-generation rights are considered

                                                             82

Mexican-United States General Claims Commission (1923): North American Dredging Company of Texas Case, Op. of Com. 1927, p.21, at p.29; Trail Smelter Arbitration, Award 2 (1941), 1935 UNRIAA, p. 1905, at p.1963 83 Ibid, at p.29; Admission of U.S. to U.N., Advisory Opinion, (1948) ICJ Rep. 57, at 79 84 Cheng, Supra [17], p.132 85 Ibid 86 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253; Nuclear Tests(New Zealand v. France), I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 457 [collectively referred as “Nuclear Test Cases”] ; North Sea, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.] at pp. 38-39, para. 63; Nicargua, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.]. 87 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary v Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 7 at 113 [Gabcikovo]; 88 Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 Colum. Hum. Rts L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1997); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 (1987) 89 J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: International Mechanisms, NonState Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples' Rights in Africa, 18 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 851, 852 (2003); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in Africa, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1209, 1224 (2003). 90 Obijio for Aginam , Global Village, Divided World: South-North Gap And Global Health Challenges At Century's Dawn, 7 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 603.

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CONTENTION IV

BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

secondary in order of their importance for protection by and against the State.91 Thus there is an unconditional obligation on the Respondent State to provide for first-generation human rights. 4.2. The Respondent State has a right to bring this claim. All States are entitled to invoke responsibility for breaches of obligations to the international community as a whole.92 First generation human rights, because of its negative character, represent commitment to the entire international community by each State because all the States have an interest in the former they are obligations erga omnes, thus making them a proper subject for international concern and justifying sanctions and initiation of proceedings by other States, individually and collectively, for violations thereof.93 The ICJ and ILC have also considered first generation human rights as peremptory norms of International Law.94  Thus the Respondent State though not an Injured State has a right to assign responsibility. 4.3. Violation of this obligation entails State Responsibility. There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation.95 Violation of an unequivocally recognised norm of customary international law being a legal obligation will constitute an internationally wrongful act.96 State responsibility entails for such an internationally wrongful act.97 Further the Applicant State cannot preclude this wrongfulness because nothing precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.98 The fact that the constitutional amendments made in the Applicant State gave them the right to usurp civil liberties show that their actions were in violation of international law and thus entails responsibility.

                                                             91

Theodore Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1986) ILC Articles, Supra [31], Art. 48 93 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, at 33 [‘Barcelona Traction’]; Naomi RohtArriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, (1990) 78 California Law Review 449. 94 Barcelona Traction, Ibid , at p. 32, para. 34. East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90, at p. 102, para. 29; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, at p. 258, para. 83; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595, at pp. 615-616, paras. 31-32. 95 ILC Articles, Supra [31], Art. 12 96 Restatement, Supra [73]; Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Customary Law and Articulation Theories: An Economic Analysis, 2 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 201 (2006); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts on Customary International Law, 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 191 (2001); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative States: International Relations, State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 839 (2002). 97 ILC Articles, Supra [31],, Art. 1 r/w Art. 28 r/w Art. 33; Ambateilos Arbitration (Greece v UK), [1956] 12 RIAA 83; Barcelona Traction, Supra [93], [1970] ICJ Rep 4; Norwegian Loans Case (France v Norway), [1957] ICJ Rep 9 [Norwegian]. 98 ILC Articles, Supra [31]1,Article 26. 92

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DEFENCE I APPLICANT STATE’S CLAIM TO CHALLENGE “EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE” IS INADMISSIBLE.

1.1. The Applicant State’s claim to challenge the Respondent State’s economic policy is inadmissible. It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Applicant State’s claim to challenge the “effective economic blockade” imposed by the Respondent State over Applicant State should be held inadmissible on the grounds of non-exhaustion of local remedies.99 The rule of exhaustion of local remedies is a customary principle of international law,100 which provides that all local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted.101 The rule of exhaustion of local remedies in such cases poses a question of admissibility.102 It has been stated that matters within the domestic jurisdiction 'as determined by' that particular State are automatically excluded from the purview of the international tribunals.103 Respect for State sovereignty provides a principal rationale for the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies.104 Matters within the competence of States under general international law are said to be within the reserved domain, the domestic jurisdiction of the States.105 It has been held by this Hon’ble Court that every State has the sovereign right to choose freely, their political, economic, social and cultural systems and the formulation of foreign policy.106 Thus, the matters, such as framing of economic policy fall within the well-established internal framework of a nation. Thus any claim with

respect

to

it

should

be

dealt

at

first

by

domestic

courts

of

Respondent

State.

                                                             99

Article 79, Rules of International Court of Justice (1978) adopted on 14 April 1978 and entered into force on 1 July 1978 100 Elettronica Sicula SpA ( E L S I ) Case (U.S. v. Italy) Case, ICJ Reports, 1989, p, 15; Stephen M. Schwebel & J. Gillis Wetter, Arbitration and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies, 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 484, 500 (1966) 101 Interhandel case, ICT Reports, 1959, p. 27; Pleadings, Israel v. Bulgaria, ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 531-2, and T. Meron, 'The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies', 25 BYIL, 1959, p. 95. Note, in addition, the North American Dredging Co. claim, 4 RIAA, p. 26 (1926); 3 AD, p. 4; Exparte Ferhut Butt 116 ILR, pp. 607, 614-15 (High Court) and 619 (Court of Appeal); Article 35, European Convention on Human Rights; Article 46, InterAmerican Convention on Human Rights; Article 5, Optional Protocol I, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and Article 295 of the Law of the Sea Convention; 102 Fawcett, 31 BY (1954), 452-8; Judge Lauterpacht, Sep. Op., Norwegian, Supra[97] at 39-41; Case of Ireland against the United Kingdom, ECHR: ILR 58, 190, Judgment, 1978, ¶159. 103 Rosenne, Law and Practice, vol. 11, pp. 778-82. 104 Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law 200 (2d ed. 2004) 105 Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction (2nd Edn., 1961),pp. 407-48, 509-25; Conforti, Bedjaoui (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Perspectives (1991), 467-82; Kelsen, Principles of International Law, pp. 62-4, 191-2, 196-201. 106 Nicaragua Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.] at pp. 14, 108; S. McCaffrey, 'The Forty-First Session of the International Law Commission: 83 AJIL, 1989, p. 937; Declaration on Inadmissibility, Supra [43], p. 1021; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted in General Assembly resolution 1974 3281 (XXIX) [Charter of Economic Rights and Duties]

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BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

1.2. Assuming but not conceding that the claim is admissible, the changed economic policy is in compliance with international law. It is humbly submitted that economic decision taken by Respondent State is targeted to protect the interest of the nation in light of huge economic loss suffered by it.107 It is often difficult to differentiate between the normal economic controls that a State exercises over its economy and economic sanctions designed to coerce a foreign State.108 State control over its domestic economy is an accepted exercise of its sovereignty.109 State control over its domestic economy is an accepted exercise of its sovereignty.110 Every State has a duty to decide such economic goal and to take such measures which are in its best interests and lead to the development of the nation.111 The right of a State to adopt the course which it considers best suited to the exigencies of its security and to the maintenance of its integrity is a very essential right.112 This right possessed by all the nations, which is based on generally accepted usage, cannot lose its raison d’être, simply because it may in some cases be abused.113 The overriding interest of self-preservation of State has been considered mutadis mutandis and invoked by international tribunals as the principle of solus populi suprema lex esto.114 This well known maxim is regarded as one of the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, within the contemplation of Article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute.115 When an act of self-preservation is carried out by the State in territory subject to its authority, forms part of the territorial application of the principle of selfpreservation which is distinct from the commonly applied external application of the principle of selfpreservation.116 In the former case, the principle of solus populi suprema lex esto permits the welfare and security of the nation as a whole to override the rights and interests of aliens.117 With regard to international obligation the right of a State to adopt measures necessary to ensure welfare and security of the community in exceptional circumstances cannot be considered as being impaired even by general provision contained in                                                              107

Para 9, Compromis Andre Beirlaen, Economic Coercion and Justifying Circumstances, 18 Revue beige de droit international 58, 68 (1984-85) [Beirlaen] 109 Justin D. Stalls, Economic Sanctions, 11 U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 115, pg.3 110 Ibid 111 Nicaragua Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.], at pp. 14, 108;Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, Supra [106] 112 Wimbeldon Case, (),()1923, PCIJ (Ser. A) No.1 at 37 113 Ibid, at 36 114 Cheng, Supra [17], p.30; Great Venezuelan Railroad Case, 1903, Ven. Arb.,, p.632 115 Cheng Ibid, p.31 116 Ibid 117 Ibid 108

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treaties.118 For welfare and safety of the community, a State is permitted to adopt a variety of measures appropriate to the needs and circumstances of the case, even though such measures may amount to an encroachment upon private rights, which ordinarily must be respected. The determinations of existence of the need and the methods best calculated to meet the contingencies are, however, left to the discretion of the State.119 International tribunals only require the State to proof the existence of the contingencies warranting the exercise of this discretion.120 1.3. In Arguendo, “Effective Economic Blockade” is justified as Economic Sanctions under international law. It is humbly submitted that the “effective economic blockade” imposed by Respondent State over Applicant State, if considered as economic sanctions, are justified as a tool to protect the human rights and control military expenses. It is well settled that customary international law does not prohibit economic sanctions.121 In a program of unilateral economic sanctions, the sending State determines whether the economic sanctions are justified or not.122 A violation of international law is a justification for the enactment of economic sanctions, which can be take any shape.123 When a State violates international law, other States may act like an international police force and attempt to enforce the law.124 Modern economic sanctions are defined as economic measures taken by the sending State against the target State to persuade a change in the policies and practices of the target States that are not in compliance with international law.125 States have endeavoured to protect human rights and to halt excessive military expenses through the use of economic sanctions.126                                                              118

Portendick Case (1843) Ibid. 120 Ibid. 121 Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-Cold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901, 918 (1995) 122 Beirlaen, Supra [108], p. 63; William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenber, A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions, in Sanctions as Economic Statecraft 162 (Steven Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds. 2000) 123 Stephen Zamora, Economic Relations and Development, in the United Nations and International Law 279 (Christopher C. Joyner ed. 1997) 124 Beirlaen, Supra [108], p. 58, 62 125 Refer Contention IV; E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1162, 1169 (1987) at 1166[Carter]; Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey j. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy 4 (1985) p. 2 [‘Hufbauer and Schott’]; Kenneth W. Abbott, Coercion and Communication: Frameworks for Evaluation of Economic Sanctions, 19 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 781, 783, 789 (1987); John Galtung, On The Effects of International Economic Sanctions, in Dilemmas of Economic Coercion 17, 19 (Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen eds. 1983); Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (David Cortright and George A. Lopez eds., 1995); Adam Packer, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 631, 634-39 (2000). 126 Hufbauer and Schott, Ibid, at 6 119

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DEFENCE I

BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Taken as a whole, these expanded objectives show that sending States have begun to use economic sanctions to enforce legal norms.127 Considering economic measures as illegal only because of their inflicting damage upon another State can hardly be accepted since all economics are competitive.128 Perhaps the use of economic sanctions merely demonstrates that there are no better alternative means available to the policy makers of sending States.129 A. Economic Sanction is a justified response to increase in Military Expenditure. It is humbly put worth before this Hon’ble Court that economic sanction are a response to the threat posed a sudden increase in the military expenditure by the Applicant State. Every UN member is under an obligation to reduce its military expenditure with a view to reduce armament and promote development.130 Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures provides that the military expenditure in a country should not exceed 10% of the total expenditure in a fiscal year.131 National security interests continue to motivate policy makers to implement economic sanctions and to change their economic policies.132 A State may typically withdraw from an arms regime when its supreme national interests have been or are expected to be jeopardized by developments related to arms and military.133 Economic sanctions or other international pressures have proved beneficial to check the disarmament on the targeted State.134 B. Economic Sanctions are justified as a countermeasure under international law. It is humbly submitted that even if the economic sanctions imposed by the Respondent State are not in conformity with the international law, they are justified as a countermeasure, since international law justifies an act of countermeasure in such cases. Wrongfulness of an act is precluded if and to the extent that it constitutes a countermeasure.135 A lawful countermeasure can be taken in response to a prior wrongful act                                                              127

Georges Abi-Saab, The Concept of Sanction in International Law, in United Nations Sanctions and International Law 32 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed. 2001); Joy K. Fausey, COMMENT: Does the United Nations' Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate Its Own Human Rights Standards?, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L.193, 196(Fall 1994) 128 Beirlaen, Supra [108], pp. 68-69 129 D. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft 13-14 (1985) at 123; Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen, Economic Coercion and Foreign Policy, in Dilemmas of Economic Coercion 2 (Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen eds. 1983) 130 UNGA Resolution 25/142B in 1980 131 Reporting Form, Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures, UNGA Resolution 25/142B in 1980; Commission on Human Security, 2003, Human Security Now, New York, p. 135; Amnesty International, The United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms 2002 132 Hufbauer and Schott, Supra [125], p. 5 133 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503art. XV, ¶ 2, 23 U.S.T. at 3446, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 12; on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms), June 18, 1979, United States-U.S.S.R., art. XV, 18 I.L.M. 1112, 1134-35 at 1158; CFE Treaty, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1 (1991), art. XIX, ¶ 2, 30 I.L.M. at 22. 134 Carter¸ Supra, [125]; Mufson, Sanctions Could Be Two-Edged Sword, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1990, at A17, col. 1. 135 ILC Articles, Supra [31], Art. 22 r/w Chap. II; Commentary, supra note 1, at 180.

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DEFENCE I

BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

and directed against the State committing the wrongful act.136 There is no requirement that countermeasure should be with regard to the same obligation breached by the State acting wrongfully.137 As the actions of the Applicant State were in violation of customary international law,138 and applicable treaty obligations,139 enforcement actions of the Applicant State are also lawful under the doctrine of countermeasures.

                                                             136

Gabcikovo, .Supra [97], pp 55-7; Nicargua, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.], at 102; David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AJIL 817 (2002). 137 Malcolm Shaw, International Law 709 (2005). 138 Contentions raised by Agents to the Respondent State. 139 Refer Contention IV.

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DEFENCE II RESPONDENT STATE IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACKS ON UC RALLY IN THE APPLICANT STATE.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Respondent State is not responsible for the attacks on UC rally in the Applicant State. 2.1 Burden of Proof is on the Applicant State to prove that UC Rally was bombed by the Respondent State. It is submitted that in order to establish the responsibility of Respondent State, it is Applicant State’s duty to discharge the burden of proof. It is a well established general principle of law that the burden of proof is upon the claimant.140 Burden of proof implies something more than merely the duty to produce evidence.141 It means that a party having the burden of proof must not only bring evidences in support of its allegations but must also convince the tribunal of their truth.142 It is hereby submitted that in the instant case, the responsibility cannot be assigned in light of unconfirmed sightings of Respondent State’s military personnel. 2.2 In Arguendo, the attack is an act of Self-Defence and thus in compliance with international law. It is humbly submitted that even if it is proved that the attack was done by Respondent State, such attack was in exercise of its inherent right to self-defence in response to the terrorist attack by UC in Jotria.143 A. Exercise of Self-Defence is in response to an armed attack. It is submitted that the attack by UC on Respondent State constitutes an armed attack for which there exists a right to self-defence. Article 51 provides that the right to self-defence may be exercised by any state subject to an armed attack until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.144 Article 51 authorizes a victim State to attack in self- defence and does not limit this inherent right to attacks by other States. This Hon’ble Court has defined armed attack as including the substantial involvement of a state in sending of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces. This description may be taken to reflect customary international law.145 That,

                                                             140

Parker Case, 1926 Mexico-U.S General Claims Commission (1923) 142 Corfu Channel Case Supra [6]; Mexico-U.S General Claims Commission (1923) 143 Refer Contention I. 144 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, at Article 1 [Charter], Article 51. 145 Nicargua, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.], at 103-04. 141

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DEFENCE II

BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

  evidently, is why Resolution 1368146 classifies terrorist attacks as an armed attack and clearly identifies international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security against which individual self-defence may be exercised.147 The defence in the context of terrorist attacks acts as a defence for limited incursions into the sovereign territory of another state.148 B. The Respondent State was in a state of ‘distress’ and ‘necessity’ so as to justify self-defence. Distress as a general principle under the rubrics of international law, is recognised in conventions,149 and judgments of international tribunals.150 It permits departure from an international obligation when there is a serious threat to life or physical integrity of persons entrusted to a State’s care and there is no other reasonable way to overcome that situation.151 Necessity is a situation of political or economic survival, the maintenance of conditions in which the essential functions can survive, inter alia, the survival of parts of its population.152 It is invoked when it is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.153 Essential interest includes the particular interests of the state.154 A peril is imminent when it is certain and inevitable.155

                                                             146

Security Council Resolution 1368 of 2001, adopted at the 4370th Meeting on 12th September, 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001). 147 Ibid. 148 Travalio, Supra [30] (citing Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism, 8 Whittier L. REV. 711, 716-17 (1986)) at 160-61; Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Self-defense against the use of force in international law 126 (1996) at 188-201; Christine Gray, International law and the use of force 161 (2d ed. 2004) at 126-29; ." Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in Law and Force in the New International Order 52 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds. 1991). 149 International Convention for the Preservation of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1963), 327 U.N.T.S 3; Convention for the Preservation of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (1972), 1046 U.N.T.S. 138. 150 Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (New Zealand v France), [1987] 23 ILM 1346 151 Ibid; ILC Articles, Supra [31], Art. 24. 152 Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, U.N. Doc. A/56/10. 153 ILC Articles, Supra [31],; Keiver, The Pacific Salmon War: The Defense of Necessity Revisited, 21 Dalhousie L.J. 408 (1998). 154 Gabcikovo, Supra[97] , 41-42. 155 Ibid.

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DEFENCE III THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RESPONDENT STATE IS SOVEREIGN AND IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.

3.1. The Applicant State has no locus to challenge the government of Respondent State. It is humbly submitted that Respondent State’s government cannot be challenged by Applicant State since it will interfere with the principles of sovereignty existing under the auspices of international law. All states are under an international legal obligation not to commit any violation of the independence or territorial or personal authority, of any other state.156 It is an accepted principle of international law that every state has the right to choose its form of government and that other states do not intervene in any way since, intervention is forbidden by international law as a principle of customary international law.157 3.2. In Arguendo, the Respondent State’s government is in compliance with international law. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the government of Jotria is a legitimate government under international law. The principles of good governance, transparency and human rights are essential elements for building representative and stable governments and hence for their legitimacy.158 Recognition of the government has been interpreted in the sense that the new government must be supported by will of the nation, substantially declared and that there must be evidence of popular approval, adequately expressed of a revolutionary change.159 In the instant case, the government existing in the State of Jotria is a democratic form of government and is recognised by its institutions like judiciary.160 The factors to be taken into account in deciding whether a government exists as the government of a state are whether it is the constitutional government of the state; the degree, nature and stability of administrative control, if any, that it of itself exercises over the territory of the state and in marginal cases the extent of international recognition that it has as a government of the state.161                                                              156

Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th Ed. 2001, pg 382,¶118 Military and Paramilitary Activities Case, ICJ Rep (1986); UN Charter; VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 161-70 (4th ed. 1981) at 127; Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law, 66 AJIL 321 (1972); ICCPR; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, 1974; Lotus Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, p.18 158 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), OAU, NEPAD Doc. (2001); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 345 (199798) 159 Q.Wright, US Intervention in the Labanon, 53 AJIL (1959); R.A.Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World, (1968); Doswald-Beck, Legal Validity; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States (1965). 160 Refer Para 10, Compromis 161 Sierra Leone Telecommunications Co Ltd v Barclays Bank plc [1998] 2 All ER 820; The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] 1 All ER 719. 157

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DEFENCE IV THERE IS NO “THREAT OF WAR” BY THE RESPONDENT STATE AND THE REQUEST WAS A MEANS TO PEACEFULLY SETTLE THE SITUATION. It is humbly submitted that the request made by the Respondent State to submit UC leadership to it, cannot be termed as a “threat of war” but was a method to ensure a peaceful settlement of the dispute which is an obligation placed on every UN member.162 UN Charter imposes an obligation upon the member nations to settle the disputes by peaceful means. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security are under an obligation to seek a solution by by peaceful means of their own choice.163 These means can be made flexible relying on the appreciable harm or the significant harm caused to the State.164 States are obliged to not to recognise an illegal situation,165 and to take positive measures to ensure the cessation of violations and to demand and facilitate the parties to comply with international law.166 Negotiation by using diplomatic channels for the commissions of inquiry to resolve international disputes has been recognised as a peaceful means of settlement of international disputes.167 A threat to retaliate, thus, has been recognised as a means of pacific settlement of disputes, if not quantified by the parameters which requires: (1) a manifest intent to injure; (2) active preparation that makes the intent a positive danger; and (3) a situation where waiting to eliminate the threat magnifies the risk.168 Thus in the instant case, the request put forth by the Respondent State was designed to ensure the Applicant State’s compliance with international law inter alia to provide cooperation under the customary principle aut dedere aut judicare.

                                                             162

Article 26, “Pacta Sund Servanda”, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,1969. Article 33, UN Charter. 164 Virginia Morris and M.-Christiane Bourloyannis, Current Development: The Work of The Sixth Committee At The Forty-Eighth Session of The UN General Assembly, 88 A.J.I.L. 343 (1994) 165 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004, paragraph 163. 166 Bassiouni, Cherif, “Searching for peace and achieving justice: The need for accountability”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol 59, No 4, 1996; Bassiouni, Cherif. “Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions”, Journal of Law and Policy, Vol 5, No 35, 2001; Aldana-Pindell, Raquel. “An emerging universality of justiciable victims rights in the criminal process to curtail impunity for state-sponsored crimes”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 26, 2004 167 Great Britain v. Russia, Report of February 26, 1905, The Hague Court Reports 403 (James Brown Scott ed. 1916) cited in international law casebooks. See Mark W. Janis & John E. Noyes, International Law, Cases and Commentary 221 (1997). 168 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Basic Books 4th ed. 2006) (1977) at 81, 85; Michael Walzer, Arguing About War 147 (Yale Univ. Press 2006) 163

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PRAYER AND CONCLUSION In light of the questions presented, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the counsel for the Respondent State most humbly and respectfully pray before this Hon’ble Court, that it may be pleased to adjudge and declare that the: 1. The Applicant State is responsible for the violation of United Nations Charter as its actions amounted to state sponsored terrorism. 2. The Applicant State violated the duty to cooperate assigned by the binding Security Council Resolution and the Doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare. 3. The arrests during emergency by the Applicant State was in violation of international law. 4. The changes brought into the constitution of the Applicant State lead to the suppression of civil liberties which is a violation of international Law. 5. Applicant State’s claim to challenge the changed economic policy is Inadmissible. 6. The Respondent State is not Responsible for the attacks on UC Rally in the Applicant State. 7. The government of the Respondent State is sovereign and is in compliance with international law. 8. The actions of the Respondent State did not classify as a threat of war. The Respondent State thus prays for the following reliefs from the court: 1. Compensation for the loss to life and property caused to Respondent State. 2. Extradition of the suspected terrorists as a means of satisfaction. 3. Compensation to the citizens of the Respondent State whose rights were violated. 4. Cessation of the violation of human rights in the Applicant State and guarantee of non-repetition. The Court may also make any such order as it may deem fit in terms of equity, justice and due conscience.  And for this act of kindness the Applicant State shall as duty bound ever humbly pray. 

Respectfully submitted, …………...….……...…………………… (Counsel for the Respondent State)

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