Remedial Law_2013-2014 PALS

REMEDIAL LAW MARCH 2013 LORNA CASTIGADOR v. DANILO M. NICOLAS G.R. No. 184023, March 4, 2013

J. Reyes The CA dismissed Castigador’s complaint on the ground that there was no allegation that the petition is based on extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Under Section 5, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, it is incumbent that when a court finds no substantial merit in a petition for annulment of judgment, it may dismiss the petition outright but the “specific reasons for such dismissal” shall be clearly set out. The petition need not categorically state the exact words extrinsic fraud; rather, the allegations in the petition should be so crafted to easily point out the ground on which it was based. FACTS: Petitioner Lorna Castigador was the previous registered owner of a piece of land in Tagaytay. The City Treasurer of Tagaytay sold the property to Respondent Danilo Nicolas at a public auction for non-payment of real estate taxes. The RTC of Tagaytay City granted Nicolas’ petition to issue a certificate of title to the property in his name after Castigador failed to redeem the property. Castigador claimed that she was not notified of the public auction, the sale, and the petition for the issuance of a certificate of title. The Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City denied Castigador’s notice of adverse claim on the ground of lack of privity between Castigador and Nicolas. Castigador filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the grounds that: 1) the petition is defective for failure to comply with Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; and (2) there is no allegation in the petition that it is based on extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules. Castigador filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition which the CA denied stating that the “the arguments posed by Castigador in support of the grounds cited for the allowance of the petition are bereft of merit, as they do not constitute extrinsic fraud to annul the questioned decision.” ISSUE: Whether the CA was justified in dismissing the petition Ruling: Petition granted. Under Section 5, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, it is incumbent that when a court finds no substantial merit in a petition for annulment of judgment, it may dismiss the petition outright but the “specific reasons for such dismissal” shall be clearly set out.

The petition need not categorically state the exact words extrinsic fraud; rather, the allegations in the petition should be so crafted to easily point out the ground on which it was based. The allegations in the petition filed with the CA sufficiently identify the ground upon which the petition was based – extrinsic fraud. Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. IRENE VILLAMAR-SANDOVAL v. JOSE CAILIPAN, et al. G.R. 200727, March 4, 2013

J. Perlas-Bernabe Cailipan, et al. filed a petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s order of default and a Notice of Appeal questioning the RTC’s decision. It is well-settled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. The simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal. The Court observes that Cailipan, et al. should have (a) withdrawn their certiorari petition and instead raised the jurisdictional errors stated therein in their appeal or (b) at the very least, informed the CA’s Twenty-First Division of the Decision rendered on the main case and the filing of their Notice of Appeal on January 22, 2011. FACTS: Petitioner Irene Villamar-Sandoval instituted a complaint for damages before the RTC against respondent Jose Cailipan, et al. Due to the failure of Cailipan, et al’s counsel to attend the hearing, the RTC declared Cailipan, et al. in default. Cailipan, et al. filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in declaring them in default. Meanwhile, the RTC decided in favor of VillamarSandoval. Cailipan, et al. then filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA, while its initially filed certiorari petition was still pending resolution before the CA. They subsequently filed an Amended Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam and a Joint Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam (Amended Notices of Appeal), clarifying therein that they were not abandoning their petition for certiorari. The CA denied that the venue was improperly laid but granted their petition on the impropriety of the order of default. The CA set aside the RTC’s Orders and directed the remand of the case to the RTC to allow Cailipan, et al. to present their evidence. Villamar-Sandoval filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that since the main case had already been decided by the RTC and Cailipan, et al. have availed of the remedy of appeal, the latter’s petition for certiorari filed with the CA was already moot and academic but was denied by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether Cailipan, et al.’s petition for certiorari was an improper remedy and/or had become moot and academic by virtue of the RTC’s January 11, 2011 Decision RULING: Petition denied. It is well-settled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. The simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal. Corollary thereto, an appeal renders a pending petition for certiorari superfluous and mandates its dismissal. As held in Enriquez v. Rivera: The general rule is that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for an appeal, for relief through a special action like certiorari may only be established when no remedy by appeal lies. The exception to this rule is conceded only "where public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictate, and the broader interests of justice so require, or where the orders complained of were found to be completely null and void, or that appeal was not considered the appropriate remedy, such as in appeals from orders of preliminary attachment or appointments of receiver." (Fernando v. Vasquez, L- 26417, 30 January 1970; 31 SCRA 288). For example, certiorari maybe available where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual (Romero Sr. v. Court of Appeals, L29659, 30 July 1971; 40 SCRA 172) Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, it is clear that Cailipan, et al.’s January 11, 2011 petition for certiorari was rendered superfluous by their January 22, 2011 appeal. Although Cailipan, et al. did not err in filing the certiorari petition with the CA on January 11, 2011 – as they only received the RTC’s Decision three days after the said date and therefore could not have availed of the remedy of an appeal at that time – the Court observes that Cailipan, et al. should have (a) withdrawn their certiorari petition and instead raised the jurisdictional errors stated therein in their appeal or (b) at the very least, informed the CA’s Twenty-First Division of the Decision rendered on the main case and the filing of their Notice of Appeal on January 22, 2011. Prudence should have guided them to pursue either course of action considering the well-entrenched conflict between the remedies of an appeal and a petition for certiorari, of which they should have been well aware of. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REP. BY THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR, REGION III v. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO, JR., et al. G.R. No. 199501, March 6, 2013

J. Carpio An order declared that the Republic was deemed to have abandoned one of the cases of a consolidated case but trial proceeded for the consolidated cases. There is no rule or law

prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is consolidated with other cases. Further, severance is within the sound discretion of the court for convenience or to avoid prejudice. FACTS: Petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General instituted a complaint for reversion and cancellation of title which was consolidated with the civil case instituted by Enrique Oribello, Jr. against Matilde Apog and Aliseo San Juan for recovery of possession over the same subject property. The trial court warned the OSG that its failure to appear and present evidence will be deemed as termination of the presentation of evidence. Atty. Oscar Pascua, representing the OSG, presented a witness. However, on September 12, 1997, the OSG failed to appear and the trial court issued an order declaring that its failure to appear was deemed an abandonment of the case. Nevertheless, the trial for the consolidated cases proceeded but was dismissed due to the non-substitution of the deceased Orilbello. The OSG moved for reconsideration on the ground that the dismissal of the case for recovery of possession did not affect the case for reversion of property. The trial court granted the motion and allowed the OSG to continue with the presentation of its evidence in June 29, 2005. The respondents, the Oribello Heirs, called the trial court’s attention to the Order it issued on September 12, 1997 where the trial court declared that the OSG was deemed to have abandoned the reversion and that there being no question against it, the order was final. The trial court granted the Oribello Heirs’ motion and recalled the order granted in June 29, 2005 and dismissed the case for reversion. The CA upheld the dismissal. ISSUES: 1. 2.

Whether the order is interlocutory Whether the consolidated cases are subject to multiple appeals

RULING: Petition granted. 1. Had the trial court declared, in no uncertain terms, that the reversion suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute, there is no doubt that the OSG would have questioned such ruling, as it now did with respect to the trial court’s 29 June 2005 Order. A final order is defined as “one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court.” Conversely, an interlocutory order “does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon” by the court. Its effects are merely provisional in character and substantial proceedings have to be further conducted by the court in order to finally resolve the issue or controversy. While the OSG failed to appear on the hearing of 12 September 1997, such failure does not constitute a ground for the dismissal of the reversion complaint for failure to prosecute. The OSG’s non-appearance on that date should simply be construed as a waiver of the right to present additional evidence. Termination of presentation of a party’s evidence does not equate to dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute. In fact, the trial court merely “deemed” the OSG to have abandoned the case without stating expressly and unequivocally that the

complaint for reversion was dismissed. Had the trial court declared, in no uncertain terms, that the reversion suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute, there is no doubt that the OSG would have questioned such ruling, as it now did with respect to the trial court’s 29 June 2005 Order. While it is within the trial court’s discretion to dismiss motu proprio the complaint on the ground of plaintiff’s failure to prosecute, it must be exercised with caution. Resort to such action must be determined according to the procedural history of each case, the situation at the time of the dismissal, and the diligence (or the lack thereof) of the plaintiff to proceed therein. As the Court held in Gomez v. Alcantara, if a lesser sanction would achieve the same result, then dismissal should not be resorted to. 2. There is no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is consolidated with other cases. Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule allows the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of issues within those cases. The Court explained, thus: In the context of legal procedure, the term “consolidation” is used in three different senses: 1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. 2)

This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasiconsolidation)

a. Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation) b. Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. 3) This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial) The reversion suit settles whether the subject land will be reverted to the State, while the recovery of possession case determines which private party has the better right of possession over the subject property. These cases, involving different issues and seeking different remedies, require the rendition and entry of separate judgments. The consolidation is merely for joint trial of the cases. Notably, the complaint for recovery of possession proceeded independently of the reversion case, and was disposed of accordingly by the trial court. Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance of one action from the other is not necessary to appeal a judgment already rendered in one action. There is no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is consolidated with other cases. Further, severance is within the sound discretion of the court for

convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under the Rules of Court that the court sever one case from the other cases before a party can appeal an adverse ruling on such case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAIME FERNANDEZ Y HERTEZ G.R. No. 188841, MARCH 6, 2013 J. DEL CASTILLO The prosecution needs to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the offense. The chain of custody of the seized items must be presented by the prosecution as unbroken starting from the time the items were confiscated and eventually marked until the time they are presented in court. It is the burden of the defense, meanwhile, to prove that the chain of custody was broken. FACTS: A search warrant was implemented at the residence of appellant Jaime Fernandez wherein police operatives found inside the house four transparent plastic sachets suspected to contain shabu, one tin can containing dried marijuana leaves, 49 pieces of rolled suspected dried marijuana leaves, one roll aluminum foil and cash money amounting to P3,840.00. After seizing these items, an inventory was conducted in the presence of the Barangay Chairman and a Barangay Kagawad; also, pictures of the seized items were taken by the police photographer while said items were being marked, afterwards, said items were brought to the police office. The seized items were later brought to the Camarines Sur Crime Laboratory wherein chemical examinations made on the specimens yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, respectively. On the basis thereof, Informations for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride and illegal possession of marijuana were filed against appellant and his son Erick Fernandez for violation of Section 8, of R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Both accused interposed denial and frame-up as their defenses. The RTC acquitted Erick Fernandez but found appellant guilty of the charges. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA affirmed appellant’s conviction by giving full faith and credit to the evidence of the prosecution over that of the defense. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was able to establish an unbroken chain of custody RULING: The RTC found the witnesses for the prosecution credible. There is no showing that the members of the search team were actuated by any ill motive or that they planted the seized items. The RTC gave full faith and credit to the prosecution witnesses’ version of the events that transpired at the time of the search. Moreover, the evidence of the prosecution sufficiently established that (1) by virtue of a lawful search, the authorities were able to seize from appellant’s house suspected shabu and marijuana, among others; and, (2) when these specimens were qualitatively examined, they yielded positive results for the said prohibited drugs.

With regard to the alleged inconsistent statements with respect to appellant’s exact location during the search and seizure, the number of rooms inside the house, and the place where the shabu and rolled marijuana leaves were found, suffice it to say that these matters are not vital and of such significance as compared to the circumstances and the very act of finding the dangerous drugs in the possession of the appellant which constitute the elements of the crime. The prosecution established the identity of the prohibited drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the offense. The totality of the prosecution’s evidence sufficiently proved the identity of the seized prohibited items despite the intervening changes in their custody and possession. The chain of custody of the seized items from the time they were confiscated and eventually marked until the time they were presented during the trial has likewise been established. The fact that the dangerous drugs presented in court were the same items recovered from appellant can be gleaned from the testimonies of police officers who narrated the incident from the time the dangerous drugs were recovered from appellant, to the time the same were inventoried in the presence of appellant and the witnesses, brought to the police station, and finally referred to the forensic chemist for qualitative examination. The integrity and identity of the confiscated items, particularly the dangerous drugs, were thus properly safeguarded. The chain of custody was clearly not broken. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with in which the burden of proof falls on the appellant. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE RAFAEL R. LAGOS, et al. G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013

C.J. Sereno A motion to file a demurrer was granted after the prosecution’s presentation of the testimonies of the apprehending officers because the prosecution failed to present the testimony of the confidential informant. It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court finds and so holds that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by prevailing jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: The Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (AIDSOTF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), with the help of a confidential informant, conducted a buy bust operation which led to the arrest of Castel Vinci Estacio. The buy-bust operation yielded 30 pink pills (ecstasy) and the recovery of the buy-bust money. During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the officers involved in the buy bust operation, PO2 Marlo V. Frando, PO2 Ruel P. Cubian, and PO3 Jose Rey Serrona and the forensic chemist, Police Senior Inspector Yelah C. Manaog. Estacio, et al. filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer and a motion for the resolution of the petition to bail. Judge Sagum denied the motions prompting Estacio to seek the inhibition

of Judge Sagum. The case was reraffled to respondent Judge Rafael Lagos, who issued an order granting the petition for bail and allowing them to file their demurrer on April 23, 2008. On June 24, 2008, Judge Lagos issued an order acquitting the accused. On July 24, 2008, Judge Lagos denied the petitioner’s, the People, motion for reconsideration and inhibition and allowed the accused to withdraw their cash bonds. The prosecution argued that Judge Lagos committed grave abuse of discretion when he granted the demurrer despite clear proof of the elements of illegal sale, the existence of the corpus delicti, and the arrest was in flagrante delicto. Estacio, et al. countered that the petition should be dismissed on the grounds that it would constitue double jeopardy and that it violates the hierarchy of the courts. ISSUE: Whether Judge Lagos committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence RULING: Petition granted. It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is endowed with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy. The trial court declared that the testimonies of PO2 Frando, PO2 Cubian, P S/Insp. Manaog, and AIDSOTF Chief Leonardo R. Suan were insufficient to prove the culmination of the illegal sale, or to show their personal knowledge of the offer to sell and the acceptance thereof. In granting the demurrer filed by the accused, Judge Lagos surmised that it was the CI who had initiated the negotiation of the sale and should have thus been presented at trial. In the present case, the fact of the illegal sale has already been established by testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team. Judge Lagos need not have characterized the Cl's testimony as indispensable to the prosecution's case. The Court finds and so holds that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by prevailing jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion. The prosecution's evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed against Estacio, et al., subject to the defenses they may present in the course of a full-blown trial.

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. TOMAS CUENCA, et al. G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013

J. Bersamin Cuenca, et al. filed a complaint for damages sustained by the wrongful issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the taking of the properties of Arc Cuisine, Inc. There is no dispute that the properties subject to the levy on attachment belonged to Arc Cuisine, Inc. alone, not to Cuenca, et al. in their own right. They were only stockholders of Arc Cuisine, Inc., which had a personality distinct and separate from that of any or all of them. The damages occasioned to the properties by the levy on attachment, wrongful or not, prejudiced Arc Cuisine, Inc., not them. As such, only Arc Cuisine, Inc. had the right under the substantive law to claim and recover such damages. This right could not also be asserted by Cuenca, et al. unless they did so in the name of the corporation itself. But that did not happen herein, because Arc Cuisine, Inc. was not even joined in the action either as an original party or as an intervenor. FACTS: Manuel D. Marañon, Jr. filed a collection suit against respondents Tomas Cuenca, Marcelina Cuenca, Milagros Cuenca, and Bramie Tayactac along with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The RTC granted the application after Marañon posted the required bond issued by petitioner Stronghold Insurance Company, Incorporated (SICI). The Sheriff levied upon the properties of Arc Cuisine, Inc. Cuenca, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss and Quash the Writ of Preliminary Attachment which was denied by the RTC but was granted by the CA on appeal. The case was remanded to the RTC to hear the case for damages that Cuenca, et al. sustained from the enforcement of the writ. The RTC ruled in favor of Cuenca, et al. and held Marañon and SICI directly and solidarily liable. The CA sustained the RTC. ISSUE: Whether Cuenca, et al. are the proper parties to recover damages from the wrongful attachment of the properties of Arc Cuisine, Inc. RULING: Petition denied. To ensure the observance of the mandate of the Constitution, Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under the same rule, a real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or one who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Accordingly, a person, to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, should appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced, that is, his interest must be a present substantial interest, not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. Where the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the ground for the motion to dismiss is lack of cause of action. The reason for this is that the courts ought not to pass upon questions not derived from any actual controversy. Truly, a person having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action. Nor does a court acquire jurisdiction over a case where the real party in interest is not present or impleaded.

There is no dispute that the properties subject to the levy on attachment belonged to Arc Cuisine, Inc. alone, not to the Cuencas and Tayactac in their own right. They were only stockholders of Arc Cuisine, Inc., which had a personality distinct and separate from that of any or all of them. The damages occasioned to the properties by the levy on attachment, wrongful or not, prejudiced Arc Cuisine, Inc., not them. As such, only Arc Cuisine, Inc. had the right under the substantive law to claim and recover such damages. This right could not also be asserted by the Cuencas and Tayactac unless they did so in the name of the corporation itself. But that did not happen herein, because Arc Cuisine, Inc. was not even joined in the action either as an original party or as an intervenor. RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013

Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al. filed a petition for certiorari when the CA extended the freeze order against their properties. Ligot, et al. should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order over their properties FACTS: The AMLC issued a Resolution directing the Executive Director of the AMLC Secretariat to file an application for a freeze order against the properties of petitioners, Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family with the CA. The Republic filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application with the appellate court for the issuance of a Freeze Order against the properties of the Ligots and Yambao. The CA granted the application in its July 5, 2005 resolution, and issued a freeze order against the Ligots’ and Yambao’s various bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days from the date of issuance. The Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of Freeze Order, arguing that if the bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles were not continuously frozen, they could be placed beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities and the government’s efforts to recover the proceeds of the Ligots’ unlawful activities would be frustrated. The CA granted the motion, extending the freeze order until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or investigations have been terminated. On November 15, 2005, the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases took effect. Under this rule, a freeze order could be extended for a maximum period of six months. Ligot argues that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended the freeze order even though no predicate crime had been duly proven or established to support the allegation of money laundering. He also maintains that the freeze order issued against them ceased to be effective in view of the 6-month extension limit of freeze orders provided under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases. The Republic claims that the CA’s resolution, granting the motion to extend the effectivity of the freeze order, had already become final and executory, and could no longer be challenged. The Republic notes that the Ligots erred when they filed what is effectively a second motion for reconsideration in response to the CA’s resolution, instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari via Rule 45 with this Court.

ISSUE: Whether petition for review on certiorari or a petition for certiorari should be filed to appeal the extension of the effectivity period of a freeze order under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases RULING: Petition denied. Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the remedy available in cases involving freeze orders issued by the CA: any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of the court may appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise. From this provision, it is apparent that Ligot, et al. should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order over their properties. Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to Ligot, et al, a review of their petition shows that the issues they raise (i.e., existence of probable cause to support the freeze order; the applicability of the 6-month limit to the extension of freeze orders embodied in the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture) pertain to errors of judgment allegedly committed by the CA, which fall outside the Court’s limited jurisdiction when resolving certiorari petitions. As held in People v. Court of Appeals: In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a petition for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. RAMONCITA O. SENADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 201620, March 6, 2013

J. Velasco, Jr. Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is not the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. In case of an error in the

designation of the offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information, not its dismissal. If the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial. FACTS: In an Information dated August 5, 2002, petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 in Dumaguete City with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is not the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. According to Senador, the private complainant in the Information went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial, the private complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia Jaime was never presented as witness. Hence, citing People v. Uba, et al. and United States v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog, Senador would insist on her acquittal on the postulate that her constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against her has been violated. The trial court found Senador guilty. The CA upheld the trial court. ISSUE: Whether an error in the designation in the Information of the offended party violates, the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal RULING: Petition denied. On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was charged with estafa, a crime against property that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper designation of the name of the offended party. Rather, what is absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act charged in the information. Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information, not its dismissal. Interpreting the previously discussed cases, the Court concludes that in offenses against property, if the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, such as the money unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, such as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO ADRID Y FLORES G.R. No. 201845, March 6, 2013

J. Velasco, Jr.

It is essential in the prosecution of drug cases that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. This means that on top of the elements of possession or illegal sale, the fact that the substance illegally sold or possessed is, in the first instance, the very substance adduced in court must likewise be established with the same exacting degree of certitude as that required sustaining a conviction. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed. FACTS: Two separate lnformations were filed charging Adrid with violation of RA No. 9165. The accused was apprehended during a buy-bust operation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD) Anti-Illegal Drugs Unit (DAID) based from information that one "Jon Jon" is pushing illegal drugs at Chesa, Tondo, Manila. The accused denied the allegation and averred that he was mauled and forced to admit something regarding the sale of drugs as well as an alibi that he was not the same "Jon Jon" stated in the information/tip given to the police. The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty in Crim. Case No. 06-247286 (sale of illegal drugs) but acquitted him in Crim. Case No. 06-247287 (illegal possession of drugs) for insufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. ISSUE: Whether the chain of custody was broken RULING: As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The Courts also certainly cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the possibility of substitution, alteration or contamination—whether intentional or unintentional—of narcotic substances at any of the links in the chain of custody thereof. That is why reasonable safeguards are provided for in our drugs laws to protect the identity and integrity of narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders. Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 materially requires the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs to, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The SC particularly notes that of the individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical possession of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from appellant, only SPO1 Marinda testified for the specific purpose of identifying the evidence. But his testimony failed to

sufficiently demonstrate an unbroken chain; he himself admits that he transferred the possession of the specimens to an investigator at the MPD DAID, SPO1 Pama, who never testified in court. The custodial link ended with SPO1 Marinda. When he testified that the specimens were submitted by SPO1 Pama for laboratory examination, he was veritably assuming the occurrence of an event; he was not testifying on the fact of submission out of his personal knowledge because he took no part in the transfer of the specimen from the police station to the laboratory. This testimony of SPO1 Marinda alone, while perhaps perceived by the courts below as straightforward and clear, is incomplete to satisfy the rule on chain of custody. SPO1 Pama’s testimony would have been the link to SPO1 Marinda’s testimony to that of PS/Insp. Mariano’s testimony as the forensic chemist who performed the laboratory examination. There is a considerable amount of time, from the time the seized items were handed over to SPO1 Pama up to the time it reached the laboratory for testing, in which the whereabouts of the illegal drugs were unaccounted for. This constitutes a clear but unexplained break in the chain of custody. Also, the prosecution’s admission that the "Forensic Chemical Officer has no personal knowledge as to where or from whom the specimen she examined originally came from” puts into serious question whether it was in fact the same SPO1 Pama who turned over the specimen for laboratory testing, or some other police officer or person took possession of the specimen before it was brought to the laboratory. Also, The prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending its presentation in court. This unexplained link also created doubt as to the integrity of the evidence. As for the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty relied upon by the courts a quo, the same cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to provide each and every link in the chain of custody. This runs contrary to the rule that the corpus delicti should be identified with unwavering exactitude. RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA (ILOILO), INC. v. GERRY CENTENO G.R. No. 200667, March 11, 2013

J. Perlas-Bernabe Gerry Centeno, Spouses Centeno’s son, bought the property from his parents and remained in possession. The Bank petitioned the RTC for the issuance of a writ of possession after title to the property was consolidated in its name. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function, unless it appears that the property is in possession of a third party claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor. FACTS:

Spouses Centeno defaulted on the loan, prompting petitioner, Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Bank) to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the said mortgage. Consequently, the subject lots were sold to the Bank being the highest bidder at the auction sale. It obtained a Certificate of Sale at Public Auction which was later registered with the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City. Sps. Centeno failed to redeem the subject lots within the one year redemption period. Respondent Gerry Centeno, son of Sps. Centeno, purchased the said lots from his parents. While Centeno was in possession of the subject lots, the Bank secured a Final Deed of Sale thereof and was able to obtain the corresponding tax declarations in its name. The Bank filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC, claiming entitlement to the said writ by virtue of the Final Deed of Sale covering the subject lots. Centeno opposed the petition claiming that he purchased the lot, forgery of the deed of sale, and prescription. The RTC ruled the Bank as the lawful owner of the subject lots whose rights became absolute due to Centeno’s failure to redeem the same. Consequently, it found the issuance of a writ of possession ministerial on its part. The CA reversed the RTC and ruled against the issuance of a writ of possession. It considered Centeno as a third party who is actually holding the property adverse to the judgment obligor and as such, has the right to ventilate his claims in a proper judicial proceeding i.e., an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action. ISSUE: Whether the Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara is entitled to a writ of possession over the subject lots RULING: Petition granted. It is well-established that after consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function, unless it appears that the property is in possession of a third party claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor. The foregoing rule is contained in Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In this case, Centeno acquired the subject lots from his parents, Sps. Centeno, on March 14, 1988 after they were purchased by petitioner and its Certificate of Sale at Public Auction was registered with the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City in 1971. It cannot therefore be disputed that Centeno is a mere successor-in-interest of Sps. Centeno. Consequently, he cannot be deemed as a "third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor" under legal contemplation. Hence, the RTC had the ministerial duty to issue – as it did issue – the said writ in the Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara’s favor. EFREN S. ALMUETE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 179611, March 12, 2013

J. Del Castillo The practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts for promulgation of the affirmance or modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction in criminal cases is

no longer allowed. Hence, the absence of the convicts on the day of promulgation of judgment did not affect its validity. The RTC did not err in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of its judgment. FACTS: Petitioner Efren D. Almuete, Johnny Ila and Joel Lloren were charged with violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended by E.O. No. 277. On the day of promulgation of judgment, Almuete’s counsel informed the trial court that Almuete and Lloren were ill while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation. The RTC, however, found their absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled, finding them guilty. Accordingly, the RTC cancelled the bail bonds of Almuete, Ila and Lloren and issued warrants of arrest against them. Almuete and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the validity of the promulgation, the factual and legal bases of their conviction, and the correctness of the penalty imposed which was denied by the RTC. Almuete and his co-accused filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA granted the petition and acquitted Almuete. The Supreme Court reversed Almuete’s acquittal and reinstated the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision and its October 12, 1998 Order. Almuete moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied. The Supreme Court issued an Entry of Judgment. Almuete filed a Motion for Clarification on whether he could still appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision. This Court noted without action his Motion for Clarification. Almuete filed with the RTC a Motion for Repromulgation of the September 8, 1998 Decision which the RTC denied. The RTC also denied Almuete’s motion for reconsideration. The CA dismissed Almuete’s Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit and denied his motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether the promulgation of the Decision of the RTC convicting Almuete was valid despite his absence and regardless of his intention to be present at the promulgation of the Decision RULING: Petition granted. The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for "promulgation" of the judgment of the appellate court should, therefore, be immediately discontinued. It is not only an unauthorized surplusage entailing unnecessary expense, but it could also create security problems where the convict was already under detention during the pendency of the appeal, and the place of confinement is at some distance from the station of the court. Upon receipt of the certified copy of the judgment of the appellate court if the convict is under detention, the trial court should issue forthwith the corresponding mittimus or commitment order so that the prisoner may be considered remitted or may be transferred to the corresponding prison facility for confinement and service of sentence. When the convict is out on bail, the trial court shall immediately order the bondsman to surrender the convict to it within ten (10) days from notice and thereafter issue the corresponding mittimus. In both cases, the trial court shall submit to this Court proof of the execution of judgment within fifteen (15) days from date of such execution. It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts for promulgation of the affirmance or modification by this Court or the CA of

judgments of conviction in criminal cases is no longer allowed. Hence, the Supreme Court finds no error on the part of the RTC in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision which was reinstated in People v. Court of Appeals. SPOUSES NERIO AND SOLEDAD PADOR AND REY PADOR v. BARANGAY CAPTAIN BERNABE ARCAYAN, et al. G.R. No. 183460, March 12, 2013

CJ. Sereno The writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property or commercial in nature. Hence, the writ of amparo filed by Spouses Nerio, et al. after Barangay officials raided their ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants cannot be issued. FACTS: Petitioners Spouses Nerio, Soledad Pador and Rey Pador alleged that respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid, Spouses Nerio et al. received invitation letters for a conference from respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan and sent a letter-reply for which Arcayan refused to sign a receipt. Spouses Nerio et al. concluded that based on the events that their right to life, liberty and security was gravely threatened and filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo. The RTC issued the Writ and directed Alivio, et al. to make a verified return. Alivio, et al. filed their Verified Return claiming that Nerio threatened to kill Revales after accusing him of uprooting the marijuana plants. They proceeded to patrol the area despite Nerio’s threats. Arcayan sent invitation letters in response to the threats and that he did not sign as he already received a copy of the letter-reply. After hearing the petition, the RTC denied the petition finding that the claims were based merely on hearsay, speculations, surmises and conjectures, and that Alivio, et al. had sufficiently explained the reason for the letters of invitation. ISSUE: Whether a writ of amparo will issue for the protection of property or commercial rights RULING: Petition denied. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, the Supreme Court ruled that the writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property or commercial in nature. In the same case, the Court held that the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. EBRENCIO F. INDOYON, JR., MUNICIPAL TREASURER, LINGIG,

SURIGAO DE SUR v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 193706, March 12, 2013

CJ. Sereno The CA dismissed Indoyon’s petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 for being non-compliant with the Rules of Court and various Supreme Court Circulars. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the CA’s judgment, final order or resolution is a petition for review on certiorari. The petition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, final order or resolution appealed from; or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. Under Supreme Court Circular 2-90, an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or to the CA by a wrong or an inappropriate mode merits outright dismissal. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. FACTS: Petitioner Ebrencio F. Indoyon, Jr., the municipal treasurer of the Municipality of Lingig, Surigao del Sur, incurred a cash shortage. The Regional Legal and Adjudication-Commission on Audit recommended to the Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) the filing of a criminal case for malversation and an administrative case for dishonesty and grave misconduct against Indoyon. The Ombudsman found Indoyon guilty of serious dishonesty and grave misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Indoyon filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the administrative Complaint filed before the Ombudsman had first been acquired by the BLGF-DOF and that the two administrative cases were one and the same because of their identity of issues, facts and parties. The Ombudsman, however, maintained that the two cases were not identical and denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Indoyon filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 43 with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the CA. The Petition was dismissed on the ground that it suffered not just one technical infirmity, but several technical infirmities that violated various circulars and issuances of this Court. Indoyon’s Motion for Reconsideration, was denied by the CA. The BLGF-DOF sent a letter to the ICORegional Director, BLGF-DOF, Caraga, directing the implementation of the Ombudsman’s Decision dismissing Indoyon from the service. ISSUE: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Indoyon’s Rule 43 Petition for Review on Certiorari on the ground of noncompliance with the Rules of Court and Supreme Court circulars RULING: Petition denied. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the CA’s judgment, final order or resolution, as in the present case, is a petition for review on certiorari. The petition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, final order or

resolution appealed from; or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. By filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, Indoyon therefore clearly availed himself of the wrong remedy. Under Supreme Court Circular 2-90, an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or to the CA by a wrong or an inappropriate mode merits outright dismissal. On this score alone, the instant Petition may be dismissed. As already discussed earlier, the proper remedy of Indoyon should have been to file a petition for review on certiorari. The Court cannot help but suspect that his failure to avail himself of that remedy within the reglementary period of 15 days was the reason he filed, instead, the present special civil action. A special civil action provides for a longer period of 60 days from notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution. The Court notes that the instant Petition was filed 35 days after that notice, by which time Indoyon had therefore lost his appeal under Rule 45. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court dismissed a Rule 65 Petition on the ground that the proper remedy for Indoyon should have been an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In that case, the Court stressed how it had time and again reminded members of the bench and the bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. MIKE ALVIN PIELAGO Y ROS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013

J. Reyes What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the Information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, which determines the crime being charged in the information. Hence, the fact that Pielago was charged with acts of lasciviousness did not preclude his conviction of rape by sexual assault. FACTS: Petitioner Mike Alvin Pielago y Ros was charged with acts of lasciviousness for kissing the vagina and inserting one of his fingers into the vagina of a 4 year old girl. The RTC found Pielago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault. The CA affirmed the RTC. ISSUE: Whether Pielago can be convicted of rape by sexual assault despite being charged in the Information with acts of lasciviousness RULING: Petition denied. It is well-settled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In this respect, the designation in the

Information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. In the instant case, the designation of the offense in the Information against Pielago was changed from the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 to the crime of rape by sexual assault penalized under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. It cannot be said, however, that his right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated. This Court is not unaware that the Information was worded, as follows: "commit an act of lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a minor being four (4) years old, by kissing the vagina and inserting one of his fingers to the vagina of AAA." And, as correctly explained by the CA, the factual allegations contained in the Information determine the crime charged against the accused and not the designation of the offense as given by the prosecutor which is merely an opinion not binding to the courts. As held in Malto v. People: what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, which determines the crime being charged in the information. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GERALD SORIANO ALIAS “PEDRO” G.R. No. 191271, March 13, 2013 CJ. Sereno Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when the concurrence of the following factors obtain: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as would prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances and facts must be absolutely incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis propounding the innocence of the accused. However, in the present case, the circumstances presented by the prosecution do not form a solid and cohesive narrative that proves with moral certainty its contention that Soriano perpetrated these heinous acts. To synthesize, the only circumstances cited to implicate him in the crime are the following: (a) he passed through the shortcut to Wao around 3:00 p.m. on 31 December 1998; (b) Vicky did not see anyone else use that road from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on that day; and (c) the soiled garments confiscated from him were identified to have been the same ones he was wearing then. FACTS: Petitioner Gerald Soriano was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of AAA an eight year old girl. According to the prosecution, Alice Hibaya saw Soriano leave Noel Quinatadacan’s house at approximately 3:00 P.M. Vicky Bearneza saw Soriano, in a yellow shirt and blue denim, walking drunkenly towards the shortcut to Wao and claimed that she did not see anyone else pass by until 5:00 P.M. when she left. BBB, AAA’s mother saw Soriano pass by their house towards the shortcut around 3:30 P.M. which was also the time that BBB expected AAA to be home. BBB asked for help looking for AAA at approximately 6:00 P.M. but was unsuccessful. Tomas Bearneza, Vicky’s husband, found AAA’s body in a canal the next day at 8:00 A.M. The trial court and the CA found him guilty. Soriano claims that the estimated time of death of AAA did not preclude the possibility that other culprits had perpetrated the crime; that the prosecution failed to establish that he had caused the bite marks found on AAA; that he had never been found to be in the company of the

victim; that it was not shown that he had gone to the place where her cadaver was found; that while he was seen going towards the direction of the crime scene, this fact does not conclusively prove that he had raped and killed the victim; and that his soiled clothes were not found at or near the area where the crime was committed, but were taken from his house without the benefit of a search warrant. ISSUE: Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict Gerald Soriano of rape with homicide RULING: Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when the concurrence of the following factors obtain: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as would prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances and facts must be absolutely incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis propounding the innocence of the accused. The foregoing findings unquestionably establish that AAA was raped and killed. However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution do not form a solid and cohesive narrative that proves with moral certainty its contention that Soriano perpetrated these heinous acts. To synthesize, the only circumstances cited to implicate him in the crime are the following: (a) he passed through the shortcut to Wao around 3:00 p.m. on 31 December 1998; (b) Vicky did not see anyone else use that road from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on that day; and (c) the soiled garments confiscated from him were identified to have been the same ones he was wearing then. BENEDICTO MARQUEZ Y RAYOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 197207, March 13, 2013 J. BRION For the successful prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. As regards the failure of the police to strictly comply with the provisions of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, it is settled that the failure to strictly follow the directives of this section is not fatal and will not necessarily render the items confiscated from an accused inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. FACTS: Petitioner Benedicto Marquez y Rayos Del Sol was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In September 2005, upon receipt of reports from some parents that an employee of the school had been selling drugs to the students, the guidance counselor showed pictures of janitors and other non-teaching personnel of the school. One student identified the petitioner as the person who had been selling drugs to the students. On the same

day, the counselor saw a group of students talking to the petitioner; upon trying to approach them, the students scampered away. The counselor noticed that the petitioner was holding a piece of paper and when she tried to get said piece of paper, it fell to the ground. The piece of paper contained two tea bag-like sachets containing dried leaves inside. They then went to the principal’s office and showed the sachets to the principal and to the school’s administrative officer. Afterwards, the school officials called the police. The police inspected the items seized from the petitioner and after further questioning, brought the petitioner and the seized marijuana to the police station. The plastic sachets confiscated from the petitioner were examined and found to contain a total of 1.49 grams of marijuana. The Regional Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of illegal possession of 1.49 grams of marijuana, penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. ISSUE: Whether the chain of custody provided for in R.A. No. 9165 has been broken RULING: The chain of custody over the confiscated marijuana was shown not to have been broken. To recall, when the counselor got hold of the piece of paper containing two sachets of marijuana, she immediately went to the principal’s office, and showed these sachets to the principal and to the school’s administrative officer. When the police arrived, she handed the seized sachets for inspection. Thereafter, the police officers brought the petitioner and the seized sachets to the station for investigation. When they arrived, the sachets were handed to the desk officer who in turn forwarded the two sachets to the investigator who marked the seized evidence. It was explained that the investigator is the officer "responsible to put the markings." On the same day, the District Station Commander prepared a request from laboratory examination and personally delivered this request together with the plastic sachets to the Crime Laboratory where they were received, examined and found positive for the presence of marijuana. This finding was noted by Police District Chief. From the sequence of events, the prosecution established the crucial links in the chain of custody of the seized items. As regards the failure of the police to strictly comply with the provisions of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, it is settled that the failure to strictly follow the directives of this section is not fatal and will not necessarily render the items confiscated from an accused inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the present case, the succession of events, established by evidence, shows that the items seized were the same items tested and subsequently identified and testified to in court. Thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the petitioner were duly proven not to have been compromised. Moreover, the police officers explained during trial the reason for their failure to strictly comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. ISABEL N. GUZMAN v. ANIANO N. GUZMAN AND PRIMITIVA G. MONTEALTO G.R. No. 172588, March 13, 2013 J. Brion

Isabel filed 3 motions for reconsideration which were denied by the RTC. The CA dismissed her petition on the ground that she lost her right to appeal when she filed a second motion for reconsideration. When the RTC issues its decision and orders, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the proper remedy therefrom is a Rule 42 petition for review. A second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court and the right to appeal is lost. The RTC ruled on the issue of Isabel’s transfer of rights even if it was not raised as an error. Under Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the RTC is mandated to decide the appeal based on the entire record of the MTC proceedings and such pleadings submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. Nonetheless, even without this provision, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, or is closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent. The RTC also denied the motions for reconsideration on the ground that a notice of hearing was not attached. A motion unaccompanied by a notice of hearing is considered a mere scrap of paper that does not toll the running of the period to appeal. The requirement of notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process that seeks to avoid "surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court." FACTS: Petitioner Isabel Guzman filed a complaint for ejectment against her children respondents, Aniano Guzman and Primitiva Montealto. The MTC ruled in favor of Isabel but the RTC reversed the MTC and ruled in favor of Aniano and Primitiva. On June 16, 2005, Isabel received a copy of the RTC decision. Isabel filed three (3) motions for reconsiderations, all of which were denied by the RTC. Isabel filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition noting that a Rule 42 petition for review, not a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, was the proper remedy to assail an RTC decision rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. It found that Isabel lost her chance to appeal when she filed a second motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. The CA denied her motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: 1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing Isabel Guzman’s petition for certiorari 2. Whether the RTC acted within its appellate jurisdiction 3. Whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly enforced the notice of hearing requirement RULING: Petition denied. 1. Isabel’s resort to a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to assail the RTC decision and orders is misplaced.

Isabel’s resort to a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to assail the RTC decision and orders is misplaced. When the RTC issued its decision and orders, it did so in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; the proper remedy therefrom is a Rule 42 petition for review. Instead, Isabel filed a second motion for reconsideration and thereby lost her right to appeal; a second motion for reconsideration being a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Isabel’s subsequent motions for reconsideration should be considered as mere scraps of paper, not having been filed at all, and unable to toll the reglementary period for an appeal. The RTC decision became final and executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration. It is elementary that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is "immutable and unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land." Thus, the RTC decision, even if allegedly erroneous, can no longer be modified. 2. The RTC acted within its jurisdiction in considering the matter of the Isabel’s transfer of rights, even if it had not been raised as an error. Besides, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction in considering the matter of the Isabel’s transfer of rights, even if it had not been raised as an error. Under Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the RTC is mandated to decide the appeal based on the entire record of the MTC proceedings and such pleadings submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. Nonetheless, even without this provision, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, or is closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent. The matter of the Isabel’s transfer of rights, which was in the records of the case, was the basis for the RTC’s decision. Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not involved, hence, it is a special civil action with a special procedure. The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases is the question of entitlement to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. Thus, any ruling on the question of ownership is only provisional, made solely for the purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. Accordingly, any ruling on the validity of Isabel’s transfer of rights is provisional and should be resolved in a proper proceeding. 3. The RTC did not also commit a grave abuse of discretion in strictly enforcing the requirement of notice of hearing. The RTC did not also commit a grave abuse of discretion in strictly enforcing the requirement of notice of hearing. The requirement of notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process that seeks to avoid "surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court." Given the purpose of the requirement, a motion unaccompanied by a notice of hearing is considered a mere scrap of paper that does not toll the running of the period to appeal. This requirement of notice of hearing equally applies to Isabel’s motion for

reconsideration. Isabel’s alleged absence of counsel is not a valid excuse or reason for noncompliance with the rules. ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK (FORMERLY ANCHOR FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION) v. HENRY H. FURIGAY, ET. AL. G.R. No. 191178, March 13, 2013 J. Mendoza Before an action can properly be commenced, all the essential elements of the cause of action must be in existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions precedent to the institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of the parties or implied by law must be performed or complied with before commencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse party has been such as to prevent or waive performance or excuse non-performance of the condition. Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint, such as the failure to allege exhaustion of all legal remedies in the complaint warrants dismissal. FACTS: Petitioner Anchor Savings Bank (ASB) filed a verified complaint for sum of money and damages with application for replevin against Ciudad Transport Services, Inc. (CTS), its president, respondent Henry H. Furigay, his wife, Gelinda C. Furigay; and a "John Doe." While the civil case was pending, Spouses Furigay donated their registered properties in Alaminos, Pangasinan, to their minor children, respondents Hegem G. Furigay and Herriette C. Furigay. Claiming that the donation of these properties was made in fraud of creditors, ASB filed a Complaint for Rescission of Deed of Donation, Title and Damages against Spouses Furigay and their children. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss filed by the Spouses Furigay but upon reconsideration, dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription and failure to pay docket fees. The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that ASB failed to allege in the complaint that it had resorted to all legal remedies to obtain satisfaction of its claim. ISSUE: Whether a complaint that fails to allege exhaustion of all legal remedies is dismissible RULING: Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action. Section 2 of the same rule defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In order that one may claim to have a cause of action, the following elements must concur: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. In other words, "a cause of action arises when that should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been done is done." In Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc., it was held that "before an action can properly be commenced, all the essential elements of the cause of action

must be in existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions precedent to the institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of the parties or implied by law must be performed or complied with before commencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse party has been such as to prevent or waive performance or excuse non-performance of the condition." The rules of procedure require that the complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. "The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of plaintiff." The focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint warrants its dismissal. In all, it is incorrect for ASB to argue that a complaint need not allege all the elements constituting its cause of action since it would simply adduce proof of the same during trial. "Nothing is more settled than the rule that in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the inquiry is "into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations." The inquiry is confined to the four comers of the complaint, and no other. Unfortunately for ASB, the Court finds the allegations of its complaint insufficient in establishing its cause of action and in apprising Spouses Furigay of the same so that they could defend themselves intelligently and effectively pursuant to their right to due process. NOVATEKNIK LAND CORPORATION v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA CITY G.R. No. 194104, March 13, 2013 J. Mendoza NLC filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA without filing a motion for reconsideration before the RTC. Before a petition for certiorari can prosper, the petitioner must be able to show, among others, that he does not have any other "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." This remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order. FACTS: Petitioner Novateknik Land Corporation (NLC), entered into a Credit Agreement with respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB). NLC failed to pay the loan despite repeated demands. PNB filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties covered by the real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage. The RTC of Manila issued the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale, announcing the sale of NLC properties. The properties were awarded to PNB, as the sole bidder, and the bid amount was applied in partial satisfaction of the outstanding obligation of the borrowers. The RTC granted NLC petition for a Temporary Restraining Order against PNB but later denied its petition for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. NLC filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA citing extreme urgency. The CA dismissed the petition for failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the RTC. ISSUE: Whether NLC was justified in elevating the case to the CA without filing the requisite motion for reconsideration before the RTC

RULING: Petition denied. Unmistakably, before a petition for certiorari can prosper, NLC must be able to show, among others, that he does not have any other "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." This remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order. Well established is the rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, subject to certain exceptions, to wit: a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. In the case at bench, the proper recourse of NLC was to have filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 22, 2010 Order of the RTC denying its application for injunctive relief. Only after the denial of such motion can it be deemed to have exhausted all available remedies and be justified in elevating the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. ROLANDO Z. TIGAZ v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 180681, March 18, 2013 CJ Sereno Tigaz filed three pleadings assailing the Ombudsman’s decision finding probable cause to indict him for violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. 3019 and the Sandiganbayan’s resolution denying his motion to quash the information and suspending him pendent lite. In the determination of probable cause, absolute certainty of evidence is not required, for opinion and reasonable belief are sufficient. Besides, any other defense contesting the finding of probable cause that is highly factual in nature must be threshed out in a full-blown trial, and not in a special civil action for certiorari before this Court. A Rule 65 petition is an inappropriate remedy to question the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to quash an information and, its imposition of suspension pendente lite. The remedy is not the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, but the continuance of the case in due course. FACTS:

Petitioner, Ronaldo Tigaz, a municipal mayor, filed the following: (1) a Petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order; (2) a Supplemental Petition; and (3) a Second Supplemental Petition. Filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, these pleadings assail the Ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding probable cause to indict Tigaz and his Sangguniang Bayan members for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 as well as the Resolutions of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, denying his plea to quash the criminal Information filed against him. Tigaz also questions the resolution of the Sandiganbayan granting the prosecution’s Motion to suspend him pendente lite. ISSUES: 1. 2.

Whether the Ombudsman acted with bias in prosecuting Tigaz Whether the Sandiganbayan erred when it refused to quash the information

RULING: Petition denied. 1. Since the imputation of bias to the Office of the Ombudsman is without support, this Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, fails. To impute bias – in no less than a special civil action for certiorari – Tigaz must show not only strong grounds stemming from extrajudicial sources, but also palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Firstly, the Court has squarely held in Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) that there is nothing inherently irregular or illegal in filing an indictment against the Ombudsman for an offense different from that charged in the initiatory complaint, if the indictment is warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation. Secondly, as regards the finding of probable cause, it appears extant that the exercise of the wide prerogative by the Office of the Ombudsman was not whimsical, capricious or arbitrary, given the supporting documentary evidence it had appreciated together with the NBI and the Sandiganbayan. In the determination of probable cause, absolute certainty of evidence is not required, for opinion and reasonable belief are sufficient. Besides, any other defense contesting the finding of probable cause that is highly factual in nature must be threshed out in a full-blown trial, and not in a special civil action for certiorari before this Court. Thirdly, Tigaz's election victory over the Ombudsman's brother does not clearly establish prejudice. In De la Cruz v. DECS, this Court has declared that kinship alone does not establish bias and partiality. There must be convincing proof to show bias, otherwise, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails. Since the imputation of bias to the Office of the Ombudsman is without support, this Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, fails.

2. In any event, the OSG correctly argues that a Rule 65 petition is an inappropriate remedy to question the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to quash an information and, its imposition of suspension pendente lite. And because the first petition holds no water, his Supplemental Petition and Second Supplemental Petition have no basis to rely upon. In any event, the OSG correctly argues that a Rule 65 petition is an inappropriate remedy to question the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to quash an information and, its imposition of suspension pendente lite. The remedy still available to Tigaz is not the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, but the continuance of the case in due course. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe Villareal was arrested by PO3 de Leon while holding a plastic sachet and because PO3 de Leon recognized him as someone he arrested for illegal possession before. A previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5. FACTS: PO3 Renato de Leon was riding his motorcycle when he saw respondent Nazareno Villareal holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet. PO3 de Leon approached Villareal and recognized him as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession. Despite Villareal’s attempt to escape, PO3 de Leon apprehended him with the help of a tricycle driver. Villareal was brought to the 9th Avenue Police Station and proceeded to the SAID-SOU office where the plastic sachet was marked with PO3 de Leon and Villareal’s initials and Villareal’s date of arrest. Villareal was turned over to the investigator and a letter request was prepared for the laboratory examination of the contents of the plastic sachet. The qualitative examination resulted in the finding that the contents were 0.03 gram of shabu. ISSUE: Whether Villareal’s arrest was a lawful warrantless arrest provided for under the Rules of Court RULING: Petition granted. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, which provided that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to

commit an offense; b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it. The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Villareal. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that Villareal had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case. However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5. In fine, Villareal’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. "Probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested, which clearly do not obtain in Villareal’s case. ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013 J. Brion Section 6, Rule 110 and Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. Hence, the fact that the Information did not state the precise date of the commission of the crime did not automatically render the charge against Engr. Zapanta for qualified theft invalid.

FACTS: An information was filed against petitioner, Engr. Anthony Zapanta with qualified theft committed sometime in October 2001. The RTC convicted him. The CA affirmed the RTC. On appeal to the Supreme Court by way of Rule 45, Engr. Zapanta submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed "sometime in the month of October, 2001," he was convicted for acts not covered by the information, i.e., November 2001, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. ISSUE: Whether an Information must state the precise date of the commission of the offense RULING: Conformably with Section 6, Rule 110 and Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. In this case, Engr. Zapanta had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the information stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words "sometime in the month of October, 2001." Engr. Zapanta could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the contents of the information, as well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to enable him to prepare his defense. The Court stresses that the information did not have to state the precise date when the offense was committed, as to be inclusive of the month of "November 2001" since the date was not a material element of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Clearly, the month of November is the month right after October. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHIL. RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 188956, March 20, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. The RTC dismissed the application for land registration of AFP-RSBS for failure to prosecute after it presented all its evidence and after it decided in its favor. An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. In other words, unless there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it is without prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice.

AFP-RSBS presented Ms. Alma Aban as its witness but her testimony was not considered because she did not present an authorization to testify from AFP-RSBS. There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. No law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such omission can be considered as a failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting such witness. All that the Rules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided therein. FACTS: Petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) filed an Application for Registration of Title over three parcels of land before the RTC of Pasig City, through its then Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Mr. Honorio S. Azcueta. There being no opposition despite due notice and publication, the trial court issued an order of general default against the whole world, and AFP-RSBS was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. AFP-RSBS then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P. Aban, Vice President and Head of its Asset Enhancement Office. AFP-SBS submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence, following which, the trial court granted the application. In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the AFP-RSBS failed to prove that it has personality to own property in its name and AFP-RSBS failed to show that the witness it presented was duly authorized to appear for and in its behalf. The trial court granted the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG on the ground that AFP-RSBS failed to prosecute its case. ISSUES: 1. Whether AFP-RSBS failed to prosecute 2. Whether a witness must present an authorization to testify from the party presenting her RULING: Petition granted. 1. That the RTC dismissed the application for land registration of AFP-RSBS for failure to prosecute after it presented all its evidence and after said court has rendered a decision in its favor, is highly irregular. Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides only three instances wherein the Court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute. Jurisprudence has elucidated on this matter in De Knecht v. CA: An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. In other words, unless there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it

is without prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice. Indeed, there was no basis for the court a quo’s ruling that AFP-RSBS failed to prosecute the subject case, because none of the grounds provided in the Rules for dismissing a case due to failure to prosecute is present. That the RTC dismissed the application for land registration of AFP-RSBS for failure to prosecute after it presented all its evidence and after said court has rendered a decision in its favor, is highly irregular. 2. There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. However, there is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. No law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such omission can be considered as a failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting such witness. All that the Rules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided therein. In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, it was held that Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualifications based on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other exceptions. (In Re Estate of Enriquez, 29 Phil. 167) As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. (Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition, Vol. 2A, p. 90) The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. A reading of the pertinent law and jurisprudence would show that Ms. Aban is qualified to testify as a witness for the petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being able to perceive and being able to make her perceptions known to others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the disqualifications described above. MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD v. PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN AND TEODORA ALYN ESTEBAN G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013 J. Bersamin Courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. The CA correctly ruled that no prima facie evidence existed that sufficiently indicated Philip and Teodora’s involvement in the commission of the crime. The circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase

was derived from the bare recollections of Ariane, and of Guray and Corpus. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed and that Philip and Teodora are probably guilty thereof. Out of the total of 16 statements/affidavits corresponding to the respective witnesses, only nine were sworn to before a competent officer. The lack of the requisite certifications from the affidavits of most of the other witnesses was in violation of Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The rule was designed to avoid self-serving and unreliable evidence from being considered for purposes of the preliminary investigation, the present rules for which do not require a confrontation between the parties and their witnesses; hence, the certifications were mandatory. FACTS: Petitioner Marie Callo-Claridad, mother of the deceased Cheasare Armani “Chase” Claridad filed a complaint against respondents, Philip Esteban and Teodora Esteban for the death of her son. The complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleged that Chase was in his home in Ferndale Homes, Quezon City when his sister Ariane, saw a white Honda Civic car parked outside their house and that she recognized the driver as Philip Esteban. The security guards of the subdivision logged in Philip’s arrival noting the presence of a male companion in the car. Marivic Rodriguez, a househelper of Shellane Yukoko, the resident of No. 9 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes, along with Jennylyn Buri and her ward, Joei Yukoko, heard cries for help but did not bother to check. The guards noted the arrival of Teodora. One of the security guards, Abelardo Sarmiento, Jr., while patrolling noticed that one of the three cars parked parallel to one another at the carpark of No. 10, Cedar Place bore red streaks. Upon a closer inspection, Sarmiento, Jr. found the lifeless body of Chase. SG Solis received a phone call from a Mr. Esteban Larry saying that a kid met an accident at Cedar Place and after a search around the area, there was no such incident. The OCP of Quezon City dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence, motive and circumstantial evidence to charge Philip with homicide or murder. The Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal. The CA denied Claridad’s petition for review. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3.

Whether the court can reverse the Secretary of Justice’s finding of probable cause Whether the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to constitute probable cause Whether unsworn affidavits may be considered during the preliminary investigation

RULING: Petition denied. 1. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly

those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against Philip and Teodora was committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe that Philip and Teodora were guilty thereof. On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. As the Court has postulated in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III: Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Under the circumstances presented, the Court concludes to be correct the CA’s determination that no prima facie evidence existed that sufficiently indicated Philip and Teodora’s involvement in the commission of the crime. It is clear that there was no eyewitness of the actual killing of Chase; or that there was no evidence showing how Chase had been killed, how many persons had killed him, and who had been the perpetrator or perpetrators of his killing. There was also nothing that directly incriminated the respondents in the commission of either homicide or murder. 2. But there was nothing else after that, because the circumstances revealed by the other witnesses could not even be regarded as circumstantial evidence against Philip. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed and that Philip and Teodora are probably guilty thereof. The pieces of evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the respondents were probably guilty of the crime and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase derived from the bare recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and Corpus (respectively, the househelp and nanny in the household of a resident of the subdivision) about

seeing Chase board the white Honda Civic at around 7:00 p.m. of February 27, 2007, and about Philip being the driver of the Honda Civic. But there was nothing else after that, because the circumstances revealed by the other witnesses could not even be regarded as circumstantial evidence against Philip. To be sure, some of the affidavits were unsworn. The statements subscribed and sworn to before the officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) having the authority to administer oaths upon matters connected with the performance of their official duties undeniably lacked the requisite certifications to the effect that such administering officers had personally examined the affiants, and that such administering officers were satisfied that the affiants had voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. 3. The lack of the requisite certifications from the affidavits of most of the other witnesses was in violation of Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The lack of the requisite certifications from the affidavits of most of the other witnesses was in violation of Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provided that the preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner: a) the complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. The CA explained that the requirement for the certifications under the aforecited rule was designed to avoid self-serving and unreliable evidence from being considered for purposes of the preliminary investigation, the present rules for which do not require a confrontation between the parties and their witnesses; hence, the certifications were mandatory. In the case at bar, a perusal of the statements/affidavits accompanying the complaint shows that out of the total of 16 statements/affidavits corresponding to the respective witnesses, only nine (9) thereof were sworn to before a competent officer. These were the affidavits of the following: (1) SG Sarmiento; (2) SG Solis; (3) SG Fabe; (4) SG Marivic Rodriguez; (5) Jennylyn Buri; (6) Richard Joshua Sulit; (7) Marites Navarro; (8) Pamela-Ann Que; and (9) Edbert Ylo, which were sworn to or subscribed before a competent officer. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ZENAIDA SORIANO AND MYRNA SAMONTE G.R. No. 189843, March 20, 2013 J. Perez The chain of custody provided for in Section 21(1), Art. II of R.A. 9165, to wit: (1) there must be a showing that a physical inventory was conducted in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official; and (2) there must be photograph(s) of the seized items taken in the presence of the above-enumerated representatives. It was ruled that omission(s) in strictly following the provision are not fatal to the prosecution’s case as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved and established with moral certainty. FACTS:

Zenaida Soriano and Myrna Samonte were charged for violation of Sections 5 (illegal sale) and 11 (illegal possession) of Article II of R.A. No. 9165. During the trial, the prosecution witness positively identified both accused as well as all the pieces of evidence presented by the State. The witness, however, admitted that there were no barangay officials present when they recovered the plastic sachets from the accused neither was there any formal report made to the barangay regarding the buy bust operation. The accused used denial and alibi for their defense. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. ISSUE: Whether there was a legitimate buy-bust operation with regard to the chain of custody not being followed when there were no Barangay Officials present during the operation RULING: That the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti because the arresting team failed to comply with Section 21(1), Art. II of R.A. 9165 is rejected by the Supreme Court. The SC has time and again ruled that such omissions are not fatal to the prosecution’s case as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved and established with moral certainty. Such omissions to wit: (1) there is no showing that a physical inventory was conducted in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official; and (2) no photograph of the seized items was taken in the presence of the above-enumerated representatives. The prosecution has accounted for the chain of custody of the subject substances. Absent a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof of tampering with the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence had been preserved lies. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ, ET. AL. G.R. No. 181458, March 20, 2013 CJ. Sereno The Republic has been actively involved in the trial for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth for two decades but was absent for one hearing. Due to this single absence, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case. Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that the court may dismiss a complaint in case there are no justifiable reasons that explain the plaintiff's absence during the presentation of the evidence in chief. The word "may" in Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, operates to confer on the court the discretion to decide between the dismissal of the case on technicality vis-à-vis the progressive prosecution. The Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it failed to observe the three day notice requirement. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, does not require that the court receive the notice three days prior to the hearing date. Rule 13, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, states that the date of the mailing of motions through registered mail shall be considered the date of their filing in court, it follows that the Republic

filed the motion to the court 10 days in advance of the hearing date. In so doing, it observed the 10-day requirement under Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the time and date of the hearing must not be later than ten days after the filing of the motion. FACTS: On 23 July 1987, petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint against respondents, Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez, et al. for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth from respondents for the benefit of the Republic. Allegedly, these properties were illegally obtained during the reign of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and were the subject of sequestration orders. The Sandiganbayan resolved the case in favor of DiazEnriquez, et al. and lifted the sequestration orders. The Republic filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court. The counsels for the Republic, Special PCGG Counsel Maria Flora A. Falcon attended to the civil case, while OSG Senior State Solicitor Derek R. Puertollano handled the case before the Supreme Court. Pending the pre-trial of the case, Atty. Falcon’s contract with the PCGG ended. She informed Atty. Puertollano that she was no longer connected with the PCGG and turned over to him the records of the civil case. However, Atty. Puertollano was appearing in the case before the Supreme Court and belatedly received the letter regarding Atty. Falcon. No representative appeared on behalf of the Republic. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case without prejudice. Atty. Mary Charlene Hernandez took over the case from PCGG's previous special counsel and only after a while did she learn of the trial dates. She also knew nothing about the dismissal of the case and filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement of the hearing. The OSG came to know of the dismissal of the civil case only when it received the Order on 15 November 2007. It filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a notice for hearing on 7 December 2007. This motion was served on the Sandiganbayan and Enriquez-Diaz, et al. on 29 November 2007 via registered mail. Unfortunately, the court received the motion only on 10 December 2007. The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground of failure to observe the three-day notice requirement. With this instant dismissal, the Sandiganbayan no longer considered the reasons adduced by the Republic to explain the latter's absence in court. The Republic argued that Falcon had diligently attended to the civil action. But since she was no longer connected to the PCGG, and given that the OSG only learned of this circumstance seven days after the hearing, counsels for the Republic failed to appear during the hearing. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Republic failed to prosecute the case warranting the dismissal of the case 2. Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the motion for reconsideration on the ground of lack of notice RULING: Petition granted. 1. These circumstances should have easily persuaded the Sandiganbayan that the Republic intended to advance the ill-gotten wealth case.

As worded, Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that the court may dismiss a complaint in case there are no justifiable reasons that explain the plaintiff's absence during the presentation of the evidence in chief. Generally speaking, the use of "may" denotes its directory nature, especially if used in remedial statutes that are known to be construed liberally. Thus, the word "may" in Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, operates to confer on the court the discretion to decide between the dismissal of the case on technicality vis-à-vis the progressive prosecution thereof. Firstly, based on the records, the Republic's counsels have actively participated in the case for two decades. The Sandiganbayan has not made any remark regarding the attendance of the Republic, save for this single instance. Secondly, after the latter received the assailed Order, it duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration. These circumstances should have easily persuaded the Sandiganbayan that the Republic intended to advance the ill-gotten wealth case. 2. Plainly, the rule does not require that the court receive the notice three days prior to the hearing date. The Sandiganbayan is incorrect. By the very words of Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, the moving party is required to serve motions in such a manner as to ensure the receipt thereof by the other party at least three days before the date of hearing. The purpose of the rule is to prevent a surprise and to afford the adverse party a chance to be heard before the motion is resolved by the trial court. Plainly, the rule does not require that the court receive the notice three days prior to the hearing date. Likewise, the Republic mailed the motion to the Sandiganbayan on 29 November 2007. Since Rule 13, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, states that the date of the mailing of motions through registered mail shall be considered the date of their filing in court, it follows that the Republic filed the motion to the court 10 days in advance of the hearing date. In so doing, it observed the 10-day requirement under Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the time and date of the hearing must not be later than ten days after the filing of the motion. Considering that the Motion for Reconsideration containing a timely notice of hearing was duly served in compliance with Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court, the fact that the Sandiganbayan received the notice on 10 December 2007 becomes trivial. The court cannot also blame the Republic for this belated receipt of the registered mail since it followed the rules. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT PENILLA Y FRANCIA G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013 J. Perez In rape cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to her attacker because of fear. Physical resistance is not an essential element of rape. Also, delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant. Neither does an inconclusive medical report negate the finding of rape. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a

prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime and the medical certificate will then be rendered as merely corroborative. FACTS: Gilbert Penilla was charged with the crime of rape and with the use of deadly weapon against the complainant AAA against her will and consent. At the time of the incident, AAA was renting a room at a boarding house owned by Penilla’s grandmother. Around midnight, she was sleeping alone in her room and was suddenly awakened by Penilla’s angry voice berating her for the loud volume of her television which was disturbing his sleep and rest in the adjacent room. AAA rose and was surprised to see Penilla by her bedside, naked and holding a kitchen knife of about eight (8) inches long. Penilla then pushed her towards the bed, knelt on top of her and poked the knife at the right side of her body. Paralyzed with fear and physically overpowered by Penilla, AAA remained silent and did not shout for help while Penilla forced himself on AAA. After four days, AAA filed a complaint for rape against Penilla before the Barangay. Penilla denied having raped AAA and instead, claimed that the act was consensual. After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Penilla of rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s finding of guilt. ISSUE: Whether the crime of rape has actually occurred RULING: Rape case principles have not changed: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the complainant's credibility becomes the single most important issue. In rape cases, the accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's testimony because of the fact that, usually, only the participants can directly testify as to its occurrence. Since normally only two persons are privy to the commission of rape, the evaluation of the evidence thereof ultimately revolves around the credibility of the complaining witness. The dictum in rape cases is that the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Rape may be committed not only against single women and children but also against those who are married, middle-aged, separated, or pregnant. Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to her attacker because of fear. Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission to the perpetrator’s lust. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman

involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused; it is not an essential element of rape. Rape victims react differently. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant the burden of proving resistance. On the matter of evaluating the credibility of witnesses, it depends largely on the assessment of the trial court. When it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. Thus, appellate courts rely heavily on the weight given by the trial court on the credibility of a witness as it had a first-hand opportunity to hear and see the witness testify. Also, delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant. Neither does an inconclusive medical report negate the finding of rape. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. In fact, a doctor’s certificate is merely corroborative in character and not an indispensable requirement in proving the commission of rape. SPOUSES LEHNER AND LUDY MARTIRES v. MENELIA CHUA G.R. No. 174240, March 20, 2013 J. Peralta Spouses Martires filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration and reckoned the 15 day period for filing an appeal with the Supreme Court from the date the CA denied the Second Motion for Reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for review on certiorari under the said Rule "shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment." Relative thereto, Section 2, Rule 52 of the same Rules provides that "no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Since a second motion for reconsideration is not allowed, then unavoidably, its filing does not toll the running of the period to file an appeal by certiorari. The validity of the contents and the regularity of the notarization of the Deed of Transfer were challenged. A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument. When there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence. While indeed a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The validity of the contents and execution of the subject Deed of Transfer were challenged in the proceedings where its prima facie validity was subsequently overthrown by the questionable circumstances attendant in its supposed execution. FACTS:

Respondent Menelia Chua entered into a loan agreement with petitioner Spouses Lehner and Ludy Martires secured by a real estate mortgage over 24 memorial lots at Holy Cross Memorial Park. Chua filed a complaint for the annulment of the mortgage against Spouses Martires on the ground that the interest rates imposed are unjust and exorbitant. She amended her complaint after finding out that the lots were transferred in the name of Spouses Martires through a forged Deed of Transfer and Affidavit of Warranty which was not opposed by Spouses Martires. The trial court ruled in favor of Spouses Martires. At first the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court but later modified its decision finding that the Deed of Transfer and the Affidavit of Warranty are void ab initio upon Chua’s motion for reconsideration. The CA denied the two motions for reconsideration filed by Spouses Martires. ISSUES: 1. 2.

Whether the petition was properly filed within the 15-day period Whether a defectively notarized document will enjoy the presumption of regularity

RULING: Petition denied. 1. For this reason, Spouses Martires' failure to file this petition within the 15-day period rendered the assailed Amended CA Decision and Resolutions final and executory, thus, depriving this Court of jurisdiction to entertain an appeal therefrom. At the outset, the instant petition should be denied for being filed out of time. Spouses Martires admit in the instant petition that: (1) on July 18, 2006, they received a copy of the July 5, 2006 Resolution of the CA which denied their Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Amended Decision; (2) on July 26, 2006, they filed a Motion to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration attaching thereto the said Second Motion for Reconsideration; (3) on September 5, 2006, they received a copy of the August 28, 2006 Resolution of the CA which denied their Motion to Admit as well as their Second Motion for Reconsideration; and (4) they filed the instant petition on October 20, 2006. Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for review on certiorari under the said Rule "shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment." Relative thereto, Section 2, Rule 52 of the same Rules provides that "no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Based on the abovementioned dates, the start of the 15-day period for the filing of this petition should have been reckoned from July 18, 2006, the time of petitioners' receipt of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration, and not on September 5, 2006, the date when they received the CA Resolution denying their Second Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, Spouses Martires should have filed the instant petition not later than August 2, 2006. It is wrong for Spouses Martires to reckon the 15-day period for the filing of the instant petition from the date when they received the copy of the CA Resolution denying their Second Motion for Reconsideration. Since a second motion for reconsideration is not allowed, then unavoidably, its filing did not toll the running of the period to file an appeal by certiorari. Spouses Martires made a critical mistake in waiting for the CA to resolve their second motion for reconsideration before pursuing an appeal.

2. In the present case, the presumption cannot be made to apply, because aside from the regularity of its notarization, the validity of the contents and execution of the subject Deed of Transfer was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was subsequently overthrown by the questionable circumstances attendant in its supposed execution. Anent the first assigned error, Spouses Martires are correct in pointing out that notarized documents carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity. However, the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence. In the present case, the CA has clearly pointed out the dubious circumstances and irregularities attendant in the alleged notarization of the subject Deed of Transfer, to wit: (1) the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City which supposedly attested that a copy of the subject Deed of Transfer is on file with the said court, was contradicted by the Certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the Notarial Section of the same office as well as by the testimony of the court employee who prepared the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court, to the effect that the subject Deed of Transfer cannot, in fact, be found in their files; (2) respondent's categorical denial that she executed the subject Deed of Transfer; and (3) the subject document did not state the date of execution and lacks the marital consent of respondent's husband. While indeed a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In the present case, the presumption cannot be made to apply, because aside from the regularity of its notarization, the validity of the contents and execution of the subject Deed of Transfer was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was subsequently overthrown by the questionable circumstances attendant in its supposed execution. These circumstances include: (1) the alleged agreement between the parties that the ownership of the subject property be simply assigned to Spouses Martires instead of foreclosure of the contract of mortgage which was earlier entered into by them; (2) the Deed of Transfer was executed by reason of the loan extended by Spouses Martires to Chua, the amount of the latter's outstanding obligation being the same as the amount of the consideration for the assignment of ownership over the subject property; (3) the inadequacy of the consideration; and (4) the claim of respondent that she had no intention of transferring ownership of the subject property to Spouses Martires. EDITHA PADLAN v. ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELISIMO DINGLASAN G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013 J. Peralta Spouses Dinglasan filed an action for cancellation of title involving real property valued at Php. 4,000.00 with the RTC. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to

real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by Spouses Dinglasan for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void. FACTS: Petitioner Editha Padlan purchased a parcel of land registered under the names of petitioner Spouses Elenita and Felisimo Dinglasan. However, the deed of sale was falsified through the forged signatures of Spouses Dinglasan by Maura Passion, who caused the sale. Padlan transferred the title to the property under her name. Spouses Dinglasan demanded that Padlan surrender the lots causing Spouses Dinglasan to file a case before the RTC of Bataan for the cancellation of title. The RTC found that Padlan was a buyer in good faith and dismissed the complaint. The CA ruled in favor of Spouses Dinglasan. Padlan filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the complaint lacks merit as the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and over her person. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the subject property RULING: Petition denied. However, in order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings, respondents’ counsel informed the court that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the next hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessor’s Office. However, they did not present such copy.

To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by Spouses Dinglasan for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void. APRIL 2013 SIXTO N. CHU v. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION G.R. No. 184333, April 1, 2013

J. Peralta It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons. It was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of Chu was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that Chu would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service. Facts: Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation filed a complaint against petitioner Sixto Chu for a sum of money, replevin and damages due to the non-payment of the purchase price of a Hitachi Excavator. The RTC issued a writ of replevin against Chu’s heavy equipment. Sherriff Doroteo P. Cortes failed to serve the summons personally upon Chu and resorted to substituted service by having the summons received by the security guard Rolando Bonayon. The RTC ruled in favor of Mach Asia. Chu filed an appeal with the CA arguing that the substituted service of summons was invalid and that the declaration of default, in proceeding with the trial of the case, and rendering an unfavorable judgment against him were erroneous. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC arguing that due process was duly served with the substituted service and that the process server’s inadvertence or neglect should not unduly prejudice Mach Asia’s right to speedy justice. Issue: Whether a substituted service of summons upon a security guard is valid Ruling: Petition denied. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons

cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to. It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons. Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective. Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of Chu was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that Chu would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service. Hence, if Chu had actually received the summons through his security guard, the requirement of due process would have nevertheless been complied with. Based on the presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns, the security guard would not have allowed the sheriff to take possession of the equipments without the prior permission of Chu; otherwise he would be accountable to Chu for the said units. Chu, for his part, would not have given his permission without being informed of the fact of the summons and the writ of replevin issued by the lower court, which permission includes the authority to receive the summons and the writ of replevin. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. ARLIC ALMOJUELA G.R. No. 194368, April 2, 2013

J. Brion It is necessary for the petitioning government agency or its authorized representatives to certify against forum shopping, because they, and not the OSG, are in the best position to know if another case is pending before another court. If the OSG is compelled by circumstances to verify and certify the pleading in behalf of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to inform the courts of its reasons for doing so, beyond simply citing cases where the Court allowed the OSG to sign the certification. Facts: Ding Cang Hui a.k.a. Tony Lao / Tony Ling, a Chinese inmate charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was discovered to have escaped from his cell at the Makati City Jail. SJO2 Arlic Almojuela was among the officers of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) – National Capital Region Office (NCRO) who were on third shift custodial duty when Lao escaped. A BJMP Investigation Report conducted on the incident concluded that SJO2 Almojuela and the rest of the jail officers on third shift custodial duty all colluded to facilitate Lao’s getaway. Based on the report’s recommendation, the Intelligence and Investigation Division of the BJMP filed an administrative complaint against the abovementioned

BJMP/NCRO members and CESO IV Director Arturo Walit, the BJMP hearing officer, found them liable. The CA denied SJO2 Almojuela’s petition but upon a motion for reconsideration lowered the penalty imposed. SJO2 Almojuela argues that the certificate of non-forum shopping, instead of having been signed by the CSC, was signed by the assistant solicitor general, in violation of the rule on certification against forum shopping; that the CSC is not the proper party to appeal the CA’s decision because it must maintain its impartiality as a judge and disciplining authority in controversies involving public officers; and that, he had been deprived of due process during the BJMP investigation, as he was not given the opportunity to submit his evidence and to present his witnesses while the prosecution was allowed to adduce its evidence under a trial-type arrangement. Issues: 1. Whether the CSC’s petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed for failure to comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; 2. Whether the CSC’s petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed as the CSC is not the proper party to appeal the CA’s amended decision; 3. Whether SJO2 Almojuela had been deprived of due process when he was not allowed to present his evidence and witnesses during the BJMP investigation Ruling: Petition partially granted. 1.

The CSC’s petition failed to comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

The rule is different when the OSG acts as a government agency’s counsel of record. It is necessary for the petitioning government agency or its authorized representatives to certify against forum shopping, because they, and not the OSG, are in the best position to know if another case is pending before another court. The reason for this requirement was succinctly explained in Hon. Constantino-David et. al. v. Pangandaman-Gania: The fact that the OSG under the 1987 Administrative Code is the only lawyer for a government agency wanting to file a petition or complaint does not automatically vest the OSG with the authority to execute in its name the certificate of non-forum shopping for a client office. In some instances, these government agencies have legal departments which inadvertently take legal matters requiring court representation into their own hands without the OSG’s intervention. Consequently, the OSG would have no personal knowledge of the history of a particular case so as to adequately execute the certificate of non-forum shopping; and even if the OSG does have the relevant information, the courts on the other hand would have no way of ascertaining the accuracy of the OSG’s assertion without precise references in the record of the case. Thus, unless equitable circumstances which are manifest from the record of a case prevail, it becomes necessary for the concerned government agency or its authorized representatives to certify for non-forum shopping if only to be sure that no other similar case or incident is pending before any other court. To be sure, there may be situations when the OSG would have difficulty in securing the signatures of government officials for the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. But these situations cannot serve as excuse for the OSG to wantonly undertake by itself the

verification and certification of non-forum shopping. If the OSG is compelled by circumstances to verify and certify the pleading in behalf of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to inform the courts of its reasons for doing so, beyond simply citing cases where the Court allowed the OSG to sign the certification. In Hon. Constantino-David et. al. v. PangandamanGania, the Court dealt with this situation and enumerated the following requirements before the OSG can undertake a non-forum shopping certifications as counsel of record for a client agency: (a) allege under oath the circumstances that make signatures of the concerned officials impossible to obtain within the period for filing the initiatory pleading; (b) append to the petition or complaint such authentic document to prove that the partypetitioner or complainant authorized the filing of the petition or complaint and understood and adopted the allegations set forth therein, and an affirmation that no action or claim involving the same issues has been filed or commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency; and, (c) undertake to inform the court promptly and reasonably of any change in the stance of the client agency 2.

The CSC is the proper party to raise an appeal against the CA’s amended petition

More than ten years have passed since the Court first recognized in CSC v. Dacoycoy the CSC’s standing to appeal the CA’s decisions reversing or modifying its resolutions seriously prejudicial to the civil service system. Since then, the ruling in Dacoycoy has been subjected to clarifications and qualifications, but the doctrine has remained the same: the CSC has standing as a real party in interest and can appeal the CA’s decisions modifying or reversing the CSC’s rulings, when the CA action would have an adverse impact on the integrity of the civil service. As the government’s central personnel agency, the CSC is tasked to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; it has a stake in ensuring that the proper disciplinary action is imposed on an erring public employee, and this stake would be adversely affected by a ruling absolving or lightening the CSC-imposed penalty. Further, a decision that declares a public employee not guilty of the charge against him would have no other appellant than the CSC. To be sure, it would not be appealed by the public employee who has been absolved of the charge against him; neither would the complainant appeal the decision, as he acted merely as a witness for the government. The Court thus finds no reason to disturb the settled Dacoycoy doctrine. 3.

SJO2 Almojuela was afforded due process in the BJMP investigations

In SJO2 Almojuela’s case, he was informed of the charges against him, and was given the opportunity to refute them in the counter-affidavit and motion for reconsideration he filed before the BJMP hearing officer, in the appeal and motion for reconsideration he filed before the CSC, in his petition for review on certiorari, in his memorandum on appeal, and, finally, in the motion for reconsideration he filed before the CA. These circumstances sufficiently convince the Court that SJO2 Almojuela had been given ample opportunity to present his side, and whatever defects might have intervened during the BJMP investigation have been cured by his subsequent filing of pleadings before the CSC, the CA, and before this Court. DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN, JR. v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al. G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013

J. Bersamin A petition for mandamus was filed to compel the Secretary of Justice to charge Dalandag for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to include a person in the information, but may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion. Facts: Following the Maguindanao Massacre, the Department of Justice constituted a Special Panel of Prosecutors that charged 196 individuals in a joint resolution. The Panel partly relied on the twin affidavits of Kenny Dalandag. Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ and was listed as one of the prosecution’s witnesses in the pre-trial order. Petitioner Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice, Secretary Leila de Lima requesting that Dalandag be included in the information as he already confessed his participation. Secretary De Lima denied the request. Ampatuan, Jr. filed a petition for mandamus to compel Secretary De Lima to charge Dalandag with the RTC of Manila. The RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus. Issue: Whether the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ Ruling: Petition denied. A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. The discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist. While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court, such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily, but with due regard to the proper administration of justice. Anent the requisite that there must be an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is obvious – the public prosecutor should know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of the several accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case, as well as the availability or

non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the ‘most guilty’ one, and the like On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information. The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. As such, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of Ampatuan, Jr., but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that the Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as Ampatuan Jr.'s recourse. FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. G.R. No. 197937, April 3, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. Under the established jurisprudence on litis pendentia, the following considerations predominate in the ascending order of importance in determining which action should prevail: (1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties. There can be no doubt Civil Case No. CEB-35529 is the appropriate vehicle to determine the rights of FDCP and SM Prime.

Facts: Cebu City passed a local tax ordinance mandating that amusement tax shall be paid to the Office of the City Treasurer. Petitioner Film Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP) is empowered by R.A. 9167 to receive proceeds of the amusement tax collected by the local government. FDCP, through the OSG, sent respondent SM Prime Holdings a demand letter for the payment of amusement tax rewards of films shown at SM Cinemas from September 11, 2003 to November 4, 2008. The City of Cebu filed a petition for declaratory relief with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and sought to declare R.A. 9167 as unconstitutional before the RTC of Cebu (CEB-35529) and a TRO was issued against FDCP. FDCP filed a collection suit against SM Prime before the RTC of Pasig City (Civil Case 72238). SM Prime filed a motion for intervention with the RTC of Cebu which the trial court granted. The RTC of Pasig City granted SM Prime’s motion to dismiss ruling that the proper vehicle for litigating the collection suit is before the RTC of Cebu and that all the elements of litis pendentia are present. Issues: 1. 2.

Whether the case filed in Cebu City and in Pasig City constitute litis pendentia Whether the action filed in Pasig City should prevail

Ruling: Petition granted. 1. There could be no doubt that a judgment in either case would constitute res judicata to the other. Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. The determination of whether there is an identity of causes of action for purposes of litis pendentia is inextricably linked with that of res judicata, each constituting an element of the other. In either case, both relate to the sound practice of including, in a single litigation, the disposition of all issues relating to a cause of action that is before a court. The interpleader action of SM Prime, anchored on its defense of prior payment, would be considered by the Cebu City RTC in its final determination of the parties’ rights and interests as it resolves the legal questions. The Pasig City RTC is likewise confronted with the legal and constitutional issues in the collection suit, alongside with SM Prime’s defense of prior payment. It is evident that FDCP’s claim against the SM Prime hinges on the correct interpretation of the conflicting provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 and R.A. No. 9167. There could be no doubt that a judgment in either case would constitute res judicata to the other. Sound practice thus dictates that the common factual and legal issues be resolved in a single proceeding. 2. In this case, all things considered, there can be no doubt Civil Case No. CEB35529 is the appropriate vehicle to determine the rights of FDCP and SM Prime.

Under the established jurisprudence on litis pendentia, the following considerations predominate in the ascending order of importance in determining which action should prevail: (1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties. Moreover, considering the predicament of respondent, the Court also finds relevant the criterion of the consideration of the interest of justice it enunciated in Roa v. Magsaysay. In applying this standard, what was asked was which court would be "in a better position to serve the interests of justice," taking into account (a) the nature of the controversy, (b) the comparative accessibility of the court to the parties and (c) other similar factors. In this case, all things considered, there can be no doubt Civil Case No. CEB-35529 is the appropriate vehicle to determine the rights of FDCP and SM Prime. In that declaratory relief case instituted by the City of Cebu, to which SM Prime had been remitting the subject amusement taxes being claimed by FDCP in Civil Case No. 72238, the issue of validity or constitutionality of Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. No. 9167 was directly pleaded and argued between FDCP and the City of Cebu, with subsequent inclusion of SM Prime as intervenor. Moreover, the presence of City of Cebu as party plaintiff would afford proper relief to SM Prime in the event the Cebu City RTC renders judgment sustaining the validity of the said provisions. SM Prime had vigorously asserted in both courts that it had remitted the amusement taxes in good faith to the City of Cebu which had threatened sanctions for non-compliance with City Tax Ordinance No. LXIX, and that it should not be made to pay once again the same taxes to FDCP. As equally dire consequences for non-compliance with the demand for payment having been made by FDCP, such defense of good faith is best ventilated in Civil Case No. CEB-35529 where the City of Cebu is a party. SEGUNDINA A. GALVEZ v. SPS. HONORIO C. MONTAÑO AND SUSANA P. MONTAÑO, et al. G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013 J. Bersamin The mere failure to attach copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition for review is not necessarily fatal as to warrant the outright denial of due course when the clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the RTC, and other attachments of the petition sufficiently substantiate the allegations. Facts: Respondents Spouses Honorio and Susana Montaño purchased a parcel of property from Philippine National Bank following an extrajudicial foreclosure. Segundina Galvez, one of the original owners, refused to vacate the land claiming that it was sold without by her husband, Eustacio Galvez without her consent. Spouses Montaño filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with the MTC of Batbangon, Leyte. The MTC ruled in favor of Spouses Montaño. The RTC affirmed the MTC’s decision. On appeal, the CA dismissed Galvez’s petition on the ground that no copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations thereof were attached as annexes in violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also denied her motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether failure to attach the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition merits its dismissal Ruling: Petition granted. The foregoing rulings show that the mere failure to attach copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition for review is not necessarily fatal as to warrant the outright denial of due course when the clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the RTC, and other attachments of the petition sufficiently substantiate the allegations. For the guidance of the CA, therefore, the Court has laid down three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching the pleadings and portions of the records to the petition in Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora, which involved the dismissal of a petition for certiorari assailing an unfavorable decision in a labor dispute for failing to attach copies of all pleadings (like the complaint, answer, position paper) and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations in the petition, to wit: First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition. Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached. Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits. The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under Rule 42, reflect that the significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached documents is whether the accompanying documents support the allegations of the petition. SOLID BUILDERS, INC. AND MEDINAJ FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION G.R. No. 179665, April 3, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.

Facts: China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI). To secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land in the Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon City and New Cubao Central in Cainta, Rizal. SBI and MFII filed a Complaint "To Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order" in the RTC of Pasig City claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings. The trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction and denied CBC’s motion for reconsideration and a motion to dissolve injunction. The CA reversed the RTC and dissolved the injunctive writ. Issue: Whether a writ of preliminary injunction will issue against the foreclosure of mortgaged property Ruling: Petition denied. A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. In this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury. As no clear right that warrants the extraordinary protection of an injunctive writ has been shown by SBI and MFII to exist in their favor, the first requirement for the grant of a preliminary injunction has not been satisfied. In the absence of any requisite, and where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ of injunction must be struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it granted the petition for certiorari of CBC and ordered the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. In the first place, any injury that SBI and MFII may suffer in case of foreclosure of the mortgaged properties will be purely monetary and compensable by an appropriate judgment in a proper case against CBC. Moreover, where there is a valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, it cannot be correctly claimed that the irreparable damage sought to be prevented by the application for preliminary injunction is the loss of the mortgaged properties to auction sale. The alleged entitlement of SBI and MFII to the "protection of their properties put up as collateral for the loans" they procured from CBC is not the kind of irreparable injury contemplated by law. Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtormortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WELVIN DIU y KOTSESA, et al. G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013

J. Leonardo-De Castro It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Facts: Respondents Welvin Diu and Dennis Dayaon were charged with robbery with homicide for taking the bag of Perlie Salvador and stabbing Nely Salvador. Perlie, the surviving victim, was presented as one of the prosecution’s witnesses and positively identified the Diu as the one who attacked her and Dayaon as the one who stabbed her sister, Nely. The RTC found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision. Issues: 1. appeal

Whether Diu and Dayaon can question the legality of their warrantless arrests on

Ruling: Petition denied. Lastly, nothing on record shows that Diu and Dayaon questioned the legality of their arrests prior to entering their pleas of "not guilty" during their arraignment. Hence, applicable herein is the following pronouncements of the Court in Rebellion v. People: Petitioner’s claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit. We note that nowhere in the records did we find any objection interposed by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. In this case, petitioner was duly arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. Indeed, in the more recent case of People v. Trestiza, the Court pronounced that "the fatal flaw of an invalid warrantless arrest becomes moot in view of a credible eyewitness account." NEMESIO FIRAZA, SR., v. SPS. CLAUDIO AND EUFRECENA UGAY G.R. No. 165838, April 3, 2013 J. Reyes

Spouses Ugay filed an action for quieting of title while Firaza, Jr. filed a counterclaim. Such counterclaim is a permissible direct attack to the validity of the adverse party’s torrens title. As such counterclaim, it involves a cause of action separate from that alleged in the complaint; it has for its purpose the vindication of a right in as much as the complaint similarly seeks the redress of one. Facts: Spouses Claudio and Eufrecena Ugay filed a complaint for Quieting of Title alleging that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land. The complaint prayed for the annulment of the tax declaration issued in the name of petitioner Nemesio Firaza, Sr. on the ground that it creates a cloud upon Spouses Ugay’s title. Firaza, Sr. set up the affirmative defense that Spouses Ugay obtained their title through fraud and misrepresentation and on the basis of the said affirmative defense, Firaza also filed a counterclaim praying for the nullification of the title to the parcel of land and reconveyance to him of the ownership of the subject lot. The RTC denied Firaza’s affirmative defense on the ground that the same can be better ventilated along with the allegations of the complaint and answer in a full-blown trial. While on direct examination, Firaza, Sr.’s counsel questioned Land Management Officer, a hostile witness for Spouses Ugay, on the circumstances attending the issuance of Free Patent Application. Counsel for Spouses Ugay objected to the questioning on the ground that the same constitutes a collateral attack to the respondents’ land title. Firaza, Sr. argued that the questions are necessary for him to establish his defenses of fraud and misrepresentation and to substantiate his counterclaim for reconveyance. The RTC required the parties to file, as they did so file, their respective position papers on whether Firaza Sr.’s counterclaim constitutes a direct or a collateral attack to the validity of Spouses Ugay’s title. The RTC disallowed any issue pertaining to Firaza Sr.’s counterclaim as it was deemed to be a direct attack on the validity of Spouses Ugay’s title. The RTC denied his motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision and denied his motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether Nemesio Firaza Sr.’s counterclaim constitutes a collateral attack of the Spouses Ugay’s land title and thus bars the former from introducing evidence thereon in the latter’s civil action for quieting of title Ruling: Petition granted. Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree proscribes a collateral attack to a certificate of title and allows only a direct attack In Arangote v. Maglunob, the Court, after distinguishing between direct and collateral attack, classified a counterclaim under former, viz: The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an

incident thereof. Such action to attack a certificate of title may be an original action or a counterclaim, in which a certificate of title is assailed as void. In the recent case of Sampaco v. Lantud, the Court applied the foregoing distinction and held that a counterclaim, specifically one for annulment of title and reconveyance based on fraud, is a direct attack on the Torrens title upon which the complaint for quieting of title is premised. Earlier in, Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA, the Court ruled similarly and explained thus: Nor is there any obstacle to the determination of the validity of TCT No. 10101. It is true that the indefeasibility of torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. In the instant case, the original complaint is for recovery of possession filed by petitioner against private respondent, not an original action filed by the latter to question the validity of TCT No. 10101 on which petitioner bases its right. To rule on the issue of validity in a case for recovery of possession is tantamount to a collateral attack. However, it should not be overlooked that private respondent filed a counterclaim against petitioner, claiming ownership over the land and seeking damages. Hence, we could rule on the question of the validity of TCT No. 10101 for the counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the same. From the foregoing, it is immediately apparent that the courts a quo erred in their conclusions. The CA erroneously classified the herein counterclaim as a collateral attack. On the other hand, the RTC correctly adjudged the same as a direct attack to the Spouses Ugay’s land title but mistakenly declared it as a prohibited action. As clearly pronounced in the above-cited jurisprudence, Firaza Sr.’s counterclaim is a permissible direct attack to the validity of Spouses Ugay’s torrens title. As such counterclaim, it involves a cause of action separate from that alleged in the complaint; it has for its purpose the vindication of a right in as much as the complaint similarly seeks the redress of one. As the plaintiff in his own counterclaim, Firaza Sr. is equally entitled to the opportunity granted the plaintiff in the original complaint, to establish his cause of action and to prove the right he asserts. SPS. WELTCHIE RAYMUNDO AND EMILY RAYMUNDO v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES., substituted by ASSET ASIA PACIFIC (SPV-AMC) 2, INC. G.R. No. 195317, April 3, 2013 J. Reyes A case which has been suspended for 8 years due to LBP’s opposition to the admission of an amended and supplemental complaint may be continued. It is incumbent that trial should continue to settle the issues between the parties once and for all. Court litigation which is primarily a search for truth must proceed; and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. Facts: Petitioner Spouses Weltchie and Emily Raymundo filed a complaint for annulment of loan documents against respondent Land Bank of the Philippines. During the pre-trial stage, Spouses Raymundo manifested that they were exploring the possibility of settling the case and that they will file their manifestation for the withdrawal or continuation of the proceedings within 30 days. Spouses Weltchie filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended and Supplemental Complaint and Admission of the Same which was denied by the RTC on the ground that it was

intended to delay the proceedings. The RTC denied their motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the RTC. LBP prayed that it be substituted by Philippine Distressed Asset Asia Pacific (PDAS2) in the case as it sold and conveyed its interest in the case to the PDAS2. The substitution was granted by the Supreme Court. PDAS2 manifested the removal of its opposition to the admission of the amended and supplemental complaint as it has caused suspension of the proceedings for more than 8 years. Spouses Raymundo joined PDAS2 in its withdrawal and prayed that its amended and supplemental complaint be granted. Issue: Whether the proceedings may continue despite its suspension for 8 years Ruling: Petition granted. The Court also notes PDAS2’s withdrawal of its opposition to the admission of the Spouses Raymundo amended and supplemental complaint, just so the proceedings before the RTC which have been suspended for more than eight years may continue. As the records show, the case below is still at its pre-trial stage. Indeed, the inordinate delay is no longer justified by Spouses Raymundo’s persistence to have their amended complaint admitted. It is incumbent that trial should continue to settle the issues between the parties once and for all. Court litigation which is primarily a search for truth must proceed; and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. Concomitantly, neither the parties nor their lawyers should be allowed to dictate the pace by which a case proceeds. The Judge shall see to it that the proceedings are expedited by all means available to him, including the issuance of orders to force the parties to go to trial if a settlement could not be reached within a reasonable time. With the mutual agreement of the parties to allow the admission of the amended complaint, the Court finds no bar for the proceedings in the R TC to continue. FRANKLIN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013 J. Brion In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In instances where a complaint against a Punong Barangay is filed with the Ombudsman first, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over the complaint to the exclusion of the Sandiganbayan, which exercises concurrent jurisdiction. Facts: Petitioner Franklin Alejandro, the Punong Barangay of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, interfered with the PNP-CIDG’s anti-water pilferage operation when he ordered the confiscated containers of his son’s car wash business to be unloaded. Respondent Office of the

Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, after conducting its initial investigation, filed with the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman an administrative complaint against Alejandro for his blatant refusal to recognize a joint legitimate police activity, and for his unwarranted intervention. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found Alejandro guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service. Alejandro filed a motion for reconsideration which the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied. Alejandro appealed to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which the CA dismissed for premature filing. The CA ruled that Alejandro failed to exhaust proper administrative remedies because he did not appeal the Deputy Ombudsman’s decision to the Ombudsman. The CA denied Alejandro’s motion for reconsideration. Alejandro argues that filing a motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman can be considered as exhaustion of administrative remedies and that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction as an elective local official can only be removed from office by order of a court as stated in the Local Government Code of 1991. The OSG contends that Alejandro failed to exhaust administrative remedies as he did not appeal the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman to the Ombudsman and that the Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials. Issues: 1. Whether the principle of exhaustion of remedies requires for reconsideration from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman to the Office of the Ombudsman for the purpose of a Rule 43 Review 2. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over elective officials Ruling: Petition granted. 1. No further need exists to exhaust administrative remedies from the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman because he was acting in behalf of the Ombudsman. Administrative Order No. 07 did not provide for another appeal from the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman to the Ombudsman. It simply requires that a motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari may be filed in all other cases where the penalty imposed is not one involving public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary. This post-judgment remedy is merely an opportunity for the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, or the Office of the Ombudsman, to correct itself in certain cases. To the Court’s mind, Alejandro has fully exhausted all administrative remedies when he filed his motion for reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman. There is no further need to review the case at the administrative level since the Deputy Ombudsman has already acted on the case and he was acting for and in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman. 2. The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies. The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.

Consequently, as the Court held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies. In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, Alejandro is a Barangay Chairman, occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14. Under RA 7160, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official. Since the complaint against Alejandro was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the Sangguniang Bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent. MARCELINO AND VITALIANA DALANGIN v. CLEMENTE PEREZ, et al. G.R. No. 178758, April 3, 2013 J. Del Castillo Under the 1964 Rules of Court, notice of the execution sale to the judgment obligor was not required, or was merely optional; publication and posting sufficed. It was only in 1987 that the Court, via Circular No. 8 amending Rule 39, Section 18 of the Rules of Court, required that written notice be given to the judgment debtor. Facts: Respondent Spouses Clemente and Cecilia Gonzales Perez filed a complaint against petitioner Spouses Marcelino and Vitaliana Dalangin for recovery of a sum of money after they failed to pay for the purchase of a parcel of land. The trial court ruled in favor of Spouses Perez and the decision became final as no appeal was taken. A writ of execution was issued. The Provincial Sheriff of Batangas then levied upon and sold Spouses Dalangin’s properties at auction. The execution sale was conducted on March 15, 1972 and a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of Spouses Perez covering several properties. For failure to redeem, the sheriff executed a Final Deed of Conveyance over said properties, and a Writ of Possession was issued by the trial court. The Writ of Possession was received by Emmanuel Dalangin, Spouses Dalangin’s son and Spouses Perez possessed the riceland and one-half of a 5 ha. property. Twelve years after the issuance of the Writ of Possession, Spouses Dalaingin filed a case for annulment of the sheriff’s sale arguing that the sheriff’s sale, Certificate of Sale and the Final Deed of Conveyance be nullified and voided for lack of publication and notice of the sheriff’s sale, and for inadequacy of the purchase price of the subject properties. The trial court upheld the validity of the sheriff’s sale, issued an amended decision partially dismissing the complaint with respect to two properties and ordering the issuance of tax declarations in the names of Spouses Dalangin. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition. Spouses Dalangin contend that under Rule 39, Section 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a written notice of sale on execution should have been given to them. They insist that the lack of notice of the sheriff’s sale renders the same of no effect. Spouses Perez claim that under the 1964 Rules then applicable to the sheriff’s sale which was held on March 15, 1972, particularly Rule 39, Section 18, notice to the judgment obligor was not required.

Issues: 1. 2.

Whether the 1997 Rules of Court are applicable Whether the presumption of regularity of the execution sale applies

Ruling: Petition denied. 1. The applicable rule at the time of the execution sale on March 15, 1972 is Rule 39, Section 18 of the 1964 Rules of Court. This rule does not require personal written notice to the judgment debtor. At the time of the execution sale on March 15, 1972, the applicable rule is Rule 39, Section 18 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Rule 39, Section 18 of the 1964 Rules of Court does not require written notice to the judgment obligor. Spouses Perez are thus correct in their argument that at the time of the execution sale on March 15, 1972, personal notice to the Spouses Dalangin was not required under Rule 39, Section 18 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Indeed, notice to the judgment obligor under the 1964 Rules of Court was not required, or was merely optional; publication and posting sufficed. It was only in 1987 that the Court required that written notice of the execution sale be given to the judgment debtor, via Circular No. 8 amending Rule 39, Section 18 of the Rules of Court on notice of sale of property on execution. Thus, the alleged failure on the part of the respondents to furnish petitioners with a written notice of the execution sale did not nullify the execution sale because it was not then a requirement for its validity. 2. The presumption of regularity of the execution sale and the sheriff’s performance of his official functions prevail in the absence of evidence to the contrary and in light of the self- serving allegations and bare denials of petitioners to the effect that they were not served with notice of the sheriff’s sale. There was substantial compliance with Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: the documents in support thereof, i.e., the Certificate of Posting issued by Sheriff Legaspi and the Affidavit of Publication executed by the publisher of The Times Newsweekly, appear to be in order. In this case, the purpose of giving notice through posting and publication under Section 15(c) of the same rule—to let the public know of the sale to the end that the best price or a better bid may be made possible to minimize prejudice to the judgment debtor—was realized. Applying Reyes to this case, the Court affirms the view that petitioners may no longer question the conduct of the execution proceedings below. As correctly held by the CA, the presumption of regularity of the execution sale and the sheriff’s performance of his official functions prevail in the absence of evidence to the contrary and in light of the self-serving allegations and bare denials of petitioners to the effect that they were not served with notice of the sheriff’s sale, and given that the entire record covering the sale could no longer be located. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GERRY OCTAVIO y FLORENDO and REYNALDO CARIÑO y MARTI G.R. No. 199219, April 3, 2013 J. Velasco, Jr.

Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. Facts: Respondent Gerry Octavio was charged with violation of Secs. 5 and 11 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 while respondent Reynaldo Cariño was charged with violation of Sec. 11 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Octavio and Cariño were apprehended in a buy-bust operation conducted by the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. Octavio and Cariño and the confiscated items were brought to the SAID-SOTF office for further investigation and later to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug test and examination, respectively. The RTC convicted Octavio and Cariño which was affirmed by the RTC. Octavio and Cariño, on appeal, argued that no photograph was taken of the items seized from them. Further, Barangay Captain Del Prado, an elected public official, was not present during the alleged buy-bust operation. He was only asked to sign the inventory of the seized items shortly after his arrival at the scene of the buy-bust operation. Thus, he has no personal knowledge as to whether the drugs allegedly seized from them were indeed recovered from them. The CA affirmed the RTC. Issue: Whether the issue on the break of chain of evidence raised on appeal for the first time may be taken into consideration by the CA Ruling: Petition denied. Barangay Captain Del Prado, not only positively identified both Octavio and Cariño but also identified the items contained in the inventory receipt. Such testimony clearly established compliance with the requirement of Section 21 with regard to the presence and participation of the elected public official. Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to take a photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused by the arresting officers; turned-over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected. Finally, the Court notes and agrees with the observation of the CA that the issue regarding the break in the chain of custody of evidence was raised belatedly and only for the first time on

appeal. In People v. Mateo, this Court brushed aside the accused's belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person was inadmissible because the arresting officers failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because accused did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. SPS. MONTANO T. TOLOSA AND MERLINDA TOLOSA v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK G.R. No. 183058, April 3, 2013 J. Perez The purchaser remains entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice, of course, to the eventual outcome of the pending annulment case. Otherwise stated, the issuance of the writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the RTC until the issues raised in the annulment case are, once and for all, decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. Facts: Petitioners Spouses Montano and Merlinda Tolosa entered into a credit agreement with respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) secured by real estate mortgages over four properties in Aklan. When Spouses Tolosa failed to pay, UCPB filed a petition for extrajudicial sale with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex- Officio Sheriff of Kalibo. After due notice and publication, the mortgaged properties were sold at a public auction to UCPB, being the highest bidder. UCPB registered the Certificate of Sale with the Register of Deeds and when Spouses Tolosa failed to redeem the properties within one year, it consolidated its ownership over the properties. UCPB filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in the cadastral case before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. Spouses Tolosa filed their opposition to the petition by pointing out a pending civil case for the nullity of the foreclosure sale and issuance of the certificate of sale. The RTC held the petition for a writ of possession in abeyance on the ground that its issuance might unduly prejudice the rights of Spouses Tolosa. The CA reversed the RTC and granted the writ of possession as its issuance was ministerial in nature and was not subject to the discretion of the RTC. Issue: Whether a pending case for nullity of promissory notes, foreclosure sale and the issuance of a certificate sale may suspend the issuance of a writ of possession after the expiration of the one year redemption period Ruling: Petition denied. The rule is likewise settled that the proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex-parte and summary in nature. As one brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest, it is a judicial proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. The issuance of the writ of possession is, in turn, a ministerial function in the exercise of which trial courts are not granted any discretion. Since the judge to whom the application for writ of

possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure, it has been ruled that the ministerial duty of the trial court does not become discretionary upon the filing of a complaint questioning the mortgage. Corollarily, any question regarding the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale and the resulting cancellation of the writ may, likewise, be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135. Gauged from the foregoing principles, the Court finds that the CA committed no reversible error in ordering the issuance of the writ of possession sought by UCPB. The record shows that UCPB caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the subject realties as a consequence of the Spouses Tolosa’s default on their mortgage obligation. As the highest bidder at the 4 January 2000 foreclosure sale, UCPB consolidated its ownership on 22 January 2001 or upon failure of the Spouses Tolosa to exercise their right of redemption within the oneyear period therefor prescribed. Subsequent to the issuance of the certificates of title and tax declarations over the same properties in its name, UCPB complied with the requirements under Act 3135 by filing its ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC on 2 September 2004. Since UCPB had already become the absolute and registered owner of said properties, the CA correctly ruled that it was the ministerial duty of the RTC to issue the writ of possession in favor of the former. Given the ministerial nature of the RTC’s duty to issue the writ of possession after the purchaser has consolidated its ownership, it has been ruled, moreover, that any question regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as justification for opposing the issuance of the writ. More to the point, a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure does not stay the issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless of the pendency of such suit, the purchaser remains entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice, of course, to the eventual outcome of the pending annulment case. Otherwise stated, the issuance of the writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the RTC until the issues raised in the annulment case are, once and for all, decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. To be sure, the foregoing rule admits of a few jurisprudential exceptions. In Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the judgment debtor filed a separate action to invalidate the auction sale of properties approximately worth P500,000.00 for the unusually low price of P57,396.85. Citing equitable considerations, this Court upheld the deferment of the issuance of the writ of possession sought by the judgment creditor on the ground that the validity of the auction sale is an issue that requires pre-emptive resolution to avoid injustice. In the case of Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, on the other hand, the Court ruled that the duty ceases to be ministerial where the property mortgaged had been, in the meantime, sold to third parties who had assumed the mortgagor’s indebtedness and took possession of the property. In Sulit v. Court of Appeals, the mortgagee’s failure to deliver the surplus from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale equivalent to at least 40% of the mortgage debt was likewise found sufficient justification for the non-issuance of the writ of possession sought. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDMUNDO VITERO G.R. No. 175327, April 3, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro The testimony of a rape victim must be given weight and credence. When the issue focuses on the credibility of the witnesses or the lack of it, the assessment of the trial court is controlling because of its unique opportunity to observe the witness and the latter’s demeanor,

conduct, and attitude especially during the cross-examination unless cogent reasons dictate otherwise. Facts: AAA was raped 6 times by her father, respondent Edmundo Vitero in her grandparents’ house at night when her siblings were asleep. Vitero was charged with qualified rape. The RTC convicted Vitero of qualified rape which was affirmed by the CA with modifications to the penalty imposed. Issue: Whether AAA’s testimony should be given weight and credence. Ruling: Petition denied. As to the third element of the crime, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that it was duly proven as well, giving weight and credence to AAA’s testimony. AAA was able to describe in detail how Vitero mounted her, undressed her, and successfully penetrated her against her will, one night in April 1998. The RTC described AAA’s testimony to be "frank, probable, logical and conclusive," while the Court of Appeals declared it to be "forthright and credible" and "impressively clear, definite, and convincing." Relevant herein is the Court’s pronouncements in People v. Manjares that: In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions for rape. When the issue focuses on the credibility of the witnesses or the lack of it, the assessment of the trial court is controlling because of its unique opportunity to observe the witness and the latter’s demeanor, conduct, and attitude especially during the cross-examination unless cogent reasons dictate otherwise. Moreover, it is an established rule that findings of fact of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted which would otherwise materially affect the disposition of the case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO GONZALES y SANTOS aka TAKYO G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013 J. Bersamin

The indeterminateness of the identities of the individuals who could have handled the sachet of shabu after PO1 Dimla’s marking broke the chain of custody, and tainted the integrity of the shabu ultimately presented as evidence to the trial court. Facts: Acting on a tip by an informant, a buy bust operation was planned. PO1 Eduardo Dimla acted as the poseur-buyer and marked the buy bust money, two Php. 100.00 bills with his initials “ED”. PO1 Dimla, along with the rest of the team, proceeded to respondent Alberto Gonzales’ house. Gonzales handed PO1 Dimla a small plastic sheet containing a white substance and PO1 Dimla gave Gonzales the marked money. PO1 Dimla gave the signal and Gonzales was arrested. PO1 Dimla marked the sachet with his initials, “ED”. The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office certified that the contents was 0.194 gram of shabu. With only PO1 Dimla as the sole prosecution witness, the RTC convicted Gonzales which the CA affirmed. Issue: Whether the sachet was properly marked according to the rules on the chain of custody Ruling: Petition granted. Given the high concern for the due recording of the authorized movements and custody of the seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment, the presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of and recovered during the illegal sale is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Without such dangerous drugs being presented as evidence, the State does not establish the corpus delicti, which, literally translated from Latin, refers to the body of the crime, or the actual commission by someone of the particular offense charged. The first stage in the chain of custody is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of the dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value. Although PO1 Dimla, the State’s lone witness, testified that he had marked the sachet of shabu with his own initials of "ED" following Gonzales’ arrest, he did not explain, either in his court testimony or in the joint affidavit of arrest, whether his marking had been done in the presence of Gonzales, or done immediately upon the arrest of Gonzales. Nor did he show by testimony or otherwise who had taken custody of the sachet of shabu after he had done his marking, and who had subsequently brought the sachet of shabu to the police station, and, still later on, to the laboratory. Given the possibility of just anyone bringing any quantity of shabu to the laboratory for examination, there is now no assurance that the quantity presented here as evidence was

the same article that had been the subject of the sale by Gonzales. The indeterminateness of the identities of the individuals who could have handled the sachet of shabu after PO1 Dimla’s marking broke the chain of custody, and tainted the integrity of the shabu ultimately presented as evidence to the trial court. The Court hardly needs to reiterate that the chain of custody, which Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, supra, explicitly describes as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction," demands such record of movements and custody of seized items to include the identities and signatures of the persons who held temporary custody of the seized item, the dates and times when such transfers of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. By way of exception, Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR both state that the non-compliance with the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs provided there were justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and provided that the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was preserved. But the noncompliance with the procedures, to be excusable, must have to be justified by the State’s agents themselves. Considering that PO1 Dimla tendered no justification in court for the noncompliance with the procedures, the exception did not apply herein. The absolution of Gonzales should then follow, for the Court cannot deny that the observance of the chain of custody as defined by the law was the only assurance to him that his incrimination for the very serious crime had been legitimate and insulated from either invention or malice. In this connection, the Court states that the unexplained non-compliance with the procedures for preserving the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs has frequently caused the Court to absolve those found guilty by the lower courts HEIRS OF FAUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN MESINA v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN YRAY, et al. G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013 J. Velasco, Jr. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Facts: During their lifetime, Spouses Mesina bought two parcels of land on installment basis from Spouses Fian. When Spouses Fian died, their heirs, respondents, claimed ownership and possession of the land and refused to receive payments claiming that there was no sale. Petitioners, the Heirs of Mesina filed an action for quieting of title and damages before the RTC impleading the Heirs of Mesina as Heirs of Domingo, Sr. represented by Theresa Fian Yray as defendants. Yray moved for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to implead all the heirs of Spouses Fian and that Heirs of Fian is not a juridical person with a separate personality. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that all the heirs of Spouses Fian are indispensable parties and should have been impleaded in the complaint and that the complaint was improperly verified, as found by the RTC.

Issues: 1. Whether the non-joinder of indispensable party constitutes a failure to state a cause of action 2. Whether a verification that omits the phrase “or based on authentic records” is defective Ruling: Petition granted. 1. As such, this is properly a non-joinder of indispensable party, the indispensable parties who were not included in the complaint being the other heirs of Fian, and not a failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Non-joinder means the "failure to bring a person who is a necessary party or in this case an indispensable party into a lawsuit." An indispensable party, on the other hand, is a party-ininterest without whom no final determination can be had of the action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant. As such, this is properly a non-joinder of indispensable party, the indispensable parties who were not included in the complaint being the other heirs of Fian, and not a failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Having settled that, the Court’s pronouncement in Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v. Tinghil is instructive as regards the proper course of action on the part of the courts in cases of nonjoinder of indispensable parties, viz: The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is improper. What the trial court should have done is to direct Norman Mesina to implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a reasonable time from notice with a warning that his failure to do so shall mean dismissal of the complaint. 2. That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase "or based on authentic records" does not make the verification defective. That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase "or based on authentic records" does not make the verification defective. Notably, the provision used the disjunctive word "or." The word "or" is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. As such, "personal knowledge" and "authentic records" need not concur in a verification as they are to be taken separately. Also, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal requirement, not jurisdictional. It is mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged

are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. Thus, when circumstances so warrant, as in the case at hand, "the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served." JOSEFINA F. INGLES, et al. v. HON. ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, etc., et al./JOSEFINA F. INGLES, et al. v. HON. ARSENIO J. MAGPALE, etc., et al./JOSEFINA F. INGLES, et al. v. CHARLES J. ESTEBAN G.R. No. 141809/G.R. No. 147186/G.R. No. 173641, April 8, 2013 J. Perez An order for extrajudicial foreclosure given by an executive judge in the exercise of her administrative function is not a civil action of the Regional Trial Courts that may be the proper subject of an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession cannot be consolidated with an action for annulment of mortgage where title to the property has already been consolidated in favor of the mortgagor following the expiration of the one year redemption period except when title has not yet consolidated in favor of the mortgagor and this presumed right of ownership is contested and made the basis of another action, in which case, the actions must be consolidated. It suffices, according to Altres v. Empleo, that the verification and certification was signed by at least one of Ingles, et al.who was competent to do so. The certiorari petition was verified by Josefina and Hector F. Ingles—both of whom the Court finds competent to attest to the truth of the allegations of their petition, considering that they are unquestionably principal parties-in-interest to their certiorari petition. Facts: G.R. No. 141809 Respondent Charles Esteban filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property of petitioner Josefina Ingles and the Heirs of Jose Ingles before the RTC of Quezon City with respondent Executive Judge Estrella Estrada. Judge Estrada granted Esteban’s petition and Esteban was the highest bidder at the public auction. Ingles, et al. filed a petition for Annulment of Final Orders granting the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA dismissed their petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. G.R. No. 147186 Ingles, et al. filed complaint for Annulment of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage against Esteban with the RTC of Quezon City Branch 225 presided by respondent Judge Arsenio Magpale. Esteban’s petition to file an Ex Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession was consolidated with the case in Branch 225. Esteban’s petition was granted by Judge Magpale upon a Motion for Reconsideration and was allowed to present evidence ex parte. Ingles, et al. also filed petition for certiorari against the Order granting the writ of possession and allowing Esteban to present evidence ex parte. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of failure to comply with the verification and certification against forum shopping. G.R. No. 173641

After Judge Magpale inhibited himself, the cases were re raffled to Branch 97 presided by Judge Oscar Leviste. Esteban was granted a writ of possession which was contested by Ingles, et al. through a Motion for Reconsideration. Esteban filed a petition for mandamus before the CA where he sought to compel the trial court to rule on the Motion for Reconsideration. The CA granted Esteban’s petition for mandamus. The Motion for Reconsideration was resolved by Judge Corpuz-Cabochan, who replaced the retired Judge Leviste, ruling that the proceedings before Branch 97 were suspended due to the pendency of proceedings in the CA involving the same property. Issues: G.R. No. 141809 1. Whether an order granting a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure is a civil action that allows for the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court G.R. No. 147186 2. Whether Ingles, et al. substantially complied with the requirements of the verification and certification against forum shipping when only two of them signed 3. Whether the issuance of a writ of possession may be consolidated with an action for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure 4. Whether Esteban had already consolidated his title over the property G.R. No. 173641 5.

Whether the petition for mandamus should be granted

Ruling: G.R. No. 141809 1. The assailed Orders dated 8 October 1997, 20 November 1997 and 27 July 1998 of Executive Judge Estrada are not the final orders in "civil actions" of "Regional Trial Courts" that may be the subject of annulment by the Court of Appeals under Rule 47. Section 1 of Rule 47 sets forth in no unclear terms that only judgments, final orders and resolutions in "civil actions" of "Regional Trial Courts" may be the subject of a petition for annulment before the Court of Appeals. Against this premise, it becomes apparent why the Heirs of Ingles’ petition for Annulment of Final Orders must fail. The subject of the Ingleses’ petition for Annulment of Final Orders are not the proper subjects of a petition for annulment before the Court of Appeals. The assailed Orders dated 8 October 1997, 20 November 1997 and 27 July 1998 of Executive Judge Estrada are not the final orders in "civil actions" of "Regional Trial Courts" that may be the subject of annulment by the Court of Appeals under Rule 47. There is a clear-cut difference between issuances made in a "civil action" on one hand and orders rendered in a proceeding for the extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage on the other.

"Civil actions" are suits filed in court involving either the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. They are commenced by the filing of an original complaint before an appropriate court and their proceedings are governed by the provisions of the Rules on Court on ordinary or special civil actions. Civil actions are adversarial in nature; presupposing the existence of disputes defined by the parties that are, in turn, submitted before the court for disposition. Issuances made therein, including and most especially judgments, final orders or resolutions, are therefore rendered by courts in the exercise of their judicial function. In contrast, proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, as the name already suggests, are not suits filed in a court. They are commenced not by the filing of a complaint, but by submitting an application before an executive judge who, in turn, receives the same neither in a judicial capacity nor on behalf of the court. The conduct of such proceedings is not governed by the rules on ordinary or special civil actions, but by Act No. 3135, as amended, and by special administrative orders issued by this Court. Proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages are also not adversarial; as the executive judge merely performs therein an administrative function to ensure that all requirements for the extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage are satisfied before the clerk of court, as the ex-officio sheriff, goes ahead with the public auction of the mortgaged property. Necessarily, the orders of the executive judge in such proceedings, whether they be to allow or disallow the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, are not issued in the exercise of a judicial function but, in the words of First Marbella Condominium Association, Inc. v. Gatmaytan, issued by the RTC Executive Judge in the exercise of his administrative function to supervise the ministerial duty of the Clerk of Court as Ex Officio Sheriff in the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclsoure sale G.R. No. 147186 2. Ingles, et al.’s certiorari petition contains a substantially valid verification and contains a substantially compliant certificate against forum shopping. In the seminal case of Altres v. Empleo, the Court laid out guiding principles that synthesized the various jurisprudential pronouncements regarding non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of a defective, verification and certification against forum shopping. The Court quotes them at length: 1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping. 2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. 3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons." 5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a

common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. Verily, the signatures of all of Ingles, et al. were not required to validly verify their certiorari petition. It suffices, according to Altres, that the verification was signed by at least one of Ingles, et al.who was competent to do so. In this case, the certiorari petition was verified by Josefina and Hector F. Ingles—both of whom the Court finds competent to attest to the truth of the allegations of their petition, considering that they are unquestionably principal parties-in-interest to their certiorari petition. Hence, their certiorari petition contains a substantially valid verification. Ingles, et al.’s certiorari petition likewise contains a substantially compliant certificate against forum shopping. Altres articulates the rule where a certification against forum shopping is required to be attached in a petition or complaint that names several petitioners or plaintiffs, as follows: 5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 3. The consolidation of the petition for the writ of possession and annulment of judgment had already ceased to become proper by the time the RTC allowed Esteban to present ex-parte evidence in support of his application for the issuance of a writ of possession. As a rule, a petition for the issuance of a writ possession may not be consolidated with any other ordinary action. It is well-settled that a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex-parte, summary and non-litigious by nature; which nature would be rendered nugatory if such petition was to be consolidated with any other ordinary civil action. The exception to the foregoing rule is the case of Active Wood Products, Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals. In Active Wood, the Court allowed the consolidation of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with an ordinary action for the annulment of mortgage. In doing so, Active Wood justified such consolidation as follows: It is true that a petition for a writ of possession is made ex-parte to facilitate proceedings, being founded on a presumed right of ownership. Be that as it may, when this presumed right of ownership is contested and made the basis of another action, then the proceedings for writ of possession would also become seemingly groundless. The entire case must be litigated and if need be as in the case at bar, must be consolidated with a related case so as to thresh out thoroughly all related issues. But perhaps the most crucial refinement of Active Wood was in the case of Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils. Espinoza declared that the mere fact that the purchaser’s "presumed right of ownership is contested and made the basis of another action" does not mean that such

action ought to be consolidated with the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. For Espinoza, the application of the Active Wood doctrine must be limited only to cases with the same factual circumstances under which the latter was rendered. Espinoza called attention to the fact that in Active Wood the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was "filed before the expiration of the one-year redemption period" and that "the litigated property had not been consolidated in the name of the mortgagee." Hence, Espinoza invalidated the consolidation of an action for the annulment of the extrajudicial sale with a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession after finding that the latter petition was filed after the expiration of the one-year redemption period and after the purchaser had already consolidated his title over the auctioned property. This must be, Espinoza explained, because when: title to the litigated property had already been consolidated in the name of respondent, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Consequently, the consolidation of the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with the proceedings for nullification of foreclosure would be highly improper. Otherwise, not only will the very purpose of consolidation (which is to avoid unnecessary delay) be defeated but the procedural matter of consolidation will also adversely affect the substantive right of possession as an incident of ownership. Applying the foregoing judicial pronouncements to the case at bar, this Court discerns that the consolidation of LRC Case No. Q-10766 (98) and Civil Case No. Q-98-33277 had already ceased to become proper by the time the RTC allowed Esteban to present ex-parte evidence in support of his application for the issuance of a writ of possession. Separation of the two cases is moreover warranted. 4. It is uncontested that by the time Esteban filed his Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which was before the RTC allowed him to present ex-parte evidence in support of his application for the issuance of a writ of possession, Esteban had already consolidated his title over the ten (10) lots. The ruling in Espinoza applies. It is uncontested that by the time Esteban filed his Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which was before the RTC allowed him to present ex-parte evidence in support of his application for the issuance of a writ of possession, Esteban had already consolidated his title over the ten (10) lots. At that time, Esteban was already the absolute owner of the ten (10) lots and, as such, his right to possess the same becomes a matter of right on his part. Charles’ claim of possession is no longer merely based on a "presumed right of ownership" as Ingles, et al. have evidently failed to exercise their right of redemption within the period provided by law. By then, the consolidation of Esteban’s application for a writ of possession with Ingles, et al.’s action for the annulment of mortgage had already lost its basis and, therefore, ceased to become proper. Consequently, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed on the part of the RTC in allowing Esteban to present ex-parte evidence in support of his application for the issuance of a writ of possession. Even though Esteban filed his original Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ Possession still within the redemption period, Espinoza would nevertheless apply. Esteban’s subsequent filing of his Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession at a time that he was already absolute owner of the auctioned lots supplemented his earlier Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ Possession —thus making his application for a writ of possession similar to that in the Espinoza case.

G.R. No. 173641 5.

The two cases are ordered deconsolidated.

In view of the Court’s above discussions in G.R. Nos. 141809 and 147186, there is no longer any legal reason on which the suspension of the proceedings before the RTC in LRC Case No. Q-10766 (98) and Civil Case No. Q-98-33277 may be anchored on. The two cases are ordered deconsolidated. Civil Case No. Q-98-33277 should proceed and be resolved with dispatch. In LRC Case No. Q-10766 (98), the Writ of Possession in favor of Charles J. Esteban should be issued immediately. This is line with the order issued on 12 July 2001 by the Regional Trial Court granting the Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession after evaluating Esteban’s Memorandum and Ingles, et al.’s comment thereon. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL TOLENTINO y CATACUTAN G.R. No. 187740, April 10, 2013

J. Perez Findings of fact of the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal since conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases depends heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court which is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Facts: Respondent Manuel Tolentino was charged in an Information with rape for raping AAA, an 11 year old minor. Tolentino raped AAA by pointing a knife at her chest and threatening her that he would kill her and her family if she told her parents. The RTC convicted him of rape which was affirmed by the CA. Tolentino assails the credibility of AAA as a witness claiming that she did not resist or try to escape. Issue: Whether the CA can pass upon the credibility of witnesses Ruling: Petition denied. On this score, findings of fact of the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal since conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases depends heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court which is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. The factual findings of the RTC are further strengthened by the affirmation of the Court of Appeals. AAA’s testimony is indeed clear and straightforward. Her sworn Statement taken before the police station jived in all material details with her testimony during trial. Moreover, the medicolegal’s finding of fresh laceration bolstered AAA’s claim that she was raped only a few hours before she underwent medical examination.

AAA’s failure to shout for help, although her siblings were sleeping beside her and her parents were on the other room, does not detract from the credibility of her claims. She explained to the court’s satisfaction that Tolentino, while holding a knife, had threatened to kill her family if she reported the incident. An 11-year old child like AAA can only cower in fear and submission in the face of a real threat to her life and her family’s posed by an armed assailant. FRANCISCO C. ADALIM v. ERNESTO TANINAS, et al. G.R. No. 198682, April 10, 2013 J. Carpio In instances where appeals are filed out of time, appeal fees paid on the day of promulgation of a resolution, or when issues not raised in the pleadings are admitted, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service themselves provide that administrative investigations shall be conducted without strict recourse to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. Facts: Petitioner Francisco Adalim was declared by the RTC as mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar. However despite the court declaration and grant of motion for execution pending appeal, his rival Diego Lim still held office at the municipal building. Adalim issued a memorandum mandating all municipal employees to submit their daily time records and respondents, Ernesto Taninas, et al. were listed as those without daily time records. Adalim issued a memorandum dropping Taninas, et al. from the rolls due to absence without official leave. Taninas, et al. filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission Regional Office which the CSCRO ordered their reinstatement. The CSC, upon a motion for reconsideration by Taninas, et al. ordered the reinstatement of the employees. The CA affirmed the resolutions of the CSCRO and the CSC. Adalim opposed the resolutions on the ground that they were filed out of time as they were filed more than 6 months from the date of dismissal; that the appeal fee was paid on the same day as the day of promulgation; and that the CSC admitted issues that were not alleged in the pleadings. Issue: Whether the CSC can relax the application of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service Ruling: Petition denied. At the outset, Adalim assails the CSC’s liberal application of its rules. In a number of cases, the Court upheld the CSC’s decision relaxing its procedural rules to render substantial justice. The Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service themselves provide that administrative investigations shall be conducted without strict recourse to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. The case before the CSC involves the security of tenure of public employees protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a resolution of the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a rigid application of the CSC Rules of Procedure. Accordingly, both the CSC and the CA properly

allowed respondent employees’ appeal despite procedural lapses to resolve the issue on the merits. HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO, et al. v. PORFERIO SOLIMAN, et al. G.R. No. 178952, April 10, 2013

J. Del Castillo The Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of the action and the fact that only one of the heirs executed the verification or certification of non-forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action. Facts: Petitioners, Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo filed a complaint for collection of land amortizations, dispossession, ejectment, and cancellation of Deed of Transfer against respondents, Porfirio Soliman, Vivian Valete, and Antonio Soliman before the Provinicial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Tarlac. The PARAD ruled in favor of Heirs Gallardo. The DARAB affirmed the decision of the PARAD with modifications. The CA dismissed the Heirs Gallardo’s petition for review on the ground that the verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by only four out of six petitioners. The CA held that it must be signed by all of the petitioners or else it is insufficient. Issue: Whether one petitioner may sign the Verification/Certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of his co-petitioners who are his immediate relatives sharing a common interest Ruling: Petition granted. Here, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a common interest in the land sought to be reconveyed and a common cause of action raising the same arguments in support thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo Hernandez, Jr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners when he certified that they had not filed any action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issue. Thus, the Verification/Certification that Hernandez, Jr. executed constitutes substantial compliance under the Rules. Similarly, in Traveño v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative the Court held that: 5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. The same position was taken in Medado v. Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing, where the Court held that "where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of non-forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action."

BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC. v. ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL (deceased) substituted by REYNALDO P. VILLAREAL, JR., et al. G.R. No. 181182, April 10, 2013

J. Del Castillo Boardwalk’s appeal was not perfected because of its failure to timely file the Petition and to pay the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court which is the CA. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and executory. Facts: Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. filed an Amended Complaint for replevin against respondent Elvira A. Villareal, one of Boardwalk’s distributors of RTW merchandise for his alleged failure to pay a car loan obtained from Boardwalk with the MeTC of Manila. The MeTC ruled in favor of Boardwalk but was reversed by the RTC. Boardwalk through counsel filed with the Manila RTC a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, praying that it be granted 30 day to file its Petition for Review and paid the docket and other legal fees. Boardwalk also filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC which the RTC denied for being the wrong mode of appeal. The CA dismissed Boardwalk’s petition. The CA held that Boardwalk erred in filing its Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees with the RTC and that the subsequent filing of its Petition with the CA was late and beyond the reglementary 15-day period provided for under Rule 42. The CA also found that Boardwalk’s prayer for a 30-day extension in its Motion for Extension irregular, because the maximum period that may be granted is only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42. It held that Boardwalk’s Petition for Review failed to include a board resolution or secretary’s certificate showing that its representative, Ma. Victoria M. Lo, was authorized to sign the Petition or represent Boardwalk in the proceedings, rendering the Verification and Certification against forum-shopping defective. Finally, the CA faulted Boardwalk for its failure to attach to its Petition copies of the Complaint, Answer, position papers, memoranda and other relevant pleadings, as required in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 42, thus meriting the outright dismissal of its Petition for Review. Issues: 1. 2. 3.

Whether Boardwalk properly paid the docket fees Whether the CA may grant an extension of 30 days Whether Boardwalk’s appeal is perfected

Ruling: 1. Boardwalk erroneously paid the docket fees and other lawful fees with the RTC. Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court specifically states that payment of the docket fees and other lawful fees should be made to the clerk of the CA. A plain reading of the Rules leaves no room for interpretation; it is categorical and explicit. It was thus grave error on the part of Boardwalk to have misinterpreted the same and consequently mistakenly remitted its payment to the RTC clerk. Boardwalk’s subsequent payment to the clerk of the CA of the docket fees and

other lawful fees did not cure the defect. The payment to the CA was late; it was done long after the reglementary period to file an appeal had lapsed. It must be stressed that the payment of the docket fees and other lawful fees must be done within 15 days from receipt of notice of decision sought to be reviewed or denial of the motion for reconsideration. In this case, Boardwalk remitted the payment to the CA clerk long after the lapse of the reglementary period. 2. The CA may grant an extension of 15 days only. The grant of another 15-days extension, or a total of 30-days extension is allowed only for the most compelling reason. Boardwalk sought an extension of 30 days within which to file its Petition for Review with the CA. This is not allowed. Section 1 of Rule 42 allows an extension of only 15 days. "No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason." Boardwalk never cited any compelling reason. Thus, even on the assumption that the CA granted Boardwalk a 15-day reprieve from February 3, 2007, or the expiration of its original reglementary period, it still failed to file its Petition for Review on or before the February 19, 2007 due date. Records show that the Petition was actually filed only on March 7, 2007, or way beyond the allowable February 19, 2007 deadline. The appellate court thus correctly ruled that this may not simply be brushed aside. 3.

Boardwalk’s appeal is not deemed perfected.

More significantly, Section 8 of Rule 42 provides that the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner "upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the corresponding docket and other lawful fees." Undisputably, Boardwalks’s appeal was not perfected because of its failure to timely file the Petition and to pay the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court which is the CA. Consequently, the CA properly dismissed outright the Petition because it never acquired jurisdiction over the same. As a result, the RTC’s Decision had long become final and executory. To stress, the right to appeal is statutory and one who seeks to avail of it must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and executory. And, just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also does the prevailing party have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of a decision in his favor. ROYAL SAVINGS BANK, formerly COMSAVINGS BANK, now GSIS FAMILY BANK v. FERNANDO ASIA, et al. G.R. No. 183658, April 10, 2013 CJ Sereno The obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial, once it appears that there is a third party who is in possession of the property and is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. Facts:

Petitioner Royal Savings Bank (RSB) secured a final order from the CA in its favor for the issuance of a certificate of title in its name. The RTC granted RSB’s petition and issued a writ of possession in its favor. Respondents Fernando Asia, et al. claimed to have been in open and continuous possession of the property for 40 years and that they were not aware of any proceeding against the property. In order to stay the Notice to Vacate given by the Sheriff, Asia, et al. filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Possession and Writ of Execution which the RTC granted. After 6 months of inaction by the RTC on the Motion for Reconsideration that RSB filed, it filed a motion for early resolution where the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration. RSB filed an appeal directly with the Supreme Court. Issues: 1. Whether the RTC can grant a motion to quash a writ of possession when there is doubt as to who has the better right to possess a property 2. Whether a pairing judge can quash the writ of possession issued by the presiding judge Ruling: 1. The Court finds that it was only proper for the RTC to quash the Writ of Possession until a determination is made as to who, between RSB and Asia, et al., has the better right to possess the property. In the eyes of this Court, the RTC did not err in issuing the herein assailed Orders on the basis of its initial finding that Asia, et al. are third parties who are actually holding the property adversely vis-à-vis the judgment debtor. The RTC did not err in applying the doctrine laid down in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, in which the Court ruled that the obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial, once it appears that there is a third party who is in possession of the property and is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. The Court explained in Philippine National Bank v. Austria that the foregoing doctrinal pronouncements are not without support in substantive law, to wit: Notably, the Civil Code protects the actual possessor of a property, to wit: Art. 433.Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. Under the aforequoted provision, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The term "judicial process" could mean no less than an ejectment suit or reivindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated. The Court finds that it was only proper for the RTC to quash the Writ of Possession until a determination is made as to who, between RSB and Asia, et al., has the better right to possess the property. 2. The pairing judge, who issued the Order quashing the Writ of Possession, issued it in her capacity as the judge of Branch 222 of Quezon City-the same branch, albeit then under a different judge, that issued the Writ of Possession.

Lastly, RSB alleges that the pairing judge violated the hierarchy of courts when she quashed the writ of possession validly issued by the then presiding Judge of the RTC Quezon City, a coequal body. No court has the power to interfere by injunction in the issuance or enforcement of a writ of possession issued by another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to issue that writ. However, as correctly pointed out by Asia, et al. in their Comment, it was the same trial court and "not another court or co-equal court body that quashed the subject writ of possession." The pairing judge, who issued the Order quashing the Writ of Possession, issued it in her capacity as the judge of Branch 222 of Quezon City-the same branch, albeit then under a different judge, that issued the Writ of Possession. SANDOVAL SHIPYARDS, INC., and RIMPORT INDUSTRIES, INC., represented by ENGR. REYNALDO G. IMPORTANTE v. PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY (PMMA) G.R. No. 188633, April 10, 2013

CJ Sereno Although the RTC has legal basis under A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA in relation to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court to order the dismissal of the case, the Court finds this sanction too severe to be imposed on PMMA where the records of the case is devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings. Facts: Respondent Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages against petitioners Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. and Rimport Industries, Inc. (SSI and RII) before the RTC. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of PMMA. In their Rule 45 Petition, SSI and RII contend that the judge who wrote the Decision was not present during the trial and did not have the advantage of firsthand assessment of the testimonies of the witnesses, thus warranting a factual review. Issues: 1. Whether a factual review is warranted, considering that the trial judge who penned the Decision was different from the judge who received the evidence of the parties 2. Whether failure to attend mediation proceedings warrants a dismissal of the case Ruling: 1. The fact that the trial judge who penned the Decision was different from the one who received the evidence is not one of the exceptions that warrant a factual review of the case. The fact that the trial judge who penned the Decision was different from the one who received the evidence is not one of the exceptions that warrant a factual review of the case. SSI and RII cannot carve out an exception when there is none. We have already addressed this matter in Decasa v. CA, from which the Court quotes: We have held in several cases that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment; and that for the same reason, the latter did not have the

opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous. Even though the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses, such is not enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. It may be true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, but it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial. That a judge did not hear a case does not necessarily render him less competent in assessing the credibility of witnesses. He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes of their testimony and calibrate them in accordance with their conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law 2. SSI and RII are likewise mistaken in their assertion that the trial court should have dismissed the Complaint for PMMA’s failure to attend the mediation session. SSI and RII are likewise mistaken in their assertion that the trial court should have dismissed the Complaint for PMMA’s failure to attend the mediation session. In Chan Kent v. Micarez, in which the trial court dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiff and her counsel to attend the mediation proceedings, this Court held: To reiterate, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA regards mediation as part of pre-trial where parties are encouraged to personally attend the proceedings. The personal non-appearance, however, of a party may be excused only when the representative, who appears in his behalf, has been duly authorized to enter into possible amicable settlement or to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution. To ensure the attendance of the parties, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA specifically enumerates the sanctions that the court can impose upon a party who fails to appear in the proceedings which includes censure, reprimand, contempt, and even dismissal of the action in relation to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The respective lawyers of the parties may attend the proceedings and, if they do so, they are enjoined to cooperate with the mediator for the successful amicable settlement of disputes so as to effectively reduce docket congestion. Although the RTC has legal basis to order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13-2007, the Court finds this sanction too severe to be imposed on the petitioner where the records of the case is devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings. There is no clear demonstration that the absence of petitioner's representative during mediation proceedings on March 1, 2008 was intended to perpetuate delay in the litigation of the case. Neither is it indicative of lack of interest on the part of petitioner to enter into a possible amicable settlement of the case. Here, there was no finding that the absence of PMMA was in willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation, that the absence was intended to effect a delay in litigation, or that PMMA lacked interest in a possible amicable settlement of the case. In fact, the CA found that all efforts had been exerted by the parties to amicably settle the case during the pretrial. Thus, RTC's nondismissal of PMMA's Complaint was but appropriate. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERT P. NARCEDA G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013

CJ Sereno

No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Facts: Respondent Robert Narceda married Marina. However, Marina went to Singapore and has never returned. Robert learned from a friend that Marina married a Singaporean. With this, Robert filed with the RTC a petition for the judicial declaration of presumptive death and/or absence of Marina. The RTC granted Robert’s petition. The CA dismissed the Republic’s appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding under the Family Code and is thus governed by Title XI thereof. Article 247 of the Family Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in summary court proceedings shall be immediately final and executory. Issue: Whether an appeal from a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Art. 41 of the Family Code may be filed Ruling: As explained in Republic v. Tango, the remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding is not an ordinary appeal, but a petition for certiorari, to wit: By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As a result, the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not tolled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned. Consequently, petitioner's contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this Court. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOLITA QUESIDO y BADARANG G.R. No. 189351, April 10, 2013

J. Leonardo-De Castro

Non-compliance with Sec. 21, R.A. 9165 does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Facts: Respondent Lolita Quesido was apprehended in a buy-bust operation conducted by District Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force, Manila Police District (DAID-SOTG) with SPO1 Chua as the poseur-buyer. SPO1 Chua marked the buy-bust money with an “x”. SPO1 Chua exchanged the money for one of the three sachets with white crystalline substance and he gave the signal for his companions to come forward to effect the arrest. Quesido and the confiscated items were turned over to the investigator. The confiscated item was subjected to a laboratory test where it tested positive for shabu. The RTC convicted Quesido, which was affirmed by the CA. Quesido argues that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the procedural requirements of R.A. 9165 and she insists that the chain of custody for the supposed seized drug was not properly established. Issues: 1. Whether the chain of custody was strictly complied with 2. Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the credibility of the testimony of the police officers Ruling: 1. The Court finds that the procedural guidelines laid out in Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 were not strictly complied with. In spite of this, the Court can still conclude that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in evidence in this case were duly preserved in consonance with the chain of custody rule. Nonetheless, despite the apparent mandatory language that is expressed in Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. 9165, the Court has always reiterated in jurisprudence that non-compliance with Section 21 does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In People v. Remigio, the Court restated the enumeration of the different links that the prosecution must prove in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, namely: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and

Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. In the case at bar, the Court finds that the procedural guidelines laid out in Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 were not strictly complied with. In spite of this, the Court can still conclude that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in evidence in this case were duly preserved in consonance with the chain of custody rule. 2. The testimonies of SPO1 Chua and PO3 Jimenez were properly given significant probative weight by the trial court and, subsequently, by the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, the testimonies of SPO1 Chua and PO3 Jimenez were properly given significant probative weight by the trial court and, subsequently, by the Court of Appeals. In People v. Lapasaran, we elaborated on the importance of the credible testimony of police officers in the prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs through the following: Moreover, this Court has often said that the prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs depends largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is fundamental that the factual findings of the trial courts and those involving credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misappreciation of facts, or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. ALBERT CHUA, JIMMY CHUA CHI LEONG and SPOUSES EDUARDO SOLIS and GLORIA VICTA v. B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC./LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION v. B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. G.R. No. 165863/G.R. No. 165875. April 10, 2013

J. Mendoza To allow the presentation of evidence on a piece-meal basis, thereby needlessly causing a delay in the resolution of the case would be anathema to the purpose of delivering justice. Facts: Petitioners, Albert Chua, Jimmy Chua Chi Leong, Spouses Eduardo and Gloria Solis, and Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) filed a petition to reopen a case docketed as G.R. No. 105027 decided by the Supreme Court with respondent B.E. San Diego, Inc. as one of the parties. Chua, et al. attached to their petition several documents among which are 1) flow charts tracing the subdivision and partition of Cuenca’s land into the present parcels of land purchased by petitioners from the heirs of Cuenca himself; the partitions were made with approval of the court; 2) a certification by the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite that Barrio Niog and Barrio Talaba are actually adjacent to each other; and 3) a certification and sketch from the Land Registration Authority that the lot described in the alleged OCT No. 0-490 of Teodora Dominguez sits upon and encroaches on the National Highway (Aguinaldo Highway). The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the case to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition ruling that the documents were not exactly "newly discovered

evidence" because all of them could have been previously obtained and presented at the hearing before the lower court. Issue: Whether the evidence adduced in the petition to reopen are newly discovered evidence Ruling: Petition denied. The Court sustains the ruling of the CA that the alleged new documents submitted by Chua, et al. cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence. The documents attached by Chua, et al. in their petition to re-open were the following: 1] Certified true copies of notices of hearing pertaining to Juan’s application for registration and confirmation of title; 2] Certification by the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite, that Barrios Niog and Talaba are adjacent; and 3) certification from the LRA regarding the encroachment of San Diego’s property. These are not newly discovered and they cannot affect the Court’s ruling in its April 22, 1994 Decision in G.R. No. 105027. The Court quotes with approval the ruling of the CA on this matter: A common characteristic shared by all the foregoing documents is that they are not exactly "newly discovered evidence" as plaintiffs’ claim they are. By their nature, all of them could have been previously obtained and presented by plaintiffs at the hearings before the lower court. For plaintiffs’ failure to present these documents there is no one else to blame but themselves. It appears that they did not exert their best efforts to get hold of evidence which was already available, or at the very least, obtainable, to buttress their claim. To allow the presentation of evidence on a piece-meal basis, thereby needlessly causing a delay in the resolution of the case would be anathema to the purpose of delivering justice. ROGELIO DANTIS v. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR. G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013

J. Mendoza Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit "3" must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence. Exhibit "4," on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt. Facts: Petitioner Rogelio Dantis filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against respondent Julio Maghinang, Jr. Dantis inherited the property through an extrajudicial partition of Emilio Dantis’ estate. Maghinang, Jr. presented an affidavit executed on September 3, 1953 by Ignacio Dantis, Rogelio’s grandfather and father of Emilio Dantis. It alleged that Emilio agreed to sell 352 sq.m. to Ignacio. Julio admitted that the affidavit was signed by Emilio. The receipt he presented was merely a photocopy. Julio was only 11 years old. The RTC ruled in favor of Rogelio. The CA reversed the RTC ruling that Exhibit "4" was an indubitable proof of the sale of the 352-square meter lot between Emilio and Julio, Sr.

Rogelio submits that Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "4" are devoid of evidentiary value and, hence, deserve scant consideration. He stresses that Exhibit "4" is inadmissible in evidence being a mere photocopy, and the existence and due execution thereof had not been established. Issue: Whether the affidavit of Ignacio and the photocopy of the receipt are admissible Ruling: Petition granted. To begin with, Exhibit "3," the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary weight. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of oath. Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. The sworn statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit "3" must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot be deemed a declaration against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule because the declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio). Exhibit "4," on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3. A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, it was held that where the missing document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally involved. The claim of Julio, Jr. that Emilio affixed his signature on the original of Exhibit "4" in 1953 is highly improbable because record shows that Emilio died even before that year, specifically, on November 13, 1952.

It is quite strange that two receipts were prepared for the initial payment of ₱100.00 in connection with the sale of the subject lot. The Court notes that the contents of Exhibit "4" were similar to those of Annex "A" of Julio, Jr.’s Answer, dated June 9, 2002. Annex "A," however, was typewritten and the name of the recipient indicated therein was a certain Cornelio A. Dantis, whose identity and participation in the alleged sale was never explained. Apart from the lone testimony of Julio, Jr., no other witness who knew or read Exhibit "4," much less saw it executed, was presented. In the absence of any shred of corroborative evidence, the Court cannot help but entertain doubts on the truthfulness of Julio, Jr.’s naked assertion. EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN v. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013

J. Leonen Under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. Facts: Export Industry Bank (EIB) filed a collection suit against petitioners, Eagleridge Development (EDC) Corporation, Marcelo Naval, and Crispin Oben with the RTC of Makati City. The EIB, through a Deed of Assignment, transferred EDC’s outstanding loan obligations to EDC, to respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. (Cameron), which included a Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) between EDC and Cameron. Cameron substituted EIB. EDC filed a Motion for the Production/Inspection of the LSPA but was denied by the RTC for failing to show “good cause” for the production of the LSPA. The CA dismissed EDC’s petition for Oben’s lack of Verification and Certification Against Forum-Shopping and Failure to Attach a Copy of the Complaint. Issues: 1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition on technicality, i.e. on a defective verification and certification against forum shopping and the attachment to the petition of a mere machine copy of the complaint 2. Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the production and/or inspection of the LSPA Ruling: 1. The Court agrees with EDC, that the appellate court erred in ruling that Oben's Verification and Certification was defective for lack of a Board Resolution authorizing Oben to sign on behalf of EDC. The Court agrees with EDC, that the appellate court erred in ruling that Oben's Verification and Certification was defective for lack of a Board Resolution authorizing Oben to sign on behalf of EDC. Oben executed and signed the Verification and Certification in his personal capacity as an impleaded party in the case, and not as a representative of EDC. The Court notes that an earlier Verification and Certification signed by Naval, for himself and as a representative of EDC, and a

Secretary Certificate containing his authority to sign on behalf of EDC, were already filed with the appellate court together with the petition for certiorari. As such, what was only lacking was Oben's Verification and Certification as pointed out in the August 29, 2012 Resolution of the CA. On the other hand, contrary to EDC’s assertion, a reading of the CA Resolution dated November 27, 2012 shows that the appellate court merely noted the belated attachment of a machine copy, not a certified true copy, of the complaint to petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Although not expressly stated, the machine copy of the complaint is in fact acceptable, as Rule 65 provides that one may attach to the petition mere machine copies of other relevant documents and pleadings. More importantly, the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari was anchored on its finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying the production of the LSPA, that the errors committed by Judge Ruiz were, if at all, mere errors of judgment correctible not by the extraordinary writ of certiorari and an ordinary appeal would still be available in the action below for sum of money. 2. Since the Deed of Assignment was produced in court by Cameron and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its understanding may also be inevitably inquired into by EDC. The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of the modes of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only the parties, but also the court to discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending before it. Generally, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with information essential to the fair and amicable settlement or expeditious trial of the case. All the parties are required to lay their cards on the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case. Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly discretionary on the part of the trial court judge, nevertheless, it cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied because to do so would bar access to relevant evidence that may be used by a party-litigant and hence, impair his fundamental right to due process. The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness and practicability. Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. Since the Deed of Assignment was produced in court by Cameron and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its understanding may also be inevitably inquired into by EDC.

THE SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM, COMMISSION ON AUDIT v. COURT OF APPEALS AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM G.R. No. 174788, April 11, 2013

CJ Sereno A preliminary injunction is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. Factually, there must exist a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. As the Supreme Court has previously ruled, while the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear. Facts: Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) filed a Petition for Prohibition with the CA against petitioner Special Audit Team (SAT) of the Commission on Audit (COA) with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO), a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, and a writ of prohibition to restrain the SAT from conducting an audit of GSIS transactions. GSIS also submitted a Manifestation and Motion detailing the urgency of restraining the SAT as SAT’s supervisor had said that notices for disallowance were available at the COA’s Records Division. The CA granted the prayer of GSIS for the issuance of a TRO effective 60 days from notice. The CA granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting of an injunction bond. Issue: Whether the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued Ruling: Petition denied. Writs of injunction do not perfunctorily issue from the courts. For the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In this case, respondents failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. From its ruling, it is clear that the CA erred in granting a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. Factually, there must exist "a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right." As this Court has previously ruled, "while the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear." Lacking a clear legal right, the provisional remedy should not have been issued, all the more because the factual support for issuing the writ had not been established. In giving injunctive

relief, courts cannot reverse the burden of proof, for to do so "would assume the proposition which the petitioner is inceptively duty bound to prove." This concern is not a mere technicality, but lies at the heart of procedural law, for every case before a court of law requires a cause of action. Moreover, there was no urgency in the request of the GSIS for injunctive relief, because no notice of disallowance had been issued. The CA held that since there was a question on the validity of the SAT and a corresponding threat of a notice of disallowance, then the status quo must be preserved. Its criteria falls short of the "clear legal right" standard. Even if there was a notice of disallowance, the COA’s rules for contesting the issuance would have been the proper remedy; otherwise, any administrative dispute settlement procedure would be rendered useless by the simple filing of an injunctive suit in court. CARLITO C. ENCINAS v. PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR., and PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013

CJ Sereno The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character. Facts: Respondents PO1 Alfredo Agustin, Jr. and PO1 Joel Caubang filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection a letter-complaint for illegal transfer of personnel under the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 against petitioner Carlito Encinas with the BFP. PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang also filed a similar complaint with the CSC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga and the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan accusing Encinas of violation of Sec. 4(c) of R.A. 6713. Encinas was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. The BFP complaint was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The CSCRO found Encinas administratively liable. Encinas appealed to the CSC claiming that PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang were guilty of forum shopping as they filed a complaint before the CSCRO and the BFP. The CSC denied the petition as the CSCRO complaint was for violation of R.A. 6713 and the BFP complaint was for violation of R.A. 6975. Hence there was no forum shopping. The CA denied Encinas’ appeal and held that there was no forum shopping. Issue: Whether PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang are guilty of forum shopping Ruling: Petition denied. The Court does not agree with Encinas. In Yu v. Lim, this Court enumerated the requisites of forum-shopping as follows: Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the

concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections; "or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point." In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the definition above. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the result of a factfinding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with finality. The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character. Indeed, the public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of a preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence presented, further action should be taken through the filing of a criminal complaint in court. Similarly, in the instant case, the BFP exercised its investigative or fact-finding function to determine whether, based on the facts and the evidence presented, further administrative action—in the form of a formal charge—should be taken against petitioner. In neither instance is there in adjudication upon the rights, obligations, or liabilities of the parties before them. SPOUSES OSCAR AND THELMA CACAYORIN v. ARMED FORCES AND POLICE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC. G.R. No. 171298, April 15, 2013 J. Del Castillo A complaint for the consignation of a loan payment of a subdivision lot does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Consignation is necessarily judicial, as the Civil Code itself provides that consignation shall be made by depositing the thing or things due at the disposal of judicial authority. Facts: Petitioner Spouses Oscar and Thelma Cacayorin entered into a loan agreement with the Rural Bank of San Teodoro, along with a PAG-IBIG loan facility, to purchase a piece of property from the Armed Forces and Police Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. (AFPMBAI). AFPMBAI prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title in Spouses Cacayorin’s name. The Rural Bank was closed and placed under the receivership of the PDIC. AFMBAI took possession of the loan documents of the Spouses Cacayorin and demanded payment for the loan. With the Rural Bank closed, Spouses Cacayorin could not pay the loan. Spouses

Cacayorin filed a complaint for consignation of loan payment, recovery of title, and cancellation of mortgage annotation against AFPMBAI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). AFPMBAI moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and not the Puerto Princesa RTC, as it was filed by Spouses Cacayorin in their capacity as buyers of a subdivision lot and it prays for specific performance of contractual and legal obligations decreed under P.D. 957. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The CA reversed the trial court. Issue: Whether the HLURB has no jurisdiction over a complaint involving consignation Ruling: Petition granted. On the question of jurisdiction, Spouses Cacayorin’s case should be tried in the Puerto Princesa RTC, and not the HLURB. Consignation is necessarily judicial, as the Civil Code itself provides that consignation shall be made by depositing the thing or things due at the disposal of judicial authority Article 1258 clearly precludes consignation in venues other than the courts. Elsewhere, what may be made is a valid tender of payment, but not consignation. While it may be true that Spouses Cacayorin’s claim relates to the terms and conditions of the sale of AFPMBAI’s subdivision lot, this is overshadowed by the fact that since the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3812 pleads a case for consignation, the HLURB is without jurisdiction to try it, as such case may only be tried by the regular courts. RICARDO CHU, JR. and DY KOK ENG v. MELANIA CAPARAS and SPOUSES RUEL AND HERMENEGILDA PEREZ G.R. No. 175428, April 15, 2013

J. Brion A petition filed under Rule 45 required the evaluation of the factual findings of the RTC and the CA. The question, to be one of law, must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances and should avoid the scrutiny of the probative value of the parties’ evidence. Once the issue invites a review of the factual findings of the RTC and of the CA, as in this case, the question posed is one of fact that is proscribed in a Rule 45 petition. Facts: Petitioners Ricardo Chu and Dy Kok Eng filed a complaint to recover the possession of a parcel of land in Cavite against respondents Melania Caparas and Spouses Ruel and Hermenegilda Perez. The RTC allowed Chu and Eng to present their evidence ex parte following Caparas et al’s failure to file an answer. The RTC ruled in Chu and Eng’s favor but disapproving the survey plan for lack of authority. Caparas, et al. filed a petition for relief from judgment on the ground of excusable negligence. The RTC reversed its decision. The CA upheld the RTC. Issue:

Whether the petition under Rule 45 raises questions of fact Ruling: Petition denied. At the outset, the Court finds that the resolution of the petition necessarily requires the reevaluation of the factual findings of the RTC and of the CA. Essentially, what Chu and Eng seek in this petition is a relief from the Court on the issue of encroachment, as well as the issues of prematurity and propriety of the award of damages that are intertwined with the issue of encroachment. On this point alone, the petition must fail, as a Rule 45 petition bars the Court from the consideration of factual issues. The question, to be one of law, must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances and should avoid the scrutiny of the probative value of the parties’ evidence. Once the issue invites a review of the factual findings of the RTC and of the CA, as in this case, the question posed is one of fact that is proscribed in a Rule 45 petition. The Court’s jurisdiction under a Rule 45 review is limited to reviewing perceived errors of law, which the lower courts may have committed. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings, when aptly supported by evidence, bind this Court. This is especially true when the CA affirms the lower court’s findings, as in this case. While this Court, under established exceptional circumstances, had deviated from the above rule, the Court does not find this case to be under any of the exceptions. REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA v. MARIO and MARGIE LAURON G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013

J. Peralta A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Facts: Petitioner Rey Catedrilla filed a complaint for ejectment against respondent Spouses Mario and Margie Lauron with the MTC of Lambunao, Iloilo. Spouses Lauron claimed that Catedrilla had no cause of action against them as they are not the owners of the residential building standing on his lot but Mildred Kascher, as shown in the tax declaration. Catedrilla claims that he inherited the property from his mother Lilia Catedrilla and that Spouses Lauron are merely staying on the property through mere tolerance. Spouses Lauron claimed that Catedrilla’s father, Maximo entered into an amicable settlement with Kascher where Maximo offered to sell the property to Kascher. However, Maximo was unable to comply and Spouses Lauron argued that the amicable settlement should have force and effect of a final judgment of the court. The MTC ruled in favor of Catedrilla which was affirmed by the RTC. The CA reversed the lower courts and ruled that Kascher should have been impleaded being an indispensable party. Issues: 1. 2.

Whether the amicable settlement between Maximo and Margie is still enforceable Whether Spouses Lauron were correctly impleaded as defendants

Ruling: 1. The settlement is considered rescinded in accordance with the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. The Court has held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the parties themselves. It has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved, and cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery. However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos, the Court clarified that the broad precept enunciated in Art. 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code, which provides that if one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission. This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party. While the amicable settlement executed between Maximo and Margie before the Barangay had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, it appears that there was non-compliance thereto by Margie on behalf of her parents which may be construed as repudiation. The settlement is considered rescinded in accordance with the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Since the settlement was rescinded, Catedrilla, as a co-owner, properly instituted the action for ejectment to recover possession of the subject lot against Spouses Lauron who are in possession of the same. 2. It is indeed Spouses Lauron who are the real parties-in-interest who were correctly impleaded as defendants in the unlawful detainer case filed by Catedrilla. In ejectment cases, the only issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. In an action for unlawful detainer, the real party-in-interest as party-defendant is the person who is in possession of the property without the benefit of any contract of lease and only upon the tolerance and generosity of its owner. Well settled is the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. Here, records show that the subject lot is owned by Catedrilla's mother, and Catedrilla, being an heir and a co-owner, is entitled to the possession of the subject lot. On the other hand, Spouses Lauron are the occupants of the subject lot which they do not own. Spouses Lauron’s possession of the subject lot was without any contract of lease as they failed to present any, thus lending credence to Catedrilla's claim that their stay in the subject lot is by mere tolerance of Catedrilla and his predecessors. It is indeed Spouses Lauron who are the real parties-ininterest who were correctly impleaded as defendants in the unlawful detainer case filed by Catedrilla.

ROYAL PLANT WORKERS UNION v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. No. 198783, April 15, 2013

J. Mendoza An Arbitration Committee rendered a decision which was contested by the other party as a judgment or a final order under the Labor Code, hence the Rules of Court do not apply. A decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. Upon receipt of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Resolution denying RPWU’s motion for reconsideration, RPWU should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari. Facts: Petitioner Royal Plant Workers Union (RPWU) agreed with respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) to submit their dispute to an Arbitration Committee. The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of RPWU. CCBPI filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 before the CA. The CA set aside the decision of the Arbitration Committtee. RPWU argues that the proper remedy should have been a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and that the decision of the Arbitration Committee is a judgment or a final court order under the Labor Code. It also argued that the 1997 Rules of Procedure does not cover cases under the Labor Code. Issue: Whether an appeal to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a proper remedy to question the decision of the Arbitration Committee Ruling: Petition granted. CCBPI is correct. This procedural issue being debated upon is not novel. The Court has already ruled in a number of cases that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. The recent case of Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Hyatt (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) v. Hon. Voluntary Arbitrator Buenaventura C. Magsalin and Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines reiterated the well-settled doctrine on this issue, to wit: In the case of Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v. Bacungan, we repeated the well-settled rule that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43. We held that: "The question on the proper recourse to assail a decision of a voluntary arbitrator has already been settled in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, where the Court held that the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein, and consistent with the original purpose to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities.

Hence, upon receipt on May 26, 2003 of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Resolution denying RPWU’s motion for reconsideration, RPWU should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ: NORIEL RODRIGUEZ v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, et al G.R. No. 191805/G.R. No. 193160, April 16, 2013

CJ Sereno The writ of amparo’s curative role is an acknowledgment that the violation of the right to life, liberty, and security may be caused not only by a public official’s act, but also by his omission. Accountability may attach to Arroyo, et al. who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. Facts: Following the Decision of the Supreme Court in 2011, the Ombudsman sent a letter to the Supreme Court requesting for a two month period to make the report and stating that Noriel Rodriguez and his family has refused to cooperate due to security reasons. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that they cannot be held accountable as they were not mentioned by name as having performed acts violative of the rights, life, liberty and security of Rodriguez and his family. Issues: 1. Whether the unwillingness of Rodriguez to participate in the proceedings affect the grant of the writ of amparo 2. Whether Arroyo, et al. may be held accountable Ruling: 1. The purported unwillingness of Rodriguez to appear or participate at this stage of the proceedings due to security reasons does not affect the rationale of the writ granted by the CA, as affirmed by this Court. The purported unwillingness of Rodriguez to appear or participate at this stage of the proceedings due to security reasons does not affect the rationale of the writ granted by the CA, as affirmed by this Court. In any case, the issue of the existence of criminal, civil, or administrative liability which may be imputed to Arroyo, et al. is not the province of amparo proceedings -- rather, the writ serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action. In this case then, the thrust of ensuring that investigations are conducted and the rights to life, liberty, and security of Rodriguez, remains. 2.

Accountability may attach to Arroyo, et al. who are imputed with knowledge

relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or even administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The totality of evidence as a standard for the grant of the writ was correctly applied by this Court, as first laid down in Razon v. Tagitis: The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test. Arroyo, et al.’s claim that they were not competently identified as the soldiers who abducted and detained Rodriguez, or that there was no mention of their names in the documentary evidence, is baseless. The CA rightly considered Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay as a meticulous and straightforward account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated on account of his suspected membership in the NPA. Arroyo, et al. conveniently neglect to address the findings of both the CA and this Court that aside from the abduction of Rodriguez, Arroyo, et al., specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the former’s right to security when they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives. The CA found that the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the photos of Rodriguez’s relatives hung on the wall of the house, and the innermost portions of the house. There is no reasonable justification for this violation of the right to privacy and security of Rodriguez’s abode, which strikes at the very heart and rationale of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. More importantly, Arroyo, et al. also neglect to address the Court’s ruling that the failure to conduct a fair and effective investigation similarly amounted to a violation of, or threat to Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty, and security. The writ’s curative role is an acknowledgment that the violation of the right to life, liberty, and security may be caused not only by a public official’s act, but also by his omission. Accountability may attach to Arroyo, et al. who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013 Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not yet been any proclamation of the winner. Facts:

Respondent Lino Baluag, a rival mayoralty candidate of respondent Rommel Arnado, filed a petition to disqualify and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy as municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Arnado won the 2010 elections as the new municipal mayor. However, the COMELEC First Division annulled Arnado’s election changes. Arnado filed a motion for reconsideration while petitioner Casan Maquiling, another mayoralty candidate who placed 2nd filed a motion for intervention and motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC En Banc, in granting Maquiling’s motion for intervention, cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect. The COMELEC En Banc granted Arnado’s motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether intervention is allowed in a disqualification case Ruling: Petition granted. Mercado v. Manzano clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said: That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered. Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court. Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO v. EMERSON S. CARLOS G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013 CJ Sereno A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition. Facts: Petitioner Emmanuel De Castro filed petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto seeking to oust respondent Emerson Carlos from the position of assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). De Castro filed the petition directly with the Supreme Court citing urgent demands of public interest, particularly the veritable need for stability in the civil service and the protection of the rights of civil servants. Moreover, considering that no other than the President of the Philippines is the appointing authority, De Castro doubts if a trial court judge or an appellate court justice, with a prospect of promotion in the judiciary would be willing to go against a presidential appointment. Issue: Whether a presidential appointee can file a petition for quo warranto under Rule 66 directly with the Supreme Court Ruling: Petition denied. Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed. Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition." A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition. A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket. In this case, De Castro justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his Reply and after Carlos had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal of the present Petition. De Castro likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.

De Castro’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be dismissed. AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLE RIGHTS ALLIANCE (A-IPRA) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. G.R. No. 204591, April 16, 2013 J. Reyes The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal. Otherwise, the Supreme Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction. Facts: Petitioner Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance (A-IPRA) is a sectoral political party whose primordial objectives are the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of the indigenous people. It was allowed registration and accreditation by the COMELEC Second Division in January 13, 2010. A-IPRA participated in the May 2010 elections with the Insigne group, headed by Atty. Eugenio Insigne as its nominees but failed to win a seat. For the May 2013 elections, A-IPRA filed Manifestation of Intent to participate in the May 2013 elections with the Lota Group headed by Melvin G. Lota, as its nominees. However, the Insigne Group opposed on the ground that they were never replaced by the Lota Group in accordance with the bylaws of A-IPRA and that they were the legitimate representatives. On November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled the registration and accreditation of A-IPRA. Issue: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Resolution dated November 7, 2012 Ruling: Petition denied. It is a well-settled principle that this Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal; otherwise, the Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. In Atong Paglaum, the Court specifically ruled that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion, thus: We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the

coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision. With a definite ruling of this Court on the absence of grave abuse of discretion in the consolidated cases of Atong Paglaum, the instant petition had become moot and academic and must therefore be dismissed. As regards the legitimacy of the nomination of the Lota Group raised by the Insigne group in their petition for intervention and opposition, the same is more aptly addressed to the COMELEC. The determination of who is the rightful representative of a political party or the legitimate nominee of a party-list group lies with the COMELEC, as part and parcel of its constitutional task of registering political parties, organizations and coalitions under Section 2(5), Article IX(C) of the 1987 Constitution. Apparently, the COMELEC failed to resolve the issue of the legitimacy of the nomination of the Lota Group in its Resolution dated November 7, 2012 and this was raised as an issue by the Insigne Group in the instant petition. However, with the remand of all the petitions to the COMELEC and the directive for it to redetermine the qualifications of the petitioning party-list groups, it is only appropriate that the Insigne Group present their challenge to the legitimacy of the Lota Group’s nomination before the Commission to give it the opportunity to rule on the matter at the same time that it reevaluates A-IPRA’s qualifications to run in the May 2013 elections based on the new set of guidelines in Atong Paglaum. PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND HEALTH MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOTARY PUBLIC JOHN DOE, AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE; J. KING & SONS. CO., INC. G.R. No. 179018, April 17, 2013 CJ Sereno Issues raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court are deemed waived, because these should have been brought up at the first opportunity. Facts: Respondent Union Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Supreme Court’s Decision dated 18 June 2012 raising three new arguments. Issue: Whether issues can be raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court Ruling: Petition denied.

Issues raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before this Court are deemed waived, because these should have been brought up at the first opportunity. Nevertheless, there is no cogent reason to warrant a reconsideration or modification of the 18 June 2012 Decision. Union Bank raises three new issues that require a factual determination that is not within the province of this Court. These questions can be brought to and resolved by the RTC as it is the proper avenue in which to raise factual issues and to present evidence in support of these claims. Anent Union Bank's last contention, there is no need for the Court to discuss and revisit the issue, being a mere rehash of what it has already resolved in its Decision. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of public funds when they are under official custody. In Mamba v. Lara, it has been held that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government. Facts: Respondent Eduardo Cacayuran, along with residents of the municipality, launched a signature campaign opposing the construction of a commercial center at the Agoo Plaza in La Union. They claimed that the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial center, as funded by the proceeds from the loans extended by petitioner Land Bank were "highly irregular, violative of the law, and detrimental to public interests, and will result to wanton desecration of the said historical and public park." Cacayuran sent the officials a letter expressing the residents’ concern and that they be furnished with copies of the pertinent documents however, his letter was unheeded. Cacayuran then filed a complaint, in his capacity as a taxpayer, against the Implicated Officers and Land Bank, assailing, among others, the validity of the Loans on the ground that the Plaza Lot used as collateral thereof is property of public dominion and therefore, beyond the commerce of man. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Cacayuran. Land Bank claims that Cacayuran did not have any standing to contest the construction of the APC as it was funded through the proceeds coming from the Subject Loans and not from public funds. Besides, Cacayuran was not even a party to any of the Subject Loans and is thus, precluded from questioning the same. Issue: 1. Whether Cacayuran has the standing to sue: 2. Whether the funds are public funds 3. Whether Cacayuran must be privy to the contract Ruling: 1. Cacayuran has standing to file the instant suit.

It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met namely, (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. 2. The proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds by the Municipality’s receipt. First, although the construction of the APC would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the Subject Loans, which Land Bank insists are not taxpayer’s money, there is no denying that public funds derived from taxation are bound to be expended as the Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA as a security for the foregoing loans. Needless to state, the Municipality’s IRA, which serves as the local government unit’s just share in the national taxes, is in the nature of public funds derived from taxation. The Court believes, however, that although these funds may be posted as a security, its collateralization should only be deemed effective during the incumbency of the public officers who approved the same, else those who succeed them be effectively deprived of its use. In any event, it is observed that the proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds by the Municipality’s receipt thereof. Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of public funds when they are under official custody. 3. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government.../../G480/Documents/Paula Azurin/Dean's Circle/G.R. No. 191667.htm - fnt33 Second, as a resident-taxpayer of the Municipality, Cacayuran is directly affected by the conversion of the Agoo Plaza which was funded by the proceeds of the Subject Loans. It is wellsettled that public plazas are properties for public use and therefore, belongs to the public dominion. As such, it can be used by anybody and no one can exercise over it the rights of a private owner. In this light, Cacayuran had a direct interest in ensuring that the Agoo Plaza would not be exploited for commercial purposes through the APC’s construction. Moreover, Cacayuran need not be privy to the Subject Loans in order to proffer his objections thereto. In Mamba v. Lara, it has been held that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government. Therefore, as the above-stated requisites obtain in this case, Cacayuran has standing to file the instant suit. APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased mother, Modesta Garcia, and CRISTINA SALAMAT v. DOMINGA ROBLES vda de CAPARAS G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013 J. Del Castillo

Under the Dead Man's Statute Rule, if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro Caparas that he entered into a sharing of leasehold rights with Modesta Garcia and Cristina Salamat cannot be used as evidence against Dominga Caparas as the latter would be unable to contradict or disprove the same. Facts: Flora Makapugay owned a farm tilled by Eugenio Caparas as an agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement. Before Makapugay died, she appointed Amanda de la Paz, her niece, as her attorney-in-fact. After Eugenio died, Amanda entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract with Pedro Caparas, Eugenio’s son, installing Pedro as the sole and lone cultivator of the land. When Pedro died, his wife Dominga Caparas took over as the agricultural lessee. Petitioners Modesta Garcia, substituted by her son, Apolonio Garcia, and Cristina Salamat claimed that during the lifetime of Pedro, their brother, they agreed that they would farm the land on an alternate basis and that Makapugay was aware of this arrangement. They also claimed that Pedro excluded them from farming the land and deceived Amanda into agreeing that he be the sole lessee but upon learning of his deception Amanda recognized them as co-lessees of Pedro. The PARAD and DARAB, on appeal, ruled that Dominga was the lessee and the rightful successor tenant. The CA denied Garcia and Salamat’s appeal. Issue: Whether the agreement entered into between Amanda and Garcia and Salamat prior to the death of Pedro is admissible Ruling: Petition denied. DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96, which was filed in 1996 or long after Pedro’s death in 1984, has no leg to stand on other than Amanda’s declaration in her July 10, 1996 Affidavit that Pedro falsely represented to Makapugay and to her that he is the actual cultivator of the land, and that when she confronted him about this and the alleged alternate farming scheme between him and petitioners, Pedro allegedly told her that "he and his two sisters had an understanding about it and he did not have the intention of depriving them of their cultivatory rights." Garcia and Salamat have no other evidence, other than such verbal declaration, which proves the existence of such arrangement. No written memorandum of such agreement exists, nor have they shown that they actually cultivated the land even if only for one cropping. No receipt evidencing payment to the landowners of the latter’s share, or any other documentary evidence, has been put forward. What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute, which provides that "if

one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction." Thus, since Pedro is deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with Garcia and Salamat, and which is now the subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedro’s surviving spouse and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being unable to contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedro’s prior death. AMELIA AQUINO, et al. v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY G.R. No. 181973, April 17, 2013 J. Perez Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. Facts: Petitioners Amelia Aquino, Rodolfo Taggueg, Jr., Adelaida Hernandez, and Leopoldo Biscocho, Jr., who are second category Philippine Ports Authority officials filed a Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition before the RTC of Manila. They claim that they are entitled to RATA in the amount not exceeding 40% of their respective basic salaries based on recent developments allegedly brought about by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, et al. which was decided almost six (6) years after the Court’s decision in PPA v. COA, et al. They further claim that certain issuances were released by the COA and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), which in effect, extended the cut-off date in the grant of the 40% RATA, thus entitling them to these benefits. Respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata under paragraph (f), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It argued that a case involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of action had already been resolved by this Court in PPA v. COA, et al. The RTC ordered the dismissal of the petition. The CA granted Aquino, et al.’s appeal ruling that res judicata is not applicable in light of the existence of COA and DBM issuances. The case was remanded to the RTC for trial and the RTC ruled in favor of Aquino, et al. The CA reversed the RTC. Issue: Whether the petition must be dismissed on the basis of res judicata or stare decisis Ruling: Although the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the petition must still fail because the Court’s ruling must adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court notes that when the petition was elevated to the CA in the first instance in CA-G.R. SP No. 64702, the matter submitted to be resolved by the appellate court was simply the issue

on whether the trial court was correct in granting the motion to dismiss and in declaring that the case is barred by the principle of res judicata. Despite the non-appeal by PPA of the appellate court’s ruling that res judicata is not applicable, the case did not attain finality in view of the order of the CA remanding the case to the trial court for continuation of hearing. The appellate court’s ruling in CA G.R. SP No. 91743, therefore, was not barred by the ruling in CA G.R. SP No. 64702 since the ruling in the second instance was already a ruling after trial on the merits. Although the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the petition must still fail because the Court’s ruling must adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, the Court expounded on the importance of this doctrine in securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus: Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. HOLY TRINITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. SPOUSES CARLOS ABACAN AND ELIZABETH ABACAN G.R. No. 183858, April 17, 2013 CJ Sereno It is well-settled that the sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. The argument of Spouses Abacan that they subsequently acquired ownership of the subject property cannot be considered as a supervening event that will bar the execution of the questioned judgment, as unlawful detainer does not deal with the issue of ownership. Facts: Petitioner Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation (HTRDC) acquired the property from Santiago, but later found that the lot was already occupied by some individuals, among them respondents Spouses Carlos and Elizabeth Abacan. HTRDC commenced a complaint with the DARAB for cancellation of emancipation patents against some of the occupants of the land. The provincial adjudicator ordered the cancellation of the emancipation patents of the occupants of the land. The DARAB later affirmed the decision of the provincial adjudicator. HTRDC filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages with the MTCC of Malolos against the occupants of the land, again including Spouses Abacan. HTRDC made both verbal and written demands on the occupants to vacate the property. The occupants failed to vacate the property. Thus, HTRDC had to resort to the filing of an ejectment case against them. The MTCC decided in favor of HTRDC. In order to prevent the enforcement of the writ of execution and demolition, Spouses Abacan filed several actions in the RTC but all were dismissed without appeal. The MTCC issued an

Alias Writ of Execution, and an Alias Special Order of Demolition. Spouses Abacan moved to quash both writs on the ground that Emancipation Patent had been issued in their favor during the pendency of the case. As such, they argued that they had now acquired ownership of relevant portions of the subject property. The MTCC denied their motion on the ground that Spouses Abacan’s acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. The CA held that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the matter. Issues: Whether the subsequent acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case Ruling: The MTCC correctly denied their motion, citing our ruling in Oblea v. Court of Appeals and Chua v. Court of Appeals to the effect that the subsequent acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. In this case, the motion to quash was grounded on the sole argument that the judgment should no longer be enforced because of the occurrence of a material supervening event. Spouses Abacan alleged that before the alias writs were issued, but after the MTCC rendered judgment in the unlawful detainer case, they had acquired ownership over the subject property as evidenced by Emancipation Patent Nos. 00780489 and 00780490. The MTCC correctly denied their motion, citing our ruling in Oblea v. Court of Appeals and Chua v. Court of Appeals to the effect that the subsequent acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. According to the MTCC: This court gives due weight to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the cases of Oblea vs. Court of Appeals (244 SCRA 101) and Chua vs. Court of Appeals (271 SCRA 564), wherein it made a categorical pronouncement that the subsequent acquisition of ownership by any person is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. True it is that the sole issue in an action for unlawful detainer x x x is physical or material possession. Such issue of physical or material possession was already passed upon by this court during trial. As held in the case of Dizon vs. Concina (30 SCRA 897), the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the parties respecting title to the land or building. (Sec. 18, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) It is well-settled that the sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. The argument of Spouses Abacan that they subsequently acquired ownership of the subject property cannot be considered as a supervening event that will bar the execution of the questioned judgment, as unlawful detainer does not deal with the issue of ownership.

SPOUSES ARMANDO SILVERIO, SR. and REMEDIOS SILVERIO v. SPOUSES RICARDO and EVELYN MARCELO/SPOUSES EVELYN and RICARDO MARCELO v. SPOUSES ARMANDO SILVERI, SR. and REMEDIOS SILVERIO G.R. Nos. 184079/184490, April 17, 2013 J. VILLARAMA, JR. It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. Facts: Respondents, Spouses Ricardo and Evelyn Marcelo filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners, Spouses Armando Silverio, Sr., and his mother, Remedios Silverio before the MeTC of Parañaque City Branch 78. Spouses Marcelo represented themselves as the lawful owners and possessors of Lot 3976, a residential land in Marcelo Compound, Parañaque City. They claimed ownership over said lot by virtue of a DENR Decision and a Tax Declaration. Spouses Marcelo alleged that Spouses Silverio sought permission to construct a house within Lot 3976 to which Spouses Marcelo agreed on the condition that they will vacate the moment they need the land. Subsequently, Spouses Marcelo made an oral demand on Spouses Silverio to leave the house and return possession of the lot within 15 days from notice but the demand was unheeded. Aside from this, Spouses Marcelo filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents Armando Silverio, Sr., and Remedios Silverio before the MeTC of Parañaque City Bracnh 78. The complaint bore the same allegations in their complaint except that Spouses Marcelo asked for Spouses Silverio’s permission to construct a house and that Spouses Marcelo improved the house and operated a sari sari store. The MeTC of Parañaque City Branches 77 and 78, decided in favor of Spouses Marcelo. The Parañaque RTC Branches 258 and 257 affirmed the ruling of the MeTC Branches 77 and 78 respectively. The CA affirmed the MeTC and RTC. The CA found Spouses Marcelo guilty of forum shopping and splitting of a cause of action. It observed that the two cases for unlawful detainer filed by Spouses Marcelo are based on a single claim of ownership over Lot 3976 which embraces the subject properties. Spouses Silverio and Remedios Silverio claim that a DENR Decision annulled and cancelled the Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of Spouses Marcelo and that Lot 3976 remained as public land. Issues: 1. Whether the filing of separate complaints for unlawful detainer against the same lessees who refuse to vacate, on demand, two different houses constitutes forum shopping and splitting of a cause of action 2. Who between the spouses Marcelo and the Silverios have better right to the physical possession of Lot 3976? Ruling: 1. Evidently, the Spouses Marcelo engaged in forum shopping by filing separate cases for unlawful detainer based on a single claim of ownership over Lot 3976. Said act

is likewise tantamount to splitting a cause of action which, in this case, is a cause for dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia. Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Evidently, the Spouses Marcelo engaged in forum shopping by filing separate cases for unlawful detainer based on a single claim of ownership over Lot 3976. Said act is likewise tantamount to splitting a cause of action which, in this case, is a cause for dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia. On this score alone, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Spouses Marcelo in G.R. Nos. 184490 must fail, alongside their averments in G.R. No. 184079. 2. In any case, even if the Court confronts the issue as to who between the Spouses Marcelo and the Silverios have better right of possession over the subject properties, Spouses Marcelo would still not prevail. As earlier stated, the DENR-NCR had canceled the MSA filed by the spouses Marcelo in its Decision dated July 11, 2007. The Department found that the spouses Marcelo failed to satisfy the requirements for the acquisition of Lot 3976 under the Public Land Act. The DENR-NCR clarified that the Decision dated December 12, 1996 gave due course to the application, not only of the spouses Marcelo, but also those of other applicants. It gave weight to the findings in the ocular inspection that the spouses Marcelo are actually occupying only 50 square meters of Lot 3976 while the remaining portions are inhabited by 111 families. The DENR-NCR adds that the spouses Marcelo cannot claim the entire Lot No. 3976 since Republic Act No. 730 limits the area of land that may be applied for to 1,000 square meters. In conclusion, the DENR-NCR held that Lot 3976 remains a public land and its dwellers may apply for the purchase of those portions that they are actually occupying. Factual considerations relating to lands of the public domain properly rest within the administrative competence of the Director of Lands and the DENR. Findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise because of their jurisdiction, are confined to specific matters and are accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts. Even if they are not binding to civil courts exercising jurisdiction over ejectment cases, such factual findings deserve great consideration and are accorded much weight. Nonetheless, the declaration by the DENR-NCR that Lot 3976 is still part of the public domain does not mean that neither of the parties is entitled to the possession of the subject properties. In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, we reiterated the policy behind the summary action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, thus: It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the

object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his.../../G480/Documents/Paula Azurin/Dean's Circle/G.R. No. 184079.htm - fnt56 It is undisputed by the spouses Marcelo that the Silverios presently occupy those portions of Lot 3976 which are the subjects of the consolidated petitions before us. In particular, the Silverios tie their possession of the parcel at issue in G.R. No. 184490 to Florante Marcelo who appropriated a portion of Lot 3976 for himself, and with his wife, constructed a house thereon in 1986. As regards the portion of Lot 3976 subject of G.R. No. 184079, the Silverios have established their dwelling thereon in 1987 - long after Lot 3976 was classified as alienable and disposable public land on January 3, 1968. Considering that the Silverios are in actual possession of the subject portions of Lot 3976, they are entitled to remain on the property until a person who has a title or a better right lawfully ejects them. The ruling in this case, however, does not preclude the Silverios and the spouses Marcelo from introducing evidence and presenting arguments before the proper administrative agency to establish any right to which they may be entitled under the law. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT FO THE PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) v. SPOUSES WILLIAM AND REBECCA GENATO G.R. No. 187677, April 17, 2013 CJ Sereno The existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true ownership of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy. Facts: Petitioner Republic of the Philippines represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) filed a complaint against several defendants including respondents, Spouses William and Rebecca Genato. The Republic was informed that the land of Spouses Genato overlapped government property causing it to file a Manifestation and Motion to have the property declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject of conflicting claims. The RTC admitted the amended complaint and deferred the release of the amount and deposited it with the bank as well as declaring the property as subject of conflicting claims. The RTC ruled that the issue of the validity of the title would be properly ventilated in a separate proceeding and barred the Republic from presenting further evidence. The CA dismissed the Republic’s appeal. Issue:

Whether the trial court has the jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of the ownership of the land in an expropriation proceeding Ruling: Petition granted. Indeed, this Court first had the occasion to interpret Section 9, Rule 67 in the case of Republic. In addressing the issue of "whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned," the Court answered in the affirmative: The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned, must be resolved in the affirmative. That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provides: SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the clerk of court for the benefit of the persons adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made. In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true ownership of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy. However, the authority to resolve ownership should be taken in the proper context. The discussion in Republic was anchored on the question of who among the respondents claiming ownership of the property must be indemnified by the Government: Now, to determine the person who is to be indemnified for the expropriation of Lot 6, Block 6, Psd-2017, the court taking cognizance of the expropriation must necessarily determine if the sale to the Punzalan spouses by Antonio Feliciano is valid or not. For if valid, said spouses must be the ones to be paid by the condemnor; but if invalid, the money will be paid to someone else. Thus, such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be construed as final and binding on the parties. By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANTE L. DUMALAG G.R. No. 180514, April 17, 2013

J. Leonardo-De Castro The failure of police officers to mark the items seized from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its confiscation at the place of arrest does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. Facts: A buy-bust operation was organized composed of PO3 Albano, PO2 Valdez, SPO4 Salvatierra and PO2 Harold Nicolas, with PO3 Albano acting as the poseur-buyer. PO3 Albano marked the buy bust money with the letter “R”. The team proceeded to the respondent, Dante Dumalag’s room, Room 03 at the beach resort. Dumalag gave a sachet with white substance to PO3 Albano and PO3 Albano gave the marked money to Dumalag. PO3 Albano gave the signal and Dumalag was apprehended. They brought Dumalag to the Laoag police station where the sachet was marked “R” on one side and “DD” by PO3 Albano. PO2 Valdez marked the items he confiscated “DUV” and brought the items to the laboratory for examination along with a letter request. The laboratory examination yielded a positive result for metamphetamine hydrochloride. During his testimony, PO3 Albano identified their Joint Affidavit of arrest, the extract of the police blotter showing the pre-operation activity; the extract of the police blotter containing the post operations report, the two pieces of P100 bills buy bust money, the three plastic confiscated from the possession of the accused with the marking letter "R" and "DD", the P50 bill in which the three sachets were supposedly rolled, the plastic sachet containing crystalline substance that was sold by the suspect and the Certification of Seized Items. PO2 Valdez identified those that he confiscated: the five (5) pieces of crumpled aluminum foil, the Nokia 3210 cellphone, the Winston cigarette pack, a stick of Winston cigarette and a purple cigarette lighter. Both witnesses also identified the letter request for laboratory examination and the letter request for urine examination. The RTC and CA convicted Dumalag. Dumalag argued that the police officers who arrested him and purportedly confiscated the sachets of shabu from his possession failed to strictly comply with the mandated procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Dumalag claimed that the sachets of shabu supposedly seized from his possession were marked when he was already at the police station and not at the place of his arrest. Issues: Whether the chain of custody rule has been complied with Ruling: The Court finds that the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu seized from Dumalag had been duly established by the prosecution, in compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of

dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence. In this case, prosecution witnesses, PO3 Albano and PO2 Valdez, categorically stated under oath that as members of the buy-bust team, they caught accused-appellant in flagrante delicto selling and possessing shabu. The prosecution was able to establish that (a) Dumalag had no authority to sell or to possess any dangerous drugs; (b) during the buy-bust operation conducted by the police on January 5, 2005 at the Sexy Beach Resort in Barangay Estancia, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, accused-appellant sold and delivered to PO3 Albano, acting as a poseur-buyer, for the price of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), one heat-sealed plastic sachet containing 0.023 grams of white crystalline substance, chemically confirmed to be shabu; and (c) as a result of a search incidental to the valid warrantless arrest of accused-appellant, he was caught in possession of three more heat-sealed plastic sachets containing 0.01, 0.015, and 0.04 grams of white crystalline substance, all chemically confirmed also to be shabu. The two marked One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills used as buy-bust money, as well as the aforementioned sachets of shabu were among the object evidence submitted by the prosecution to the RTC. As for the non-presentation by the prosecution of the informant, this point need not be belabored. The Court has time and again held that "the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative." The informant's testimony is not needed if the sale of the illegal drug has been adequately proven by the prosecution. Furthermore, the Court finds that the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu seized from Dumalag had been duly established by the prosecution, in compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. As pertinently summarized by the Court of Appeals, the prosecution had proven each and every link of the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu from the time they were seized from Dumalag, kept in police custody then transferred to the laboratory for examination, and up to their presentation in court. It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark the items seized from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its confiscation at the place of arrest does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In, People v. Resurreccion, the Court explained that "marking" of the seized items "immediately after seizure and confiscation" may be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an accused in illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court elaborated in this wise: Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody. The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

There is no question herein that the confiscated sachets of shabu and related paraphernalia were inventoried and marked in the presence of Dumalag at the police station where he was brought right after his arrest. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO DELIGERO y BACASMOT G.R. No. 189280, April 17, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro The granduncle, or more specifically the brother of the victim’s grandfather, is a relative of the victim in the fourth civil degree, and is thus not covered by Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1) of the Revised Penal Code. Facts: Respondent Alberto Deligero was charged with qualified rape in an Information for raping his granddaughter, AAA, a minor of 15 years of age. The Information alleged him as AAA’s grandfather. The RTC convicted Deligero of qualified rape. The CA affirmed the conviction. However, the CA held that the crime committed was only simple rape as the unauthenticated photocopy of AAA’s baptismal certificate was not sufficient to prove the age of AAA. Furthermore, while it was alleged in the Information that Deligero is AAA’s grandfather, what was proven during the trial was that he was AAA’s granduncle, being the brother of AAA’s paternal grandfather. Issue: Whether Deligero is liable for qualified rape being the granduncle of AAA Ruling: Petition granted. The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the deportment and manner of testifying of Ecatan and Deligero, on one hand, and that of AAA, on the other, concluded that it was AAA who was telling the truth. This Court has repeatedly held that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are "entitled to great weight and respect, if not conclusiveness, for we accept that the trial court was in the best position as the original trier of the facts in whose direct presence and under whose keen observation the witnesses rendered their respective versions of the events that made up the occurrences constituting the ingredients of the offenses charged. The direct appreciation of testimonial demeanor during examination, veracity, sincerity and candor was foremost the trial court’s domain, not that of a reviewing court that had no similar access to the witnesses at the time they testified." Thus, where the Deligero, as in the case at bar, fails to show that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals overlooked a material fact that otherwise would change the outcome, or misappreciated a circumstance of consequence in their assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of their respective versions, this Court is constrained to affirm such uniform factual findings. The Court of Appeals modified the Decision of the trial court and adjudged Deligero to be liable only for simple rape, ruling that the unauthenticated photocopy of AAA’s baptismal certificate was not sufficient to prove the age of AAA. The Court of Appeals furthermore ruled that while it was alleged in the Information that Deligero is AAA’s grandfather, what was proven during the trial was that he was AAA’s granduncle, being the brother of AAA’s paternal grandfather.

The Court agrees with the modification of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the Court notes that even if the correct blood relationship of being AAA’s granduncle was alleged in the Information, and the age of AAA was proven by sufficient evidence, Deligero would still be liable for simple rape. The granduncle, or more specifically the brother of the victim’s grandfather, is a relative of the victim in the fourth civil degree, and is thus not covered by Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1) of the Revised Penal Code. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARILYN AGUILAR y MANZANILLO G.R. No. 191396, April 17, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro Despite the failure of the apprehending officers to make an inventory of and to photograph the items seized from Aguilar, they were nevertheless able to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence had been preserved, the chain of custody of such items, having been adequately established in the case at bar. Facts: A buy-bust operation was conducted with PO2 Medrano as the poseur-buyer. PO2 Medrano marked the buy-bust money with the initials “JG”. After respondent Marilyn Aguilar received the buy-bust money from PO2 Medrano and giving the sachet containing a white crystalline substance to PO2 Medrano, PO2 Medrano gave the signal and his companions rushed forward. They introduced themselves as police officers and apprised her of her rights. PO2 Medrano was able to retrieve another sachet from Aguilar’s pockets when she was asked to turn out her pockets. Aguilar was brought to the police station of Taguig City.PO2 Medrano brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame where the items were identified as metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Aguilar argues that the police officers failed to follow the protocol in the custody and control of seized items due to the absence of an inventory and photographs of the confiscated drugs as required by R.A. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations. Issue: Whether the chain of custody rule has been complied with Ruling: Despite the failure of the apprehending officers to make an inventory of and to photograph the items seized from Aguilar, they were nevertheless able to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence had been preserved, the chain of custody of such items, having been adequately established in the case at bar. While a testimony about a perfect and unbroken chain is ideal, such is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. A perusal of the law reveals, however, that failure to strictly comply with the procedure in Section 21 will not render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible in evidence, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of such items are preserved since they will be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Despite the failure of the apprehending officers to make an inventory of and to photograph the items seized from Aguilar, they were nevertheless able to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence had been preserved, the chain of custody of such items, having been adequately established in the case at bar. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals: It was undisputed that at about 6:20 in the evening of November 30, 2004, PO2 Medrano bought a sachet of shabu from accused-appellant which he paid with two (2) P500.00 marked bill[s]. PO2 Medrano placed the shabu in his pocket then executed the pre-arranged signal. After arresting accused-appellant, PO2 Medrano seized the marked money from the former’s left hand then frisked accused-appellant and found another sachet of shabu. He marked the sachet of shabu he bought "RM-1" and the one he found in accused-appellant’s pocket "RM-2". They brought accused-appellant and the seized items to the headquarters. While accusedappellant was being booked, the team prepared the request for laboratory examination. The request and the seized drugs were personally brought by PO2 Medrano to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Quezon City that same evening. P/Insp. Angel Timario received the request and specimens brought by PO2 Medrano. He weighed and examined the contents of the sachets, confirming that the items were methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. His findings are embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-1171-04. The specimens which bore the markings "RM-1" and "RM-2" were identified by PO2 Medrano during trial. SPOUSES FELIX CHINGKOE and ROSITA CHINGKOE v. SPOUSES FAUSTINO CHINGKOE and GLORIA CHINGKOE G.R. No. 185518, April 17, 2013 CJ Sereno In the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. Facts: Respondents, Spouses Faustino and Gloria Chingkoe are the registered owners of a real property in Quezon City, where they allowed Spouses Felix and Rosita to inhabit. Due to the insistence of his mother, Tan Po Chu, Faustino agreed to sell to Felix the property on the condition that the title shall be delivered only after the full payment of the purchase price and settlement of their mortgage obligations with RCBC. Faustino delivered to Felix an uncompleted Deed of Sale to be completed upon full payment. Faustino sent a demand letter asking Felix and Rosita to vacate the property but refused to do so. Faustino and Gloria then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC of Quezon City. Felix and Rosita, in their Answer, presented a complete Deed of Sale claiming that they had paid the full price but Faustino and Gloria refused to give them the property. Felix and Rosita filed an action for specific performance against Faustino and Gloria.

The MTC ruled in favor of Felix and Rosita taking into consideration the Deed of Sale. The RTC affirmed the MTC. The CA reversed the lower courts saying that the Deed of Sale was only a document preparatory to an actual sale. Issues: 1. Whether the CA can admit and give weight to a testimony given in a different proceeding (action for specific performance) pending before the Regional Trial Court in resolving the issue herein (unlawful detainer) 2. Whether the CA can rule on the validity of a Deed of Sale in a summary ejectment action Ruling: 1. The reasons advanced by the CA in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 3156 are valid and not contrary to law. The reasons advanced by the CA in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 3156 are valid and not contrary to law. As a general rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." The general rule admits of exceptions as enumerated in Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, the Court, citing U.S. v. Claveria, which the Court quotes: In the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, ‘in the absence of objection,’ ‘with the knowledge of the opposing party,’ or ‘at the request or with the consent of the parties’ the case is clearly referred to or ‘the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives' and 'admitted as part of the record of the case then pending.’ And unlike the factual situation in Tabuena v. CA, the decision in Civil Case No. 3156 formed part of the records of the instant case (Civil Case No. 2728) with the knowledge of the parties and in the absence of their objection. In the case at bar, as the CA rightly points out in its Resolution dated 28 November 2008, Felix and Rosita never objected to the introduction of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes containing the testimony of Tan Po Chu, which were records of Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. As shown by the records and as Felix and Rosita admitted in their Reply, the testimony was already introduced on appeal before the RTC. In fact, it was Felix and Rosita themselves who specifically cited Civil Case No. Q-95-22865, referring to it both by name and number, purportedly to bolster the claim that they were constrained to sue, in order to compel delivery of the title.

2. Although the issue in unlawful detainer cases is physical possession over a property, trial courts may provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. Concerning the second issue, Felix and Rosita object to the assessment of the Deed of Sale by the CA, claiming such a determination is improper in summary proceedings. It should be noted that it was Felix and Rosita who introduced the Deed of Sale in evidence before the MTC and the RTC, as evidence of their claimed right to possession over the property. They attached the deed to their Answer as Annex "1." The CA discovered that they falsified their copy of the document denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale in this wise: Said draft of the deed was undated and bears the signature of one witness, as can be clearly noticed upon its very careful perusal. Notably, respondents made it appear in the draft of the Deed of Absolute Sale that there indeed was a valid and consummated sale when in truth and in fact, there was none. The document accomplished by the respondents (herein petitioners) gave them some semblance, albeit highly questionable, of ownership over the property by affixing their signatures, affixing the signature of one Cora Hizon as witness and superimposing the signature of Jane Chan with that of one Noralyn Collado. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states that when the defendant raises the question of ownership in unlawful detainer cases and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. This Court has repeatedly ruled that although the issue in unlawful detainer cases is physical possession over a property, trial courts may provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. "These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality." MAY 2013 JUNE 2013 MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and the ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 J. Carpio Fujiki, Marinay’s first spouse, filed an action for recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying the second bigamous marriage of her marriage to Maekara. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of

criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "the term of prescription of the crime of bigamy shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago." FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national, married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the Philippines but both lost contact with one another. Marinay met another Japanese national, Shinichi Maekara and married in the Philippines without dissolving the first marriage. Fujiki and Marinay reestablished their relationship and were able to obtain a judgment from a Japanese family court declaring the marriage between Maekara and Marinay as void for being bigamous. Fujiki filed a petition for the recognition of the judgment of the Japanese family court with the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC dismissed the petition because only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki. The RTC denied Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration. The Solicitor General, acting for the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, filed a Manifestation and Motion agreeing with Fujiki’s petition, arguing that Fujiki is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage void and that the petition to recognize the foreign judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. ISSUE: Whether the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court RULING: Petition granted. To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirements of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which

presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court. In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code. For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines. However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago." PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), ANTONIO P. BELICENA, ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., RAUL C. DE VERA, ROSANNA P. DIALA and JOSEPH A. CABOTAJE G.R. Nos. 185729-32, June 26, 2013 J. Abad After Mercado was granted immunity and placed under the witness protection program, the Sandiganbayan refused to recognize his immunity by declining to discharge him from the information as a state witness. The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. Indeed, Congress has vested such power in the Ombudsman as well as in the Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to employ an accused as a state witness must necessarily originate from the public prosecutors whose mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the several accused before the courts. Courts should generally defer to the judgment of the prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be used as a witness only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119.

FACTS: Homero A. Mercado, was the President of JAM Liner, Inc. The other respondents, Antonio A. Belicena, Uldarico P. Andutan Jr., Raul C. De Vera, and Rosanna P. Diala, were Department of Finance (DOF) officials formerly assigned at its One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback Center (DOF One-Stop Shop). Mercado showed willingness to testify against the criminal syndicate that allegedly ran the tax credit scam at the DOF One-Stop Shop and applied with the Department of Justice (DOJ) for immunity as state witness under its witness protection program. The DOJ granted immunity to Mercado. The Office of the Ombudsman charged him and Belicena, et al. before the Sandiganbayan’s Fourth Division with violations of Section 3(j) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 and two counts of falsification under Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code. Mercado filed a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation before the Ombudsman, citing the DOJ’s grant of immunity to him. The Ombudsman executed an Immunity Agreement with Mercado. The agreement provided that, in consideration for granting him immunity from suit, Mercado would produce all relevant documents in his possession and testify against the accused in all the cases, criminal or otherwise, that may be filed against them. The Ombudsman filed a motion to discharge Mercado from the information involving him. The Sandiganbayan denied the Ombudsman’s motion ruling that the pieces of evidence adduced during the hearing of the Ombudsman’s motion failed to establish the conditions required under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court for the discharge of an accused as a state witness. The Sandiganbayan denied the Ombudsman’s motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to recognize the immunity from criminal prosecution that the Ombudsman granted Mercado and, as a result, in declining to discharge him from the information as a state witness RULING: Petition granted. The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. Indeed, Congress has vested such power in the Ombudsman as well as in the Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to employ an accused as a state witness must necessarily originate from the public prosecutors whose mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the several accused before the courts. The latter do not as a rule have a vision of the true strength of the prosecution’s evidence until after the trial is over. Consequently, courts should generally defer to the judgment of the prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be used as a witness only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119. But the records, particularly Mercado’s consolidated affidavit, show that his testimony if true could be indispensable in establishing the circumstances that led to the preparation and issuance of fraudulent tax credit certificates. Indeed, nobody appears to be in a better position to testify on this than he, as president of JAM Liner, Inc., the company to which those certificates were issued. Belicena, et al. further contend that Mercado should not be granted immunity because he also benefited from the unlawful transactions. But the immunity granted to Mercado does not

blot out the fact that he committed the offense. While he is liable, the State saw a higher social value in eliciting information from him rather than in engaging in his prosecution. PHILIPPINE HAMMONIA SHIP AGENCY, INC. and DORCHESTER MARINE, LTD. v. EULOGIO DUMADAG G.R. No. 194362, June 26, 2013 J. Brion For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties or any of them. Otherwise stated, there is a question of law when the issue arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the issue involves the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. In the present case, the controversy arises not from the findings made by Hammonia and Dorchester’s physicians which contradict the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician; it arises from the application of the law and jurisprudence on the conflicting assessments of the two sets of physicians. FACTS: Petitioners Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc., in behalf of its principal, Dorchester Marine Ltd., hired respondent Eulogio V. Dumadag for four months as Able Bodied Seaman for the vessel Al Hamra after being declared fit for work. However, while on board Dumadag complained of difficulty in sleeping but was adjudged twice to be fit for work. When his contract ended, he was not rehired despite the findings that he was fit to work. After four consultations finding him unfit for work at sea, Dumadag filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance and attorney’s fees against Hammonia and Dorchester. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Dumadag which was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA. ISSUE: Whether the petition should be dismissed for raising only questions of fact and not of law in violation of the rules. RULING: Petition denied. The Court finds Hammonia and Dorchester’s position untenable. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties or any of them. Otherwise stated, there is a question of law when the issue arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the issue involves the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. In the present case, the controversy arises not from the findings made by Hammonia and Dorchester’s physicians which contradict the fit-towork certification of the company-designated physician; it arises from the application of the law and jurisprudence on the conflicting assessments of the two sets of physicians. The Court thus finds no procedural obstacle in its review of the case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DATU NOT ABDUL G.R. No. 186137, June 26, 2013 CJ Sereno

Abdul was convicted despite the evidentiary gaps in the testimonies of the police officers. The chain-of-custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the corpus delicti presented in court is shown to be one and the same as that which was retrieved from the accused or from the crime scene. Two crucial links must be complied with. First, the seized illegal drug must be marked in the presence of the accused and immediately upon confiscation. This marking must be supported by details on how, when, and where the marking was done, as well as the witnesses to the marking. Second, the turnover of the seized drugs at every stage – from confiscation from the accused, transportation to the police station, conveyance to the chemistry lab, and presentation to the court  must be shown and substantiated. It was a grave error for the CA to rule that there was an unbroken chain of custody simply because the plastic sachet had been marked, inventoried, sent to the crime laboratory for analysis, and found positive for shabu, despite the fact that the integrity of the confiscated item throughout the entire process had never been established. FACTS: Respondent Datu Not Abdul was apprehended during a buy-bust operation conducted by PO2 Daniel Akia of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency acting as the poseur-buyer together with P S/Insp John Mencio, SPO4 Marquez Madlon, and PO2 Erwin Garcia. The police officers brought him to the PDEA office, where the operation was documented and the arrest report and the Affidavits of the arresting officers were prepared. Also, an inventory of the item seized from Adbul was made in the presence of representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the media, and the barangay council. PO2 Akia allegedly marked the plastic sachet with the initials "MKM, DEA, EMG" and Exhibit "A." The plastic sachet was then forwarded to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office Cordillera Administrative Region for analysis. The forensic analyst, PO2 Juliet Valentin Albon issued a chemistry report which found that the plastic sachet contained 1.85 grams of a white crystalline substance; and that a qualitative examination gave a positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The RTC convicted Abdul which was affirmed by the CA. In his appeal before the Supreme Court, Abdul cited inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers and that the buy-bust operation team failed to follow the guidelines for drug operations, as SPO4 Madlon testified that he did not place any markings on the plastic sachet of shabu at the place where the arrest took place, but only marked it at the office. Also, the testimonies of PO2 Akia and PO2 Garcia were silent as to when and where the marking of the shabu took place. ISSUES: 1. 2. rule

Whether an issue raised for the first on appeal may be reviewed by the Supreme Court Whether the prosecution sufficiently established compliance with the chain-of-custody

RULING: Petition granted. 1. This case falls under this exception because the CA, in appreciating the facts, erred in affirming the RTC’s ruling that there was compliance with the rule on the chain of custody.

Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments should be brought to the attention of the trial court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule arises when there is plain error. An instance of plain error is overlooking, misapprehending, or misapplying facts of weight and substance that, if properly appreciated, would warrant a different conclusion. This case falls under this exception because the CA, in appreciating the facts, erred in affirming the RTC’s ruling that there was compliance with the rule on the chain of custody. 2. It was a grave error for the CA to rule that there was an unbroken chain of custody simply because the plastic sachet had been marked, inventoried, sent to the crime laboratory for analysis, and found positive for shabu, despite the fact that the integrity of the confiscated item throughout the entire process had never been established. The chain-of-custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the corpus delicti presented in court is shown to be one and the same as that which was retrieved from the accused or from the crime scene. This rule, when applied to drug cases, requires a more stringent application, because the corpus delicti – the narcotic substance  is not readily identifiable and must be subjected to scientific analysis to determine its composition and nature. Hence, every link in the chain of custody must not show any possibility of tampering, alteration or substitution. However, it is accepted that a perfect chain is not the standard. Nonetheless, two crucial links must be complied with. First, the seized illegal drug must be marked in the presence of the accused and immediately upon confiscation. This marking must be supported by details on how, when, and where the marking was done, as well as the witnesses to the marking. Second, the turnover of the seized drugs at every stage – from confiscation from the accused, transportation to the police station, conveyance to the chemistry lab, and presentation to the court  must be shown and substantiated. All the foregoing facts show that there were substantial evidentiary gaps in the chain of custody of the plastic sachet. Hence, these facts put into question the reliability and evidentiary value of the contents of the alleged confiscated plastic sachet from appellant – if indeed it was the same as the one brought to the laboratory for examination, found positive for shabu, and then presented before the RTC. It was a grave error for the CA to rule that there was an unbroken chain of custody simply because the plastic sachet had been marked, inventoried, sent to the crime laboratory for analysis, and found positive for shabu, despite the fact that the integrity of the confiscated item throughout the entire process had never been established. It is of no moment either that Abdul stipulated the existence of Chemistry Report No. D-057-05, as this report did not amount to an admission of the identity of the contents of the plastic sachet. Instead, it merely proved the existence and authenticity of the request for a laboratory examination, and its result had no bearing on the required chain of custody from the time of seizure of the plastic sachet. J PLUS ASIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. UTILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION G.R. No. 199650, June 26, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. The CIAC rendered an arbitral award that was appealed to the CA through a Petition for Review under Rule 43. With the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7902 and promulgation of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the CIAC was included in the enumeration of quasijudicial agencies whose decisions or awards may be appealed to the CA in a petition for review under Rule 43. Such review of the CIAC award may involve either questions of fact, of law, or of fact and law. FACTS: Petitioner J Plus Asia Development Corporation and Martin Mabuhay entered into a Construction Agreement where Mabuhay would construct J Plus Asia’s condominium/hotel building. After it was found that only 31.39% of the project was completed, J Plus terminated the contract and sent letters of demand that were unheeded. J Plus filed a request for arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) and prayed that Mabuhay and his surety, respondent Utility Assurance, pay liquidated damages and overpayment. The CIAC ruled in favor of J Plus. The CA reversed the CIAC’s ruling. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act and the Special Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution stripped the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction to review arbitral awards. 2. Whether the CA erred in reversing the arbitral award on an issue that was not raised in the answer, not identified in the terms of reference, not assigned as an error, and not argued in any of the pleadings filed before the court. RULING: 1. The Court finds no merit in J Plus’ contention that with the institutionalization of alternative dispute resolution under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the CA was divested of jurisdiction to review the decisions or awards of the CIAC. On the procedural issues raised, the Court finds no merit in J Plus’ contention that with the institutionalization of alternative dispute resolution under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the CA was divested of jurisdiction to review the decisions or awards of the CIAC. J Plus erroneously relied on the provision in said law allowing any party to a domestic arbitration to file in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition either to confirm, correct or vacate a domestic arbitral award. The Court holds that R.A. No. 9285 did not confer on Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction to review awards or decisions of the CIAC in construction disputes. On the contrary, Section 40 thereof expressly declares that confirmation by the RTC is not required. Executive Order (EO) No. 1008 vests upon the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. By express provision of Section 19 thereof, the arbitral award of the CIAC is final and unappealable, except on questions of law, which are appealable to the Supreme Court. With the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7902 and promulgation of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the CIAC was included in the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies whose decisions or awards may be appealed to the CA in a petition for review under Rule 43. Such review of the CIAC award may involve either questions of fact, of law, or of fact and law.

J Plus misread the provisions of A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC (Special ADR Rules) promulgated by this Court and which took effect on October 30, 2009. Since R.A. No. 9285 explicitly excluded CIAC awards from domestic arbitration awards that need to be confirmed to be executory, said awards are therefore not covered by Rule 11 of the Special ADR Rules, as they continue to be governed by EO No. 1008, as amended and the rules of procedure of the CIAC. The CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration provide for the manner and mode of appeal from CIAC decisions or awards in Section 18 thereof which states that a petition for review from a final award may be taken by any of the parties within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 2. As to the alleged error committed by the CA in deciding the case upon an issue not raised or litigated before the CIAC, this assertion has no basis. As to the alleged error committed by the CA in deciding the case upon an issue not raised or litigated before the CIAC, this assertion has no basis. Whether or not Mabunay had incurred delay in the performance of his obligations under the Construction Agreement was the very first issue stipulated in the Terms of Reference (TOR), which is distinct from the issue of the extent of Utility Assurance’s liability under the Performance Bond. Indeed, resolution of the issue of delay was crucial upon which depends J Plus’ right to the liquidated damages pursuant to the Construction Agreement. Contrary to the CIAC’s findings, the CA opined that delay should be reckoned only after the lapse of the one-year contract period, and consequently Mabuhay’s liability for liquidated damages arises only upon the happening of such condition. POSEIDON INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SERVICES, INC. v. TITO R. TAMALA, FELIPE S. SAURIN, JR. ARTEMIO A. BO-OC and JOEL S. FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 186475, June 26, 2013 J. Brion A petition was filed to assail a CA decision rendered under Rule 65 where it failed to pass upon the intrinsic correctness of the NLRC decision. In reviewing the legal correctness of a CA decision rendered under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Court examines the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, and not strictly on the basis of whether the NLRC decision under review is intrinsically correct. FACTS: Respondents Tito Tamala, Felipe Saurin, Jr., Artemio Bo-oc, and Joel Hernandez filed a complaint against petitioner International Maritime Services, Inc. for illegal termination of employment with prayer for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts; and for non-payment of salaries, overtime pay and vacation leave pay with the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint which was affirmed by the NLRC. The CA reversed the NLRC. ISSUE: Whether in a Rule 65 Review the CA may pass upon the intrinsical correctness of the appealed decision

RULING: Petition denied. The settled rule is that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to the review of questions of law, i.e., to legal errors that the CA may have committed in its decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional errors that we undertake in original certiorari actions under Rule 65. In reviewing the legal correctness of a CA decision rendered under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Court examines the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, and not strictly on the basis of whether the NLRC decision under review is intrinsically correct. In other words, the Court has to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. Viewed in this light, the Court does not re-examine the factual findings of the NLRC and the CA, nor does the Court substitute its own judgment for theirs, as their findings of fact are generally conclusive on this Court. The Court cannot touch on factual questions "except in the course of determining whether the CA correctly ruled in determining whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in considering and appreciating the factual issues before it." WILSON T. GO v. BPI FINANCE CORPORATION G.R. No. 199354, June 26, 2013 J. Brion Under the requirements, it is clear that only fifteen (15) days may initially be requested, not the thirty (30) days petitioner requested. The petitioner cannot also assume that his motion has been granted if the CA did not immediately act.In any case, the late response cannot be used as an excuse to delay the filing of its pleading as a party cannot make any assumption on how his motion would be resolved. Precisely, a motion is submitted to the court for resolution and we cannot allow any assumption that it would be granted.

FACTS: Respondent is engaged in the business of extending credit card accommodations to its cardholders through the use of credit cards for the purchase of goods and services from BPI’s member establishments on the condition that the charges incurred shall be reimbursed by the cardholders to BPI upon proper billing.In this regard, the respondent filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money with the MeTC against petitioner as one of its cardholders for the latter’s incurred credit charges amounting to Php 77,970.91. The petitioner denied the respondent’s allegations, contending that the BPI credit card was a company account and was issued to him because of his position as Executive VicePresident of Noah’s Ark Merchandising, and being such, he cannot be held liable as he was only acting on behalf of the company.

The petitioner, however, failed to produce evidence during the hearing which resulted in the MeTC declaring his waiver of such right and deemed the case submitted for decision. On April 23, 2008, the MeTC rendered its judgment holding the petitioner liable to pay respondent the balance due plus interest and other charges. An appeal was then filed by the petitioner with the RTC, which rendered a decision on September 4, 2009 affirming the MeTC decision. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the RTC on November 16, 2009, which order was received by the petitioner’s counsel on November 26, 2009.

On December 10, 2009, petitioner filed before the CA a motion for extension of time for 30 days, or up to January 10, 2009, within which to appeal. However, since January 10, 2010 was a Sunday, petitioner instead filed his petition for review on January 11, 2010.On May 20, 2010, or 4 months after the motion for extension of time was filed, the CA issued the disputed May 4, 2010 resolution, which partially granted the motion for extension and gave petitioner a period of 15 days, or until December 25, 2009, instead of the 30 days as requested, and denied the petition for review for being filed beyond the period of extension given. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA on October 12, 2011. Hence, a this petition under Rule 45 was filed by petitioner assailing the resolutions of the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review should be given recognition as he only became aware of the 15-day extension granted him instead of the 30-day request four months after he filed the same. RULING: We deny the petition for lack of merit. Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that: Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. — A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. The rule is clear that an appeal to the CA must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days. While a further extension of fifteen (15) days may be requested, a specific request must be made with specifically cited reason for the request. The CA may grant the request only at its discretion and, by jurisprudence, only on the basis of reasons it finds meritorious. Under the requirements, it is clear that only fifteen (15) days may initially be requested, not the thirty (30) days Go requested. The petitioner cannot also assume that his motion has been granted if the CA did not immediately act. In fact, faced with the failure to act, the conclusion is that no favorable action had taken place and the motion had been denied. It is thus immaterial that the resolution granting the extension of time was only issued four months later, although such late action is a response we cannot approve of. In any case, the late response cannot be used as an excuse to delay the filing of its pleading as a party cannot make any assumption on how his motion would be resolved. Precisely, a motion is submitted to the court for resolution and we cannot allow any assumption that it would be granted.

We ruled in Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals where we said that the appellant "knew or ought to have known that, pursuant to the above rule, his motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days could be granted for only fifteen (15) days. There simply was no basis for assuming that the requested 30-day extension would be granted." As we heretofore stressed, an extension of time to appeal is generally allowed only for fifteen (15)

days. Go cannot simply demand for a longer period, without citing the reason therefor, for the court's consideration and application of discretion. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMAN ZAFRA y SERRANO G.R. No. 197363, June 26, 2013

J. Leonardo-de Castro The Supreme Court has been regular in its declaration that "inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape."Besides, the task of evaluating the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is best left to the RTC, which had the opportunity to scrutinize the witnesses directly during the trial. FACTS: A complaint was filed by the daughter of herein accused, hereinafter referred to as AAA, against her father for the crime of rape to which the accused pleaded not guilty uponhis arraignment. The evidence for the prosecution showed that the accused first started molesting his daughter when she was around 13 or 14 years old, which developed into actual sexual intercourse when she was about 15. AAA claimed that her mother knew about what her father was doing to her but did nothing to stop it. AAA told no one about her ordeal except her best friend for fear of her father, and that her mother might not side with her. As such, she moved to her aunt’s house on November 2001. However, sometime thereafter, AAA was called by her brother overto their residenceforher father apparently had some chores for her to do. Upon AAA’s arrival thereat, her father told her to fix his beddings and wash the dishes. The accused however went inside the room and locked the door just as AAA was about to get out. Thereupon, the accused raped his daughter and wiped his penis with a towel after he ejaculated. Upon her return to her aunt’s house, AAA was asked by her mother, “inulit na naman ng tatay mo, ano?” to which she replied yes. Her mother then went back to their house, got the linen in her father’s room, then soaked it in water. AAA then filed the complaint abovestated. The accused on the other hand denied the charge against him and claimed that the complaint was filed as an act of retaliation by his wife, and presented letters from AAA wherein she admitted to fabricating the charge against her father because he and her mother fought. The RTC found merit in the evidence of the prosecution and found the accused guilty of qualified rape of his minor daughter and sentenced him to death. The accused then appealed the decision of the RTC with the CA, imputing error on the part of the RTC for relying on AAA’s inconsistent testimony. The CA however denied his appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in giving credence to the testimony of the private complainant’s highly inconsistent and unrealistic testimony. RULING:

The present appeal is devoid of merit. As stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial, Zafra does not contest the facts that AAA is his biological daughter and was only 17 years old on December 14, 2001, the time the last rape occurred. What Zafra challenges is his conviction in light of the evidence the prosecution submitted during his trial. Zafra attacks the credibility of AAA for being inconsistent. He claims that during AAA’s testimony, she was so confused that she contradicted her own statements. Zafra also emphasizes the fact that prior to December 14, 2001, AAA acted as if nothing had happened at all. Zafra claims that the fact that she did not stay away from him despite the alleged incidents of rape belie her claim of sexual abuse. In support of his argument, Zafra points out the fact that AAA did not sustain any external physical marks, as shown by the medico-legal findings, despite her testimony that on December 14, 2001, Zafra punched her thighs whenever she resisted him. This Court has been regular in its declaration that "inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape." Thus, Zafra’s attempt to discredit AAA’s testimony that he raped her on December 14, 2001 must ultimately fail for his failure to show solid grounds on which to impeach it. Besides, the task of evaluating the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is best left to the RTC, which had the opportunity to scrutinize the witnesses directly during the trial, viz: It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness’ credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate court can see are the cold words of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk that some of what the witness actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As correctly stated by an American court, "There is an inherent impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot be transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be considered by the appellate court. Zafra’s denial is coupled with the attribution of ill motive against AAA. He claims that AAA filed this case because he scolded her and because of his quarrel with his wife and in-laws. AAA’s credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such imputation of ill motives. It is highly unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives or grudge. Moreover, Zafra’s claim that his wife wanted him in jail is contrary to AAA’s testimony that her own mother, Zafra’s wife, tried to dissuade her from filing this case against him. Zafra’s defense of denial must necessarily fail. It is a well-settled doctrine that such defense will only prosper upon the presentation of clear and convincing evidence substantiating it. Otherwise, it is a selfserving assertion that deserves no weight in law, and which cannot prevail over the positive, candid, and categorical testimony of the complainant.

Courts look upon retractions with considerable disfavor because they are generally unreliable. To explain the rationale for rejecting recantations, this Court, in People v. Alejo, quoting Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, held: Mere retraction by a witness or by complainant of his or her testimony does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony or statement, if credible. The general rule is that courts look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. x x x. The reason is because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that they will later be repudiated and there would never be an end to criminal litigation. It would also be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their minds for one reason or another. This would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. In the case at bar, AAA’s retractions were not even in an Affidavit of Desistance. They were written on mere scraps of paper, and in different handwritings. This Court agrees with both lower courts that if the notes were genuine, they should have been authenticated according to the rules on evidence. If it were true that AAA wanted to withdraw the case against her father, she should have approached the prosecutor and expressed her desire to do so. Moreover, she should have taken the witness stand once more to attest to her alleged letters. It is worthy to note that in her alleged recantations, AAA enumerated, as reasons for her filing this complaint, the same exact defenses Zafra presented before the court.

VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS-DIO, as authorized representative of H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., and WESTDALE ASSETS, LTD. v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE RAMON S. CAGUIOA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, and TIMOTHY J. DESMOND G.R. No. 178947, June 26, 2013 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TIMOTHY J. DESMOND G.R. No. 179079, June 26, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial. The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court.The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. FACTS: In 2001, petitioner Virginia De Los Santos-Dio, the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd.and authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd., was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and CEO of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc., and the authorized representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc., the majority shareholder of SBMEI. Dio, on behalf os H.S. Equities, Ltd., decided to invest in SBMEI’s Ocean Adventure Marine Park. Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI had substantial capital and guaranteed returns on investment, which led to the execution of a Subscription Agreement between the Desmond, as representative of SBMEI and JV China, and Dio, as representative of HS Equities.In another transaction, this time on behalf of Westdale, invested in a separate business venture, call Miracle Beach Hotel Project, which involved the development of a resort owned by Desmond adjoining Ocean Adventure.Dio further claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmond’s representations, SBMEI actually had no capacity to deliver on its guarantees, and that in fact, as of 2001, it was incurring losses. She likewise claimed to have discovered false entries in the company’s books and financial statements. Dio thus filed two criminal complaints against Desmond for estafa (a) through false pretenses under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC; and (b) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through misappropriation or conversion under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC, both against Desmond before the Olongapo City Prosecutor’s Office. In his defense, Desmond maintained that his representation of himself as Chairman and CEO of SBMEI was not a sham and that Dio had not even proven that he did not have the expertise and qualifications to double her investment.After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause against Desmond for the abovementioned crimes. In view of the foregoing, criminal informations were correspondingly filed with the RTC docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 516-2004 and 515-2004. The RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that no probable cause exists for the crimes charged against him since not all the elements of estafa were present. The City Prosecutor then filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied. As such, it filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. CA upheld the RTC’s authority to dismiss a criminal case if in the process of determining probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest, it also finds the evidence on record insufficient to establish probable cause. It explained that such dismissal is an exercise of judicial discretion sanctioned under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this score, the CA evaluated the evidence presented and agreed with the RTC’s conclusions that there was no sufficient basis showing that Desmond committed estafa by means of false pretenses. ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it dismissed the subject informations for lack of probable cause. RULING: Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.

The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused immediately upon the filing of the information, the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes a mere superfluity, if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh in on the evidence without a full-blown trial. In the case of Co v. Republic, the Court emphasized the settled distinction between an executive and a judicial determination of probable cause, viz: We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself ascertain from the latter’s findings and supporting documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. This prerogative is granted by no less than the Constitution which provides that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." While a judge’s determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, viz: SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the

case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information. In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause. Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTC’s immediate dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not observed. In this case, records show that certain essential facts – namely, (a) whether or not Desmond committed false representations that induced Dio to invest in Ocean Adventure; and (b) whether or not Desmond utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for the Miracle Beach Project for purposes different from what was agreed upon – remain controverted. As such, it cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) and 315(1) (b) of the RPC had already been established, thereby rendering the RTC’s immediate dismissal of the case highly improper. Lest it be misconceived, trial judges will do well to remember that when a perceived gap in the evidence leads to a "neither this nor that" conclusion, a purposeful resolution of the ambiguity is preferable over a doubtful dismissal of the case. Verily, a judge's discretion to dismiss a case immediately after the filing of the information in court is appropriate only when the failure to establish probable cause can be clearly inferred from the evidence presented and not when its existence is simply doubtful. After all, it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused, the objective of a previously-conducted preliminary investigation being merely to determine whether there is sufficient ground, to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. In this light, given that the lack of probable cause had not been clearly established in this case, the CA erred, and the RTC gravely abused its discretion, by ruling to dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004 and 516-2004. Indeed, these cases must stand the muster of a full-blown trial where the parties could be given, as they should be given, the opportunity to ventilate their respective claims and defenses, on the basis of which the court a quo can properly resolve the factual disputes therein.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PETER LINDA y GEROLAGA G.R. No. 200507, June 26, 2013 J. Perez When the witness rendered a clear and direct narration of the details of the buy-bust operation from the moment the team was organized, upon receipt of the information from the confidential informant, to the time the shabu was marked and turned over to the crime laboratory for examination, andabsent any showing of ill-motive or bad faith on the part of the arresting officers, as in this case where accused-appellant testified that he did not know any of the members of the team, the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty finds application. FACTS: In an Information dated 27 February 2008 accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 before the RTC of Manila to which he pleaded not guilty. The evidence for the prosecution showed that on February 22, 2008, the team of SPO1 Rodolfo Ramos received confidential information regarding the illegal drug activity of the accused along Malate Manilaand thereafter conducted a buy bust operation. As the operation took place, the accused handed to the poseur-buyer one transparent cachet containing white crystalline substance with the resemblance of “shabu.” The accused was then arrested by the poseur-buyer and introduced himself as a police officer, read the accused his rights, and marked the plastic sachet accordingly. The forensic chemist examined the substance and the same tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused on the other hand averred that on that same day, he was doing nothing at home when suddenly several persons entered the house and went looking for his parents. When the accused told them that his parents no longer lives there, he was told to go with the police. The accused alleged that he was only not informed of the charges until he was in court. The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged, which was affirmed by the CA in toto. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE:

Whether the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING:

The appeal is bereft of merit. Here, we see no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.Corroborated by supporting documents, PO2 Bernabe rendered a clear and direct narration of the details of the buy-bust operation from the moment SPO1 Rodolfo Ramos organized the team, upon receipt of the information from the confidential informant, to the time the shabu was marked and turned over to the crime laboratory for examination. Absent any showing of ill-motive or bad faith on the part of the arresting officers, as in this case where accused-appellant testified that he did not know any of the members of the team, the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty finds application. This, we explained in People v. Tion:

x x x Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. Settled is the rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the police officers or deviation from the regular performance of their duties. The records do not show any allegation of improper motive on the part of the buy-bust team. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of the police officers must be upheld. By upholding the credibility of the testimony of the witness for the prosecution on the circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused-appellant, we cannot give credence to the contrary version of the defense that the warrantless arrest was made inside the house of the accused-appellant after the arresting officers failed to find his parents, whom he admitted were also involved in drug-related illegal activities. The argument of the defense that the warrantless arrest was invalid and that the item seized is inadmissible in evidence must, therefore, fail. Proceeding from the above, we find that the essential requisites for illegal sale of shabu were all present in the instant case. These are: "(a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing." The prosecution has likewise complied with the following material requirements: (1) proof that the transaction or sale actually took place and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence." Thus, PO2 Bernabe testified that after he was introduced by the confidential informant to accused-appellant as a friend who wanted to buy shabu, he offered to buy and accused-appellant agreed to sell him drugs worth two hundred pesos (P200.00). When accused-appellant received the marked money, he gave PO2 Bernabe a sachet of white crystalline substance, which, after its marking at the crime scene and upon submission to the laboratory, tested positive for shabu. Both the item subject of the sale and the marked money were presented in court. The defense now argues that the prosecution failed to establish with moral certainty the identity of the item seized because the chemist who examined the specimen did not take the witness stand. Neither did anyone allegedly testify on how the said specimen was delivered to the court.

The contentions are likewise unmeritorious. There is no iota of doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were preserved. The Letter-Request for Laboratory Examination shows that it was PO2 Bernabe who personally delivered to the crime laboratory the specimen that he earlier marked. Moreover, specifically stated in the Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial court was the fact that Reyes herself, the very chemist that examined the specimen, brought the same to the court. And, while the court dispensed with her testimony, the parties already stipulated on the material points she was supposed to testify on. Clearly, the chain of custody was not broken. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MONICA MENDOZA y TRINIDAD

G.R. No. 191267, June 26, 2013 J. Perez

The defense of the accused that she was arrested without a valid warrant, thus making the seized items the fruit of the poisonous tree, should fail, especially when the arrest falls under the instances when a valid warrantless arrest can be made. FACTS: The accused in this case was charged under two separate informations with the violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence which showed that on May 15, 2004, a confidential informant went to the police station to report the rampant illegal sale of drugs by a certain alias Monica who happened to be the accused along PNR South Compound, Makati City. A buy-bust operation was then conducted to effect the arrest of the accused.Upon the consummation ofthe transaction, the pre-arranged signal was performed and then the rest of the buy-bust team approached the area of the transaction. The arrest was then made wherein the accused was apprised of its nature and of her constitutional rights. A search was further conducted which resulted in the discovery of the buy-bust money and five more sachets containing suspected shabu, and the markings were correspondingly done. The accused was then brought to the police station where she was turned over to the investigator on duty, and the items seized were then brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. For her part, the accused denied the charges against her, contending that she was not caught selling shabu nor was she caught of possessing the same. She avers that on that same day, she was just hanging clothes at the back of her house when a kid named Totoy told her that police officers were looking for her. She was then invited to the police station under the belief that she was told to do so because of another case wherein she was a star witness. However, the accused was brought to the Drug Enforcement Unit where she was asked whether he knew a certain Edwin Kerabu and replied that she usually sees him front of the “binggohan.” Kerabu was then apprehended from the said place, and was frisked and the police officers was able to recover from his pocket white substance suspected to be shabu. When the accused requested to go home, he was not permitted by the police officers and charges were filed against her. The RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged, which the CA affirmed in toto. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the trial court gravely erred in admitting in evidence the seized dangerous drugs despite being the products of an unlawful arrest.

RULING: Accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in appreciating the evidence presented by the prosecution as they were seized as a result of an unlawful arrest. She insists that a valid warrant should have been secured first before they proceeded to arrest her.

This argument is totally faulty and is without even an iota of credibility. The warrantless arrest conducted on accused-appellant was valid. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the situations when a person may be arrested without a warrant, thus: "SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgement or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another." Paragraph (a) of Section 5, is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. In the instant case, the prosecution completely and fully established that accusedappellant was arrested in flagrante delicto. At any rate, accused-appellant failed to raise any objection to the manner of her arrest before arraignment. In fact, she participated in the trial. She even took the witness stand and testified in her own behalf. She is now estopped from assailing the legality of her arrest as she waived any irregularity, if any, that may have tainted her arrest. Significantly, the proof of an in flagrante delicto an-est, removes whatever credibility there may have been about the testimony of the accused-appellant of the alleged circumstances that made her go with the police to the DEU unit. Her version that she was a frame-up victim cannot stand against the testimony of the police, supported by evidence of corpus delicti. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAMIL MORES

G.R. No. 189846, June 26, 2013 J. Leonardo-de Castro We have reiterated in jurisprudence that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.

FACTS: The accused-appellant and his co-accused Delio Famor were charged under an information of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder to which they pleadednot guilty. The evidence for the prosecution showed that at about 6:00 P.M. of January 24, 1994, witness Famisaran was chatting with his friends at the Madugo Bridge, accused-appellant stopped before them and uttered “gusto n’yo pasabugin ko ito,” and left. At about 9:00 P.M.on same date, he Famisaran was at Roxas Gymnasium where a ball was being held, he again saw the accused-appellant, who was then conversing with accused Famor in hushed tones. Famisaran then saw the accused pull out a round object, which the former knew to be the grenade the latter earlier showed them, from his left pocket and threw it on the floor. Another witness kicked the object and there was an explosion and commotion ensued. The police investigated incident and medical attention were given those injured. The accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that on that same night, he was asleep early at his house with his wife and child, and was only woken up by his wife when she heard an explosion from the direction of Camp Gozar. When he went out the house, someone told him that the explosion occurred in the gymnasium. He then went with his friend to look for the latter’s children who attended the ball, and after finding them at the hospital, went back home. At the conclusion of court proceedings, the trial court convicted appellant for the felony of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. However, it acquitted co-accused Famor on the ground that there was a paucity of evidence to establish that Famor was appellant’s co-conspirator in the commission of the criminal act of which both of them were charged. The CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the trial court’s ruling. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: The court a quo erred in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses thus the guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING: Appellant claimed that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were fraught with inconsistencies and should not have been given credit by the trial court. Furthermore, appellant asserts that flight must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. Although it is undisputed that, after his arraignment, appellant had stopped appearing in court and up to this day remains at large, appellant points out that he never left the vicinity of the crime scene and was, in fact, seen by one of the prosecution witnesses, to be near that area minutes after the explosion occurred. If he was indeed the perpetrator of the grisly crime charged, appellant argues that he could have just left town that very evening in order to insure non-apprehension. We are not persuaded and, thus, sustain appellant’s conviction.

Contrary to appellant’s protestation, we find no cogent reason to question the veracity of the testimony of Famisaran as well as that of the other witnesses for the prosecution. We have reiterated in jurisprudence that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high

respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. In all, we concur with the trial court in setting aside the inconsequential differences in the prosecution’s witnesses’ testimonies and in pointing out that their testimonies actually corroborated each other as to rolling of a grenade onto the dance floor and their respective positions from the blast. Finally, we cannot subscribe to appellant’s theory that his continued presence at the vicinity of the Municipality of Roxas right after the grenade throwing incident negates his guilt of the crime charged and that his absence in court proceedings subsequent to his arraignment should not be taken against him. We have elucidated on this point in one recent case wherein we held that non-flight does not necessarily connote innocence, to wit: Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave differently and even erratically in externalizing and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or flee – a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt – while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion from other members of the community. Moreover, our position on the effects of unexplained flight on the guilt or innocence of an accused remains unchanged. In People v. Camat, we reiterated the jurisprudential doctrine that flight is indicative of guilt in this manner: Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. In one case, this Court had stated that it is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a lion. CARLOS L. TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013

J. Del Castillo A written admission, even if given without the assistance of counsel, can be admitted in evidence. More so in this case, as petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment, and not during custodial investigation. FACTS: Herein petitioner was charged under an information with the crime of estafa through the falsification of commercial documents to which he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented evidence which showed that the petitioner, being the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch, caused to be prepared PNs and cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo Tan, in connection with the purported loans obtained by the latter from the bank. The same documents were approved and signed by the petitioner as the branch manager of the Metrobank Commercio Branch, and forged or caused to be signed the signature of Tan as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back to show that the latter indeed endorsed the same for payment, then handed them to the cashier for encashment. The petitioner then obtained the proceeds of the alleged loan and misappropriated the same for his use and benefit.

The bank conducted an internal audit after the discovery of the irregular loans, where petitioner was made to sign a document in the form of questions and answers. For his defense, the petitioner alleged that he was able to solicit Tan as client-depositor when he was branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch, and was granted a credit line for Php 40M. Allegedly, Tan was also allowed by the bank to create a fictitious account under the name Jose Tan to hide his finances due to rampant kidnappings or from their spouses. On one occasion, a loan availment in the amount of Php 16M was allegedly made by Tan wherein said proceeds were ordered to be deposited by him to the Jose Tan account. During the investigation conducted by the bank, the petitioner was made to sign a document which turned out to be a confession to the crime, and was not even given the assistance of a counsel. The RTC rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty of the crime charged, which the CA affirmed upon appeal. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but the same was also denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the petitioner’s written statement of confession when the same was taken even if he was not under police custody nor custodial investigation.

RULING: While he admits signing a written statement, petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleges that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the OSG, maintains that petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence since the constitutional proscription invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context of private employment but is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus prays for the affirmance of the appealed CA Decision. We find the Petition wanting in merit. Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above. In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of

his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement. Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, we declared that the right to counsel "applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission: However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility. Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. He attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress and intimidation. Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary." Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained therein attest to its voluntariness. As correctly pointed out by the CA: As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details which could only be supplied by appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and coherence which cannot be associated with a mind to which intimidation has been applied. Appellant’s answers to questions 14 and 24 were even initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the corrections made therein. The response to every question was fully informative, even beyond the required answers, which only indicates the mind to be free from extraneous restraints. In People v. Muit, it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of petitioner’s extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied without the knowledge and information given by him." Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed

intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed. SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013 J. Del Castillo

The allegation of petitioners that they are not the owners of the subject property, thus making them unable to remove the installed surveillance cameras on the corporation’s building, cannot be upheld especially when the corporation who is managed by the family of petitioners. They are thus considered parties-in-interest in the present case. FACTS: Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for Injunction and Damages with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/TRO against respondents as owners of ALDO Development and Resources, Inc., alleging that they are the registered owners of the parcel of land upon which a building was constructed upon by the latter. It was also alleged that sometime earlier, a case was filed by the respondents against petitioners for Injunction and Damages for the latter allegedly was constructing a fence without a permit and which would destroy the wall of the former’s building which was however denied by the court. In order to gather evidence for such case, the respondents installed on their building surveillance cameras facing the petitioner’s property, and also took pictures of the construction without the consent of the latter. The petitioners on the main pray that the respondents be ordered to remove the cameras and to be enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance for being violative of the petitioner’s right to privacy. In their defense, the respondents asserted that they did not install the video surveillance cameras, and that they are but merely stockholders of ALDO and not owners thereof. The RTC, in its decision, ruled in favor of petitioner and granted their application for TRO. The motion for reconsideration filed by respondents was denied by the RTC, thus prompting them to file a petition or certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. Such was granted by the CA, declaring that the respondents are not the proper parties to the suit, since they are not the owners of the building but mere stockholders of ALDO.

ISSUE: Whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit. RULING: A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former." In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras. Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras. In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case. During the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to care, and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC. He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective properties. With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded. Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family. Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras. And when respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and transferred. Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit. RAYMUNDO CODERIAS, as represented by his Attorney-In-Fact, MARLON M. CODERIAS v. ESTATE OF JUAN CIDOCO, represented by its Administrator, DR. RAUL R. CARAG G.R. No. 180476, June 26, 2013 J. Del Castillo Respondent had no right to claim prescription because a CLT had already been issued in favor of petitioner. The farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law. As such, respondent had neither the right to evict petitioner nor to claim prescription. FACTS: The deceased respondent Cidoco owned a 4-hectare farm in Nueva Ecija wherein petitioner was a tiller. As such, respondent was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer. However, petitioner and his family left the farm under threat of death by people connected with

respondent. Upon learning of respondent’s death, the petitioner and his family re-established themselves on the farm, and thereafter filed a with the DARAB a petition against respondent’s estate praying that his possession and cultivation of the farm be respected and that a leasehold contract between them be executed. Respondent on the other hand moved to dismiss the petition, contending that the petitioner’s cause of action has prescribed under Sec.38 of RA 3844, as amended, since the alleged dispossession took place in 1980 but the Petition was filed only in 1995, or beyond the statutory three-year period for filing such claims. On September 10, 1996, the PARAD issued a decision dismissing the petition on the groung of prescription. Upon petitioner’s appeal to the DARAB, the PARAD decision was set aside, ordering the respondent to respect and maintain the petitioner in his peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject landholding. The motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent was denied by the DARAB. Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA, insisting that petitioner’s cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches. The CA held that although there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent, the former’s action has prescribed. Petitioner then filed a manifestation with motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s cause of action has prescribed. RULING: The CA has failed to recognize this vinculum juris, this juridical tie, that exists between the petitioner and Chioco, which the latter is bound to respect. Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished only under any of the following three circumstances, to wit: "(1) abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2) voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or (3) absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed the lessee x x x." None of these is obtaining in this case. In particular, petitioner cannot be said to have abandoned the landholding. It will be recalled that Chioco forcibly ejected him from the property through threats and intimidation. His house was bulldozed and his crops were destroyed. Petitioner left the farm in 1980 and returned only in 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death. Two years after, or in 1995, he filed the instant Petition. Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides that "an action to enforce any cause of action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued." In this case, we deem it proper to reckon petitioner’s cause of action to have accrued only upon his knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993, and not at the time he was forcibly ejected from the landholding in 1980. For as long as the intimidation and threats to petitioner’s life and limb existed, petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the recognition of this juridical tie. Since the threats and intimidation ended with Chioco’s death, petitioner’s obligation to file a case to assert his rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws within the prescriptive period commenced. These rights, as enumerated above, include the right to security of tenure, to continue in possession of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, the pre-emptive right to buy the land, as well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge.

Force and intimidation restrict or hinder the exercise of the will, and so long as they exist, petitioner is deprived of his free will. He could not occupy his farm, plant his crops, tend to them, and harvest them. He could not file an agrarian case against Chioco, for that meant having to return to Nueva Ecija. He could not file the case anywhere else; any other agrarian tribunal or agency would have declined to exercise jurisdiction. It is worth reiterating at this juncture that respondent had no right to claim prescription because a CLT had already been issued in favor of petitioner. The farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law. As such, respondent had neither the right to evict petitioner nor to claim prescription. In Catorce v. Court of Appeals, this Court succinctly held: Petitioner had been adjudged the bona fide tenant of the landholding in question. Not only did respondent fail to controvert this fact, but he even impliedly admitted the same in his Answer to petitioner’s Complaint when he raised, as one of his defenses, the alleged voluntary surrender of the landholding by petitioner. Respondent Court should have taken this fact into consideration for tenants are guaranteed security of tenure, meaning, the continued enjoyment and possession of their landholding except when their dispossession had been authorized by virtue of a final and executory judgment, which is not so in the case at bar. At any rate, respondent cannot legally invoke the strict application of the rules on prescription because the failure of petitioner to immediately file the Petition was due to its own maneuvers. This Court should not allow respondent to profit from its threats and intimidation. Besides, if we subscribe to respondent’s ratiocination that petitioner’s cause of action had already prescribed, it would lead to an absurd situation wherein a tenant who was unlawfully deprived of his landholding would be barred from pursuing his rightful claim against the transgressor. Petitioner’s tenure on the farm should be deemed uninterrupted since he could not set foot thereon. And if he could not make the required payments to Chioco or the Land Bank of the Philippines, petitioner should not be faulted. And, since his tenure is deemed uninterrupted, any benefit or advantage from the land should accrue to him as well. Our law on agrarian reform is a legislated promise to emancipate poor farm families from the bondage of the soil. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in the exact same spirit, with mechanisms which hope to forestall a reversion to the antiquated and inequitable feudal system of land ownership. It aims to ensure the continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment by the beneficiary of the land that he tills which would certainly not be possible where the former owner is allowed to reacquire the land at any time following the award – in contravention of the government’s objective to emancipate tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013 J. Perez It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the

proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC. FACTS: Private respondent, a registered voter and resident of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations, one of which is that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen. In her Answer, herein petitioner notes that such allegation is not supported by evidence. During the course of the proceedings, private respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits which include, among others, a copy of an article published on the internet with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; and a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad. The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution granting the Petition and cancelling the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner. It found that the petitioner was not a Filipino citizen for having failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9225 and was thus ineligible to run for the position of Representative of Marinduque. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply obtaining and using an American passport, which was however denied by the COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution. The petitioner was then declared the winner of the May 2013 Elections and on the same day took her oath of office. A Certificate of Finality was thereafter issued by the COMELEC En Banc declaring the aforesaid Resolution final and executory. Hence, petitioner filed this present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order assailing the Resolution and Certificate issued by the COMELEC En Banc. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance of the “newlydiscovered evidence” without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. RULING: Petitioner assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence. Her contentions are incorrect. It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC. Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan’s petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.

Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. RETIRED JUDGE GUILLERMO ANDAYA A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181, June 25, 2013 J. Leonen In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of respondent’s cessation from office.Respondent’s cessation from office x x x does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The Court’s jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of the case. FACTS: When a judicial audit was conducted on RTC, Br. 53, Lucena City, Quezon, the report showed that the respondent judge failed to decide several cases submitted for decision beyond the reglementary period provided under the constitution, thus making him liable for several thousands of pesos in fine. ISSUE: Whether respondent judge can still be held liable for said penalty. RULING: The reports yield the finding that, indeed, 23 criminal cases and 9 civil cases are included in both reports. However, it must be noted that the March 2009 Monthly Report of Cases only covered 45 cases, while there were 43 criminal cases and 46 civil cases that were the subject of the judicial audit report of the present complaint. This means that despite the overlap, there are still 20 unresolved criminal cases and 37 unresolved civil cases for which the respondent Judge might be held accountable for. The other complaint also does not include the unresolved motions in 29 criminal cases and 53 civil cases, which are included in the judicial audit report in the present complaint. The respondent Judge could no longer be made liable for these infractions. A review of the records shows that the judicial audit was conducted on January 19, 20, and 21, 2009 during the respondent Judge’s incumbency. However, the administrative complaint was docketed only on April 29, 2009 after his compulsory retirement on March 27, 2009. In the case of Re: Missing Exhibits and Court Properties in Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte, a Memorandum recommending that court’s presiding Judge, Jesus L. Grageda, who compulsorily retired on November 25, 2009, be held liable for not ordering a prompt investigation as to missing court exhibits and properties and be made to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) was submitted by the OCA to the Court on July 10, 2012, or more than two (2) years after he retired. In dismissing the complaint against him, We ruled that:

In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of respondent’s cessation from office. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Hamoy, the Court held that: Respondent’s cessation from office x x x does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The Court’s jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of the case. In the present case, Judge Grageda’s compulsory retirement divested the OCA of its right to institute a new administrative case against him after his compulsory retirement. The Court can no longer acquire administrative jurisdiction over Judge Grageda by filing a new administrative case against him after he has ceased to be a public official. The remedy, if necessary, is to file the appropriate civil or criminal case against Judge Grageda for the alleged transgression. Similarly, in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda, the Court dismissed another pending administrative case against him, thus: Records show that Judge Grageda compulsorily retired on November 25, 2009 while the judicial audit was conducted at RTC, Br. 4, Panabo City from November 17 to November 26, 2009. The OCA then submitted its report only on March 24, 2010, which was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter on April 28, 2010, or months after Judge Grageda retired from the judiciary. Consequently, his retirement effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant administrative proceeding that was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the Court, much less the OCA, of any jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the infractions committed while he was still in the service. As held in the case of OCA v. Judge Celso L. Mantua [A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291, February 8, 2012]: This Court concedes that there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit. However, the absence of such rules should not serve as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results ofthe judicial audit.In light of these pronouncements, the Court has lost jurisdiction tofind him liable for the cases and motions left unresolved prior to hisretirement. JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." FACTS: On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia, pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. The RTC, in

finding reasonable ground to believe that an immediate danger of violence against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a several TPOs in their favor. During the pendency of the abovementioned petition, the petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition, questioning, among others, the constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses. The CA thus issued a 60-day TRO against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orderd pursuant thereto. Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law. ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. RULING: Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified. To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz: SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows: x x x. Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court. Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued. (b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or thirdparty complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz: SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following: (a) Facts undisputed and admitted; (b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved; (c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented; (d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and (e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner. As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, should not be enjoined. The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris, Jr., the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus: Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and,

hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC. SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC. v. JESUS B.MENDOZA G.R. No. 202247, June 19, 2013 J. Carpio While the share was bought by Sime Darby and placed under the name of Mendoza, his title is only limited to the usufruct, or the use and enjoyment of the club’s facilities and privileges while employed with the company.Despite being informed by Sime Darby to stop using the facilities and privileges of the club share, Mendoza continued to do so. Thus, in order to prevent further damage and prejudice to itself, Sime Darby properly sought injunction in this case. FACTS: Respondent is the sales manager of petitioner with tasks of handling sales, marketing and distribution of the company’s tires and rubber products. A club share in Alabang Country Club (ACC) was purchased by petitioner from Margarita de Araneta, which was however placed under the name of respondent because ACC’s by-laws provided that only natural persons may own such. From the time of its purchase, the petitioner was the one who paid for the monthly dues and other assessments on the club share. Respondent retired in April 2005 and obtained his separation pay in full amounting to more than Php 3M.Sometime thereafter, the petitioner found an interested buyer of the club share. However, before the sale could push through, the broker required the petitioner to secure an authorization to sell from respondent as the same was still registered in the latter’s name. Respondent refused to sign the same unless petitioner paid him allegedly an amount corresponding to his unpaid separation benefits, and such refusal resulted in the sale failing to materialize. Petitioner thus filed a complaint for damages with writ of preliminary injunction against respondent with the RTC, claiming that it was the practice of the company to extend to its senior managers and executives the privilege of using and enjoying the facilities of various club memberships. They further alleged that even after his retirement, respondent continued using the facilities and privileges of ACC, to the damage and prejudice of petitioner. In his answer, the respondent averred that he owns the club share, being purchased by the petitioner for him as part of his employee benefits and bonus for exemplary service. The RTC denied the petitioner’s prayer for restraining order and preliminary injunction, and trial on the merits ensued. The RTC then rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, enjoining the defendant from making use of the stock certificate of ACC. The decision was then appealed by the respondent to the CA, which reversed the same. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether Sime Darby is entitled to damages and injunctive relief against Mendoza, its former employee. RULING: The petition has merit. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, states:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. In Medina v. Greenfield Development Corp., we held that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, Sime Darby has the burden of establishing the following requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the present case, petitioner Sime Darby has sufficiently established its right over the subject club share. Sime Darby presented evidence that it acquired the Class "A" club share of ACC in 1987 through a Deed of Sale. Being a corporation which is expressly disallowed by ACC’s By-Laws to acquire and register the club share under its name, Sime Darby had the share registered under the name of respondent Mendoza, Sime Darby’s former sales manager, under a trust arrangement. Such fact was clearly proved when in the application form dated 17 July 1987 of the ACC for the purchase of the club share, Sime Darby placed its name in full as the owner of the share and Mendoza as the assignee of the club share. Also, in connection with the application for membership, Sime Darby sent a letter dated 17 September 1987 addressed to ACC confirming that "Mendoza, as Sime Darby’s Sales Manager, is entitled to club membership benefit of the Company." While the share was bought by Sime Darby and placed under the name of Mendoza, his title is only limited to the usufruct, or the use and enjoyment of the club’s facilities and privileges while employed with the company. In Thomson v. Court of Appeals, we held that a trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase price of a property in the name of another, because of the presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest for himself. While Sime Darby paid for the purchase price of the club share, Mendoza was given the legal title. Thus, a resulting trust is presumed as a matter of law. The burden then shifts to the transferee to show otherwise. It can be gathered then that Sime Darby did not intend to give up its beneficial interest and right over the share. The company merely wanted Mendoza to hold the share in trust since Sime Darby, as a corporation, cannot register a club share in its own name under the rules of the ACC. At the same time, Mendoza, as a senior manager of the company, was extended the privilege of availing a club membership, as generously practiced by Sime Darby. However, Mendoza violated Sime Darby’s beneficial interest and right over the club share after he was informed by Atty. Ronald E. Javier of Sime Darby’s plan to sell the share to an interested buyer. Mendoza refused to give an authorization to sell the club share unless he was paid P300,000 allegedly representing his unpaid retirement benefit. In August 2004, Mendoza tried to appropriate the club share and demanded from ACC that he be recognized as the true owner of the share as the named member in the stock certificate as well as in the annual report issued by ACC. Despite being informed by Sime Darby

to stop using the facilities and privileges of the club share, Mendoza continued to do so. Thus, in order to prevent further damage and prejudice to itself, Sime Darby properly sought injunction in this case. As correctly observed by the RTC in its Decision dated 30 April 2007: In order for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following requisites must be present: (a) invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable, and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations. All the elements are present in the instant case. Plaintiff bought the subject share in 1987. As the purchaser of the share, it has interest and right over it. There is a presumption that the share was bought for the use of the defendant while the latter is still connected with the plaintiff. This is because when the share was registered under the name of defendant, the latter signed the stock certificate in blank as well as the deed of assignment and placed the certificate under the possession of the plaintiff. Hence, plaintiff did not intend to relinquish its interest and right over the subject, rather it intended to have the share held in trust by defendant, until a new grantee is named. This can be inferred from plaintiff’s witness’ testimony that plaintiff required the defendant to sign the said documents so that the plaintiff can be assured that its ownership of the property is properly documented. Thirdly, plaintiff’s payments of monthly billings of the subject share bolster defendant possession in trust rather than his ownership over the share. With this, the right of plaintiff over the share is clear and unmistakable. With defendant’s continued use of the subject share despite that he is not anymore connected with plaintiff, and with plaintiff’s demand upon the defendant to desist from making use of the club facilities having been ignored, clearly defendant violated plaintiff’s right over the use and enjoyment thereof. Hence, plaintiff is entitled to its prayer for injunction. CENTURY IRON WORKS, INC. and BENITO CHUA v. ELETO B. BANAS G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013 J. Brion In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be put into issue while in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, only questions of jurisdiction may be inquired into. FACTS: Respondent worked at petitioner corporation as an inventory comptroller from July 2000 until his dismissal on June 2002. His dismissal arose from complaints from petitioner’s gas suppliers regarding alleged massive shortage of empty gas cylinders, which petitioner failed to make a report of. Petitioner required respondent to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for loss of trust and confidence and for gross and habitual neglect of duty, and appeared at a hearing to air his side. Respondent was then terminated from service on grounds of loss of trust and confidence. A complaint for illegal dismissal was thus filed by respondent with prayer for reinstatement and money claims. In his defense, respondent averred that he was merely an inventory clerk who is not responsible for the lost cylinders, and that his tasks were limited to conducting periodic and yearly inventories, nor did he have any authority to receive and/or release cylinders. As such, he cannot be terminated on the ground of loss of confidence. On the other hand, petitioners argued that respondent was a supervisory employee who was responsible for the lost cylinders. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent and ruled that he was illegally dismissed. On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling in toto. A motion for reconsideration was then filed by the petitioner which howeverwas denied by the NLRC, prompting him to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.The CA affirmed with modification the NLRC ruling. ISSUE:

Whether or not questions of fact may be inquired into in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court RULING: On the first issue, the CA relied on Cebu Shipyard & Eng’g Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc. in affirming the lower tribunals’ finding that Bañas worked as an inventory clerk. According to the CA, this Court has ruled in Cebu Shipyard that in petitions for certiorari, only questions of law may be put into issue and questions of fact cannot be entertained. Not noticing such glaring error, the petitioners agree to such disquisition.They, however, assert that there is an exception to the rule that only questions of law may be brought in an original action for certiorari, such as when the lower court’s findings of facts are not supported by sufficient evidence or that the same was based on misapprehension or erroneous appreciation of facts. A revisit of Cebu Shipyard shows that the CA has inadvertently misquoted this Court. In the said case, we held: In petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. The finding of negligence by the Court of Appeals is a question which this Court cannot look into as it would entail going into factual matters on which the finding of negligence was based. We clarify that the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. Both the petitioners and the CA have confused Rule 45 and Rule 65. In several Supreme Court cases, we have clearly differentiated between a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a lower tribunal on pure questions of law. It is only in exceptional circumstances that we admit and review questions of fact. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a special civil action, an original petition confined solely to questions of jurisdiction because a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. CONRADA O. ALMAGRO v. SPS. MANUEL AMAYA, SR. and LUCILA MERCADO, JESUS MERCADO, SR., and RICARDO MERCADO G.R. No. 179685, June 19, 2013 J. Velasco, Jr. PD 27 encompasses only rice and corn land, i.e., agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy. In the instant case, since the landholdings cultivated by respondents are primarily devoted to vegetable production, it is definitely outside the coverage, and necessarily cannot properly be placed under the umbrella, of PD 27. Thus, as the RARAD found, the

landholdings cultivated by respondents which are portions of the subject lot were improperly placed under PD 27 through OLT. FACTS: In 1976, Conrada allowed respondent Sps. Amaya to construct a house on a 46-square meter portion of Lot No. 13333 on the condition that no additional improvements of such nature requiring additional lot space shall be introduced and that they shall leave the area upon a 90-day notice. A decade later, Conrada asked the Amayas to vacate. Instead of heeding the vacation demand, the Amayas built permanent improvements on their house, the new structures eating an additional 48 square meters of land space. As such, Conrada filed a Complaint against the Sps. Amaya before the DARAB-Region 7 for Ejectment, Payment of Rentals with Damages. In their answer, the Sps.Amaya contended that they had possessory rights over the area on which their house stands and the portion which they are cultivating, thereby placing the latter under OLT pursuant to PD 27. Conrada discovered after making inquiries that herein emancipation patents (EPs) in favor of respondents have been generated over portions of Lot No. 13333. Aggrieved, Conrada filed a petition also before the DARAB-Region 7 praying for the cancellation of the EPs since the subject lot has been primarily devoted to vegetables production and cultivation, not to corn or rice, thus, outside the ambit of the OLT under PD 27. The RARAD rendered a decision declaring the coverage of Lot No. 13333 under OLT improper, and cancelled the EPs issued in the name of respondents. Respondents thus appealed the decision to the DARAB proper. The DARAB issued a decision upholding the validity of the EPs issued to Manuel, thus effectively recognizing their tenurial rights over portions of Lot No. 13333. The DARAB further upheld the validity and efficacy of the EPs issued in the name of respondents and dismissed the complaints filed by Conrada for lack of merit. Upon appeal to the CA, the DARAB decision was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is covered by PD 27. RULING: The issue raised is essentially factual in nature. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions and errors of law, not of fact, may be raised before the Court. Not being a trier of facts, it is not the function of the Court to re-examine, winnow and weigh anew the respective sets of evidence of the parties. Corollary to this precept, but subject to well-defined exceptions,is the rule that findings of fact of trial courts or the CA, when supported by substantial evidence on record, are conclusive and binding on the Court. But for compelling reasons, such as when the factual findings of the trying court or body are in conflict with those of the appellate court, or there was a misapprehension of facts or when the inference drawn from the facts was manifestly mistaken, this Court shall analyze or weigh the evidence again and if necessary reverse the factual findings of the courts a quo. This is precisely the situation obtaining in this case. The findings, on the one hand, of RARAD Arrieta and, those of the DARAB and the CA, on the other, relative to the appreciation of evidence adduced in hearings before RARAD Arrieta, are incompatible with each other. As determined by the RARAD on the basis of documentary and testimonial evidence, and the more conclusive judicial admissions made by respondents, vegetables are the primary crop planted in the areas respectively cultivated by respondents. But the DARAB would have none of the RARAD’s premised findings, relying instead on the presumptive correctness of the agrarian reform officers’ determination, supposedly reached after a tedious proceeding, as to the nature of the land subject of this case and the identity of the farmer-beneficiaries and their entitlement to lot award. To the DARAB, the fact

that EPs have been issued to respondents is proof enough that the disputed portions are planted to corn as primary crop under the tillage of respondents. The DARAB held, thus: It must be stressed that the issuance of the EPs in the instant case creates a presumption which yields only to a clear and cogent evidence that the awardee is the qualified and lawful owner because it involves a tedious process. Moreover, the identification and classification of lands and qualification of farmer-beneficiaries are factual determination performed by government officials and personnel with expertise in the line of work they are doing. Their findings, conclusions/recommendations and final actions on the matter, after thorough investigation and evaluation, have the presumption of regularity and correctness (La Campana Food Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 770). As such, the burden of proving the ineligibility or disqualification of the awardee rests upon the person who avers it through clear and satisfactory proof or substantial evidence as required by law. Complainant, other than her bare allegations, failed to prove that herein respondents-appellants do not deserve the said government grant. Under the circumstances, it is just proper to assume that the issuance of questioned documents was regular and correct. Thus, this Board finds no cogent reason to cause the cancellation of the subject EPs which had long been issued in favor of respondentsappellants. Clearly, the DARAB misappreciated the evidence adduced before the office of the RARAD and the judicial admissions made by respondents to prove certain key issues. DARAB relied upon the presumption based on what it points to as the tedious process in the issuance of the EPs. It considered as but "bare allegations" what were duly established by documentary and testimonial evidence and by respondents’ admission no less that the primary crop planted in the subject landholdings is not corn but vegetables, and that corn is only planted sporadically and only for the personal consumption of one of the respondents. To be sure, the presumption of regularity or correctness of official action cannot be used as springboard to justify the PD 27 coverage of the disputed lots because a presumption is precisely just that––a mere presumption. Once challenged by credibly convincing evidence, as here, it can no longer be treated as binding truth. In Mercado v. Mercado and Gabriel v. Jamias, the Court has ruled that the mere issuance of an EP does not put the ownership of ARBs beyond attack and scrutiny. EPs issued to such beneficiaries may be corrected and canceled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. In fact, DAR AO No. 02, Series of 1994, lists and defines the grounds for cancellation of registered EPs or Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA). PD 27 pertinently provides, "This shall apply to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not." Daez v. Court of Appeals sets forth the requisite essential to place a piece of land under PD 27, thusly: P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisite for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these requisite is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. x x x It is, thus, clear that PD 27 encompasses only rice and corn land, i.e., agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy. In the instant case, since the landholdings cultivated by respondents are primarily devoted to vegetable production, it is definitely outside the coverage, and necessarily cannot properly be placed under the umbrella, of PD 27. Thus, as the RARAD found, the landholdings cultivated by respondents which are portions of the subject lot were improperly placed under PD 27 through OLT.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERDINAND CASTRO G.R. No. 195777, June 19, 2013 J. Perez The finding of the credibility of the testimonies of the arresting officers should prevail over the testimonies of the accused-appellant and his friend-witnesses especially so when their respective testimonies were inconsistent on material points. Even assuming that these were not substantial enough to doubt the credibility of the testimonies of the defense witnesses, we cannot simply disregard the contradicting testimonies of the accused-appellant on one hand and his witnesses on the other as to the place where the arrest was made. FACTS: The accused was charged under an information with violating Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 to which he pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. The prosecution presented evidence which showed that the Drug Enforcement Unit of Pasig City Police Station received a call from an confidential informant who reported that a certain “Fredie” (herein accused) was selling illegal drugs at Kalamansi Street, Pasig City. A buy-bust operation was then conducted to apprehend appellant. The team then proceeded to the area of operation, and the poseur-buyer was later approached by the accused and was handed a sachet containing white crystalline substance which he took from his pocket. When the pre-arranged signal was performed, the other members of the team approached the area and arrested the accused. When they frisked the accused, the two piecesof transparent plastic sachets and the buy-bust money were found in his possession and were confiscated. The proper markings on the sachet were accordingly done at the area of operation, and the accused was brought to the station for further investigation. In his defense, the accused alleged that on that night, as he was about to enter the gate of his house, four persons suddenly confrontedhim and grabbed him. When he asked why he was being arrested, he did not get a reply. Thereafter, his name, age and address were taken and he was then charged with possession and sale of illegal drugs. The trial court convicted the accused of the both crimes as charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which found him guilty of the crime of illegal sale and possession of drugs. RULING: The defense posits that the equipoise rule should have been applied in his favor inasmuch as the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense are all self-serving. We cannot agree. The equipoise rule does not apply because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are, in fact, credible based on settled legal principles and doctrines applicable to the particular factual circumstances of the case. Thus, we have said, time and again, that "findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings." Also, "the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect." We find nothing in the records that would justify a deviation from the findings of the trial court and the appellate court. Supported by evidence, the arresting officers rendered a straightforward narration of the details of the operation relative to the following: (1) the receipt of an information as to the illegal drugs

activity in the area where accused-appellant was apprehended; (2) the organization of the buy-bust team; (3) the preparations made for the purpose; (4) the entrapment itself leading to the arrest of accusedappellant; (5) the marking of the seized items; and (6) the eventual delivery of the specimens to the crime laboratory. Neither did the defense prove that there was ill-motive or bad faith on the part of the team to falsely impute upon him the commission of these grave offenses. The doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, therefore, applies. As explained in People v. Tion: x x x Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. Settled is the rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the police officers or deviation from the regular performance of their duties. The records do not show any allegation of improper motive on the part of the buy-bust team. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of the police officers must be upheld. Necessarily, the finding of the credibility of the testimonies of the arresting officers should prevail over the testimonies of the accused-appellant and his friend-witnesses especially so when their respective testimonies were inconsistent on material points. Even assuming that these were not substantial enough to doubt the credibility of the testimonies of the defense witnesses, we cannot simply disregard the contradicting testimonies of the accused-appellant on one hand and his witnesses on the other as to the place where the arrest was made. From the context of the testimony of accused-appellant on cross-examination, he was arrested outside his house in front of his drinking buddies Millare and dela Cruz. Accused-appellant’s two (2) witnesses, on the other hand, implied clearly that the arrest was made inside the house considering that the arresting officers followed accused-appellant inside the house and there they saw, upon peeping through the window, that their friend was already handcuffed. In People v. Concepcion, the Court had the occasion to rule on the credibility of the witnesses with two conflicting statements on the place of arrest. It held: The testimony of defense witness Julieta dela Rosa does not convince us. As the wife of appellant Alfredo and sister-in-law of appellant Henry, we find her not to be credible. Her testimony is suspect and unsubstantiated. In her direct testimony, she said her husband, appellant Alfredo, was outside their house with his friends. However, such statement was belied by Alfredo himself who said he was inside his house when he was allegedly arrested by members of the PDEA. Such inconsistency as to where appellant Alfredo was when the alleged unlawful arrest was made, further diminishes the credibility of the defense witnesses. Further, in Aurelio v. People, the Court discussed the weight given to the testimonies of a longtime neighbor and a sister, who rendered contradicting statements, viz: The testimonies of the petitioner’s witnesses cannot be given more weight than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Teresita is the sister of the petitioner while Julieta has been his neighbor for the past 10 years. Thus, their testimonies are necessarily suspect, considering they are petitioner’s sibling and friend respectively. The testimonies of Julieta and Teresita even contradict each other as Teresita declared that five malefactors entered their home while Julieta stated that only two men went with petitioner inside his house. This inconsistency further diminishes the credibility of petitioner’s witnesses. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENEDICT HOMAKY LUCIO G.R. No. 191391, June 19, 2013 J. Perez

The question as to what part of the body of the accused did the police officers recover the money does not dissolve the elements of illegal sale and possession as minor inconsistencies do not negate or dissolve the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Minor inconsistencies in the narration of the arresting officers do not detract from their essential credibility as long as their testimony on the whole is coherent and intrinsically believable. FACTS: The accused and co-accused Wilma Tomas were charged under an information with the violation of Sec. 5 and Sec. 11 of RA 9165, to which they pleaded not guilty upon their arraignment. The evidence for the prosecution showed that a buy-bust operation was conducted for the apprehension of a couple identified as Wilma and Ben, who were allegedly involved in the illegal distribution or sale of dangerous drugs, particularly marijuana in Baguio City. At the area of operation, the poseur-buyer met Ben and offered to buy marijuana to be transported back to Manila. Upon the performance of the pre-arranged signal, the rest of the buy-bust team approached the area and arrested the couple. The officers then informed them of their constitutional rights in Tagalog and Ilocano, and were then brought, along with the confiscated 36 marijuana bricks, to the policce station for proper documentation and identification. The markings required were accordingly done by one of the members of the buy-bust team and were then sent to the crime lab for examination. The 35 bricks tested positive for marijuana. The defense, on the other hand, interposed frame-up. The RTC convicted the accused of the crimes charged but acquitted co-accused Tomas. It ruled that the elements of both illegal sale and possession of drugs were sufficiently established by the prosecution. It also recognized the credibility of the testimonies of the police officers pertaining to the buy-bust operation and the positive identification of the accused as the seller of the bricks of marijuana. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court in toto, holding that all the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drug were proven by the prosecution. It also upheld the credibility of the witnesses and placed highest respect on the findings of facts of the trial court. It likewise disregarded the absence of surveillance or test buy prior to the buy-bust operation as well as the strict compliance of the requirements to establish chain of custody under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which gave credence to the evidence presented by the prosecution despite their inconsistencies. RULING: After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm the ruling of conviction of both the trial court and CA. In his appellant’s brief, Lucio questions the full credence given by the lower courts to the version of the prosecution despite their irregularities and inconsistencies. Among the lapses asserted was the lack of previous surveillance prior to the buy-bust operation. No test buy was conducted to confirm the truthfulness of the statements given by the informant which prompted the operation. It must be stressed that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation. This issue in the prosecution of illegal drugs cases, again, has long been settled by this Court. We have been consistent in our ruling that prior surveillance is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by their informant. In People v. Eugenio, the Court held that there is no requirement that prior surveillance should be conducted before a buy-bust operation can be undertaken especially when the policemen are accompanied to the scene by their civilian informant. Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or a buybust operation, there being no fixed or textbook method for conducting one. When time is of essence, the

police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance. The buy-bust operation conducted by PO1 Castro and the rest of them, together with their civilian informant is justified by the urgency of the situation. Another point argued is the inconsistency of the recollection of events by PO1 Castro, PO1 Labbutan and SPO4 Lucas with regard to the recovery of the marked money from the accused. PO1 Castro recalled that it was recovered from the hand of Lucio while PO1 Labbutan and SPO4 Lucas testified that the same was recovered from the pocket of the accused after a body search. We cannot sustain his argument. In order for a discrepancy or inconsistency between the testimonies of witnesses to serve as basis for acquittal, it must refer to significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused x x x. An inconsistency which has nothing to do with the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the acquittal of the accused." In this case, the question as to what part of the body of the accused did the police officers recover the money does not dissolve the elements of illegal sale and possession as minor inconsistencies do not negate or dissolve the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Minor inconsistencies in the narration of PO1 Castro, PO1 Labbutan and SPO4 Lucas do not detract from their essential credibility as long as their testimony on the whole is coherent and intrinsically believable. In his final effort to evade conviction, the accused challenged the establishment of chain of custody of illegal drugs. In People v. Kamad, the following elements are necessary in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. Upon review, we are convinced that the prosecution had sufficiently proved all the elements to establish chain of custody of illegal drugs.1âwphi1 In his direct examination, PO1 Castro positively identified the marijuana brick sold to him through the markings "GCPC GCP Castro" and date "3/31/04" placed on the brick also identified as Exhibit A. The rest of the marijuana bricks subject of illegal possession case were likewise marked with AAL, LPL GCPC and HPE and dated as "3/31/04" numbered from B-1 to B-35. Upon taking custody of the marijuana bricks, the marijuana bricks were brought to the PDEA Office for proper investigation and documentation. The same were properly inventoried and recounted in the presence of the fiscal and the arresting team. Thereafter, a request for examination of the marijuana bricks was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory to determine presence of illegal drug. As per Chemistry Report identified as Exhibit "G" made by Forensic Chemist Officer Emilia Gracio Montes, Exhibits "A" and "B," consisting of the marijuana brick sold to PO1 Castro as well the thirty five bricks confiscated, all resulted positive of presence of dangerous drug. There was a question regarding the physical condition of the marijuana bricks when they were allegedly bought and confiscated compared to when they were presented in court. It was argued that the bricks were wrapped in newspapers when bought, but when presented in court, they were already found with packing tape and contained in a plastic bag. This observation cannot be taken against the prosecution. It is only natural that the bricks were no longer be wrapped in newspapers as they were opened by the forensic chemist for testing purposes. It was explained by the prosecution that when the

bricks were brought back to the prosecutor’s office, a portion of the bricks was cut in order to take representative samples. It has been ruled time and again that failure to strictly comply with Section 21 (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The function of the chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. SPOUSES MANUEL SY AND VICTORIA SY v. GENALYN D. YOUNG G.R. No. 169214, June 19, 2013 J. Brion The law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. FACTS: The parcel of land subject matter of this case belonged to George Young. His wife, Lilia Young executed a Second Supplemental to the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, under which said land was adjudicated solely in her favor. Lilia represented her daughter respondent in the execution of the document, who was then a minor. Subsequently, Lilia obtained a loan from petitioners with the property as security. When she defaulted on her loan, the property was foreclosed and sold to petitioners and was thereafter registered in their name, prompting respondent to file a complaint for Nullification of Second Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement, Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale and Tax Declaration with the RTC. She argued that the partition was unenforceable since she was only a minor at the time of its execution, pointing out that the partition was contrary to the Rules of Court as it was without the court’s approval. A motion to admit a supplemental complaint was then filed by respondent on July 20,2000, invoking her right to redeem the property as co-owner thereof. When the RTC denied said motion on December 28, 2000, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 (CA-G.R. Sp. No. 65629) with the CA. The petition was however denied by the CA, holding that respondent’s cause of action is entirely different from her original complaint, which prompted the respondent to elevated to the SC under Rule 65 (GR157955). Meanwhile, trial in the RTC continued while CA-G.R. Sp. No. 65629 was pending in the CA. Consequently, respondent moved to suspend the proceedings until the CA has decided on the propriety of admitting the amended complaint, but the same was denied by the RTC.Respondent then filed a motion to cancel hearing on the ground that she was indisposed, which resulted in the dismissal of the complaint by the RTC on the ground of non-suit. The respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the RTC on January 4, 2002. An appeal (CA-G.R. Sp. No. 74045) was then filed by respondent questioning orders of the RTC dismissing her complaint. On May 28, 2002, Genalyn again filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul the same RTC Orders that comprise the subject matter of the ordinary appeal, which was however denied by the CA. Respondent then filed a petition for review under Rule 45 (GR 157745) which was consolidated with GR 157955.

A decision was then promulgated on the consolidated cases. The SC granted the petition in GR 157955 and ordered the RTC to admit the supplemental complaint, since Genalyn’s cause of action stems directly from her rights as co-owner of the subject property. On the other hand, in GR 157745, the SC ruled that Genalyn engaged in forum shopping in filing an appeal and a petition for certiorari questioning the orders of the RTC and thus dismissed the petition. ISSUE: Whetheror not the CA erred in setting aside the RTC Orders which dismissed the case for non-suit. RULING: We deny the petition. The present action is barred by the law of the case. In denying the petition, we necessarily must reiterate our ruling in Young which constitutes as the controlling doctrine or the law of the case in the present case. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. We point out in this respect that the law of the case does not have the finality of res judicata. Law of the case applies only to the same case, whereas res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in another case. In law of the case, the rule made by an appellate court cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case. Furthermore, law of the case relates entirely to questions of law while res judicata is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact. Although res judicata may include questions of law, it is generally concerned with the effect of adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding. The rationale behind this rule is to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal. Without it, there would be endless litigation. Litigants would be free to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the chance of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given case. In Young, we directed the RTC to admit Genalyn’s supplemental complaint. In so ruling, we also vacated the RTC Orders which dismissed Genalyn’s complaint for failure to prosecute. Moreover, Genalyn’s move to suspend the proceedings which led to the dismissal of her complaint stemmed essentially from the RTC's erroneous refusal to admit the supplemental complaint. On the second issue, we unequivocably also settled that Genalyn committed forum shopping when she filed an appeal and a petition for certiorari successively. This ruling we uphold as the ruling that should apply. REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC. and NEPTUNE SHIP MANAGEMENT SVCS, PTE., LTD. v. CAPTAIN FRANCISCO B.GUEVARRA G.R. No. 157020, June 19, 2013 J. Abad The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually covers a situation where the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Precisely, what such clarification wanted to address is the erroneous claim that "the period of extension" in such a case "is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period." The correct rule, according to the clarification, is that "any extension of time to file the required pleading should x x x be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday."

FACTS: Petitioner Reinier, as the agent of Neptune, hired the services of respondent to work as master of their vessel. In the courseof his work, the Reinier sent the respondent notice relieving him from work which prompted the latter to file a case for illegal dismissal against the former and its principal.The Labor Arbiter found that respondent was illegally dismissed for he was not given the opportunity to be heard, and ordered Reinier and Neptune to solidarily pay the former the salaries due him for the remainder of the contract. Reinier appealed to the NLRC, which affirmed the decision of the LA. The due date to file a petition for special civil action of certiorari before the CA fell on July 26, 2002, a Friday, but Reinier succeeded in obtaining an extension of 15 days, which period counted from July 26 began to run on July 27, a Saturday, and fell due on August 10, a Saturday. Reinier filed its petition on the following Monday, August 12, 2002. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time, and ruled that the petitioner violated A.M. 00-2-14-SC (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension Filed on Next Working Day is Granted.) Since August 10, 2002, the last day of the extended period, fell on a Saturday, automatic deferment to the next working day did not apply and Reinier should have filed its petition before August 10, a Saturday, considering that the court is closed on Saturdays. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing its petition for having been filed out of time. RULING: The petition is granted. The CA ruling is reversed and set aside. A.M. 00-2-14-SC clarifies the application of Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court when the last day on which a pleading is due falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday and the original period is extended. The clarification states: Whereas, the aforecited provision applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading on the next working day is deemed on time; Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working day immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday so that when a motion for extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period; NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to declare that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day of the period" so that when a party seeks an extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to be the last day and hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. Reinier Shipping’s last day for filing its petition fell on July 26, a Friday. It asked for a 15-day extension before the period lapsed and this was granted. As it happened, 15 days from July 26 fell on August 10, a Saturday. The CA held that Reinier Shipping should have filed its petition before August 10 (Saturday) or at the latest on August 9 (Friday) since, in an extended period, the fact that the extended due date (August 10) falls on a Saturday is to be "disregarded." Reinier Shipping has no right to move the extended due date to the next working day even if such due date fell on a Saturday. Since the courts were

closed on August 10 (Saturday), Reinier Shipping should have filed its petition, according to the CA, not later than Friday, August 9. But this is obviously wrong since it would mean compelling Reinier Shipping to file its petition one day short of the 15-day extension granted it. That would unjustly deprive it of the full benefit of that extension. Since its new due date fell on a Saturday when courts are close, however, the clear language of Section 1, Rule 21, applies. This gives Reinier Shipping up to Monday (August 12), the next working day, within which to file its petition. The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually covers a situation where the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Precisely, what such clarification wanted to address is the erroneous claim that "the period of extension" in such a case "is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period." The correct rule, according to the clarification, is that "any extension of time to file the required pleading should x x x be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday." For example, if a pleading is due on July 10 and this happens to be a Saturday, the time for filing it shall not run, applying Section 1 of Rule 21, on July 10 (Saturday) nor on July 11 (Sunday) but will resume to run on the next working day, which is July 12 (Monday). The pleading will then be due on the latter date. If the period is extended by 10 days, such 10 days will be counted, not from July 12 (Monday) but from the original due date, July 10 (Saturday) "regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday." Consequently, the new due date will be 10 days from July 10 or precisely on July 20. As stated above, the situation of Reinier Shipping is different. BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013 J. Perez The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondent. Since respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed after petitioner has completed the presentation of its evidence in the trial court, we can say that the filing of the motion to dismiss was a mere ploy on the part of respondent to delay the prompt resolution of the case against her. FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuanceof a writ of preliminary attachment against spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. An answer was filed, but herein respondent filed an amended answer which alleges that her husband Manuel has already died. As a result, petitioner filed a motion to require the respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel. After the receipt of the list of heirs, petitioner filed a motion for substitution, praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as codefendants, which was granted by the trial court. The trial of the case then proceeded. The plaintiff, herein petitioner, presented evidence and exhibits were thereafter admitted. The reception of the evidence for the respondent was cancelled upon agreement of the parties, and the same was given a period of fifteen days within which to file a demurrer to evidence. However, respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss. The motion was denied by the trial court for having been filed out of time. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss despite discovery, during the trial, of evidence which constitutes as ground for dismissal of the case. The CA granted the petition of the respondent and denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner, hence, this appeal. ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in not holding that: 1. Respondent is already estopped from questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction; 2. Petitioner never failed to implead an indispensable party as the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party; 3. The inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is a mere misjoinder of party not warranting the dismissal of the case before the lower court; and 4. Since the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party, it is not necessary that petitioner file its claim against the estate of Manuel. RULING: On whether or not respondent is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. At the outset, it must be here stated that, as the succeeding discussions will demonstrate, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel should not be an issue in this case. A protracted discourse on jurisdiction is, nevertheless, demanded by the fact that jurisdiction has been raised as an issue from the lower court, to the Court of Appeals and, finally, before this Court. For the sake of clarity, and in order to finally settle the controversy and fully dispose of all the issues in this case, it was deemed imperative to resolve the issue of jurisdiction. 1. Aspects of Jurisdiction Petitioner calls attention to the fact that respondent’s motion to dismiss questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction was filed more than six years after her amended answer was filed. According to petitioner, respondent had several opportunities, at various stages of the proceedings, to assail the trial court’s jurisdiction but never did so for six straight years. Citing the doctrine laid down in the case of Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al. petitioner claimed that respondent’s failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars her from later questioning it, especially since she actively participated in the proceedings conducted by the trial court. Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, in Tijam, the case relied upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the authority of the then Court of First Instance to hear a case for the collection of a sum of money in the amount of P1,908.00 which amount was, at that time, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal courts. Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein. Based on the foregoing provisions(Rule 9,Sec. 1 and Rule 15, Sec. 8), the "objection on jurisdictional grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in a motion to dismiss or the answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. x x x Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues cannot be waived x x x subject, however, to the principle of estoppel by laches." Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection is not

raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it made a sweeping pronouncement in its questioned decision, stating that "issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first time on appeal" and that, therefore, respondent timely raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and is, consequently, not estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction. As the question of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the defendant Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot claim the defense since "lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence." 2. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of summons; trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo In the first place, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by the trial court. A defendant is informed of a case against him when he receives summons. "Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person." In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court. Although the factual milieu of the present case is not exactly similar to that of Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, one of the issues submitted for resolution in both cases is similar: whether or not a case, where one of the named defendants was already dead at the time of its filing, should be dismissed so that the claim may be pursued instead in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant. The petitioner in the Sarsaba Case claimed, as did respondent herein, that since one of the defendants died before summons was served on him, the trial court should have dismissed the complaint against all the defendants and the claim should be filed against the estate of the deceased defendant. The petitioner in Sarsaba, therefore, prayed that the complaint be dismissed, not only against Sereno, but as to all the defendants, considering that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Sereno. This is exactly the same prayer made by respondent herein in her motion to dismiss. The Court, in the Sarsaba Case, resolved the issue in this wise: x x x We cannot countenance petitioner’s argument that the complaint against the other defendants should have been dismissed, considering that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Sereno. The court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over one’s person is a defense which is personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against all of the defendants. Failure to serve summons on Sereno’s person will not be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint against the other defendants, considering that they have been served with copies of the summons and complaints and have long submitted their respective responsive pleadings. In fact, the other defendants in the complaint were given the chance to raise all possible defenses and objections personal to them in their respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent answers. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal by the trial court of the complaint against Sereno only. Based on the foregoing pronouncements, there is no basis for dismissing the complaint against respondent herein. Thus, as already emphasized above, the trial court correctly denied her motion to dismiss.

On whether or not the estate of Manuel Toledo is an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter of a case that a final adjudication cannot be made in his or her absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. He or she is a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but "an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable." Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly proceed. On the other hand, a "person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him or her and those already parties to the action, or if he or she has no interest in the subject matter of the action." It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party simply because his or her presence will avoid multiple litigations. Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary. In other words, the collection case can proceed and the demands of petitioner can be satisfied by respondent only, even without impleading the estate of Manuel. Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to petitioner’s complaint for sum of money. However, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with the contention of respondent, held that the claim of petitioner should have been filed against the estate of Manuel in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the said provisions. In construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court, the precursor of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which latter provision has been retained in the present Rules of Court without any revisions, the Supreme Court, in the case of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Villarama, et. al., held: Construing Section 698 of the Code of Civil Procedure from whence [Section 6, Rule 87] was taken, this Court held that where two persons are bound in solidum for the same debt and one of them dies, the whole indebtedness can be proved against the estate of the latter, the decedent’s liability being absolute and primary; x x x. It is evident from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87 provides the procedure should the creditor desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said provision making compliance with such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving solidary debtors, should the creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. There is, therefore, nothing improper in the creditor’s filing of an action against the surviving solidary debtors alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed. The foregoing ruling was reiterated and expounded in the later case of Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion where the Supreme Court pronounced: A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth

that a creditor (in a solidary obligation) has the option whether to file or not to file a claim against the estate of the solidary debtor. x x x xxxx It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the right to "proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously." The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor, x x x. For to require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it a condition precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive him of his substantive rightsprovided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code. As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied literally, Article 1216 of the New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the estate of [the deceased debtor] only. Obviously, this provision diminishes the [creditor’s] right under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Otherwise stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter, substantive. Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party and the case can proceed as against respondent only. That petitioner opted to collect from respondent and not from the estate of Manuel is evidenced by its opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss asserting that the case, as against her, should be dismissed so that petitioner can proceed against the estate of Manuel. On whether or not the inclusion of Manuel as party defendant is a misjoinder of party. Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that "neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately." Based on the last sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a misjoined party must have the capacity to sue or be sued in the event that the claim by or against the misjoined party is pursued in a separate case. In this case, therefore, the inclusion of Manuel in the complaint cannot be considered a misjoinder, as in fact, the action would have proceeded against him had he been alive at the time the collection case was filed by petitioner. This being the case, the remedy provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not obtain here. The name of Manuel as party-defendant cannot simply be dropped from the case. Instead, the procedure taken by the Court in Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, whose facts, as mentioned earlier, resemble those of this case, should be followed herein. There, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court when it resolved the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Sereno in this wise: As correctly pointed by defendants, the Honorable Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Patricio Sereno since there was indeed no valid service of summons insofar as Patricio Sereno is concerned. Patricio Sereno died before the summons, together with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, could be served upon him. However, the failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of the defendants herein, does not render the action DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three (3) other defendants, x x x, were validly served with summons and the case with respect to the answering defendants may still

proceed independently. Be it recalled that the three (3) answering defendants have previously filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was denied by the Court. Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno will be DISMISSED and the same may be filed as a claim against the estate of Patricio Sereno, but the case with respect to the three (3) other accused [sic] will proceed. As a result, the case, as against Manuel, must be dismissed. In addition, the dismissal of the case against Manuel is further warranted by Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states that: only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action." Applying this provision of law, the Court, in the case of Ventura v. Militante, held: Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. x x x. In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a person. The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff, when he institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party defendant to his cause of action. In a suit or proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can acquire no jurisdiction for the purpose of trial or judgment until a party defendant who actually or legally exists and is legally capable of being sued, is brought before it. It has even been held that the question of the legal personality of a party defendant is a question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of procedure. Indeed, where the defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical person or an entity authorized by law, the complaint may be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action. Since the proper course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is the dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trial court err when it ordered the substitution of Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is proper only where the party to be substituted died during the pendency of the case, as expressly provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person and, in effect, there was no party to be substituted. CONCRETE SOLUTIONS, INC./PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORPORATION, represented by ANASTACIO G. ARDIENTE, JR. v. ARTHUR CABUSAS G.R. No. 177812, June 19, 2013 J. Peralta In petitions for review under Rule 45, only questions of law must be raised.It is elementary rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Here, the findings of the Labor Arbiter, on one hand, and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, on the other, are conflicting, thus we are constrained to determine the facts of the case. FACTS: Respondent was hired by petitioner as a transit mixer driver with a status of a project employee. Sometime thereafter, petitioners received reports that respondent unloaded less than a cubic meter of concrete mix two kilometers away from the project site and sold the excess to the residents nearby. As such, respondent was required by petitioner to explain in writing why he should not be meted with disciplinary action for the alleged act of theft or dishonesty under the company’s Code of Conduct and Discipline. The respondent explained his side but was still meted with a three-day suspension. In another report received by petitioner, respondent allegedly took the company’s plastic drum for personal

gain. The allegation was denied by the respondent, explaining that it would be impossible to do the same without being noticed by the guard. An investigation was then conducted within which the respondent was placed under preventive suspension. As the respondent did not report for work after the period of preventive suspension expired, the petitioners terminated him on the ground of abandonment of work, nor did he report after a telegram was sent him requiring him to return. Earlier, however, a complaint for, among others, unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal was filed by the respondent against the petitioners. He denied that he went AWOL and was just awaiting the result of the investigation as of the alleged theft of company property and did not abandon his work, and prayed for reinstatement. The LA dismissed the case for lack of merit, finding that the respondent was validly dismissed from his employment as he abandoned his job. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the latter modified the decision of the LA, ordering the petitioner to reinstate the respondent with full backwages, finding that no abandonment occurred as there was no clear showing that respondent was required to return to work after the period of preventive suspension. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the NLRC, which prompted the filing of an appeal before the CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the NLRC decision. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether respondent deliberately abandoned his work which is a just cause for his dismissal. RULING: It must be stressed that in petitions for review under Rule 45, only questions of law must be raised. Whether respondent abandoned his job or was illegally dismissed are questions of fact better left to quasi-judicial agencies to determine. It is elementary rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. In exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues when the LA and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions. Here, the findings of the Labor Arbiter, on one hand, and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, on the other, are conflicting, thus we are constrained to determine the facts of the case. It is well settled that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause, and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and, therefore, illegal. In this case, petitioners claim that respondent was validly dismissed as he abandoned his work as shown by the following circumstances, to wit: He did not go back to work on May 6, 2001, i.e, after his preventive suspension expired on May 5, 2001; he did not report to work despite receipt of the telegram on May 25, 2001 stating that "he was absent without official leave since May 5, 2001, and to notify CSI as soon as possible," but instead , through his lawyer, sent a letter asking for a copy of the result of the investigation; despite not being given the result of the investigation, respondent still did not bother to report back to work; and the complaint he filed with the LA did not pray for reinstatement. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur, to wit: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To be a valid cause for dismissal for abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. Clearly, the operative act is still the employee's ultimate act of putting an end to his employment. We find that the elements of abandonment are lacking. The CA did not commit any reversible error in affirming the NLRC's decision that respondent was illegally dismissed for petitioners' failure to substantiate their claim that the former abandoned his work. The circumstances obtaining in this case do not indicate abandonment.

UNIVAC DEVELOPMENT INC. v. WILLIAM M. SORIANO G.R. No. 182072, June 19, 2013 J. Peralta The CA can grant a petition when the factual findings complained of are not supported by the evidence on record; when it is necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice; when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the LA; and when necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case. Thus, contrary to the contention of petitioner, the CA can review the finding of facts of the NLRC and the evidence of the parties to determine whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding that there was no illegal dismissal against respondent. FACTS: A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by respondent against petitioner for being terminatedeight days prior to the completion of his six months probationary employment period. Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that there was no illegal dismissal as the respondent did not report for work which constitutes abandonment. After earlier declaring at a meeting that he intended to leave the company, petitioner presumably understood respondent’s absence from work as such intention. The LA dismissed the respondent’s complaint for lack of merit, which was later affirmed by the NLRC. When respondent elevated the matter to the CA under Rule 65, the NLRC decision was nullified and petitioner was ordered to pay the respondent full backwages and separation pay. The CA considered respondent’s dismissal from employment illegal because he was not informed of the standards required for regularization; petitioner failed to show proof that respondent’s performance was poor and unsatisfactory constituting a just cause for termination; and that the evidence presented negates petitioner’s claim that respondent abandoned his job. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether the CA violated the doctrine of immutability of judgment of the NLRC when the former granted the petition for certiorari of the respondent. RULING: The petition is without merit. Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC becomes final and executory after the lapse of ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. However, the adverse party is not precluded from assailing the decision via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA and then to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. Thus, contrary to the contention of petitioner, there is no violation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment when respondent elevated the matter to the CA which the latter consequently granted. The power of the CA to review NLRC decisions has already been thoroughly explained and clarified by the Court in several cases, to wit: The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via Rule 65 or Petition for Certiorari has been settled as early as in our decision in St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission. This Court held that the proper vehicle for such review was a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and that this action should be filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts. Moreover, it is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902[10] (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, amending for the purpose of Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended, known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the Court of Appeals — pursuant to the exercise of its original

jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari — is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues. We agree with petitioner that in a special civil action for certiorari, the issues are confined to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. In exercising the expanded judicial review over labor cases, the Court of Appeals can grant the petition if it finds that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence which is material or decisive of the controversy which necessarily includes looking into the evidence presented by the parties. In other words, the CA is empowered to evaluate the materiality and significance of the evidence which is alleged to have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC in relation to all other evidence on record. The CA can grant a petition when the factual findings complained of are not supported by the evidence on record; when it is necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice; when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the LA; and when necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case. Thus, contrary to the contention of petitioner, the CA can review the finding of facts of the NLRC and the evidence of the parties to determine whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding that there was no illegal dismissal against respondent. HOSPICIO D. ROSAROSO, ANTONIO D. ROSAROSO, MANUEL D. ROSAROSO, ALGERICA D. ROSAROSO, and CLEOFE R. LABINDAO v. LUCILA LABORTE SORIA, SPOUSES HAM SOLUTAN and LAILA SOLUTAN, and MERIDIAN REALTY CORPORATION G.R. No. 194846, June 19, 2013 J. Mendoza Thedisputable presumptions provided under Rule 131, Sec. 3 operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted. FACTS: Petitioners allege in their complaint that their father Luis Rosaroso, with the full knowledge and consent of his second wife Lourdes, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (First Sale) covering subject properties. They further alleged that a second sale took place, when respondent Lucila made her father sign a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to Meridian three parcels of residential land. They thus pray that such second sale be declared null and void ab initio. Lucila and her daughter Laila contested the first sale in favor of petitioners, contending that even assuming it was valid, petitioners were estopped from questioning the second sale in favor of Meridian because they failed not only to effect the necessary transfer of title, but also in annotating their interests on the titles of the questioned properties. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, holding that when Luis executed the second deed of sale in favor of Meridian, he was no longer the owner of the subject lots as he already sold the same to his children by his first marriage. In other words, Luis lost his right to dispose of the said properties to Meridian from the time he executed the first deed of sale in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, ruling that the first deed of sale in favor of petitioners was void because they failed to prove that they indeed tendered a consideration for the four parcels of land. As to the second deed of sale, the CA stated that it was valid because the documents were notarized and, as such, they enjoy the presumption of regularity. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the CA, prompting them to file this present appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in declaring the first sale null and void for failure of petitioners to prove they paid sufficient consideration for the subject properties. RULING: The fact that the first deed of sale was executed, conveying the subject properties in favor of petitioners, was never contested by the respondents. What they vehemently insist, though, is that the said sale was simulated because the purported sale was made without a valid consideration. Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted. In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that the sale was made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court. The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It relied heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to sign the deed of sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not pay the purchase price for the subject properties. This testimony, however, is self-serving and would not amount to a clear and convincing evidence required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption that there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed. IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO and BENJAMIN D. BALOIS v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA G.R. No. 182130, June 19, 2013 THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MUNTINLUPA, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MUNTINLUPA CITY, BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, and IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO v. ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA G.R. No. 182132, June 19, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe Courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers. On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. FACTS: In view of the incidents that transpired on December 28, 2001 and April 23 to 24, 2002, Benjamin filed a criminal complaint for Rape, Serious Illegal Detention and Child Abuse under Section 5(b), Article

III of RA 7610 against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel and Grace before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa, docketed as I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22, which however was laterdismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Nonetheless, Prosec. Alejo recommended the filing of informations for Child Abuse against Gil for having sexual intercourse with Irisby taking advantage of her minority and his moral influence as a pastor of their church. Subsequently, Benjamin filed a second complaint against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, Grave Coercion and Obstruction of Justice before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati, docketed as I.S. No. 03-G-14072-75. Iris executed an affidavit sworn before Makati Assistant City Prosecutor George de Joya denying she was kidnapped, detained, or raped by Gil. She also affirmed that she loved Gil and eloped with him. Nevertheless, the information was also dismissed for insufficiency of evidence by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Henry M. Salazar. Similarly, observed that there was no evidence or any particular allegation of facts in the complaint-affidavit constituting the acts which were claimed as coercive. In the same vein, he found no evidence or any sufficient allegation to support the charge of Obstruction of Justice. Dissatisfied, petitioner Benjamin moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied. On December 15, 2003, Iris, assisted by members of the groups Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and Gabriela, proceeded to the DOJ Task Force on Women and Children Protection and filed a third complaint against Gil for Forcible Abduction with Rape and Obstruction of Justice, punished under Presidential Decree No. 1829, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-127. This, also, was denied by State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim of the DOJ Task Force for insufficiency of evidence. Aggrieved, Iris and Benjamin appealed the dismissal of all the foregoing charges to the DOJ. The DOJ Secretary resolved the consolidated petitions in in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22, I.S. No. 03-G-14027-75 and I.S. No. 2004-127, finding probable cause to chargeGil for Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610; Gil, Jessebel, Atty. Reyna and Grace for one count each of Serious Illegal Detention and Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610; and Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for one (1) count each of Forcible Abduction with Rape. Respondents then moved for the reconsideration of such resolution. Meanwhile, two separate criminal informations were filed for Forcible Abduction with Rape against Gil, Arturo, and Atty. Reyna, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-122, and for Serious Illegal Detention with Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel, and Grace, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07128. Warrants of arrest were accordingly issued by the Presiding Judges of the courts hearing the case. For alleged reasons of extreme urgency, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA while the resolution of their abovementioned motion for reconsideration was pending. The CA gave due course to respondents’ petition for certiorari and rendered its decision revoking the DOJ Resolutions. Of particular note to the CA were the inconsistent and inherently improbable testimony of Iris, the existence of love letters and text messages of love and concern between Iris and Gil, and the hiatus of evidence that would show that Atty. Reyna, Arturo, Jessebel and Grace conspired to rape or illegally detain Iris. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, essentially arguing that the CA erroneously assumed the function of public prosecutor when it determined the non-existence of probable cause. The said motion was, however, denied. Hence this petition under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in revoking the DOJ resolutions based on graveabuse of discretion. RULING: The petitions are party meritorious.

It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers, dictating that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and balances, whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari, has been tasked by the present Constitution "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In the case of Callo-Caridad v. Esteban, citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tobias III, the Court held: In reviewing the findings of the public prosecutor on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof. On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. As the Court has postulated in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tobias III: Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. x x x x In the context of filing criminal charges, grave abuse of discretion exists in cases where the determination of probable cause is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. In this regard, case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As held in PCGG v. Jacobi: In fact, the prosecutor may err or may even abuse the discretion lodged in him by law. This error or abuse alone, however, does not render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the petitioner to establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, before judicial relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained. To note, probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Accordingly, probable cause does not require

an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. As pronounced in Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.: A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. In order to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to determine if the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense. Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court therefore holds as follows: First, the DOJ Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion in finding that probable cause exists for the crime of Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo as the elements of rape, more likely or than not, appear to be present. Similarly, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the DOJ Secretary’s finding of probable cause for Rape against Atty. Reyna and Arturo, but only insofar as the June 23 to November 9, 2003 incidents are concerned. Second, the Court further holds that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion in finding that probable cause exists for the crime of Serious Illegal Detention as records are bereft of any evidence to support a finding that Iris was illegally detained or restrained of her movement. Third, the DOJ Secretary also committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.As earlier discussed, there lies no evidence to prove that Iris was restrained of her liberty during the period of her captivity, thus, denying the element of abduction. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. ROSA REYES, CENANDO, REYES and CARLOS REYES G.R. No. 194247, June 19, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. FACTS: Petitioner filed complaints before the RTC, seeking to expropriate the lands of herein respondents. In their separate answers, the respondents alleged that although they had no objection to petitioner’s right to expropriation, the amount of just compensation offered was ridiculously low considering that the subject properties were already re-classified into residential lots. A writ of possession was subsequently granted in petitioner’s favor, meanwhile, respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that there were no genuine issues left for resolution, except for the award of damages. In opposition, petitioner argued that Rule 35 of the Rules of Court on summary judgment applies only to ordinary civil actions for recovery of money claims and not to expropriation cases.

Moreover, it claimed that the mandatory constitution of a panel of commissioners for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of just compensation due under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court precludes a summary judgment. The RTC thus granted the motion for summary judgment, brushing aside petitioner’s insistence for the constitution of a panel of commissioners under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, dismissing the same as a futile exercise which would only delay the proceedings. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the RTC, prompting it to file an appeal before the CA. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss appeal, averring that an appeal from a summary judgment raises only questions of law; hence, the proper recourse to assail its propriety should be a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 as adopted by petitioner. The CA dismissed the petitioner’s appeal for being the wrong mode to assail the RTC’s summary judgment, finding that the errors raised in the appeal essentially pertained to the propriety of the RTC’s grant of respondents’ motion for summary judgment and thus, involved only questions of law of which the CA had no jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. RULING: Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, there are two (2) modes of appealing a judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction: (a) If the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the proper recourse is an ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; and (b) If the issues raised involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Corollary thereto, should a party raise only questions of law through an ordinary appeal taken under Rule 41, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that the said appeal shall be dismissed. Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual. Applying these principles, the Court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Records show that petitioner raised four (4) issues in its appeal before the CA: First, whether or not summary judgment was properly rendered by the RTC; Second, whether or not there is any evidence on record to support the conclusion that the subject lots had already been re-classified from agricultural to residential; and if in the affirmative, whether or not the same may be considered as "interior lots" which would necessarily affect its zonal valuation;

Third, whether or not the appointment of commissioners is indispensable in an expropriation case; and Fourth, whether or not the properties of Cenando and Rosa Reyes overlap that of the Philippine National Bank. At the outset, it bears to note that the second and fourth issues were not raised by petitioner in its opposition to respondents’ motion for summary judgment but only in its motion for reconsideration from the RTC’s Order dated November 27, 2007. It has been consistently held that appellate courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged nor raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal. Thus, while these issues may be classified as questions of fact since their resolution would require an evaluation of the evidence on record, the CA was precluded from considering the same. Consequently, only the first and third issues were left for its determination. Unlike the second and fourth issues, the first and third issues can be properly classified as questions of law since their resolution would not involve an examination of the evidence but only an application of the law on a particular set of facts. To elucidate, the first issue regarding the propriety of the RTC’s summary judgment involves only a question of law since one need not evaluate the evidence on record to assess if the unresolved issues in this case, i.e., the classification of the properties expropriated, its location and valuation, constitute genuine issues. This is in line with the rule that a summary judgment is not warranted when there are genuine issues which call for a full blown trial. Similarly, the third issue concerning the propriety of the appointment of a panel of commissioners only requires an application of Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, without the need of examining the evidence on record. Thus, given that the issues to be resolved on appeal only involve questions of law, no reversible error was committed by the CA in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The proper recourse should have been to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNESTO DELA CRUZ @ BERNING G.R. No. 183091, June 19, 2013 J. Leonardo-de Castro

As to the credibility of witnesses, the trial judge can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. Moreover, even if there are no eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime, especially so if the crime is rape, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to by the courts. FACTS: The accused was charged under an information with the crime of rape with homicide to which he pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. The evidence showed that the victim AAA left her home early in the morning to gather gabi from a farm about 50 meters away. When the AAA did not return to after a few hours, her sister BBB went looking for her. Along the way, BBB noticed the gabi gathered by the AAA and found the accused undressed except for blood-drenched briefs. The accused was in the act of cutting minongga tree branches and was covering something with them, and suddenly ran when he noticed BBB. It was after the accusedhad gone that BBB found the headless body of AAA, while her head lay a few meters away from her body.

In his defense, the accused denied the prosecution’s allegations, contending that he had been working in his farm and it wasn’t until after noon that he went home. The RTC, in deciding the case, noted thelack of eyewitnesses to the crime, but stated that the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt was established by the prosecution through circumstantial evidence. As such, it rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The CA then affirmed the decision of the RTC and found BBB to be a credible witness. It said that the minor inconsistencies in her testimony and the testimony of the other witness presented were not significant enough to warrant the acquittal of the appellant. In any event, it stated that appellant’s bare denial of his guilt against the positive testimony and categorical assertions of the prosecution’s witnesses proved to be worthless since it was uncorroborated. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution satisfactorily proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there was overwhelming circumstantial evidence presented to point that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of rape with homicide. As we have stated before, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to establish the complicity of the perpetrator’s crime when these are credible and sufficient, and could lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the complex crime of rape with homicide. As the Court of Appeals stated: The Prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, and no other, had raped and killed [AAA]. The following are the circumstantial evidence, to wit: 1. [BBB] went to the mountain farm to look for [AAA] and in the process saw the accused from 10 armsstretches away covering the victim’s body with tree branches; 2. The accused was then holding a bolo and clad only in his bloodied briefs while covering the headless body of the victim with tree branches; 3. The victim’s head was found 5 meters away from her body; 4. The victim’s body was exposed, with her undergarments missing; 5. After medical examination, the victim’s vagina tested positive for the presence of spermatozoa; 6. [AAA] also suffered 3 hack wounds, one of which was found to have been inflicted before the victim expired; 7. The accused threw the bolo he used in cutting tree branches, which, when recovered, was determined to be the bolo brought by [AAA] from her house; and 8. He left the victim’s body and ran down the mountainous terrain. To an unprejudiced mind, the above circumstances form a solid unbroken chain of events which ties appellant to the crime beyond reasonable doubt. BBB saw appellant at the scene of the crime; he was wearing bloodied underwear; he was wielding a bolo owned by AAA, cutting branches which he used to cover something; on seeing BBB he threw the bolo away and ran; when BBB checked what the appellant was trying to hide, she discovered it to be the headless body of AAA; AAA’s undergarments had

been removed; upon medical examination spermatozoa was found in her genitalia; and AAA was hacked several times before she was beheaded. With respect to the appellant’s contention that the witnesses presented were not credible, we reiterate the jurisprudential principle affording great respect and even finality to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses especially if the factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The trial judge can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. In People v. Dion we stated that: Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the victim’s credibility becomes the primordial consideration. It is settled that when the victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. The trial court’s assessment of the witnesses' credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding. x x x. Given that in the present case, the courts a quo have sufficiently addressed the question on the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB and appellant does not present to this Court any scintilla of evidence to prove that the testimony of the witness was not credible, the Court must uphold the identical assessment of the RTC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In any event, the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses did not detract from BBB's credibility as a witness. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) v. ARIEL R. MARQUEZ G.R. No. 191877, June 18, 2013 IRENEO M. VERDILLO v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) G.R. No. 192287, June 18, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. FACTS: Marquez and Verdillo were both employed as dealers in the game of Craps at PAGCOR at the Casino Filipino Heritage. One night, they both alternately manned a Craps table where a Mr. Johnny Cheng was playing. The Acting Pit Supervisor Eulalia Yang noticed that on several occasions Verdillo made a “good dice” call even though not one of the dice from the player’s throw hit the table’s rubber wall. Upon checking the CCTV, the members of the Casino Management and the investigators from the Corporate Investigation Unit were convinced that several void throws were declared as “good dice” while the same was being manned by Marquez and Verdillo. As such, both were administratively charged with conspiring with Cheng in defrauding PAGCOR of an undetermined amount of money. Both Marquez and Verdillo were thus found liable for fraudulent transactions and were dismissed from service due to “Dishonesty, Grave violation of company rules and regulations, Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the company, and Loss of trust and confidence" for conspiring with a co-dealer and a customer in defrauding the house on numerous occasions. Marquez and Verdillo filed their Motions for

Reconsideration, but both were denied by PAGCOR for lack of merit. Aggrieved, they appealed their dismissal from service to the CSC, but both appeals were dismissed for lack of merit. Not satisfied, Marquez filed a petition for review with the CA arguing that he was not accorded his right to due process and that there was no substantial evidence to support a finding of his guilt in the administrative charge. The CA then reversed the resolutions of the CSC, holding that there was no dishonesty on his part. Meanwhile, Verdillo filed with the CA a separate petition for review, arguing that PAGCOR’s decision was not supported by the evidence on record. Unsatisfied, PAGCOR filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, contending that the designation of the offense in an administrative case is not controlling and one may be found guilty of another offense if it is based on the same facts subject of the original designation. Furthermore, PAGCOR asserts that the CA erred in simply brushing aside the evidence considered by the CSC, stressing that the factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling on the reviewing authority. On the other hand, Marquez maintains that there was no substantial evidence to support the findings of the CSC. For his part, Verdillo also filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari. He argues that PAGCOR failed to present substantial evidence to justify his dismissal from service. He contends that his sworn statement cannot be considered as substantial evidence to support the offense of violation of office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as there was no admission on his part that he violated house rules. Thus, he prays for his reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits as well as back wages. ISSUE: Whether Marquez and Verdillo are guilty of dishonesty, violation of office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service to justify their dismissal from service. RULING: It is worthy to state that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised. It is not our function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect. A question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. This rule, however, is not ironclad. We have consistently recognized several exceptional circumstances where we disregarded the aforesaid tenet and proceeded to review the findings of facts of the lower court such as when the findings of fact are conflicting or when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Considering the conflict in the factual findings of the CSC and of the CA, we rule on the factual issues as an exception to the general rule. Marquez was administratively charged for conspiring with Verdillo and Cheng to defraud PAGCOR. The CA observed that there was a disparity between the offense charged and the offenses for which Marquez was found guilty -- dishonesty, grave violation of company rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the company and loss of trust and confidence. The CA concluded that PAGCOR failed to comply with the requirement of administrative due process since Marquez was not duly apprised of the proper charges which led to his dismissal.We do not agree. In Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, the Court pronounced that the charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense. It must be

stressed that what the law requires is to simply inform the civil servant of the nature and cause of accusation against him in a clear and concise manner for the purpose of giving him the right to confront the allegations against him. The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this administrative case. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. The law simply requires that the civil servant is informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him in a clear and concise manner to give the person a chance to answer the allegations intelligently. Evidently, PAGCOR substantially complied with the requirements of due process for administrative cases. With regard to Verdillo’s contention that he would be in a better position to defend himself if confronted with the CCTV footage, we find the same to be without merit. There is more than substantial evidence which proves that he indeed declared void transactions as valid on at least eight occasions. We note that the CCTV footage is not the only evidence against him. Acting Pit Supervisor Yang actually witnessed that several clearly void transactions were declared by Verdillo as good and valid. Even Verdillo’s sworn statement reveals that he did not see the dice hit the rubber wall. In fact, he mentioned in his statement that he used his sense of hearing in determining whether or not the dice hit the rubber wall. The CSC, as affirmed by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 106961, found sufficient evidence to support a finding of dishonesty, grave violation of company rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the company and loss of trust and confidence. The circumstances in this case all point to the conclusion that Verdillo conspired with Marquez and Cheng. Verdillo declared several dice throws of Cheng as "good dice" even if they were void. Marquez then paid Cheng his winnings in huge amounts. Whenever a customer or employee would pass the Craps table, Cheng would change his dice throws and would even comment "may multo" (there is a ghost) when Acting Pit Supervisor Yang would approach the craps tableThese anomalous transactions were not only witnessed by Acting Pit Supervisor Yang, but were also confirmed by the CCTV footage. As regards Marquez, evidence shows that on eight occasions, Marquez paid customer Cheng despite the fact that the latter’s throws were void. He admitted that he knew that on several occasions the throws made should have been declared void and that it was incumbent upon him to make sure that the calls were in order. This duty could not have escaped him as he had been a dealer for five years. Hence, it is our view that the conduct of Marquez amounts to serious dishonesty, and not merely negligence, since his dishonest act was committed not just a few times but repeatedly or eight times over a very short period of seven minutes, a statistical improbability. Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. We find that Marquez and Verdillo failed to present any cogent reason for the Court to deviate from the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to be binding and final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case. All told, we find that there was substantial evidence for the charges against Marquez and Verdillo, warranting their dismissal from service. ROBERTO B. REBLORA v. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 195842, June 18, 2013 J. Perez The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil action under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 could not be anymore overstated in remedial law. Indeed, by restricting the review of judgments or resolutions of the COA only thru a special civil action for certiorari before this Court, the Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible scope of inquiry in such cases only to

errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewed—even by this Court. FACTS: Petitioner rendered civilian government service at the DILG prior to entering military service as a Probationary Ensign in the Philippine Navy. The AFP confirmed the incorporation of his petitioner’s service in the DILG with his length of service in the military pursuant to Sec.3 of PD 1638, as amended by PD 1650. On 2003, at the age of 59, and after a total of 34 years of active service, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from the military by virtue of General Order No. 12, who was already ranked as a Commander in the Philippine Navy. After his retirement, petitioner claimed retirement benefits under Sec.17 of PD 1638 and chose to avail of the monthly retirement pay with the option to receive in advance and in lump sum an amount equivalent to three years worth thereof for the first three years after his retirement. The AFP granted petitioner’s claim of retirement benefits and immediately paid the same, taking into account his actual military service without including his service in the DILG. Petitioner insisted that the computation of his retirement benefit should include his civilian government service at the DILG immediately before he entered military service. After an unsuccessful bid to obtain a favorable legal opinion from the AFP Judge Advocate General, the petitioner requested assistance from the COA for the collection of his claimed additional retirement benefit. The COA agreeing with the petitioner that his civilian service at the DILG should and ought to be included as part of his active service in the military for purposes of computing his retirement benefits under PD No. 1638. However, since his civilian service should be included as part of his active service in the military, the COA opined that petitioner should also have been considered as compulsorily retired on 2000 and not on 2003. The COA explained that as of 22 May 2000, petitioner has already reached the age of 56 with a total of 31 years in active service, inclusive of his four years in the DILG, which fulfilled the conditions for compulsory retirement under Section 5(a) of PD No. 1638, as amended. The COA found that petitioner was not actually underpaid but was rather overpaid his benefits. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether the COA erred in the computation of respondent’s retirement benefits. RULING: We deny the petition. This Court can very well dismiss the instant petition on account of it being the wrong remedy. Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by this Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, as is the present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 64, which implements the mandate of Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, is clear on this: Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided. The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil action under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 could not be anymore overstated in remedial law—the most profound of which, arguably, is the difference of one to the other with respect to the permissible scope of inquiry in each. Indeed, by restricting the review of judgments or resolutions of the COA only thru a special civil action for certiorari before this Court, the Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible scope

of inquiry in such cases only to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewed— even by this Court. That is where the present petition patently fails. It alleges neither grave abuse of jurisdiction nor any jurisdictional error on the part of the COA. It, in fact, contented itself with imputations of errors on the part of the COA and the AFP as to how they interpreted or applied PD No. 1638 to the petitioner’s case. For all intents and purposes, the present petition is, on that account, an improper invocation of this Court’s power of review over the judgments and resolutions of the COA. Nevertheless, even if this Court should take a liberal appreciation of the present petition as one that is filed under Rule 65, such petition would still fail. We have taken an extra step and scoured the established facts vis-à-vis the allegations of the instant petition in search of any vestiges of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA, but we found none. What we did find, on the other hand, is that the assailed COA Decision and Resolution was rendered in accord with law. DARMA MASLAG v. ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, and REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BENGUET G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013 J. del Castillo There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and law. The first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a Petition for Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between these two modes of appeal lies in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the Order or Decision being appealed. FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of original certificate of title against respondents before the MTC, which found that respondent Monzon is guilty of fraud in obtaining and OCT over petitioner’s property and ordered the reconveyance of said property to petitioner. Respondents appealed to the RTC which declared,through Judge Cabato, that the MTC without jurisdiction over the petitioner’s cause of action and took cognizance of the case pursuant to Sec.8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. Both parties acknowledged receipt of the RTC order but neither presented additional evidence before the new Judge De Rivera. A Resolution was issued by the RTC which reversed the MTC decision, ordering petitioner to turn over possession of the subject land to respondent Monzon. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA, assailing the resolution of the RTC which reversed MTC’s findings. The respondents, on the other hand, moved to dismiss petitioner’s ordinary appeal for being the improper remedy, and asserted that the proper mode should have been under Rule 42 for the RTC rendered such resolution in its appellate jurisdiction. The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal, holding that the proper remedy is Petition for Review under Rule 42 and not an ordinary appeal. Petitioner sought reconsideration, this time arguing that RTC rendered the said resolution in its original jurisdiction, which was also denied by the CA, enunciating its earlier decision. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the case, and if so, whether the CA was correct in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.

RULING: Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject property.Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended by RA No. 7691, provides: Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; xxxx SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxxx (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x. In the case at bench, annexed to the Complaint is a Declaration of Real Property dated November 12, 1991, which was later marked as petitioner’s Exhibit "A", showing that the disputed property has an assessed value of P12,400 only. Such assessed value of the property is well within the jurisdiction of the MTC. In fine, the RTC, thru Judge Cabato, erred in applying Section 19(1) of BP 129 in determining which court has jurisdiction over the case and in pronouncing that the MTC is divested of original and exclusive jurisdiction. This brings to fore the next issue of whether the CA was correct in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides for the dismissal of an improper appeal: SECTION 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. – An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed. An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and law. The first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a

Petition for Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between these two modes of appeal lies in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the Order or Decision being appealed. As discussed above, the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; hence, there is no other way the RTC could have taken cognizance of the case and review the court a quo’s Judgment except in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Besides, the new RTC Judge who penned the May 4, 2004 Resolution, Judge Diaz de Rivera, actually treated the case as an appeal despite the October 22, 2003 Order. He started his Resolution by stating, "This is an appeal from the Judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad Benguet" and then proceeded to discuss the merits of the "appeal." In the dispositive portion of said Resolution, he reversed the MTC’s findings and conclusions and remanded residual issues for trial with the MTC. Thus, in fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was a judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. With regard to the RTC’s earlier October 22, 2003 Order, the same should be disregarded for it produces no effect (other than to confuse the parties whether the RTC was invested with original or appellate jurisdiction). It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is "not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside." Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.38 Thus, the CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. To reiterate, only statutes can confer jurisdiction. Court issuances cannot seize or appropriate jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly held that "any judgment, order or resolution issued without jurisdiction is void and cannot be given any effect." By parity of reasoning, an order issued by a court declaring that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when under the law it has none cannot likewise be given effect. It amounts to usurpation of jurisdiction which cannot be countenanced. Since BP 129 already apportioned the jurisdiction of the MTC and the RTC in cases involving title to property, neither the courts nor the petitioner could alter or disregard the same. Besides, in determining the proper mode of appeal from an RTC Decision or Resolution, the determinative factor is the type of jurisdiction actually exercised by the RTC in rendering its Decision or Resolution. Was it rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, or in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction? In short, we look at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC. We do not look into what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised. This is but logical. Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a question which already involves the merits of the appeal, but we obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was improper to begin with. LUCILLE DOMINGO v. MERLINDA COLINA G.R. No. 173330, June 17, 2013 J. Peralta Prosecution's failure to prove the second and third elements of the violation of BP 22, it can be deduced that the prosecution was able to establish the presence of the first and fourth elements, i.e., (1) a person draws and issues a check and (4) the check is dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds or credit. Hence, the fact that petitioner was proven to have drawn and issued a check and that the same was subsequently dishonored for inadequate funds leads to the logical conclusion that the fact from which her civil liability might arise, indeed, exists. As such, the RTC correctly entertained the respondent’s appeal of the civil aspect of the case. FACTS: Petitioner was charged under an information with the violation of BP 22 for the check it issued in payment of an obligation in favor of respondent. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence which the MTCC granted. It held that the prosecution failed to prove elements 2 and 3 of the crime of violation of BP 22, thus acquitting the accused and dismissing the case.

The prosecution then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Order of Dismissal and in the Alternative to Reopen the Civil Aspect of the Case, contending that although petitioner did not receive valuable consideration for her bounced check, she is nonetheless liable to respondent for the face value of the check as an accommodation party and, that petitioner's knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the dishonor of her check. However, said motion was also denied by the MTCC, declaring further that the act from which the civil liability of the accused did not exist. The respondent appealed the case to the RTC of Davao City, which modified the MTCC decision and ordered the herein petitioner to pay the former the civil liability arising out of the offense charged. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the RTC, prompting the filing of a petition for review with the CA. The CA dismissed the petitioner for review, hence, this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain the appeal when it was violative of Sec.2, Rule 111 when the MTCC already ruled that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. RULING: The petition lacks merit. The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the same Rules states that: In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. In the instant case, the Orders of the MTCC, dated October 25, 2001 and November 23, 2001, did not contain any such finding or determination. The Court agrees with the CA that in acquitting petitioner in its Order dated October 25, 2001, the MTCC did not rule on the civil aspect of the case. While it subsequently held in its November 23, 2001 Order that "the act from which the civil liability of the accused in favor of the private complainant may arise does not exist in this case," the MTCC, nonetheless, failed to cite evidence, factual circumstances or any discussion in its October 25, 2001 Decision which would warrant such ruling. Instead, it simply concluded that since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the offense charged, then the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The MTCC held that its observations and ratiocinations in its October 25, 2001 Order justified its conclusion. However, after a careful review of the above-mentioned Orders, the Court finds nothing therein which the MTCC could have used as a reasonable ground to arrive at its conclusion that the act or omission from which petitioner's civil liability might arise did not exist. On the contrary, the tenor of the Orders of the MTCC is that the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner was based on reasonable doubt. As may be recalled, the MTCC dismissed the criminal case on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the second and third elements of BP 22, i.e., (2) the check is applied on account or for value and (3) the person issuing the check knows at the time of its issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for the full payment of the check upon its presentment.

This only means, therefore, that the trial court did not convict petitioner of the offense charged, since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases. Conversely, the lack of evidence to prove the aforesaid elements of the offense charged does not mean that petitioner has no existing debt with respondent, a civil aspect which is proven by another quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence. Moreover, from the above pronouncement of the MTCC as to the prosecution's failure to prove the second and third elements of the offense charged, it can be deduced that the prosecution was able to establish the presence of the first and fourth elements, i.e., (1) a person draws and issues a check and (4) the check is dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds or credit. Hence, the fact that petitioner was proven to have drawn and issued a check and that the same was subsequently dishonored for inadequate funds leads to the logical conclusion that the fact from which her civil liability might arise, indeed, exists. On the basis of the foregoing, the RTC correctly entertained respondent's appeal of the civil aspect of the case. SIMPLICIA O. ABRIGO and DEMETRIO ABRIGO v. JIMMY F. FLORES, EDNA F. FLORES, DANILO FLORES, BELINDA FLORES, HECTOR. FLORES, MARITES FLORES, HEIRS OF MARIA F. FLORES, JACINTO FAYLONA, ELISA FAYLONA MAGPANTAY, MARIETTA FAYLONA CARTACIANO, and HEIRS of TOMASA BANZUELA VDA. DE FAYLONA G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013 J. Bersamin A supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time. FACTS: Involved in the suit is a lot inherited by both Francisco (Faylona) and Gaudencia (Faylona) from their deceased parents.It appears that after Francisco’s death, his widow and Gaudencia entered into an extrajudicial partition whereby the western half of the same lot was assigned to Francisco’s heirs while the eastern half thereof to Gaudencia. There was, however, no actual ground partition of the lot up to and after Gaudencia’s death. It thus result that both the heirs of Francisco (herein respondents) and Gaudencia (herein petitioners) owned in common the land in dispute.The heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco, herein private respondents, filed a complaint for judicial partition in order to terminate their co-ownership. The trialcourt rendered judgment in favor of private respondents by ordering the partition of the land in dispute in such a way that the western half thereof shall pertain to the heirs of Francisco while the eastern half, to the heirs of Gaudencia. The court thus ordered the latter to remove all their improvements which encroached on the western half. The heirs of Gaudencia thus filed an appeal with the CA which affirmed the judgment of the RTC. Since no further appellate proceedings were taken by the petitioners or their other co-heirs, the judgment thus became final. Thereafter, the heirs of Francisco filed with the court a motion for execution to enforce and implement its decision. The implementing sheriff returned the writ “PARTIALLY SATISFIED,” as the petitioners failed to remove the aforesaid improvements. On account of cush return, the respondents filed with the court a Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition. Before the court could act on respondents’ aforementioned Motion for Demolition, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Resolution on Motion for Demolition, alleging that they have become one of the coowners of the western half, purportedly because one of the successors-in-interest of Francisco – Jimmy Flores – who was co-plaintiff of the private respondents in the case, sold to them his share in the western half. The CA denied the petitioners’ motion to defer and directed the issuance of an alias writ of execution, to which the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which in turn was opposed by the

respondents. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA against the repondents and the RTC, which was, however, also denied. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale by respondent Jimmy Flores of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402square meter lot constituted a supervening event that rendered the execution of the final judgment against petitioners inequitable. RULING: Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not obtain herein. To accept their contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in order to further partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the ¼ portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening would be legally impermissible, considering that the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, could no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant to correct what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension. Verily, petitioners could not import into the action for partition of the property in litis their demand for the segregration of the 1/4 share of Jimmy Flores. Instead, their correct course of action was to initiate in the proper court a proceeding for partition of the western portion based on the supposed sale to them by Jimmy Flores. We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time. In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event. The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment. Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of his supposed 1/4 share in the western portion of the property in litis, assuming it to be true, did not modify or alter the judgment regarding the partition of the property in litis. It was also regarded with suspicion by the CA because petitioners had not adduced evidence of the transaction in the face of respondents, including Jimmy Flores, having denied the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale itself. The issuance of the special order of demolition would also not constitute an abuse of discretion, least of all grave. Such issuance would certainly be the necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final and immutable decision. According to Section 10(d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court, when the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except

upon special order of the court issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the judgment obligor or his agent has failed to remove the improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court. With the special order being designed to carry out the final judgment of the RTC for the delivery of the western portion of the property in litis to their respective owners, the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari could only be upheld. ABELARDO JANDUSAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 185129, June 17, 2013 J. Reyes The fact that petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the funds of the association of the year 2000 which were received by him in trust, already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitioner’s own personal use. FACTS: In 1999, petitioner was elected as the treasurer of a tricycle driver’s association CALAPUPATODA, which is a registered non-stock association of tricycle operators and drivers in Valenzuela City, and was re-elected the following year. Relative to his dutiesas treasurer, he maintained a “blue book” which reflected the association’s income derived from membership dues, motor and driver’s fees and the butaw, an amount collected from members on a daily basis. Consequent to the election of the new set of officers for the year 2001, a turnover meeting was held where petitioner turned over the “blue book” which reflected the net remaining funds of the association for the year 2000. Despite demands, however, petitioners failed to turn over such funds. Petitioner was thus formally charged with estafa or violation of paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC before the RTC. Prosecution presented evidence showing that on a meeting held, petitioner signed an undertaking to return the said amount to the association. Petitioner however denied signing the undertaking and claimed that the same was merely inserted on top of his signature when he signed the same. The RTC rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa, which was affirmed by the CA. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for new trial, which were denied by the CA. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the judgment of the RTC finding him guilty of estafa beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: The petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the first element of estafa – that he received the money or funds of the association for the year 2000. The courts a quo were correct in convicting the petitioner of estafa. Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is demand by the offended party to the offender. As correctly found by the CA: In the case at bar, the aforementioned elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution. It cannot be denied that accused-appellant, as Treasurer of CALAPUPATODA, received and held money for administration and in trust for the association. He was thus under an obligation to turnover the same upon conclusion of his term as Treasurer. Instead, however, he misappropriated the same to the prejudice of the association and, despite demand, failed to

account for or return them. Such failure to account, upon demand, of funds or property held in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. In addition, misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. The "failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation." As mentioned, the petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the funds of the association of the year 2000 which were received by him in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitioner’s own personal use. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELINO COLLADO Y CUNANAN, MYRA COLLADO Y SENICA, MARK CIPRIANO Y ROCERO, SAMUEL SHERWIN LATARIO Y ENRIQUE, AND REYNALDO RANADA Y ALAS G.R. No. 185719, June 17, 2013 J. del Castillo The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were lawfully arrested. Pursuant to the above-mentioned rule, the subsequent search and seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid. Hence, appellants’ claim of unreasonable search and seizure must fail. FACTS: Co-accused spouses Marcelino and Myra Collado were charged under an information with the crime of violating Sec. 5 and Sec. 6 of RA 9165, to which they pleaded not guilty upon their arraignment. The evidence for the prosecution showed that on information obtained from a civilian asset by the police officers, co-accused spouses were engaged in selling shabu and that drug users were using their residence in Pasig City for drug sessions. A buy-bust team was thereafter formed to apprehend the suspects. Upon reaching the target area, the asset introduced the poseur-buyer to Marcelino as regular buyer of shabu. When the transaction was consummated, the pre-arranged signal was then performed, after which the rest of the team rushed to the scene. The poseur-buyer then introduced himself as a police officer and arrested Marcelino, and frisked the latter, thus obtaining a metal container that contained a sachet of white crystalline substance and marked the same accordingly. Meanwhile, inside the house of the suspects were several other persons gathered around a table littered with drug paraphernalia, hence they too were arrested. On the other hand, Marcelino contends that on that evening, he was at the living room with his nieces and children as he was fixing a VCD player. Then suddenly, four armed men rushed inside the house and pointed their guns at him. He was then dragged outside where the other accused already in handcuffs, and was there informed that they were arrested for selling shabu. The RTC found Marcelino guilty of Sections 5, 11, and 14 of PD 9165. The rest of the accused applied for probation, while the others, including Marcelino and Myra, appealed the decision to the CA. The appellate court found the warrantless arrest of the accused to be lawful considering they were caught in the act of committing a crime. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of Marcelino and Myra were legally done. RULING:

Appellants argue that the arrest, search, and seizure conducted by the police were illegal since it was not supported by a valid warrant. They thus posit that their right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for lawful warrantless arrests, viz:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: "(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." A common example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after conducting a buybust operation. This is precisely what happened in the present case. The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia. Thus, there is no other logical conclusion than that the arrest made by the police officers was a valid warrantless arrest since the same was made while the appellants were actually committing the said crimes. Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they can no longer question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to the same before their arraignment. Neither did they take steps to quash the Informations on such ground. They only raised this issue upon their appeal to the appellate court. By this omission, any objections on the legality of their arrest are deemed to have been waived by them.Anent their claim of unreasonable search and seizure, it is true that under the Constitution, "a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, one of which is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search

warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were lawfully arrested. Pursuant to the above-mentioned rule, the subsequent search and seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid. Hence, appellants’ claim of unreasonable search and seizure must fail. Appellants argue that the procedure laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 was not followed. They specifically harp on the fact that the confiscated drugs were not photographed and inventoried. Moreover, they contend that the police officers who handled the seized specimen were not presented in court to testify on the condition in which they received the said specimen. For the appellants, these defects constitute a clear break in the chain of custody and, consequently, the prosecution failed to establish corpus delicti. The Court, however, finds this argument unmeritorious. Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165 provides for the custody and disposition of the confiscated drugs, to wit: (1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; This rule is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165, viz: a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/ team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizure; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. Pursuant to the above-cited provisions, this Court has consistently ruled that the failure of the police officers to inventory and photograph the confiscated items are not fatal to the prosecution’s cause, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized substance were preserved, as in this case. Here, PO2 Noble, after apprehending Marcelino and confiscating from him the sachets of shabu, immediately placed his markings on them. Moreover, it is of no moment that Forensic Chemist Alejandro De Guzman who conducted the laboratory examination was not presented as a witness. The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons who had custody of the illegal drugs is not a crucial point against the prosecution. There is no requirement for the prosecution to present as witness in a drugs case

every person who had something to do with the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the prohibited drugs from him. To stress, the implementing rules are clear that non-compliance with the requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. REPUBLIC GAS CORPORATION, ARNEL U. TY, MARI ANTONETTE N. TY, ORLANDO REYES, FERRER SUAZO and ALVIN U. TY v. PETRON CORPORATION, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, and SHELL INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY LIMITED G.R. No. 194062, June 17, 2013 J. Peralta The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a certiorari petition may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. However, this rule is not absolute as jurisprudence has laid down several recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration. FACTS: Petitioners are the directors and officers of Republic Gas Corporation, an entity duly licensed to engage in, conduct and carry on, the business of refilling, buying, selling, distributing, and marketing at wholesale and retail of LPG. Respondents Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporationare the two largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines.

LPG Dealers Associations received reports that certain entities were engaged in the unauthorized refilling, sale, and distribution of LPG cylinders bearing the registered tradenames and trademarks of the respondents, thus prompting the filing of a complaint with the NBI regarding such activity. The NBI thus conducted an investigation, and found that several persons and/or establishments, including herein petitioner corporation, were suspected of having violated provisions of BP 33. The NBI then applied for the issuance of search warrants in the RTC, against REGASCO, which was granted by the judge. The Assistant City Prosecutor then recommended the dismissal of the comlpaint, contending that the respondents failed to show REGASCO was engaged in selling petitioner’s products or that it imitated and reproduced the registered trademarks of the petitioners. On appeal, the DOJ Secretary affirmed the prosecutor’s dismissal. Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, respondents sought recourse to the CA through a petition for certiorari, which was granted. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by respondents should have been denied outright.

RULING:

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a certiorari petition may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. However, this rule is not absolute as jurisprudence has laid down several recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration, viz.: (a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court. (c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved. In the present case, the filing of a motion for reconsideration may already be dispensed with considering that the questions raised in this petition are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and passed upon by the Secretary of Justice in her assailed resolution. HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO, REPRESENTED BY: LOLIBETH SOTTO NOBLE, DANILO C. SOTTO, CRISTINA C. SOTTO, EMMANUEL C. SOTTO, and FILEMON C. SOTTO; and SALVACION BARCELONA, AS HEIR OF DECEASED MIGUEL BARCELONA v. MATILDE S. PALICTE G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013 J. Bersamin

Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action these elements are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. FACTS: Filemon had four children, namely: Marcelo Sotto, Pascuala Sotto-Pahang, Miguel Barcelona, and Matilde. Marcelo was the administrator of the Estate of Sotto. Marcelo and Miguel were the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners.Pilar Teves and the other heirs of Carmen Rallos, the deceased wife of Filemon, filed with the CFI a complaint against the Estate of Sotto, seeing to recover certain properties that Filemon inherited from Carmen. The CFI rendered judgment in favor of Pilar and the heirs of Carmen, and to satisfy the monetary part of the judgment, levy on execution was effected against properties belonging to the Estate of Sotto. The levied assets were then sold at public auction, and was later redeemed by herein respondent. Respondent then filed a motion (Civil Case No. R-10027) to transfer to her name the title to the four properties, which the CFI granted when the other heirs failed to exercise the option granted them to join respondent as co-redemptioners. Thereafter, the heirs of Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that they be included as respondent’s coredemptioners. This, however, was denied for lack of merit, which they then elevated to the SC on certiorari (G.R. No. 154585). Their petition was denied. Pascuala, who previously executed a document expressly waiving her rights in the four properties covered by the deed of redemption, changed her mind and filed a complaint with the RTC seeking the nullification of her waiver of her rights, and to have herself be declared as coredemptioner of such properties. However, the RTC dismissed the same on the ground that it is already barred by laches, which was later assailed in her petition for certiorari filed with the CA. She then appealed the dismissal of her petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 131722), but the Court denied due course to her petition. The heirs of Marcelo, and the heirs of Manuel, instituted an action for partition(Civil Case No. CEB-24293) against respondent in the RTC, alleging in their complaint that despite the redemption of the four properties having been made in the sole name of Matilde, the four properties still rightfully belonged to the Estate of Sotto for having furnished the funds used to redeem the properties, and prayed that the RTC declare the four properties as the assets of the Estate of Sotto, and that the RTC direct their partition among the heirs of Filemon.Respondent moved to dismiss the case, alleging that claim was already barred by prior judgment considering that the decision in all the abovementioned cases had become final, and the cases involved the same parties, the same subject matter, the same causes of action, and the same factual and legal issues. The RTC held that it had no jurisdiction to annul the rulings of co-equal courts that had recognized respondent’s exclusive rights over the properties and dismissed the case, and the motion for reconsideration petitioners filed. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the dismissal of the case with the CA, but the same was affirmed, hence this appeal.

In the meantime, the Estate of Sotto, through its administrator Marcelo, moved in the probate court to require respondent to account for and turn over the properties that allegedly belonged to the estate. The probate court granted the motion, but subsequently reversed itself upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the Estate of Sotto appealed (G.R. No. 158642), but the Court promulgated its decision adversely against the Estate of Sotto. ISSUES: Whether or not the present action for partition was already barred by prior judgment.

RULING: Petitioners argue here that the four properties be declared as part of the Estate of Sotto to be partitioned among the heirs of Filemon because the funds expended by Matilde for the redemption of the properties came from the Estate of Sotto.

We still rule that res judicata was applicable to bar petitioners’ action for partition of the four properties. Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action these elements are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. The first three elements were present. The decision of the Court in G.R. No. 55076 (the first case), the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 131722 (the second case), the order dated October 5, 1989 of the RTC in Civil Case No. R-10027 as upheld by the Court in G.R. No. 154585 (the third case), and the decision in G.R. No. 158642 (the fourth case) – all of which dealt with Matilde’s right to the four properties – had upheld Matilde’s right to the four properties and had all become final. Such rulings were rendered in the exercise of the respective courts’ jurisdiction over the subject matter, and were adjudications on the merits of the cases. We find that, indeed, Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was no different from the previous cases as far as parties, subject matter, causes of action and issues were concerned. In other words, Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was an undisguised relitigation of the same settled matter concerning Matilde’s ownership of the four properties. In all the five cases (Civil Case No. CEB-24293 included), an identity of parties existed because the parties were the same, or there was privity among them, or some of the parties were successors-in-interest litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary, because a shared identity of interest sufficed for res judicata to apply. Moreover, mere substantial identity of parties, or even community of interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter were not impleaded in the first case, would be sufficient. As such, the fact that a previous case was filed in the name of the Estate of Sotto only was of no consequence.

Secondly, the subject matter of all the actions (Civil Case No. CEB-24293 included), was the same, that is, Matilde’s right to the four properties. On the one hand, Matilde insisted that she had the exclusive right to them, while, on the other hand, the other declared heirs of Filemon, like petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, maintained that the properties belonged to the Estate of Sotto. And, lastly, a judgment rendered in the other cases, regardless of which party was successful, would amount to res judicata in relation to Civil Case No. CEB-24293. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive about the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. Section 47 (b) Rule 39 of the Rules of Court institutionalizes the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment, viz: Section 47. Effect of judgments and final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: xxxx (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and xxxx The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law: one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation –interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for one and the same cause – nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness. The doctrine is to be applied with rigidity because: x x x the maintenance of public order, the repose of society, and the quiet of families require that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth. So deeply is this principle implanted in xxx jurisprudence that commentators upon it have said, the res judicata renders white that

which is black and straight that which is crooked. Facit excurvo rectum, ex albo nigrum. No other evidence can afford strength to the presumption of truth it creates, and no argument can detract from its legal efficacy. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWARD M. CAMACHO G.R. No. 185604, June 13, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. The nature of the proceeding for reconstitution of a certificate of title under R.A. No. 26 denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition. The purpose of such a proceeding is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or destruction occurred. The same R.A. No. 26 specifies the requisites to be met for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a certificate of title. Failure to comply with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the proceedings null and void. FACTS: Respondent filed a petition seeking the reconstitution of an OCT whose number is no longer legible due to wear and tear, alleging that he is the owner thereof by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale executed by the heirs of Sps. Lapitan in his favor. The RTC thus issued an Order finding the respondent’s petition sufficient in form and substance ans set the same for hearing.

After trial, the RTC rendered its decision, granting the petition of respondent, and directing the RD to reconstitute said original certificate of title in respondent’s favor. The OSG later on filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC for lack of merit, holding thatrespondent complied with Section 2 of R.A. No. 2642 considering that the reconstitution in this case is based on the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT. Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the decision of the RTC was affirmed, holding that respondent’s petition is governed by Section 10 of R.A. No. 26 since the reconstitution proceedings is based on the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT itself. Aggrieved, respondent filed this present petition under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether the RTC properly acquired and was invested with jurisdiction in the first place to hear and decide the Land Registration Case in the light of the strict and mandatory provisions of R.A. No. 26.

RULING: We resolve the sole issue in the negative.

Section 110 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended by R.A. No. 6732, allows the reconstitution of lost or destroyed original Torrens title either judicially, in accordance with the special procedure laid down in R.A. No. 26, or administratively, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6732. As the case set before this Court is one for judicial reconstitution, we limit the discussion to the pertinent law, which is R.A. No. 26, and the applicable jurisprudence.

The nature of the proceeding for reconstitution of a certificate of title under R.A. No. 26 denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition. The purpose of such a proceeding is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or destruction occurred. The same R.A. No. 26 specifies the requisites to be met for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a certificate of title. Failure to comply with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the proceedings null and void. Thus, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or destroyed one, R.A. No. 26 laid down procedures which must be strictly followed in view of the danger that reconstitution could be the source of anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy substitute for original registration of title proceedings. It bears reiterating that respondent’s quest for judicial reconstitution in this case is anchored on the owner’s duplicate copy of said OCT – a source for reconstitution of title provided under Section 2 (a) of R.A. No. 26, which provides in full as follows: SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order: a. The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title; b. The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title; c. A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; d. An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; e. A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and f. Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. In this aspect, the CA was correct in invoking our ruling in Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., that notices to owners of adjoining lots and actual occupants of the subject property are not mandatory and jurisdictional in a petition for judicial reconstitution of destroyed certificate of title when the source for such reconstitution is the owner’s duplicate copy thereof since the publication, posting and notice requirements for such a petition are governed by Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of R.A. No. 26. Section 10 provides: SEC. 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act: Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: And, provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act.

Correlatively, the pertinent provisions of Section 9 on the publication, posting and the contents of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution clearly mandate: SEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may require. The notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner, the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, the location of the property, and the date on which all persons having an interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they may have. x x x In sum, Section 10, in relation to Section 9, requires that 30 days before the date of hearing, (1) a notice be published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette at the expense of the petitioner, and that (2) such notice be posted at the main entrances of the provincial building and of the municipal hall where the property is located. The notice shall state the following: (1) the number of the certificate of title, (2) the name of the registered owner, (3) the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, (4) the location of the property, and (5) the date on which all persons having an interest in the property, must appear and file such claims as they may have. Verily, while the CA invoked the appropriate provisions of R.A. No. 26, it failed, however, to take note that Section 9 thereof mandatorily requires that the notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title and the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title. In this case, the RTC failed to indicate these jurisdictional facts in the notice. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEL REBOTAZO y ALEJANDRA G.R. No. 192913, June 13, 2013 CJ. Sereno The ‘material inconsistencies’ asserted by the accused-appellant which allegedly create grave doubts are, on the contrary, too minor, trivial and inconsequential to affect the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the inconsistencies having been fully and sufficiently explained during trial by the witnesses themselves, and their explanations having been accepted by the Trial Court. Besides, it has been held, time and again, that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations of witnesses do not destroy the witnesses' credibility but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. FACTS: The accused was charged under two separate informations with the violation of Sections 5 and 11, RA 9165, to which the accused pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. The evidence for the prosecution showed that a buy-bust operation was conducted by the NBI to apprehend

the accused, after a confidential informant reported that the former intended to sell shabu to him later that day. At the area of operation, the confidential informant, and the poseur-buyer told the accused that they wanted to purchase shabu. When the transaction was consummated, the prearranged signal was then performed which caused the rest of the buy-bust team to approach the area and arrest the accused and was subjected to a body search. The accused voluntarily informed the NBI agents that he had another sachet of shabu inside one of his socks. At the NBI office, Dungog conducted an inventory of the seized items in the presence of accused, a media representative, and a representative from the DOJ. A laboratory examination was likewise made, and the specimen yielded positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. Appellant also underwent a drug test, and tested positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. The accused on the other hand contended that on that day, he was with his friend, herein confidential informant, when they were suddenly approached by herein poseur-buyer. The poseur-buyer then gave money to his friend, and the latter gave something lengthy to the former. A few minutes after the poseur-buyer left, the NBI agents approached and searched him, but found nothing. He also claimed that at the time of the arrest, he was not informed of his constitutional rights, and that he was wearing only pants, a t-shirt and slippers, and had no socks. The accused was then forced to sign a document known as the Inventory of Dangerous Drugs. The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged, giving more weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution. It relied on the testimony of the poseur-buyer who narrated how the illegal sale took place, presented in court the evidence of the corpus delicti, and positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. It also gave credence to the testimony of the two police officers, who were both "presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions. Upon intermediate appellate review, the CA rendered a decision affirming the factual findings of the RTC on the premise that witness Diaz and Dungog had clearly and convincingly established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that the CA did not find any ill motive on the part of these witnesses to falsely implicate appellant only bolstered his conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in finding the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses sufficient to warrant appellant’s conviction for the crimes charged.

RULING: The supposed factual discrepancies in the prosecution’s evidence do not hold water. The rule on material inconsistencies has been enunciated by this Court several times. In People v. Arcega, we have held that "by and large, the ‘material inconsistencies’ asserted by the accused-appellant which allegedly create grave doubts are, on the contrary, too minor, trivial and inconsequential to affect the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the inconsistencies having been fully and sufficiently explained during trial by the witnesses themselves, and their explanations having been accepted by the Trial Court. Besides, it has been held, time and again, that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations of witnesses do not destroy the witnesses' credibility but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony."

On this score, we agree with the findings of the CA that the prosecution has sufficiently explained the factual discrepancies. First, on the lack of signature of an elected official and the failure to indicate the name of the person who affixed his signature as DOJ representative in the inventory report, jurisprudence has maintained that "non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."It appears from the records that the NBI tried to contact barangay officials to attend the inventory-taking, but none arrived.49 Such effort on the part of the NBI agents and the consequent failure of said elected officials to appear should be considered sufficient justifiable ground so as to excuse the prosecution from complying with this particular requirement. Considering that the integrity of the seized drugs has been maintained, and that the drugs were immediately marked for proper identification, the absence of an elected official during the inventory-taking should not be deemed fatal to the prosecution’s case. Second, the alleged confusion in the identity of the media representatives was thoroughly explained by witness Dungog. Third, on the discrepancy between the inventory report and the actual incident, including the markings on Specimen "A" and Specimen "B," the discrepancy was also explained by Dungog. JOSELITO RAMOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 194384, June 13, 2013 CJ. Sereno The assertion by petitioner that parts of onw of the witness’ testimony were inconsistent with that of the other witnesses cannot be given credence. It should be noted that the witnesses saw the incident from different vantage points, the former being a passive eyewitness, and latter being direct witnesses to the incident. As such, the latter were able to observe events that the latter might have overlooked or failed to see. FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of homicide. The evidence for the prosecution showed that the victim, Pedro Prestoza, was riding a tricycle with six other people, when another tricycle, this one driven by Ramos, cut in on their path. Petitioner and a certain Danny Alvarez alighted from their tricycle and pulled down Nelson Tagulao from the other tricycle. Alvarez then struck Nelson Tagulao with a lead pipe. Prestoza alighted from his tricycle in order to stop the attack, but the two assailants then turned on the victim, was hit by Alvarez with the lead pipe and by Ramos with a piece of wood. While they were ganging up on Prestoza, Jimmy Tagulao arrived and engaged Alvarez in a fist fight. The latter and petitioner then ran away. Prestoza was brought to a hospital for treatment, but he died of his wounds after eight days. In his defense, the petitioner contended that the tricycle he was driving was trailing two other tricycles with men on board who were cursing at him. He was about to overtake the two other tricycles when they blocked his way. The passengers of the two other tricycles alighted, and one of them thrust a

knife at him, but missed. Ramos immediately alighted from his tricycle and ran away, with four other persons giving chase. He was about to return to his tricycle when he saw his younger brother Edwin arrive on board another tricycle, and approached him. The latter was suddenly stabbed by Nelson Tagulao. Ramos took his brother away from the place, as seven other persons attacked them with pieces of wood. He then saw his elder brother Orlando being struck on the head with a stone by Hipolito Cervas. Ramos flagged down a tricycle and brought his brothers to a hospital, then reported the incident to the police. Edwin and Orlando filed a complaint for frustrated murder against prosecution witnesses John Tagulao, Gerardo Gloria, Ernesto Ydia and eight others, but the complaint was dismissed. After trial, the RTC found Ramos guilty of the crime of homicide, giving credence to the testimonies of John Tagulao and Gerardo Gloria. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding that the identity of Ramos as one of the assailants has been sufficiently established by creditble eyewitness testimony. Thus, petitioner’s denial could not have prevailed over his positive identification. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner thus filed this petition under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should not have been given credence, because the testimony of Ernesto Ydia contradicts the testimonies of the other witnesses, and because they were impelled by an improper motive, as petitioner’s brothers had filed a complaint for frustrated murder against them

RULING: We deny the petition and affirm the RTC’s finding of guilt. Petitioner Ramos ascribes reversible error on the part of the CA when it affirmed his conviction, because parts of Ernesto Ydia’s testimony were allegedly inconsistent with the testimonies of John Tagulao and Gerardo Gloria. As petitioner pointed out, John Tagulao testified that petitioner, Alvarez and a certain Jordan Baladad mauled the victim. On the other hand, Ernesto Ydia stated that petitioner, his brothers Edwin and Orlando, and Jordan Baladad were the ones who had beat up Prestoza.

The CA and the RTC correctly refused to give credence to the testimony of Ernesto Ydia. As explained by the appellate court: Significantly, the points of recall and circumstances of the witnesses were different. Ydia was a passive eyewitness, being a passenger from another tricycle. Tagulao and Gloria, on the other hand, directly witnessed the incident as they were riding the same tricycle ridden by Prestoza. As such, Tagulao and Gloria were able to observe events that Ydia might have overlooked or failed to see. Thus, the CA and the RTC relied on the testimonies of John Tagulao and Gerardo Gloria to establish the facts that led to Prestoza’s death. A review of the records shows that their testimonies clearly identified petitioner as one of the perpetrators of the mauling incident and were consistent on material points. Petitioner finally argues that the testimonies of John Tagulao and Gerardo Gloria should not be given credence because the witnesses bear a grudge against him. He attributes the supposed grudge to a complaint for frustrated murder filed against them by petitioner’s brothers Edwin and Orlando.

Again, we disagree. The rule is that "where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and that he would not prevaricate and cause damnation to one who brought him no harm or injury." In this case, while petitioner's brothers did in fact file a criminal complaint for frustrated murder against John Tagulao, Gerardo Gloria, and some other individuals, the complaint was eventually dismissed. Nothing on record shows any other circumstance that could have impelled the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against petitioner. In fact, John Tagulao was a son-in-law of the victim. Thus, the reasonable presumption is that, as a family member, he was interested in the prosecution of the real perpetrator of the crime. We therefore rule that, in the absence of evidence that the prosecution witnesses were moved by an improper motive in testifying against petitioner, the presumption that they were not so moved prevails, and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE v. STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT and/or PHILIPPINE ESTATE CORPORATION G.R. No. 200402, June 13, 2013 CJ. Sereno Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion by a public officer on whom the law imposes the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which the officer is required to act. Neither can mandamus be issued unless a clear right of the bidder is shown. Mandamus does not lie if the right is doubtful. FACTS: The indebtedness of PNCC to various governmental financial institutions was transferred to the National Governmentthrough the Committee on Privatization (COP)/Asset Privatization Trust (APT) and the Bureau of Treasury. Consequently, APT slated the privatization of PNCC in order to generate maximum cash recovery for the government. Thus, sometime in July of 2000, it announced the holding of a public bidding involving the package sale of stocks, receivables, and securities owned by the National Government in the PNCC.Dong-A Consortium, which was formed by respondent STRADEC and Dong-A Pharmaceuticals, signified its intention to bid. As a prospective bidder, it received the accompanying bid documents given by APT. The public bidding was then conducted, however, when they offered their bids, none of the bidders met the indicative price of APT.APT then informed Dong-A Consortium informing the latter that its offer had been rejected, to which the latter asked for reconsideration and requested the award of the PNCC properties.Meanwhile, the term of APT expired and PMO was thus organized to implement the disposition of government-acquired assets, including PNCC shares. The decision of APT to reject the bid still stands. STRADEC thus filed a complaint for Declaration of Right to a Notice of Award and/or Damages on behalf of Dong-A Consortium against PMO and PNCC. In its answer, PMO argued that STRADEC had no legal right to demand an issuance of a Notice of Award even after having submitted the highest bid. In its decision, the RTC ruled that PMO directed the issuance of a

Notice of Award in favor of Dong-A Consortium. Upon appeal to the CA, the sale of the assets of PNCC was awarded to Dong-A Consortium. ISSUE: Whether or not Dong-A Consortium has the right to receive the award, as directed by the lower courts. RULING: As accurately depicted by the OSG, to compel the issuance of a Notice of Award is tantamount to a prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Mandamus, however, will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion by a public officer on whom the law imposes the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which the officer is required to act. Respondent has no cause of action to compel APT to award the bid to Dong-A Consortium.

Neither can mandamus be issued unless a clear right of the bidder is shown. Mandamus does not lie if the right is doubtful. Here, as discussed, Dong-A Consortium has no right to receive the award, since it failed to match the indicative price. Petitioner cannot be compelled to accept the bid of Dong-A Consortium since this forced consent treads on the government’s freedom to contract. The freedom of persons to enter into contracts is a policy of the law, and courts should move with all necessary caution and prudence when interfering with it. It must be remembered that in the field of competitive public bidding, the owner of the property to be auctioned – the government – enjoys a wide latitude of discretion and autonomy in choosing the terms of the agreement. This principle is especially true in this case, since the policy decision then was for APT to liquidate nonperforming assets of the government in order to recover losses. Therefore, absent any abuse of discretion, injustice, unfairness or fraudulent acts, this Court refrain from discrediting the judgment call of APT to prefatorily refuse any offer that fell below the indicative price.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ATTY. RICARDO D. GONZALEZ G.R. No. 185821, June 13, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr.

While the provisions of the Rules of Court apply to Special Agrarian Court proceedings, it is clear that, unlike in expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court, the appointment of a commissioner or commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of one of the parties.And since neither party objected to the appointment of commissioners, the proper fees to be paid to them should likewise be governed by the Rules of Court.

FACTS:

Respondent is the registered owner of two contiguous parcels of land devoted to coconut production which was tenanted by several people. Pursuant to CARP, the respondent voluntarily offered to sell the subject property to the DAR for Php250,000.00 per hectare. Pursuant to DAR Administrative Order, the DAR and the LBP valued the subject property at P50,265.17 per hectare, but the same was rejected by the respondent. The case was then referred to the RARAD, but the valuation made by the DAR and the LBP was affirmed.

Disappointed with the low valuation, respondent filed before the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC) a petition for just compensation against the LBP, the DAR, and the tenants of the subject property. With the conformity of the parties, the SAC appointed Commissioners to determine the amount of just compensation due the respondent. The Commissioners thus submitted their valuation recommendation.

The SAC then rendered a decision, and came up with its own valuation, considering that the asking price of the respondent was high, while the recommendation of the committee was low. Both the DAR and LBP sought reconsideration of the decision but the SAC denied their respective motions. Aggrieved, the LBP appealed the decision to the CA.

The CA affirmed the findings and the ruling of the SAC, and ordered LBP being the losing party, to bear the payment of the commissioners’ fees. Hence, LBP filed this petition under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether or not LBP should be held liable for the payment of the commissioners’ fees

RULING:

We held in Lee v. Land Bank of the Philippines that while the provisions of the Rules of Court apply to SAC proceedings, it is clear that, unlike in expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court, the appointment of a commissioner or commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of one of the parties. Section 58 of R.A. No. 6657 provides:

SEC. 58. Appointment of Commissioners. — The Special Agrarian Courts, upon their own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, may appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof with the court.

Here, both parties did not object to the appointment of commissioners. Our ruling in Apo Fruits is instructive:

The relevant law is found in Rule 67, Section 12 of the Rules of Court:

"SEC. 12. Costs, by whom paid. — The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner."

Rule 141, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, provides that:

"SEC. 16. Fees of commissioners in eminent domain proceedings. — The commissioners appointed to appraise land sought to be condemned for public uses in accordance with these rules shall each receive a compensation to be fixed by the court of NOT LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED (P300.00) PESOS per day for the time actually and necessarily employed in the performance of their duties and in making their report to the court, which fees shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings."

From the afore-quoted provision, the award made by the RTC is way beyond that allowed under Rule 141, Section 16; thus, the award is excessive and without justification. Records show that the commissioners were constituted on 26 May 2000 and they submitted their appraisal report on 21 May 2001, when the old schedule of legal fees was in effect. The amendment in Rule 141 introduced by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which took effect on 16 August 2004, increased the commissioner’s fees from P100.00 to P300.00 per day. Assuming they devoted all the 360 days from the time they were constituted until the time they submitted the appraisal report in the performance of their duties, and applying the old rate for commissioner’s fees, they would only receive P38,000.00. Moreover, even if the new rate is applied, each commissioner would receive only P108,000.00. The rule above-quoted is very clear on the amount of commissioner’s fees. The award made by the RTC in the amount of 2½% of the total amount of just compensation, i.e., 2 1/2% of P1,383,179,000.00, which translates to P34,579,475.00, is certainly unjustified and excessive. x x x

Accordingly, remand of the case for the determination of the proper amount of commissioners’ fees is in order, pursuant to the aforecited provision of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. The SAC shall particularly determine the number of days which the Board actually devoted to the performance of its duties. Since the Board in this case was constituted on March 3, 2000, and it rendered its Report on July 28, 2000, or prior to the increase in the rate of commissioner's fees, the old rate of P100.00 per day shall be applied.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by Fritzi C. Pantoja, in her capacity as the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR-Laguna v. PARAMOUNT HOLDINGS EQUITIES, INC., JIMMY CHUA, ROJAS CHUA, BENJAMIN SIM, SANTOS C. TAN, WILLIAM C. LEE and STEWART C. LIM G.R. No. 176838, June 13, 2013 J. Reyes

The jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. Basic is the rule that the "jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasijudicial office or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs."

FACTS:

The case stems from the petition filed with the Office of the PARAD by the DAR through PARO Felixberto Kagahastian, seeking to nullify the sale of several parcels of land to respondents. The PARO argued that the properties were agricultural land yet their sale was effected without DAR Clearance as required under Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARL. The respondents opposed the petition, contending that the case is cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and not the DARAB. The PARAD dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The decision was then appealed to the DARAB.

The DARAB reversed and set aside the ruling of the PARAD, finding that the DARAB has the jurisdiction over the case. Aggrieved, the respondents then appealed the decision with the CA, and ruled that the DARAB’s jurisdiction over the dispute should be determined by the allegations made in the petition. Since the action was essentially for the nullification of the subject properties’ sale, it did not involve an agrarian suit that is within the DARAB’s jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the dispute that seeks the nullification of the subject properties’ sale.

RULING:

The Court answers in the negative.

The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited under the law, as it was created under E.O. No. 129-A specifically to assume powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A. Significantly, it was organized under the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The limitation on the authority of it to mere agrarian reform matters is only

consistent with the extent of DAR’s quasi-judicial powers under R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 229, which read:

SECTION 50 [of R.A. No. 6657]. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.—The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

SECTION 17 [of E.O. No. 229]. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.—The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA).

Thus, Sections 1 and 2, Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, which was adopted and promulgated on May 30, 1994 and came into effect on June 21, 1994, identify the specific extent of the DARAB’s and PARAD’s jurisdiction, as they read:

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.— The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following:

a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;

b) The valuation of land, and the preliminary determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);

c) The annulment or cancellation of lease contracts or deeds of sale or their amendments involving lands under the administration and disposition of the DAR or LBP;

d) Those cases arising from, or connected with membership or representation in compact farms, farmers’ cooperatives and other registered farmers’ associations or organizations, related to lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;

e) Those involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, preemption and redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws;

f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;

g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, except sub-paragraph (q) thereof and Presidential Decree No. 815.

Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARL of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.

h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.

SECTION 2. Jurisdiction of the Regional and Provincial Adjudicator.—The RARAD and the PARAD shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents in connection therewith, arising within their assigned territorial jurisdiction.

Consistent with the aforequoted legal provisions, we emphasized in Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario that the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation of agrarian laws.

Basic is the rule that the "jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial office or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs." Upon the Court’s perusal of the records, it has determined that the PARO’s petition with the PARAD failed to indicate an agrarian dispute.

Specifically, the PARO’s petition failed to sufficiently allege any tenurial or agrarian relations that affect the subject parcels of land. Although it mentioned a pending petition for coverage filed with DAR by supposed farmers-tillers, there was neither such claim as a fact from DAR, nor a categorical statement or allegation as to a determined tenancy relationship by the PARO or the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. It is also undisputed, that even the petition filed with the PARAD failed to indicate otherwise, that the subject parcels of land had not been the subject of any notice of coverage under the CARP. Clearly, the PARO’s cause of action was merely founded on the absence of a clearance to cover the sale and registration of the subject parcels of land, which were claimed in the petition to be agricultural. Given the foregoing, the CA correctly ruled that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the PARO’s petition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PERCIVAL DELA ROSA y BAYER G.R. No. 201723, June 13, 2013

J. Reyes

Denial is intrinsically a weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. To be sure, it is negative, self-serving evidence that cannot be given evidentiary weight greater than that of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former indisputably deserves more credence and evidentiary weight.

FACTS:

Accused, along with his co-accused Tabasa, were charged under an information for the crime of the murder of Magdua, to which the former pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment while his co-accused remained at large. Based on the evidence presented, the prosecution witness Samson was talking to the the victim Magdua when suddenly the accused and Tabasa approached them, and the victim was boxed by Tabasa and stabbed on the chest by the accused. The victim was then brought to the hospital but to no avail.

The RTC convicted the accused of murder, finding that both accused conspired with each other, and issued an alias writ of against his co-accused Tabasa. On appellate review, the accused assailed the credibility of the eyewitness Samson, arguing that the lighting made it impossible for the witness to positively identify the victim’s assailants. Moreover, the inconsistencies in Samson’s testimony place his guilt in serious doubt and he questioned RTC’s appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Despite such protestations, the CA gave full weight and credibility to Samson’s testimony, affirmed the decision of the trial court, and held that the totality of the evidence presented clearly established the elements of murder. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s judgment convicting Dela Rosa for Murder.

RULING:

Records show that Samson, a friend of the victim who was with him at the time of the incident, straightforwardly testified that it was Dela Rosa who pulled out the bladed weapon during the assault and who stabbed the victim on his chest and at the back of his neck. As aptly stated by the CA, the positive, categorical and unequivocal declaration of Samson identifying Dela Rosa as one of the assailants deserves more consideration than the defense’s speculation on the state of darkness of the locus crimini or the number of times the victim was stabbed. During the trial, Samson also vividly described the manner by which Dela Rosa committed the crime, giving the RTC a clear picture of how Dela Rosa and Tabasa ganged up on the victim. Indeed, it is evident that the totality of the evidence for the prosecution, coupled with the defense’s failure to discredit Samson’s testimony, established Dela Rosa’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As held in People of the Philippines v. Welvin Diu y Kotsesa and Dennis Dayaon y Tupit:

The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. x x x.

Moreover, Dela Rosa’s denial of conspiracy and participation in the crime lacks merit.

Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner in which the offense was perpetrated; or inferred from the acts of the accused when those acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential, but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices.

In this case, the evidence on record established that Dela Rosa and Tabasa shared a community of criminal design. Together, they approached Magdua while the latter was busy talking to Samson; Tabasa then boxed Magdua while Dela Rosa pulled out a knife and stabbed the latter on the chest. When Magdua managed to run away, the two perpetrators ran after him and were able to overtake him. Tabasa, again, threw fist blows to Magdua who still tried to retreat. From behind, Dela Rosa then pulled his knife and stabbed Magdua at the nape. Such acts, taken altogether, show how Dela Rosa and Tabasa jointly accomplished killing Magdua. Consequently, Dela Rosa’s denial is not supported by convincing evidence and deserves scant consideration. Such self-serving denial, therefore, cannot overthrow the positive identification made by Samson that he was one of the perpetrators of the crime.

In addition, denial is intrinsically a weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. To be sure, it is negative, selfserving evidence that cannot be given evidentiary weight greater than that of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former indisputably deserves more credence and evidentiary weight.

ST. JOSEPH ACADEMY OF VALENZUELA FACULTY ASSOCIATION (SJA VFA)-FUR CHAPTER-TUCP v. ST. JOSEPH ACADEMY OF VALENZUELA and DAMASO D. LOPEZ G.R. No. 182957, June 13, 2013 J. Reyes

In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision.

FACTS:

A notice of strike was filed by the petitioner against respondent for illegal termination and union busting. When the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, the four members of the union who already passed the teacher’s board examinations were ordered reinstated with full backwages. However, as to those fifteen members who have no licenses but with temporary or special permits, the reinstatement ordered by the SOLE was only effective until their permits are valid.

The CA, however, ruled that reinstatement is no longer possible inasmuch as it is the Department of Education, Culture and Sports that can assign para-teachers to schools as it may determine. The award of backwages was also deleted as there was no illegal dismissal as found by the SOLE, the non-licensees not being its regular employees. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether Labor Cases can be reviewed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

RULING:

In Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association, the Court reiterated the basic approach in the review of CA decisions in labor cases, viz:

In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly

determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?

Consequently, the Court finds that the CA did not commit an error in ruling that reinstatement is not possible. In the same light, the Court finds that the CA, likewise, did not commit an error in deleting the award of backwages.

DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE CHINESE CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION, INC. G.R. No. 184589, June 13, 2013 J. Leonardo de-Castro

Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory.

FACTS:

Purita Landicho filed before the CFI Rizal an Application for Registration of a piece of land located in San Mateo, Rizal. After trial, the court found the evidence presented by Landicho sufficient and thus confirmed her title over the property, and ordered the LRC to register the same in her name and to comply with Section 21 of RA 2347 on the issuance of a decree and OCT. The RD, however, issued to Landicho a TCT rather than an OCT for the subject property. The subject property was thereafter sold several times, finally to herein respondent Philippine Chinese Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI)

Sometime thereafter, Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of herein petitioner. Several years later, petitioner filed an

Omnibus Motion before the RTC, alleging that the decision of the RTC which confirmed Landicho’s title over the property had not been executed. Petitioner particularly asserts that no decree of registration had been issued by the LRC Commissioner (now LRA Administrator) and that no OCT had ever been issued in by the RD in Landicho’s name, and thus prays that the LRA issue the decree of registration in his name.Petitioner submitted the TCT of PCCAI to support his claim, contending that the same was fictitious, thus making the court issue a subpoena to PCCAI to testify at the hearing. Later, PCCAIfiled a verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in the case filed by Rodriguez, alleging that it is an indispensable party in the case, having substantial legal interest therein as registered owner of the subject property. The RTC thus issued a decision on the Omnibus Motion of petitioner, ordering the LRA to issue a decree of registration and the RD to issue an OCT in his favor, while the motion to intervene of PCCAI was denied.

PCCAI then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA, assailing the orders of the RTC for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. PCCAI acknowledged that it is the ministerial duty of the RTC to issue a writ of execution for a final and executory decision/order; however, PCCAI argued that when subsequent facts and circumstances transpired which renders the execution of the final and executory decision/order unjust or inequitable, then the trial court should refrain from issuing a writ of execution. The CA found merit in the petition of PCCAI, and granted its motion for intervention. Aggrieved, petitioner thus filed the present petition under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PCCAI had right to intervene

RULING:

Intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of which read:

SECTION 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an

interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

SECTION 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.

The subject property is presently covered by TCT No. 482970 in the name of PCCAI. As the registered owner, PCCAI clearly has a legal interest in the subject property. The issuance of another certificate of title to Rodriguez will adversely affect PCCAI, constituting a cloud on its TCT No. 482970.

Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, the Court allowed exceptions in several cases, viz:

This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice.

Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.

The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the relaxation of the rules of procedure on intervention. First, the interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject property arose only after the CFI Decision dated November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and executory. PCCAI bought the subject property from WPFI on November 13, 1973 and was issued TCT No. 482970 for the same on July 15, 1975; while Rodriguez bought the subject property from Landicho on November 14, 1996. Second, as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Rodriguez trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of Landicho, the original party in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Third, the latest proceedings in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 involved Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion, filed before the RTC on May 18, 2005, in which he prayed for the execution of the November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the case only to oppose Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion on the ground that the subject property is already registered in its name under TCT No. 482970, which originated from Landicho’s TCT No. 167681. And fourth, after learning of Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 via the November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was reasonably expected to oppose the same. Such action was the most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in Rodriguez’s name. For this reason, the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABEL DIAZ G.R. No. 200882, June 13, 2013 J. Leonardo-de Castro

In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the trial court’s findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.

FACTS:

The accused was charged under an information with the crime of rape, to which he pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. The evidence for the prosecution showed that the offended party, 17-year old Mara, and the accused were neighbors as they both resided at X Compound, Y Subdivision, Barangay Z, Tarlac City. Mara was living alone in a studio-type unit beside the house of her elder sister, Ditse, while the accused-appellant lived five houses or some 30 meters away. One night, at around 3:00 in the morning, Mara was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody on top of her. While the lights in her room were switched off, light coming from outside illuminated her room and allowed her to recognize the then shirtless accused as the intruder. She pushed the accused and shouted "Umalis ka sa harap ko! Go away!" but she was not able to free herself as he held her hands and he was straddling her. Despite her resistance, however, the accused-appellant was able to raise her loose shirt and removed her panty. She continued to resist the advances of the accused but to no avail. Weakened by her struggle, the accused was able to penetrate her. The dastardly deed done, the accused-appellant stood up, wore his pants and left. After a few minutes, she went to the house of Ditse to inform the latter about what happened to her. They then went to the police station to report the incident and later to the hospital for her medical examination

In his defense, the accused denied the accusation against him. He claimed that, that evening, he attended the birthday party of a neighbor in the same X Compound where he and Mara were both residing at that time. He drank liquor with three other men at the party. They were drinking until around 1:00 in the morning of the following day when and then went home drunk and slept.He woke up the next day and drove his tricycle, and plied his ordinary route until around 5:00 in the afternoon. When he returned home from driving, he was told that Ditse wanted to see him. When he went to Ditse’s place, Ditse told him that Mara was raped and that he was the culprit. The police soon arrived and brought the accused to the police station where a sample of his pubic hair was taken and he was made to face Mara.

The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against Mara.The trial court found Mara’s testimony meritorious as it was supported by the physical evidence, particularly the result of her medical examination on the same day of the incident complained of. In contrast, his alibi did not preclude the possibility of his presence at the place of the crime at the time of its commission.

The accused then appealed to the CA alleging that the trial court gave undue credence to the testimony of Mara, particularly, that her identification of him was

contrary to human experience as she admitted that her room was dark and she was not wearing her eyeglasses at the time of the alleged assault. However, the CA rejected the contentions of the accused pointing out that the prosecution clearly established the element of force or intimidation, denied the appeal of the accusedappellant and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Mara.

RULING:

The appeal of the accused-appellant boils down to a question of credibility of the prosecution’s primary witness, the private complainant Mara. As a rule, however, credibility is the sole province of the trial court. It is well-settled that:

When the issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. x x x.

In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the trial court’s findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. On the one hand, this judicial deference is a recognition of the role of trial judges in fact-finding – trial judges have the unique opportunity of having the privilege of a front-row seat to observe firsthand the details of a testimony, the demeanor and deportment of witnesses, and the drama during the trial. On the other hand, this is an acknowledgment by this Court of the limitations of its review in appealed cases – this Court stands outside the trial court, is far-removed from the witness stand, and relies solely on the records of the case.

Acutely aware of the Court’s position as the last resort of litigants, we have nevertheless carefully sifted through the records of this case but found nothing that indicates to us that the trial and the appellate courts overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the outcome of the case. Thus, we uphold the Court of Appeals ruling that Mara made a clear and positive identification of the accused-appellant as her sexual assaulter. The records bear this out.

We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the prosecution sufficiently proved the element of force or intimidation which attended the sexual assault against Mara. It cannot be denied that the accused-appellant forcibly held, repeatedly punched and violently ravished Mara. The injuries which she sustained in the neck, thigh and genital areas, documented in the medico legal-report of the examination conducted on the very same day her person was violated, trump accused-appellant’s contrary claim. Weak and in pain, the repeated threats of being stabbed coupled with the blows already inflicted on her, certainly intimidated Mara and created a numbing fear in her mind that her assailant was capable of hurting her more and carrying out his threats.

We also affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that Mara’s credibility was not eroded by her testimony that the accused-appellant tarried for two hours in her room. The Court of Appeals said it well: when one is being raped, forcibly held, weak and in great pain, and in shock, she cannot be reasonably expected to keep a precise track of the passage of time down to the last minute. Indeed, for a woman undergoing the ordeal that Mara underwent in the hands of the accused-appellant, every moment is like an eternity of hell and the transit of time is a painfully slow crawl that she would rather forget. In addition, the precise duration of the rape is not material to and does not negate the commission of the felony. Rape has no regard for time and place. It has been committed in all manner of situations and in circumstances thought to be inconceivable.

As regards his defenses, the accused-appellant’s denial and alibi crumble in the face of his positive identification by Mara. In particular, his alibi is worthless as his presence at a mere 30 meters away from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission definitely does not constitute a physical impossibility for him to be at Mara’s room at the time of the rape. On the contrary, it is in fact an implied admission that there is facility of access for the accused-appellant to be at the place where the crime happened when it happened.

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. v. LEANDRO LEGASPI G.R. No. 202791, June 10, 2013 J. Mendoza

The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot make this determination without looking into the evidence of the parties.

FACTS:

Respondent was employed on board the vessel Azamara Journey under the employment of petitioner. He was covered by a CBA whereinit was agreed that the company shall pay a maximum disability compensation of up to $60,000.00 only. While on board the vessel, the respondent suffered cardiac arrest and was treated by the ship’s doctor. However, he was later repatriated to receive further medical treatment and examination. Respondent then filed a complaint for full and permanent disability compensation against petitioner before the LA.

The LA ruled in favor of respondent and ordered the petitioner to pay to the former the disability compensationamounting to US$81,320.00 plus and additional 10% for charges. Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the decision of the LA to the NLRC, which affirmed said decision in its resolution.

When the decision became final and executory on September 5, 2010, a hearing for the motion for execution was conducted, wherein petitioner paidto respondent US$81,320.00 on October 22, 2010, the balance to be paid on the next hearing. Petitioner timely filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on November 8, 2010; meanwhile, the LA issued a writ of execution on March 2, 2011.However, the CA, unaware of the finality of the LA decision and the writ of execution issued, granted the petition for certiorari and modified the resolutions of the NLRC,awarding only US$60,000.00 pursuant to the CBA.

Petitioner then filed a motion to amend dispositive portion, submitting to the CA the writ of execution issued by the LA, and contending that it was entitled to a return of its excess payment. In its resolution, the CA denied the motion and ruled that the petition should have been dismissed for being moot and academic not only because the decision had becomefinal and executory but also because the judgment had been satisfied even before the filing of the petition for certiorari. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the finality of the NLRC judgment rendered the petition for certiorari moot before the CA.

RULING:

Petition for Certiorari is not moot.

Section 14, Rule VII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties, and entry of judgment shall be made upon the expiration of the said period. In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, however, it was ruled that judicial review of decisions of the NLRC may be sought via a petition for certiorari before the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and under Section 4 thereof, petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition. Hence, in cases where a petition for certiorari is filed after the expiration of the 10-day period under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure but within the 60-day period under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA can grant the petition and modify, nullify and reverse a decision or resolution of the NLRC.

Accordingly, in this case, although the petition for certiorari was not filed within the 10-day period, petitioner timely filed it before the CA within the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65. It has, thus, been held that the CA’s review of the decisions or resolutions of the NLRC under Rule 65, particularly those which have already been executed, does not affect their statutory finality, considering that Section 4, Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, provides that a petition for

certiorari filed with the CA shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining order is issued. In Leonis Navigation, it was further written:

The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot make this determination without looking into the evidence of the parties. Necessarily, the appellate court can only evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged to have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation to all other evidence on record. Notably, if the CA grants the petition and nullifies the decision or resolution of the NLRC on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the decision or resolution of the NLRC is, in contemplation of law, null and void ab initio; hence, the decision or resolution never became final and executory.

KAPISANANG PANGKAUNLARAN NG KABABAIHANG POTRERO, INC. and MILAGROS H. REYES v. REMEDIOS BARRENO, LILIBETH AMETIN, DRANREV F. NONAY, FREDERICK D. DIONISIO and MARITES CASIO G.R. No. 175900, June 10, 2013 What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by different fora upon the same issues. FACTS:

Respondents, as employees of petitioner,filed a complaint before the DOLE for, among others, underpayment of wages, and non-payment of labor standard benefits. During its pendency, however, respondent Barreno received a memo from petitioner Reyes terminating her from her employment, which resulted in the filing of another complaint for illegal dismissal by the former with the NLRC. When the remainder of the respondents were also informed of their termination, they filed a complaint with the NLRC, which was subsequently consolidated with Barreno’s complaint. Petitioners, in their Position Paper dated November 29, 2001, alleged that respondents committed forum shopping when they filed the NLRC CASE during the pendency of the DOLE CASE. Such was denied by respondents in their reply dated December 19, 2001, explaining that the DOLE CASE referred only to money claims and that it it had already been withdrawn, while the NLRC CASE involves the complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims.Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated December 18, 2001 with regard to the DOLE CASE after having instituted the NLRC CASE. Records, however, show that the said motion was left unresolved.

The LA found the respondents did not commit forum shopping, holding that the subsequent dismissal of the respondents affected the jurisdiction of the DOLE-NCR since illegal dismissal cases are beyond the latter’s jurisdiction.Necessarily therefore, the case for money claims pending before the DOLE-NCR had to be consolidated with the illegal dismissal case before the NLRC. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the ruling of the LA was set aside and found that the respondents were guilty of forum shopping in filing the same complaint against petitioners in two fora, namely the DOLE and the NLRC. On appeal, the CA agreed with the NLRC that respondents committed forum shopping in seeing their money claims before the DOLE and NLRC. Both parties moved for reconsideration which the CA denied, hence this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding respondents guilty of forum shopping.

RULING: At the outset, the Court finds that contrary to the findings of both the NLRC and the CA, respondents are not guilty of forum shopping. Thus, considering that the NLRC did not resolve the appeal on the merits but instead dismissed the case based on a finding of forum shopping, the Court concurs in the result arrived at by the CA in remanding the cases for illegal dismissal to the NLRC for resolution of the appeal. Forum shopping exists "when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court." What is truly important to consider in determining whether it exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by different fora upon the same issues.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, respondents did not commit forum shopping. Clearly, there is no identity of causes of action between the cases pending with the DOLE and the NLRC. The DOLE CASE involved violations of labor standard provisions where an employer-employee relationship exists. On the other hand, the NLRC CASE questioned the propriety of respondents' dismissal. No less than the Labor Code provides for these two (2) separate remedies for distinct causes of action. More importantly, at the time the DOLE CASE was initiated, respondents' only, cause of action was petitioners' violation of labor standard laws which falls within the jurisdiction of the DOLE. It was only after the same was filed that respondents were dismissed from employment, prompting the filing of the NLRC CASE, which is within the mantle of the NLRC's jurisdiction. Under the foregoing circumstances, respondents had no choice but to avail of different fora. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE ARMANDO CERVANTES CACHUELA and BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused. BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013 Out-of-court identifications, when the same is not supported by detailed narrations, cannot be given weight. For no way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the level of

certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of time between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and assessment of Lino’s testimony. That being said, there can be conviction if the prosecution can establish the appellants’ participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that the accused, and none other, committed the imputed crime, and such was done in this case. FACTS: The accused in this case was charged with the crimof robbery with homicide under an information to which they pleaded not guilty upon their arraignment. At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime.Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

After trial, the RTC found both the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. They then filed an appeal before the CA, but the same was denied. The CA held that pieces of circumstantial evidence showed that the appellants robbed WSC and killed Rex during the course of this robbery, and ruled that the totality of these circumstances point to the appellants as the perpetrators of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. It disregarded the appellants’ defenses of alibi, denial and frame-up for being self-serving. The CA likewise found unmeritorious the appellants’ argument that the firearms confiscated from them were inadmissible in evidence, pointing out that the seizures were the result of lawful entrapment operations. It further held that the appellants failed to impute any ill or improper motive against the police officers who conducted the entrapment operations. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the court correctly convicted both the accused of the crime charged. RULING: Admissibility of the out-of-court identification and the extrajudicial confession Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex in a police line-up held at the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We note that Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the National Center for Mental Health, and subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason, we examine with greater scrutiny Lino’s testimony regarding Zaldy’s alleged out-of-court identification.

People v. Algarme explains the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine its admissibility, as follows: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of

and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the line-up took place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with the appellants (if there were indeed other persons included in the line-up); and whether the line-up was confined to persons of the same height and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied Zaldy before and during the line-up, and whether there had been the possibility of prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy regarding the appearance of the appellants. To our mind, Lino’s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-ofcourt identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of time between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and assessment of Lino’s testimony. The records also bear out that Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession at the NBI Main Office, where he implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged. During trial, he repudiated this confession, and claimed that he had been tortured by the NBI agents, and that he was forced to copy a previously prepared statement. After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing." We point out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he executed the alleged written confession. "A custodial investigation is understood x x x as x x x any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. x x x It begins when there is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. After a close reading of the records, we rule that Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas – the NBI itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas’ open declaration to the agency’s investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty. Paglinawan confirmed this fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas at the time his client made the alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when she was called to assist him; she merely represented

herself to be a mere witness to the confession. There was also nothing in the records to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas’ confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights. To be sure, this is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial investigation. "An ‘effective and vigilant counsel’ necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and be able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." In addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present at the time the written confession was made. We note in this regard that the prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the witness stand despite hints made during the early stages of the trial that she would be presented. At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime. Sufficiency of the proven circumstantial evidence

In view of the inadmissibility of Zaldy’s out-of-court identification and Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession, the prosecution’s case rests purely on circumstantial evidence. Conviction can be secured "on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others." There can be conviction if the prosecution can establish the appellants’ participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that the accused, and none other, committed the imputed crime. "Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of

all the circumstances unavoidably leads to a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with one another, and the only rational hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom must be the guilt of the accused." In our view, no doubt exists, based on the appellants' actions, that their primary objective was to rob WSC, and that the killing of Rex was done on occasion, or by reason, of the robbery: first, Ibañez went to WSC on July 23, 2004, and inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the rates of the firing range, the amount of the membership fee of the company’s gun club, the days when there are many people in the firing range, and whether she was the only female employee of the company; second, when Henessy arrived at WSC at 9:00 a.m. on July 26, 2004, Zaldy informed her that he cannot open the front door because his hands were tied; third, Henessy called the company’s operations manager and informed him that Zaldy had been tied; fourth, the police saw Zaldy handcuffed to the vault when they opened the back gate; fifth, the police saw the lifeless body of Rex lying on the floor with several gunshot wounds when they entered the firing range; sixth, the operations manager discovered that 53 guns and several ammunitions had been missing from the gun store, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245; seventh, the NBI agents caught Cachuela trying to sell the .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T110203E000151 in an entrapment operation in Cavite; eighth, the NBI agents caught Ibañez trying to sell the .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245 and a .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z in a follow-up entrapment operation in Cavite; ninth, Cachuela and Ibañez were unable to explain how they came into possession of the stolen firearms; tenth, Police Inspector Armin Austria, the PNP Forensic Firearm Examiner, found that the 98 pieces of .45 fired cartridge cases found at the crime scene were fired from the .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z recovered from Ibañez;27 and finally, Dr. Nulud conducted an autopsy on the body of Rex, and found that the victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax, and abdomen caused by a .45 pistol. From these established circumstances, the overriding intention of the appellants cannot but be to rob WSC; the killing of Rex was merely incidental to the robbery. "Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property." Rex was killed to facilitate the robbery; he was also the person who would have been a witness to the crime. In People v. De Leon, we held that "homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime." In this regard, we cannot overlook the fact that another WSC employee – Zaldy – was not killed, but merely tied to the vault. The Court cannot second-guess on what could have been behind the malefactors’ decision to spare Zaldy’s life, but we note that Zaldy became one of the accused in this case after the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict him in the crime, as the robbery could have been the result of an "inside job." Unfortunately, Zaldy was unable to testify during trial since the RTC ordered that he be brought to the National Center for Mental Health for treatment. Accordingly, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession (which we ruled to be inadmissible) was the only evidence linking Zaldy to the crime. For lack of evidence, we cannot make any definite conclusion and can only speculate on Zaldy’s involvement in the crime charged. We find it worthy to stress that the appellants failed to overcome the disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent

wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act." To recall, Ibañez was at WSC two days before the robbery, asking questions to the company’s secretary. Several days after the robbery, the appellants were caught trying to sell firearms that were reported stolen from WSC in separate entrapment operations; they could not satisfactorily explain how and why these guns came to their respective possession. The appellants likewise did not impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers that would impel the latter to fabricate evidence against them. These factors lead to no other conclusion than that the appellants, to the exclusion of others, had robbed WSC. To our mind, the fact that the cartridge bullet shells found at the firing range (where the lifeless body of Rex had been discovered) matched with one of the guns recovered from Ibañez during the entrapment operation clinches the case against the appellants insofar as establishing the nexus between the robbery and the victim’s killing. Notably, the gunshot wounds suffered by Rex also came from the same caliber of gun recovered from Ibañez. In the final analysis, the prosecution sufficiently established the direct and intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, and that the death of Rex had been committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same. VALBUECO, INC. v. PROVINCE OF BATAAN, represented by its Provincial Governor ANTONIO ROMAN; EMMANUEL M. AQUINO, in his official capacity as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Balanga, Bataan; and PASTOR P. VICHUACO, in his official capacity as Provincial Treasurer of Balanga, Bataan G.R. No. 173829, June 10, 2013 J. Peralta The "equiponderance of evidence" rule states that when the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim; even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action. FACTS: Petitioner was the owner of eight parcels of land situated in Bagac, Bataan. However, due to his unpaid real property taxes, the abovementioned properties were sold at public auction whereby respondent emerged as the winning bidder. Years later, petitioner filed a complaint to nullify the sale and the consolidation of title and ownership in favor of respondent province, and to reconvey the possession, title and ownership of the subject properties, alleging that a distraint of personalty should have been first made by the provincial Treasurer. In its answer, the respondent averred that distraint of personal property is not a condition sine qua non before real property could be distraint. And since the subject lots were placed under the coverage of the CARP and distributed to qualified beneficiaries under RA 6657, the beneficiaries and the DAR Secretary were impleaded as additional defendants in the amended complaint filed by petitioner. In their answer the beneficiaries moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that the petitioner’s claim states no cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to the filing of the case. Likewise, the DAR Secretary sought the dismissal of the amended complaint, arguing that the RTC has

no jurisdiction over DAR, since the relief prayed for was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. The trial court thus dismissed the amended complaint. Petitioner then elevated the case to the CA, but the same was dismissed, the RTC decision being affirmed.Hence, this present petition under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not notices of the sale were properly sent to the petitioner. RULING: Under Section 73 of PD 464 – x x x notices of the sale at public auction may be sent to the delinquent taxpayer, either (i) at the address as shown in the tax rolls or property tax record cards of the municipality or city where the property is located or (ii) at his residence, if known to such treasurer or barrio captain. Plainly, Section 73 gives the treasurer the option of where to send the notice of sale. In giving the treasurer the option, nowhere in the wordings is there an indication of a requirement that notice must actually be received by the intended recipient. Compliance by the treasurer is limited to strictly following the provisions of the statute: he may send it at the address of the delinquent taxpayer as shown in the tax rolls or tax records or to the residence if known by him or the barrio captain. In this case, it is reasonable to deduce that respondent Provincial Treasurer actually sent the notices at the address uniformly indicated in TCT No. 47377, 47378, 47379, 47380, 47381, 47382, 47385 and 47386, as well as in the tax declarations, which is 7th Floor, Bank of P.I. Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The fault herein lies with petitioner, not with respondent Provincial Treasurer. It had a number of years to amend its address and provide a more updated and reliable one. By neglecting to do so, it should be aware of the chances it was taking should notices be sent to it. Respondent Provincial Treasurer cannot be faulted for presumably sending the notices to petitioner’s address indicated in the land titles and tax declarations of the subject properties. The principle We enunciated in Valencia v. Jimenez, Camo v. Riosa Boyco, and Requiron v. Sinaban that there can be no presumption of regularity of any administrative action which results in depriving a taxpayer of his property through a tax sale does not apply in the case at bar. By and large, these cases cited by petitioner involved facts that are way too different from the one found in the instant case. More importantly, in the present case, respondent Province, through its witness, Josephine Espino, unequivocally attested that the procedural requisites mandated by PD 464 were definitely observed. During her presentation, Espino stated that she is a Local Treasury Operation Officer IV of the Provincial Treasurer’s Office since March 2000 and that she had previously served as Local Treasury Operations Officer and Local Revenue Collection Officer III of the Provincial Treasurer’s Office, being in charge of collecting taxes. Under oath, she declared to have personal knowledge of the fact that notice of tax delinquency was sent by the Provincial Treasurer’s Office to petitioner. She could not, however, show any documentary proof mainly because the exclusive folder of petitioner’s properties are now missing despite exercise of all possible means to locate them in other property files. Considering the long time that elapsed between the public sale held sometime in 1987 or 1988 and the presentation of her testimony in 2002, it is also understandable that Espino could no longer remember the minute details surrounding the notices, publication, and posting that respondent Provincial Treasurer observed relative to the auction sale of the subject properties.

The Court, therefore, affirms the RTC’s opinion that petitioner was not able to establish its cause of action for its failure to submit convincing evidence to establish a case and the CA’s position that it must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of respondents’ claim. Indeed, in Sapu-an v. Court of Appeals, We held:

The general rule in civil cases is that the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. By "preponderance of evidence" is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts on which they are testifying, the nature of such facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility as far as the same may legitimately appear at the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, although the preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number. It is settled that matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him. What petitioner has accomplished is only to cast doubts by capitalizing on the absence of documentary evidence on the part of respondents. While such approach would succeed if carried out by the accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn findings of fact and credibility by the trial court, especially when the same had been affirmed by the CA. It must be stressed that overturning judgments in civil cases should be based on preponderance of evidence, and with the further qualification that, when the scales shall stand upon an equipoise, the court should find for the defendant. The "equiponderance of evidence" rule states that when the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim; even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action. BENIGNO M. VIGILLA, ALFONSO M. BONGOT, ROBERTO CALLESA, LINDA C. CALLO, NILO B. CAMARA, ADELIA T. CAMARA, ADOLFO G. PINON, JOHN A. FERNANDEZ, FEDERICO A. CALLO, MAXIMA P. ARELLANO, JULITO B. COST ALES, SAMSON F. BACHAR, EDWIN P. DAMO, RENA TO E. FERNANDEZ, GENARO F.CALLO, JIMMY C. ALETA, and EUGENIO SALINAS v. PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF CRIMINOLOGY INC. and/or GREGORY ALAN F. BAUTISTA G.R. No. 200094, June 10, 2013 J. Mendoza It is the swearing of a person before the Notary Public and the latter’s act of signing and affixing his seal on the deed that is material and not the submission of the notarial report. Parties who appear before a notary public to have their documents notarized should not be expected to follow up on the submission of the notarial reports. They should not be made to suffer the consequences of the negligence of the Notary Public in following the procedures prescribed by the Notarial Law. Such notarization gives prima facie evidence of the due execution of the releases, waivers, and quitclaims; and since such were not refuted nor disputed by complainants herein, thus, we have no recourse but to uphold their due execution. FACTS:

Petitioners were hired as employees under the Maintenance Division of PCCr, but were under the control and supervision of MBMSI, a private corporation engaged in providing janitorial services. Atty. Seril is an officer of both corporations, as Senior Vice President for Administration of the former, and the President and General Manager of the latter. Their corporation’s relations were terminated, however, by PCCr when it learned that the certificate of incorporation of MBMSI has been revoked. Thuis resulted in the termination of the petitioners from their employment.

Petitioners then filed a complaint against PCCr, its President Gregory Bautista, MBMSI, and Atty. Seril, for illegal dismissal and payment of labor standard benefits. They alleged that PCCr is their employer and not MBMSI, as the former was the one who hired them, which was denied by PCCr in their answer. To support its claim, PCCr submitted releases, waivers, and quitclaims executed by petitioners in favor of MBMSI. The LA rendered a decision directing the PCCr to reinstate the petitioners with backpay, explaining that PCCr was actually the one which exercised control over the means and methods of the work of the petitioner, thru Atty. Seril, who was acting, throughout the time in his capacity as Senior Vice President for Administration of PCCr, not in any way or time as the supposed employer/general manager or president of MBMSI. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the LA was affirmed, but released the respondents from liability by virtue of the releases, waivers, and quitclaims. The decision was later modified, reinstating some of the complainants. As to those not reinstated a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was then filed with the CA. However, the decision of the NLRC was still upheld. Hence, this petition under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether the releases, waivers, and quitclaims executed are valid and enforceable.

RULING: Petitioners had several opportunities to question the authenticity of the said documents but did not do so. The records disclose that during the proceedings before the LA, PCCr submitted several documents, including the subject releases, waivers and quitclaims executed on September 11, 2009 in favor of MBMSI, but petitioners never put their genuineness and due execution at issue. These were brought up again by the respondents in their Memorandum of Appeal, but again petitioners did not bother to dispute them.

It was only after the NLRC’s declaration in its February 11, 2011 Resolution that the claims of petitioners had been settled amicably by virtue of the releases, waivers and quitclaims, that petitioners, in their motion for reconsideration, denied having executed any of these instruments. This passiveness and inconsistency of petitioners will not pass the scrutiny of this Court. Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Questions of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve. Only errors of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the CA. Moreover, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court. Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the following NLRC factual findings are binding and conclusive on this Court: We noted that the individual quitclaims, waivers and releases executed by the complainants showing that they received their separation pay from MBMSI were duly notarized

by a Notary Public. Such notarization gives prima facie evidence of their due execution. Further, said releases, waivers, and quitclaims were not refuted nor disputed by complainants herein, thus, we have no recourse but to uphold their due execution. Even if the Court relaxes the foregoing rule, there is still no reason to reverse the factual findings of the NLRC and the CA. What is on record is only the self-serving allegation of petitioners that the releases, waivers and quitclaims were mere forgeries. Petitioners failed to substantiate this allegation. As correctly found by the CA: "petitioners have not offered concrete proof to substantiate their claim of forgery. Allegations are not evidence." Petitioners requested the Court to take a look at such releases, waivers and quitclaims, particularly their contents and the handwriting, but they failed to attach to the records copies of the said documents which they claimed to have been forged. The petition is dismissible on this ground alone. The Rules of Court require the petition to be accompanied by such material portions of the record as would support the petition. Failure to comply with the requirements regarding "the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition" is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. Moreover, mere unsubstantiated allegations of lack of voluntariness in executing the documents will not suffice to overcome the presumption of authenticity and due execution of a duly notarized document. As correctly held by the NLRC, "such notarization gives prima facie evidence of their due execution." Petitioners contend that the alleged notarization of the releases, waivers and quitclaims by one Atty. Ramil Gabao did not take place, because there were no records of such documents in the Notary Section of Manila. Thus, the prima facie evidence thereof has been disputed. The Court is not moved. Respondents should not be penalized for the failure of the notary public to submit his Notarial Report. In Destreza v. Rinoza-Plazo, this Court stated that "the notarized deed of sale should be admitted as evidence despite the failure of the Notary Public in submitting his notarial report to the notarial section of the RTC Manila." The Court expounded: It is the swearing of a person before the Notary Public and the latter’s act of signing and affixing his seal on the deed that is material and not the submission of the notarial report. Parties who appear before a notary public to have their documents notarized should not be expected to follow up on the submission of the notarial reports. They should not be made to suffer the consequences of the negligence of the Notary Public in following the procedures prescribed by the Notarial Law. SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., and/or DANNY Z. ESCALANTE v. TEOFILO GONZAGA G.R. No. 187722, June 10, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a valid cause. Failing in which, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. In this relation, the quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence which, as defined in case law, means that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

FACTS: Respondent was hired by petitioner SURNECO as its lineman, but was later assigned as temporary teller at the latter’s sub-office in Gigaquit, Surigao del Norte. Petitioner Escalante , as General Manager of SURNECO, sent a memorandum to respondent, seeking an explanation regarding his remittance shortages, and in the meantime, an investigation committee was formed to investigate such matter.The Committee then tendered its report, finding the respondent guilty of gross and habitual neglect and of misappropriation of funds. Respondent sought reconsideration before SURNECO’s BOD but the latter denied the same after he presented his case. Consequently, he was dismissed from service. In view of the foregoing, the respondent filed a complaint before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch for illegal dismissal with payment of backwages including damages and attorney’s fees, claiming that he was denied due process and dismissed without just cause. The LA rendered a decision finding that petitioners were unable to show that respondent’s dismissal was just and valid and thus, ordered that the latter be reinstated to his former position. The LA found that the alleged shortages in respondent’s remittances were not proven since the actual receipts were not presented in evidence. Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the NLRC, attaching an Audit Report by an independent CPA as additional evidence.The NLRC then vacated the ruling of the LA, finding respondent to have been dismissed for a just and valid cause. With respect to the imputed cash shortages, the NLRC did not give credence to Gonzaga’s position in view of his general denial. In this light, the NLRC faulted Gonzaga for not demanding the production and examination of the collection receipts during the investigation proceedings, noting that the said omission meant that the collection receipts would confirm the shortage. The decision was then appealed to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the NLRC’s ruling, and instead reinstated the LA’s decision with modifications. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA. It held that the Summaries presented by petitioners remained insufficient as they failed to establish the voluminous character of the official receipts evidencing the amount of Gonzaga’s collections and remittances as to render them admissible under Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It also observed that apart from the fact that the September 15, 2003 Audit Report was belatedly filed with the NLRC eight months after Gonzaga had filed his Comment to the Memorandum of Appeal, the said report was hearsay since the accountant who prepared the said report was not presented to testify on its veracity. Hence, this petition under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s dismissal was just and valid. RULING: In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a valid cause. Failing in which, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. In this relation, the quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence which, as defined in case law, means that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

Applying the foregoing principles to this case, the Court finds that petitioners were able to prove, by substantial evidence, that there lies a valid cause to terminate Gonzaga’s employment. The Court concurs with the NLRC’s finding that petitioners’ evidence – which consists of the Collection Report, the Summaries, and the September 15, 2003 Audit Report with attached Cash Flow Summary – adequately supports the conclusion that Gonzaga misappropriated the funds of the cooperative. The data indicated therein show gaping discrepancies between Gonzaga’s collections and remittances, of which he was accountable for. In this accord, the burden of evidence shifted to Gonzaga to prove that the reflected shortage was not attributable to him. However, despite being allowed to peruse the bills and receipts on record together with the assistance of an accountant and a counsel during the investigation proceedings, Gonzaga could not reconcile the amounts of his collections and remittances and, instead, merely interposed bare and general denials. To note, petitioners could not be faulted for not presenting each and every bill or receipt due to their voluminous character. Corollarily, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that documents of such nature could indeed consist of multiple pages; likewise, it is clear that petitioners only sought to establish a general result from the whole, i.e., the total cash shortage. In this regard, the requirement that the offeror first establish the voluminous nature of the evidence sought to be presented, as discussed in the CA’s March 30, 2009 Resolution, is dispensed with. Besides, technical rules of evidence are not strictly followed in labor cases47 and thus, their liberal application relaxes the same. Neither does the lack of collection receipt numbers, as Gonzaga alleges, suffice to exculpate him from the dismissal charges. This is because the said numbers had already been supplied by petitioners through their eventual submission of the Cash Flow Summary which was attached to the September 15, 2003 Audit Report. On this score, the Court observes that the CA should have considered the foregoing documents as they corroborate the evidence presented by the petitioners before the LA. Verily, labor tribunals, such as the NLRC, are not precluded from receiving evidence submitted on appeal as technical rules are not binding in cases submitted before them.48 In fact, labor officials should use every and reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. Also, it cannot be said that with the admission of the said evidence, Gonzaga would be denied due process. Records show that he was furnished a copy of the Manifestation with the attached audit report on September 23, 2003 and the NLRC only rendered a decision on August 31, 2004. This interim period gave him ample time to rebut the same; however, he failed to do so. Finally, the records are bereft of any showing that SURNECO’s internal auditor was illmotivated when he audited Gonzaga. Thus, there lies no reason for the Court not to afford full faith and credit to his report. All told, considering the totality of circumstances in this case, the Court finds the evidence presented by the petitioners, as opposed to the bare denial of Gonzaga, sufficient to constitute substantial evidence to prove that he committed serious misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty to warrant his dismissal from employment. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA CALUMBRES y AUDITOR

G.R. No. 194382, June 10, 2013 J. Perez The solo performance by SPO1 Dela Victoria of all the acts necessary for the prosecution of the offense is unexplained and puts the proof of corpus delicti, which is the illegal object itself, in serious doubt. No definite answer can be established regarding the question as to who possessed what from the time of the alleged apprehension until the trial of the case. We are left in doubt whether or not the sachet of shabu allegedly seized from Calumbres was the very same object offered in court as the corpus delicti, or if a sachet of anything was in fact seized from Calumbres.SPO1 Dela Victoria’s claim that the sachet of shabu presented in court was the same one confiscated from Calumbres, cannot be taken at its face value, solely on the presumption of regularity of one’s performance of duty. FACTS: The prosecution presented its lone witness SPO1 Dela Victoria who testified that on April 6, 2004, an informant came to his office and reported that someone was selling shabu at Brgy. 31. He then hired a faux-buyer and proceeded to the area the informant described. When he saw the faux-buyer hand something to herein accused after receiving something from the latter, he immediately approached the accused and introduced himself as the police. He took the money from the accused and retrieved the suspected shabu from the faux-buyer. The accused was then brought to the office of Dela Victoria for booking, where he claimed he recorded the incident in the police blotter, prepared a request for lab report and took his photograph. In her defense, the accused avers that she only met Dela Victoria when she was brought to the police station at Precinct 2 in the Cogon Market because she snatched the wallet of a man. He promised her release onlyif she would give him three cellphones, but she had none.The RTC convicted the accused as charged, which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING: SPO1 Dela Victoria’s credibility must be thoroughly looked into, being the lone arresting officer who allegedly took custody of the confiscated shabu and the five twenty-peso bills supposedly used by his poseur-buyer to buy the shabu from Calumbres. It did not escape us that while there were five 20peso bills used, only one of them was presented in court. SPO1 Dela Victoria also claimed to have taken a photograph of the confiscated items but he failed to present it in court on the lame excuse that there was no money to have the picture developed; and, alone, he inventoried these items without the participation of the accused and in the absence of the authorities, in blatant disregard of Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

The details of SPO1 Dela Victoria’s testimony reveal lapses too, which, if connected, cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of Calumbres. His informant never identified Calumbres as the drug pusher; what his informant told him was that drug sale was ongoing at Sto. Nino, Brgy. 31, prompting him to hire a faux-buyer. At that time, the information was still unverified and the seller of shabu unidentified. Without the informant’s details of who the pusher was, it was incomprehensible how a poseur-buyer, randomly and instantly hired, would have been able to identify Calumbres as the pusher.

A reading of the RTC decision on this matter reveals that the conviction was arrived at upon reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of SPO1 Dela Victoria’s official duty. It is noteworthy however, that presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Nothing less than evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can erase the postulate of innocence. And this burden is met not by placing in distrust the innocence of the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability. The solo performance by SPO1 Dela Victoria of all the acts necessary for the prosecution of the offense is unexplained and puts the proof of corpus delicti, which is the illegal object itself, in serious doubt. No definite answer can be established regarding the question as to who possessed what from the time of the alleged apprehension until the trial of the case. We are left in doubt whether or not the sachet of shabu allegedly seized from Calumbres was the very same object offered in court as the corpus delicti, or if a sachet of anything was in fact seized from Calumbres. Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 reads: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 reads: (a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. SPO1 Dela Victoria’s claim that the sachet of shabu presented in court was the same one confiscated from Calumbres, cannot be taken at its face value, solely on the presumption of regularity of one’s performance of duty. SPO1 Dela Victoria blatantly broke all the rules established by law to safeguard the identity of a corpus delicti. To allow this to happen is to abandon everything that has been said about the necessity of proving an unbroken chain of custody of the corpus delicti. AMANDO P. CONTES v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), VICTORY M. FERNANDEZ, JULIO E. SUCGANG and NILO IGTANLOC

G.R. Nos. 187896-97, June 10, 2013 J. Perez Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43, in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a criminal case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and that remedy is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. FACTS: Petitioner charged respondents with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 3019, or the Anti Graft and Corrup Practices Act, claiming that respondents utilized a heavy equipment in levelling a portion of his land and destroyed . The Ombudsman (Visayas), in its Consolidated Evaluation Report, recommended the dismissal of the cases due to the fact that two other cases involving the same parties and issues had already been filed by petitioner. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Report but the same was denied by the Ombudsman (Visayas). Petitioner then filed an appeal directly to the SC, via a petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, assailing the denial of his motion for reconsideration. He refutes the finding of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) that he had filed a similar administrative and criminal complaint against respondents. In their Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition because the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the petitioner’s complaints.

RULING: Petitioner, in filing this petition for review, committed a procedural misstep which warrants an outright dismissal. Petitioner misconstrued Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and disregarded prevailing jurisprudence. Section 27 provides, in part, that:

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This provision, insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, had been declared unconstitutional by this Court as early as in the case of Fabian v. Desierto. We ruled in Fabian that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43, in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a criminal case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. We made the pronouncement in Acuña v. Deputy

Ombudsman for Luzon that the remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Considering that the case at bar was a consolidation of an administrative and a criminal complaint, petitioner had the option to either file a petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals or directly file a certiorari petition under Rule 65 before this Court. Neither of these two remedies was resorted to by petitioner. By availing of a wrong remedy, this petition merits an outright dismissal. ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 198755, June 5, 2013 J. Mendoza Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. FACTS: Robert Bang-on, a 14-year old second year high school student, filed an affidavit-complaint against petitioner, a third year high school teacher of the same school, before the Civil Service Commission-CAR, because the former was punched in the stomach without warning for failure to follow instructions. A criminal case for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries was also filed by Bang-on with the RTC for the same incident. In his defense, petitioner averred that he did not punch Bang-on but merely scolded the class for failure to follow instructions. The CSC-CAR, finding the existence of a prima facie case for misconduct, formally charged petitioner, and after due hearing, found petitioner guilty of Simple Misconduct. While the proceedings of the administrative case were ongoing, the RTC rendered judgment in the criminal case and found petitioner guilty of slight physical injuries. Upon appeal to the CSC, the decision of the CSC-CAR was affirmed and perpetually disqualified him from employment. In his motion for reconsideration, he questioned for the first time the jurisdiction of the CSC over the case, contending that administrative harges against a public school teacher should have been initially heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. However, the same was denied by the CSC, ruling that petitioner was estopped from challenging its jurisdiction considering he actively participated in the administrative proceedings against him. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, which affirmed the CSC decision. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied, prompting petitioner to file this appeal under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether the CSC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

The petitioner’s argument that the administrative case against him can only proceed under R.A. No. 4670 is misplaced. In Puse v. Santos-Puse, it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers. Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the establishment and administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of the government. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987) and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines) expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers. Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the investigating committee constituted therein. Also, under Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994), the Board of Professional Teachers is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein. Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers. In CSC v. Alfonso, it was held that special laws, such as R.A. No. 4670, do not divest the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers. Pat-og, as a public school teacher, is first and foremost, a civil servant accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC for complaints lodged against him as a public servant. To hold that R.A. No. 4670 divests the CSC of its power to discipline public school teachers would negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established and would impliedly amend the Constitution itself. To further drive home the point, it was ruled in CSC v. Macud that R.A. No. 4670, in imposing a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings against public school teachers, should be construed to refer only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the DepEd. By no means, then, did R.A. No. 4670 confer an exclusive disciplinary authority over public school teachers on the DepEd.

At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped from raising the issue. Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened. Here, instead of opposing the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same by actively participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. HEIRS OF SPOUSES DIONISIO DELOY and PRAXEDES MARTONITO, represented by POLICARPIO DELOY G.R. No. 192893, June 5, 2013 J. Mendoza First level courts are clothed with the power to preliminarily resolve questions on the ownership of real property, if necessary, to arrive at the proper and complete determination of the question on physical possession or possession de facto. Thus, as correctly ruled by the CA, the MTCC should have taken cognizance of the complaint as it was well within its jurisdiction to do so. Moreover, considering that B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, has distinctly defined and granted the MTCC with jurisdiction, it is the trial court’s duty and obligation to exercise the same when properly invoked. FACTS: Respondents are the owners of the subject land in Trece Martires, Cavite by virtue of succession. Their predecessor-in-interest Dionisio donated a portion thereof to the Communications and Electricity Development Authority (CEDA) for the latter to provide cheap and affordable electric supply to the province of Cavite.CEDA then sold to MERALCO, its electric distribution system, transformers, accessories, poles, hardware, wires, etc. necessary for the latter to provide electrical service in Cavite. Thereafter, MERALCO occupied the subject land. The respondents then offered the land for sale to MERALCO, but their offer was rejected. Thus, they demanded MERALCO to vacate the premises, but since the latter failed to heed their demand, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by the former with the MTCC. The MTCC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the case. Aggrieved, the respondents then appealed the case before the RTC, which however, affirmed the decision of the MTCC. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the RTC, the respondents then elevated the case before the CA via a petition under Rule 42.In its decision, the CA set aside the RTC ruling and accordingly granted the complaint for unlawful detainer against MERALCO. Hence, this petition under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MTCC has jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer. RULING: MERALCO contends that respondents’ complaint failed to make out a case for unlawful detainer but, rather, one incapable of pecuniary estimation, properly cognizable by the RTC and

not the MTCC. It stresses the allegations in the complaint involve a prior determination on the issue of ownership before the issue of possession can be validly resolved. This contention fails to persuade. When the issue of ownership is raised in an ejectment case, the first level courts are not ipso facto divested of its jurisdiction. Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, provides: Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxxx (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. xxxx In this regard, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows the first level courts, in ejectment cases, to provisionally determine the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of physical possession. Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.–When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Accordingly, it is unquestionably clear that the first level courts are clothed with the power to preliminarily resolve questions on the ownership of real property, if necessary, to arrive at the proper and complete determination of the question on physical possession or possession de facto. Thus, as correctly ruled by the CA, the MTCC should have taken cognizance of the complaint as it was well within its jurisdiction to do so. Moreover, considering that B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, has distinctly defined and granted the MTCC with jurisdiction, it is the trial court’s duty and obligation to exercise the same when properly invoked. SPOUSES RUBIN AND PORTIA HOJAS v. PHILIPPINE AMANAH BANK AND RAMON KUE G.R. No. 193453, June 5, 2013 J. Mendoza Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it. This doctrine is based on the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied on it. Thus, in order for this doctrine to operate, a representation must have been made to the detriment of another who

relied on it. In other words, estoppel would not lie against one who, in the first place, did not make any representation. FACTS: Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they obtained a loan from respondent bank secured by a mortgage that covered both real and personal properties. Loan payments were made, which, however, were not properly recorded by the respondent. For the failure of the petitioner to pay the loan, the respondent applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged real properties of petitioner, whereby the bank emerged as the highest bidder in the public auction. Petitioners further alleged that the bank wrote their son regarding the extension of the redemption period given them under the bank’s incentive scheme; but despite such letter, the bank sold the properties in a public bidding. In the said bidding, the properties were awarded to private respondent and were thus requested to vacate the premises. This prompted petitioners to file an action for "Determination of True Balance of Mortgage Debt, Annulment/Setting Aside of Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage and Damages, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction" against respondent. The RTC dismissed the petitioners’ complaint, which prompted the petitioners to file an appeal with the CA. They averred that since the period for redemption has been extended pursuant to the letter given by the bank, the latter violated the principleof estoppel when it conducted the public sale of the land. The appeal was denied by the CA, holding that the period of extension was never extended. It further ruled that the bank, through said letter, did not make an unqualified representation to petitioners that it had extended the period of redemption. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not holding that the bank has violated the principle of estoppel when it conducted the public sale.

RULING: Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it. This doctrine is based on the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied on it. Thus, in order for this doctrine to operate, a representation must have been made to the detriment of another who relied on it. In other words, estoppel would not lie against one who, in the first place, did not make any representation. In this case, a perusal of the letter, on which petitioners based their position that the redemption period had been extended, shows otherwise. Pertinent portions of the said letter read: xxxx Our records show that the above account has already been foreclosed by the bank. However, the borrowers concerned can still exercise the one (1) year right of redemption over the foreclosed properties until April 21, 1988. As the Bank has adopted an incentive scheme whereby payments are liberalized to give chances to former owners to repossess their properties, we suggest that you advise your parents

to drop by at our Zamboanga Office so they can avail of this rare privilege which shall be good only up to December 31, 1988. As correctly held by the RTC and upheld by the CA, the date "December 31, 1988" refers to the last day when owners of foreclosed properties, like petitioners, could submit their payment proposals to the bank. The letter was very clear. It was about the availment of the liberalized payment scheme of the bank. On the last day for redemption, the letter was also clear. It was April 21, 1988. It was never extended. In this regard, the CA was correct when it wrote: Here, there is no estoppel to speak of. The letter does not show that the Bank had unqualifiedly represented to the Hojases that it had extended the redemption period to December 31, 1988. Thus, the Hojases have no basis in positing that the public sale conducted on November 4, 1988 was null and void for having been prematurely conducted.

GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS, INC. v. VICTORIA P. CABRAL, SPS. ENRIQUE T. MORAGA and VICTORIA SORIANO, FILCON READY MIXED, INC., DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), and REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUA YAN BRANCH G.R. No. 175542, June 5, 2013 VICTORIA P. CABRAL v. PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR, JOSEPH NOEL C. LONGBOAN I OFFICE OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATOR, GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS, INC., SPOUSES ENRIQUE T. MORAGA and VICTORIA SORIANO and FILCON READY MIXED, INC. G.R. No. 183205, June 5, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.No one shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. FACTS: Cabral was the registered owner of the subject parcel of land which was later placed under the coverage of PD 27, thus resulting in the issuance of three Emancipation Patents (EP) in favor of Sps. Moraga. Cabral then filed a complaint before the PARAD seeking the cancellation of said EPs, contending that the same were obtained through fraud. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the PARAD for lack of merit, and such decision was then appealed by Cabral to the DARAB.While the appeal was pending, Sps. Moraga sold the subdivided the parcel of land and sold the lots to Filcon, who then sold the same to herein petitioner Green Acres. The DARAB then rendered a decision on the appeal of Cabral, ordering the cancellation of the title issued in the names of Sps. Moraga and of Filcon for having been illegally acquired.

Green Acres then filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages with Application for Preliminary Injunction and Writ of Preliminary Attachment before the RTC against Cabral, Sps. Moraga, Filcon, the DARAB and the RD of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Cabral, in her answer, alleged that Green Acres never acquired valid title to the subject property much less can it claim to be an innocent purchaser for value. The RTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence filed by Cabral and ordered the case dismissed. Green Acres’ motion for recondieration having been denied, it thus filed an appeal with the CA. In the meantime, the DARAB Decision became final and executory, prompting Cabral to file with the PARAD a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution of such. The said motion was, however, denied by the PARAD, ruling that such decision cannot be implemented against Green Acres, as it does not contain any order of cancellation of title issued in favor of Green Acres. From this, Cabral filed an appeal with the PARAD. The CA dismissed Green Acres’ appeal, citing that the trial court had no authority to interfere with the proceedings of a court of equal jurisdiction. On the other hand, the PARAD issued an order denying Cabral’s appeal and held that her act of impleading Green Acres as additional defendant only in the execution stage is highly irregular and that to enforce the decision against the same would violate the latter’srights to due process. Aggrieved, Cabral then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of PARAD. The same was denied by the CA, holding that an execution can only be issued against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court; as Green Acres was never a party to this case not was it mentioned in the decision sought to be exeucted, he cannot be made to suffer the consequnces of a case where it did not participate. Thus, both Green Acres and Cabral filed petitions for review under Rule 45, seeking the reversal of the CA decisions adverse to them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the DARAB sought to be executed can be enforced against Green Acres.

RULING: The petition of Green Acres is impressed with merit. The petition of Cabral is denied. Cabral contends that the PARAD committed grave abuse of discretion in not issuing the writ of execution to enforce the January 17, 2001 DARAB decision in her favor. She argues that the issuance of a writ of execution is ministerial under Section 1, Rule XX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure which provides that the execution of a final order or decision shall issue as a matter of course. Cabral also argues that contrary to the PARAD’s ruling, she is not seeking the amendment of the final decision sought to be executed. She contends that the directive to the Register of Deeds to restore TCT No. T-73737 (M) in her name means that it should be done regardless of who holds title to the property at the time of execution. In this case, it is Green Acres. She also points out that the transfer from the Spouses Moraga to Filcon in 1996 and eventually to Green Acres in 1999 transpired after she filed a case with the DARAB in 1994. Therefore, under Section 12.2, Rule XX of the DARAB Rules, Green Acres is considered a successor in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action upon whom the final judgment or order of the DARAB is conclusive. Cabral also insists that Green Acres cannot be considered an innocent purchaser for value because the transfers were made to defeat the DARAB ruling.

Green Acres, for its part, submits that the CA did not err in denying Cabral’s petition for certiorari. Green Acres contends that Cabral, through her motion for execution, sought the amendment of the DARAB decision and did not move merely for its execution. Green Acres points out that Cabral’s motion for execution specifically sought the cancellation of Green Acres’ titles even though the DARAB decision neither included Green Acres or its titles. Green Acres points out that if the issuance of a writ of execution that conforms to the decision may be denied on the ground that it will be inequitable, moreso should it be denied in the case where the writ of execution prayed for goes beyond the decision. Hence, even if the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce a final and executory decision is a ministerial duty, the PARAD may not issue a writ of execution against Filcon and Green Acres as prayed for by Cabral. Green Acres also argues that it cannot be bound by the DARAB decision since a writ of execution of a decision can only be issued against a party to the case and not against one who did not have his day in court. Moreover, if granted, the execution sought will constitute a collateral attack against the titles of Green Acres since nowhere in the DARAB decision sought to be executed were they mentioned. Green Acres also adds that Cabral misinterpreted Section 12.2 of the DARAB Rules to mean that a judgment issued in a case is binding upon, and can be executed, even against those parties not impleaded in the case. Green Acres submits that Section 12 is a mere reproduction of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on the principle of res judicata. Thus, the cited DARAB rule does not operate to bind Green Acres, either presently or in the future, to the DARAB decision which does not mention Green Acres either in the body or the dispositive portion. Green Acres likewise argues that impleading it as an additional defendant in the execution stage aggravates the violation of its right to due process. We find in favor of Green Acres. The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. In Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr., this Court ruled: An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in Civil Case No. Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The effect of the said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto. It is beyond dispute that Green Acres was not made a party in the DARAB case. Consequently, the January 17, 2001 DARAB decision cannot bind Green Acres. Likewise, the binding effect of the DARAB decision cannot be extended to Green Acres by the mere issuance of a writ of execution against it. No one shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who

did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. In the instant case, Cabral seeks the execution of a final and executory DARAB decision that directs the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of the Spouses Moraga and Filcon. Nowhere in the said decision is Green Acres or its TCTs mentioned. Nonetheless, in her Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, Cabral alleged that Green Acres, like Filcon, "also never acquired valid title to the subject land" and "hence, its present TCTs thereto should likewise be cancelled (together with the respective Emancipation Patents and TCTs of Sps. Moraga and Filcon Ready Mixed, Inc. mentioned in the DARAB Decision) and reverted back to her TCT." She prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Spouses Moraga and "their subsequent assigns/successors in interest Filcon Ready Mixed, Inc. and Green Acres Holdings, Inc." Clearly, seeking the cancellation of the titles of Green Acres by a mere Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of a decision rendered in a case where said titles were not in issue constitutes a collateral attack on them which this Court cannot allow. Furthermore, as correctly ruled by the PARAD and upheld by the appellate court, only the decision of the DARAB as embodied in the dispositive portion of the decision can be implemented by a writ of execution. As held in Ingles v. Cantos: A writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed, and the execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award, for it is a settled general principle that a writ of execution must conform strictly with every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. It may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. Where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity. A reading of the fallo of the DARAB decision would show that nothing in it directs the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of Green Acres. To subscribe to Cabral’s prayer in her motion is tantamount to modifying or amending a decision that has already attained finality in violation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment. It is also worth noting that the fact that the DARAB by final judgment ordered the cancellation of the titles of the Spouses Moraga and Filcon does not automatically make the titles of Green Acres null and void. It is settled that a void title may be the source of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought the property from the registered owner, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. RODRIGO RONTOS y DELA TORRE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 188024, June 5, 2013 CJ. Sereno This Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of substantive law that mandates strict compliance. It was laid down by Congress as a safety precaution against potential abuses by law enforcement agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal

drugs. Under the principle that penal laws are strictly construed against the government, stringent compliance therewith is fully justified. FACTS: Due to reports of illegal drug activity in the area, two police officers were dispatched to conduct surveillance along Sampaloc St., Camarin, Caloocan. When they arrived at said place, the said police officers noticed herein petitioner who was scrutinizing two plastic sachets in his hand. When they approached the petitioner, the police officers noticed that the plastic sachets appear to be containing a white crystalline substance similar to shabu. When one of them confiscated the sachet, he introduced himself as a police officer and informed the petitioner of the offense he committed. The markings were done on the sachets and the same were placed in a makeshift envelope. When they brought the petitioner to the station, the police investigator conducted an investigation and prepared a request for a lab examination of the contents of the sachet. The examination yielded a positive result for shabu. As such, a complaint for violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 was filed before the city prosecutor for the filing of the proper charges in court. The petitioner, in his defense, stated that on said day, he was at home with his family and their visitor Cassandra when suddenly the police officers barged in and searched the house, claiming that they were looing for something. However, when the search proved futile, they arrested petitioner and Cassandra and detained them in the Drug Enforcement Unit in Camarin. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and ruled that the elements of the crime were duly proven by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. On appeal to the CA, petitioner contended that since his warrantless arrest was illegal, the allegedly confiscated items were inadmissible in evidence. The CA however affirmed the decision of the RTC, holding that the petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto when he committed the crime in plain view of the police officers. While the CA admitted that no photograph or inventory of the confiscated items was taken or made, it entertained no doubt that the dangerous drugs presented in court were the same ones confiscated from petitioner. Furthermore, the failure of the police officers to observe the proper procedure for handling confiscated dangerous drugs may only result in administrative liability on their part. That failure does not cast doubt on the identity and integrity of the illegal drugs. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. RULING: On the basis of the nonobservance of the rules of procedure for handling illegal drug items, we resolve to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.

In illegal drugs cases, the identity and integrity of the drugs seized must be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to arrive at a finding of guilt. The case against the accused hinges on the ability of the prosecution to prove that the illegal drug presented in court is the same one that was recovered from the accused upon his arrest. The procedure set forth in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is intended precisely to ensure the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized. This provision requires that upon seizure of illegal drug items, the apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs shall (a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and (b) take photographs thereof (c) in the presence of the person from whom these items were seized or confiscated and (d) a representative from the media and the Department of Justice and any elected public official (e) who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given copies thereof. This Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of substantive law that mandates strict compliance. It was laid down by Congress as a safety precaution against potential abuses by law enforcement agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal drugs. Under the principle that penal laws are strictly construed against the government, stringent compliance therewith is fully justified. Here, the procedure was not observed at all. Where it is clear that Section 21 was not observed, as in this case, such noncompliance brings to the fore the question of whether the illegal drug items were the same ones that were allegedly seized from petitioner. We cannot, in good conscience, affirm the conviction of petitioner for possession of illegal drugs if the police officer charged with the preservation of the evidence cannot even be certain in the identification of the envelope that was presented in court. As held in Dolera v. People, there also exists in the present case a reasonable likelihood of substitution, in that the two plastic sachets that tested positive for shabu and were presented in court were not the items allegedly seized from petitioner. This possibility of substitution is fatal for the prosecution, for there is then a failure to prove the identity of the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt. We are not unaware of the rule that justifiable grounds may excuse noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The problem in this case is that the police officers presented no justifiable reason why they neglected to observe the proper procedure. Considering that PO1 Pacis himself expressed misgivings on the identity of the envelope shown to him in court, with the envelope that he had placed the confiscated illegal drug items in, neither can we confirm that the chain of custody had been sufficiently established. Corpus delicti is the "actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged." In illegal drug cases, it refers to the illegal drug item itself. When courts are given reason to entertain reservations about the identity of the illegal drug item allegedly seized from the accused, the actual commission of the crime charged is put into serious question. In those cases, courts have no alternative but to acquit on the ground of reasonable doubt. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERNESTO GANI y TUPAS G.R. No. 195523, June 5, 2013 J. Peralta

Settled is the rule that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the complainant. Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and selfserving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. FACTS: The accused was charged under an information with the crime of rape to which he pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. The evidence for the prosecution showed that the accused raped his niece AAA, who was then only 5 year old, while the latter and her brother were harvesting vegetables with her brother. After having sexual intercourse with AAA, the accused drew out his knife and slashed her vagina causing her serious injury. When the accused left, AAA then went home and recounted her ordeal to her grandmother. AAA was then brought to the hospital medical care. Subsequently, AAA's aunt filed, in her behalf, a Criminal Complaint against appellant.

In his defense, the accused interposed an alibi claiming that he was in Quezon City at the time of the rape and pointed to his brother-in-law, Ermelo Alingasa, as the one who committed the rape. The RTC found the version of the prosecution credible and, accordingly, rendered judgment finding accused the accusedguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his niece AAA. The RTC held that the victim's testimony was corroborated by the findings of the medico-legal officer who examined and treated her.Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the CA. The CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings of the RTC, but modified the penalty imposed and the amount of moral damages awarded. ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused despite the fact that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt

RULING: The accused basically questions the credibility of the private complainant. He contends that the latter failed to amply explain why she previously accused another person as the culprit and who was even detained by reason of such accusation; and, that if appellant was the actual perpetrator of the crime, why was he not immediately taken into custody and indicted. The Court upholds the rulings of the RTC and the CA that appellant's defense of alibi deserves scant consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time when the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. In this case, appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene on February 21, 1997. His token defense, during his direct

examination, that he was in Quezon City when the victim was raped is hardly credible because he failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime when it was committed. On the contrary, he admitted, when he was cross-examined, that he was, in fact, in the same locality (Sitio Bayogbayog, Barangay Bulata) when AAA was raped. At any rate, settled is the rule that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the complainant. Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As to appellant's defense of frame-up, this Court quotes with approval the disquisition of the CA on the matter, to wit: BBB, private complainant's elder sister testified on direct examination that it was their grandmother, mother of accused-appellant, who reported the incident to the police authorities. The grandmother pointed to one Ermelo Alingasa as the person responsible for the crime so that her son, herein accused, could evade the crime of rape. Witness, BBB, was not able to confront her grandmother regarding the incident because the latter ran away and went to Guimaras as did the accused-appellant. When BBB was presented on the witness stand, accused-appellant neither challenged the truthfulness of the foregoing testimony nor did he question her credibility. xxxx Verily, WE find appellant's argument that he was being framed presumably due to a family conflict as a flimsy excuse. It is highly improbable that AAA would accuse appellant, her own uncle at that, of so serious a crime as rape, if it were not the truth. In any case, revenge or feud has never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a complainant for rape, especially a minor, who remained steadfast in her testimony that she was raped. x x x x. It is settled that the defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. In the case under consideration, appellant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that AAA was moved by hatred or revenge, or that she was influenced by her aunt to implicate appellant. Thus, appellant’s bare allegation of frame-up must fail. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ABUSAMA M. ALID, Officer-in-Charge, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE - REGIONAL FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII) vs. ABDULWAHAB A. BAYAO, OSMEÑA I. MONTAÑER, RAKMA B. BUISAN, HELEN M. ALVAREZ, NEILA P. LIMBA, ELIZABETH B. PUSTA, ANNA MAE A. SIDENO, UDTOG B. TABONG, JOHN S. KAMENZA, DELIA R. SUBALDO, DAYANG W. MACMOD, FLORENCE S.

TAYUAN, in their own behalf and in behalf of the other officials and employees of DA-RFU XII G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013 J. Leonen The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. FACTS: Petitioner Department of Agriculture–Regional Field Unit XII (DA-RFU XII) is a government office mandated to implement the laws, policies, plans, programs, rules, and regulations of the Department of Agriculture in its regional area, while respondents are officials and employees of DA-RFU XII. EO 304 was passed which designated Koronadal City as the regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region, and provided that all national government offices in the Region shall transfer their regional seat of operations to Koronadal City. Private respondents opposed to transfer to Cotabato City, contending that a building was constructed in Cotabato City that can accommodate the whole staff of DA-RFU XII, and that there is not bulding yet in Koronadal City, and rent there is very expensive. Further, the government would have to spend over ₱7,200,000.00 as dislocation pay as well as other expenses for equipment hauling and construction.

Nonetheless, respondent Alid held a meeting,ordering the transfer of the regional office to ATI Building in Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm in Tupi, both located in South Cotabato and Uptown, Koronadal City. This prompted respondents to file a Complaint for Injunction with prayer for issuance of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO, which was granted by the RTC. Petitioner then went to the CA via Rule 65, but the same was denied for failure to first resort to a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed order. Hence, this petition under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not the case falls under the exceptions for filing a Motion for Reconsideration priorto filing a Petition Under Rule 65.

RULING: For its part, petitioner argues that its Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals falls under the exceptions to the necessity of filing a Motion for Reconsideration. In its Petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioners explained its reasons for no longer filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed order in that (a) the questions to be raised in the motion have already been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court and (b) there is urgent necessity for the resolution of the questions or issues raised. Petitioners allege that the trial court presiding judge was not acting on the disposition of the case with dispatch and that any further delay would unduly prejudice the interests of the government in pursuing its economic development strategies in the region. Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to

correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. The second exception is present in this case. In Siok Ping Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., this Court found that the non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration in the case was not fatal since the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, viz: Respondent explained their omission of filing a motion for reconsideration before resorting to a petition for certiorari based on exceptions (b), (c) and (i). The CA brushed aside the filing of the motion for reconsideration based on the ground that the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court. We agree. Respondent had filed its position paper in the RTC stating the reasons why the injunction prayed for by petitioner should not be granted. However, the RTC granted the injunction. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and presented the same arguments which were already passed upon by the RTC. The RTC already had the opportunity to consider and rule on the question of the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the injunction. We found no reversible error committed by the CA for relaxing the rule since respondent's case falls within the exceptions. Similarly, the various issues raised in the Petition with the Court of Appeals have already been raised by petitioner on several occasions through its pleadings with the trial court. The lower court, therefore, passed upon them. Thus, the present case falls under the second exception in that a Motion for Reconsideration need not be filed where questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court. In any case, this Court disregards the presence of procedural flaws when there is necessity to address the issues because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service and the serious implications the case may cause on the effective administration of the executive department. ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS vs. FRANCISCO R. CO, JR. G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013 J. Bersamin

Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action – is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an actionas long as it acquires jurisdiction over the resthat is thesubject matter of the action. The purpose of summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. FACTS: Respondent filed a case against Abante Tonite and herein petitioners, claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in its Abante Tonite issue. The court wherein such case was raffled to issued the summons to be served on each defendant at their business address. When the Sheriff went to the stated address to effect the personal service of summons on defendants, his efforts became futile as the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. When he returned that afternoon, the service was still not effected as they were still out of the office. Hence, the Sheriff decided to resort to substituted service and explained the reason therefor in his return.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons.The RTC denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss and directed them to filed their answers to the complaint within the remaining period allowed by the Rules. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that the sheriff had immediately resorted to substituted service of the summons upon being informed that they were not around personally receive the summons upon being informed that they were not around to personally receive the same. Tthe RTC however denied their motion, prompting them to file a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the CA assailing the order of the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that certiorari will prosper only if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners were likewise denied by the CA, prompting the filing of this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in holding that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein petitioners.

RULING: The petition for review lacks merit. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action – is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendantin an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an actionas long as it acquires jurisdiction over the resthat is thesubject matter of the action. The purpose of

summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in personam, on the one hand, and an action inrem or quasi in rem, on the other hand, are aptly delineated in Domagas v. Jensen, thusly: The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the property to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam. On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action. As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action.Upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court forthwith issues the corresponding summons to the defendant. The summons is directed to the defendant and signed by the clerk of court under seal. It contains the name of the court and the names of the parties to the action; a direction that the defendant answers within the time fixed by the Rules of Court; and a notice that unless the defendant so answers, the plaintiff will take judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for. To be attached to the original copy of the summons and all copies thereof is a copy of the complaint (and its attachments, if any) and the order, if any, for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an action in personam cannot be overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental

objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him. As to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void. If the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the latter, the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of his defense. With the proper service of the summons being intended to afford to him the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him, he may also waive the process. In other words, compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction. Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him. The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order to ensure the realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. The latter mode of service is known as substituted service because the service of the summons on the defendant is made through his substitute. It is no longer debatable that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective. This is because substituted service, being in derogation of the usual method of service, is extraordinary in character and may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time may substituted service be resorted to. Hence, the impossibility of prompt personal service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant himself and the fact that such efforts failed, which statement should be found in the proof of service or sheriff’s return. Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the impossibility of prompt personal service as basis for resorting to substituted service may be waived by the defendant either expressly or impliedly. There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners were "always roving outside and gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness

should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs. In reality, petitioners’ insistence on personal service by the serving officer was demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses served through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam. They had also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action. DR. ZENAIDA P. PIA v. HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Formerly Acting Ombudsman, Office of the Ombudsman, Dr. OFELIA M. CARAGUE, Formerly PUP President, Dr. ROMAN R. DANNUG, Formerly Dean, College of Economics, Finance and Politics (CEFP), now Associate Professor, CEFP Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Sta. Mesa, Manila

G.R. No. 172334, June 5, 2013 J. Reyes In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable is substantial evidence. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court defines substantial evidence as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The settled rule provides that factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; the Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to review evidence on record and assess the probative weight thereof. FACTS: Respondent Dr. Dannug, in his capacity as Dean of the College of Economics of PUP, filed a complaint against petitioner as a professor of PUP, alleging that the latter was directly selling to her students a book in violation of Section 3, Article X of the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers. He attached therewith a list of students who were allegedly forced to buy a copy of said book.In her defense, petitioner argued that her students were not forced to buy the book, even submitting a certification to that effect from students who had bought from her. The Ombudsman declared petitioner guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and ordered her suspension. Upon appeal to the CA, the decision of the Ombudsman was affirmed, holding that the violation of petitioner has been sufficiently established by substantial evidence. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision finding Pia guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. RULING:

In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable is substantial evidence. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court defines substantial evidence as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The settled rule provides that factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; the Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to review evidence on record and assess the probative weight thereof. Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the CA have sufficiently identified Pia’s act that constitutes Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Although Pia questions the weight that should be accorded to the list of students attached to the complaint of Dannug, it is significant that she readily admitted having directly sold copies of the book/compilation "Organization Development Research Papers" to her students, an act that is proscribed among PUP faculty members, by the submission of a certification from her students claiming that they were not forced to buy copies of the book. In asking for the complaint’s dismissal, Pia argues that she was not covered by the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers which was cited by the Office of the Ombudsman to support the decision rendered against her. She contends that the Code only applies to teachers in educational institutions at the pre-school, primary, elementary and secondary levels, but not to professors in the tertiary level.

Our review of the CA decision indicates that such argument has already been sustained by the appellate court. Nonetheless, the finding of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service remains justified given the standards that are required from Pia as a faculty member in a staterun university. The appellate court correctly explained: We sustain the petitioner’s contention that she is not covered under R.A. No. 7836 (The Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994) relative to the definition of "teachers" therein. As we have earlier stated, the culpability of the petitioner is anchored on her irregular and unjustifiable act being complained of, in violation of an existing regulation of a state-run university (the PUP, in this case) where she is currently employed. Additionally, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. Pia’s argument that she was not properly charged with the offense for which she was found guilty of committing still does not warrant her exoneration from the offense. In Avenido, we emphasized that the designation of the offense or offenses with which a person is charged in an administrative case is not controlling, and one may be found guilty of another offense where the substance of the allegations and evidence presented sufficiently proves one’s guilt. Citing the case of Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, we held in Avenido that the charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense. Considering then that the acts alleged and proved to have been committed by Pia amounts to Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and that she has been afforded a full opportunity to present her side and refute the act imputed against her, the Court finds no cogent reason to nullify the ruling made by the CA on Pia’s guilt.

MR. ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS, represented by the CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (CMFR), through its Executive Director, MRS. MELINDA QUINTOSDE JESUS; and the NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), through its Chairperson, MR. JOSE TORRES, JR. v. SUPERENTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO, DIRECTOR, DAVAO PRISONS AND PENAL FARM, PANABO CITY, DIGOS DAVAO DEL NORTE G.R. No. 182855, June 5, 2013 J. Reyes The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment. FACTS: Adonis was convicted by the Br.17, RTC Davao for libel, filed against him by then Representative Prospero Nograles, and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence accordingly. He began serving such sentence at the Davao Prison on February 20, 2007. A second libel case was likewise filed against Adonis by Jeanette Leuterio, pending before Br. 14, RTC Davao. Sometime thereafter, the Board of Pardons and Parole issued an order for the discharge of seven inmates, one of which is Adonis. Also, the SC issued Admin. Circ. No. 08-2008, the subject of which is the "Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases." In view of the abovementioned, Adonis filed with the RTC Br. 17 a Motion to Reopen Case, praying for his immediate release from detention and modification of his sentence pursuant to said circular. He also filed before Br. 14 a motion for his provisional release from detention, which was granted by the judge in open court and he was allowed to post bail. On the same day, an order for the release of Adonis was sent to the Chief of Davao Penal Colony, but such was not effected. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was then filed by Adonis on May 30, 2008, alleging that his liberty was restrained by the respondent for no valid reason. On February 11, 2009, the court received the letter from respondent, informing the court that Adonis had been released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after accepting the conditions set forth of his parole.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be granted. RULING: The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be allowed or discharge authorized, to wit:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.― If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. Since his detention was by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6) others, on December 11, 2007. While it is true that a convict may be released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole. Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14. In fact, even when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate release at that time. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GUILLERMO LOMAQUE G.R. No. 189297, June 5, 2013 J. del Castillo "AAA’s" momentary inaction will neither diminish nor affect her credibility. "The filing of complaints of rape months, even years, after their commission may or may not dent the credibility of witness and of testimony, depending on the circumstances attendant thereto." "It does not diminish the complainant’s credibility or undermine the charges of rape when the delay can be attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the threats of bodily harm, specially by one who exercises moral ascendancy over the victim." FACTS: The accused was charged under separate informations of thirteen counts of rape by sexual intercourse allegedly committed against his stepdaughter AAA. The evidence for the prosecution showed that the accused, on numerous occasions, had sexual intercourse with AAA, the first of which is when she was only eight years old. Thiss eventually led to AAA becoming pregnant which her mother discovered when they went to the hospital for a medical check-up. When her mother inquired who the father was, AAA told her that it was the accused, a matter which the latter admitted. However, when the mother became hysterical, the accused retracted and concocted a story that somebody else caused the pregnancy of AAA. After giving birth, AAA returned to their house and saw the accused kissing her younger sister, CCC. Afraid that CCC might suffer the same fate she had, she decided to file a complaint against the accused,and with the help of her aunt went to Bantay-Bata 163 to seek assistance. In his defense, the accused denied that he sexually abused AAA, claiming that he could not have committed the crimes charged because as a bio-medical technician, he was deployed all over the country to repair hospital equipment. He offered several plane tickets in support of

this allegation. He likewise testified that his parents-in-law and sister-in-law were living with them. The RTC found AAA to be a credible witness and rejected the defense of denial and alibi proffered by the appellant. Consequently, it rendered a Decision which declared appellant guilty of seven counts of rape by sexual intercourse, one count of rape by sexual assault and one count of Acts of Lasciviousness. The accused elevated the case to the CA, and faulted the trial court in giving full weight and credence to AAA’s testimony and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The OSG, on the other hand prayed for the affirmance of the assailed Judgment contending that AAA’s testimony is clear, candid and straightforward and contended that appellant’s culpability was established beyond reasonable doubt. The CA, not impressed with the arguments of the accused, affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant for the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness. Basically, appellant assails the credibility of AAA.

RULING: In his attempt to discredit "AAA," appellant contends that "AAA’s" silence and failure to divulge her alleged horrifying ordeal to immediate relatives despite the claim that it happened for several times run counter to the natural reaction of an outraged maiden despoiled of her honor. We are not persuaded. "AAA’s" momentary inaction will neither diminish nor affect her credibility. "The filing of complaints of rape months, even years, after their commission may or may not dent the credibility of witness and of testimony, depending on the circumstances attendant thereto." "It does not diminish the complainant’s credibility or undermine the charges of rape when the delay can be attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the threats of bodily harm, specially by one who exercises moral ascendancy over the victim." In this case, not long after the initial rape, appellant threatened "AAA" that he would kill her and her mother if ever she would tell anyone about what happened. At that time, "AAA" was only 11 years old and was living under the same roof with the latter whom she treated as a father. Obviously, the threat "AAA" received from appellant, coupled with his moral ascendancy, is enough to cow and intimidate "AAA." Being young and inexperienced, it instilled tremendous fear in her mind. In People v. Domingo, we ruled that the effect of fear and intimidation instilled in the victim’s mind cannot be measured against any given hard-and-fast rule such that it is viewed in the context of the victim’s perception and judgment not only at the time of the commission of the crime but also at the time immediately thereafter. In any event, "the failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge." Neither the failure of "AAA" to struggle nor at least offer resistance during the rape incidents would tarnish her credibility. "Physical resistance need not be established when intimidation is brought to bear on the victim and the latter submits herself out of fear. As has been held, the failure to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminal acts of the accused." Rape is subjective and not everyone responds in the same way to an attack by a sexual fiend. Although an older person may have shouted for help under similar circumstances, a young victim such as "AAA" is easily overcome by fear and may not be able to cry for help.

Also, the fact that "AAA" resumed her normal life after the commission of the alleged rapes cannot be taken against her. We have consistently ruled that "no standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement, particularly a child who could not be expected to fully comprehend the ways of an adult. People react differently to emotional stress and rape victims are no different from them." Moreover, appellant contends that it challenges human credulity that he was able to sexually abuse "AAA" despite the many people around them. Such contention deserves scant consideration. This is not the first time that our attention was called upon to rule on this matter. As has been repeatedly ruled, rape can be committed even when the rapist and the victim are not alone. "Lust is no respecter of time and place." "Rape is not impossible even if committed in the same room while the rapist’s spouse is sleeping or in a small room where other family members also sleep." "AAA" having positively identified the assailant to be the appellant and no other, the latter’s proffered defense of denial must fail. "Denial could not prevail over the victim’s direct, positive and categorical assertion." As to his alibi, appellant failed to substantiate the same with clear and convincing evidence. The plane tickets he submitted in evidence to show that he was in other places during the incidents are irrelevant. As correctly observed by the RTC, the tickets were all issued in 1994 while the incidents subject of the Informations charging appellant with rape transpired from 1996 to 1999. Thus, appellant’s alibi being uncorroborated and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is self-serving and deserves no weight in law. In fine, "AAA’s" woeful tale of her harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant is impressively clear, definite and convincing. Her detailed narration of the incidents, given in a spontaneous and frank manner and without any fanfare, were beyond cavil well-founded. We therefore sustain the RTC’s and the CA’s findings of appellant’s guilt. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MYLENE TORRES G.R. No. 191730, June 05, 2013 J. Perez The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This rule is, however, not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. Though there are deviations from the required procedure, what is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. FACTS: On January 19, 2007, appellant Mylene Torres was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The prosecution claimed that on January 17, 2007, PO1 Rivera received information that the appellant was engaged in the sale of dangerous drugs. On the basis thereof, the police conducted surveillance. Thereafter, a team was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation. Upon consummation of the sale, appellant was arrested and apprised of her violation. PO1 Rivera remained in possession of the one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance subject of the sale. The buy bust team

subsequently brought appellant and the confiscated item to their office. At their office, PO1 Rivera placed a scotch tape and put his initials "JLR" on the one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet subject of the sale and turned it over to the investigator. The specimen tested was positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. On the other hand, the appellant denied such claims and averred that on that day, armed police officers searched her house, frisked her and invited her to the police station though nothing was found in her possession. She was incarcerated and subjected to a drug test, but the result was not made known to her. The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction against appellant, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether non-compliance with the mandatory procedure for handling dangerous drugs set forth in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, particularly the physical inventory and the taking of photograph of the seized item, created reasonable doubt on appellant’s culpability. RULING: The petition is denied. Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards for the protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit: SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, to include, as much as possible, a description of the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.

The chain of custody is, however, not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states: x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. Clearly, what is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." In the present case, as contrary to the claim of appellant, the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution leads to an unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated item from appellant. Though there were deviations from the required procedure, i.e., making physical inventory and taking photograph of the seized item, still, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the dangerous drug seized from appellant were duly proven by the prosecution to have been properly preserved; its identity, quantity and quality remained untarnished. It must be stressed that said "justifiable ground" will remain unknown in the light of the apparent failure of the accused-appellant to challenge the custody and safekeeping or the issue of disposition and preservation of the subject drugs and drug paraphernalia before the RTC. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARIEL CALARA G.R. No. 197039, June 05, 2013 J. Perez The Court has held that although there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details, they do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant. The prosecution witnesses’ positive identification prevails over the mere denial of appellant. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense. When unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, it is negative and self-serving and merits no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. FACTS: On March 6, 2004, Francisco Dulay (Francisco) was fatally stabbed while he was about to board a tricycle. Dante Dulay (Dante) and Fernando Porquillano (Fernando) identified accused as the perpetrator through the latter’s distinguishing tattoo mark on his right arm. Francisco was immediately brought to the hospital where he died. Accused, on the other hand, denied killing Francisco and claimed that on the day of the incident, he was accompanied by his friends, Albert Cauian, alias "Dugong" and Guiller Salvador, to the lugawan to court a girl. A commotion ensued and accused had a fistfight with Dante. Appellant saw Francisco attempt to stab him but Dugong intercepted the attack and stabbed Francisco first.

The trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of murder, which was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether inconsistencies in the statements of the witnesses have caused the failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of appellant RULING: The petition is denied. Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall. What is vital in their testimonies is not their knowledge of the weapon used, but that they saw appellant stab the victim. As a matter of fact, the presentation of the murder weapon is not even indispensable to the prosecution of an accused. The Court has held that although there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details, they do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant. The purported inconsistencies aside, Dante and Fernando were steadfast in pointing to appellant as the person who stabbed Francisco. Dante was able to identify appellant by his tattoo mark and upon hearing someone call out his name at the time of the stabbing, thus: The prosecution witnesses’ positive identification prevails over the mere denial of appellant. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense. When unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, it is negative and self-serving and merits no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. SUSAN LIM-LUA v. DANILO Y. LUA G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 05, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court, which is immediately executory. However,respondent’s act was not contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in actually providing for the needs of his children. FACTS: On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua. She prayed for support pendente lite which was granted by the trial court. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court stated that the Order granting support had become final and executory since respondent’s

motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper for violation of the three-day notice period. On certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), the said court allowed deductions to the monthly support. Petitioner, on the other hand, asserted that none of the expenses deducted may be chargeable as part of the monthly support. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and issued a writ of execution. Upon respondent’s failure and refusal to pay the support in arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages. Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Petition for Certiorari. The CA thereafter set aside the assailed Order of the trial court and ruled in favor of respondent. ISSUES: Whether respondent should be held guilty of indirect contempt. RULING: The petition is denied. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. The good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered. Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court, which is immediately executory. However, we agree with the CA that respondent’s act was not contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in actually providing for the needs of his children. It is a matter of record that respondent continued shouldering the full cost of their education and even beyond their basic necessities in keeping with the family’s social status. Moreover, respondent believed in good faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would allow him to offset the substantial amounts he had spent or paid directly to his children. Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate income on her own because she presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and at the same time engages in the business of lending money. He also claims that the two children have finished their education and are now employed in the family business earning their own salaries. Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be submitted to the trial court in which the action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of support may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. As we held in Advincula v. Advincula: …Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in

accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO BUSTAMANTE G.R. No. 189836, June 05, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Moreover, it is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law because denial cannot prevail over the positive, candid and categorical testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive declaration of the complainant and the negative statement of the appellant, the former deserves more credence. FACTS: At about lunch time or thereafter on February 17, 1997, AAA was alone in the second floor in their house when her father, the appellant, arrived. The appellant laid her down on the floor and removed her shorts and panty. He then removed his pants and went on top of her. Thereafter, she reported the incident to her mother and the police. On the other hand, appellant claimed that in the early morning on February 17, 1997, he went to Tuguegarao with his daughter, AAA, because the latter told him that her cousin, Randy Torrado, molested her. When they reached their house, policemen arrived and brought him to the Municipal Hall. Appellant further claimed that his daughter AAA charged him of the heinous crime of rape because his wife and brothers-inlaw harbored ill feelings against him. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court rendered judgment against appellant of the crime of rape. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether AAA’s testimony should be given full credence so as to prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Jurisprudence is likewise instructive that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found AAA to be a credible witness and her testimony worthy of full faith and credit. After a careful review of the records of this case, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower courts. It is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law because denial cannot prevail over the positive, candid and categorical testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive declaration of the complainant and the negative statement of the appellant, the former deserves

more credence. Likewise, the testimonies of the witnesses presented by appellant failed to buttress his defense of denial as they merely related to tangential matters which do not seriously affect the issue of AAA’s credibility. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO PIOSANG G.R. No. 200329, June 05, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story. As between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. In the case at bar, accused-appellant was in the immediate vicinity of the locus criminis at the time of commission of the crime. FACTS: On July 8, 1998, then eleven-and-a-half-year-old CCC called AAA, his neighbor, and asked her to play computer with him at the house of accused-appellant, Ricardo Piosang on instructions of the latter.On their way, however, AAA and CCC were suddenly pushed inside accused-appellant’s comfort room, wherein the latter instructed CCC to hold AAA from behind. Accused-appellant removed his short pants and inserted his private part into AAA. Thereafter, accused-appellant ordered CCC to do the same thing the former did. CCC pretended to do what he was told.Accused-appellant threatened to kill them if they told anyone of what happened, and then let them go home. Months after, AAA only revealed what happened to her when her mother warned her not to let anyone touch her private part. On the other hand, accused-appellant completely denied the charges and claimed that he was at home on the day in question. He further averred that it was CCC who raped AAA. The trial court held accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged. Such conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether the guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. RULING:

AAA, who was six years old by the time she testified in court, had consistently, positively, and categorically identified accused-appellant as her abuser. Her testimony was direct, candid, and replete with details of the rape. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story. In contrast, accused-appellant averred that he was at home, letting his hair dry in the garage, at the time of AAA’s rape. We have oft pronounced that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. In the case at bar, AAA was raped in the detached comfort room of accused-appellant’s house on July 8, 1998, at which time, accused-appellant claimed that he was in the garage of the very same house. Obviously, accused-appellant was in the immediate vicinity of the locus criminis at the time of commission of the crime. Accused-appellant’s theory that he was falsely charged with rape because the actual rapist, CCC, was a minor and could not be held criminally liable, is baseless and illogical. We stress that AAA clearly testified that it was only accused-appellant who inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina and that CCC merely pretended to have also done so. Accused-appellant failed to impute any ill motive on the part of AAA to single him out from all other neighbors and untruthfully charge him with the rape. As we held in People v. Agcanas: Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. HENRY L. SY v. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY G.R. No. 202690, June 5, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe A claim of excusable negligence does not loosely warrant a relaxation of the rules. Verily, the party invoking such should be able to show that the procedural oversight or lapse is attended by a genuine miscalculation or unforeseen fortuitousness which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against so as to justify the relief sought. The standard of care required is that which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his important business. In this accord, the duty rests on every counsel to see to adopt and strictly maintain a system that will efficiently take into account all court notices sent to him.

FACTS: A complaint was filed by then Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. on November 7, 1996 with the RTC for the expropriation of a 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned and registered under the name of petitioner. Pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the respondent deposited the amount of Php 241,090.00 representing 15% of the fair market value of the property based on its tax declaration with the Office of the Clerk of Court. However, because the petitioner disputes the amount of the just compensation, the RTC appointed three commissioners to determine the proper amount to be paid by the respondent. Two of the commissioners recommended the payment of Php 5,500.00 per sq. m. while the other commissioner recommended the higher amount of Php 13,500.00 per sq. m. as just compensation. The RTC, in its Orderdated adopted the findings the two commissioners and ordered the payment of aforesaid amount with interest. Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which affirmed the RTC ruling with modifications and ordered the payment of damages. Aggrieved, petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated July 16, 2012 for being filed out of time. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. RULING: At the outset, the Court observes that Sy’s motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and thus, was properly dismissed by the CA. Records show that, as per the Postmaster’s Certification, the CA’s January 20, 2012 Decision was received by Sy on January 26, 2012 and as such, any motion for reconsideration therefrom should have been filed not later than fifteen (15) days from receipt, or on February 10, 2012. However, Sy filed his motion for reconsideration (subject motion) a day late, or on February 13, 2012, which thus, renders the CA decision final and executory. In this regard, it is apt to mention that Sy’s counsel, Atty. Tranquilino F. Meris (Atty. Meris), claims that his secretary’s inadvertent placing of the date January 27, 2012, instead of January 26, 2012, on the Notice of Decision constitutes excusable negligence which should therefore, justify a relaxation of the rules. The assertion is untenable. A claim of excusable negligence does not loosely warrant a relaxation of the rules. Verily, the party invoking such should be able to show that the procedural oversight or lapse is attended by a genuine miscalculation or unforeseen fortuitousness which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against so as to justify the relief sought. The standard of carerequired is that which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his important business. In this accord, the duty rests on every counsel to see to adopt and strictly maintain a system that will efficiently take into account all court notices sent to him. Applying these principles, the Court cannot excuse Atty. Meris’ misstep based on his proffered reasons. Evidently, the erroneous stamping of the Notice of Decision could have been averted if only he had instituted a credible filing system in his office to account for oversights such as that committed by his secretary. Indeed, ordinary prudence could have prevented such mistake. Be that as it may, procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.

As applied in this case, the Court finds that the procedural consequence of the above-discussed one-day delay in the filing of the subject motion – which, as a matter of course, should render the CA’s January 20, 2012 Decision already final and executory and hence, bar the instant petition – is incommensurate to the injustice which Sy may suffer. This is in line with the Court’s observation that the amount of just compensation, the rate of legal interest, as well as the time of its accrual, were incorrectly adjudged by both the RTC and the CA, contrary to existing jurisprudence. In this respect, the Court deems it proper to relax the rules of procedure. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MOISES CAOILE G.R. No. 203041, June 5, 2013 J. Leonardo - de Castro It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness’ credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids. FACTS: The victim in this case, hereinafter referred to as AAA, was left in the care of her grandmother and auntie in Alipang, Rosario, La Union when her mother left for work abroad when she was still young. One of their neighbors was the accused whose daughter, Marivic, was the playmate of AAA. The evidence for the prosecution showed that the accused had, in multiple times and places, carnal knowledge of AAA. Sometime in April 2005, AAA heard her friend BBB complain to the Barangay Tanod that the accused mashed her breast, and upon hearing BBB’s story, AAA blurted out that she, too, was abused by the accused. CCC took AAA, her niece, to the police station to reportthe incident, and thereafter AAA was subjected to various types of medical examinations. The psychological evaluation conducted on AAA showed that she suffers from mental retardation. The accused, in his defense, denied the accusations and alleged that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA was consensual as they were lovers, and that he did not now that AAA was a demented person since she acted like a normal individual. The RTC, in its May 6, 2009 decision, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. On appeal, the accused alleged that the lower court was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and attacked the credibility of AAA and the methods used to determine her mental state. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape even though the credibility of AAA was questionable. RULING: Caoile’s insistence, to escape liability, that AAA is not a mental retardate, cannot be accepted by this Court. The fact that AAA was able to answer in a straightforward manner during her testimony cannot be used against her. The capacity of a mental retardate to stand as a witness in court has already been settled by this Court. In People v. Castillo, we said: It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal

capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant’s accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused. Moreover, it is settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. More importantly, AAA’s medical condition was verified not only by one expert, but three witnesses – a psychologist and two psychiatrists, one of whom was even chosen by the defense and testified for the defense. All three experts confirmed that AAA suffered from mental retardation. Caoile cannot, at this point, properly impeach his own witness without violating established rules of evidence. This Court further disagrees with Caoile’s claim that the experts "merely impressed that they conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] in which she obtained a performance classified within the mental retardation range." The experts’ findings on AAA’s mental condition were based on several tests and examinations, including the Stanford-Binet Test, which Caoile, relying on this Court’s ruling in People v. Cartuano, Jr., considered as one of the more reliable standardized tests. Besides, this Court has already qualified the applicability of Cartuano in cases involving mentally deficient rape victims, to wit: People v. Cartuano applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to sustain a finding of mental retardation. Indeed, the Court has clarified so in People v. Delos Santos, declaring that the records in People v. Cartuano were wanting in clinical, laboratory, and psychometric support to sustain a finding that the victim had been suffering from mental retardation. It is noted that in People v. Delos Santos, the Court upheld the finding that the victim had been mentally retarded by an examining psychiatrist who had been able to identify the tests administered to the victim and to sufficiently explain the results of the tests to the trial court. Borrowing our words in People v. Butiong, "in direct contrast to People v. Cartuano, this case did not lack clinical findings on the mentality of the victim." Here, the psychiatric evaluation report of Caoile’s own expert witness is the final nail on the coffin of Caoile’s argument. In addition, this Court will not contradict the RTC’s findings, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, absent any valid reason. The trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding upon this Court. In People v. Sapigao, Jr., we explained in detail the rationale for this practice: It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness’ credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate court can see are the cold words of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk that some of what the witness actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As correctly stated by an American court, "There is an inherent impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful crossexamination, something in his manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot be transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be considered by the appellate court." JOSELITO C. BORROMEO v. JUAN T. MINA G.R. No. 193747, June 5, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe

Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, not because of the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness. Basic considerations of due process dictate that theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court would not ordinarily be considered by a reviewing court, except when their factual bases would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable him to properly meet the issue raised. FACTS: Petitioner filed a Petition dated June 9, 2003 before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) of Isabela, seeking that: (a) his landholding over the subject be exempted from the coverage of the government’s Operation Land Transfer(OLT) program under PD No. 27; and (b) respondent’s emancipation patent over the subject property be consequently revoked and cancelled. To this end, petitioner alleged that he purchased the aforesaid property from its previous owner, one Serafin M. Garcia, as evidenced by a deed of sale notarized on February 19, 1982. For various reasons, however, he was not able to effect the transfer of title in his name. Subsequently, to his surprise, he learned that an emancipation patent was issued in respondent’s favor without any notice to him. In a Resolution, the PARO cancelled respondent’s emancipation patent and directed the petitioner to allow the respondent to continue in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property and to execute a leasehold contract over the same pursuant to the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Aggrieved, respondent filed an administrative appeal before the DAR Regional Director, who declared the subject property exempted from OLT coverage but did not order the cancellation of the respondent’s emancipation patent and instead directed petitioner to institute proper proceedings for such purpose before the DARAB. The DAR Secretary in turn affirmed the ruling of the Regional Director in toto. As such, respondent filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the DAR Secretary’s Ruling. It doubted petitioner’s claim of ownership based on the 1982 deed of sale due to the inconsistent allegations regarding the dates of its notarization stated in the two PARO petitions, and found the sale to be null and void. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner which was, however, denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in declaring the sale between him and Garcia as null and void. RULING: Petitioner contends that the CA erred in declaring the sale between him and Garcia as null and void. In this connection, he avers that there was actually an oral sale entered into by him and Garcia (through his son Lorenzo Garcia) in 1976. The said oral sale was consummated on the same year as petitioner had already occupied and tilled the subject property and started paying real estate taxes thereon. He further alleges that he allowed respondent to cultivate and possess the subject property in 1976 only out of mercy and compassion since the latter begged him for work. The existing sale agreement had been merely formalized by virtue of the 1982 deed of sale. In his Comment, respondent counters that petitioner cannot change his theory regarding the date of sale between him and Garcia nor even raise the same factual issue on appeal before the Court. Moreover, he asserts that the 1982 deed of sale was not registered and therefore, does not bind him. In any event, he posits that the sale between petitioner and Garcia was null and void. Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, not because

of the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness. Basic considerations of due process dictate that theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court would not ordinarily be considered by a reviewing court, except when their factual bases would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable him to properly meet the issue raised, such as when the factual bases of such novel theory, issue or argument is (a) subject of judicial notice; or (b) had already been judicially admitted, which do not obtain in this case. Records show that petitioner changed his theory on appeal with respect to two (2) matters: First, the actual basis of his ownership rights over the subject property, wherein he now claims that his ownership was actually based on a certain oral sale in 1976 which was merely formalized by the 1982 deed of sale; and Second, the status of respondent as tenant of the subject property, which he never questioned during the earlier stages of the proceedings before the DAR but presently disputes before the Court. Clearly, the factual bases of the foregoing theories require the presentation of proof as neither of them had been judicially admitted by respondent nor subject of judicial notice. Therefore, the Court cannot entertain petitioner’s novel arguments raised in the instant petition. Accordingly, he must rely on his previous positions that (a) his basis of ownership over the subject property rests on the 1982 deed of sale; and (b) that respondent’s status as the tenant of the subject property remains undisputed. METRO MANILA SHOPPING MECCA CORP., SHOEMART, INC., SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., STAR APPLIANCES CENTER, SUPER VALUE, INC., ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC., HEALTH AND BEAUTY, INC., JOLLIMART PHILS. CORP., and SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION v. MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, and THE CITY OF MANILA G.R. No. 190818, June 5, 2013 J. Perlas – Bernabe The Court held that the original period for filing the petition for review may be extended for a period of fifteen (15) days, which for the most compelling reasons, may be extended for another period not exceeding fifteen (15) days. In other words, the reglementary period provided under Section 3, Rule 8 of the RRCTA is extendible and as such, CTA Division’s grant of respondents’ motion for extension falls squarely within the law. FACTS: Sometime in October 2001, respondent, as Treasurer of the City of Manila, assessed the petitioners for their fourth quarter local business taxes pursuant to the Revenue Code of the City of Manila amounting to Php 5,104,281.26, which the latter paid under protest on October 20, 2001. The protest was denied on October 25, 2001. On October 20, 2003, petitioners filed a case with the RTC, alleging that the City Ordinance relied upon for the assessment was null and void and sought the refund of the taxes they previously paid to the City. Respondents then filed a Motion to Dismisson November 6, 2003 but since the RTC did not address the arguments raised in such, they filed an Answer on December 16, 2003, averring in both that petitioners failed to filed any written claim for tax refund or credit with the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila. On July 8, 2004, petitioners sent respondents Requests for Admissions & Interrogatories dated July 7, 2004 which inter alia requested the admission of the fact that the former fied a written protest with the latter. However, petitioners did not respond to said request. In its Decision, the RTC held that respondents’ assessment of local business tax under the Revenue Code of Manila is null and void, thereby warranting the issuance of a tax refund or tax credit in the amount previously paid. Aggrieved, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC, which the latter denied. Thereafter, they filed two Motions for Extension to File Petition for Review with the CTA, effectively requesting for a period of thirty days from May 27, 2007, or until June 26, 2007, to file their petition for review. On June 26, 2007, respondents filed their Petition for Review dated June 22,

2007 via registered mail and issued a Resolution on July 6, 2007 granting the Motion for Extension and admitted their Petition. In its decision, the CTA Division reversed and set aside the RTC’s ruling and in effect denied the petitioners’ request for tax credit/refund, and held that the petitioners failed to contest the denial of their protest before a court of competent jurisdiction within the period provided for under the LGC, thus making the assessment conclusive and unappealable. Petitioners then moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. They then elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc which upheld the CTA Division’s ruling. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA Division correctly gave due course to respondents’ petition for review. RULING: The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioners argue that the CTA Division erred in extending the reglementary period within which respondents may file their Petition for Review, considering that Section 3, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA (RRCTA) is silent on such matter. Further, even if it is assumed that an extension is allowed, the CTA Division should not have entertained respondents’ Petition for Review for their failure to comply with the filing requisites set forth in Section 4, Rule 5 and Section 2, Rule 6 of the RRCTA. Petitioners’ arguments fail to persuade. Although the RRCTA does not explicitly sanction extensions to file a petition for review with the CTA, Section 1, Rule 7 thereof reads that in the absence of any express provision in the RRCTA, Rules 42, 43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of Court may be applied in a suppletory manner. In particular, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9282 makes reference to the procedure under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. In this light, Section 1 of Rule 42 states that the period for filing a petition for review may be extended upon motion of the concerned party. Thus, in City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., the Court held that the original period for filing the petition for review may be extended for a period of fifteen (15) days, which for the most compelling reasons, may be extended for another period not exceeding fifteen (15) days. In other words, the reglementary period provided under Section 3, Rule 8 of the RRCTA is extendible and as such, CTA Division’s grant of respondents’ motion for extension falls squarely within the law. Neither did respondents’ failure to comply with Section 4, Rule 5 and Section 2, Rule 6 of the RRCTA militate against giving due course to their Petition for Review. Respondents’ submission of only one copy of the said petition and their failure to attach therewith a certified true copy of the RTC’s decision constitute mere formal defects which may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. It is well-settled that dismissal of appeals based purely on technical grounds is frowned upon as every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. In this regard, the CTA Division did not overstep its boundaries when it admitted respondents’ Petition for Review despite the aforementioned defects "in the broader interest of justice." SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. G.R. No. 182963, June 3, 2013 J. Peralta Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed. FACTS:

On February 15, 2001, petitioner spouses executed a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citimotors, Inc amounting to Php 834, 768.00. On the same day, Citimotors, Inc. assigned all its rights, titles and interests in the Promissory Note to ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc., whichlikewise assigned the same to respondent on May 31, 2002. For failure of the petitioner spouses to pay four consecutive installments, respondent through counsel, sent to petitioners a demand letter declaring the entire obligation as due and demandable and requiring to pay Php 576,664.04, or surrender the mortgaged vehicle immediately upon receiving the letter. As the demand left unheeded, respondent filed on October 4, 2002 an action for Replevin and Damages before the Manila RTC. A writ of replevin was issued but the subject vehicle was not seized. Trial on the merits then ensued and after weighing the evidence, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioners to pay the amount due as aforesaid with interests. Upon appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the lower court’s decision, and, subsequently, denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari was filed. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have defaulted in their payment even though there lacks competent proof of their receipt of a written letter of demand, thus making the action for replevin improper. RULING: The contention is untenable. Records bear that both verbal and written demands were in fact made by respondent prior to the institution of the case against petitioners. Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that no demand letter was sent by respondent, there is really no need for it because petitioners legally waived the necessity of notice or demand in the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage, which they voluntarily and knowingly signed in favor of respondent’s predecessor-in-interest. Said contract expressly stipulates: In case of my/our failure to pay when due and payable, any sum which I/We are obliged to pay under this note and/or any other obligation which I/We or any of us may now or in the future owe to the holder of this note or to any other party whether as principal or guarantor x x x then the entire sum outstanding under this note shall, without prior notice or demand, immediately become due and payable. Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v. Escobido that prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed. Also, petitioners’ representation that they have not received a demand letter is completely inconsequential as the mere act of sending it would suffice. Again, We look into the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage, which provides: All correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters, summonses, subpoenas, or notifications of any judicial or extrajudicial action shall be sent to the MORTGAGOR at the address indicated on this promissory note with chattel mortgage or at the address that may hereafter be given in writing by the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE or his/its assignee. The mere act of sending any correspondence by mail or by personal delivery to the said address shall be valid and effective notice to the mortgagor for all legal purposes and the fact that any communication is not actually received by the MORTGAGOR or that it has been returned unclaimed to the MORTGAGEE or that no person was found at the address given, or that the address is fictitious or cannot be located shall not excuse or relieve the MORTGAGOR from the effects of such notice.

The Court cannot yield to petitioners’ denial in receiving respondent’s demand letter. To note, their postal address evidently remained unchanged from the time they executed the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage up to time the case was filed against them. Thus, the presumption that "a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail" stands in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary. ERNESTO L. NATIVIDAD v. FERNANDO MARIANO, ANDRES MARIANO and DOROTEO GARCIA G.R. No. 179643, June 3, 2013 J. Brion The broader interests of justice and equity demand that we set aside procedural rules as they are, after all, intended to promote rather than defeat substantial justice. If the rigid and pedantic application of procedural norms would frustrate rather than promote justice, the Court always has the power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation, particularly if defects of jurisdiction appear to be present. FACTS: On December 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication (PARAD) of Nueva Ecija a petition for ejectment and collection of back lease rentals against the respondents who are the tenants of the subject property, alleging that he purchased the same in a public auction several years ago. The PARAD granted the petition in its October 27, 1999 decision, ordering the respondents to vacate the property and to pay the lease rentals in arrears. When the respondents failed to appeal the decision despite due notice, the PARAD’s decision became final and executory, and on April 6, 2000, the PARAD granted Ernesto’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondents filed an appearance and a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground of excusable negligence on May 4, 2000. They alleged that they had no knowledge of such sale, and that they had been paying the lease rentals to the landowner, attaching thereto copies of rental payment receipts issued by the latter’s representative. The petition was however denied by the PARAD on June 7, 2000, declaring that none of the grounds that grant the petition exists, and that the same was filed out of time. The motion for reconsideration filed by respondents was also denied by the PARAD. Aggrieved, they appealed to the DARAB. On February 15, 2005, the DARAB granted the respondents’ appeal and reversed the PARAD’s October 27, 1999 Decision, ordering the petitioner to maintain the respondents in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property, but still ordered the latter to pay the lease rentals in arrears. Petitioner then appealed the DARAB decision to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which the latter denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not the final and executory decision of the PARAD could still be reopened modified. RULING:

We cannot blame Ernesto for insisting that the PARAD decision can no longer be altered. The doctrine of immutability of final judgments, grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice, is well settled. Indeed, once a decision has attained finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, whether the modification is to be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The doctrine holds true even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. The judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must, on some definite date fixed by law, become final even at the risk of occasional errors. The only accepted exceptions to this general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc

entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. This doctrine of immutability of judgments notwithstanding, we are not persuaded that the DARAB and the CA erred in reopening, and ruling on the merits of the case. The broader interests of justice and equity demand that we set aside procedural rules as they are, after all, intended to promote rather than defeat substantial justice. If the rigid and pedantic application of procedural norms would frustrate rather than promote justice, the Court always has the power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation, particularly if defects of jurisdiction appear to be present. This is the precise situation that we presently find before this Court. In the present petition, the DARAB granted the respondents’ appeal, despite the lapse of ten months from the respondents’ notice of the PARAD’s decision, because the PARAD denied the respondents’ petition for relief from judgment simply on a sweeping declaration that none of the grounds for the grant of the petition exists and that the petition had been filed out of time. The records, however, sufficiently contradict the PARAD’s reasons for denying the respondents’ petition for relief; not only do we find justifiable grounds for its grant, we also find that the respondents filed their petition well within the prescriptive period. Thus, the PARAD effectively and gravely abused its discretion and acted without jurisdiction in denying the petition for relief from judgment. A petition for relief from the judgment of the PARAD is governed by Section 4, Rule IX of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure (the governing DARAB rules at the time Ernesto filed his complaint). It reads in part: SECTION 4. Relief from Judgment. A petition for relief from judgment must be verified and must be based on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake and excusable neglect x x x; Provided, that the petition is filed with the Adjudicator a quo within three (3) months from the time the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect was discovered and six (6) months from notice of order, resolution or decision from which relief is sought. A reading of Section 4 shows that four grounds justify the grant of the petition for relief from judgment, namely: fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence. The same provision also presents two periods that must be observed for such grant – 90 days and six months. In their first and second petitions, the respondents invoked the ground of excusable negligence. They alleged that they failed to appear before the PARAD due to their inexperience and ignorance of agrarian reform laws and of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, as well as indigence. These circumstances – their averred ignorance coupled with financial constraints if not outright poverty - taken altogether sufficiently convince us that the respondents’ negligence is more than excusable and constitutes a justifiable ground for the grant of their petition for relief. We are also convinced that the respondents complied with the twin period requirement set by Section 4, Rule IX of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. First, the records show that the respondents received a copy of the PARAD’s October 27, 1999 decision on December 10, 1999, at the earliest; they filed their first petition on May 4, 2000 or five months after. Second, following our above discussion that the respondents had sufficiently shown grounds for the grant of their petition, we perforce count the 90-day period from the respondents’ discovery of their excusable negligence. We construe this date as the time when the respondents discovered

the adverse consequence of their failure to answer, seek reconsideration or appeal the PARAD’s decision, which was when they were evicted from the subject property on June 9, 2000 or 35 days before they filed their first petition. Clearly, the respondents filed their petition well within 6 months from their notice of the PARAD’s decision and within 90 days from the discovery of their excusable negligence. Based on these considerations, we are convinced that the DARAB did not err in granting the respondents’ appeal despite the procedural lapses. Under Section 3, Rule I of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB and its adjudicators "shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity." The same provision is essentially embodied in R.A. No. 3844 upon which Ernesto heavily relied. In our view, considerations of equity, justice and jurisdiction surround this case, justifying the relaxation of the rules and the DARAB’s grant of the respondents’ appeal. In sum, we rule that the DARAB correctly allowed the respondents’ appeal despite the lapse of the reglementary period. Accordingly, we cannot impute error on the CA in not reversing the DARAB’s decision simply under the doctrine of immutability of judgments. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REGGIE BERNARDO G.R. No. 198789, June 3, 2013 J. Reyes It has been settled that affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Absent clear and convincing evidence, alibi and denial are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be proved, not only that the assailant was in another place when the crime was committed, but that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission altogether. FACTS: An information charged the accused of the crime of murder of one Efren Calumag y Antonio and the attempted murder of one Reah Calumag, to which the accused pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. Reah Calumag, one of the witnesses offered by the prosecution, testified that the incident transpired on July 27, 2006 along the National Highway in Sarrat, Ilocos Norte while she was aboard a motorcycle driven by her father, Efren Calumag. Three men on a motorcylce going the same direction suddenly appeared beside them and shot them several times, consequently causing Efren to die and Reah to survive as she was treated for her wounds. Two days thereafter, Reah went to the police station upon being informed that the police has in their custody a person who fitted the description of one of the assailants as given by her, who is herein accused. The accused on the other hand interposed the defense of denial and alibi, alleging that although he was originally ordered to be released on July 21, 2006, he was still incarcerated at the time the crime was committed as his request to stay in jail was granted by the warden for he has nowhere else to go. He even narrated that on the day of the incident, he washed his clothes in the morning, helped in preparing the lunch, and was later accompanied by three jail guards to the PAGIBIG office in Laoag City using the district jail service. The RTC rendered its judgment on April 27, 2007 and found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder, giving credence to Reah’s narration of facts over Bernardo’s defense of denial and alibi. On March 4, 2011, the CA affirmed the

decision of the RTC, deleting however the temperate damages awarded by the lower court. Aggrieved, the accused filed this present appeal. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution has proven the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: The Court sustains the accused’s conviction. Bernardo asserts alibi and denial as defenses. He argues that he was in jail when the crime was committed. Such alibi, while corroborated by the testimonies of some of Batac District Jail guards, cannot prevail over the positive identification made by Reah pinpointing Bernardo as one of the malefactors who shot Efren to death. The identification of Bernardo as an assailant was positively and credibly established by the prosecution in this case. It has been settled that affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Absent clear and convincing evidence, alibi and denial are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be proved, not only that the assailant was in another place when the crime was committed, but that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission altogether. In this case, Bernardo claims the physical impossibility of having committed the crime for the reason that he was still in jail when it was perpetrated. He was ordered released by the RTC of Batac on July 21, 2006; hence, he was no longer a detention prisoner during the commission of the crime. The Batac District Jail is in the same province where the crime was committed and could be easily reached within thirty to forty five minutes from BarangaySan Marcos, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Having been discharged from jail, Bernardo was also free to move around and was not subject to strict monitoring. This was bolstered by the finding of the RTC that there was no record that Bernardo stayed in jail on the day the crime was perpetrated. Undisputedly, there was no physical impossibility for Bernardo to leave his cell and be present at the shooting incident. The alleged minor discrepancies in the testimony of Reah, the main prosecution witness, identifying Bernardo as one of the perpetrators in the shooting incident were, indeed, negligible. As the CA correctly emphasized, Reah was not only able to relate a detailed story of what transpired on July 27, 2006 but more importantly, her testimony was sufficient to convict Bernardo for the crime charged.

JULY 2013 WILLIAM T. GO v. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO, substituted by his legal heirs TERESITA C. LOOYUKO, et. al. G.R. No. 196529, July 1, 2013 J. Mendoza The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. When the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement in an unlawful detainer case brought by a vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of a right to hold possession.

FACTS: Respondent Alberto T. Looyuko (Looyuko) and Jimmy Go, brother of petitioner William Go (William) were partners in a business called Noah’s Ark Group of Companies (Noah’s Ark). Their partnership was embodied in a written agreement, dated February 9, 1982. Sometime in 1986, William was appointed Chief of Staff of Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery. He was allowed by Looyuko to occupy the townhouse in Gilmore Townhomes, Granada Street, Quezon City. On October 10, 1986, another agreement was entered into by Looyuko and Jimmy in furtherance of their business partnership. In a letter, dated October 28, 1998, Looyuko demanded that William vacate the townhouse. Jimmy filed an adverse claim over the property, annotating his interest on the title as co-owner. He claimed that the townhouse was bought using funds from Noah’s Ark and, hence, part of the property of the partnership. William refused to vacate the property relying on the strength of his brother’s adverse claim. On December 2, 1998, Looyuko filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against William before the MeTC. He adduced as evidence the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 108763 issued in his name as well as the aforementioned demand letter. He alleged that William’s occupation was merely by tolerance, on the understanding that he should vacate the property upon demand. On the other hand, William presented the partnership agreements, the contract to sell of the subject property to Noah’s Ark, and the cash voucher evidencing payment for the acquisition of the property. The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of Looyuko stating that he had the right to the possession of the said townhouse as its registered owner. William then appealed to the QC RTC. Meanwhile, Looyuko filed a motion for execution pending appeal on the ground that the supersedeas bond was insufficient. On his part, William filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the unlawful detainer case because a complaint for specific performance against Looyuko had been filed by Jimmy before RTC of Pasig City to establish his alleged right as a co-owner. In March 2001, the QC RTC ruled in favor of William and deferred the proceedings in the unlawful detainer case to await the outcome of the civil case before the Pasig RTC. The QC RTC also denied Looyuko’s two motions for execution. The CA, however, reversed the QC RTC orders and directed the immediate execution of the MTC Decision. On March 29, 2004, the QC RTC issued a decision in the action for unlawful detainer, reversing the findings of the MTC and ruling in favor of William. It held that the property was purchased in the name of Noah’s Ark and that Looyuko held the title for purpose of expediency only. Looyuko filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA ruled in favor of Looyuko and held that the issue of possession could be resolved without ruling on the claim of ownership. Hence, this petition. ISSUES:

1. Whether the issue of ownership should be ruled upon in relation to the action between Jimmy and Looyuko involving their claimed shares in the title over the property. 2. Whether respondent’s prior physical possession is necessary for his action for unlawful detainer to prosper. RULING: The petition is denied. This petition involves an action for unlawful detainer, which is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in an unlawful detainer case is originally legal but becomes illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. When the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The Court agrees with William that the issue of ownership should be ruled upon considering that such has been raised and it appears that it is inextricably linked to the question of possession. Its resolution will then boil down to which of the parties’ respective evidence deserves more weight. Even granting, however, that all the pieces of documentary evidence presented by William are valid, they will fail to bolster his case. The Court has consistently upheld the registered owners’ superior right to possess the property in unlawful detainer cases. It is an age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to its possession. It has repeatedly been emphasized that when the property is registered under the Torrens system, the registered owner’s title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. It has even been held that it does not even matter if the party’s title to the property is questionable. The TCT of respondent Looyuko is, therefore, evidence of indefeasible title over property and, as its holder, he is entitled to its possession as a matter of right. Thus, partnership agreements and other documentary evidence presented by petitioner William not, by themselves, enough to offset Looyuko’s right as registered owner. It must underscored, however, that this adjudication on ownership is merely provisional and would bar or prejudice the action between Jimmy and Looyuko involving their claimed shares in title over the property.

the the are be not the

However, William is mistaken in his argument that respondent Looyuko’s prior physical possession is necessary for his action for unlawful detainer to prosper. Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit: Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provision of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold

possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. Nowhere does it appear in the above-cited rule that, in an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff be in prior physical possession of the property. Thus, it has been held that prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement in an unlawful detainer case brought by a vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of a right to hold possession.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEMARI JALBONIAN alias “BUDO” G.R. No. 180281, July 01, 2013 J. Del Castillo When there is only one witness to the crime and that he was familiar with both the victim and the accused, it can therefore be established that such witness is telling the truth. Finding of guilt based on the testimony of a lone witness is not uncommon. "For although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. FACTS: On July 30, 1991, an Information for murder was filed against appellant. Appellant then went into hiding for more than five years and was apprehended only on July 10, 1996. During his arraignment, he entered a plea of "not guilty”. For the evidence of the prosecution, Barangay Chairman Oscar Valenciano (Valenciano) testified that at 9:00 a.m. of January 26, 1991, a barangay assembly meeting was held in Balicotoc Elementary School, a public educational institution located in Brgy. Balicotoc, Ilog, Negros Occidental. After the meeting was adjourned at noon, the participants including Valenciano left the school premises. From a distance of about three-arms length, Valenciano saw appellant position himself behind Fortunato Quintanilla, Jr. (Quintanilla), stab the latter on the back with a knife, and immediately run away. Valenciano ordered Julio Gaston, a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), to chase appellant but the latter eluded arrest. Quintanilla was brought by Valenciano to the nearest hospital but he died before reaching there. After the prosecution rested its case, appellant filed a Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Dismiss by Way of Demurrer of Evidence. However, the trial court denied the motion. Despite the denial, the defense did not present any evidence anymore. The RTC convicted appellant of murder qualified by treachery. It gave credence to the testimony of Valenciano who identified appellant as the perpetrator of the crime and gave a detailed account of the stabbing incident. The trial court found that Valenciano had no reason to falsely testify against the appellant and that his account as to how appellant stabbed the victim was corroborated by the death certificate. In addition, the trial court considered appellant’s flight for more than five years as indication of his guilt. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal which the RTC approved. Pursuan thereto, the records of the case were elevated to the Supreme Court. However, in view of the ruling in People v. Mateo this case was remanded to the CA for intermediate review.The CA affirmed appellant’s conviction but modified the RTC’s judgment. Hence, the present appeal. ISSUE: Whether the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING:

The appeal is dismissed. The Court is convinced that it was appellant who killed the victim. Valenciano clearly narrated the details of the stabbing incident and positively identified appellant as the assailant. It has been held that when a testimony is given in a candid and straightforward manner, there is no room for doubt that the witness is telling the truth. Moreover, Valenciano’s testimony on the stabbing of the victim was corroborated by the Certificate of Death attesting that the cause of death was a stab wound. As to appellant’s argument that it was impossible for Valenciano to personally identify him as the assailant since the victim and his attacker had their backs turned to Valenciano, the Court finds the same unworthy of credence. Suffice it to say that the relative position of the witness from the victim and the assailant refers to a minor detail that does not detract from his credibility. What is important is that Valenciano witnessed the unfolding of the crime and was able to positively identify appellant as the culprit. In addition and as correctly pointed out by the OSG, Valenciano readily identified appellant because the latter used to reside in the same barangay of which he was barangay captain. Likewise untenable is appellant’s contention that Valenciano’s testimony cannot be relied upon since it was not corroborated by other witnesses to the crime. Finding of guilt based on the testimony of a lone witness is not uncommon. "For although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary ‘only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate.’" This is not obtaining in this case. Moreover, appellant also failed to attribute any improper motive to Valenciano to falsely testify against him. There was no evidence to establish that Valenciano harbored any ill-will against appellant or that he had reasons to fabricate his testimony. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption is that the witness was not moved by any ill-will and was untainted by bias, and thus worthy of belief and credence. Furthermore, appellant’s immediate departure from the scene of the crime and successful effort to elude arrest until his apprehension more than five years later are not consistent with his claim of innocence. Flight from the scene of the crime and failure to immediately surrender militate against appellant’s contention of innocence "since an innocent person will not hesitate to take prompt and necessary action to exonerate himself of the crime imputed to him." Under these circumstances, the rule that "where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both the victim and the accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where no improper motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused, then his version of the story deserves much weight," thus applies. The Court is therefore convinced that appellant’s culpability for the killing of the victim was duly established by the testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Valenciano.

ROY D. PASOS v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION G.R. No. 192394, July 03, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. When a party files an appeal bond amounting to at least 90% of the amount it was adjudged to pay, such payment can be considered as substantial compliance. The bond requirement on appeals may be relaxed when there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC or when the appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond. FACTS: Petitioner started working for respondent on April 26, 1996. He was designated as Clerk II (Accounting) and was assigned to NAIA-II Project. His employment was extended until August 4, 1998 instead of the stipulated date, June 25, 1996. On February 23, 1999, petition was again hired by PNCC as Accounting Clerk and was assigned to the SM Project. Said appointment, however, did not specify the date when his employment will end; it only stated that it will be coterminus with the completion of the project. Despite the termination of his employment on October 19, 2000, petitioner claims that his superior instructed him to report for work the following day, intimating to him that he will again be employed for the succeeding SM projects. For purposes of reemployment, he then underwent a medical examination which allegedly revealed that he had pneumonitis. Petitioner was advised by PNCC’s physician, Dr. Arthur C. Obena, to take a 14-day sick leave. On November 27, 2000, after serving his sick leave, petitioner claims that he was again referred for medical examination where it was revealed that he contracted Koch’s disease. He was then required to take a 60-day leave of absence. The following day, he submitted his application for sick leave but PNCC’s Project Personnel Officer, Mr. R.S. Sanchez, told him that he was not entitled to sick leave because he was not a regular employee. Petitioner still served a 60-day sick leave. When he returned for work, he was informed that his services were already terminated on October 19, 2000 and he was already replaced due to expiration of his contract. This prompted petitioner on February 18, 2003 to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against PNCC with a prayer for reinstatement and back wages. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and ordered PNCC to pay petitioner back wages amounting toP422,630.41 and separation pay of P37,662 or a total of P460,292.41. PNCC then filed an appeal bond amounting to P422,630.41 or at least 90% of the adjudged amount. The NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the LA. As to the procedural issues raised before it, NLRC ruled that there was substantial compliance as to the appeal bond and that Mr. Erece, Jr. was the proper person to represent PNCC, despite the lack of any board resolution authorizing him to do so. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari but the appellate court dismissed the same for lack of merit. Hence this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether an appeal should be dismissed outright if the appeal bond filed is less than the adjudged amount. 2. Whether the head of the personnel department sign the verification and certification on behalf of the corporation sans any board resolution or secretary’s certificate

authorizing such officer to do the same. RULING: The petition is granted. There is substantial compliance as to the requirement of an appeal bond. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory. As provided in Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, in case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. However, the Court has relaxed this requirement in a number of cases in order to bring about the immediate and appropriate resolution of cases on the merits. In Ong v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the bond requirement on appeals may be relaxed when there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC or when the appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond. The Court held that "while the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond." In the instant case, when the PNCC filed an appeal bond amounting to P422,630.41 or at least 90% of the amount it was ordered to pay by the LA, there is no question that this is substantial compliance with the requirement that allows relaxation of the rules. Validity of the verification and certification signed by a corporate officer on behalf of the corporation without the requisite board resolution or secretary’s certificate An individual corporate officer cannot exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors pursuant to Section 23, in relation to Section 25 of the Corporation Code which clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. However, in many cases the Court recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum-shopping. The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case. While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition."

In the present case, the Court recognizes the authority of Mr. Erece, Jr. to sign the verification and certification on behalf of PNCC sans a board resolution or secretary’s certificate as allowed in Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan. In Pfizer, the Court ruled as valid the verification signed by an employment specialist as she was in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition despite the fact that no board resolution authorizing her was ever submitted by Pfizer, Inc. even belatedly. Even assuming that the verification in the appeal filed by PNCC is defective, it is well settled that rules of procedure in labor cases maybe relaxed. As provided in Article 221 of the Labor Code, as amended, "rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process." Moreover, the requirement of verification is merely formal and not jurisdictional.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ, ROLANDO L. LONTOC, SR. et al. G.R. No. 172206, July 03, 2013 J. Peralta When the Office of the Ombudsman decides on a case, the Court of Appeals has no authority nor discretion to stay such decision as this would tantamount to an encroachment on the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman under the Constitution, and Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure. FACTS: On August 18, 2005, the BSU-BOR received an Order from Deputy Ombudsman Victor Fernandez directing the former to enforce the aforementioned Office of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution. Pursuant to said Order, the BSU-BOR issued Resolution No. 18, series of 2005 resolving to implement the Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, herein respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 4 (RTC), against the BSU-BOR. The gist of the petition before the RTC is that the BSU-BOR should be enjoined from enforcing the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution because the same are still on appeal and, therefore, are not yet final and executory. The RTC ordered the dismissal of herein respondents' petition for injunction on the ground of lack of cause of action. The CA issued a Resolution granting respondents' prayer for a temporary restraining order enjoining the BSU-BOR from enforcing its Resolution No. 18, series of 2005. Thereafter, on March 7, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order, with the Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order attached thereto. On April 7, 2006, the CA denied the Ombudsman's Motion to Recall the TRO and granted appellant’s Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The CA further conditioned that the writ be issued upon the posting by the appellants of an Injunction Bond, enjoining the Board of Regents of BSU, and all other persons and agents acting under its command authority, pending the complete resolution of the appeal. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Batangas State University Board of Regents (BSU-BOR) could validly enforce the Office of the Ombudsman’s Joint Decision dated February 14, 2005 and Supplemental Resolution dated July 12, 2005, finding respondents guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and imposing the penalty of dismissal from service with its accessory penalties, despite the fact that said Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution are pending appeal before the CA. RULING:

The petition is granted. The CA should have allowed the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal pending with the lower court. The wisdom of this course of action has been exhaustively explained in Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego: "2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the right to seek redress on the apparently erroneous issuance by this Honorable Court of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision x x x." In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the Office of the Ombudsman correctly summed up its legal interest in the matter in controversy. In support of its claim, it invoked its role as a constitutionally mandated "protector of the people," a disciplinary authority vested with quasi-judicial function to resolve administrative disciplinary cases against public officials. To hold otherwise would have been tantamount to abdicating its salutary functions as the guardian of public trust and accountability. It is true that under the rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court after a consideration of the appropriate circumstances. However, such discretion is not without limitations. One of the limits in the exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and the Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the Ombudsman's powers as provided in the Constitution and RA 6770. Here, since its power to ensure enforcement of its Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution is in danger of being impaired, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in defending its right to have its judgment carried out. The CA patently erred in denying the Office of the Ombudsman's motion for intervention. Note that for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following essential requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and, (3) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the present case, the right of respondents cannot be said to be clear and unmistakable, because the prevailing jurisprudence is that the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on government employees or officials is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary cases. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against such officer. The Ombudsman's decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately executory pending appeal. It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the CA. This rule is similar to that provided under Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

The ratiocination above also clarifies the application of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The CA, even on terms it may deem just, has no discretion to stay a decision of the Ombudsman, as such procedural matter is governed specifically by the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The CA's issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of dismissal imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an encroachment on the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution, and Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The issuance of an injunctive writ renders nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.

HEIRS OF JOSE FERNANDO v. REYNALDO DE BELEN G.R. No. 186366, July 03, 2013 J. Velasco, Jr. When a party fails to specify the assessed value of the property subject matter of the action, this court to which it was filed, will not acquire jurisdiction over the case. This is because what determines the nature of the action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. FACTS: Petitioners are the children of the late Jose and they are in the process of partitioning their inheritance. However, they could not properly accomplish the partition due to the presence of the respondent who intruded into a portion of their property located in Bulacan and conducted quarrying operations in its immediate vicinity for so many years, without their knowledge and permission. Petitioners wrote a letter to respondent, which was left unheeded and the respondent failed to appear during the barangay conciliation. Thus, a complaint for Recovery of Possession was filed by the petitioners against respondent. Instead of filing an Answer, respondent Reynaldo De Belen filed a Motion to Dismiss setting forth the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) lack of cause of action; (3) ambiguity as to the portion of the lot De Belen occupies; and, (4) incomplete statement of material facts, the complaint having failed to state the identity, location and area of the lot sought to be recovered. The motion was denied and the trial court ordered herein petitioners to amend the complaint, which they complied with. Respondent then moved for Bill of Particulars, specifically questioning the legal basis for the complaint since the entire property appears to be co-owned by Jose and Antonia Fernando and it was not particularized in the complaint as to what specific portion belongs to each of the co-owners. In addition, the respondent, in his Answer, claimed that even the Bill of Particulars did not clearly show the exact identity, personal circumstances and relationship of the individual heirs of the decedent, location, area and size of the subject property. Also, prescription, estoppel and laches had set in as against the petitioners. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The CA set aside the decision of the RTC for want of jurisdiction and declaring further that the Amended Complaint must be dismissed. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction for failure to allege in the complaint the assessed value of the subject property. RULING:

The petition is granted. Instant complaint for Recovery of Possession failed to specify the assessed value of the property subject matter of the action. “What determines the nature of the action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.” The allegations in the complaint and the relief sought by the party determine the nature of the action if the title or designation is not clear. The complaint, in the case at bar, is bereft of any allegation which discloses the assessed value of the property subject matter thereof. The court a quo therefore, did not acquire jurisdiction over instant action. The Amended Complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Furthermore, after the entire proceedings fully participated in by the respondent, he cannot be allowed to question the result as having been rendered without jurisdiction. This is the teaching in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, et al. as reiterated in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc., where the Court ruled: “While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, “this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened.” In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered.”

ALFREDO C. LIM, JR. v. SPOUSES TITO S. LAZARO and CARMEN T. LAZARO G.R. No. 185734, July 03, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe When the parties executed a compromise agreement, such agreement does not extinguish the obligation of the debtor; hence, the attachment to his property should continue to subsist such obligation is fully complied with. While the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law. FACTS: On August 22, 2005, Lim, Jr. filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC, seeking to recover from respondents-spouses Lazaro the sum of P2,160,000.00, which represented the amounts stated in several dishonored checks issued by the latter to the former. The RTC granted and subsequently issued the writ of preliminary attachment. In this accord, three (3) parcels of land registered in the names of Sps. Lazaro were levied upon. On September 22, 2006, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement which was approved by the RTC. In said compromise agreement, Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim, Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis, following a schedule of payments covering the period from September 2006 until October 2013, under the following terms, among others: (a) that should the financial condition of Sps. Lazaro improve, the monthly installments shall be increased in order to hasten the full payment of the entire obligation; and (b) that Sps. Lazaro’s failure to pay any installment due or the dishonor of any of the postdated checks delivered in payment thereof shall make the whole obligation immediately due and demandable. Subsequently, the Sps. Lazaro filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to lift the writ of preliminary attachment, which the RTC granted and ordered the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the writ’s annotation on the subject TCTs. It ruled that since the case had already been considered closed and terminated, the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted and quashed. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether the writ of preliminary attachment was properly lifted. RULING: The petition is granted. By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also

availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected. In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law. Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper. Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement, the obligations thereunder have yet to be fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should have continued to subsist. In fine, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment subject of this case should be restored and its annotation revived in the subject TCTs, re-vesting unto Lim, Jr. his preferential lien over the properties covered by the same as it were before the cancellation of the said writ. Lest it be misunderstood, the lien or security obtained by an attachment even before judgment, is in the nature of a vested interest which affords specific security for the satisfaction of the debt put in suit.

LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS v. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DR. ANDRESS NAVARRO, JR. G.R. No. 198240, July 03, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. When a witness takes participation in a case, it is only mandated that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an exception. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. FACTS: Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the lots left behind by the deceased Spouses Navarro. Respondents based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr., the father of the respondents and brother of the petitioner. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The examination, conducted by PO2 Alvarez, resolved that the signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not by one and the same person. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation. After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right to due process since no notice was given to them before the examination was conducted. The RTC granted respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarez’s supposed testimony would be hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness, because her testimony is not yet needed. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the sisters. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in not ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness RULING: The petition is granted. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court has held that a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged communication. In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, the Court has held that the specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called. There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an exception. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception to others. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit: SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s testimony should not have been considered as hearsay. Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion. But the RTC already ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her

testimony is offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances, the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the RTC ruling.

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY ALVARO YPON, et al. v. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE, ETC, ET.AL. G.R. No. 198680, July 08, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe The allegation that the petitioners are the lawful heirs is not sufficient to be entitled to the relief. There is a need to institute a separate special proceeding for heirship before the said heirs can be considered real parties-in-interest and without such, any complaint instituted by them shall not prosper for failure to state a cause of action. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. FACTS: On July 29, 2010 petitioners filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages against respondent. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon died intestate and childless, thereby leaving behind lots. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, respondent executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the titles in Magdaleno’s name, leading to the subsequent transfer to his name, to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest. In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by documents and that by way of affirmative dfense, he claimed that petitioners have no cause of action against him (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against respondent. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding, this does not mean that they could be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court. Aggrieved, the petitioners sought direct recourse to the Supreme Court. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state cause of action was proper. RULING: The petition is denied. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations

in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened. In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of the case.

HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA, SR. v. PABLO R. MIRANDA G.R. No. 179638, July 08, 2013 J. Mendoza A party aggrieved by a decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the decision, but only insofar as the merits of the action for revival is concerned. The original judgment, which is already final and executory, may no longer be reversed, altered, or modified. An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. It is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. FACTS: In 1994, petitioners filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa a Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance against the heirs of Pedro Miranda, the heir of Tranquilino Miranda and the spouses respondent Pablo Miranda and Aida Lorenzo. The RTC rendered a decision upholding the validity of the titles and ordered Pablo Miranda to indemnify all other heirs of Numeriano Miranda the amount equivalent to 12/13 fair market value of the co-owned residential house. The petitioners did not file any appeal hence the decision of the RTC became final and executor. On December 11, 2001 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution which, however, was not implemented. On July 8, 2005, respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue a “Break-Open and Demolition Order" in order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property. But since more than five years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion. This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a Petitionfor Revival of Judgment. Petitioners opposed the revival of judgment assailing, among others, the jurisdiction of the RTC to take cognizance of the Petition for Revival of Judgment. On June 20, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision granting the Petition. On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC, which was opposed by respondent on the ground that the Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and executory. Petitioners, in turn, moved for the transmittal of the original records of the case to the CA, insisting that respondent’s opposition is without merit. The RTC denied the Notice of Appeal. Petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with the CA, which was denied and the appeal is dismissed for having been filed out of time. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA. ISSUES: 1. Whether the appeal was perfected on time; 2. Whether the action to revive judgment is appealable; 3. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for Revival of Judgment RULING: The petition is denied. The Notice of Appeal was belatedly filed

It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed "within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from." Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that "the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;" instead, "the date of actual receipt by the court is deemed the date of filing of that pleading." Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time. Only the merits of the action for revival may be appealed An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. It is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. As such, a party aggrieved by a decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the decision, but only insofar as the merits of the action for revival is concerned. The original judgment, which is already final and executory, may no longer be reversed, altered, or modified. In this case, petitioners assail the Decision dated August 30, 1999, which is the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced by respondent. Considering that the said Decision had already attained finality, petitioners may no longer question its correctness. As the Court stated, only the merits of the action for revival may be appealed, not the merits of the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. RTC has jurisdiction over the Petition for Revival of Judgment As to whether the RTC has jurisdiction, the Court rules in the affirmative. An action for revival of judgment may be filed either "in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general." In this case, respondent filed the Petition for Revival of Judgment in the same court which rendered the Decision dated August 30, 1999. Hence, the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition.

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. FEDERICO A. SERRA G.R. No. 203241, July 10, 2013 J. Carpio When there is a delay in the execution of the decision caused by the respondent for his own advantage, the five-year period to enforce the same shall be suspended. The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in. This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage. FACTS: On 20 May 1975, Serra and petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy, wherein Serra agreed to lease his land to RCBC for 25 years. Serra further granted RCBC the option to buy the land and improvement within 10 years from the signing of the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy. However, when RCBC informed Serra of its decision to exercise its option to buy the property but Serra replied that he was no longer interested in selling the property, which then prompted RCBC to file a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Serra in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (Specific Performance case). The RTC Makati initially dismissed the complaint. However, it subsequently reversed itself and ordered Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC. Serra then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). On 18 May 1989, Serra donated the property to his mother, who then sold the property to Hermanito Liok (Liok). A new land title was issued in favor of Liok. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Nullification of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with Reconveyance and Damages against Liok, Ablao and Serra (Annulment case) before the RTC of Masbate City. Meanwhile, the CA, and later the Supreme Court, affirmed the order of the RTC Makati in the Specific Performance case. The Supreme Court declared that the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy was valid, effective, and enforceable. Such decision became final and executory upon entry of judgment. On 22 October 2001, the RTC Masbate ruled in favor of RCBC. The CA affirmed the RTC Masbate decision. Thus, Liok filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, while Serra and Ablao filed a Petition for Certiorari, before the Supreme Court. In separate Resolutions, the Court found neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion on the CA’s part. On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of the decision in the Specific Performance case. RCBC alleged that it was legally impossible to ask for the execution of the decision prior to the annulment of the fraudulent transfers made by Serra. Thus, the period to execute by motion was suspended during the pendency of the Annulment case. The RTC Makati denied RCBC’s motion for execution. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:

Whether or not the court a quo erred in holding that petitioner RCBC is barred from having its 05 January 1989 Decision executed through Motion, considering that under the circumstances obtaining in this case, RCBC was unlawfully prevented by the respondent from enforcing the said decision. RULING: The petition is granted. The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in. This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage. In the present case, it is clear that the delay in the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the Annulment case effectively suspended the five-year period to enforce through a motion the decision in the Specific Performance case. Since the decision in the Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and RCBC’s motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBC’s motion is deemed filed within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision through a motion. This Court has reiterated that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on its rights, RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of technicality. While strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.

FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR. v. LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN, et al. G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013 J. Mendoza When petitioner files a claim for attorney’s fees, he may do such as an incident in the main action or have it instituted in a separate action. While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. FACTS: Petitioner is the legal counsel of the spouses De Guzman in a 1990 case of annulment of contract and recovery of possession. While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, the spouses died in a vehicular accident and were substituted by their children, the respondents herein. On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He alleged, among others, that he had a verbal agreement with the deceased Spouses de Guzman that he would get 25% of the market value of the subject land if the complaint filed against them by Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he had successfully represented them, respondents refused his written demand for payment of the contracted attorney’s fees. The RTC denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that it was filed out of time. The RTC stated that the said motion was filed after the judgment rendered in the subject case, as affirmed by the SC, had long become final and executory on October 31, 2007. The RTC wrote that considering that the motion was filed too late, it had already lost jurisdiction over the case because a final decision could not be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes. There would be a variance of the judgment rendered if his claim for attorney’s fees would still be included. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether the trial court committed a reversible error in denying the motion to determine attorney’s fees on the ground that it lost jurisdiction over the case since the judgment in the case has become final and executory; 2. Whether the trial court seriously erred in declaring that petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees would result in a variance of the judgment that has long become final and executory; 3. Whether the trial court erred in not declaring that the finality of the decision did not bar petitioner from filing the motion to recover his attorney’s fees. RULING: The petition is granted.

It is well settled that a claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action. With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s fees only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client. It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award’s complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court. In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an incident in the main action, which is permitted by the rules. As to the timeliness of the filing, this Court holds that the questioned motion to determine attorney’s fees was seasonably filed. There is no dispute that petitioner filed his Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees about one (1) year and eleven (11) months from the finality of the RTC decision. Because petitioner claims to have had an oral contract of attorney’s fees with the deceased spouses, Article 1145 of the Civil Code allows him a period of six (6) years within which to file an action to recover professional fees for services rendered. Respondents never asserted or provided any evidence that Spouses de Guzman refused petitioner’s legal representation. For this reason, petitioner’s cause of action began to run only from the time the respondents refused to pay him his attorney’s fees.

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 161075. JULY 15, 2013 J. BERSAMIN An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused. FACTS: Rafael Consing, Jr. was charged with estafa through falsification.

Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land under the name of de la Cruz. In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc., a joint venture partner of Unicapital. Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. The title held by De la Cruz was spurious. Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands. Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document against Consing and de la Cruz Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the civil cases. The RTC issued an order suspending the criminal proceedings on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. The RTC order was questioned via petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari holding that the resolution of the civil case is prejudicial to the criminal cases. ISSUE: Whether or not the existence of pending civil cases a prejudicial question with regards to the Criminal Proceedings RULING: Petition granted. The Criminal Proceedings should continue Between the civil and criminal case: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions in controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) involved are identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in question are identical; and (6) the issue of private respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions is identical in all the proceedings. In the case at bar, The Supreme Court finds no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) is for Injunctive Relief is whether or not Consing merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), is for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the

questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.

ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ, in her capacity as then Administrator of POEA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented by CHAIRMAN REYNALDO VILLAR and COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.. G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe When the commission, having no knowledge of a prior dismissal, fixes the reckoning point of the period of disallowance at an erroneous date, it does not tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. FACTS: Labrador was the former Chief of the POEA’s Employment Services Regulation Division (ESRD). On May 2, 1997, then Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Quisumbing) ordered his dismissal from service as he was found to have bribed an overseas Filipino worker. Labrador’s dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Aside from the administrative proceedings, a criminal case for direct bribery was instituted against Labrador in view of the same infraction. Consequently, on August 31, 1999, the Sandiganbayan (SB) promulgated a Decision, convicting him of the aforementioned crime. Labrador’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to elevate the matter to the Court. The Court affirmed Labrador’s conviction and subsequently denied his motion for reconsideration with finality. Likewise, the Court denied Labrador’s motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration with motion for new trial and prayer for referral to the Court En Banc, resulting to the Resolution’s entry of judgment. On October 26, 2000, the SB received copies of the same resolution and its corresponding entry of judgment. As such, the SB immediately set the case for this purpose. On February 26, 2001, Labrador’s counsel de oficio manifested in open court that Labrador desires to apply for probation. Eventually, upon favorable recommendation of the Parole and Probation Office, the SB granted Labrador’s application for probation and likewise cancelled the bail bond he posted for his provisional liberty. Thereafter, at the end of Labrador’s probation period, it was recommended that his probation be terminated and that he be discharged from its legal effects. The SB, however, withheld its approval and, instead, issued a Resolution stating that Labrador’s application for probation was, in fact, erroneously granted due to his previous appeal from his judgment of conviction, in violation of Section 4 of the Probation Law. On February 7, 2005, COA State Auditor IV Escurel, issued a COA Audit Memo which contained her audit observations on the various expenditures of the POEA pertaining to the payment of salaries and benefits to Labrador for the period covering August 31, 1999 to March 15, 2004. It questioned why Mr. Leonel Labrador was allowed to continue in the service and receive his salaries and other personal benefits when pursuant to the August 31, 1999 judgment of conviction, which had long become final and executory, Mr. Labrador is considered

terminated from the service and is no longer entitled to continue to draw his salaries thereafter up to March 15, 2004. Thus, COA issued a Notice of Disallowance finding Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA employees, personally liable for the salaries and other benefits unduly received by Labrador. Dimapilis-Baldoz sought the reconsideration of the Notice of Disallowance, asserting that the POEA should not be held liable for the refund of the foregoing amount since Labrador's employment was fully and promptly terminated upon receipt of the SB’s Resolution. However, on October 29, 2009, the COA issued a decision which affirmed the Notice of Disallowance. The COA pointed out that Labrador should not have reported for work while he was under probation since his probation did not obliterate the crime for which he was convicted, more so his penalty of dismissal from the service. The POEA moved for the reconsideration however, it was no longer entertained in view of the issuance by the COA Secretary of a Notice of Finality of Decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether grave abuse of discretion attended the COA’s disallowance in this case. RULING: The petition is partly granted. Significant to the determination of the appropriate period of the disallowance is the undisputed fact that, pursuant to an order issued by then Labor Secretary Quisumbing, Labrador had already been made to suffer the administrative penalty of dismissal from service on May 2, 1997, which was long before the SB convicted him of direct bribery on August 31, 1999. As a matter of law, a department secretary’s decision confirming the removal of an officer under his authority is immediately executory, even pending further remedy by the dismissed public officer. As to the immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against petitioners, the same is authorized by Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive Oder No. 292, thus: "The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned." Hence, based on these authorities, then Labor Secretary Quisumbing’s order of dismissal in this case should have also been executed immediately upon its issuance. In this accord, Labrador should not have been allowed to report for work from such date, much less receive any salary or benefit accruing from his previous post. At this juncture, it is well to note that neither the grant nor subsequent revocation of Labrador’s probation should hold any relevance to his disqualification from office. As correctly

argued by the COA, the grant of probation does not justify a public employee’s retention in the government service. Thus, irrespective of the incidents concerning Labrador’s probation, the concomitant effects of his conviction, more significantly, his disqualification to hold public office, were already left for him to suffer at the time the SB’s August 31, 1999 Decision became final and executory. Jurisprudence instructs that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. Applying these principles to the case at bar, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COA in fixing the reckoning point of the period of disallowance at May 3, 2000, since records are bereft of any showing that it had any knowledge of Labrador’s prior dismissal on May 2, 1997. To hold otherwise would be simply antithetical to the concept of grave abuse of discretion, much less countenance a speculative endeavor. Be that as it may, the Court cannot, nevertheless, sanction the erroneous finding that the disallowance of the POEA’s illegal disbursements to Labrador should only be reckoned from May 3, 2000 when he was, in fact, already dismissed as early as May 2, 1997. The salaries of government employees clearly constitute public funds which should, at all times, be properly accounted for. In this relation, the Constitution vests the COA with the primary responsibility to ensure that any irregularity in the disbursement of the same is cleared, or any attendant illegality be proscribed. Yet, when a significant fact which would impact this process is missed – as in this case, the May 2, 1997 dismissal of Labrador – the public nature of the above-mentioned interests impels the Court to judiciously mind the COA of such fact if only to aid the latter to fulfill its constitutional mandate as well as to avert any loss on the part of the government. The COA must correct its previous issuances in this case in order to reflect the actual date of Labrador’s dismissal which would also be the proper reckoning point of the period of disallowance. NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, et. al. v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et. al. G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. When a party assails the legality of an official act, he must first establish that he has a direct and personal interest. Not only should they show that the act is invalid but they must sustain that they may suffer as a result of its enforcement. Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. FACTS: On January 30, 2007 a joint meeting of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees was held to discuss, among others, the evaluation of the 2009 Order of National Artists and the convening of the National Artist Award Secretariat. The nomination

period was set for September 2007 to December 31, 2007, which was later extended to February 28, 2008. The pre-screening of nominations was held from January to March 2008. On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. A total of 87 nominees were considered during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist of 32 names was compiled. On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel purportedly composed of an entirely new set of Council of Experts met and shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the preliminary shortlist. On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was conducted. From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a final list of four names was agreed upon.22 The final list, according to rank, follows: Name

Art Field/Category

Number of Votes

Manuel Conde (+)

Film and Broadcast Arts (Film)

26

Ramon Santos

Music

19

Lazaro Francisco (+)

Literature

15

Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz

Visual Arts

15

On May 6, 2009, a letter, signed jointly by the Chairperson of the NCCA, Undersecretary Vilma Labrador, and the President and Artistic Director of the CCP, Mr. Nestor Jardin, was sent to the President.23 The letter stated, thus: According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Mañosa and Jose Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and invited resource persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees. The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo recommending the conferment of the Order of National Artists on the four recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on private respondents GuidoteAlvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009. Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that the Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno be enjoined and declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. In a Resolution dated August 25, 2009, the Court issued a status quo order enjoining "public respondents" "from conferring the rank and title of the Order of National Artists on private

respondents; from releasing the cash awards that accompany such conferment and recognition; and from holding the acknowledgment ceremonies for recognition of the private respondents as National Artists." ISSUE: Whether the proclamation of respondents as National Artists is valid. RULING: The petition is denied. Standing of the Petitioners Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official act must have a direct and personal interest. They must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that they sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite way. In this case, the Court finds that the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or privilege to which they are entitled as members of the Order of National Artists as a result of the conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. In particular, they will be denied the privilege of exclusive membership in the Order of National Artists. Among the other petitioners, Prof. Gemino Abad presents a unique valid personal and substantial interest. Like respondents Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, he was among the 87 nominees for the 2009 Order of National Artists. Like respondent Moreno, he made it to the preliminary shortlist. As he did not make it to the second shortlist, he was not considered by the Final Deliberation Panel, more so by the former President. It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Mañosa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists. The Committee on Honors and the former President effectively treated respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as a preferred class. The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position. The undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into effect. While

petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is entitled to be given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abad’s right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case. As regards the other concerned artists and academics as well as the CAP, their claim of deep concern for the preservation of the country’s rich cultural and artistic heritage, while laudable, falls short of the injury in fact requirement of standing. Their assertion constitutes a generalized grievance shared in a substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens. Nor can they take refuge in their status as taxpayers as the case does not involve any illegal appropriation or taxation. A taxpayer’s suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of the Congress. Propriety of the Remedies It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are preventive and, as such, cannot be availed of to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. Where the act sought to be prohibited or enjoined has already been accomplished or consummated, prohibition or injunction becomes moot. Nevertheless, even if the principal issue is already moot, this Court may still resolve its merits for the future guidance of both bench and bar. Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." More than being a teaching moment, this is not the first time that the Order of National Artists was conferred in the manner that is being assailed in this case. 72 If not addressed here and now, there is great probability that the central question involved in this case will haunt us again in the future. Every President may invoke absolute presidential prerogative and thrust upon us National Artists after his or her own heart, in total disregard of the advise of the CCP and the NCCA and the voice of the community of artists, resulting to repeated episodes of indignation and uproar from the artists and the public. Furthermore, if not corrected, such an act would give rise to mischief and dangerous precedent whereby those in the corridors of power could avoid judicial intervention and review by merely speedily and stealthily completing the commission of an illegality. JOYCE V. ARDIENTE v. SPOUSES JAVIER and MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CDO WATER DISTRICT and GASPAR GONZALEZ, JR. G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013 J. Peralta Co-parties before the RTC and CA cannot be made adversary parties in a petition for review on certiorari. There is no basis to treat the co-parties as such when it cannot be shown that there was a cross-claim filed against said co-parties. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a crossclaim against her co-defendants before the RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present petition. FACTS:

Petitioner Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement selling, transferring and conveying in favor of respondent Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of P70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation that the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994. For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed until on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to complain, she was told that she was delinquent for three (3) months and that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off. On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills. On the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain who authorized the cutting of the water line. The COWD reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off. Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Ma. Theresa. Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez then filed an appeal with the CA. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that petitioner has a "legal duty to honor the possession and use of water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement" and "that when petitioner applied for its disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and injury to Ma. Theresa. As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give a notice of disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the spouses Pastorfide.” COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the finding that the CA did not commit any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition was denied. COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied with finality. Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition against the Spouses Javier, Ma. Theresa, CDO Water District and Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr. ISSUES: Whether the petitioner’s co-defendants before the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA can be her adversary parties in the instant petition for review on certiorari RULING: Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on the part of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to do so, considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present petition.

More importantly, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court was already denied with finality on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed CA Decision final and executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are already precluded from participating in the present petition. They cannot resurrect their lost cause by filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the same prayer in their previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA. CAROLINA B. JOSE v. PURITA SUAREZ G.R. No. 17611 July 17, 2013 J. Abad When a trial court merely denied a motion for being “unmeritorious” without further elaborating on the bases of its conclusion, it then fails to perform its bounden-duty to make an independent evaluation of the merits of the case. Such failure of the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. FACTS: Carolina filed two Affidavit-Complaints for estafa against Purita before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu, one concerning 14 Chinabank checks totalling P1.5 million 8 and the other pertaining to 10 Chinabank checks in the aggregate amount of P2.1 million. She claimed that on April 26, 2004, Purita went to her house because the latter needed cash for her business. Carolina gave Purita the cash she needed provided she would pay interest at 5% monthly. In exchange for the cash, Purita issued checks all dated April 27, 2004. However, the checks were dishonored upon presentment. Hence, the complaint for estafa. The City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Purita for estafa. Stressing that her transactions with Carolina did not constitute estafa, Purita promptly filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). The The DOJ reversed and set aside the Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor. Pursuant to the DOJ’s directive, City Prosecutor Nicolas C. Sellon moved for the withdrawal of the Information before the RTC. However, the RTC denied the Motion to Withdraw Information. When Purita moved for reconsideration, the RTC issued another Order denied such motion. The CA ruled that the RTC Judge failed to personally assess or evaluate the Resolution of the DOJ. Upholding the DOJ’s ruling that there is no probable cause to indict Purita for estafa, the CA also held that the matter is the proper subject of a civil case as the parties engaged themselves in a contract of loan. Carolina pleaded for reconsideration and argued that the RTC’s own evaluation of a prima facie case for estafa is a matter that is within the trial court’s jurisdiction that should not be disturbed by the CA. The CA, however, rejected this claim. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA committed error in reversing the Orders of the RTC which adjudged to maintain the estafa charge against Purita. RULING: The petition is partly granted.

When a trial court is confronted to rule on “a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information”, it is its “bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion.” As aptly observed by the CA, the RTC’s Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Information failed to state cogent reasons behind the said court’s refusal to grant withdrawal of the Information. The RTC simply declared that it was denying the motion for being “unmeritorious,” without further elaborating on the bases of its conclusion. Likewise, in its Order reiterating its denial of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC merely stated that the 5% interest is a matter of defense. There was never any discussion as to how it reached such conclusion, or how the DOJ findings impacted on its ruling. And instead of confronting the reasons stated in the motion for the withdrawal of the Information, the RTC digressed and focused solely on what constitutes estafa involving bouncing checks. Hence, it is plain from the said Orders that the RTC failed to perform its bounden-duty to make an independent evaluation of the merits of the case. The CA did not therefore err in declaring that such failure of the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Thus, the Court deems it proper to remand this case to the RTC. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013 J. Peralta When a party files a motion to quash information for bigamy based on the trial court’s declaration that his marriage is null and void ab initio, the same cannot be granted. A motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. FACTS: On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina). On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon). Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina. She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy. On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in Information for Bigamy. Respondent filed an Omnibus Motion praying that he be allowed to present evidence to support his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.

On September 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying respondent’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of bigamy. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, which the appellate court granted. The CA concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge an offense. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA committed reversible error when it granted respondent’s petition for certiorari, considering that the subsequent court judgment declaring respondent’s first marriage void ab initio did not extinguish respondent’s criminal liability which already attached prior to said judgment. RULING: The petition is granted. As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its fact. Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed except when the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the crime is wanting. The Family Code has settled once and for all that a declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHRIS CORPUZ y BASBAS G.R. No. 191068, July 17, 2013 J. Perez When a witness fails to positively identify the accused as the victims assailant and that there are inconsistencies between his affidavit and testimony, the same shall not affect his credibility. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters – not to the central fact of the crime – do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses’ declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. FACTS: On 18 January 2001, Chris Corpuz (Corpuz) was charged for the Murder of Gilbert Cerezo with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm in an Information. During the trial, the prosecution’s evidence was primarily taken from the eyewitness account of Romeo Aquino (Aquino). Aquino narrated that Cerezo went to talk to Naning, the daughter of appellant when Corpuz came out of the house and shot the victim. Aquino further stated that he, together with two companions, brought Cerezo to the hospital afterwards. The prosecution also submitted as evidence the Police Blotter Entry as reported by Aquino as well as the police investigation conducted by PO Maramba. On the part of the defense, testimonies of the appellant and his daughter Cristina, also known as “Naning” were offered in evidence. After evaluating the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court found appellant guilty of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm. It noted the Certification issued by the Firearms and Explosives Division of the PNP Camp Crame indicating that the accused is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre. Aggrieved, the appellant assailed the decision on appeal. The Court of Appeals (CA) sustained the trial court’s finding and found the same to be in order. ISSUE: Whether the CA committed reversible error in giving credence to the alleged eyewitness testimony of Aquino, despite the latter’s failure to positively identify the appellant as the victim’s assailant. RULING: The petition is denied. The appellant challenges his conviction by attacking the credibility of prosecution witness Romeo Aquino. According to appellant, the said eyewitness failed to positively identify him as the victim’s assailant. This is aside from the inconsistencies between Aquino’s affidavit submitted to the police and the testimony he made in open court. Well aware that the identity of the offender is crucial in the success of the prosecution of an offense, the Court notes important details that clearly ascertain the appellant as the person responsible for the death of Gilbert Cerezo. For one, it must be pointed out that at the outset, appellant’s identity as Chris Corpuz was already admitted and he was positively identified by

Romeo Aquino during the trial as the person who shot his friend Gilbert Cerezo in the abdomen, while the latter was having a conversation with appellant’s daughter “Naning.” In a straightforward manner, Aquino narrated and demonstrated how appellant shot the victim and where they were positioned vis-a-vis his location at the time of the shooting. He also pointed to the appellant as the person who shot Cerezo with a handgun, causing the latter’s death. This was appreciated by the court a quo which observed the demeanor of Aquino while on the witness stand. At this point, the Court sees no reason to disbelieve his testimony, especially so, that there was no motive on his part to attribute the killing to appellant Corpuz, a neighbour known to him for so long. Also, it is posited that while on the stand, Aquino gave the impression that he saw the act of shooting and not merely heard a gunshot which caused him to look at the direction where it came from. Giving attention to the apparent inconsistency, it was observed that during crossexamination, Aquino insisted that he actually witnessed the shooting and that he was telling the truth. In fact, he was able to demonstrate how the shooting was carried out and the position of appellant Corpuz when he aimed his shot at Cerezo. Furthermore, as aptly cited in People v. Cabtalan, minor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Similarly, as held in the case of People v. Laog, where the appellant also raised the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim, this Court declared: Nonetheless, this matter raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters – not to the central fact of the crime – do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses’ declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. BOBBY “ABEL” AVELINO y BULAWAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 181444, July 17, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. When there are inconsistencies with the testimonies of two witnesses, this does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability and does not ignore the fact that one witness was able to unequivocally identify the accused as the gunman. It cannot be denied that once a person gains familiarity of another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance. FACTS: Petitioner Bobby “Abel” Avelino y Bulawan, together with five co-accused, was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. The prosecution presented eight witnesses: Delia Hispano, the wife of the victim; Diana Espinosa; Alfredo Manalangsang (Manalangsang); Mary Ann Cañada (Cañada); Renato Sosas; Dr. Romeo T. Salen; P/Insp. Mario Prado; and National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent Rizaldi Jaymalin.

On October 5, 2000, around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Alfredo Manalangsang was riding on a tricycle going to Baseco Compound, Tondo, Manila. Since Manalangsang was the last passenger to board the tricycle, he sat behind the driver. Upon reaching a certain point between Muelle Del Rio and 2nd Street, Port Area, Manila, the tricycle which Manalangsang was riding on passed at the left lane instead of the right lane of the road to give way to the ownertype jeep owned by the barangay and driven by its Chairman Generoso Hispano, herein victim. While Chairman Hispano was entering the nearest route near the center island, a man suddenly emerged and blocked Chairman Hispano’s vehicle. Instantaneously, Manalangsang heard bursts of gunshot which prompted him to jump from the tricycle. Manalangsang instinctively hid behind the center island of the road. At this juncture, Manalangsang peeped at the direction of Chairman Hispano’s jeep and saw three (3) men wearing bonnets, two of whom were strategically blocking the jeep of Chairman Hispano. The third man, who was wearing a green jacket and positioned himself near the gutter, fired successive shots at Chairman Hispano and thereafter approached the jeep of Chairman Hispano. He pulled down from the jeep the almost lifeless body of Chairman Hispano. Since Manalangsang was situated near the third assailant, he failed to identify the other two assailants. However, Manalangsang positively identified the third assailant as appellant Bobby “Abel” Avelino, whom he saw stooping down at the Chairman’s body and pulling the opening of his bonnet down to his chin to ascertain if the Chairman was still alive. Sensing that it was safe for him to leave the scene, Manalangsang boarded a tricycle again and went home. Denying the accusation, the defense presented as evidence the testimonies of petitioner, PO2 Anthony P. Galang, Adonis T. Bantiling and Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito D. Cabamongan (Cabamongan). Petitioner advanced the defense of denial and alibi. He testified that on October 5, 2000, he and his wife went to the Land Transportation Office in Pasay City to renew his license as they planned to go to Baguio that day. But as he was issued a temporary license late in the afternoon, instead of going home, he and his wife checked in at the Pharaoh Hotel in Sta. Cruz, Manila to spend the night. He parked his car along Dasmariñas Bridge and slept. Later, he woke up to transfer his car but his car was gone. Thus, he and his wife went to the police station in Sta. Cruz, Manila then to the Anti-Carnapping Unit along U.N. Avenue to report the incident. At the latter location, they learned from a certain Tata Randy, an acquaintance and former police officer, that the victim had been gunned down. Around 1:00 a.m., he and his wife returned to the hotel. On October 23, 2000, he was arrested by agents of the NBI. The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The CA upheld the RTC decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Cañada and disregarding the inconsistencies between the statements of Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the position of the gunman. RULING: The petition is denied.

For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. In this case, the defense failed to establish that it was physically impossible for the petitioner to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Pharaoh Hotel, where petitioner claims to have stayed with his wife at the time of the commission of the crime, is in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The said hotel is not so far from the scene of the crime, which is in Baseco Compound in Tondo, Manila, so as not to afford the petitioner an opportunity to easily go to the place of the shooting at the time Hispano was killed. Indeed, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. These, the defense failed to do. The defense of the petitioner is based, secondly, on his allegations that prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Cañada failed to positively identify him as the gunman who mortally wounded Hispano, and that Manalangsang’s testimony as to the locations and number of gunshot wounds, as well as the position of the gunman, is inconsistent with the physical evidence as provided by the medico-legal officer and the testimony of SOCO PSI Cabamongan. However, these allegations cannot exculpate the petitioner from criminal liability. Manalangsang unequivocally identified the petitioner as the gunman. Manalangsang was able to identify the petitioner because the latter revealed his face when he pulled down the bonnet he was wearing, thereby exposing his eyes, nose, mouth, and chin. Moreover, the certainty of Manalangsang in identifying the petitioner as the one who shot Hispano is bolstered by the fact that he and petitioner were neighbors for five years in Baseco. It cannot be denied that once a person gains familiarity of another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance. The identification made by Manalangsang was likewise sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of Cañada, that she saw the petitioner, with whom she was familiar, drive away in Hispano’s owner-type jeep, wearing a green jacket and black bonnet rolled up to his forehead. Further, as can be gleaned from the excerpt below, the petitioner’s defense that Manalangsang’s testimony contradicts with the medical findings, and should then be disregarded, must fail. Petitioner claims that Manalangsang’s statements that Hispano was shot in a downward direction conflict with the findings of the medico-legal that the trajectory of the bullets is in an upward direction. Clearly, the fact that the trajectory of the bullets is in an upward direction does not negate the veracity of Manalangsang’s statement that Hispano was shot by the gunman from an elevated plane. Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner as the gunman by Manalangsang, as corroborated by Cañada, must stand. Indeed, it has been consistently held by this Court that in criminal cases the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. Absent any showing that the lower courts overlooked substantial facts

and circumstances, which if considered, would change the result of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses, especially since Manalangsang and Cañada’s testimony meets the test of credibility.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO “ANDY” SOMOZA y HANDAYA G.R. No. 197250, July 17, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro The fact that the inventory was made at the accused-appellant’s house and not at the scene of the buy-bust operation did not adversely affect the chain of custody. If it is shown that the illicit drugs seized from accused-appellant are the same illicit drugs marked and subjected to physical inventory then the chain of custody was continuous and the identity, integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs seized from accused-appellant were preserved. FACTS: Two informations were filed against accused-appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Accussed-appellant was arrested after a buy-bust operation was conducted. During such operation, coin purse with six sachets containing powdered crystalline substance was found in his pocket when he was searched. NBI Agent Celon marked the items recovered from the scene immediately after accused-appellant’s apprehension. The remaining sachet bought by PO1 Bautista was marked as "BB-RS-01," the six sachets found in the coin purse as "POS-RS-01" to "POS-RS-06" and the metallic tube as "POS-RS-21 July 05." The marking was witnessed by Kagawad Talavera and media representative Elloren. Accused-appellant was thereafter informed that the law enforcers have a warrant to search his house. He was brought to his house and his place was searched in the presence of Kagawad Talavera and media representative Elloren. However, the search yielded nothing but plastic sachets, lighter and foils. Accused-appellant was subsequently brought to the NBI office for booking and documentation. He was photographed with the seized items in front of him and the incident was entered in the PDEA blotter. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the CA found nothing irregular in the buy-bust operation. The Court of Appeals held that the buy-bust was not affected by the absence of a pre-operation report. The appellate court also rejected accused-appellant’s assertion of a defect in the chain of custody of the drugs taken from him. The failure to make an immediate inventory at the scene of the buy-bust operation was not fatal to the prosecution’s case as all of the prosecution’s witnesses. ISSUE: Whether there is failure on the part of the prosecution to prove accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: The petition is denied.

In this case, the State has discharged the burden of proof required of it. In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must show the chain of custody over the dangerous drug in order to establish the corpus delicti, which is the dangerous drug itself. Such chain of custody should show that the dangerous drug sold by or in the possession of the accused is the same dangerous drug seized from the said accused and taken into custody by the apprehending officer, marked and subjected to physical inventory by the apprehending officer, submitted to the PDEA or PNP forensic laboratory, subjected by the forensic laboratory examiner to laboratory examination the results of which are contained in a sworn certification, and presented to the court as evidence against the accused This is to ensure the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items and preclude the possibility of alteration, tampering or substitution of substance in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug. The Court also finds that there was no break in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs taken from accused-appellant. The prosecution has shown that the illicit drugs seized from accused-appellant are the same illicit drugs marked and subjected to physical inventory. The chain of custody was continuous and the identity, integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs seized from accused-appellant were preserved. The inventory made at accused-appellant’s house and not at the scene of the buy-bust operation did not adversely affect the chain of custody. The fact is that, as witnessed by Kagawad Talavera and media representative Elloren, the illicit drugs taken from accusedappellant were marked in his presence at the scene of the buy-bust operation immediately after his arrest. This marking may be considered as the preliminary phase of the inventory. Indeed, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 which provides for the chain of custody of dangerous drugs seized by law enforcers is silent on the matter of marking of the seized drugs. In particular, its paragraph (1) only speaks of conducting a physical inventory and photographing of the illicit drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation.” "Marking" is the placing by the apprehending officer of some distinguishing signs with his/her initials and signature on the items seized. It helps ensure that the dangerous drugs seized upon apprehension are the same dangerous drugs subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station or at some other practicable venue rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items -- to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence -- should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. As marking is the initial stage of physical inventory, in effect, the physical inventory of the confiscated contraband commenced at the scene of the buy-bust and was completed at the house of accused-appellant. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARVIN CRUZ G.R. No. 201728, July 17, 2013 J. Reyes When the victim commits a mistake in remembering the dates when she was raped, such does not contradict the fact that she did not consent to the sexual act. A rape victim is not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that she

might in fact be trying to obliterate it from her memory. Thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party. FACTS: Accussed-appellant Marvin Cruz (Cruz) was charged in three (3) separate Informations of Violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and two (2) counts of Rape. AAA is a 17-year old college student in St. Columban’s College in Lingayen, Pangasinan. She met Cruz sometime in March 2007 via text messaging through her schoolmate and his cousin Raffy, who gave her mobile number to him. By June 2007, they became sweethearts despite the fact that they still have not personally met. They finally met on October 22, 2007 when Cruz and Raffy visited AAA’s place. It was the version of the incidents that occurred after the two had a relationship that the prosecution and the defense differed. According to the prosecution, Cruz forced himself upon AAA on the three (3) separate incidents complained of, while the defense set up the “sweetheart defense”. The first incident happened on October 23, 2007 when Cruz took advantage of AAA’s dizzy state and forcibly got her naked. He then mounted her and had sexual intercourse with her despite her resistance. On November 1, 2007, AAA broke up with Cruz through a text message. The second and third incidents both occurred on November 6, 2007. Cruz denied AAA’s accusations. He professed his love for AAA and claimed that she consented to the sexual acts. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Cruz for (2) counts of Rape and aquitted him for Violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. According to the RTC, although they were lovers, Cruz failed to prove AAA’s consent to the carnal knowledge. Despite the lapses in AAA’s testimony, the RTC found that it did not detract from her statement that she did not consent to the sexual acts complained of. The CA denied Cruz’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the lapses in AAA’s testimony is sufficient to acquit Cruz. RULING: The appeal is denied. It is well-settled that “the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to the highest respect absent a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.” In the Court’s assessment of the records, there is no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The Court is convinced that the testimony of AAA positively identifying Cruz as the one who sexually abused her is worthy of belief. The clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony of AAA unrelentingly established how Cruz sexually molested her on November 6, 2007 with the use of force, threat and intimidation. Indeed, “a rape victim is not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that she might in fact be trying to obliterate

it from her memory. Thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party.” Cruz’s defense that AAA’s testimony that she received his messages on June 2007 instead of October 2007 is flawed, is immaterial and does not in any way detract from the fact that he raped her several times on November 6, 2007. Moreover, Cruz failed to present any scintilla of evidence to prove that AAA’s testimony was not credible. As to the “sweetheart defense”, it is said that love is not a license for lust. “A love affair does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will.” In this case, Cruz’s argument that they are lovers may be true; however, the sexual incidents between him and AAA on November 6, 2007 have not been proven to be consensual. ANITA MANGILA v. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ET AL. G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013 J. Bersamin When a party is detained for legal reasons, she cannot avail of the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy. The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. FACTS: On June 16, 2003, seven (7) criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC). The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing fees, membership fees and on-line application the private complainants without lawful authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). On the following day, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules. As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the headquarters of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention.

The CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit. Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention. RULING: The petition is denied. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias. The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003, Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by

virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.

DR. ROGER R. POSADAS and DR. ROLANDO P. DAYCO v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 168651 & 169000, July 17, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. When a party files motion for reconsideration which is not set for hearing, it renders the motion without no legal effect. It is considered a pro forma motion which shall not toll the reglementary period of the appeal. This requirement is mandatory Basic is the rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for those motions which the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. FACTS: Petitioner Dr. Posadas is a longtime professor and former Dean of the College of Science at the UP-Diliman Campus. He was appointed by the Board of Regents as UP Diliman Chancellor for a three-year term starting November 1, 1993 and ending on October 31, 1996. On July 26, 1995, Dr. Posadas submitted to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) an Application for Funding of his proposed project entitled "Institutionalization of Technology Management at the University of the Philippines in Diliman" (TMC Project). The TMC Project, to be funded by a grant from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), aimed to design and develop ten new graduate courses in technology management for the diploma, master’s and doctoral programs to be offered by TMC. On November 7, 1995, Dr. Posadas was appointed as Project Director of UP TMC effective September 18, 1995 up to September 17, 1996.In another undated "Contract for Consultancy Services", Dr. Posadas was hired as Consultant for the TMC Project for the same period. As evidenced by disbursement vouchers and admitted by Dr. Posadas, the latter received his "honoraria"(P30,000.00 per month) and consultancy fees (totaling P100,000.00) as Project Director and Consultant of the TMC Project until May 1996 when the Commission on Audit (COA) raised questions on the legality of the said fees.7 In August 1996, payment of the subject "honoraria" and fees was suspended by COA Resident Auditor Romeo J. Pulido who noted that there were deficiencies. In a Memorandum dated September 16, 1996, UP’s Chief Legal Officer Marichu C. Lambino addressed the foregoing concerns of COA Auditor Pulido.Atty. Lambino stated that (a) the compensation received by Dr. Posadas are in the nature of consultancy fees and hence expressly exempted by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) National Compensation Circular (NCC) No. 75 dated March 11, 1995; (b) the TMC Project, being a training program, is likewise exempted from the coverage of NEDA Guidelines on the Procurement of Consulting Services for Government Projects; and (c) under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 43, series of 1993 "Streamlining and Deregulating Human Resource Development Functions" UP is authorized, without prior approval from the CSC, to determine the rates of honorarium for government personnel participating as resource persons, coordinator, and facilitator, in training programs. On the issue of double compensation, Atty.

Lambino pointed out that Dr. Posadas was appointed Project Director because of managerial expertise, and his skills in supervising personnel who are involved in an academic undertaking, and as Consultant because of his expertise in technology management. Finding these explanations/justifications acceptable, Auditor Pulido lifted the notices of suspension in September 1997. However, even before the issuance of the suspension notices, then UP President Dr. Emil Q. Javier, ordered an investigation on the basis of an administrative complaint filed. After the conduct of a preliminary investigation and finding a prima facie case against the petitioners, President Javier issued the formal chargesfor Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority. The ADT found petitioners guilty of serious or grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of dismissal in accordance with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1989, as well as Article 250 of the University Code. The Report likewise stated that the acts of petitioners for which they were held administratively liable may warrant prosecution under Section 3(h) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019. Under the Orderdated August 25, 1998 signed by President Javier, petitioners were dismissed from the service. On September 3, 1998, Atty. Carmelita Yadao-Guno in her capacity as General Counsel of UP formally endorsed the findings and recommendations of the ADT to the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the BOR at its 1126th meeting resolved petitioners’ appeal in the ADT Case. Satisfied with the BOR’s action, petitioners caused the withdrawal of their appeal before the CSC. On June 9, 1999, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of the charges against petitioners for insufficiency of evidence. However, said recommendation was disapproved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto who ordered that petitioners be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(b) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713. The corresponding Informations were thus filed against the petitioners before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case Nos. 25465-66). The Sandiganbayan found both Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied due course for the reason that it has not been set for hearing as required by the rules, hence the motion is pro forma. ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was not set for hearing. RULING: The petition is dismissed. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan requires a motion for reconsideration to be set for hearing, as it provides under Rule VII: SECTION 1. Motion Day. - Except for motions which may be acted upon ex parte, all motions shall be scheduled for hearings on a Friday, or if that day is a non-working holiday, on the next working day.

Motions requiring immediate action may be acted upon on shorter notice. Under the Rules of Sandiganbayan, effective January 10, 1979, a petition for reconsideration of a judgment or final order may be filed upon the grounds, in the form and subject to the requirements, for motions for new trial in criminal cases under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. In the case of Alvarezv. Sandiganbayan, the Court upheld the Sandiganbayan in not considering "the failure of the movant to fix the place, date and time of the hearing of his motion a substantial defect, for instead of giving the motion a short shrift, it set the incident for hearing, and even granted the prosecution ten days from notice within which to oppose/comment." The Court noted what was then the practice of the Sandigabayan itself, rather than the movant, to determine the date and time of hearings of motions. The peculiar circumstances of said case heavily weighed in favor of relaxation of the rules, with the Court’s finding that the evidence presented against the petitioner does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and may not be deemed sufficient to support a conviction. Hence, the Court was not prepared "to declare that petitioner’s omission to set his motion for hearing is so grievous an error as to foreclose the award to him of the relief to which he is otherwise entitled." In any event, the mandatory setting for hearing a motion for reconsideration to reverse or modify a judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan is already settled. A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal. Section 4, Rule 121 states: SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. – The motion for a new trial or reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. x x x. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor. As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec.2 of Rule 37 and Sec. 4 of Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with Sec.5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for those motions which the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. The notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service. This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement renders the motion defective. "As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading." In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing, his motion was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, his motion was properly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan. The Court thus find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Sandiganbayan when it denied due course to petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on the ground that it "has not been set for hearing as required by the rules" and the same is "deemed pro forma."

COALITION OF ASSOCIATION OF SENIOR CITIZEN IN THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC G.R. No. 206844-45/G.R. No. 206982, July 23, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro When the COMELEC reviews the registration of party lists, it must give the latter the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the requirements for the accreditation. However, a formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; Rule 17 of the COMELEC’s Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process. FACTS: The SENIOR CITIZENS party-list participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization failed to get the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast. Thereafter, SENIOR CITIZENS was granted leave to intervene in the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections. In accordance with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organization’s first nominee, served as a member of the House of Representatives. Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, the relevant terms of which the Court quote: After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho). The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after. According to the Datol Group’s petition, the members of SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention on November 27, 2010 in order to address "the unfulfilled commitment of Rep. Arquiza to his constituents." Further, a new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the organization were allegedly elected during the said convention. SENIOR CITIZENS’ third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as the organization’s Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were allied with Rep. Arquiza. Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter rivalry as both groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed leadership of the organization. On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. that the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation, which was accepted by the Coalition. Thereafter, the COMELEC En Banc conducted a hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS petition in E.M. No. 12-040. At the hearing, the counsel for CITIZENS (Arquiza Group) admitted that Rep. Kho’s tender of resignation was made pursuant to the agreement entered into by the organization’s nominees. However, said counsel also stated that the Board of Trustees of the organization reconsidered the acceptance of Rep. Kho’s resignation and the latter was, instead, to complete his term. Also, from the transcript of the hearing, it appears that the Arquiza Group previously manifested that it was

withdrawing its petition, but the same was opposed by the Datol Group and was not acted upon by the COMELEC. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution in E.M. No. 12-040, dismissing the petition of the SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group). It held that the term of office of public officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private parties. Public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject of any private agreement. Public office is vested with public interest that should not be reined by individual interest. In fact, to formalize the policy of disallowing term sharing agreements among party list nominees, the Commission recently promulgated Resolution No. 9366, which provides: "SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. – Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed." Considering all these, the Court finds the term sharing agreement by the nominees of the Senior Citizen’s Party-List null and void. Subsequently, on December 04, 2012, the Commission En Banc disqualified the petitioner SENIOR CITIZENS because of the said term-sharing agreement between its nominees. The Commission En Banc found it to be contrary to public policy. The Court then ordered the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of the petitioner and its Manifestations of Intent to Participate was denied. The petitioner was then removed from the registry and was not allowed to participate as a candidate for the May 13, 2013 Elections and subsequent elections thereafter. On May 13, 2013, the elections proceeded. Despite the earlier declaration of its disqualification, SENIOR CITIZENS still obtained 677,642 votes. Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and its disqualification to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed the instant petitions. ISSUE: Whether respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled petitioner’s certificate of registration/accreditation without due process of law. RULING: The petition is granted. The Arquiza Group argues that no notice and hearing were given to SENIOR CITIZENS for the cancellation of its registration on account of the term-sharing agreement of its nominees. The Arquiza Group maintains that SENIOR CITIZENS was summoned only to a single hearing date in the afternoon of August 24, 2012 and the COMELEC’s review therein focused on the group’s programs, accomplishments, and other related matters. The Arquiza Group asserts that SENIOR CITIZENS was not advised, before or during the hearing, that the issue of the termsharing agreement would constitute a basis for the review of its registration and accreditation. Likewise, the Datol Group faults the COMELEC for cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS without giving the latter the opportunity to show that it

complied with the parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. The Arquiza Group confirms that after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, the COMELEC conducted summary hearings in executive sessions, without informing SENIOR CITIZENS. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 provides for the procedure relative to the review of the registration of party-list organizations. The provision states that the COMELEC may, motu prorprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds provided by the law. Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v. Commission on Elections the concept of due process as applied to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein that: The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below: (1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings. The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process, the Court has consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements

for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence. Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the "duty to give reason" to enable the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the decision-maker In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the requirements for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the termsharing agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organization’s qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of COMELEC, however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the Arquiza Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition asked for the confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the Arquiza group and its subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its petition. Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned them about the complications brought about by their term-sharing agreement. However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and the issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantes’s remonstration was not sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing agreement would be considered as a ground for the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and accreditation.

Furthermore, after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, which remanded, among other cases, the disqualification cases involving SENIOR CITIZENS, said organization should have still been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the matter of the term-sharing agreement, either through a hearing or through written memoranda. Instead, the COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without conducting any further proceedings thereon after its receipt of our Decision in Atong Paglaum. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILS., et al. v. PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe A plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete statement of the present status of any pending case if the latter involves the same issues as the one that was filed. If there is no such similar pending case, Section 5(a) of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath that to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending. FACTS: On December 7, 2004, petitioner Abbott Laboratories offered Alcaraz the position of Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager. In its offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary basis for six months. However, during the course of her employment, Alcaraz experienced difficulties in dealing with the staff. On May 16, 2005, Alcaraz was called to a meeting where she was told that she failed to meet the regularization standards for the position. Thereafter, she was requested to tender her resignation. Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly terminated from her employment and thus, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Abbott and its officers. She contended that while her employment contract stated that she was to be engaged on a probationary status, the same did not indicate the standards on which her regularization would be based. She further averred that the individual petitioners maliciously connived to illegally dismiss her. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Alcaraz’s complaint for lack of merit. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the findings of the LA. In the First CA Petition, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and held that the latter did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration for the First CA Petition, the petitioners filed the Second CA Petition which the CA likewise denied and ruled that the NLRC was correct in upholding the execution of the NLRC Decision. Alcaraz again moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before the LA, which the latter granted. The petitioners then appealed said motion to the NLRC through a Memorandum of Appeal on the ground that the implementation of the LA’s order would render its motion for reconsideration moot and academic. Alcaraz alleges that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping when they filed the Second CA Petition pending the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the decision in the First CA Petition. She contends that petitioners have not complied with the certification requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court when they failed to disclose in the instant petition the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal filed before the NLRC.

ISSUES: Whether petitioners are guilty of forum shopping and have violated the certification requirement under Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. RULING: The petition is denied. Compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt. Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Section 5(b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that a plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete statement of the present status of any pending case if the latter involves the same issues as the one that was filed. If there is no such similar pending case, Section 5(a) of the same rule provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath that to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending. In this case, records show that, except for the element of identity of parties, the elements of forum shopping do not exist. Evidently, the First CA Petition was instituted to question the ruling of the NLRC that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. On the other hand, the Second CA Petition pertains to the propriety of the enforcement of the judgment award pending the resolution of the First CA Petition and the finality of the decision in the labor dispute between Alcaraz and the petitioners. Based on the foregoing, a judgment in the Second CA Petition will not constitute res judicata insofar as the First CA Petition is concerned. Thus, considering that the two petitions clearly cover different subject matters and causes of action, there exists no forum shopping. JOSIELEN LARA CHAN v. JOHNNY T. CHAN G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013 J. Abad When a party to a case wishes to request for subpoena duces tecum, it must be established first that the records would have been offered as evidence for admission in court. Otherwise, such request is premature. Furthermore, Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court.

FACTS: On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation. Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no longer be repaired. During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from “methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.” Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to “be allowed to submit in evidence” the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC. The CA denied Josielene’s petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication. RULING: The petition is denied. Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records of Johnny’s confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in support of her action to have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted her request for subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character of those records. He cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:

SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxxx (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient. The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems. Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecumcovering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation

thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not privileged.” Also, Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides: SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.

PROVINCE OF CAGAYAN, represented by HON. ALVARO T. ANTONIO, et. al. v. JOSEPH LASAM LARA G.R. No. 188500, July 24, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe When a party fails to comply with a pre-requisite mandated by law, he does not therefore acquire any legal right to be protected by an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. FACTS: On September 14, 2007, Lara obtained an Industrial Sand and Gravel Permit (ISAG Permit) from the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), authorizing him to conduct quarrying operations in a twenty-hectare area situated in Barangay Centro, Muncipality of Peñablanca (Peñablanca), Cagayan (Permit Area) and extract and dispose of sand, gravel, and other unconsolidated materials from the Permit Area. For the same purpose, Lara obtained an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the DENR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB). On January 3, 2008, Jovy Balisi (Balisi), Lara’s representative, went to the Cagayan Provincial Treasurer’s Office (Treasurer’s Office) to pay the extraction fee and other fees for

Lara’s quarrying operations but she was directed to first secure an Order of Payment from the Environmental and Natural Resources Officer, petitioner Robert Adap (ENRO Adap). However, when Balisi went to ENRO Adap, the latter refused to issue an Order of Payment. Despite various pleas from Balisi and Atty. Victorio N. Casauay (Atty. Casauay), Lara’s counsel, ENRO Adap remained adamant with his refusal. This prompted Atty. Casauay to tender and deposit the amount of P51,500.00 with the Treasurer’s Office corresponding to the said extraction fee and other related fees. On January 11, 2008, Lara commenced his quarrying operations. Later that day, however, a total of four trucks loaded with sand and gravel extracted from the Permit Area were stopped and impounded by several local officials. Consequently, Lara filed an action for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the said officials, seeking to enjoin the stoppage of his quarrying operations. After due proceedings, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enabling Lara to restart his business. Nonetheless, on March 17, 2008, Lara received a Stoppage from Cagayan Governor Alvaro T. Antonio (Gov. Antonio), directing him to stop his quarrying operations. Hence, Lara filed the present action for injunction and damages with an urgent and ex-parte motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before the RTC. The RTC granted Lara’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction based on a prima facie finding that he is authorized to extract gravel and sand from the Permit Area. The RTC consequently made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction and thus, enjoined petitioners from stopping or disturbing Lara’s quarrying operations. Aggrieved, petitioners sought direct recourse to the Court via the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether the RTC properly issued the permanent injunction subject of this case. RULING: The petition is granted. It is well-settled that a writ of injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2) requisites, namely: (a) the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) acts which are violative of the said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply with all the requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by the local government unit where his business is situated. A governor’s permit is a pre-requisite before one can engage in a quarrying business in Cagayan. Records, however, reveal that Lara admittedly failed to secure the same; hence, he has no right to conduct his quarrying operations within the Permit Area. Consequently, he is not entitled to any injunction.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICORDITO N. DE ASIS, JR. G.R. No. 193874, July 24, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe When a party causes a publication short of the thirty-day period preceding the hearing, there is a mandatory publication notice required under the Rules of Court. The law clearly requires that (a) notice of the petition should be published in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette; and (b) publication should be made at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing. Substantial compliance with this jurisdictional requirement is not enough. FACTS: On August 7, 2002 De Asis filed a verified amended petition for Reconstitution of TCT No. 8240 of the Register of Deeds of QC in the name of his uncle, Lauriano De Asis covering a lot located at Caloocan. De Asis alleged that he purchased the subject property from Lauriano through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 5, 1978 and that the same is free from any encumbrances. Likewise, no deed affecting it has been presented or is pending before the Register of Deeds. Unfortunately, the original copy of TCT No. 8240 was destroyed by the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988, hence, the amended petition based on the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 8240, which was in his possession. Finding the amended petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC scheduled the initial hearing and directed that the Land Registration Authority (LRA), inter alia, be furnished a copy thereof. The RTC likewise ordered that notice of the amended petition be published in the Official Gazette once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks, which was complied with. On January 30, 2003, after compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and without any opposition having been raised, the RTC allowed De Asis to present his evidence ex-parte. Later, on February 7, 2003, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed a notice of appearance and deputized the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to assist the OSG and appear in the case on its behalf, which the RTC noted. On February 20, 2003, upon request of the LRA and in accordance with paragraph 4(a) of LRC Circular No. 35, De Asis was required to submit a certified true copy of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title of the subject property, with which he complied. Subsequently, the LRA Report before the RTC stating that "the technical description of Lot [No.] 804-C of the subdivision plan Psd-2341, appearing on the reproduction of [TCT] No. T-8240, was found correct after examination and due computation. The RTC Ruling The RTC granted the amended petition based on the evidence presented ex parte by De Asis. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, ratiocinating that the thirty-day notice should be reckoned from the date of issue of the Official Gazette, not from the date of its actual release, citing Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26 (RA 26). While the CA conceded the stringent and mandatory nature of the requirement of publication, it however considered the fact that the source of the reconstitution in this case was the owner’s duplicate copy of title in De Asis’ possession, the authenticity of which was never disputed by the Republic. ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC when it granted the amended petition on the basis of non-compliance with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 requiring publication of the notice of hearing in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing, a jurisdictional requisite RULING: The petition is granted. At the outset, the Court notes that the present amended petition for reconstitution is anchored on the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 8240 – a source for reconstitution of title under Section 3(a)29 of RA 26 which, in turn, is governed by the provisions of Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of RA 26 with respect to the publication, posting, and notice requirements. Section 10 reads: SEC. 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act: Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: And, provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act. Corollarily, Section 9 reads in part: SEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may require. x x x. The foregoing provisions, therefore, clearly require that (a) notice of the petition should be published in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette; and (b) publication should be made at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing. Substantial compliance with this jurisdictional requirement is not enough; it bears stressing that the acquisition of jurisdiction over a reconstitution case is hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law. The factual antecedents of this case are undisputed: De Asis caused the publication of the notice of the amended petition in the December 23 and 30, 2002 issues of the Official Gazette. However, the NPO certified that the December 30, 2002 issue was officially released only on January 3, 2003, evidently short of the thirty-day period preceding the January 30, 2003 scheduled hearing. Indubitably, therefore, there was a defect in the mandatory publication of the notice required under Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of RA 26. The purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

Hence, while Section 9 merely required that the notice of the petition should be "published x x x twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette," jurisprudence expressly clarified that "publication" means the actual circulation or release of the issue of the Official Gazette on which the notice of the petition is printed. The law could not have possibly contemplated "publication" independent of its actual dissemination to the public, for whose benefit the requisite of publication is mandated in the first place. For sure, publication without actual circulation of the printed material is worthless. Consequently, the thirty-day period that precedes the scheduled hearing should be reckoned from the time of the actual circulation or release of the last issue of the Official Gazette, and not on the date of its issue as reflected on its front cover. To interpret it otherwise, as the CA had erroneously done in this case, would render nugatory the purposes of publication in reconstitution proceedings, which are to safeguard against spurious and unfounded land ownership claims, to apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action, and to give them enough time to intervene. Otherwise, unscrupulous parties would merely invoke compliance with the requirement of two-time publication in the Official Gazette, without regard to the date of its actual release, as a convenient excuse for their failure to observe the mandatory prerequisite of publication. Moreover, while it is true that the thirty-day period in this case was short by only three (3) days, the principle of substantial compliance cannot apply, as the law requires strict compliance, without which the Court is devoid of authority to pass upon and resolve the petition. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NINOY ROSALES y ESTO G.R. No. 197537, July 24, 2013 J. Perez The victim’s mental retardation does not affect her credibility of her testimony. Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the court. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the court. FACTS: Appellant was charged with rape. The victim, AAA, then 39 years of age, testified that in the morning of 27 June 2004, appellant forced her to go with him to his house located inside a nearby cemetery in Caloocan City. Upon reaching appellant’s house, appellant raped AAA. AAA identified appellant in court as the person who raped her. Dr. Lorenda Gozar (Dr. Gozar), a clerical psychologist working with the National Bureau of Investigaton, testified on AAA’s mental condition. Dr. Gozar had examined AAA and concluded in her Neuro-Psychiatric Examination and Evaluation that AAA has been found suffering from "moderate mental retardation with a Mental Age of (6) six years and (8) eight months and an IQ of (41) forty-one." Appellant, testifying in his own behalf, denied that he raped AAA. He however admitted that he was having a drinking session in his house with AAA when the alleged rape incident occurred. Appellant stated that prior to the incident, AAA has lived in his house for 4 months. He then denied any knowledge of AAA’s mental condition.

On 19 September 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of rape and found AAA’s testimony straightforward, notwithstanding her mental condition. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the trial court gravely erred in considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution despite its apparent incredibility. RULING: The appeal is denied. At any rate, it is an oft-repeated principle that not every witness to or victim of a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. People may react differently to the same situation. One person's spontaneous, or unthinking or even instinctive, response to a horrible and repulsive stimulus may be aggression, while another's may be cold indifference. Yet, it can never be successfully argued that the latter are any less sexual victims than the former. The fact of AAA’s mental retardation did not impair the credibility of her testimony. Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A one mentally retarded person may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the court. The Court have thoroughly examined AAA’s testimony and found no reason to depart from the legal adage that the Court accords the trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses great respect in the absence of any attendant of grave abuse of discretion on the account that the trial court had the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial pieces of evidence, including the demeanor of the witnesses, and is in the best position to rule on the matter. The rule finds an even greater application when the trial court’s findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. Taking into consideration the positive and categorical declaration of AAA and the medical findings to support her claims, the SC affirms the lower courts’ unanimous finding that AAA, by proof beyond reasonable doubt, was raped by the appellant. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN ALEMAN y LONGHAS G.R. No. 181539, July 24, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as his/her sense of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about his/her environment and experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally with others but he/she may still communicate with others in writing or through signs and symbols and, as in this case, sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make observations and he/she can make those observations known to others.

FACTS: On February 10, 2003, the accused, conspiring and confederating with another person robbed and killed one Ramon Jaime Birosel y Villa while the latter was inside his car having a conversation over his cellphone. The prosecution’s case against accused-appellant hinges on the eyewitness account of Mark Almodovar, a 14-year old deaf-mute. In his testimony, Mark narrated the events that took place with particularity. He even made a drawing representing the place where he followed the accused and his company and while thereat, he saw one of the culprits uncover his face. On re-direct examination, when asked how he was able to see the face of the accused, he answered that “there was light in the area which he described as near the flowing water where the accused removed his bonnet.” When Mark testified, he was assisted by Daniel Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter. However, on February 13, 2003, Mark failed to identify accused-appellant in a police line-up. The trial court (RTC) found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. On appeal, accused-appellant interposed that Mark is not qualified as a witness because he was a deaf-mute. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision and declared that the capacity of a deaf-mute to testify has long been recognized. The witness may communicate his perceptions to the court through an interpreter. According to the appellate court, Mark is competent as a witness. ISSUE: Whether a deaf-mute is unqualified or incompetent to be a witness. RULING: The petition is denied. The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness. The rule is that “all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.” A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as his/her sense of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about his/her environment and experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally with others but he/she may still communicate with others in writing or through signs and symbols and, as in this case, sketches. Thus, a deafmute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make observations and he/she can make those observations known to others. In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark understood and appreciated the sanctity of an oath and that he comprehended the facts he testified on. Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil and the trial and the appellate courts found Catinguil qualified to act as interpreter for Mark. Mark communicated a credible account of the things he perceived on that fateful February 10, 2003. In this connection, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that “despite intense and gruelling cross-examinations, the eyewitness responded with consistency upon material details that could only come from first-hand knowledge of the shocking events which unfolded before his eyes.” The imperfections or inconsistencies cited by accused-appellant

were due to the fact that there is some difficulty in eliciting testimony where the witness is a deaf-mute. As such, those discrepancies do not detract from the credibility of Mark’s testimony, much less justify the total rejection of the same. What is material is that he positively identified accused-appellant and personally saw what accused-appellant did to the victim on the fateful night when the incident happened. Moreover, the CA correctly observed that Mark’s testimony was corroborated by the findings of the medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim’s corpse The RTC and the CA saw no improper motive which would impel Mark to testify falsely against accused-appellant. As the determination of bad faith, malice or ill motive is a question of fact, this Court respects the unanimous finding of the trial and the appellate courts on the matter. Furthermore, the CA correctly ruled that Mark’s failure to identify accused-appellant in a police line-up on February 13, 2003 was of no moment. There is no law stating that a police line-up is essential to proper identification. What matters is that the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime be made by the witness in open court.

DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. v. BASES CONVERSATION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY G.R. No. 192896, July 24, 2013 J. Reyes When a land dispute or problem is lodged before COSLAP, it is not assumed that it has jurisdiction over it. Under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants. Outside said scope, COSLAP has no authority to resolve the case before it. FACTS: Petitioner Dream Village claims to represent more than 2,000 families who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985 "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously." The lot used to be part of the Hacienda de Maricaban (Maricaban). Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of the United States of America (USA) early in the American colonial period, it was to be converted into the military reservation known as Fort William Mckinley. On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing from sale or settlement the tracts of land within Fort William Mckinley, now renamed Fort Bonifacio, and reserving them for military purposes. On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and disposable, thus allowing the sale to the settlers of home lots. On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 amending Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298 the areas in Western Bicutan open for disposition. On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and Subic

military reservations and their extension camps (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station, O’Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and Capas Relay Station) to productive civilian uses. Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting its members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions among the residents.Dream Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not among those transferred to the BCDA under R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent applications by the occupants should be processed by the Land Management Bureau (LMB). On August 15, 2000, Dream Village formalized its complaint in the COSLAP. The COSLAP called a mediation conference on March 22, 2001, during which the parties agreed to have a relocation/verification survey conducted of the subject lot. On the basis of the DENR’s verification survey report, the COSLAP resolved that Dream Village lies outside of BCDA, and particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302, and thus directed the LMB of the DENR to process the applications of Dream Village’s members for sales patent. The CA ruled that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the complaint. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the honorable CA erred in ruling that COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the controversy between the parties herein. RULING: The petition is denied. In fine, it is apparent that the COSLAP acted outside its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case. It would have been more prudent if the COSLAP has just referred the controversy to the proper forum in order to fully thresh out the ramifications of the dispute at bar. As it is, the impugned Resolution is a patent nullity since the tribunal which rendered it lacks jurisdiction. Thus, the pronouncements contained therein are void. On July 31, 1970, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 251 creating the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) to expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of all kinds of land disputes between settlers, streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, or recommend other solutions.67 E.O. No. 305, issued on March 19, 1971, reconstituted the PACLAP and gave it exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving public lands and other lands of the public domain,68 as well as adjudicatory powers phrased in broad terms: "To investigate, coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land disputes, streamline administrative proceedings, and, in general, to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve problems involving public lands and lands of the public domain." The abovementioned proviso Section (3)(2) of E.O. No. 561, which vests COSLAP the power to resolve land disputes, does not confer upon COSLAP blanket authority to assume every matter referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over lands in which the government has proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the land dispute in Bañaga involved parties with conflicting free patent applications which was within the authority of PACLAP to resolve, unlike that of the instant case which is exclusively cognizable by the DAR. Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of

those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or classification of the land involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of the questions raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage or destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem. Thus, under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants. Which is not the situation in the present case, hence, COSLAP had no jurisdiction. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE CLARA y BUHAIN G.R. No. 195528, July 24, 2013 J. Perez When there are clear inconsistencies in the testimony or presentation of the facts of the prosecution, the accused cannot be convicted guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. If the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf, in which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted FACTS: Prosecution witness P03 Leonardo R. Ramos (P03 Ramos) narrated that he acted as a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation conducted by their office, the District Anti-Illegal Drug Special Task Group (DAID-SOTG) of Quezon City on 12 September 2005. He recalled that on or about 4:00 o’clock in afternoon of the said date, a male informant came to their office with the information that a person named "Ningning" was selling drugs at 22-C Salvador Drive, Balonbato, Quezon City. Police team leader SPO2 Dante D. Nagera (SPO2 Nagera) endorsed the matter to their Chief of Office Col. Gerardo B. Ratuita (Col. Ratuita) for the conduct of a buybust operation. At 8:00 o’clock in the evening, the team proceeded to the area on board three vehicles: Nissan Sentra, Toyota Corolla and owner-type jeep. Upon their arrival at 9:35 o’clock in the evening, PO3 Ramos and the informant knocked on the door of the house while the rest of the team positioned themselves ten meters away. The informant identified "Gigi" as the accused Joel, Ningning’s uncle. Initiating a conversation, the informant introduced to Joel PO3 Ramos as a buyer of P200.00-peso worth of illegal drug. When PO3 Ramos asked for Ningning, Joel answered that she was upstairs. Joel asked for payment and PO3 Ramos handed theP200 marked money. Joel went upstairs and called Ningning. Ningning opened the door and handed Joel a small plastic sachet of shabu which in turn was handed to PO3 Ramos.Thereafter, PO3 Ramos touched his head as a pre-arranged signal to prompt the back-up police officers of the consummation of the illegal sale. Immediately, the rest of the team rushed to the place to arrest Joel. Joel tried to close the door to prevent the police officers from entering the house but PO3 Ramos was able to grab him. SPO2 Nagera quickly went upstairs to arrest Ningning but the latter was able to escape apprehension. PO3 Ramos immediately frisked Joel inside the house

but failed to recover anything from him; the marked money was given to Ningning when Joel went upstairs to get the plastic sachet. Joel was brought to the police station and was informed by PO1 Jimenez of his constitutional rights as a consequence of his arrest. Afterwards, the small plastic sachet recovered was marked by PO1 Jimenez inside the station and an inventory receipt was prepared. PO3 Ramos clarified that the plastic sachet was in the possession of PO1 Jimenez from the place of arrest until arrival at the police station. PO3 Ramos added that PO1 Jimenez was present at the time of arrest which explained his possession of the plastic sachet containing shabu. The trial court on 21 March 2007 found the accused guilty of the offense charged. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether the conviction of accused-appellant is proper despite the inconsistencies in the prosecution’s presentation of a supposed buy-bust operation, coupled with its failure to establish with certainty the chain of custody of evidence. RULING: The appeal is granted. It is basic in criminal prosecutions that an accused is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. It must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf, in which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted. In this case, the prosecution failed to overcome such presumption when it presented inconsistent versions of an illegal sale. The testimony of PO3 Ramos, which apparently was given as proof of all the elements that constitute an illegal sale of drug is however, inconsistent on material points from the recollection of events of PO3 Ramos, SPO2 Nagera and PO1 Jimenez regarding the marking, handling and turnover of the plastic sachet containing the dangerous drug of shabu. The clear inconsistency in the presentation of facts is fatal. It creates doubts whether the transaction really occurred or not. Though Joel’s denial as a defense is weak, such cannot relieve the prosecution the burden of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an illegal transaction actually took place. Inconsistencies and discrepancies referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not diminish the witnesses’ credibility. If the cited inconsistency has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, it does not stand as a ground to reverse a conviction. However, in this case, the material inconsistencies are furthered by inconsistencies of the police officers on minor details. Referring back to the narration of circumstances of the buy-bust operation, SPO2 Nagera was asked about the gender of the informant who went to

their office to report about the illegal activities committed by Ningning.1 He readily answered that the informant was a female. PO3 Ramos in turn, when asked to describe what happened in the afternoon before the buy-bust operation, testified that a male informant came to their office to report about a person selling illegal drugs. These conflicting statements of the prosecution effectively broke the chain of custody of evidence of the sale of dangerous drug. "Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court and finally for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition To establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, the prosecution must establish the following links, namely: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. The "objective test" in determining the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust operation provides that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation—from the initial contact between the poseurbuyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. In view of these guiding principles, the Court rules that the prosecution failed to present a clear picture on how the police officers seized and marked the illegal drug recovered by the apprehending officer and how the specimen was turned over by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. SPS ARGOVAN and FLORIDA GADEITANO v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION G.R. No. 188767, July 24, 2013 J. Perez When the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. FACTS:

Petitioner Spouses Argovan Gaditano (Argovan) and Florida Gadiano (Florida), who were engaged in the business of buying and selling beer and softdrinks products, purchased beer products from San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in the amount of P285, 504.00 on 7 April 2000. Petitioners paid through a check signed by Florida and drawn against Argovan’s Asia Trust Bank Current Account. When said check was presented for payment on 13 April 2000, the check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Despite three (3) written demands, petitioner failed to make good of the check. This prompted SMC to file a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners. On 23 October 2000, petitioners filed an action for specific performance and damages against AsiaTrust Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima. Petitioners alleged that AsiaTrust Bank and Guevarra unlawfully garnished and debited their bank accounts; that their obligation to SMC had been extinguished by payment; and that Fatima issued a forged check. Petitioners assert that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to the prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa. On 29 January 2002, the Office of the Prosecutor recommended that the criminal proceedings be suspended pending resolution of the case for Specific Performance and Damages. SMC thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Prosecutor but it was denied for lack of merit on 19 September 2002. SMC filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging the Resolutions of the Office of the Prosecutor. In a Resolution dated 3 June 2004, the DOJ dismissed the petition. SMC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DOJ Secretary denied in a Resolution dated 15 December 2004. Undaunted, SMC went up to the Court of Appeals by filling a petition for certiorari, which the court granted. ISSUE: Whether certiorari is the correct mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals. RULING: The petition is granted. Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the Secretary of the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court albeit solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. In Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, the Court stressed that the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who exercises the power of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such prosecutor. Thus, while the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the DOJ abused its discretion when it affirmed the prosecutor’s suspension of the criminal investigation due to the existence of an alleged prejudicial question. Petitioners insist that the Court of Appeals erroneously ruled against the existence of a prejudicial question by separately treating their joint savings account and Argovan’s current account, and concluding therefrom that the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently of each other. Petitioners maintain that since the checking account was funded by the monies deposited in the savings account, what mattered was the sufficiency of the funds in the savings account. Hence, petitioners’ separate action against AsiaTrust Bank for unlawfully garnishing their savings account, which eventually resulted in the dishonor of their check to SMC, poses a prejudicial question in the instant criminal proceedings. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states the two elements necessary for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question, to wit: Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided that the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. POLICE SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT DIMAPINTO MACAWADIB v. THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT G.R. No. 186610, July 29, 2013 J. Peralta When the agencies and their public records are involved and affected by any decision rendered in a petition for correction filed by a party, it is thus required that they are made parties to said proceeding. They are indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the

controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. The absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance, because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. FACTS: Petitioner was a police officer with the rank of Police Senior Superintendent. He was among the commissioned officers who were subject to compulsory retirement by virtue of Section 39 of R.A. 6975. As shown in the PNP Records Management Division, petitioner was born on January 11, 1946 and was supposed to retire on January 11, 2002. On September 3, 2001, petitioner filed an application for late registration of his birth with the Registrar’s Office. In the said application, which was subsequently approved, he swore under oath that he was born on January 1956. He then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City a Petition for Correction of Entry in the Public Service Records Regarding the Birth Date, docketed as SP No.782-01. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and the decision has become final and executory. On January 8, 2008, herein respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals (CA), seeking to nullify the above-mentioned Decision of the RTC on the ground that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the PNP, "an unimpleaded indispensable party." The CA granted the petition and ordered the RTC Decision to be nullified and set aside. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the appellate court denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether the CA erred in holding that PNP-DPRM is an indispensable party in SP No. 782-01 and that the RTC have not acquired jurisdiction over the person of PNPDPRM. 2. Whether respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC for failure of the OSG to participate in the proceedings before the RTC. RULING: The petition is denied. The CA held that it is the integrity and correctness of the public records in the custody of the PNP, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) which are involved and which would be affected by any decision rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner. The aforementioned government agencies are, thus, required to be made parties to the proceeding. They are indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." If there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness.

It is "precisely ‘when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed.’ The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present." The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC because they stand to be adversely affected by petitioner's petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations in petitioner's service records. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), if petitioner's service is extended by ten years, the government, through the PNP, shall be burdened by the additional salary and benefits that would have to be given to petitioner during such extension. As the above-mentioned agencies were not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceedings, the decision of the trial court granting petitioner's prayer for the correction of entries in his service records, is void. On the question of whether or not respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC for failure of the OSG, as government representative, to participate in the proceedings before the trial court or to file an opposition to petitioner's petition for correction of entries in his service records, the Court rules that such an apparent oversight has no bearing on the validity of the appeal which the petitioner filed before the CA. Neither can the State, as represented by the government, be considered in estoppel due to the petitioner's seeming acquiescence to the judgment of the RTC when it initially made corrections to some of petitioner's records with the PNP. The Court has reiterated time and again that the absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance, because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Nor is the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for correction of entries if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SARABIA MANOR HOTEL CORPORATION G.R. No. 175844, July 29, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe When a party raises issues involving questions of facts, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not proper. Such petition covers only questions of law. In this relation, questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the Court unless exceptions are found to exist. The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is well-defined. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. FACTS: In 1997, Sarabia obtained a P150,000,000.00 special loan package from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) in order to finance the construction of a five-storey hotel building

(New Building) for the purpose of expanding its hotel business. An additional P20,000,000.00 stand-by credit line was approved by FEBTC in the same year. The foregoing debts were secured by real estate mortgages over several parcels of land owned by Sarabia and a comprehensive surety agreement dated September 1, 1997 signed by its stockholders. By virtue of a merger, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) assumed all of FEBTC’s rights against Sarabia. Sarabia started to pay interests on its loans as soon as the funds were released in October 1997. However, largely because of the delayed completion of the New Building, Sarabia incurred various cash flow problems. Thus, despite the fact that it had more assets than liabilities at that time, it, nevertheless, filed, on July 26, 2002, a Petition for corporate rehabilitation (rehabilitation petition) with prayer for the issuance of a stay order before the RTC as it foresaw the impossibility to meet its maturing obligations to its creditors when they fall due. Finding Sarabia’s rehabilitation petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued a Stay Order on August 2, 2002. It also appointed Liberty B. Valderrama as Sarabia’s rehabilitation receiver (Receiver). Thereafter, BPI filed its Opposition. After several hearings, the RTC gave due course to the rehabilitation petition and referred Sarabia’s proposed rehabilitation plan to the Receiver for evaluation. In a Recommendation, the Receiver found that Sarabia may be rehabilitated. On August 7, 2004 the RTC approved Sarabia’s rehabilitation plan as recommended by the Receiver, finding the same to be feasible. The RTC further noted that while it may be true that Sarabia has been unable to comply with its existing terms with BPI, it has nonetheless complied with its obligations to its employees and suppliers and pay its taxes to both local and national government without disrupting the day-to-day operations of its business as an on-going concern. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the present petition for review on certiorari is the right remedy to be availed of by the petitioner. RULING: The petition is denied. It is fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. In this relation, questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the Court unless, the following exceptions are found to exist: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both parties; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is well-defined. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. This being so, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and the Court will not review them on appeal. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds BPI’s petition to be improper – and hence, dismissible– as the issues raised therein involve questions of fact which are beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review. To elucidate, the determination of whether or not due regard was given to the interests of BPI as a secured creditor in the approved rehabilitation plan partakes of a question of fact since it will require a review of the sufficiency and weight of evidence presented by the parties – among others, the various financial documents and data showing Sarabia’s capacity to pay and BPI’s perceived cost of money – and not merely an application of law. Therefore, given the complexion of the issues which BPI presents, and finding none of the above-mentioned exceptions to exist, the Court is constrained to dismiss its petition, and prudently uphold the factual findings of the courts a quo which are entitled to great weight and respect, and even accorded with finality. This especially obtains in corporate rehabilitation proceedings wherein certain commercial courts have been designated on account of their expertise and specialized knowledge on the subject matter, as in this case. MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO and ROSELLER CABOVERDE v. DOMINILDA ESPINACABOVERDE, EVE CABOVERDA-YU, et al. G.R. No. 203585, July 29, 2013 J. Velasco, Jr. When courts appoint a receiver, it must not only consider the reasons given by the owners of the properties. Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the injury resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court as those of the person requesting for receivership. FACTS: Petitioners and their siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna, are the registered owners and in possession of certain parcels of land, identified as Lots 2, 3 and 4 located at Bantayan, Sindangan and Poblacion, Sindangan in Zamboanga del Norte, having purchased them from their parents, Maximo and Dominalda Caboverde The present controversy started when on March 7, 2005, respondents Eve and Fe filed a complaint before the RTC of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte where they prayed for the annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring Lots 2, 3 and 4 from their parents Maximo and Dominalda in favor of petitioners Mila and Roseller and their other siblings, Jeanny, Laluna and Ferdinand. As encouraged by the RTC, the parties executed a Partial Settlement Agreement (PSA) where they fixed the sharing of the uncontroverted properties among themselves, in particular, the adverted additional eight (8) parcels of land including their respective products and

improvements. Under the PSA, Dominalda’s daughter, Josephine, shall be appointed as Administrator. The PSA provided that Dominalda shall be entitled to receive a share of one-half (1/2) of the net income derived from the uncontroverted properties. The PSA also provided that Josephine shall have special authority, among others, to provide for the medicine of her mother. The parties submitted the PSA to the court on or about March 10, 2008 for approval. Before the RTC could act on the PSA, Dominalda, who, despite being impleaded in the case as defendant, filed a Motion to Intervene separately in the case. Mainly, she claimed that the verified Answer which she filed with her co-defendants contained several material averments which were not representative of the true events and facts of the case. This document, she added, was never explained to her or even read to her when it was presented to her for her signature. On May 12, 2008, Dominalda filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer, attaching her Amended Answer where she contradicted the contents of the aforesaid verified Answer by declaring that there never was a sale of the three (3) contested parcels of land in favor of Ferdinand, Mila, Laluna, Jeanny and Roseller and that she and her husband never received any consideration from them. The RTC would later issue a Resolution granting the Motion to Admit Amended Answer. On May 13, 2008, the court approved the PSA, leaving three (3) contested properties, Lots 2, 3, and 4, for further proceedings in the main case. Fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, Dominalda filed with the RTC on July 15, 2008 a Verified Urgent Petition/Application to place the controverted Lots 2, 3 and 4 under receivership. Mainly, she claimed that while she had a legal interest in the controverted properties and their produce, she could not enjoy them, since the income derived was solely appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance with her selected kin. She alleged that she immediately needs her legal share in the income of these properties for her daily sustenance and medical expenses. Also, she insisted that unless a receiver is appointed by the court, the income or produce from these properties is in grave danger of being totally dissipated, lost and entirely spent solely by Mila and some of her selected kin. On August 27, 2009, the court heard the Application for Receivership and persuaded the parties to discuss among themselves and agree on how to address the immediate needs of their mother. On October 9, 2009, petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation formally expressing their concurrence to the proposal for receivership on the condition, inter alia, that Mila be appointed the receiver, and that, after getting the 2/10 share of Dominalda from the income of the three (3) parcels of land, the remainder shall be divided only by and among Mila, Roseller, Ferdinand, Laluna and Jeanny. The court, however, expressed its aversion to a party to the action acting as receiver and accordingly asked the parties to nominate neutral persons. On February 8, 2010, the trial court issued a Resolution granting Dominalda’s application for receivership over Lot Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The Resolution reads: Petitioners thereafter moved for reconsideration raising the arguments that the concerns raised by Dominalda in her Application for Receivership are not grounds for placing the properties in the hands of a receiver and that she failed to

prove her claim that the income she has been receiving is insufficient to support her medication and medical needs. The RTC denied the motion. While the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition on the ground that the court a quo failed to require Dominalda to post a bond prior to the issuance of the order appointing a receiver, in violation of Section 2, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the appointment of a receiver despite clear showing that the reasons advanced by the applicant are not any of those enumerated by the rules. 2. Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Resolution of the RTC and ruling that the receivership bond is not required prior to appointment despite clear dictates of the rules. RULING: The petition is granted. The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be far greater than the injury sought to be averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of the parties and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the court as those of the complainant. To recall, the RTC approved the application for receivership on the stated rationale that receivership was the most convenient and feasible means to preserve and administer the disputed properties. As a corollary, the RTC, agreeing with the applicant Dominalda, held that placing the disputed properties under receivership would ensure that she would receive her share in the income which she supposedly needed in order to pay for her vitamins, medicines, her regular check-ups and daily sustenance. Considering that, as the CA put it, the applicant was already an octogenarian who may not live up to the day when the conflict will be finally settled, the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the application for receivership since it was justified under Sec. 1(d), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. However, in granting applications for receivership on the basis of this section, courts must remain mindful of the basic principle that receivership may be granted only when the circumstances so demand, either because the property sought to be placed in the hands of a receiver is in danger of being lost or because they run the risk of being impaired, and that being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be granted only when there is a clear showing of necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave and immediate loss or damage. Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the injury resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court as those of the person requesting for receivership.

Moreover, this Court has consistently ruled that where the effect of the appointment of a receiver is to take real estate out of the possession of the defendant before the final adjudication of the rights of the parties, the appointment should be made only in extreme cases. After carefully considering the foregoing principles and the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court finds that the grant of Dominalda’s Application for Receivership has no leg to stand on. First, Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for the appointment of a receiver. Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially impaired and that placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose of them. Based on the allegations in her application, it appears that Dominalda sought receivership mainly because she considers this the best remedy to ensure that she would receive her share in the income of the disputed properties. Much emphasis has been placed on the fact that she needed this income for her medical expenses and daily sustenance. Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is not necessary to save Dominalda from grave and immediate loss or irremediable damage. Contrary to her assertions, Dominalda is assured of receiving income under the PSA approved by the RTC providing that she was entitled to receive a share of one-half (1/2) of the net income derived from the uncontroverted properties. Finally, it must be noted that the defendants in Civil Case No. S-760 are the registered owners of the disputed properties that were in their possession. In cases such as this, it is settled jurisprudence that the appointment should be made only in extreme cases and on a clear showing of necessity in order to save the plaintiff from grave and irremediable loss or damage. This Court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in possession of the property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued to transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of evident usurpation. Furthermore, the Court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not proper when the rights of the parties, one of whom is in possession of the property, depend on the determination of their respective claims to the title of such property unless such property is in danger of being materially injured or lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage on it or its portions are being occupied by third persons claiming adverse title. To reiterate, the RTC’s approval of the application for receivership and the deprivation of petitioners of possession over the disputed properties would be justified only if compelling reasons exist. Unfortunately, no such reasons were alleged, much less proved in this case. As regards the issue of whether the CA was correct in ruling that a bond was not required prior to the appointment of the receivers in this case, the Court rules in the negative.

Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant’s bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. SPS. SALVADOR AND NENITA CRUZ, et al. G.R. No. 165386, July 29, 2013 J. Brion When the PAC was appointed as commissioners for the determination of just compensation, there was no contravention to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Although the appointment of commissioners is mandatory, the Rules do not impose any qualifications or restrictions on the appointment, other than that the commissioners should not number more than three and that they should be competent and disinterested parties. FACTS: Civil Case No. 111-M-97 was an expropriation proceeding commenced by NAPOCOR against respondents who are the owners of individual lots located in Del Monte Park Subdivision, Dulong Bayan, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The complaint, filed on February 17, 1997, primarily sought the determination of just compensation due the respondents after the negotiations for the purchase of the lots failed. The RTC directed the Bulacan Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) "to review and submit an updated appraisal report on the properties to be acquired by Napocor in order ‘to judicially guide the Court in fixing the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants.’"In the meantime, the RTC allowed Napocor to take possession of the lots, after Napocor deposited an amount equivalent to their assessed value pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. The PAC submitted to the RTC the report that the just compensation be valued at P2,200.00 per square meter. After considering the PAC’s report, the RTC issued an order fixing the just compensation at P3,000.00 per square meter. Although the RTC found the PAC’s recommended amount of P2,200.00 reasonable, it noted that an additional amount of P800.00 was necessary in view of the then prevailing economic crises and the devaluation of the peso. Napocor appealed the RTC’s March 31, 1998 order with the CA. It assailed the appointment of the PAC, claiming that its appointment was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It also alleged that the determination of the amount of just compensation was without basis. The CA affirmed the RTC’s March 31, 1998 order, subject to a modification. It upheld the appointment of the PAC and the recommendation to set the just compensation at P2,200.00 per square meter, but removed the additionalP800.00 that the RTC imposed. Hence, this present petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether the appointment of the PAC as commissioners was contrary to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

2. Whether petitioner was denied due process in the determination of the amount of just compensation. RULING: The petition is denied. The appointment of the PAC as commissioners The settled rule in expropriation proceedings is that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. To assist the courts in this task, Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court requires the appointment of "not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." Although the appointment of commissioners is mandatory, the Rules do not impose any qualifications or restrictions on the appointment, other than that the commissioners should not number more than three and that they should be competent and disinterested parties. In this case, the Court finds that the appointment of the PAC as commissioners substantially complies with Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It is immaterial that the RTC appointed a committee instead of three persons to act as commissioners, since the PAC is composed of three members – the Provincial Assessor, the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer. Considering their positions, we find each member of the PAC competent to perform the duty required of them, i.e., to appraise the valuation of the affected lots. As correctly found by the CA, they "are government officials entrusted with the updating and time-to-time determination of currently assessed, as well as, market value of properties within their jurisdiction." The mere fact that they are government officials does not disqualify them as disinterested persons, as the provincial government has no significant interest in the case. Instead, what the Court finds material is that the PAC was tasked to perform precisely the same duty that the commissioners, under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, are required to discharge. The RTC order dated September 17, 1997 directed the PAC "to review and submit an updated appraisal report on the property to be acquired by the plaintiff NAPOCOR from the defendants to judicially guide the court in fixing the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants." The appointment of the PAC served the same function as an appointment of three persons as commissioners under the Rules. If Napocor found the appointment of the PAC to be objectionable, it should have filed its objections early on and not belatedly raise them in its appeal with the CA. The second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 67 states that – Copies of the order of appointment shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any of the commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall have received copies of the objections. There is nothing in the records which indicates that Napocor seasonably objected to the appointment of the PAC or to any aspect in the order of appointment. Instead, Napocor belatedly raised its objections only in its appeal with the CA. For its failure to comply with the Rules, it is considered Napocor to have waived its objections against any supposed irregularity in the appointment of the PAC.

The determination of just compensation The PAC members, upon their appointment and oath, are considered officers of the court, and we can extend to them the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official functions. If Napocor had any objections on the amount of just compensation fixed in the commissioners’ report, its remedy was to file its objections within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice of the report. Section 7, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court states: Section 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. – x x x Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. However, as with the objections to the appointment of the PAC, Napocor failed to make a timely objection to the report of the commissioners and raised them only before the CA. TERESA C. AGUILAR, et al. v. MICHAEL J. O’PALLICK G.R. No. 182280, July 29, 2013 J. Del Castillo When a person is not impleaded in a case, he cannot be bound by the decision therein and consequently, he was not given the opportunity to present his case. The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Not being a party to the case, he has the right to vindicate his claim in a separate action. FACTS: On March 20, 1995, a Contract To Sell was executed between Primetown Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) on the one hand, and Reynaldo Poblete and Tomas Villanueva (Poblete and Villanueva) on the other, over Unit 3301 of the Makati Prime Citadel Condominium in Makati City (the unit), and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 25156 (CCT No. 25156). Poblete and Villanueva in turn executed in favor of herein respondent Michael J. O’Pallick (O’Pallick) a Deed of Assignment covering the unit. In October 1995, PPGI issued a Deed of Sale in favor of O’Pallick after the latter paid the purchase price in full. Although O’Pallick took possession of the unit, the Deed of Sale in his favor was never registered nor annotated on CCT No. 25156. Meanwhile, in a case between PPGI and herein petitioner Teresa C. Aguilar (Aguilar) filed in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Aguilar was able to obtain a final and executory Decision in her favor, and as a result, Sheriff Cesar D. Raagas (Raagas) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, caused several properties of PPGI to be levied, including the herein subject condominium unit. But before the scheduled auction sale, or on O’Pallick filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim. Raagas conducted the public auction sale on

March 30, 2000, where Aguilar was declared the highest bidder for the subject unit. A certificate of sale was issued in her favor. Because PPGI failed to redeem the property, a final Deed of Salewas issued in favor of Aguilar on April 20, 2001. CCT No. 25156 was cancelled, and CCT No. 74777 was issued in her name. Aguilar moved for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, and in a December 21, 2001 Order, the HLURB granted the motion. On April 6, 2001, O’Pallick instituted Civil Case No. 01-572 with the RTC Makati for quieting of title and to set aside the levy on execution of the subject unit, to annul the certificate of sale issued in favor of Aguilar, as well as to recover the unit. During the proceedings, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismisson the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; and that since the subject matter was a condominium unit, the HLURB possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. The RTC dismissed the complaint because had no jurisdiction to annul the levy and sale on execution ordered by the HLURB, an agency under the Office of the President. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case to the said court for trial on the merits. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling there was illegal levy on the property under execution thus the same may be threshed out in a separate action. RULING: The petition is denied. The buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. The issuance of the writ of possession had become ministerial on the part of HLURB since the respondent Aguilar had sufficiently shown her proof of title over the subject condominium. Being the registered owner of the condominium unit, she is entitled to its possession. The case at bar is akin to foreclosure proceedings where the issuance of a writ of possession becomes a ministerial act of the court after title to the property has been consolidated in the mortgage. It must be stressed that the Register of Deeds had already cancelled CCT No. 25156 and issued CCT No. 74777 in the name of the respondent. Thus, the argument of the PPGI that the title or ownership had been wrongfully vested with the respondent is a collateral attack on the latter’s title which is more appropriate in a direct proceeding. Thus, contrary to petitioners’ claim, this Court’s pronouncement in G.R. No. 157801 can in no way constitute a final determination of O’Pallick’s claim. In his Amended Complaint, O’Pallick averred that Aguilar obtained her title through unlawful means. More particularly, he prayed for the nullification of Aguilar’s CCT No. 74777. Clearly, therefore, although captioned as one for Quieting of Title, O’Pallick’s suit is actually a suit for annulment of title. Basic is the rule that "the cause of action in a Complaint is not determined by the designation given to it by the parties. The allegations in the body of the Complaint define or describe it. The designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the Complaint. It is not even an indispensable part of the Complaint."

"The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law." Thus, the Court agrees with the CA’s pronouncement that since respondent was not impleaded in the HLURB case, he could not be bound by the decision rendered therein. Because he was not impleaded in said case; he was not given the opportunity to present his case therein. But, more than the fact that O’Pallick was not impleaded in the HLURB case, he had the right to vindicate his claim in a separate action, as in this case. As a prior purchaser of the very same condominium unit, he had the right to be heard on his claim. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIZON, et al. v. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013 J. Perez The daughter of the deceased may be entitled to the issuance of letters of administration as she is one of the preferred persons enumerated by law to such. An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. FACTS: This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer). Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate. The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las

Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The CA affirmed the RTC. ISSUES: 1. Whether the CA gravely erred in declaring that Amelia was not legally married to Eliseo Quiazon due to pre-existing marriage; 2. Whether the CA overlooked the fact that Elise has not shown any interest in the petition for letters of administration. RULING: The petition is denied. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death. The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. The Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city. Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of

the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action. Neither is the Court inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus: Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus: Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) The jurisdictional facts; (b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent; (c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed. But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration. An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to

be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law. RE: LETTER DATED APRIL 18, 2011 OF CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY PERSIDA RUEDAACOSTA REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENT OF SHERIFF’S EXPENSES A.M. No. 11-10-03, July 30, 2013 J. Reyes When a party files a second motion for reconsideration, it is considered as a prohibited pleading and as such, the Court will dismiss it. This rule, however, is not absolute. A second motion for reconsideration may be allowed if there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons therefor, and upon express leave of court first obtained. FACTS: This case stemmed from the February 7, 2011 letter of Attorney Persida V. RuedaAcosta (Atty. Acosta), Chief Public Attorney of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In the said letter, Atty. Acosta sought a clarification as to the exemption of PAO's clients from the payment of sheriffs expenses, alleging that PAO's clients in its Regional Office in Region VII are being charged with the payment of sheriff’s expenses in the amount of P1,000.00 upon the filing of a civil action in court. She claimed that sheriff’s expenses should not be exacted from PAO’s clients since Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9406 (R.A. No. 9406) specifically exempts them from the payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies. In its report and recommendation, the OCA maintained its position that PAO’s clients are not exempted from the payment of sheriff’s expenses; it stressed that the P1,000.00 sheriff’s expenses are not the same as the sheriff’s fee fixed by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court and, hence, not covered by the exemption granted to PAO’s clients under R.A. No. 9406. The OCA further alleged that the grant of exemption to PAO’s clients from the payment of sheriff’s expenses amounts to disbursement of public funds for the protection of private interests. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Atty. Acosta’s request for exemption of PAO’s clients from payment of sheriff’s expenses be denied. Adopting the recommendation of the OCA, the Court en banc issued Resolutiondated November 22, 2011 which denied Atty. Acosta’s request for exemption from the payment of sheriff’s expenses. On January 2, 2012, Atty. Acosta sought a reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated November 22, 2011, which the Court en banc referred to the OCA for appropriate action. The OCA averred that the exemption of PAO’s clients from payment of legal fees is not an absolute rule and that the Court is not precluded from providing limitations thereto. Thus, the OCA recommended the denial of Atty. Acosta’s motion for reconsideration. Tthe Court en banc issued a Resolution which denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Acosta. Unperturbed, Atty. Acosta filed a motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and a Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated April 24, 2012, alleging that the imposition of sheriff’s expenses on PAO’s clients is contrary to the

language, intent and spirit of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 since sheriff’s expenses are considered as fees "incidental to instituting an action in court." Further, she claimed that the said imposition on PAO’s clients would hinder their access to the courts contrary to the mandate of Section 11, Article III of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether the second motion for reconsideration is allowed by the Court. RULING: The petition is denied. At the outset, it bears stressing that this is already the third attempt of Atty. Acosta to obtain from this Court a declaration exempting PAO’s clients from the payment of sheriff’s fees – the initial request therefor and the subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied by this Court. As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. This rule, however, is not cast in stone. A second motion for reconsideration may be allowed if there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons therefor, and upon express leave of court first obtained. Ordinarily, the Court would have dismissed outright Atty. Acosta’s second motion for reconsideration. However, for reasons to be discussed at length later, there is a need to give due course to the instant petition in order to reassess and clarify the Court’s pronouncement in our Resolutions dated November 22, 2011 and April 24, 2012. In any case, it bears stressing that what is involved in this case is the Court’s administrative power to determine its policy vis-à-vis the exaction of legal fees from the litigants. The Court’s policy determination respecting administrative matters must not be unnecessarily bound by procedural considerations. Surely, a rule of procedure may not debilitate the Court and render inutile its power of administration and supervision over court procedures. That Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 exempts PAO’s clients from the payment of "docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies" is beyond cavil. However, contrary to Atty. Acosta’s claim, a plain reading of the said provision clearly shows that the exemption granted to PAO’s clients cannot be extended to the payment of sheriff’s expenses; the exemption is specifically limited to the payment of fees, i.e., docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action. The term "fees" is defined as a charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain privileges or services. Viewed from this context, the phrase "docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action" refers to the totality of the legal fees imposed under Rule 141of the Rules of Court. In particular, it includes filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s fees and commissioner’s fees. These are the fees that are exacted for the services rendered by the court in connection with the action instituted before it. Sheriff’s expenses, however, cannot be classified as a "fee" within the purview of the exemption granted to PAO’s clients under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406. Sheriff’s expenses are provided for under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, viz:

The difference in the treatment between the sheriff’s fees and the sheriff’s expenses in relation with the exemption enjoyed by cooperatives is further demonstrated by the wording of Section 10, Rule 141, which uses "fees" in delineating the enumeration in the first paragraph, and "expenses" in qualifying the subsequent paragraphs of this provision. The intention to make a distinction between the two charges is clear; otherwise, the Rules would not have used different designations. Likewise, the difference between the two terms is highlighted by a consideration of the phraseology in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10, Rule 141, which uses the clause "in addition to the fees hereinabove fixed," thereby unequivocally indicating that sheriff’s expenses are separate charges on top of the sheriff’s fees. The Court, however, is not unmindful of the predicament of PAO’s clients. In exempting PAO’s clients from paying docket and other legal fees, R.A. No. 9406 intended to ensure that the indigents and the less privileged, who do not have the means to pay the said fees, would not be denied access to courts by reason of poverty. Indeed, requiring PAO’s clients to pay sheriff’s expenses, despite their exemption from the payment of docket and other legal fees, would effectly fetter their free access to the courts thereby negating the laudable intent of Congress in enacting R.A. No. 9406. DONNA C. NAGTALON v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK G.R. No. 172504, July 31, 2013 J. Brion When there is a pending civil case challenging the validity of a mortgage or its foreclosure, such pendency does not bar the issuance of a writ of execution/writ of possession after said foreclosure, sale of the mortgaged properties and the lapse of the one-year period. As a ministerial function of the court, the judge need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure, as these are the questions that should be properly decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in the pending case filed before it. FACTS: Roman Nagtalon and the petitioner (Spouses Nagtalon) entered into a credit accommodation agreement (credit agreement) with respondent United Coconut Planters Bank. In order to secure the credit agreement, Spouses Nagtalon, together with the Spouses Vicente and Rosita Lao, executed deeds of real estate mortgage over several properties in Kalibo, Aklan. After the Spouses Nagtalon failed to abide and comply with the terms and conditions Officio Provincial Sheriff a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The mortgaged properties were consequently foreclosed and sold at public auction to the respondent which emerged as the sole and highest bidder. After the issuance of the sheriff’s certificate of sale, the respondent caused the entry of the sale in the records of the Registry of Deeds of Kalibo, Aklan and its annotation on the transfer certificates of titles (TCTs) on January 6, 1999. With the lapse of the one year redemption period and the petitioner’s failure to exercise her right to redeem the foreclosed properties, the respondent consolidated the ownership over the properties, resulting in the cancellation of the titles in the name of the petitioner and the issuance of TCTs in the name of the respondent.

On April 30, 2003, the respondent filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC. The petitioner opposed the petition, citing mainly the pendency of Civil Case No. 6602 (for declaration of nullity of foreclosure, fixing of true indebtedness, redemption, damages and injunction with temporary restraining order) still pending with the RTC. The RTC issued an order, holding in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession of the properties on the ground of prematurity. The RTC ruled that due to the pendency of Civil Case No. 6602 — where the issue on nullity of the credit agreement and foreclosure have yet to be resolved — the obligation of the court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure of mortgage property ceases to be ministerial. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the pendency of a civil case challenging the validity of the credit agreement, the promissory notes and the mortgage can bar the issuance of a writ of possession after the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties and the lapse of the one-year redemption period. RULING: The petition is denied. Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure is not a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of execution/writ of possession. In the case of Spouses Montano T. Tolosa and Merlinda Tolosa v. United Coconut Planters Bank, a case closely similar to the present petition, the Court explained that a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure (where the nullity of the loan documents and mortgage had been alleged) does not stay the issuance of a writ of possession. It reiterated the well-established rule that as a ministerial function of the court, the judge need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure, as these are the questions that should be properly decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in the pending case filed before it. It added that questions on the regularity and the validity of the mortgage and foreclosure cannot be invoked as justification for opposing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the new owner. In the cited case, the petitioner, in opposition to the respondent’s ex parte application for a writ of possession, likewise pointed to the prima facie merit of the allegations in her complaint for annulment of mortgage, foreclosure and sale. She alleged that the apparent nullity of the mortgage obligation and the sale of the properties justify, at the very least, the deferment of the issuance of the writ of possession. That the issuance of a writ of possession remains a ministerial duty of the court until the issues raised in the civil case for annulment of mortgage and/or foreclosure are decided by a court of competent jurisdiction has long been settled. In the Tolosa case, it would be revealed that there are exceptions to the rule that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function:

(1)Gross inadequacy of purchase price xxx (2)Third party claiming right adverse to debtor/mortgagor xxx (3) Failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to mortgagor However, in the present case is not analogous to any of the above-mentioned exceptions. The facts are not only different from those cited above; the alleged peculiar circumstances pertain to the validity of the mortgage, a matter that may be determined by a competent court after the issuance of the writ of possession. In these lights, the Court held that the CA correctly ruled that the present case does not present peculiar circumstances that would merit an exception from the well-entrenched rule on the issuance of the writ. FAUSTINO T. CHINGKOE and GLORIA CHINGKOE v. Republic of the Philippines, represented by THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS G.R. No. 183608, July 31, 2013 J. Velasco, Jr. When a party resorts to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it must be shown that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to it other than such petition. If, however, the order partakes of a final adjudication, the proper remedy therefore should be appeal, under Rule 41. A petition for certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. When an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the basis is grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: This petition stemmed from two collection cases filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In the first complaint for collection of money and damages, the Republic alleged that Chiat Sing Cardboard Inc. (Chiat Sing) secured in 1997 fake and spurious tax credit certifications. It claimed that Chiat Sing utilized the fraudulently-acquired tax credit certificates to settle its customs duties and taxes on its importations. Meanwhile, in the second complaint, the Republic alleged that in the years 1992-1998, defendant Filstar fraudulently secured 20 tax credit certificates. Thereafter, Filstar made various importations, using the tax credit certificates to pay the corresponding customs duties and taxes. After an Order of consolidation was issued, the two cases were jointly heard before Branch 34, Manila RTC. Pursuant to a Notice of Mediation Hearing sent to the parties, the cases were referred to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) for mandatory mediation. The pre-trial for the consolidated cases was initially set on January 9, 2006, but come said date, the report of the mediation has yet to be submitted; hence, on the motion of the counsel of defendant Chiat Sing, the pre-trial was canceled and rescheduled to February 15, 2006.

On February 15, 2006, the PMC reported that the proceedings are still continuing; thus, the trial court, on motion of the same counsel for Chiat Sing, moved for the re-setting of the pretrial to March 17, 2006. Unfortunately, the mediation proceedings proved to be uneventful, as no settlement or compromise was agreed upon by the parties. During the March 17, 2006 pre-trial setting, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the Republic, failed to appear. The counsel for defendant Filstar prayed for a period of 10 days within which to submit his motion or manifestation regarding the plaintiff’s pretrial brief. The trial court granted the motion, and again ordered a postponement of the pre-trial to April 19, 2006. Come the April 19, 2006 hearing, despite having received a copy of the March 17, 2006 Order, the OSG again failed to appear. It also failed to submit its comment. Thus, counsels for the defendants Filstar, Chiat Sing, and Chingkoe moved that plaintiff be declared non-suited.. The trial court then warned the plaintiffs Republic and BOC that if no comment is submitted and if they fail to appear during the pre-trial set on May 25, 2006, the court will be constrained to go along with the motion for the dismissal of the case. The scheduled May 25, 2006 hearing, however, did not push through, since the trial court judge went on official leave. The pre-trial was again reset to June 30, 2006. During the June 30, 2006 pre-trial conference, the OSG again failed to attend. A certain Atty. Bautista Corpin, Jr. (Atty. Corpin Jr.), appearing on behalf of BOC, was present, but was not prepared for pre-trial. Meanwhile, counsels for defendants Chiat Sing, Filstar, and third-party defendants Faustino T. Chingkoe and Gloria C. Chingkoe, who were all present during the pretrial, moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of respondent’s failure to prosecute. The trial court judge issued an Order resetting the pre-trial to July 14, 2006. At the hearing conducted on July 14, 2006, the respective counsels of the defendants were present/ Neither the OSG nor the BOC attended the hearing. Thus, as moved anew by the respective counsels of the three defendants, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the case. As recourse, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that the trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the two cases. The CA granted the petition and ordered the remand of the case to the Court a quo. Hence, the present recourse. ISSUE: Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it granted the petition for certiorari and revoked and set aside the order of dismissal of the RTC considering that: 1. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available in the instant case as an appeal from the order of dismissal as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the respondent; 2. The dismissal of the complaints below for the repeated failure of the respondent to appear during the pre-trial and for its failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time despite the stern warning of the RTC is not a dismissal on mere technical grounds; and 3. The dismissal of the cases with prejudice was not attended with grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC.

RULING: The petition is granted. Respondent’s Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA was not the proper remedy against the assailed Order of the RTC. Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a special civil action for certiorari could only be availed of when a tribunal “acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of [its] judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction” or when it acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and if there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is settled that the Rules precludes recourse to the special civil action of certiorari if appeal by way of a Petition for Review is available, as the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Here, respondent cannot plausibly claim that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to it to question the dismissal Order of the trial court. The RTC Order does not fall into any of the exceptions under Section 1, Rule 41, where appeal is not available as a remedy. It is clear from the tenor of the RTC’s July 14, 2006 Order that it partakes of the nature of a final adjudication, as it fully disposed of the cases by dismissing them. The proper remedy, therefore, would have been the filing of a Notice of Appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Such remedy is the plain, speedy, and adequate recourse under the law, and not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, as respondent here filed before the CA. A petition for certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. When an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the basis is grave abuse of discretion. The RTC Order subject of the petition was a final judgment which disposed of the case on the merits; hence, an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy. Respondent laments that the questioned RTC Order did not specify whether the dismissal is with prejudice or not, putting it in a precarious situation of what legal actions to take upon its receipt. This misgiving, however, stems from a misreading of the Rules. Rule 18, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court clearly states: Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. – The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. x x x The rule is clear enough that an order of dismissal based on failure to appear at pre-trial is with prejudice, unless the order itself states otherwise. It should be considered as adjudication on the merits of the case, where the proper remedy is an appeal under Rule 41. Regrettably, the respondent chose the wrong mode of judicial review. In not dismissing the petition for certiorari outright, and in not ruling that such remedy is the wrong mode of judicial review, the CA committed grave and reversible error. Dismissal due to the fault of respondent

The trial court amply gave respondent sufficient notice and opportunity to attend the pretrial conference, but despite this, it neglected its duty to prosecute its case and attend the scheduled pre-trial hearings. Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for dismissing the case. In finding that the dismissal by the trial court is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the CA committed reversible error. It is fairly obvious that the trial court gave the Republic, through the OSG and the BOC, every opportunity to be present during the pre-trial conference. Despite the express warning by the trial court during the penultimate setting on June 30, 2006, the OSG and BOC still failed to attend the next scheduled setting. Despite the leeway and opportunity given by the trial court, it seemed that the OSG and BOC did not accord proper importance to the pre-trial conference. Pre-trial, to stress, is way more than simple marking of evidence. Hence, it should not be ignored or neglected, as the counsels for respondent had. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as “the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century,” pretrial seeks to achieve the following: (a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution; (b) The simplification of the issues; (c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; (d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof; (e) The limitation of the number of witnesses; (f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner; (g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist; (h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and (i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. Petitioners’ repeated failure to appear at the pre-trial amounted to a failure to comply with the Rules and their non-presentation of evidence before the trial court was essentially due to their fault. In view, however, of the huge amount of tax collectibles involved. and considering that taxes are the "lifeblood of the government:" the dismissal of the case should be without prejudice.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALAMANDA MACABANDO G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013 J. Brion When there is absence of direct evidence to prove that the appellant caused the crime charged of him, circumstantial evidence may be availed of. To justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. FACTS: The prosecution’s evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even (“manabla ko”). Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house. At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. However, appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told Eric not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the air. The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed. Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces. Eric also returned to his house to save his belongings. The spot investigation conducted by the Fire Officers concluded that the fire started in the appellant’s house and that it has been intentional. The prosecution then charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC. The trial court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTC’s factual findings since these findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. The CA held that the totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether circumstantial evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. RULING: The petition is denied. Because no one saw the appellant set fire to his house, the trial and appellate courts resorted to circumstantial evidence since there was no direct evidence to prove his culpability to the crime charged. It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction provided that: “(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the

facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.” In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads to an unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house: first, the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke bottles near his house at around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that he would get even, and then threatened to burn his own house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the appellant’s room approximately two hours after the appellant returned to his house; fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from putting out the fire in his house; fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his house; sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the investigation conducted by the fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s house, and that it had been intentional. The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the appellant set fire to his house. The Court finds it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house is on fire is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside his house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the appellant’s indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried to put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of innocence. Notably, the appellant failed to impute any improper motive against the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against him; in fact, he admitted that he had no misunderstanding with them prior to the incident.

MARK ANTHONY ESTEBAN v. SPS. RODRIGO C. MARCELO and CARMEN T. MARCELO G.R. No. 197725, July 31, 2013 J. Brion When a petitioner wishes to file an action for unlawful detainer, there should first be a demand to pay or to comply with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate. Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful withholding of possession.

FACTS: The late Gabriel O. Esteban, substituted by his son, petitioner Mark Anthony Esteban, had been in possession of a piece of land located at Mandaluyong City, since the 1950s. In the 1960s, the late Esteban's sister constructed a foundry shop at the property. In the 1970s, after the foundry operations had proven unproductive, the respondents-spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo were allowed to reside therein, for a monthly rental fee of P50.00. Since March 2001, the respondents-spouses have stopped paying the rental fee (which by that time amounted to P160.00). On October 31, 2005, the late Esteban, through a lawyer, sent the respondents-spouses a demand letter requiring them to settle their arrears and to vacate within five (5) days from receipt thereof. For failure to comply with the demand to pay and to vacate, the late Esteban instituted an unlawful detainer case against the respondentsspouses on December 6, 2005. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ruled that there was a valid ground for ejectment; with the jurisdictional demand to vacate complied with, the respondents-spouses must vacate the property. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) fully affirmed the MeTC ruling. The CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that from the year of dispossession in 2001 when the respondents-spouses stopped paying rent, until the filing of the complaint for ejectment in 2005, more than a year had passed; hence, the case no longer involved an accion interdictal cognizable by the MeTC, but an accion publiciana that should have been filed before the RTC. Therefore, the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case so that its decision was a nullity. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the case is cognizable by the MeTC as it has been properly been filed as an accion interdictal. RULING: The petition is granted. It has been pointed out by the petitioner that there should first be a demand to pay or to comply with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate before unlawful detainer arises. "Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful withholding of possession." In 2000, the Supreme Court reiterated this rule: "It is therefore clear that before the lessor may institute such action, he must make a demand upon the lessee to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate the premises. It is the owner’s demand for the tenant to vacate the premises and the tenant’s refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of possession. Such refusal violates the owner’s right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer." Furthermore, in cases where there were more than one demand to pay and vacate, the reckoning point of one year for filing the unlawful detainer is from the last demand as the lessor may choose to waive his cause of action and let the defaulting lessee remain in the premises

In the present case, the respondents-spouses stopped paying since 2001. However, the late Esteban only sent a demand in October 31, 2005. Due to respondents-spouses’ failure to comply, the unlawful detainer case was instituted on December 6, 2005, or within the one-year prescriptive period. Based on the foregoing and as petitioner correctly posits, the case was then properly filed because it was filed within the said one-year prescriptive period counted from the date of the last demand and not from the date of dispossession. Thus, the case, being accion interdictal, is cognizable by the MeTC. ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 181119, July 31, 2013 J. Reyes When a witness commits discrepancies relating to minor details and collateral matters, such testimony does not affect the veracity of the witness’ declarations. It is an oft-repeated doctrine that the testimony of even “a single eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as such testimony is found to be clear and straight-forward and worthy of credence by the trial court. FACTS: On June 13, 1994, Leopoldo Santiago, a neighbor of the victim and the accused, was surprised when he saw the dead body of AAA outside his house. The matter was reported to the police at once. At this point, Luisa Rebada, who lived about 1-1 ½ arms length away from the house of the petitioner related to the girl’s parents that she saw AAA the afternoon before at the window of petitioner’s house. She called out to her and offered her some “yemas.” The petitioner suddenly closed the window. Later on, Luisa heard AAA cry and then squeal. Her curiousity aroused, she crept two steps up the house of the petitioner, peeped through an opening between the floor and the door, and saw the petitioner naked on top of AAA, his right hand choking the girl’s neck. Rebada became frightened and went back to her house to gather her children. She told her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, who was in her house at that time, of what she saw. Thus, with Luisa Rebada’s revelation, the petitioner was arrested. During the investigation conducted by PO3 Danilo Tan, the petitioner readily admitted to raping and killing AAA. The police were able to recover from the house of the petitioner AAA’s green slippers, a pair of gold earrings placed on top of a bamboo post, a bloodied buri mat, a pillow with blood stain in the middle, and a stained T-shirt owned by the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 43663 for Rape with Homicide before the RTC. During arraignment, the petitioner entered a plea of guilty. In compliance with law and jurisprudence, the prosecution presented its evidence. It presented (1) Luisa Rebada; (2) Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer; (3) SPO1 Manuel Artuz, the exhibit custodian of Iloilo City Police Station; (4) PO3 Danilo Tan; (5) SPO3 Rollie Luz, police investigator; and (6) BBB, the victim’s father. The defense, for its part, merely presented the autopsy report of Dr. Tito Doromal to show that the proximate cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation. On July 20, 1994, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of rape with homicide. He was accordingly meted out the penalty of death by electrocution.

On automatic appeal to the Supreme Court, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the proceedings before the lower court were tainted with procedural infirmities, namely: (a) an invalid arraignment; and, (b) admission of inadmissible evidence. Thus, on August 13, 1996, the petitioner was arraigned anew whereby he entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits was again conducted. During the hearings, counsel for the defense refused to cross-examine the witnesses who had been presented in the first trial as he interposed a continuing objection to their presentation again as witnesses since their testimonies had already been ruled upon by the Supreme Court as incredible and inadmissible in case G.R. No. 117487. When the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence, the petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence, which was subsequently denied. Instead of presenting evidence, the petitioner manifested that he was submitting the case for judgment without presentation of evidence for the defense. On May 2, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision against the petitioner. On appeal, the CA concurred with the RTC’s factual findings, affirmed the conviction of the petitioner, but modified the penalty and the damages imposed upon him. ISSUE: Whether the CA breached the Constitution and jurisprudential doctrines when it affirmed the petitioner’s conviction on the basis of evidence derived from uncounselled confession. RULING: The petition is denied. The petitioner poses the question of whether or not the CA erred in convicting him on the basis of evidence obtained from an uncounselled confession. The issue is not genuinely a legal issue even when it speciously presents itself to be one at first glance. An examination of the assailed decision reveals that the conviction handed by the courts a quo was primarily based on the testimony of Luisa, as corroborated by Dr. Doromal’s autopsy report, and not on physical evidence, to wit, the pillow and the blood-stained shirt, which the petitioner claimed were fruits of the poisonous tree. “Axiomatic is the rule that factual findings of trial courts are accorded the highest respect and are generally not disturbed by the appellate court, unless they are found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded, or some substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the disposition of the case was overlooked, misunderstood or misinterpreted. This rule is founded on the fact that the trial judge has the unique opportunity to personally observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude on the witness stand, which are significant factors in evaluating their honesty, sincerity and credibility.” Luisa’s testimonies were found by two branches of the trial court and the CA as credible, straightforward and consistent. It is also well to note that Luisa once again testified even after the proceedings before the RTC, which were conducted relative to the petitioner’s initial

indictment, were declared null. She was firm and unshaken in her identification of the perpetrator of the crime and no ill motive can be attributed to her on why she testified against the petitioner. It is an oft-repeated doctrine that the testimony of even “a single eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as such testimony is found to be clear and straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court.” Further, discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity of the witness’ declarations. The alleged inconsistencies in Luisa’s statements regarding which hand the petitioner used to strangle AAA and when did she inform her compadre, Lagrana, about what she had witnessed, were too inconsequential for they do not relate to the elements of the crime charged. Those inconsistencies cannot destroy the thrust of Luisa’s testimony that: (a) the petitioner was the last person seen with AAA before the girl’s lifeless body was found; (b) from an opening in between the door and the floor, she saw the petitioner naked on top of AAA, whose panty and shorts were taken off; and (c) the petitioner choked AAA’s neck with one hand. The autopsy report prepared by Dr. Doromal indicating that AAA was raped and that she sustained injuries in her head, neck, thoraco-abdominal regions, extremities, vagina and anus validated Luisa’s statements. Hence, this Court finds no arbitrariness in the factual findings of the courtsa quo. RHODORA PRIETO v. ALPADI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 191025, July 31, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro When a party is deprived of his day in court because of her counsel’s failure to notify him, such is not excusable and cannot be considered by the court. The failure of a party’s counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. FACTS: Prieto was employed as an accounting clerk and cashier of the Alpadi Group of Companies, composed of respondent Alpadi Development Corporation (ADC), Manufacturers Building, Incorporated (MBI), and Asian Ventures Corporation (AVC). Prieto was charged before the RTC with the crime of estafa. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented its evidence. After resting its case, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence, which was admitted by the RTC in an Order dated December 13, 2004. Prieto, represented by the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), asked for leave of court to file a Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC gave Prieto 20 days from December 13, 2004 within which to file her Demurrer to Evidence. The 20th day of the period was January 2, 2005, a Sunday, so Prieto could still file her Demurrer to Evidence on January 3, 2005, a Monday. Records show that Prieto filed her Demurrer to Evidence only on January 13, 2005. In her Demurrer to Evidence, Prieto argued that she could not be convicted for estafa because (1) as an employee, her custody of the rental collections was precarious and for a temporary purpose or short period only, and the juridical or constructive possession of the said collections remained in her employer; and (2) there was no showing that demand was made upon Prieto to deliver or return the rental collections to ADC.

In an Order dated March 8, 2005, the RTC granted Prieto’s Demurrer to Evidence. ADC, as the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 97-157752, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order. The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration. ADC sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari. The appellate granted the petition for certiorari finding that the elements of Estafa have been duly proven by the prosecution. Given the findings of the Court of Appeals that the RTC Orders were in contravention of law and settled jurisprudence and were, therefore, issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the appellate court held that its reversal of the grant of Demurrer to Evidence did not violate Prieto’s right against double jeopardy. To justify the timeliness of the filing of her Petition in G.R. No. 191025 on February 10, 2012, Prieto alleges that she received a copy of the Resolution dated November 12, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, denying her Motion for Reconsideration, only on January 26, 2010, mailed to her by the PAO. Prieto prays for the liberal application of the rules of procedure and posits that the 15-day reglementary period be counted from January 26, 2010, the day she actually received a copy of the Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration of the adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, sent to her through mail by the PAO. ISSUE: Whether petitioner can be excused from not being able to file her appeal on time due to her counsel’s negligence. RULING: The petition is denied. In National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, the Court pronounced that: The rules provide that if a party is appearing by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. x x x. The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. The failure of a party’s counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. Prieto herein not only alleges mistake or negligence on the part of the PAO, but more seriously, attributes to her former counsel deliberate acts which deprived her of her right to appeal. It must be stressed that anyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such deviation. Parties praying for the liberal interpretation of the rules must be able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Court’s intent "to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." Unfortunately for Prieto, she was unable to discharge this burden of proof.

Procedural rules should not be so easily brushed aside with the mere averment of the "higher interest of justice," as the Court discussed in Building Care Corp./Leopard Security & Investigation Agency v. Macaraeg: It should be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application of procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice. In Marohomsalic v. Cole, the Court stated: While procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well-settled that these are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. The relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice was never intended to be a license for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules can be invoked only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. The later case of Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc. v. Raza, further explained that: To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without any valid reasons proffered for or underpinning it. To merit liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its non-compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of substantial justice. x x x. The desired leniency cannot be accorded absent valid and compelling reasons for such a procedural lapse. x x x. We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" line is not some magic want that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled, let alone dismissed simply because their nonobservance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial rights. Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction. Prieto cannot claim that she had been deprived of her day in court when her arguments in support of her Demurrer to Evidence had been heard by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Moreover, she does not lose her liberty at this point for she still has the opportunity to present evidence in her defense before the RTC in the continuation of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 97-157752. With the withdrawal of the appeal in G.R. No. 190282 and the belated filing of the Petition in G.R. No. 191025, the Decision dated August 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 91714, reversing the grant by the RTC of Prieto’s Demurrer to Evidence and reinstating Criminal Case No. 97-157752, had become final and executory, thus, immutable.

SPOUSES JESUS DYCOCO and JOELA E. DYCOCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 147257, July 31, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro

When the court liberally allows the petitioner-spouses to file their petition five days after the extended period, there is no ground to believe that the court gravely abused its discretion when it subsequently dismissed the petition. Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is so because "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit one’s purpose. FACTS: On November 23, 1994, petitioner-spouses filed a complaint for ejectment, cancellation of certificates of land transfer, damages and injunction against private respondents Nelly Siapno-Sanchez and Inocencio Berma in the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Albay. Eusebio Siapno, Rogelio Siapno, Felix Sepato, Sr., Leonora Talagtag and Pablo Bonde, Sr. were also named respondents in the complaint. In their complaint, petitioner-spouses alleged that they are the absolute and registered owners of Lot No. 216, a 38,157 sq.m.-parcel of land situated at Bonbon, Libon, Albay, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. VH-5187 of the Register of Deeds of Albay. According to them, the respondents named in the complaint took advantage of the liberality of petitionerspouses, entered the subject property, successfully registered themselves as tenants for agrarian reform purposes, and occupied and cultivated the property to the prejudice of petitioner-spouses. Said respondents deprived petitioner-spouses of the enjoyment and possession of the property without paying petitioner-spouses or the Land Bank the rentals due thereon. Moreover, in violation of agrarian reform laws, said respondents subleased their respective landholdings to other persons. All seven respondents named in the complaint were summoned but only Bonde and Rogelio submitted their answer and position paper.7 Bonde and Rogelio showed that they already own their portions of the property through Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27. Pursuant to the said law, petitioner-spouses executed deeds of transfer in their favor which resulted in the issuance to them of emancipation patents and, subsequently, OCT No. E2333 and OCT No. E-2334, respectively. Thereafter, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision dated June 27, 1995 finding private respondents "not worthy to become beneficiaries" under Presidential Decree No. 27. On motion of petitioner-spouses, the Provincial Adjudicator issued a writ of execution dated November 22, 1995 ordering, among others, the ejectment of private respondents from their respective tillage. Subsequently, petitioner-spouses filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and to Cite Respondents in Contempt, claiming that private respondents returned to the subject property although they have already been ordered ejected. Private respondents filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend Implementation of the Writ of Execution. They explained that they are already the owners of their respective portions of the property in question by virtue of the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27.

In an order dated October 16, 1996, the Provincial Adjudicator found that the copy of the decision dated June 27, 1995 was sent by registered mail to and, on July 10, 1995, received by Crispina Berma Penaranda, daughter of private respondent Berma, who resided in a different barangay. Still, the Provincial Adjudicator ruled that private respondent Berma was bound by his daughter’s receipt and the decision is already final and executory as against him. Thus, with respect to him, the notice of appeal was filed out of time. On the other hand, there was no showing that private respondent Siapno-Sanchez has been served a copy of the decision before she procured a copy of it from the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator on August 26, 1996. Hence, as regards her, the notice of appeal was filed on time. Therefore, the Provincial Adjudicator denied the Motion to Quash or Suspend Implementation of the Writ of Execution with respect to private respondent Berma, and approved and granted the same motion with respect to private respondent Siapno-Sanchez. Petitioner-spouses filed the petition by registered mail on May 8, 2000. The petition was denied due course and dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their appeal on the ground of late filing. RULING: The petition is dismissed. The Court of Appeals granted petitioner-spouses a 15-day extension, within which to file their intended petition. The action of the Court of Appeals was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Thus, as the original deadline of petitioner-spouses was April 18, 2000, they had until May 3, 2000 to file their intended petition. Petitioner-spouses, however, filed the petition on May 8, 2000. Petitioner-spouses even admit that their petition in the Court of Appeals was filed five days after the extended period. It is therefore clear that the Court of Appeals simply applied the rules, while petitioner-spouses concededly failed to observe the very same rules. As such, the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the petition of petitioner-spouses was discretion duly exercised, not misused or abused. Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is so because "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit one’s purpose. In this connection, Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio is instructive: The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act

down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x. In this case, nowhere in the petition did petitioner-spouses show that the issuance of the Resolutions dated June 2, 2000 and January 1, 2001 was patent and gross that would warrant striking them down through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. AUGUST 2013 ROMULO L. NERI v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 202243, August 07, 2013 J. Velasco, Jr. Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to the parties. When there are two criminal cases that are consolidated together, it must be for the purpose of expediency and speedy disposition of justice. If not, the same shall be denied. FACTS: Petitioner Romulo L. Neri (Neri) served as Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) during the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In connection with what had been played up as the botched Philippine-ZTE National Broadband Network (NBN) Project, the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), the Sandiganbayan filed two (2) criminal Informations, the first against Benjamin Abalos, for violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act and the second against Neri, also for the same violation. The cases were raffled to the Fourth and Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan respectively. Vis-à-vis the same project, the Ombudsman would also later file an information against MacapagalArroyo and another information against her and several others in the anti-graft court’s 4th Division. In the ensuing trial in the Neri case following the arraignment and pre-trial proceedings, six (6) individuals took the witness stand on separate dates to testify for the prosecution. Thereafter, the prosecution twice moved for and secured continuance for the initial stated reason that the prosecution is still verifying the exact address of its next intended witness and then that such witness cannot be located at his given address. In the meantime, a pre-trial conference was conducted in the Abalos case following which the Fourth Division issued a Pre-Trial Order containing, among other things, a list of witnesses and documents the prosecution intended to present. Neri, whose name appeared high on the list, took the witness stand against Abalos in the Abalos case. On January 3, 2012, in SB-10-CRM-0099, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), OMB, moved for its consolidation with SB-10-CRM-0098 (People v. Abalos), SB-11-CRM-0467 (People v. Arroyo, et al.) and SB-11-0468 to 469 (People v. Arroyo). Neri opposed and argued

against consolidation. The Sandiganbayan Fifth Division, agreeing with the position thus taken by the OSP, granted the consolidation of SB-10-CRM-0099 with SB-10-CRM-0098. ISSUE: Whether the respondent court gravely erred in ordering a consolidation of the subject criminal cases when the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not allow a consolidation of criminal cases, only a consolidation of trials or joint trials in appropriate instances. RULING: The petition is granted. Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to the parties. Toward this end, consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket or consolidation of issues within those cases are permitted by the rules. To be sure, consolidation is allowed, as Rule 31 of the Rules of Court is entitled "Consolidation or Severance." The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for criminal cases is found in Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court stating: Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. - Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court. As complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan Revised Internal Rules which states: Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. – Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket number is raffled. While the assailed resolution is silent as to the resultant effect/s of the consolidation it approved, there is nothing in the records to show that what the prosecution vied for and what the Fifth Division approved went beyond consolidation for trial or joint trial. Not to be overlooked is the fact that the prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation partly on the aforequoted Sec. 22 of Rule 119 which indubitably speaks of a joint trial. Jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for consolidation of trial. As held in Caños v. Peralta, joint trial is permissible "where the actions arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties." In the case at bar, a consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos, although allowed, would nonetheless expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have no relation whatsoever in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby delaying the resolution of his case. And as in People v. Sandiganbayan, consolidation here would force petitioner to await the conclusion of testimonies against Abalos, however irrelevant or immaterial as to him (Neri)

before the case against the latter may be resolved––a needless, hence, oppressive delay in the resolution of the criminal case against him. What is more, there is a significant difference in the number of witnesses to be presented in the two cases. In fact, the number of prosecution witnesses in the Neri case is just half of that in Abalos. Clearly then, consolidation, assuming it to be proper owing to the existence of the element of commonality of the lineage of the offenses charged contemplated in Sec. 22 of Rule 119, should be ordered to achieve all the objects and purposes underlying the rule on consolidation, foremost of which, to stress, is the swift dispensation of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties. It should, however, be denied if it subverts any of the aims of consolidation. ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OR EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK v. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and THE PHILIPPINE EPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION G.R. No. 191424, August 07, 2013 J. Mendoza When the acts being prevented by a party have already been accomplished, a writ of prohibition is not proper. A prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. FACTS: The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution. Its corporate life expired on May 31, 2005. Notwithstanding, petitioner Vivas and his principals acquired the controlling interest in RBFI sometime in January 2006. At the initiative of Vivas and the new management team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI and results thereof highlighted the dismal operation of the rural bank. In view of those findings, certain measures calculated to revitalize the bank were allegedly introduced. On December 8, 2006, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued the Certificate of Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI for another fifty (50) years. Sometime in April 2008, the examiners from the Department of Loans and Credit of the BSP arrived at the ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of the bank, which Vivas appealed. Thereafter, the Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 1255 placing ECBI under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework because of serious findings and supervisory concerns noted during the general examination. Vivas claimed that the BSP took the above courses of action due to the joint influence exerted by a certain hostile shareholder and a former BSP examiner. Vivas moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 1255 on the grounds of nonobservance of due process and arbitrariness. The ISD II, on several instances, had invited the BOD of ECBI to discuss matters pertaining to the placement of the bank under PCA framework and other supervisory concerns before making the appropriate recommendations to the MB. The proposed meeting, however, did not materialize due to postponements sought by Vivas.

In its letter, dated February 20, 2009, the BSP directed ECBI to explain why it transferred the majority shares of RBFI without securing the prior approval of the MB in apparent violation of Subsection X126.2 of the Manual of Regulation for Banks (MORB). Also, the scheduled March 31, 2009 general examination of the books, records and general condition of ECBI with the cut-off date of December 31, 2008, did not push through. According to Vivas, ECBI asked for the deferment of the examination pending resolution of its appeal before the MB. In view of ECBI’s refusal to comply with the required examination, the MB issued Resolution No. 726, imposing monetary penalty/fine on ECBI, and referred the matter to the Office of the Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of appropriate legal action. The ISD II then reiterated its demand upon the ECBI BOD to allow the BSP examiners to conduct a general examination, which the ECBI asked again to be deferred due to the pendency of certain unresolved issues subject of its appeal before the MB, and because Vivas was then out of the country. The ISD II denied ECBI’s request and ordered the general examination to proceed as previously scheduled. Thereafter, the MB issued Resolution No. 823, approving the issuance of a cease and desist order against ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and transactions that were considered unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from doing such other acts or transactions constituting fraud or might result in the dissipation of its assets. On June 10, 2009, the OSI filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents against certain officials and employees of ECBI. On March 4, 2010, the MB issued Resolution No. 276, prohibiting the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership. Hence, this petition for prohibition. ISSUE: Whether the MB committed grave abuse of discretion for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership. RULING: The petition is denied. Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. In our jurisdiction, the rule on prohibition is enshrined in Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, to wit: Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that the judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as the law and justice require. x x x x. Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the petition should have been filed with the CA pursuant to the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or important reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. The MB Committed No Grave Abuse of Discretion In any event, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MB for the issuance of the assailed Resolution No. 276. The thrust of Vivas’ argument is that ECBI did not commit any financial fraud and, hence, its placement under receivership was unwarranted and improper. Vivas argues that implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing, invoking Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 which states that the BSP may take over the management of a rural bank after due hearing. The Court has taken this into account, but it appears from all over the records that ECBI was given every opportunity to be heard and improve on its financial standing. The records disclose that BSP officials and examiners met with the representatives of ECBI, including Vivas, and discussed their findings. There were also reminders that ECBI submit its financial audit reports for the years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit them and a written explanation of such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty. More importantly, ECBI was heard on its motion for reconsideration. For failure of ECBI to comply, the MB came out with Resolution No. 1548 denying its request for reconsideration of Resolution No. 726. Having been heard on its motion for reconsideration, ECBI cannot claim that it was deprived of its right under the Rural Bank Act. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS ET AL. G.R. No. 168137, August 07, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe

When a court grants a motion to release founded on legal bases supporting its , it therefore did not gravely abuse its discretion. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In order to be qualified as "grave," the abuse of discretion must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. FACTS: On the strength of a Warrant of Seizure and Detention by the Bureau of Customs, 73 container vans loaded with 29,796 bags of imported rice (subject goods) were seized and detained for alleged violation of the "Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines" (TCCP). The seizure was thereafter, docketed as Batangas Seizure Identification No. 02-03. On February 7, 2003, KCTMPC, claiming ownership over the foregoing shipment, moved to intervene in the seizure proceedings and further sought the quashal of the seizure warrant. The BoC granted KCTMPC’s motion to intervene but denied its motion to quash seizure warrant. After the formal hearing of the case, the BoC rendered a Decision in favor of KCTMPC, ordering the release of the 73 container vans loaded with the subject goods. As the BoC’s ruling was adverse to the government, the case was forwarded for automatic review to petitioner Secretary of the Department of Finance. Petitioner then reversed the Decision of the BoC and ordered the same to "determine the possible violations or applicable customs rules and regulations, and institute such actions, criminal or otherwise, against the person found to be responsible." KCTMPC filed a Motion for Execution, contending that the Decision of the BoC had already become final and executory but such motion was denied. Aggrieved, KCTMPC filed a Petition for Review with Prohibition (petition for prohibition) before the CTA. Citing the Geotina case, petitioner argued that the subject goods should be considered as prohibited under Section 102(k) of the TCCP and as such, should not be released pending final determination of KCTMPC’s petition for prohibition. The CTA issued a Resolution which granted KCTMPC’s motion to release. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CTA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted KCTMPC’s motion to release. RULING: The petition is denied. The Court finds that the CTA did not gravely abuse its discretion when it granted KCTMPC’s motion to release since there lies cogent legal bases to support its conclusion that the subject goods were merely "regulated" and not "prohibited" commodities. Among others, the CTA correctly observed that the Geotina ruling was inapplicable due to the classification of the goods involved therein. As cited by the CTA, CB Circular No. 1389

dated April 13, 1993 classified imports into three (3) categories, namely: (a) "freely importable commodities" or those commodities which are neither "regulated" nor "prohibited" and the importation of which may be effected without any prior approval of or clearance from any government agency; (b) "regulated commodities" or those commodities the importation of which require clearances/permits from appropriate government agencies; and (c) "prohibited commodities" or those commodities the importation of which are not allowed by law. Under Annex 1 of the foregoing circular, rice and corn are enumerated as "regulated" commodities, unlike the goods in the Geotina case, which were, at that time, classified as "prohibited" commodities. Therefore, owing to this divergence, the CTA properly pronounced that the Geotina ruling is inapplicable. It is a standing jurisprudential rule that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In order to be qualified as "grave," the abuse of discretion must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. Finding that this characterization does not fit the CTA’s exercise of discretion in this case, the Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion attended its grant of KCTMPC’s motion to release. THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA AND ASEOCHE, ETC.v. ATTY. JOSEJINA C. FRIA G.R. No. 183014, August 07, 2013 J. Mendoza A trial court judge may immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. It must, however, be observed that the judge’s power to immediately dismiss a criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear. The judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause – that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. FACTS: The Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03-110 instituted before Branch 203. On July 29, 2005, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff (July 29, 2005 judgment), prompting the defendant in the same case to appeal. However, Branch 203 disallowed the appeal and consequently ordered that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the foregoing judgment. The July 29, 2005 judgment became final and executory. In its Complaint-Affidavit, The Law Firm alleged that as early as April 4, 2006, it had been following up on the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the July 29, 2005 judgment. However, Atty. Fria vehemently refused to perform her ministerial duty of issuing said writ. Atty. Fria posited that the draft writ of execution (draft writ) was not addressed to her and she maintained that she need not sign the draft writ since on April 18, 2006, the presiding judge issued an Order stating that he himself shall sign and issue the same.

On July 31, 2006, the prosecutor recommended that Atty. Fria be indicted for the crime of Open Disobedience. Atty. Fria filed a Motion for Determination of Probable Cause on the ground that the Rules on Criminal Procedure do not empower trial courts to review the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause and that such rules only give the trial court judge the duty to determine whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. Pending resolution of her motion, Atty. Fria filed a Manifestation with Motion stating that the Court had rendered a Decision in the case of Reyes v. Balde II (Reyes) – an offshoot of Civil Case No. 03-110 – wherein it was held that Branch 203 had no jurisdiction over the foregoing civil case. In response, The Law Firm filed its Comment/Opposition, contending that Atty. Fria already committed the crime of Open Disobedience 119 days before the Reyes ruling was rendered and hence, she remains criminally liable for the aforestated charge. The MTC ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. It found that aside from the fact that Atty. Fria is a judicial officer, The Law Firm failed to prove the existence of the other elements of the crime of Open Disobedience. The RTC affirmed the MTC’s ruling. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in sustaining the MTC’s dismissal of the case for Open Disobedience against Atty. Fria for lack of probable cause. RULING: The petition is denied. Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court judge may immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. It must, however, be observed that the judge’s power to immediately dismiss a criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear. In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor’s authority, it must be stressed that the judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause – that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence. Applying these principles to the case at bar would lead to the conclusion that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. The dismissal ought to be sustained since the records clearly disclose the unmistakable absence of the integral elements of the crime of Open Disobedience. To elucidate, the second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is a judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been regarded as null and void due to Branch 203’s lack of jurisdiction

over

the

said

case.

Hence, since it is explicitly required that the subject issuance be made within the scope of a superior authority’s jurisdiction, it cannot therefore be doubted that the second element of the crime of Open Disobedience does not exist. Lest it be misunderstood, a court – or any of its officers for that matter – which has no jurisdiction over a particular case has no authority to act at all therein. In this light, it cannot be argued that Atty. Fria had already committed the crime based on the premise that the Court’s pronouncement as to Branch 203’s lack of jurisdiction came only after the fact. Verily, Branch 203’s lack of jurisdiction was not merely a product of the Court’s pronouncement in Reyes. The said fact is traced to the very inception of the proceedings and as such, cannot be accorded temporal legal existence in order to indict Atty. Fria for the crime she stands to be prosecuted. The Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MTC as correctly found by the RTC. It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an “evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.” LEE PUE LIONG a.k.a. PAUL LEE v. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE G.R. No. 181658, August 07, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. Furthermore, in Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party. FACTS: Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intracorporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI. On July 19, 1999, petitioner’s siblings including respondent and some unidentified persons took over and barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and other factory employees were unable to enter the factory premises. This incident led to the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 against Nixon Lee and 972-V99 against Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and respondent, which are now pending in different courts in Valenzuela City. On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretary’s Certificate issued by Virginia Lee on even date) caused the filing of a verified Petitionfor the Issuance of an Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 232238which covers a

property owned by CHI. The RTC granted the petition and directed the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of the lost one. Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among others, that the Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that respondent was in possession of the said Owner’s Duplicate Copy, the latter being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital documents of CHI. Thus, the RTC recalled and set aside its Order. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated May 9, 2000 filed before the City Prosecutor of Manila, respondent accused petitioner of two cases of perjury. Initially, the Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case. However, in the Review Resolution by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrosino A. Sulla, the recommendation to dismiss the case was set aside. Thereafter, said City Prosecutor filed the Information against petitioner before the MeTC of Manila, Branch 28. In its Order dated May 7, 2003, the MeTC gave both the defense and the prosecution the opportunity to submit their motion and comment respectively as regards the issue raised by petitioner’s counsel. Complying with the MeTC’s directive, petitioner filed the aforementioned Omnibus Motion asserting that in the crime of perjury punishable under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of any private offended party. As such, a private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution in this case. The court denied the Omnibus Motion. On petition for certiorari, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, holding that the presence of the private prosecutor who was under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor during the criminal proceedings of the two perjury cases is not proscribed by the rules. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the honorable CA committed grave error when it upheld the resolution of the MeTC that there is a private offended party in the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest. RULING: The petition is denied. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable." Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:

SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.—Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended party as "the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed." In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, the Court rejected petitioner’s theory that it is only the State which is the offended party in public offenses like bigamy. The Court explained that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party. Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages. Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action." Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. CORAZON B. BAELLO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 200858, August 07, 2013 J. Carpio, Jr. When the validity of a land title has long been settled in a previous case, an action to annul the same is already barred from being questioned in another case despite the fact that they are in different actions. Conclusiveness of judgment does not require identity of the causes of action for it to work. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. FACTS: Pedro Baello and Nicanora Baello are the owners of a parcel of land registered with OCT No. (804) 53839. When Pedro died intestate in December 3, 1971, he left 32 surviving heirs including respondents herein. On October 30, 1974, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 569 creating a committee to expropriate the Dagat-Dagatan Lagoon and its adjacent areas, including the properties of the siblings (Baello property and Rodriguez property).The National Housing Authority (NHA) took possession of the properties after the caretaker was compelled to leave. The Baello and Rodriguez heirs, for fear of losing their lives and those of their families, decided to remain silent and did not complain. On 23 February 1987, after the EDSA People Power Revolution, the heirs of Baello executed an extrajudicial partition of Pedro’s estate, which included the Baello property. Respondents were issued TCT No. 280647 over an undivided portion of the Baello property. On 18 August 1987, the NHA filed an action for eminent domain against the heirs of Baello and Rodriguez before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause of action. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Order of the RTC. The NHA filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court (SC), which the Court denied due course to the petition on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in affirming the order of the RTC. On 5 November 1993, the NHA filed a complaint for nullity of OCT No. (804) 53839. The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of estoppel and res judicata and also because the issue on the legal nature and ownership of the property covered by OCT No. (804) 53839 has already been barred by a final judgment. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Again, the NHA went to the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the CA but the Court, in the case docketed as G.R. No. 143230 denied the NHA’s petition for lack of merit. Respondents then filed an action for Recovery of Possession and Damages against the NHA and other respondents. The Regional Trial Court ruled that the dismissal of NHA’s complaint for expropriation and for declaration of nullity of OCT No. (804) 53839 left NHA with no right to hold possession of respondents’ property which was admittedly a part of Pedro’s land. The CA denied the NHA’s appeal. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in adopting the facts in G.R. No. 143230 when the case was not tried on the merits.

RULING: The petition is denied. The rule is that when material facts or questions, which were in issue in a former action and were admitted or judicially determined are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter. Jurisprudence expounds that the concept of res judicata embraces two aspects. The first, known as "bar by prior judgment," or "estoppel by verdict," is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second, known as "conclusiveness of judgment," otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. In this case, the NHA’s petition is barred by conclusiveness of judgment. The SC sustains the CA in ruling that the main issue raised by the NHA is the validity of OCT No. (804) 53839 and such issue has long been settled by the SC in G.R. No. 143230. In that case, the Court ruled that the action to annul OCT No. (804) 53839 was barred by the decision in LRC Case No. 520, which the Republic did not nullify until November 1993, when it was already barred from questioning it. Conclusiveness of judgment does not require identity of the causes of action for it to work. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue arising in the second. Hence, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANGELES BELLATE, ET AL. G.R. No. 175685, August 07, 2013 J. Brion, Jr. When the CA does not affirm the RTC’s findings of facts, such as when both have ruled differently on the identity of the lands in a case, the Supreme Court may then review the findings of fact of the appellate court. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the CA is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. However, the Court enumerated the exceptional circumstances when the Supreme Court may review the findings of fact of the CA, such as when the lower courts’ findings of fact are conflicting. FACTS: On December 28, 1975, respondent Angeles Bellate filed Free Patent Application (FPA) over Lot No. 2624, in Barangay Matobato, Calbayog City. Pursuant to the FPA, the Register of Deeds issued OCT No. 1546 in favour of Angeles. On February 19, 1980, Enriquita BellateQuizan filed a protest against the LMB, praying for the annulment of the FPA in favour of

Angeles, contending that it was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation because Angeles did not state the fact that the land had other occupants aside from him. Meanwhile, Lot No. 2624 was divided into two smaller lots, described as Lot Nos. 2624A and 2624-B. Respondent Jesus Cabanto bought the smaller lot (Lot No. 2624-B) from Angeles which then led to the cancellation of OCT No. 1546, and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 770 for Lot No. 2624-A, in the name of Angeles, and TCT No. 771 for Lot No. 2624-B, in the name of Cabanto. Acting on Enriquita’s protest, the Director of Lands ordered Supervising Land Examiner Jovencio D. Bulan to conduct a formal investigation on Lot No. 2624.On the basis of this report, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a case against Angeles and spouses Cabanto and Marieta Juanerio (Juanerio) for the reversion of land to the mass of public domain and for the annulment of the granted free patent and title with the RTC. During the pre-trial, the counsel of the respondents informed the RTC about the pendency of Civil Case No. 137-CC, an action for ownership and recovery of possession of Lot No. 2624-B which respondent Cabanto instituted in the RTC of Calbayog City, Branch 31, against Fideles Quizan, Eduardo Quizan, Preciosa Bellate, Constancio Cabaliza and Uldarico Pania. The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. The Republic appealed the case to the CA, which remanded it back to the RTC for trial on the merits. On October 7, 1996, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the premise that the land which was the subject of dispute was different from the land previously occupied by Eusebia. The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA denied the appeal. Hence, this present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether this court may review the case under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. RULING: The petition is granted. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the CA is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. In several decisions, however, the Court enumerated the exceptional circumstances when the Supreme Court may review the findings of fact of the CA. In the present case, the Court agrees with the Republic that the petition falls within the exceptions because the lower courts’ findings of fact are conflicting. In the present petition, the CA did not affirm the RTC’s findings of facts. The RTC compared the tax declarations and differences in areas and boundaries of the two properties and held that the two are distinct and separate parcels of land. On the other hand, the CA ruled that the identity of the two properties was ever raised by the parties and that the issue raised before the RTC was for the determination of whether Angeles made false statements in his application for Free Patent. Furthermore, the appellate court found that the subject lot is part of Eusebia’s property.

While both the RTC and the CA decisions ruled in favor of the respondents, the Republic correctly observed, however, that the RTC and the CA arrived at contradicting findings of facts. The RTC’s findings that Lot No. 2624 was not the same parcel of land originally owned by Eusebia cannot be reconciled with the CA’s findings that Lot No. 2624 was part of the 27,930square-meter land of Eusebia. The conclusions being conflicting, the Court then has the authority to review the case under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. MARY SHEILA ARCOBILLAS G.R. No. 179648, August 07, 2013 J. Del Castillo A Motion for Reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari. The rationale for the rule is that the law intends to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be had. It bears to stress that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of procedure. It is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with. FACTS: On May 15, 1998, the PNB Foreign Currency Denomination-Savings Account of NomadSpoor was credited with US$138.00. However, instead of posting its peso equivalent of P5,517.10, Arcobillas, the assigned administrative teller at PNB Bacolod-Lacson branch, erroneously posted US$5,517.10, resulting in an overcredit of US$5,379.10. Said amount was later withdrawn by Nomad-Spoor to the damage of PNB in the amount of P214,641.23. The misposting was discovered only about seven months later. After investigation, Arcobillas was administratively charged with neglect of duty. On February 24, 2000, PNB’s Administrative Adjudication Panel found Arcobillas guilty of gross neglect of duty and meted upon her the penalty of forced resignation with benefits.Upon denial of her plea for reconsideration, Arcobillas instituted a Complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against PNB, PNB’s Senior Manager Reynald A. Rey and Senior Vice-President Rosauro C. Macalagay. The Labor Arbiter found no sufficient evidence to establish gross and habitual negligence and that the misposting was committed without malice, bad faith or dishonest motive. The NLRC affirmed with modification the LA’s Decision. PNB received a copy of the said Decision on October 14, 2004. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration, PNB filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari until December 23, 2004. On said date, PNB filed its Petition for Certiorari before the CA. Subsequently on May 25, 2005, the NLRC issued an Entry of Final Judgment declaring its Decision final and executor. Despite the non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC, the CA took cognizance of PNB’s Petition for Certiorari. Nevertheless, it dismissed the same. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals can correct the evaluation of the evidence by, or the factual findings of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari. RULING: The petition is denied. The Court recognizes that “the finality of the NLRC’s Decision does not preclude the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. That the NLRC issues an entry of judgment after the lapse of ten (10) days from the parties’ receipt of its Decision will only give rise to the prevailing party’s right to move for the execution thereof but will not prevent the CA from taking cognizance of a Petition for Certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations." However, it is a well-established rule that "a Motion for Reconsideration” is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari. The rationale for the rule is that the law intends to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be had. Of course, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down exceptions when the filing of a Petition for Certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a Motion for Consideration such as "(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a Motion for Consideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relied by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved." Here, PNB did not at all allege to which of the above-mentioned exceptions this case falls. Neither did it present any plausible justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC. Despite this, the CA still took cognizance of PNB’s Petition for Certiorari and ignored this significant flaw. It bears to stress that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of procedure. It is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with. Thus, PNB’s "failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC before availing of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity." In view thereof, the CA erred in entertaining the Petition for Certiorari filed before it. It follows, therefore, that the proceedings before it and its assailed Decision are considered null and void. Hence, the final and executory Decision of the NLRC dated August 31, 2004 stands. FLORD NICSON CALAWAG v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS, ET AL./ MICAH P. ESPIA, ET AL. v. DR. CARLOS BAYLON, ET AL. G.R. No. 207412/207542, August 07, 2013 J. Brion

When a party wishes to compel another do a duty expected of the latter, the same should be through a petition for certiorari and mandamus. However, to be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, the party must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction presents a fourth requirement: it is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper. FACTS: The petitioners are students of UP Visayas under a scholarship from the Department of Science and Technology-Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine Research and Development. When they were preparing their thesis in the first semester of their second year, the petitioners sent to Dean Baylon their tentative thesis titles for approval. However, the Dean questioned the propriety of the thesis topics and subsequently disapproved the petitioner’s thesis composition. The petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), asking it to order Dean Baylon to approve and constitute the petitioners’ thesis committees and approve their thesis titles. They also asked that the RTC issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Dean Baylon, and order him to perform such acts while the suit was pending. The RTC granted a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which Dean Baylon allegedly refused to follow. UP Visayas eventually assailed this order before the Court of Appeals (CA) through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO). The CA issued a TRO against the implementation of the RTC’s order, holding that the petitioners had no clear right to compel Dean Baylon to approve the composition of their thesis committees as a matter of course. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA committed an error in judgment in setting aside the preliminary mandatory injunction that the RTC issued against Dean Baylon. RULING: The petition is denied. To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioners must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction presents a fourth requirement: it is justified only in a clear

case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper. The CA did not err in ruling that the petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right that needs the protection of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The SC supports the CA’s conclusion that the dean has the discretion to approve or disapprove the composition of a thesis committee, and, hence, the petitioners had no right for an automatic approval and composition of their thesis committees. By necessary implication, the dean’s power to approve includes the power to disapprove the composition of a thesis committee. Thus, under the UP System’s faculty manual, the dean has complete discretion in approving or disapproving the composition of a thesis committee. Absent any finding of grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot interfere with the exercise of the dean’s prerogative without encroaching on the college’s academic freedom. The courts may not interfere with their exercise of discretion unless there is a clear showing that they have arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their judgment. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY G.R. No. 198010, August 12, 2013 J. Peralta When a person wishes to correct or change the entries in the Civil Registrar regarding her name and status, it is required that the indispensable parties must be impleaded in the proceedings. The Rules of Court mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. FACTS: On March 8, 2004 respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is “Anita Sy” when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as “Norma S. Lugsanay.” She further claimed that her school records, PRC Board of Medicine Certificate and passport bear the name “Norma S. Lugsanay”. She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother. She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese. Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly granted. However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and set the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office for their information and guidance. Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement. On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent and directed the City Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the correction or change of the entries. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in toto the order of the RTC, finding that the respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties. RULING: The petition is granted. In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the petition. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA. The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make. Furthermore, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI, AS REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JEJOMAR C. BINAY v. EMERITA B. ODENA

G.R. No. 191661, August 13, 2013 CJ. Sereno When a party wishes to appeal a decision rendered by the CSC, the CA has jurisdiction over the case and the proper recourse is a petition for review under Rule 43. The jurisdiction of the CA over petitions for review under Rule 43 is not limited to judgments and final orders of the CSC, but can extend to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions issued by the latter. FACTS: In a case decided by the Supreme Court in 2007 (2007 Decision), the Court ruled that respondent, a teacher employed by petitioner, had been illegally dismissed and was thus ordered to be reinstated and paid her backwages, computed from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, but in no case to exceed five (5) years. The 2007 Decision, being final and executor, the CSC then directed the incumbent Mayor of Makati to immediately reinstate respondent t her former position and cause the payment of all her salaries and other benefits, as adjudged by the SC The CSC, upon motion of respondent, directed the incumbent Mayor of Makati to immediately reinstate respondent to her former position and cause the payment of all her salaries and other benefits from the date of her removal from service up to her reinstatement However, this directive was never complied with, which then compelled respondent to instead opt for an early retirement instead, effective February 13, 2008. Petitioner thereafter paid her supposed back salaries and other benefits. In line with this, respondent signed in favour of petitioner a “Release, Quitclaim and Waiver.” Respondent alleges that after realizing that she had been shortchanged by petitioner, she complained to the CSC. She claimed in her Letter-Complaint that the payment made to her, the amount of which corresponded to five years of service, was insufficient to cover her almost eight years of suffering. The CSC ruled in favour of respondent The CSC ruled in favor of respondent, and directed petitioner to pay her backwages and other benefits from the period of her illegal dismissal until her early retirement, or for a period of seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-eight (28) days. The CSC, in its Resolution No. 082264, stated that the 5-year limit was inequitable and ordered the incumbent City Mayor of Makati to recomputed the full back salaries and other benefits of respondent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied and the motion and affirmed the earlier Resolution. In a subsequent Resolution, Resulotion No. 090622, the CSC stated that res judicata invoked by petitioner must give way to the higher interest of justice. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA, which the appellate court dismissed. Petitioner then filed before the Supreme Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari (Motion for Extension), praying for an additional period of thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari, which the Court denied for failure to state material dates. In the meantime, on 7 May 2010, petitioner filed the instant Petition. ISSUE:

Whether petitioner undertook an improper remedy when it filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA to question the Resolutions issued by the CSC. RULING: The petition is denied. Although the Court ruled that a Rule 43 Petition with the CA is the proper remedy to assail the CSC resolutions, it however, found that the reasons advanced by petitioner are correct. First, the jurisdiction of the CA over petitions for review under Rule 43 is not limited to judgments and final orders of the CSC, but can extend to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions issued by the latter. Second, although the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable, the CA failed to consider that there are exceptions to this rule, as illustrated in this case. A writ of execution is a direct command of the court to the sheriff to carry out the mandate of the writ, which is normally the enforcement of a judgment. By analogy, the CSC Resolutions were orders of execution and were issued in connection with the implementation of this Court’s 2007 Decision. It is obvious from both the body and the dispositive portions of the CSC Resolutions that they carried instructions to enforce this Court’s 2007 Decision, albeit erroneously made. The directive addressed to petitioner to recompute the amount of full back salaries and other benefits is derived from the enforcement of this Court’s 2007 Decision. In a similar vein, the dispositive portion of CSC Resolution No. 090622,64 which dismissed petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution, states as follows: Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in treating the CSC Resolutions as orders of execution that were issued in connection with the implementation of this Court’s 2007 Decision. The CA, however erred in dismissing petitioner’s Rule 43 Petition for being improper. To recall, the CA ruled that an order of execution is not appealable under Section 1(f), Rule 41of the Rules of Court. It reasoned that the correct remedy should have been a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Section 1(f), Rule 41provides, in pertinent part: SECTION 1. Subject of Appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: xxxx f) An order of execution; xxxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Indeed, the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable; otherwise, a case would never end. The CA, however, failed to consider that there are exceptions to this rule. This Court in Banaga v. Majaducon enumerated the exceptions as follows: 1) the writ of execution varies the judgment; 2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; xxxx 6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority; In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus. MASAYUKI HASEGAWA v. LEILA F. GIRON G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013 J. Perez A party who files a complaint against another need not show proof that the acts alleged of happened. It is sufficient that there is probable cause to file such case. The prosecutor’s findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion.A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. FACTS: On 16 September 2006, respondent filed a Complaint Affidavit for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner and several John Does. Respondent alleged that sometime on December 2005, she and her officemate, Leonarda Marcos (Marcos) filed a complaint against their employer Pacific Consultants International, J.F. Cancio & Associates, Jaime F. Cancio, Tesa Tagalo and petitioner for illegal salary deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay, and non-remittance of SSS contributions. Respondent averred that since the filing of said complaint, they have been subjected to threats and verbal abuse by petitioner to pressure them to withdraw the complaint. Respondent had also filed separate complaints for grave threats, grave coercion, slander and unjust vexation against petitioner. Said cases are pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City. Petitioner denied the accusation and he stated that he had nothing to do with the kidnapping; that he was neither the "brains" nor a "participant" in the alleged crimes; that he did not know the alleged kidnappers; and, that he was not present inside one of the vehicles talking with one of the abductors at the place alleged by Marcos. Petitioner asserted that respondent

and Marcos are extorting money from him because the instant case was filed right after the negotiations to settle the civil aspect of the three cases they filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and MeTC Pasay failed. In a Resolution dated 5 January 2007, Senior State Prosecutor Emilie Fe M. De Los Santos dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Respondent filed an appeal from the Resolution of the prosecutor dismissing her complaint. In her Petition for Review before the DOJ, respondent claimed that the Investigating Prosecutor gravely erred when she recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioner despite overwhelming evidence showing the existence of probable cause. Finding no basis to overturn the findings of the Investigating Prosecutor, then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales dismissed the petition. On petition for certiorari before the CA, the appellate court reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the DOJ and ordered the filing of Information for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner. The Court of Appeals found that the prosecutor usurped the duties belonging to the court when she "overstretched her duties and applied the standards, not of ordinary prudence and cautiousness, nor of mere ‘reasonable belief’ and probability, but of a full-blown trial on the merits, where rules on admissibility of testimonies and other evidence strictly apply." Hence, the instant petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether the CA committed grievous error in reversing the finding of the Secretary of justice that no probable cause exists in the instant case. 2. Whether the CA committed grievous error in granting respondent’s petition for certiorari despite raising questions of fact and being unmeritorious. 3. Whether the CA committed grievous error in ruling that respondent’s petition for certiorari is the proper mode of appeal from judgments of the Secretary of Justice. RULING: The petition is denied. The elementary rule is that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The grant by the Court of Appeals of the certiorari petition is a determination that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention for lack of probable cause. The decision of whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor. Hence, the courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations, or reinvestigations, or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an offender. The prosecutor’s findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of

discretion. In this present case, there is a need for judicial review and the Court sustains the CA’s reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of the DOJ. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. It must be mentioned, though, that in order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present. In this case, all elements were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime may have been committed and petitioner may have committed it. Respondent, an office worker, claimed that she and her friend were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly boarded into a vehicle. They were detained for more than 24-hours. Whether or not the accusations would result in a conviction is another matter. It is enough, for purposes of the preliminary investigation that the acts complained of constitute the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her findings dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was committed. She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a full-blown trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated in according with the rules of evidence. Thus, the CA correctly held that when the DOJ ruled that there is no probable cause to indict petitioner, it already amounted to grave abuse of discretion on the latter’s part. Hence, resort by respondent to the extraordinary writ of certiorari and the grant thereof by the CA is correct. PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 155943, August 19, 2013 CJ. Sereno When there is a similarity of parties, subject matter and cause of action and that judgments were issued on the merits, a subsequent filing of an action involving the same elements are barred by the prior judgment. However, the identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. FACTS: Spouses Lopez and Spouses Ng acquired a 185,317 sq.m. property located in Almanza, Las Piñas City, from a certain Philip Dumbrique on 7 February 1977. Thereafter, the latter’s Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-50432 was cancelled. On 6 January 1978, TCT No. 61176 was issued in the name of Sps. Lopez, and TCT No. 61177 in the name of Sps. Ng.

May 1978—after the property had been transferred to and registered in the names of Sps. Ng and Sps. Lopez—a claim adverse to theirs and Dumbrique’s cropped up. Lilia MayugaFusilero filed a Complaint against them with the Court of First Instance (Fusilero Case). The CFI ruled in favor of the Lopezes and the Ngs. The CA affirmed the CFI’s Decision. She appealed to the Supreme Court, but her appeal was also denied. Eventually, Sps. Lopez sold their property to respondent Sps. Martel, resulting in the cancellation of the former’s title and the issuance of TCT No. T-57471 in the latter’s names. While the Fusilero case was pending, Enrique, Narciso, Reuben, Mario, Teodorica, Beatriz, Ricardo, and Rolando —all surnamed Factor— executed a Deed of Sale of Unregistered Lands dated 21 January 1975 in favor of petitioner. After the purchase of the property, petitioner enclosed it with a fence made of cement hollow blocks. It subdivided and developed the property into what is now known as "Pilar Village." On 9 December 1975, the Factors filed an Application for Registration and Confirmation of Title to Parcels of Land with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Case 1). The CFI in Case 1 rendered its Decision declaring the Factors as the rightful owners of the subject property. Consequently, it ordered the issuance of the decrees of registration and the corresponding certificates of title. In compliance with the Order, TCTs in the names of the Factors were issued on 13 December 1994. After the issuance of their TCTs, respondents filed a Petition to Reopen, Review, and Set Aside the Decision of the CFI in Case 1. The RTC issued its Decision granting respondents’ Petition to Reopen. It set aside its earlier Decision awarding the property to the Factors and ordered the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificates of title in respondents’ favour. Neither of the parties appealed the RTC Decision. Instead of appealing the Decision of the RTC, the Factors filed anew a Complaint for Annulment of Title (Case 2), alleging that TCT Nos. 61176 and 61177 were spurious and could not be used as basis for any claim of title. The Sps. Lopez and Sps. Ng filed a Motion to Dismiss Case 2, alleging that the cause of action of the Factors was barred by prior judgment and res judicata. The RTC in Case 2 issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision and dismissed the appeal of the Factors. The Factors then filed a Petition for Review with the Court, where the case was docketed as G.R. No. 132334. At the same time, petitioner filed with the RTC of Las Piñas City, on 15 July 1997, a Complaint for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of respondents’ title (Case 3). Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Quieting of Title which the RTC granted. As to the Petition for Review filed by the Factors in Case 2, it was denied. ISSUES: 1. Whether the CA erred in holding that the equitable principle of laches cannot be applied against respondents, who are holders of a Certificate of Title.

2. Whether the CA erroneously applied the principle of stare decisis and the rule on res judicata. RULING: The petition is denied. The facts of this case clearly show that petitioner’s cause of action is already barred by the prior judgments of the RTC in its Decision dated 8 December 1994 in Case 1 and of this Court in Case 2. If an action has been dismissed and the order of dismissal has become final, a prior judgment bars the institution of another action involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action as in the earlier case. The fundamental principle behind the doctrine of res judicata is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. That is, when a right or a fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court—so long as it remains unreversed— should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. In order that there may be res judicata, it is requisite (a) that the former judgment is final; (b) that it has been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) that it is a judgment on the merits; and (d) that, between the first and the second actions, there is identity of parties, subject-matter, and cause of action. The Decisions of the RTC in Case 1 and of this Court in Case 2— both of which ruled that respondents are the rightful owners of the property in question—have all become final and unappealable. In Case 2, this Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; the judgments were issued on the merits; and there was a similarity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The question of who has a better right to the property was already resolved by the RTC when it granted respondents’ Petition to set aside the CFI’s Decision granting the Factors’ Application for Registration and Confirmation of Title. Since neither of the parties appealed from this RTC Decision, it became final and unappealable. Hence, this Court ruled in Case 2 that the CA correctly affirmed the trial court’s Decision to grant respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. The cause of action of the Factors in their Complaint for Annulment of Title was, even then, already barred by the prior judgment in Case 1. Concomitantly, the issue of whether or not TCT Nos. 61176 and 61177 are valid titles has already been resolved in Case 1 and subsequently in Case 2. Both cases already involved the Factors and the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioner and respondents. The subject matter in the foregoing cases is the same property that is the subject of the instant Petition. Lastly, the prayers in both cases are the same. It must be kept in mind that the principle of res judicata does not require absolute but only substantial identity of parties, subject matter, and issues. We rule that there is identity of causes of action, the test for which is to look into the facts or evidence necessary to maintain the two actions, to wit:

Hornbook is the rule that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity. Otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. HADJI PANGSAYAN T. ABDULRAHMAN v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR MINDANAO AND GUIAMALUDIN A. SENDAD G.R. No. 175977, August 19, 2013 CJ. Sereno When there is a failure on the party to comply with Section 5, Rule 65, which is to implead other persons in the case, it is not a ground to have the case dismissed. It is stated in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, states that neither the misjoinder nor the non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. FACTS: Petitioner was a Land Management Inspector of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat. In a letter dated 29 August 1990 addressed to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), private respondent reported the alleged illegal activities of petitioner and Guialil Sayutin (Sayutin), a CENRO employee also. Petitioner solicited from him the total amount of PP5,450 as consideration for the titling in private respondent’s name of lands located in South Upi, Maguindanao, and covered by the homestead applications of Unos Pacutin and Ting Midtimbang. On the other hand, Sayutin received documents belonging to private respondent from Ellen Alcoriza (Alcoriza), records officer of CENRO Salimbao, Sultan Kudarat, without authority therefor. Sayutin later lost the aforesaid documents. The letter-complaint found its way to the Ombudsman. Instead of submitting a counteraffidavit in compliance, petitioner filed a Manifestation stating that the private respondent had already executed an Affidavit of Desistance. In that affidavit, private respondent indicated that he had forgiven petitioner after the latter produced the missing documents and returned the money solicited together with incidental expenses. Thus, petitioner prayed that he be dropped as respondent in the complaint. However, the Ombudsman still recommended the dismissal of petitioner, Sayutin, and Alcoriza from service. It found Sayutin and Alcoriza guilty of gross neglect of duty and petitioner of grave misconduct. As regards the Manifestation and the attached Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner, the Ombudsman ruled that these documents failed to controvert and, in fact, admitted the material allegations of the complaint. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Ombudsman denied. Petitioner then filed a Motion for New Trial or Second Motion for Reconsideration which the Ombudsman also denied for being a second motion for reconsideration. Under the mistaken notion that petitioner’s Motion for New Trial or Second Motion for Reconsideration had yet to be resolved by the Ombudsman, the new DENR Region XII RED

ordered the retention of petitioner in the latter’s position pending the resolution of the second motion for reconsideration. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit and the Decision attained finality. The Ombudsman then directed DENR XII RED officer-in-charge to implement the dismissal from the service of petitioner and to show proof of compliance within 10 days from receipt. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Status Quo Order before the CA, alleging that the Ombudsman had issued the Order of Implementation with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner also questioned the Order of Implementation for being a direct order to dismiss. On 21 July 2005, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing the petition for the following reasons: (1) failure to implead private respondent; and (2) failure to attach copies of the pleadings and documents relevant to the petition. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 17 August 2005. The CA issued the second assailed Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The CA also found additional grounds to dismiss the appeal. Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Order of Implementation. Thus, his petition was rendered dismissible for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The CA likewise ruled that there are three essential dates that must be indicated in a petition for certiorari: (1) when judgment or final order was received; (2) when the motion for reconsideration was filed; and (3) when notice of denial thereof was received. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Rules of Court should be given liberal construction, especially when there are substantial issues to be resolved. 2. Whether the CA misapprehended facts by concluding that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. RULING: The petition is denied. The acceptance of a petition for certiorari, and necessarily the grant of due course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Thus, the court may reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari (1) when there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or (2) when there are procedural errors, such as violations of the Rules of Court or Supreme Court circulars. In this case, the CA dismissed petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari because of procedural errors, namely: (1) failure to implead private respondent; (2) failure to attach copies of the pleadings and documents relevant to the petition; (3) failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the Order of Implementation; and, consequently, (4) failure to allege material dates in the petition. Petitioner argues that the rules of procedure should be liberally construed when substantial issues need to be resolved. Indeed, the rules of procedure need not always be applied in a strict, technical sense, since they were adopted to help secure and not override substantial justice. "In clearly meritorious cases, the higher demands of substantial justice must

transcend rigid observance of procedural rules." As in this case, the petition is meritorious even though the CA was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari in the light of the failure of petitioner to submit material documents. Failure to implead private respondent In this case, it was an error for the CA to dismiss the petition for failure to comply with Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which states: Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. — When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents. Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, states that neither the misjoinder nor the nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. If it was truly necessary to implead Guiamaludin Sendad, what the CA should have done was to order petitioner to add him as private respondent to the case. Failure to file a motion for reconsideration The CA stood ready to excuse the failure of petitioner to attach copies of the pleadings and documents relevant to the petition, since his omission could be remedied by requiring him to submit additional requirements necessary for the resolution of the petition. However, the CA could not excuse his failure to move for reconsideration of the issuance of the Order of Implementation prior to the filing of the petition for certiorari before it. On the other hand, petitioner insists that he has filed a motion for reconsideration not once, but twice. The CA is correct on this point. It is clear that upon receipt of a copy of the Order of Implementation dated 31 March 2004, petitioner immediately filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA three days later. The motions for reconsideration that petitioner referred to were filed by him in connection with the Resolution dated 14 March 1995 recommending his dismissal from service. There are well-settled exceptions to the general rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, none of them finds application in this case. ROSENDO R. CORALES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MUNICPAL MAYOR OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA AND DR. RODOLFO R. ANGELES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 186613, August 27, 2013 J. Perez Settled is the rule that for the courts to exercise the power of judicial review, the following must be extant: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have the "standing." Hence, when a case is still ripe or premature, a party cannot pre-empt by prematurely seeking judicial intervention, like filing an action for prohibition.

FACTS: Petitioner Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for three (3) consecutive terms, i.e., the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections. In his first term as local chief executive, petitioner Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the position of Municipal Administrator, whose appointment was unanimously approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sangguniang Bayan) per Resolution No. 98-64 dated 22 July 1998. During his second and third terms as municipal mayor, petitioner Corales renewed the appointment of petitioner Dr. Angeles. Following an audit on various local disbursements, Maximo Andal (Andal), the Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2006-007100 dated 6 October 2006 addressed to petitioner Corales who was asked to comment/reply. The aforesaid AOM, in sum, states that: 1) petitioner Dr. Angeles’ appointment as Municipal Administrator (during the second and third terms of petitioner Corales) was without legal basis for having been repeatedly denied confirmation by the Sangguniang Bayan; 2) petitioner Dr. Angeles can be considered, however, as a de facto officer entitled to the emoluments of the office for the actual services rendered; 3) nonetheless, it is not the Municipality of Nagcarlan that should be made liable to pay for petitioner Dr. Angeles’ salary. Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon, petitioner Corales, together with petitioner Dr. Angeles, opted to file a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna. In its turn, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on Andal’s behalf, who was impleaded in his official capacity, filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus grounded on lack of cause of action, prematurity and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. In its Order dated 17 May 2007, the trial court denied the said Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Andal was merely a nominal party. Respondent Republic, as represented by COA, as represented by Andal, consequently filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September 2007, as it unjustly denied respondent’s right to actively prosecute the case through a mere declaration that it was a nominal party despite a clear showing that the Petition for Prohibition referred to the respondent as a real party in interest. On 15 September 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision granting respondent’s Petition for Certiorari, thereby annulling and setting aside the RTC Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September 2007 and, accordingly, dismissing petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition with the court a quo. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a palpably erroneous resolution of a substantial question of law when it ordered the dismissal of petitioners’ suit for prohibition. RULING: The petition is dismissed.

It is beyond doubt that the issuance of an AOM is, indeed, an initial step in the conduct of an investigative audit considering that after its issuance there are still several steps to be conducted before a final conclusion can be made or before the proper action can be had against the Auditee. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner Corales’ claim that his comment thereon would be a mere formality. Further, even though the AOM issued to petitioner Corales already contained a recommendation for the issuance of a Notice of Disallowance, still, it cannot be argued that his comment/reply to the AOM would be a futile act since no Notice of Disallowance was yet issued. Again, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that Andal has already taken any affirmative action against petitioner Corales after the issuance of the AOM. The Supreme Court can hardly see any actual case or controversy to warrant the exercise of its power of judicial review. Settled is the rule that for the courts to exercise the power of judicial review, the following must be extant: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have the "standing." An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a mere hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. Closely related thereto is that the question must be ripe for adjudication. A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. The third requisite is legal standing or locus standi, which has been defined as a personal or substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing. The requisites of actual case and ripeness are absent in the present case. Hence, it is beyond question that in relation to his audit investigation function, Andal can validly and legally require petitioners to submit comment/reply to the AOM, which the latter cannot pre-empt by prematurely seeking judicial intervention, like filing an action for prohibition. Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is "no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In this case, petitioners insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust administrative remedies considering that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and appropriate remedial measure to assail the imposition under the AOM aside from an action for prohibition. This Court finds the said contention plain self-deception. As previously stated, petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative process was still in its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even granting that the AOM issued to petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is premature since there are still many administrative remedies available to

petitioners to contest the said AOM. Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: "[a]n aggrieved party may appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report, memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit." From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission proper. It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court. MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYANSORSOGON v. HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL. G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013 J. Reyes A party who, after complying with the requirements laid down by law, files a petition for continuing mandamus may institute the same with the RTC having jurisdiction of the place in controversy. Jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law. It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. A special civil action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred. FACTS: On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon. The petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog; and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code. Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others. The case was summarily dismissed by the RTC Branch 53 (designated environmental court) for lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTCfurther ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules. Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law. ISSUES: 1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the case. 2. Whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: a. there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; b. the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; c. petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency. RULING: The petition is granted. The RTC has the jurisdiction to resolve the environmental case. When the RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, it replied on SC A.O. No. 7 which defined the territorial areas of RTC in Regions 1 to 12 and Admin. Ciruclar No. 23-208 which designated environmental courts to try and decide violations of environmental laws committin within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The Court ruled that its territorial jurisdiction was limited within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide [the] case, as such authority rests before another coequal court." This reasoning was found by the Court to be erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners. None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law. It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC while A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to

the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts. Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect. At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically states that a special civil action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x." The petition is not dismissible on the ground that there is no final court decree, order or decision. The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law." The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit: (c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied. The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final. Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision." The petition is not dismissible on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942. The petition filed below does not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining operation; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these entities; and the perceived indifference of the DENR and local government officials over the issue. Resolution of these matters does not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the members of the Panel but requires an exercise of judicial function. Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary. The petition is not dismissible for failure to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency.

The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. Rule 8 only requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint. Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed.

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. SUMITOMO CORPORATION / SUMITOMO CORPORATION v. ASIA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 196723/G.R. No. 196728, August 28, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe When a party files another petition while one that is identical to it is pending before another tribunal, there constitutes a ground for forum shopping since the relief sought is the same. Forum shopping is treated as an act of malpractice and, in this accord, constitutes a ground for the summary dismissal of the actions involved. To be sure, the rule against forum shopping seeks to prevent the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues. FACTS: On March 15, 1996, Asian Construction entered into a Civil Work Agreement (Agreement) with Sumitomo for the construction of a portion of the Light Rail Transit System along the Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue, specifically, from Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City to Taft Avenue, Pasay City for a total cost of US$19,982,000.00 (Project). The said Agreement provides that the "validity, interpretation, enforceability, and performance of the same shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of the State of New York, U.S.A. (New York State Law), without regard to, or legal effect of, the conflicts of law provisions thereof" and that any dispute, controversy or claim arising therefrom "shall be solely and finally settled by arbitration." In May 1996, Sumitomo paid Asian Construction the amount of US$2,997,300.00 as advance payment to be recovered in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Later, an additional advance payment of US$1,998,200.00 was made in October 1997. In all, Asian Construction received from Sumitomo the amount of US$9,731,606.62, inclusive of the advance payments (before withholding tax of US$97,308.44). On September 1, 1998, Sumitomo informed Asian Construction that it was terminating the Agreement effective September 5, 1998. Sumitomo then requested Asian Construction to "make the necessary arrangements for the proper turnover of the Project.” Asian Construction, however, claimed that some claims were still left unpaid, hence, it sent Sumitomo a letter

demanding payment of the total amount of US$6,371,530.89. This was followed by several correspondences between the parties through 1999 to 2007 but no settlement was achieved. Asian Construction filed a complaint with the CIAC seeking payment for its alleged losses and reimbursements. Sumitomo filed a Motion to Dismiss, questioning the CIAC’s jurisdiction over the dispute on the ground that the arbitration should proceed in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of Japan. The motion was denied. The Arbitral Tribunal rendered the Partial Award which affirmed its jurisdiction over the dispute but held that the parties were bound by their Agreement that the substantive New York State Law shall apply in the resolution of the issues. It proceeded to dismiss both the claims and counterclaims of the parties on the ground that these had already prescribed under New York State Law’s six-year statute of limitations and ruled that, in any case, were it to resolve the same on the merits, "it would not produce an affirmative recovery for the claimant." Aggrieved, Asian Construction filed before the CA, a Rule 43 Petition for Review (First CA Petition), seeking the reversal of the Partial Award. Meanwhile, notwithstanding its dismissal of the claims and counterclaims, the Arbitral Tribunal further directed the parties to itemize their respective claims for costs and attorney’s fees and to submit factual proof and legal bases for their entitlement thereto. On March 17, 2010, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered the Final Award which granted Sumitomo’s claim for attorney’s fees in the amount of US$200,000.00. Dissatisfied with the Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling, Asian Construction filed another Rule 43 Petition for Review before the CA. The CA rendered a Resolution (July 23, 2010 Resolution), dismissing Asian Construction’s First CA Petition against the Partial Award on the ground of forum-shopping. Meanwhile, the CA gave due course to Asian Construction’s Second CA Petition assailing the Final Award and rendered a Decision on January 26, 2011, upholding the Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling except the award of attorney’s fees in favor of Sumitomo. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing Asian Construction’s First CA Petition on the ground of forum shopping. RULING: The petitions are denied. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. More particularly, forum shopping can be committed in three ways, namely: (a) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (b) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (c) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).

Forum shopping is treated as an act of malpractice and, in this accord, constitutes a ground for the summary dismissal of the actions involved. To be sure, the rule against forum shopping seeks to prevent the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues. In this case, the Court finds that the CA committed no reversible error in dismissing Asian Construction’s First CA Petition on the ground of forum shopping since the relief sought (i.e., the reconsideration of the Partial Award) and the allegations stated therein are identical to its opposition to Sumitomo’s claim for costs filed before the Arbitral Tribunal while CIAC Case No. 28-2008 was still pending. These circumstances clearly square with the first kind of forum shopping which thereby impels the dismissal of the First CA Petition on the ground of litis pendentia. MARIA LOURDES D. CASTELLS AND SHALIMAR CENTI-MANDANAS v. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES G.R. No. 188514, August 28, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe When a party files a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari, the court should not admit the same due to non-compliance with the reglementary period prescribed by the court. It is well-settled that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, the Court has recognized exceptions to the strict application of such rules, but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice. However, despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which now disallows an extension of the 60-day reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari, courts may nevertheless extend the same, subject to its sound discretion. FACTS: Petitioners were two of the 10 flight attendants of the respondent Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) who were transferred from Manila to Jeddah due to “operational requirements” (transfer order). However, after complying with the transfer order, both petitioners were told that their contract would no longer be renewed and that they were asked to resign. Petitioners, along with a co-flight attendant, Maria Joy Teresa O. Bilbao, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against SAUDIA. They alleged that they were dismissed because of their “old” age, being 39 to 40 years old at the time. The Labor Arbiter (LA) held SAUDIA guilty of illegal dismissal. It further held that the subject undertaking, which was akin to a quitclaim, did not bar petitioners and Bilbao from filing a case against SAUDIA. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed and set aside the LA’s ruling and thereby dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint. The petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Motion for Extension to File a Petition for Certiorari, praying that they be given a period of 15 days from January 18, 2008, or until February 2, 2008, within which to file the subject petition. The said motion was

granted. Since February 2, 2008 was a Saturday, petitioners filed the subject petition on the next working day, or on February 4, 2008, and the CA admitted the same. SAUDIA then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, primarily contending that A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which took effect on December 27, 2007, no longer allowed the filing of an extension of time to file a petition for certiorari, thus, the CA should not have admitted the subject petition. The CA then reconsidered its earlier resolution and granted SAUDIA’s motion. It deemed the subject petition not admitted due to petitioners’ non-compliance with the reglementary period prescribed by Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules), as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. Hence, this instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly refused admission of the subject petition. RULING: The petition is granted. It is well-settled that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, the Court has recognized exceptions to the strict application of such rules, but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice. These exceptions, as enumerated in the case of Labao v. Flores, are as follows: x x x (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. x x x In view of the foregoing, despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC - which now disallows an extension of the 60-day reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari - courts may nevertheless extend the same, subject to its sound discretion. In this case, the CA had already exercised its sound discretion in granting the extension to file the subject petition thru its Resolution. Consequently, it could not renege on such grant by rendering another issuance almost seven months later which resulted in the refusal to admit the

same petition. Such course of action is clearly antithetical to the tenets of fair play, not to mention the undue prejudice to petitioners·' rights. Verily, the more appropriate course of action would have been to admit the subject petition and resolve the case on the merits. Thus, in order to rectify this lapse, the Court deems it prudent to have the case remanded to the CA for its proper resolution. VIRGINIA M. VENZON v. RURAL BANK OF BUENAVISTA, INC., represented by Lourdesita E. Parajes G.R. No. 178031, August 28, 2013 J. Del Castillo When a trial court dismissed a case involving a rural bank, the same must be treated as a dismissal with the character of finality. That being a final decision, the proper recourse that petitioner should have availed of is the remedy under Rule 41, which is appeal, and not Rule 65. FACTS: On January 28, 2005, petitioner Virginia M. Venzon filed before the RTC of Butuan City a Petition to nullify foreclosure proceedings and Tax Declaration Nos. 96-GR-06-003-7002-R and 96-GR-06-7003-R issued in the name of respondent Rural Bank of Buenavista (Agusan del Norte), Inc. Petitioner alleged that in 1983, she and her late souse obtained a P5,000.00 loan from respondent against a mortgage on their house and lot, covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 28289 and 42710 issued in their names, which were later on replaced with Tax Declaration Nos. 96 GR-06-003-2884-R and 96 GR-06-003-2885-R; that she was able to payP2,300.00, thus leaving an outstanding balance of only P2,370.00; that sometime in March 1987, she offered to pay the said balance in full, but the latter refused to accept payment, and instead shoved petitioner away from the bank premises; that in March 1987, respondent foreclosed on the mortgage, and the property was sold at auction for P6,472.76 to respondent, being the highest bidder; that the foreclosure proceedings are null and void for lack of notice and publication of the sale, lack of sheriff’s final deed of sale and notice of redemption period; and that she paid respondent P6,000.00 on October 9, 1995, as evidenced by respondent’s Official Receipt No. 4108486 issued on October 9, 1995. The RTC dismissed the case, finding that the petitioner failed to consider that the other party is a Rural Bank and therefore, it is exempt from the requirement of publication. Hence, the foreclosure is proper without publication. The CA also dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding that the petitioner’s remedy should have been an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court since the assailed Resolution is a final order of dismissal. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA reversibly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari thereby preventing the court from finding out that actually no extrajudicial foreclosure was conducted by the office of the provincial sheriff on petitioner’s property at the instance of the private respondent. RULING: The petition is denied.

The Court finds no error in the CA’s treatment of the Petition for Certiorari. The trial court’s July 13, 2006 Resolution dismissing the case was indeed to be treated as a final order, disposing of the issue of publication and notice of the foreclosure sale – which is the very core of petitioner’s cause of action in Civil Case No. 5535 – and declaring the same to be unnecessary pursuant to the Rural Banks Act, as petitioner’s outstanding obligation did not exceed P10,000.00, and thus leaving petitioner without basis to maintain her case. This constitutes a dismissal with the character of finality. As such, petitioner should have availed of the remedy under Rule 41, and not Rule 65. The Court is not prepared to be lenient in petitioner’s case, either. Civil Case No. 5535 was instituted only in 2005, while the questioned foreclosure proceedings took place way back in 1987. Petitioner’s long inaction and commission of a procedural faux pas certainly cannot earn the sympathy of the Court. Nor can the Court grant the Petition on the mere allegation that no foreclosure proceedings ever took place. The February 2, 2005 Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Butuan City to the effect that the record of the foreclosure proceedings could not be found is not sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings taken. Petitioner herself attached the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale as Annex "A" of her Petition in Civil Case No. 5535; this should belie the claim that no record exists covering the foreclosure proceedings. Besides, if petitioner insists that no foreclosure proceedings took place, then she should not have filed an action to annul the same since there was no foreclosure to begin with. She should have filed a different action. However, petitioner is entitled to a return of the P6,000.00 she paid to respondent in 1995. While this may not be validly considered as a redemption of her property as the payment was made long after the redemption period expired, respondent had no right to receive the amount. Interestingly, respondent did not deny being the issuer of Official Receipt No. 410848. Instead, it averred that petitioner’s payment to it of P6,000.00 was false and self-serving, but in the same breath argued that, without necessarily admitting that payment of P6,000.00 was made, the same cannot be considered as redemption price. By making such an ambiguous allegation in its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent is deemed to have admitted receiving the amount of P6,000.00 from petitioner as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 410848, which amount under the circumstances it had no right to receive. "If an allegation is not specifically denied or the denial is a negative pregnant, the allegation is deemed admitted." "Where a fact is alleged with some qualifying or modifying language, and the denial is conjunctive, a ‘negative pregnant’ exists, and only the qualification or modification is denied, while the fact itself is admitted." "A denial in the form of a negative pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since it cannot be ascertained whether it is the fact or only the qualification that is intended to be denied." "Profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge, or means of knowing as ineffectual, is no denial at all." ARACELI J. CABRERA v. ANGELO G. FRANCISCO, ET AL. G.R. No. 172293, August 28, 2013 J. Del Castillo When the petitioners allege that the main purpose of their complaint is for collection of Agent’s Compensation, Commission and Damages, it is nonetheless principally for the collection of a sum of money representing the same and is thus not capable of pecuniary estimation. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of

pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the Courts of First Instance would depend on the amount of the claim. FACTS: On October 25, 1976, respondents’ father, Atty. Gella executed a private document confirming that he has appointed Severino Cabrera (Severino), husband of Araceli and father of Arnel as administrator of all his real properties. When Severino died in 1991, Araceli and Arnel, with the consent of respondents, took over the administration of the properties. Respondents likewise instructed them to look for buyers of the properties, allegedly promising them "a commission of five percent of the total purchase price of the said properties as compensation for their long and continued administration" thereof. Accordingly, petitioners introduced real estate broker and President of ESV Marketing and Development Corporation, Erlinda Veñegas (Erlinda), to the respondents who agreed to have the said properties developed by Erlinda’s company. However, a conflict arose when respondents appointed Erlinda as the new administratrix of the properties and terminated Araceli’s and Arnel’s services. Petitioners, through counsel, wrote respondents and demanded for their five percent commission and compensation to no avail. Hence, on September 3, 2001, they filed a Complaint for Collection of Agent’s Compensation, Commission and Damages against respondents before the RTC. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) failure to state a cause of action, and (3) lack of legal capacity of Araceli and Arnel to sue in behalf of the other heirs of Severino. The RTC granted the respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. On appeal, the CA ruled the Complaint did not state a cause of action since it failed to show the existence of petitioners’ right that was allegedly violated by respondents. Moreover, it found no evidence of Araceli’s and Arnel’s authority to file the Complaint for and in behalf of Severino’s other heirs. In sum, the CA found no error on the part of the RTC in granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s findings: 1. that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; 2. that the Complaint states no cause of action; 3. and that petitioners Araceli and Arnel have no legal capacity to sue in behalf of the other heirs of Severino. RULING: The Petition is denied. The RTC made an independent assessment of the merits of respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. In this case, the RTC complied with this duty by making its own independent assessment of the merits of respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. A reading of the RTC’s Order will

show that in resolving said motion, it judiciously examined the Complaint and the documents attached thereto as well as the other pleadings filed in connection with the said motion. Clearly, petitioners’ claim that the RTC merely adopted the arguments of respondents in their Motion to Dismiss when it resolved the same is belied by the above-quoted disquisition of the RTC on the matter and therefore deserves no credence. Petitioners’ Complaint is neither one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation nor involves interest in a real property. Section 19(1) and (2) of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691 read: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; xxxx To ascertain the correctness of petitioner’s contention that the RTC has jurisdiction over their Complaint because the same is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation or involves interest in a real property the assessed value of which exceedsP200,000.00, the averments in the Complaint and the character of the relief sought in the said Complaint must be consulted. This is because the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the Complaint. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the Courts of First Instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). It can be readily seen from the allegations in the Complaint that petitioners’ main purpose in filing the same is to collect the commission allegedly promised them by respondents, as well as the compensation for the services rendered by Severino, Araceli and Arnel for the administration of respondents’ properties. Captioned as a Complaint for Collection of Agent’s Compensation, Commission and Damages, it is principally for the collection of a sum of money representing such compensation and commission. Indeed, the payment of such money claim is the principal relief sought and not merely incidental to, or a consequence of another action where the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money. Therefore, the CA did not err when it ruled that petitioners’ Complaint is not incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The Court cannot also give credence to petitioners’ contention that their action involves interest in a real property. It is apparent that their only interest is to be compensated for their long-term administration of the properties. They do not claim an interest in the properties themselves but merely payment for their services, such payment they compute to be equivalent to five (5%) percent of the value of the properties. Under Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. Plaintiffs-appellants’ interest is obviously not the one contemplated under the rules on jurisdiction. Petitioners’ demand is below the jurisdictional amount required for RTCs outside of Metro Manila, hence, the RTC concerned in this case has no jurisdiction over petitioners’ Complaint. To determine whether the RTC in this case has jurisdiction over petitioners’ Complaint, respondents correctly argued that the same be considered vis-à-vis Section 19(8) of BP 129, which provides: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxxx (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interests, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). This jurisdictional amount of exceeding P100,000.00 for RTC’s outside of Metro Manila was adjusted toP200,000.00 effective March 20, 1999 in pursuance to Section 5 of RA 7691. Hence, when petitioners filed their Complaint on September 3, 2001, the said increased jurisdictional amount was already effective. The demand in their Complaint must therefore exceed P200,000.00 in order for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. There is no merit to petitioners’ averment that their demand for moral damages should be included in the computation of their total claims. Paragraph 8, Section 19 of BP 129 expressly speaks of demand which is exclusive of damages of whatever kind. The said claim for moral damages cannot be included in determining the jurisdictional amount. The CA’s affirmance of the RTC’s findings that the Complaint states no cause of action and that Araceli and Arnel have no authority to sue in behalf of Severino’s other heirs cannot be raised in this Petition. As pointed out by respondents, petitioners tailed to question in their Motion for Reconsideration before the CA its affirmance of the RTC's findings that the Complaint states no cause of action and that Araceli and Arnel have no authority to sue in behalf of the other heirs of Severino. Suffice it to say that ''prior to raising these arguments before this Court, they should have raised the matter in their Motion for Reconsideration in order to give the appellate court an opportunity to correct its ruling. For them to raise these issues be tore this Court now would be improper, since they failed to do so be tore the CA."

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. LUZ REYES BAKUNAWA, ET AL. G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013 J. Bersamin In a case of reconveyance or recovery of ill-gotten wealth, it is sufficient that the Republic prove their demand through a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence refers to the comparative weight of the evidence presented by the opposing parties. As such, it has been defined as "the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side," and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is proof that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. FACTS: Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages brought by the Republic against respondents Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuel Bakunawa, Jr., Manuel Bakunawa III, President Marcos and First Lady Imelda R. Marcos for having allegedly acquired and accumulated ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property "in unlawful concert with one another" and "in flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with grave abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, thus resulting in their unjust enrichment." The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa (Luz Bakunawa) had served as Imelda Marcos’ Social Secretary during the Marcos administration; that it was during that period of her incumbency in that position that Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful income; and that Luz Bakunawa, "by herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, for their benefit and unjust enrichment and in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems." The Republic prayed for: (a) the reconveyance to itself of all funds and other property impressed with constructive trust, as well as funds and other property acquired by respondents’ abuse of right and power and through unjust enrichment, plus interests; (b) accounting of all beneficial interests in funds, properties and assets in excess of their unlawful earnings; and (c) payment of actual damages to be proved during the trial, moral damages of P50,000,000,000.00, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and treble judicial costs. In their amended answer, the Bakunawas alleged that Luz Bakunawa was never the Social Secretary of Imelda Marcos, but only an employee in the office of the Social Secretary; that the properties acquired while Luz Bakunawa was employed in the Government were purchased with honestly earned money and their acquisition was well within their legitimate income. During the pre-trial on August 26, 1999, the Bakunawas admitted that: (a) the properties enumerated in Annex A of the complaint belonged to or were connected to them, except three

corporations, namely:7-R International Trading, 7-R Enterprise, Inc., and 7-R Group of Companies; and (b) two parcels of land that belonged to one of their children. After the Republic rested its case, respondents filed their motion to dismiss, insisting that the Republic "has failed to establish even prima facie, its case and/or charges against them." The Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in favor of respondents, finding that neither the presence of the link with the Marcoses, nor the irrefutability of the evidence against the Bakunawas for their misuse of that connection exists to justify the instant action by the PCGG. The Republic sought the reconsideration of the decision, arguing that the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that it did not show the Bakunawas’ link with the Marcoses, and in ruling that it did not prove that the Bakunawas had abused their connections or close association with the Marcoses. The Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s motion for reconsideration, reiterating its ruling that the Republic did not discharge its burden of proving the close links between the Bakunawas and the Marcoses, and of proving how the Bakunawas had abused said links, assuming that the links existed. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the Republic preponderantly showed that the Bakunawas had acquired ill-gotten wealth during Luz Bakunawa’s employment during the Marcos administration. RULING: The petition is denied. As correctly pointed out by the Republic, only a preponderance of evidence was needed to prove its demand for reconveyance or recovery of ill-gotten wealth. That is quite clear from Section 1 of E.O. No. 14-A, which provides: Section 1. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other damages or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees, may proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.(Emphasis supplied.) By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to that of the other side. Essentially, preponderance of evidence refers to the comparative weight of the evidence presented by the opposing parties. As such, it has been defined as "the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side," and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is proof that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Here, the Bakunawas filed a motion to dismiss, by which they specifically demurred to the evidence adduced against them. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the

parties in an action to the effect that the evidence that his adversary produced, whether true or not, is insufficient in point of law to make out a case or to sustain the issue. The demurring party thereby challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a judgment. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence, is required merely to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or claim, or to support a verdict of guilt or liability. Under the rule on preponderance of evidence, the court is instructed to find for and to dismiss the case against the defendant should the scales hang in equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence that tilts the scales to one or the other side. The plaintiff who had the burden of proof has failed to establish its case, and the parties are no better off than before they proceeded upon their litigation. In that situation, the court should leave the parties as they are. Moreover, although the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on the plaintiff’s side if its evidence alone is insufficient to establish its cause of action. Similarly, when only one side is able to present its evidence, and the other side demurs to the evidence, a preponderance of evidence can result only if the plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to establish the cause of action. For this purpose, the sheer volume of the evidence presented by one party cannot tip the scales in its favor. Quality, not quantity, is the primordial consideration in evaluating evidence. The evidence of the Republic did not preponderantly establish the ill-gotten nature of the Bakunawas’ wealth. The decisive query is whether the Republic preponderantly showed that the Bakunawas had acquired ill-gotten wealth during Luz Bakunawa’s employment during the Marcos administration. The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of the Republic was able to establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in Malacañang Palace during the Marcos administration, and did not establish her having a close relationship with the Marcoses, or her having abused her position or employment in order to amass the assets subject of this case. The determination by the Sandiganbayan of the equiponderance or insufficiency of evidence involved its appreciation of the evidence. The Republic’s evidence could not sustain the belief that the Bakunawas had used their influence, or the Marcoses’ influence in acquiring their properties. Nor did it prove that the ties or relationship between the Bakunawas and the Marcoses had been "similar to that of an immediate member of the family or a dummy." The Court upholds the Sandiganbayan. It was basic enough that the Sandiganbayan could not consider any evidence that was not formally offered; and could consider evidence only for the purposes it was specifically offered. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly states: Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The need to formally offer evidence by specifying the purpose of the offer cannot be overemphasized. This need is designed to meet the demand for due process by apprising the adverse party as well as the trial court on what evidence the court would soon be called upon to decide the litigation. The offer and purpose will also put the trial court in the position to

determine which rules of evidence it shall apply in admitting or denying admission to the evidence being offered. At any rate, the Court must point out that negotiated contracts, offered as evidence in the case, are not per se illegal. A negotiated contract is one that is awarded on the basis of a direct agreement between the Government and the contractor, without going through the normal procurement process, like obtaining the prior approval from another authority, or a competitive bidding process. It is generally resorted to for convenience, or "when time is of the essence, or where there is a lack of qualified bidders or contractors, or where there is conclusive evidence that greater economy and efficiency would be achieved." Absent evidence proving that the negotiated construction contracts had been irregularly entered into by the Bakunawas, or that the public had been thereby prejudiced, it is pointless for the Court to declare their invalidity. On the contrary, the Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the presumption of the validity of the contracts prevailed. It is true that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth should be relentlessly pursued. But the pursuit should not be mindless as to be oppressive towards anyone. Due process requires that there be sufficient competent evidence of the asset being ill-gotten wealth, and of the person or persons charged with the illegal acquisition of ill-gotten wealth being a close associate or subordinate of the Marcoses who took advantage of such ties with the Marcoses to enrich themselves. In that effort, the Republic carries the heavy burden of proof, and must discharge such burden fully; otherwise, the effort would fail and fall. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO G.R. No. 201447, August 28, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro When an accused dies pending appeal of his conviction, such death extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. FACTS: Accused-appellant Amistoso was charged before the RTC of Masbate City for the rape of his daughter, AAA, alleged to be 12 years old at the time of the incident. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Amistoso guilty of qualified rape. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed Amistoso’s conviction. Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to the Supreme Court (SC). The SC affirmed the CA’s Decision with modification. In a letter dated February 7, 2013 Ramoncito Roque, Officer-in-Charge, Inmate Documents and Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Amistoso had died on December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison. Attached to the letter is a photocopy of the Death Report. Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), which represented Amistoso and which was apparently also unaware of its client’s demise, still filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Decision. In a Resolution dated March 20, 2013, the Court required Roque to submit a certified true copy of Amistoso’s Death Certificate within 10 days from notice and deferred action on

the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the PAO pending compliance with the Court’s former directive. In a letter dated June 20, 2013, and received by the Court on June 25, 2013, PIS Lansangan finally provided the Court with a certified true copy of Amistoso’s Death Certificate. ISSUE: Whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability. RULING: The petition is granted. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished: By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. In People v. Bayotas, the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final judgment: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.” It is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and unresolved and that the Court ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his death. Moreover, since said Decision has not yet become final, hence, the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside. MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA NG STAYFAST PHILS., INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. G.R. No. 155306, August 28, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro When the NLRC promulgates a decision, the proper recourse from such is not to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but instead, to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitions from Rule 45 and Rule 65 are not the same. A

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the availment of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The filing of a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. FACTS: Petitioner and Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Stayfast (NLMS-Olalia) sought to be the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees of respondent company, Stayfast Philippines, Inc. A certification election was conducted on December 29, 1995 and out of the 223 valid votes cast, petitioner garnered 109 votes while NLMS-Olalia received 112 votes and 2 votes were for "No Union." Thus, the Med-Arbiter who supervised the certification election issued an Order certifying NLMS-Olalia as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of respondent company. Petitioner appealed the Order of the Med-Arbiter to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The Secretary of Labor and Employment initially set aside the Order of the MedArbiter and called for run-off election between petitioner and NLMS-Olalia. On motion of NLMSOlalia, however, the Secretary of Labor and Employment reconsidered his earlier decision and restored the Med-Arbiter’s Order dated January 9, 1996. Petitioner elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court but was subsequently dismissed. Meanwhile, NLMS-Olalia demanded to collectively bargain with respondent company. The latter rejected petitioner’s demand, insisting that it would negotiate a collective bargaining agreement only with whichever union is finally certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the workers. Nevertheless, NLMS-Olalia went on strike. Subsequently, on June 5, 1997, petitioner filed its own notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Respondent company opposed petitioner’s move and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner was not the certified bargaining agent and therefore lacked personality to file a notice of strike. Thereafter, the parties were able to make concessions during the conciliation-mediation stage in the NCMB which led petitioner to withdraw its notice of strike. On July 21, 1997, however, petitioner’s members staged a "sit-down strike" to dramatize their demand for a fair and equal treatment as respondent company allegedly continued to discriminate against them. Respondent company issued a memorandum requiring the alleged participants in the "sit-down strike" to explain within 24 hours why they should not be terminated or suspended from work for infraction of company rules and regulations pertaining to unauthorized work stoppage, acts inimical to company interest, and disregard of instruction of immediate supervisor to perform assigned task. As no one complied with the memorandum within the 24-hour deadline, respondent company promptly terminated the service of the participants in the "sit-down strike" on July 22, 1997. Consequently, on July 23, 1997, petitioner staged a strike and filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, union busting and illegal lockout against respondent company and its General Manager, Maria Almeida, in the NLRC. On April 27, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision which ruled that, while petitioner may file a notice of strike on behalf of its members, petitioner failed to cite any

instance of discrimination or harassment when it filed its notice of strike on June 5, 1997 and the incidents mentioned as discriminatory occurred after the filing of the said notice. Moreover, assuming the strike was legal at the beginning, it became illegal when petitioner committed acts prohibited under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code. The NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES: Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper. RULING: The petition is denied. First, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Contrary to petitioner’s claim in its petition that there was no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than this petition for certiorari, the right recourse was to appeal to this Court in the form of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of appeal, the Decision dated July 1, 2002 of the Court of Appeals was a final judgment as it denied due course to, and dismissed, the petition. Thus, petitioner should have filed an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in this Court. The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no appeal. Moreover, certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. In this case, petitioner received the Decision dated July 1, 2002 on August 2, 2002 and, under the rules, had until August 19, 2002 to file an appeal by way of a petition for review in this Court. Petitioner let this period lapse without filing an appeal and, instead, filed this petition for certiorari on October 1, 2002. Second, even assuming that a petition for certiorari is the correct remedy in this case, petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the availment of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The filing of a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. In the present case, the Court of Appeals was not given any opportunity either to rectify whatever error it may have made or to address the ascription and aspersion of grave abuse of discretion thrown at it by petitioner. Nor did petitioner offer any compelling reason to warrant a deviation from the rule. The instant petition for certiorari is therefore fatally defective.

Third, petitioner was not able to establish its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is so because "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit one’s purpose. In this case, nowhere in the petition did petitioner show that the issuance of the Decision of the Court of Appeals was patent and gross that would warrant striking it down through a petition for certiorari. No argument was advanced to show that the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion and hostility. Thus, petitioner failed in its duty to demonstrate with definiteness the grave abuse of discretion that would justify the proper availment of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Fourth, petitioner essentially questioned the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Petitioner cannot properly do that in a petition for certiorari. For petitioner to question the identical findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC is to raise a question of fact. However, it is settled that questions of fact cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari. Only established or admitted facts can be considered. Romy’s Freight Service v. Castro explains the rationale of this rule: The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The phrase ‘grave abuse of discretion’ has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility." It does not encompass an error of law. Nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties’ respective evidence or the evaluation of their relative weight. (Citations omitted.) Fifth, considering that petitioner basically presented an issue of fact, its petition for certiorari crumbles in view of the identical findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which were further upheld by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that findings of fact made by Labor Arbiters and affirmed by the NLRC are not only entitled to great respect, but even finality, and are considered binding if the same are supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, in arriving at the said ruling, the Court of Appeals even reviewed the rationale of the Labor Arbiter’s decision and was convinced that there was justifiable reason for the NLRC to uphold the same.

LUCENA B. RALLOS v. CITY OF CEBU G.R. No. 202651, August 28, 2013 J. Reyes When the petitioner filed other pending actions involving the same people, same reliefs prayed for and essentially the same issue, there exists forum shopping because the elements of litis pendentia are present. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. FACTS: At the root of the controversy are Lots 485-D and 485-E of the Banilad Estate, Sambag I, Cebu City, which were expropriated to be used as a public road in 1963. The Heirs of Fr. Rallos alleged that the City of Cebu occupied the lots in bad faith sans the authority of the former's predecessors-in-interest, who were the registered owners of the subject parcels of land. On June 11, 1997, the Heirs of Fr. Rallos filed before the RTC a Complaint for Forfeiture of Improvements or Payment of Fair Market Value with Moral and Exemplary Damages against the City of Cebu. In its Answer filed on October 6, 1997, the City of Cebu contended that the subject parcels of land are road lots and are not residential in character. They have been withdrawn from the commerce of men and were occupied by the City of Cebu without expropriation proceedings pursuant to Ordinance No. 416 which was enacted in 1963 or more than 35 years before the Heirs of Fr. Rallos instituted their complaint. On January 14, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision, which found the City of Cebu liable to pay the Heirs of Fr. Rallos just compensation in the amount still to be determined by a board of three commissioners, one each to be designated by the contending parties and the court. On March 21, 2002, the RTC issued a Consolidated Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the City of Cebu, but modifying the Decision rendered on July 24, 2001. Through the said order, the RTC increased the amount of just compensation payable to the Heirs of Fr. Rallos. The CA opined that the RTC erred in holding that the reckoning point for the determination of the amount of just compensation should be from 1997, the time the complaint for just compensation was filed by the Heirs of Fr. Rallos. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the CA still dismissed on procedural grounds the appeal filed by the City of Cebu. The Heirs of Fr. Rallos thereafter filed before the RTC a Motion for Execution which the trial court granted. The City of Cebu sought the reiteration of the directives stated in the Writ of Execution issued on December 4, 2008 and the setting aside of the amended demand letter served upon it by Sheriff Bellones. On March 16, 2009, the RTC issued an Order denying the City of Cebu's motion for the reiteration of the writ of execution. The RTC, however, set aside the demand letter served upon the City of Cebu by Sheriff Bellones and interpreted the directives of the writ of execution. The Heirs of Fr. Rallos assailed the abovementioned order on the ground that it effectively modified the final and executory Decision rendered on July 24, 2001. The RTC did

not consider their claims, thus they filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the CA. The appellate court granted the petition after finding that the two assailed orders effectively modified the final and executory disposition made by the RTC. However, on April 13, 2012, the CA granted the City of Cebu's application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). Subsequently, a writ of preliminary injunction was likewise issued. Lucena then filed numerous petitions for indirect contempt. ISSUE: Whether the present petition is proper. RULING: The petition is dismissed. Lucena engaged in forum shopping. In the Verification and Non-Forum Shopping Certification attached to the instant petition and executed by Lucena, she admitted that there are five other pending actions for indirect contempt which she filed relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388. She, however, claims that the issues in the other five petitions are different from that raised before this Court now. Lucena's claim cannot be sustained. "Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in different fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another." "Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case." Since the elements of litis pendentia concur in the instant petition and SCA No. CEB38292, this Court so holds Lucena guilty of forum shopping.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. APOLIARIO MANALILI G.R. No. 191253, August 28, 2013 J. Perez The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of

defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. FACTS: Apolinario Manalili was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with statutory rape. Upon arraignment, Manalili entered a plea of “not guilty” to the offense charged against him. AAA, the victim who was then barely eleven (11) years old narrated with particularity the events that took place on the date of the crime. Also, when she executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 18 March 1998, she stated that she was molested more than three (3) times by Manalili. On cross-examination, AAA described the place of the incident in detail. Although it was dark, AAA narrated that she was certain it was Manalili who followed her inside the house. Familiar with Manalili’s voice, AAA positively identified Manalili when he instructed her to remove her underwear. She recalled that while drinking, Manalili was only wearing pants without a t-shirt on. She claims that the man who mounted her only had pants on, without a t-shirt. The RTC rendered a decision convicting Manalili of statutory rape. The Court finds that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Manalili appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) but the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the essential elements of statutory rape beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether AAA’s testimony is not sufficient to convict Manalili. RULING: The petition is denied. As held by the CA, rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dark or deserted and secluded places away from the prying eyes, and the crime usually commences solely upon the word of the offended woman herself and conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the prosecution’s single witness of the actual occurrence. As a corollary, a conviction for rape may be made even on the testimony of the victim herself, as long as such testimony is credible. In fact, the victim’s testimony is the most important factor to prove that the felony has been committed. Manalili contends that AAA’s testimony is not sufficient to convict him because the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime was not positively established. However, jurisprudence is instructive that identification of an accused by his voice has been accepted particularly in cases where, such as in this case, the witness has known the malefactor personally for so long and so intimately. The Court has opined that once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance.

Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case. The trial court noted that during AAA’s cross-examination, her testimony bore the hallmarks of truth, as she remained consistent on material points. There is no reason to disturb the trial court’s appreciation of the credibility of AAA’s testimony. The trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. “The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts˗and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.” Moreover, the Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. FELY Y. YALONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe When a party inappropriately files a petition for review instead of a required notice of appeal, the same shall be dismissed. Appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the latter court. FACTS: Respondent Lucila C. Ylagan filed a complaint against Fely C. Yalong (Yalong) for the crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). During trial, Ylagan testified that Yalong borrowed from her the amount ofP450,000.00 with a verbal agreement that the same would be paid back to her in cash and, as payment thereof, issued to her, inter alia, a postdated check in the similar amount of P450,000.00. However, the check was dishonored and returned to her for the reason "Account Closed." As verbal and written demands made on Yalong to pay her loan proved futile, Ylagan was constrained to file the instant criminal case. In her defense, Yalong averred that she already paid her loan but did not require Ylagan to issue a receipt or acknowledge the same. Likewise, she claimed that the subject check belonged to her husband and that while she knew that the said check was not covered by sufficient funds, it was already signed by her husband when she handed it to Ylagan. The MTCC found Yalong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of BP 22. Consequently, Yalong filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied, considering that the judgment against her was promulgated in absentia on account of her unjustified absence. Aggrieved, Yalong filed a Petition for Certiorari with Petition for Bail (certiorari petition), before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC denied Yalong’s certiorari petition, finding the promulgation of the MTCC Decision in absentia to be valid as Yalong was duly notified of the scheduled date of promulgation on October 6, 2006 and yet failed to appear thereat. Yalong

then filed the subject petition for review before the CA which was dismissed on the ground that the "Order of the RTC was issued in the exercise of its original jurisdiction – where appeal by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC – and not a petition for review is the proper remedy." Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA properly dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground of improper appeal. RULING: The petition is denied. While the Rules of Court (Rules) do not specifically state that the inappropriate filing of a petition for review instead of a required notice of appeal is dismissible, Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules nonetheless provides that appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the latter court. A notice of appeal is filed with the regional trial court that rendered the assailed decision, judgment or final order, while a petition for review is filed with the CA. Also, a notice of appeal is required when the RTC issues a decision, judgment or final order in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, while a petition for review is required when such issuance was in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, owing to these differences, Yalong’s filing of the subject petition for review cannot be simply accorded the same effect as the filing of a notice of appeal. In the present case, Yalong should have filed a notice of appeal with the RTC instead of a petition for review with the CA. As a consequence of Yalong’s failure to file a notice of appeal with the RTC within the proper reglementary period, the RTC Decision had attained finality which thereby bars Yalong from further contesting the same. Verily, jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. To be sure, the rules on appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable to forestall or avoid unreasonable delays in the administration of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial business, and to put an end to controversies. As it stands, the subject petition for review was the wrong remedy and perforce was properly dismissed by the CA. B. STA. RITA & CO., INC. AND ARLENE STA. RITA KANAPI v. ANGELINE M. GUECO G.R. No.193078, August 28, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe Persons who are not parties to a case, either as petitioners, defendants or intervenors, they cannot participate in the proceedings of the same. Consequently, they also cannot be adversely affected by the outcome of such proceeding. A complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and a supplement of the principal action. The complaint-in-intervention essentially latches on the complaint for its legal efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads to its concomitant dismissal. FACTS:

On April 11, 2000, Gueco purchased four (4) parcels of land from B. Sta. Rita through its president. The transaction was evidenced by a deed of sale. In October 2001, Gueco filed a petition for the surrender of the subject titles against B. Sta. Rita, its corporate secretary and the Tarlac RD. However, B. Sta Rita and its corporate secretary pray that the transaction be construed as a conditional sale and that it be rescinded and that they be restored in the possession of the subject properties. On July 30, 2003, while the surrender of titles case was pending, the Sta. Ritas, as alleged heirs of the late Ben Sta. Rita and as shareholders of B. Sta. Rita, for themselves, their co-heirs and on behalf of B. Sta. Rita, and by way of a derivative suit filed a complaint for reformation and rescission of contract and quieting of title against Gueco. The Sta. Ritas also moved to intervene in the surrender of titles case, claiming similarity of the subject matter and parties, which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted. On the other hand, Gueco, as defendant in the reformation case, moved to dismiss the complaint. The motion was denied, thus Gueco elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 5, 2004, herein petitioner Arlene Sta. Rita Kanapi, wife of Edgardo, together with the Heirs of Edgardo, moved for leave to file their complaint-in-intervention in the reformation case, alleging that she is also a stockholder and director of B. Sta. Rita. The RTC admitted the complaint-in-intervention and proceeded to hear the cases jointly. On July 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision in the certiorari case, dismissing the reformation case due to the Sta. Ritas’ lack of legal personality to bring a derivative suit. Aggrieved, the Sta. Ritas filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA. As such, they filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court. On December 8, 2005, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision rescinding the sale. The CA reversed and set aside the Joint Decision. It held that the final dismissal of the reformation case left only the surrender of titles case for RTC to resolve. As rescission was one of the main issues raised in the dismissed reformation case, it was reversible error on the part of the RTC Branch 63 to have rescinded the sale transaction in favor of the Sta. Ritas. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the reformation case on the ground of lack of personality on the part of the Sta. Ritas should not have affected Arlene’s complaint-in-intervention. RULING: The petition is denied. Arlene’s and the Heirs of Edgardo’s complaint-in-intervention in the dismissed reformation case had been effectively discharged since the principal complaint therein had already been terminated with finality. Clearly, their complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and a supplement of the principal action. In other words, the complaint-in-intervention essentially latches on the complaint for its legal efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads to its concomitant dismissal. Applying these principles to this case therefore lead to the conclusion that the dismissal of the main complaint in the reformation case necessarily resulted in the dismissal of Arlene’s and the Heirs of Edgardo’s complaint-in-intervention lodged in the same case.

Arlene or the Heirs of Edgardo were not parties – either as defendants or intervenors – in the surrender of titles case nor did they, in any manner, participate in the proceedings of the same. It is a standing rule that no person shall be adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a party. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that Arlene and the Heirs of Edgardo cannot be adversely affected by the outcome of the surrender of titles case and, as such, cannot therefore interpose an appeal therefrom. Neither can Arlene file the instant appeal on behalf of B. Sta. Rita since there lies no evidence on record to show that she had been properly authorized by the said corporation to file the same. It is fundamental that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents, which Arlene clearly is not. Consequently, for her lack of authority, the appeal of Arlene on behalf of B. Sta. Rita must necessarily fail. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BIENVENIDO CASTRO G.R. No. 189125, August 28, 2013 J. Perez When the court ignored the fact that an objection was raised in the motion for reconsideration, it then proceeded to say that the defense was not pleaded during trial so that it cannot be considered on appeal. This is not correct. As principle that since the statement in the pleading is conclusive on the pleader, it is unaffected by any contrary proof submitted by the pleader, whether or not objection is interposed by any party. FACTS: Respondent Bienvenido Castro (Castro) is the owner of an unregistered property located at Surigao Del Sur. On 20 June 1994, Castro voluntarily offered to sell the property to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Castro’s offered price isP60,000.00 per hectare or a total of P560,340.00 for the entire 9.3390 hectare lot. The DAR, through the LBP, assessed the property at P15,441.25 per hectare or a total price of P144,205.90. Castro rejected it. Consequently, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), in DARAB Case No. LVC-XIII-232, conducted a summary administrative proceeding to fix just compensation for the subject property. At the preliminary conference, Castro alleged that LBP’s valuation did not constitute fair and just compensation. On 9 March 2000, the DARAB issued an Order directing LBP to conduct another inspection and to reassess Castro’s property. LBP complied, but still reached the same valuation at P144,205.90. Two years later, in 2002, Castro insisted on a higher valuation through a petition to fix just compensation before the RTC. LBP’s opposed and its main defense was that the case should be dismissed since the DARAB Decision on the amount of just compensation for the subject property was not timely elevated to the SAC within the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, the DARAB Decision had attained finality and constituted a bar to the filing of the case. Nevertheless, the SAC set the case for pre-trial. Since LBP and Castro had declared in their respective pre-trial briefs that they were willing to enter into a settlement. After numerous

delays, on 13 August 2004, the Commissioners submitted its report. Relying heavily on the Commissioners’ and Supplemental Reports, the SAC rendered a Consolidated Decisionfixing the just compensation of Castro’s property at P43,327.16 per hectare or a total of P404,632.35 for the entire 9.3390 hectares. Aggrieved, LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the SAC’s decision, asserting that Castro had already accepted LBP’s valuation of the subject property at P144,205.90 as shown in three documents Castro had signed: two Reply to Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated 18 September 1997 and 13 March 2001, respectively; and the Deed of Confirmation of Transfer Executed by the Landowner dated 5 March 2001. LBP likewise assailed the Commissioners’ Report, contending that at the time LBP initially inspected the subject property in 1994, only two hectares were unirrigated riceland while the remaining 7.3390 hectares were forest land, in contrast to the Commissioners’ findings based on the Ocular Inspection conducted a decade thereafter in 2004. On appeal, the Court of Appeals completely agreed with the SAC that LBP was already estopped from raising the defense that Castro has accepted the assessed amount of ₱144,205.90 for the subject property. ISSUE: Whether the CA failed to sustain the national government’s substantive right to avail of the defense that the respondent is already estopped from questioning the valuation of the property with his agreement. RULING: The petition is dismissed. The trial court ruled in its denial of LBP’s motion that the defense or objection is not one of the recognized exceptions to the rule on waiver of defenses not pleaded in the answer of motion to dismiss. On appeal, LBP repleaded the fact of payment and argued that Castro is already estopped from questioning the land valuation of the DAR. The Court of Appeals, iterating the trial court, ruled that the failure to raise the defense of consummated sale is a "procedural infirmity which cannot be cured on appeal." The Court of Appeals ignored the fact that the objection was raised in the motion for reconsideration which was duly litigated below and proceeded to say that the defense was not pleaded during trial so that it cannot be considered on appeal. It ignored Castro’s acceptance of the valuation by the DAR in the amount of P144,205.90, the payment by LBP to Castro of the determined price of P144,205.90, and the receipt of the payment which Castro confirmed. These facts were all documented and, more importantly, all unrebutted by respondent. Most significantly, the court below did not pay attention to the fact that the documented and accepted LBP payment for the property squares with the pertinent averment in the complaint that: 7. x x x upon acquisition of the land and tax declaration over which was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines, the Fair Market Value raised to P245,615.00, per TDN 99-16012-00567 x x x

The Tax Declaration evidencing "transfer to the Republic of the Philippines" attached to the petitions as Annex "C," declares that the owner is the Republic of the Philippines and that the administrator is Land Bank of the Philippines. The averments in the petition for payment, Paragraph 7, and the evidence made part of the petition which is the tax declaration in the name of the Republic amount to an admission that the claim or demand set forth in Castro’s petition has been paid or otherwise extinguished. Such admission is conclusive on respondent. All contrary or inconsistent proof submitted by the party who made the admission should be ignored. And they should be ignored whether the objection is interposed by the other party or not. Santiago is a case where, like the case at hand, the dismissal of the action was based on the judicial admission embodied in the very allegations in the complaint. Santiago is a land registration case involving a property claimed as publicly and uninterruptedly possessed since 26 July 1894. However, the pleadings alleged that the parcel of land subject of registration was part of public forest released by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources by an Order dated 10 August 1961. The Court clearly pronounced in Santiago that what was so categorically set forth in the pleading which is that the land is part of a public forest is conclusive and binding on the pleader. Therefrom we declared as principle that since the statement in the pleading is conclusive on the pleader, it is unaffected by any contrary proof submitted by the pleader, whether or not objection is interposed by any party. The principles in Santiago, derived from repeated prior rulings and forwarded to later cases, cover and apply to the present case. The solemn declaration in Castro's pleading is that the Republic is the owner of the land the compensation for which he seeks. The ownership is proved by the tax declaration made part of the pleading naming the Republic as such owner. The judicial admission that Castro no longer owns the property cannot be controverted by Castro as it is conclusive as to him. The proceedings, including the appointment of commissioners who inspected and priced the property for the purpose of compensating Castro, which is inconsistent with ownership by the Republic, should be ignored. The full hearing in the case cannot overcome the fact of government ownership as admitted in the complaint. The payment by LBP for the property and its transfer to the Republic was fully discussed and submitted before the trial court through LBP's motion for reconsideration. The trial and appellate courts, however, incorrectly viewed the motion as a belated and procedurally unacceptable defense rather than, as it should be, a reminder to the Court about the fact, conclusive on Castro as pleader, of transfer of ownership to the Republic. SEPTEMBER 2013 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOJIE SUANSING G.R. No. 189822, September 02, 2013 J. Del Castillo When there is a single eyewitness, her testimony is sufficient to support a conviction so long as such testimony is found to be clear and straight-forward and worthy of credence by the trial court. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity of the witness’ declarations.

FACTS: On June 13, 1994 the dead body of AAA, four (4) years old at the time, was found outside the house of her neighbor. When the matter was reported to the police, Luisa Rebada, a neighbor of the petitioner, related to the AAA’s parents what she knew. Rebada recounted that at about 5:30 of the afternoon before, she saw AAA at the window of petitioner’s house. She called out to her and offered her some “yemas.” The petitioner suddenly closed the window. Later on, Rebada heard AAA cry and then squeal. Thereafter, she saw the petitioner naked on top of AAA, his right hand choking the girl’s neck. Rebada became frightened and went back to her house to gather her children. She told her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, who was in her house at that time, of what she saw. The latter got nervous and left. That evening,when she heard that AAA’s parents were looking for the child, she called out from her window and asked what time AAA left their house. Thus, with Luisa Rebada’s revelation, the petitioner was arrested. During the investigation, the petitioner readily admitted to raping and killing AAA. The police were able to recover from the house of the petitioner AAA’s green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a bloodied buri mat, a pillow with blood stain in the middle, and a stained T-shirt owned by petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner was charged for Rape with Homicide whereby he entered a plea of guilty. The RTC found him guilty of the crime. On automatic appeal to the Supreme Court, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the proceedings before the lower court were tainted with procedural infirmities, namely: (a) an invalid arraignment; and, (b) admission of inadmissible evidence. Thus, the petitioner was arraigned anew whereby he entered a plea of not guilty. During the hearings, counsel for the defense refused to cross-examine the witnesses who had been presented in the first trial as he interposed a continuing objection to their presentation again as witnesses since their testimonies had already been ruled upon by the Supreme Court as incredible and inadmissible. When the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence, the petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence, which was subsequently denied. Instead of presenting evidence, the petitioner manifested that he was submitting the case for judgment without presentation of evidence for the defense. The RTC rendered a decision against the petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether the CA breached the Constitution and jurisprudential doctrines when it affirmed the petitioner’s conviction on the basis of evidence derived from uncounselled confession RULING: The petition is denied. An examination of the assailed decision reveals that the conviction handed by the courts a quo was primarily based on the testimony of Luisa, as corroborated by Dr. Doromal’s autopsy report, and not on physical evidence, to wit, the pillow and the blood-stained shirt, which the petitioner claimed were fruits of the poisonous tree. Luisa’s testimonies were found by two branches of the trial court and the CA as credible, straightforward and consistent. It is also well to note that Luisa once again testified even after the proceedings before the RTC, which were conducted relative to the petitioner’s initial

indictment, were declared null. She was firm and unshaken in her identification of the perpetrator of the crime and no ill motive can be attributed to her on why she testified against the petitioner. It is an oft-repeated doctrine that the testimony of even “a single eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as such testimony is found to be clear and straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court.” Further, discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity of the witness’ declarations. The alleged inconsistencies in Luisa’s statements regarding which hand the petitioner used to strangle AAA and when did she inform her compadre, Lagrana, about what she had witnessed, were too inconsequential for they do not relate to the elements of the crime charged. Those inconsistencies cannot destroy the thrust of Luisa’s testimony that: (a) the petitioner was the last person seen with AAA before the girl’s lifeless body was found; (b) from an opening in between the door and the floor, she saw the petitioner naked on top of AAA, whose panty and shorts were taken off; and (c) the petitioner choked AAA’s neck with one hand. SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF PANGASUGAN, BAYBAY, LEYTE v. EXPLORATION PERMIT APPLICATION OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY G.R. No. 162226, September 02, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe When a party fails to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal, the decision shall become final and executory. Under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. FACTS: On July 3, 1996, PNOC-EDC applied for an exploration permit with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau covering a total area of 16,144 hectares in the Province of Leyte and located within the Leyte Geothermal Reservation. On November 19, 1996, petitioner passed Resolution No. 58, Series of 1996, expressing its deep concern for the possible environmental damages that may be brought about by PNOC-EDC’s activities. Thereafter, it filed a Complaint praying for the denial of the subject application with the MGB Panel of Arbitrators (PA). The PA dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but remanded the same to the Mining Environment and Safety Division of the Office of the Regional Director of MGB for appropriate action. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the MAB. The MAB affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint, albeit on a different ground. While it ruled that the PA has jurisdiction over the complaint, the same is nevertheless dismissible for being premature. The MAB opined that since the complaint is primarily anchored on perceived environmental damages which are still abstract, anticipatory, and not ripe for determination, petitioner lacks a cause of action against PNOC-EDC. Nonetheless, the MAB declared that such dismissal is without prejudice to any protest or opposition to PNOC-EDC’s non-compliance with its Environmental Work Program under any exploration permit that may be issued to it. On January 21, 2004, the MAB declared its Decision final and executory. It cited Section 11, Rule V of the Rules which provides that motions for reconsideration should be filed within 10 days from receipt of the decision, resolution or order sought to be reconsidered. Moreover, it

noted that petitioner actually failed to file a motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the subject application was given due course, subject to pertinent laws, rules, and regulations. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the MAB is correct in giving due course to the subject application RULING: The petition is denied. At the outset, it should be made clear that petitioner itself admits that it is assailing the MAB’s Order dated January 21, 2004. However, it is well to emphasize that such Order merely declared the MAB’s earlier Decision as final and executory for failure of petitioner to either move for reconsideration or appeal the same. It is well-settled that under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. This doctrine has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrine is not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as a time-honored principle of procedural law. FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No. 169461, September 02, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe When a court has already ruled on a matter binding over an issue, another court cannot set aside the ruling of said court which is of co-equal and coordinate standing.The doctrine of judicial stability states that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. The rationale for the same is founded on the concept of jurisdiction – verily, a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment. FACTS: In a land registration case, petitioner sought for the original registration of two (2) parcels of land. During its initial hearing, no oppositor appeared except Prosecutor Amelia Panganiban who appeared in behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, the RTC issued the

corresponding Order of Special Default and the reception of evidence was delegated to the Branch Clerk of Court. The subject lots were both investigated and inspected separately and based on the findings, the subject lots are within the alienable and disposable zone. Also, in a letter from the Chief of the Surveys Division of the DENR Region IV – Land Management Sector, it is stated that the subject lots are not portion of/nor identical to any approved isolated survey. During the reception of evidence, the government, through respondent, was given the opportunity to examine the authenticity of the documents presented by petitioner. Without any object, all exhibits were admitted by the RTC. Meanwhile, respondent did not present any evidence to contradict petitioner’s application. The RTC granted petitioner’s application for the registration of the subject lots, despite the fact that there subsists a decision in a previous cadastral case which covers the same lots, as manifested by the petitioner. The trial court found that petitioner was able to substantiate its bona fide claim of ownership over the subject lots. Subsequently, the RTC issued an Amended Order setting aside any decision affecting the subject lots and reiterated the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration in favor of petitioner due to the finality of the RTC Decision. Claiming that the RTC’s Amended Order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was initially denied. Upon reconsideration, the CA admitted the petition. In its Decision, the CA granted respondent’s petition and thereby annulled and set aside the RTC Decision and Amended Order. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in annulling and setting aside the RTC Decision and Amended Order as well as the final decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner over the subject lots RULING: The petition is denied. As amply addressed by the CA, the RTC’s Amended Order was issued in violation of the doctrine of judicial stability. This doctrine states that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. The rationale for the same is founded on the concept of jurisdiction – verily, a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment. Therefore, as the RTC’s Amended Order was issued in stark contravention of this rule, the CA correctly ordered its nullification. While petitioner points out to the fact that respondent belatedly filed its certiorari petition before the CA, it must be observed that the CA had already exercised its discretion in giving due course to the same. Jurisprudence dictates that the strict application of the rules on filing a petition for certiorari may be relaxed, among others, in the exercise of the sound discretion by the judge (or the CA) as guided by all the attendant circumstances, as in this case.

Indeed, the Court can only commiserate with petitioner as it has already gone through the rigors of proving its cause before the RTC only to fall short of its ultimate objective. Yet, the Court’s duty to uphold the principles of law and jurisprudential pronouncements as herein discussed remains staunch and unyielding. Definitively, the Court cannot sanction the registration of the subject lots when there stands an existing decision binding over the same. Neither can the Court allow the RTC to set aside the ruling of a co-equal and coordinate court. Based on these reasons, the Court is therefore constrained to sustain the nullification of the RTC Decision and Amended Order as well as the final decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FREDDY SALONGA Y AFIADO G.R. No. 194948, September 02, 2013 CJ. Sereno When the drugs confiscated from the accused were properly accounted for and forthrightly submitted to the Crime Laboratory, there will be no suspicion as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized articles. The chain of custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. FACTS: On October 7 2003, a buy-bust operation was conducted whereupon the accused was arrested for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. After the arrest, the accused was frisked and three (3) more sachets of shabu were seized from him. Thereafter, they proceeded to the police station where the sachets of shabu were marked and later brought to the PNP Crime Laboaratory. He was then charged for violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article 11 of R.A. No. 9165 (illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs). The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC after it found that the drugs confiscated from the accused were properly accounted for and forthrightly submitted to the Crime Laboratory, that nothing invited the suspicion that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized articles were jeopardized. ISSUE: Whether the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused of the alleged sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Sections 5 and 11, respectively of R.A. 9165 RULING:

The petition is granted. The accused argues that the prosecution failed to prove that the subject items allegedly confiscated from him were the ones submitted to the forensic chemist for examination; thus, they were not able to establish the unbroken chain of custody of the illegal drugs. It has been consistently ruled that the elements needed to be proven to successfully prosecute a case of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The Court has adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. “It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.” The Court finds unreasonable doubt on the evidence presented to prove an unbroken chain of custody. First, it is not clear from the evidence that the marking, which was done in the police station, was made in the presence of the accused or his representative, as mandated by Section 21 of R.A. 9165. Thus, there is already a gap in determining whether the specimens that entered into the chain were actually the ones examined and offered in evidence. Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs and other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contrabands are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, planting or contamination of evidence. Second, the prosecution failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the seized items. Third, the Court finds conflicting testimony and glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity of the handling of the seized drugs. The material inconsistency of who actually received the specimens in the Crime Laboratory creates a cloud of doubt as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. Thus, the identity of the corpus delicti was not proven. The gaps in the chain of custody creates a reasonable doubt as to whether the specimens seized from the accused were the same specimes brought to the laboratory and eventually offered in court as evidence. Without adequate proof of the corpus delicti, the conviction cannot stand. As held by the Court in People v. De Guzman:

Accordingly, the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the seized items has been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is enough to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person charged with a crime, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The inconsistency in the evidence and the weak presentation of the prosecution leaves a gaping hole in the chain of custody, which creates a reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013 J. Bersamin The Heirs of Maximo Alvarez and Valentina Clave filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon. They alleged that Prodon maliciously made an entry in the TCT of the property of the respondents, the entry states that the property had been sold to them with a right of repurchase. The deed of sale with the right of repurchase had been lost. The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document. FACTS: The Heirs of Maximo Alvarez and Valentina Clave (Respondents) filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon, the respondents averred that their parents, were the registered owners of that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 84797 and their parents had been in possession of the property during their lifetime. Respondents are in possession of the property and have been paying the real property taxes due thereon. The owner’s duplicate copy cannot be located but the original copy of TCT No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact. The original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to Prodon subject to the right of repurchase and that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did not exist. Respondents prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages. During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Petitioners. The RTC concluded that the original copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts

had been exerted to produce it before the court. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the best evidence rule is applicable in the instant case RULING: The petition is denied. The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the original of the document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before the court, considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally. The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original. This case involves an action for quieting of title, a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. The action is for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property. The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be material to an action for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance, when an action for quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a contract for not complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides that evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. There is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play. Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. This was because the deed, although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title. Her inability to produce the

original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its existence and due execution by other means that could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of writing.

ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN AND RAINIER PUNZALAN v. MICHAEL GAMALIEL J. PLATA AND RUBEN PLATA G.R. No. 160316, September 2, 2013, J. Mendoza The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaints filed against the petitioners for lack of sufficient basis both in fact and in law. The respondents filed their separate petitions before the DOJ. The DOJ ordered the filing of separate informations against the respondents. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The DOJ reconsidered its findings and ruled that there was no probable cause. The respondents elevated the matter to the CA. The CA annulled and set aside the recent Resolutions of the DOJ. It a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the DOJ a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of the supposed offenders. The rule is based not only upon the respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the executive department but upon practicality as well. FACTS: On August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Peña was in front of a store near their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others arrived. Ricky Eugenio mocked Dela Peña to which the latter responded; irked by the response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dela Peña while Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group then ganged up on him. Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed because he was able to run. The group chased him. The latter was seen by Plata and Cagara while Dencio was being mauled by Rainier, et al., thereby compelling Plata and Cagara to go out of Plata’s house and defend Dencio. Dencio run towards Plata and Cagara and took the gun out of Cagara’s hand and aimed the gun at Rainier, et al. which, in turn, forced Plata to grapple with Cagara to prevent Cagara from hurting anyone but unfortunately, the gun accidentally fired and hit Rainier in the thigh. Rainier filed a criminal complaint for Attempted Homicide against Michael Gamaliel Plata (Michael) and one for Illegal Possession of Firearms against Robert Cagara (Cagara). On the other hand, Michael, Ruben Plata (Ruben) and several others filed several complaints against petitioners Rosalinda, Randall, Rainier, and several individual. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaints filed against the petitioners for lack of sufficient basis both in fact and in law. The respondents filed their separate petitions before the DOJ. The DOJ modified the Joint Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of separate informations for Slight Oral Defamation, Light Threats, Attempted Homicide, Malicious Mischief,

and Theft against Rosalinda, Rainier, Randall and the other respondents in the above cases. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The DOJ reconsidered its findings and ruled that there was no probable cause. In its Resolution, dated June 6, 2000, the DOJ set aside its directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to withdraw the informations. The respondents moved for a reconsideration of the June 6, 2000 Resolution but the DOJ denied the motion. The respondents elevated the matter to the CA by way of certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary which ordered the withdrawal of the separate informations. The CA annulled and set aside the recent Resolutions of the DOJ and reinstated its March 23, 2000 Resolution. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Court can interfere with the discretion of the prosecutor RULING: The petition is granted. The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provided that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by a complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Court considers it a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the DOJ wide latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of the supposed offenders. The rule is based not only upon the respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the executive department but upon practicality as well. In this special action, this Court is being asked to assume the function of a public prosecutor. It is being asked to determine whether probable cause exists as regards petitioners. More concretely, the Court is being asked to examine and assess such evidence as has thus far been submitted by the parties and, on the basis thereof, make a conclusion as to whether or not it suffices to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It is a function that this Court should not be called upon to perform. It is a function that properly pertains to the public

prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a Regional Trial Court are concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves adjudication process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor. It is moreover a function that in the established scheme of things, is supposed to be performed at the very genesis of, indeed, prefatorily to, the formal commencement of a criminal action. The proceedings before a public prosecutor, it may well be stressed, are essentially preliminary, prefatory, and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative adjudgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or crime. The rule is that this Court will not interfere in the findings of the DOJ Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion, thus "means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The party seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse of discretion committed by the DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution of the public prosecutor. The conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither whimsical nor capricious as to be corrected by certiorari. Even on the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made erroneous conclusions, such error alone would not subject his act to correction or annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. After all, not "every erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an abuse of discretion." LIGAYA ESGUERRA, ET AL. v. HOLCIM PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. No. 182571, September 2, 2013 J. Reyes The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders without giving HOLCIM the chance to be heard. Since HOLCIM was not given an opportunity to rebut the petitioners’ evidence, considering that the former’s Manifestation and Motion for Ocular Inspection was denied, justice will be better served if the trial court determines first the existence of documents relative to HOLCIM’s payments made to de Guzman, and if the same is not done, to receive further evidence, this time, from both parties. In the examination of a person, corporation, or other juridical entity who has the property of such judgment obligor or is indebted to him, and such person, corporation, or juridical entity denies an indebtedness, the court may only authorize the judgment obligee to institute an action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt. Nothing in the Rules gives the court the authority to order such person or corporation to pay the judgment obligee and the court exceeds its jurisdiction if it orders the person who denies the indebtedness to pay the same. The Court held that an "execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent third parties. FACTS:

Esguerra filed an action to annul the Free Patent in the name of de Guzman. Esguerra claimed that he was the owner of Lot 3308-B covered by TCT No. T-1685-P (M). Esguerra learned that the said parcel of land was being offered for sale by de Guzman to Hi-Cement Corporation (now HOLCIM Philippines, Inc.).The former possessor of the land, Felisa Maningas, was issued Free Patent No. 575674 which was subsequently issued in the name of de Guzman over said parcel of land and described in Psu-216349, covered by OCT No. P-3876. Esguerra also demanded that the portion of his property, which has been encroached upon and included in de Guzman’s Free Patent, be excluded. He later amended his complaint to implead HiCement as a co-defendant since the latter was hauling marble from the subject land. He also prayed that Hi-Cement be ordered to desist from hauling marble, to account for the marble already hauled and to pay him. The RTC dismissed Esguerra’s complaint but on appeal, the CA reversed it. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision. After attaining finality, the case was remanded to the RTC for execution. Accordingly, the RTC made a finding that the total volume of limestone which HOLCIM allegedly quarried from the subject land amounted to P91,872,576.72. It also ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the royalties which were purportedly due to the petitioners. HOLCIM filed a motion for reconsideration and motion for ocular inspection. The RTC denied their motions. It stated that to grant the motions for reconsideration and ocular inspection is to reopen the case despite the fact that the trial court has no more power to do so since the execution of this Court’s decision is now a matter of right on the petitioners’ part. Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals .The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The motion for reconsideration of the Petitioner was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether HOLCIM is estopped to question the jurisdiction of the trial court to conduct a hearing and to accept evidence on the exact amount of royalty RULING: The petition is granted. The petitioners argue that HOLCIM is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC in conducting a hearing on the exact amount of royalty that HOLCIM must pay the petitioners. They allege that: (a) HOLCIM expressed willingness to pay the royalty to whoever would be adjudged the rightful owner of the subject land; (b) HOLCIM and de Guzman did not appear in the hearing nor oppose the Omnibus Motion dated September 28, 2004; (c) HOLCIM did not file any opposition or comment on the petitioners’ Formal Offer of Evidence, Supplement to the Motion for Execution and Motion for Alias Writ of Execution; and (d) HOLCIM is now the new owner of de Guzman’s property. As such, it has acquired the rights, interests and liabilities of de Guzman. The petitioners insist that HOLCIM must not only account for the royalty it paid de Guzman, but it must also turnover said payments to the petitioners What is clear is that the present case emanates from the petitioners’ desire to implement the CA decision which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Decision .At the execution stage, the only thing left for the trial court to do is to implement the final and executory judgment; and the dispositive portion of the decision controls the execution of judgment. The final judgment of this Court cannot be altered or modified, except for clerical errors, misprisions or omissions.

The final judgment does not direct HOLCIM nor its predecessor Hi-Cement to pay a certain amount to Esguerra and his heirs. What was required from HOLCIM to do was merely to account for the payments it made to de Guzman. Apparently, this was not enforced. It may be deduced from the records that when the petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion, they asked for the examination of de Guzman and Hi-Cement (HOLCIM) under Sections 36 and 37 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. This motion was subsequently granted by the trial court. Sections 36 and 37 of Rule 39 are resorted to only when the judgment remains unsatisfied, and there is a need for the judgment obligor to appear and be examined concerning his property and income for their application to the unsatisfied amount in the judgment. In the instant case, the decision in CAG.R. CV No. 40140 as affirmed by the Court calls on HOLCIM to simply make an accounting of the royalty paid to de Guzman. Unfortunately, the trial court, instead of facilitating the accounting of payments made by HOLCIM to de Guzman, proceeded to adduce evidence on the amount of limestone extracted from the disputed area and imposed the monetary liability on HOLCIM. It cannot be denied that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders without giving HOLCIM the chance to be heard. Since HOLCIM was not given an opportunity to rebut the petitioners’ evidence, considering that the former’s Manifestation and Motion for Ocular Inspection was denied, justice will be better served if the trial court determines first the existence of documents relative to HOLCIM’s payments made to de Guzman, and if the same is not done, to receive further evidence, this time, from both parties. It must be emphasized, however, that the evidence to be adduced here is in relation to the amount of royalty paid to de Guzman by HOLCIM for marbles extracted from the disputed area of 38,451 sq m beginning March 23, 1990 up to the time HOLCIM ceased to operate in the subject area. In the event that the petitioners’ claim is beyond the subject area and period, and HOLCIM denies such indebtedness, the governing rule should be Section 43, Rule 39 . Pursuant to this Rule, in the examination of a person, corporation, or other juridical entity who has the property of such judgment obligor or is indebted to him (Rule 39, Section 37), and such person, corporation, or juridical entity denies an indebtedness, the court may only authorize the judgment obligee to institute an action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt. Nothing in the Rules gives the court the authority to order such person or corporation to pay the judgment obligee and the court exceeds its jurisdiction if it orders the person who denies the indebtedness to pay the same. In Atilano II v. Asaali, the Court held that an "[e]xecution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent third parties." PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHRISTOPHER RIVERA Y ROYO G.R. No. 200508, September 4, 2013, J. Mendoza Rivera claimed that AAA was his girlfriend and that sexual intercourse was consensual. AAA went to the motel voluntarily. The sweetheart defense is an affirmative defense that must be supported by convincing proof. Such defense is "effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on accused-appellant the burden of proving the alleged relationship by substantial evidence." Independent proof is required. It cannot be

argued that because AAA voluntarily went with Rivera to the Ilang-Ilang Lodge, she consented to have sex with him. To presume otherwise would be non sequitur. It must be noted that AAA, who was not in good terms with a co-worker, wanted a change in employer. She easily believed Rivera who convinced her that he could help her look for a new job. Thus, she trusted Rivera and went along with him because of his assurance that he could help her find a new employment. FACTS: AAA had a misunderstanding with a co-worker and wanted to change her employer. Rivera offered to help her look for another job. On September 29, 2004, AAA went with Rivera believing that the latter will bring her to his parent's house in Quiapo. Rivera brought her to Ilang Ilang Motel located along Quezon Boulevard. When they entered a room, Rivera had sexual intercourse with AAA against her will and without her consent. AAA did not complain to the nearest police station because she was ashamed and thought of bringing Rivera to her cousin's house. For the defense, Rivera claimed that AAA was his girlfriend and she voluntarily went with him to the Ilang Ilang lodging house in Quiapo. The other defense witness, Dueño, the cashier at the lodging house, supported the version of Rivera. She observed that both were happy when they checked in at the lodge and added that it was even AAA who paid for the room. The RTC rendered its judgment finding Rivera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether there is rape in the instant case RULING: Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually the victim alone who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse. Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important point to consider. Thus, if the victim’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the accused should be acquitted of the crime. The rule in this regard, applicable to this case, is: "The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are the utmost significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to disbelieve. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case." The Court, in its own assessment of the case, casts no doubt on AAA’s credibility and to the truthfulness of her testimony, as opposed to Rivera’s weak reliance on the "sweetheart theory." Not even an iota of ill motive to file such a malicious case for rape on the part of AAA

was shown by Rivera to at least discredit her claim that the act was not consensual. As held in People v. Cabanilla, the sweetheart defense is an affirmative defense that must be supported by convincing proof. As correctly ruled by the CA, such defense is "effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on accused-appellant the burden of proving the alleged relationship by substantial evidence." Independent proof is required. It cannot be argued that because AAA voluntarily went with Rivera to the Ilang-Ilang Lodge, she consented to have sex with him. To presume otherwise would be non sequitur. It must be noted that AAA, who was not in good terms with a co-worker, wanted a change in employer. She easily believed Rivera who convinced her that he could help her look for a new job. Thus, she trusted Rivera and went along with him because of his assurance that he could help her find a new employment. AAA’s failure to shout or to tenaciously resist appellant should not be taken against her since such negative assertion would not ipso facto make voluntary her submission to appellant’s criminal act. In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. As already settled in our jurisprudence, not all victims react the same way. Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. In his last ditch effort to secure his exoneration, Rivera pointed out that the records were bereft of evidence to prove that AAA suffered vaginal lacerations. The lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina, however, does not negate sexual intercourse. Laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the context used in the RPC, "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. Accordingly, granting arguendo that AAA did not suffer any laceration, Rivera would still be guilty of rape after it was clearly established that he did succeed in having carnal knowledge of her. At any rate, it has been repeatedly held that the medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to a conviction. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT REYES WAGAS G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013 J. Bersamin Alberto Lagaray filed a complaint for estafa against Gilbert Reyes for allegedly placing orders over the phone and issuing a check with insufficient fund as payment. Alberto Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting over the telephone. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the

offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Court’s constitutional duty to acquit him. FACTS: Alberto Ligaray filed a complaint for estafa against Wagas, who allegedly placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone. Ligaray released the goods to Cañada the brother-in-law of Wagas who had given him a postdated check, which was dishonored when presented for payment because of insufficiency of funds. Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas because they transacted through telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice. In his defense, Wagas admitted having issued the said check to Cañada, his brother-inlaw, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the check was intended as payment for a portion of Cañada’s property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check. Wagas admitted the letter signed and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray P200, 000.00 for goods received, but insisted that it was Cañada who had transacted with Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband (Cañada) had begged him to assume the responsibility. The RTC convicted Wagas of estafa .Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, opining that the evidence Wagas desired to present at a new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and that there was no compelling ground to reverse its decision. ISSUE: Whether the Prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime RULING: In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting over the telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who delivered the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Cañada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s brother-in-law.

Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then. We deem it essential for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness that a telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be first authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person with whom the witness conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other means. Without the authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to the telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In this respect, an identification based on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed. The identity of the caller could also be established by the caller’s self-identification, coupled with additional evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the statement challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller. It is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication is accorded probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. The Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to definitely establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the telephone. It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove, and as a means of respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence. Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction. . SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013 J. Bersamin The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs. FACTS:

San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties) purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 parcels of land under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price were not delivered to San Miguel Properties. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957. At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor. The OCP Las Piñas dismissed San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale. The OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration. San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which were eventually denied. The CA dismissed San Miguel Properties’ petition. ISSUE: Whether the HLURB administrative case could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question RULING: The petition is denied. Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes’ posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to

avoid conflicting decisions. The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’ submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary. An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it. Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the contract. The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which provided that the power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with damages. As presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a party’s breach of the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the former one, contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or the specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case. On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as

well as provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions. Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case. Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. RODULFO VALCURZA AND BEATRIZ LASAGA, ET AL. v. ATTY. CASIMIRO N. TAMPARONG, JR. G.R. No. 189874, September 4, 2013 CJ. Sereno The DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of registered CLOAs relating to an agrarian dispute between landowners and tenants. However, in cases concerning the cancellation of CLOAs that involve parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees – cases related to the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations - the jurisdiction is with the DAR, and not the DARAB. It is the DAR and not the DARAB that has jurisdiction. First, the issue of whether the CLOA issued to petitioners over respondent’s land should be cancelled hinges on that of whether the subject landholding is exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of two zoning ordinances. This question involves the DAR’s determination of whether the subject land is indeed exempt from CARP coverage – a matter involving the administrative implementation of the CARP Law. Second, respondent’s complaint does not allege that the prayer for the cancellation of the CLOA was in connection with an agrarian dispute. The complaint is centered on the fraudulent acts of the MARO, PARO, and the regional director that led to the issuance of the CLOA. FACTS: Casimiro N. Tamparong, Jr. (respondent) is the registered owner of a land pursuant to a judicial decree. The Sangguniang Bayan of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental allegedly passed a Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance classifying respondent’s land from agricultural to industrial. The DAR Secretary eventually issued Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) over the land in favor of Petitioners.

Respondent filed a protest against the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage on the ground that his land was industrial, being found within the industrial estate of PHIVIDEC per Zoning Ordinance No. 123. Regional Director Benjamin R. de Vera denied respondent’s protest. Aggrieved, Respondent filed a Complaint for Annulment of CLOA and Cancellation of OCT No. E-4640 with the Provincial Adjudication Reform and Adjudication Board (PARAB). He questioned the issuance of the CLOA on the ground that his land had long been classified by the municipality as industrial. It was also covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1962, being adjacent to the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate, and was thus exempted from CARP coverage. The PARAB declared that Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance had reclassified Lot No. 2252 from agricultural to industrial land prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It held that the complaint was not a protest or an application for exemption, but also for annulment and cancellation of title over which DARAB had jurisdiction. As the PARAB exercised delegated authority from the DARAB, it was but proper for the former to rule on the complaint. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, the PARAB found the CARP coverage irregular and anomalous because the issuance of the CLOA, as well as its registration with the Register of Deeds, happened before the survey plan was approved by the DENR. On appeal, CA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CA, which ruled that the annulment of duly registered CLOAs with the Land Registration Authority falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB and not of the regional director and the subject landholding was considered industrial because of a zoning classification. The case was elevated to the SC. Petitioner alleged that it is the DAR and not the DARAB that has jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether the DARAB has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case RULING: The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law. The court or tribunal must look at the material allegations in the complaint, the issues or questions that are the subject of the controversy, and the character of the relief prayed for in order to determine whether the nature and subject matter of the complaint is within its jurisdiction. If the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or tribunal, the dispute must be addressed and resolved by the said court or tribunal. Section 50 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 vests the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as with exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. The jurisdiction of the DAR over the adjudication of agrarian reform cases was later on delegated to the DARAB, while the former’s jurisdiction over agrarian reform implementation was assigned to its regional offices. The DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of registered CLOAs relating to an agrarian dispute between landowners and tenants. However, in cases concerning the cancellation of CLOAs that involve parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees –

cases related to the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations - the jurisdiction is with the DAR, and not the DARAB. It is the DAR and not the DARAB that has jurisdiction. First, the issue of whether the CLOA issued to petitioners over respondent’s land should be cancelled hinges on that of whether the subject landholding is exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of two zoning ordinances. This question involves the DAR’s determination of whether the subject land is indeed exempt from CARP coverage – a matter involving the administrative implementation of the CARP Law. Second, respondent’s complaint does not allege that the prayer for the cancellation of the CLOA was in connection with an agrarian dispute. The complaint is centered on the fraudulent acts of the MARO, PARO, and the regional director that led to the issuance of the CLOA. HEIRS OF MELENCIO YU, ET AL. v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL G.R. No. 182371, September 4, 2013 J. Peralta The CA issued a TRO in order to stop the demolition order. It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable. Here, there is no "irreparable injury" as understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely," immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients" and the cost of the billboard which is "a considerable amount of money" is easily quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within the concept of irreparable damage or injury. Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. "An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement." An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof. Here, any damage petitioner may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. FACTS: Spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga filed a civil case against John Z. Sycip. The Trial court declared that Melencio Yu is the rightful owner of the said real property. The judgment later attained finality. During the pendency of the said case, squatters entered the subject lot. Consequently, when a writ of execution and an order of demolition were issued by the trial court, a group of squatters known as Yard Urban Homeowners Association, Inc. (YUHAI) filed a complaint for injunction with damages and prayer for writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)or temporary restraining order (TRO). RTC Br. 23 granted petitioners’ motion to implement the writ of demolition. A Special Order of Demolition was issued. Thereafter, a notice to vacate was issued. YUHAI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA issued a TRO but it later revoked it. Petitioners filed a Motion to Resume and Complete Demolition pursuant to the Special Order, which was granted.

Private respondents filed a Special Appearance with Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion again arguing that they should not be included in the demolition as they are not parties to both cases. Upon, denial, a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or WPI seeking to set aside the October 9, 2007 Order was filed before the CA. The CA issued a TRO but was later vacated for being moot and academic because the writ of demolition was already executed and completed. Arguing in main that there was no complete demolition and no proper turn-over of the contested lot on December 13, 2007, private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration with very urgent prayer for immediate issuance of WPI and WPMI. The CA resolved to grant the prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. On the same day, the writ was issued by respondent Rosemarie D. Anacan-Dizon. Aggrieved, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and, later, an Urgent Motion for Dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and without waiting for the CA resolution on the two motions, petitioner filed the present case before the SC. ISSUES: Whether the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by Dizon is proper RULING: The petition is granted. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. To justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, it must be shown that: (1) the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) such right has been violated and the invasion by the other party is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise since, to be protected by injunction, the alleged right must be clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. In this case, there is doubt on private respondents’ entitlement to a preliminary mandatory injunction since the evidence presented before the respondent CA in support thereof appears to be weak and inconclusive, and the alleged right sought to be protected is vehemently disputed. The documentary evidence presented by private respondents does not suffice to prove their ownership and possession of the contested lot. Notably, both the Quitclaim Deed allegedly executed on April 16, 1957 by the spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga in favor of Alfonso Aguinaldo Non and the Transfer of Free Patent Rights allegedly executed on May 28, 1957 by Melencio Yu in favor of Concepcion Non Andres were among those documents already declared null and void by the trial court in Civil Case No.1291 on the grounds that: (a) the spouses never received any consideration for said conveyances; (b) the documents were falsified; (c) the instruments were not approved by the Provincial Governor or his duly-authorized representative pursuant to Sections 145 and 146 of the Revised Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu; (d) all transactions were restricted by the law governing free patent; and (e) Lot No. 2, Psu-135740-Amd is a paraphernal property of Talinanap Matualaga and was sold without her consent.

It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable. Here, there is no "irreparable injury" as understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely," immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients" and the cost of the billboard which is "a considerable amount of money" is easily quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within the concept of irreparable damage or injury. As described in Social Security Commission v. Bayona, damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. "An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement." An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof. Here, any damage petitioner may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. As previously held in Golding v. Balatbat, the writ of injunction should never issue when an action for damages would adequately compensate the injuries caused. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the probability of irreparable injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused. KOPPEL, INC. v. MAKATI ROTARY CLUB FOUNDATION, INC. G.R. No. 198075, September 4, 201 J. Perez Petitioner may still invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract notwithstanding the fact that it assails the validity of such contract. This is due to the doctrine of separability. Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement is considered as independent of the main contract. Being a separate contract in itself, the arbitration agreement may thus be invoked regardless of the possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract. FACTS: In 1975, Fedders Koppel Inc.(FKI) bequeathed a parcel of land in favor of respondent Makati Rotary Club Foundation, Inc. by way of a conditional donation. One of the conditions of the donation required the respondent to lease the subject land back to FKI under terms specified in their Deed of Donation. The Deed of Donation also stipulated that the lease over the subject property is renewable for another period of twenty-five (25) years subject to their mutual agreement. Two (2) days before the lease was set to expire, a new contact of lease (2000 Lease Contract) was entered into by the parties which contained an arbitration clause enforceable in the event the parties come to disagreement about the" interpretation, application and execution" of the lease. The 2000 Lease Contract was renewed for another five (5) years. This new lease (2005 Lease Contract) required FKI to pay a fixed annual rent. In addition to paying the fixed rent, however, the 2005 Lease Contract obligated FKI to make a yearly “donation “of money to the

respondent. Notably, the 2005 Lease Contract contained an arbitration clause similar to that in the 2000 Lease Contract. FKI sold all its rights and properties relative to its business in favor of herein petitioner Koppel, Inc. Petitioner assumed all the rights and obligations of FKI under the Lease Contract. However, petitioner did not comply with the terms and conditions of the 2005 Lease Contract despite repeated demands by the respondent. Instead, petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for the rescission or cancellation of the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation against the respondent. Thus, the Respondent filed an unlawful detainer case with the MeTC. Petitioner averred that pursuant to the 2005 Lease Contract the disagreement between the parties should first be referred to arbitration. MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The RTC reversed the MeTC, which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner can invoke the arbitration clause and yet impugn the validity of the 2005 Lease Contract RULING: The arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract stipulates that "any disagreement" as to the “interpretation, application or execution " of the 2005 Lease Contract ought to be submitted to arbitration. To the mind of this Court, such stipulation is clear and is comprehensive enough so as to include virtually any kind of conflict or dispute that may arise from the 2005 Lease Contract including the one that presently besets petitioner and respondent. First, the disagreement between the petitioner and respondent falls within the allencompassing terms of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract. While it may be conceded that in the arbitration of such disagreement, the validity of the 2005 Lease Contract, or at least, of such contract’s rental stipulations would have to be determined, the same would not render such disagreement non-arbitrable.) Second, petitioner may still invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract notwithstanding the fact that it assails the validity of such contract. This is due to the doctrine of separability. Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement is considered as independent of the main contract. Being a separate contract in itself, the arbitration agreement may thus be invoked regardless of the possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract. Once again instructive is Cargill, wherein this Court held that, as a further consequence of the doctrine of separability, even the very party who repudiates the main contract may invoke its arbitration clause. Third, the operation of the arbitration clause in this case is not at all defeated by the failure of the petitioner to file a formal "request" or application therefor with the MeTC. We find that the filing of a "request" pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. No. 9285 is not the sole means by which an arbitration clause may be validly invoked in a pending suit. JOVITO C. PLAMERAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013 J. Perez Plameras was found guilty of violation of RA 3019 by the Ombudsman. He appealed via petition for review under Rule 45. Petitioner insists that his transaction is related to the mother contract between the DECS and CKL Enterprises, which culminated in a case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, where the Ombudsman absolved the DECS officials. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt is on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt is on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The Court reiterates the well-settled rule that, absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. FACTS: The Province of Antique was among the beneficiaries of the DECS’ Purchase of School Desks Program. Petitioner during his incumbency as Provincial Governor of the Province of Antique received two (2) checks from the DECS- Poverty Alleviation Fund drawn against the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), for the purchase of school desks and armchairs. Petitioner signed a Purchaser-Seller Agreement for the Supply and Delivery of Monoblock Grader’s Desks with CKL as represented by Jesusa T. Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz). Petitioner applied with the LBP Head Office for the opening of an Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit. Such application was approved by the LBP. Thus, Letter of Credit was issued in favor of Dela Cruz of CKL. The petitioner signed Sales Invoice and accepted LBP Draft. The sales invoice stated that the petitioner received and accepted 1,354 grader’s desks and 5,246 table armchairs in good order and condition. Cruz of CKL Enterprises submitted the said sales invoice and draft to the LBP Head Office. Thereupon, the said bank fully negotiated the letter of credit for the full amount and remitted its proceeds to Land Bank Pasig City Branch for credit to the account of CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz, charging the full payment to the Provincial School Board/Governor Jovito Plameras, Jr. Province of Antique. Upon inquiry by the petitioner, he learned that CKL had delivered only 1,294 pieces of grader’s desks and 1,838 pieces of tablet armchairs. The petitioner demanded from CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz, the complete delivery of the purchased items. For failure to settle the matter, a case was filed by the Province of Antique, represented by its new Governor, Exequiel B. Javier against CKL Enterprises to refund the amount paid. While the civil case was pending, Governor Javier likewise instituted a criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for the offense charge. A case was filed against the petitioner for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty of the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether there is a misappreciation of facts and evidence RULING:

The petition is denied. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People, the Court held that: A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The Court reiterates the well-settled rule that, absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. As held in the case of Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that "xxx Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case, those findings should not be ignored xxx." Indeed, even if the foregoing rules were, to be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, this Court, nevertheless finds no reason to disagree with the comparative analysis of the Sandiganbayan between the 1996DECS contract and the contract subject matter of this case, which resulted in the conclusion that the two contracts are different, separate and distinct from one another. Otherwise, there would have been no need for a separate check issued to the petitioner and for the opening of a letter of credit in favor of CKL Enterprise, in the same way, that it becomes unnecessary to draft another Purchaser-Seller Agreement – the same being already covered by the prior contract where CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz was fully paid in the amount of P81,788,170.70 under Check No. 247768 dated 24 December 1996. In all, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors in finding him guilty of the offense charged. HERNANDO BORRA, JOHN PACHEO, ET AL. v. CA, 2ND AND 19TH DIVISIONS AND HAWAIIAN PHILIPPINE COMPANY G.R. No. 167484, September 9, 2013 J. Peralta There can be no forum shopping in the instant case because the grounds cited by private respondent in its motions to dismiss filed in 1998 and in the present case are different. In 1998, the motion to dismiss is based on the argument that the final and executory decision in the Perez case serves as res judicata and, thus, bars the re-litigation of the issue of employeremployee relations between private respondent and petitioners. In the instant case, private respondent again cites res judicata as a ground for its motion to dismiss. This time, however, the basis for such ground is not Perez but the final and executory decision in RAB Case No. 0609-10699-97. Thus, the relief prayed for in private respondent's motion to dismiss subject of the instant case is founded on totally different facts and issues. FACTS:

In 1997, Petitioners filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) two (2) separate complaints. RAB Case No.06-09-10698-97 was filed against herein private respondent alone, while RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 impleaded herein private respondent and a certain Fela Contractor as respondents. In RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97, herein petitioners asked that they be recognized and confirmed as regular employees of herein private respondent and further prayed that they be awarded various benefits received by regular employees for three (3) years prior to the filing of the complaint, while in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97, herein petitioners sought for payment of unpaid wages, holiday pay, allowances, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary damages also during the three (3) years preceding the filing of the complaint. In 1998, Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss RAB Case No. 06-09-0698-97 on the ground of res judicata. Private respondent cited an earlier decided case entitled "Humphrey Perez, et al. v. Hawaiian Philippine Co. et al." (Perez case), which was an action for recovery of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. It includes herein petitioners among the complainants and herein private respondent and one Jose Castillon (Castillon) as respondents. Private respondent contended that the Perez case, which has already become final and executory serves as a bar to the litigation of RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97, because it was ruled therein that petitioners are not employees of private respondent but of Castillon. The Labor Arbiter granted the Motion to Dismiss. On appeal, NLRC set aside the Order of the Labor Arbiter and reinstated the complaint in RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97. The CA affirmed the decision of NLRC. The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the CA. In the meantime, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 holding that there is no employer-employee relations between private respondent and petitioners. The decision became final and executory. Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97 on the ground of among others, of res judicata. Private respondent contended that the final and executory Decision of the Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 serves as a bar to the further litigation of RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97. The Labor Arbiter denied the Motion to Dismiss. Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. The CA granted the petition. ISSUES: 1) Whether there is res judicata in the instant case 2) Whether private respondent is guilty of forum shopping RULING: The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) "bar by prior judgment" and (2) "conclusiveness of judgment." This Court had occasion to explain the difference between these two aspects of res judicata as follows: there is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal. But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only

as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. Forum-shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). More particularly, the elements of forum-shopping are: (a) identity of parties or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. In the instant case, there can be no forum shopping, because the grounds cited by private respondent in its motions to dismiss filed in 1998 and in the present case are different. In 1998, the motion to dismiss is based on the argument that the final and executory decision in the Perez case serves as res judicata and, thus, bars the re-litigation of the issue of employeremployee relations between private respondent and petitioners. In the instant case, private respondent again cites res judicata as a ground for its motion to dismiss because of the final and executory decision in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97. Thus, the relief prayed for in private respondent's motion to dismiss subject of the instant case is founded on totally different facts and issues. . CORAZON S. CRUZ UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE, VILLA CORAZON CONDO DORMITORY v. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY G.R. No. 184732, September 9, 2013

J. Perlas-Bernabe Jurisprudence dictates that the appellee’s role in the appeal process is confined only to the task of refuting the assigned errors interposed by the appellant. Since the appellee is not the party who instituted the appeal and accordingly has not complied with the procedure prescribed therefor, he merely assumes a defensive stance and his interest solely relegated to the affirmance of the judgment appealed from. Keeping in mind that the right to appeal is essentially statutory in character, it is highly erroneous for the appellee to either assign any error or seek any affirmative relief or modification of the lower court’s judgment without interposing its own appeal. The CA committed a reversible error in sustaining the dismissal of the Pasig case on the ground of improper venue because the same was not an error raised by Cruz who was the appellant before it. The CA cannot take cognizance of MIAA’s position that the venue was improperly laid since, being the appellee, MIAA’s participation was confined to the refutation of the appellant’s assignment of errors. FACTS:

Cruz filed before the RTC-Pasig City a complaint for breach of contract, consignation, and damages against respondent Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). In her complaint, Cruz alleged that she executed a Contract of Lease with MIAA and the latter failed to inform her that part of the leased premises is subject to an easement of public use since the same was adjacent to the Parañaque River. As a result, she was not able to obtain a building permit as well as a certificate of electrical inspection from the MERALCO, leading to her consequent failure to secure an electrical connection. MIAA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and improper venue. The RTC-Pasig City issued an Order dismissing Cruz’s complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied. Thus, Cruz filed a notice of appeal. On the other hand, MIAA filed its Defendant-Appellee’s Brief refuting Cruz’s arguments. In addition, MIAA raised its argument on improper venue which had been previously denied by the RTC. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision. Cruz moved for reconsideration but was denied by the CA. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals can resolve the issue raised by the appellee RULING: Jurisprudence dictates that the appellee’s role in the appeal process is confined only to the task of refuting the assigned errors interposed by the appellant. Since the appellee is not the party who instituted the appeal and accordingly has not complied with the procedure prescribed therefor, he merely assumes a defensive stance and his interest solely relegated to the affirmance of the judgment appealed from. Keeping in mind that the right to appeal is essentially statutory in character, it is highly erroneous for the appellee to either assign any error or seek any affirmative relief or modification of the lower court’s judgment without interposing its own appeal. As held in the case of Medida v. CA: An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below. He cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him. He cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the judgment modified. All that said appellee can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor, even on grounds not included in the decision of the court a quo nor raised in the appellant's assignment of errors or arguments. In the case at bar, the Court finds that the CA committed a reversible error in sustaining the dismissal of the Pasig case on the ground of improper venue because the same was not an error raised by Cruz who was the appellant before it. Pursuant to the above-mentioned principles, the CA cannot take cognizance of MIAA’s position that the venue was improperly laid since, being the appellee, MIAA’s participation was confined to the refutation of the appellant’s assignment of errors. As MIAA’s interest was limited to sustaining the RTC-Pasig City’s judgment, it cannot, without pursuing its own appeal, deviate from the pronouncements made therein. In particular, records bear out that the RTC-Pasig City, while granting MIAA’s motion to dismiss, found the latter’s argument on improper venue to be erroneous. Hence, given that the said conclusion was not properly contested by MIAA on appeal, the RTC-Pasig City’s ruling on the matter should now be deemed as conclusive. Corollary, the CA should not have taken this

ground into consideration when it appreciated the case before it. By acting otherwise, it therefore committed a reversible error, which thereby warrants the reversal of its Decision. ENGINEER MANOLITO P. MENDOZA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 195395, September 10, 2013 J. Leonen In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Mendoza was afforded due process despite his claim that he had never personally received a copy of the Notice of Disallowance/s. He was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration. The Commission gave due course to the Motion and ruled on the merits. Petitioner Mendoza, therefore, has been duly afforded an opportunity to explain his side and seek a reconsideration of the ruling he assails, which is the "essence of administrative due process." FACTS: Mendoza is the general manager of Talisay Water District. The Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed a total amount of P380,208.00 which Mendoza received as part of his salary as the Water District's general manager from 2005 to 2006. COA found that petitioner Mendoza's salary as general manager was not in consonance with the rate prescribed under Salary Standardization Law and the approved Plantilla of Position of the district. COA also found that Mendoza's claim of salary was not supported with an Appointment duly attested by the Civil Service Commission. Payment to petitioner Mendoza was, therefore, illegal. COA issued the "Notice of Finality of COA Decision" informing petitioner Mendoza of the finality of the Notice of Disallowance/s. Mendoza filed his Motion for Reconsideration of the "Notice of Finality of COA Decision." He assailed the finality of the Notice of Disallowance/s, arguing that he had not personally received a copy of this, which deprived him of the opportunity to answer the Notice immediately. The Commission on Audit denied petitioner Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. It found that the Notice of Disallowance/s had been received by petitioner Mendoza's employee and ruled that petitioner Mendoza is deemed to have received, the Notice of Disallowance/s constructively. It likened the service of the Notice of Disallowance/s to the service of summons. The Commission also noted that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings; therefore, petitioner Mendoza cannot invoke the defense of technicality. ISSUE: Whether the Notice of Disallowance/s became final and executory despite lack of personal service on petitioner Mendoza RULING: The Commission on Audit issued the Notice of Disallowance/s on May 28, 2007. The 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit governed pleading and practice in the Commission during this period. Section 5 of Rule IV stated that the report, Certificate of

Settlement and Balances, notice of disallowances and charges, and order or decision of the Auditor shall be prepared in such number of copies as may be necessary for distribution to the following: (1) original to the head of agency being audited; (2) one copy to the Auditor for his record; (3) one copy to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency of the government under audit; (4) other copies to the agency officials directly affected by the audit findings. Section 6 of the said Rules provided that unless a request for reconsideration in filed or an appeal is taken, the report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, order or decision of the Auditor shall become final upon the expiration of six (6) months after notice thereof to the parties concerned. In this case, copies of the Notice of Disallowance/s were received on May 29, 2007 by "the Agency Head," "Accountant," and "Persons Liable" with their signatures appearing beside the three designations. Petitioner Mendoza never disputed this fact. After his receipt of the Notice of Finality of COA Decision on August 27, 2009, petitioner Mendoza filed the Motion for Reconsideration dated September 10, 2009. The Commission on Audit gave due course to the Motion for Reconsideration and issued the assailed Decision two (2) years after the issuance of the Notice of Disallowance/s. It ruled that petitioner Mendoza's salary is covered by the Salary Standardization Law. These circumstances show that the Notice of Disallowance/s was served on the necessary officers in accordance with the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit. Moreover, this Court En Banc in Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission ruled that: Time and again, we have held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Mendoza was afforded due process despite his claim that he had never personally received a copy of the Notice of Disallowance/s. He was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration. The Commission gave due course to the Motion and ruled on the merits. Petitioner Mendoza, therefore, has been duly afforded an opportunity to explain his side and seek a reconsideration of the ruling he assails, which is the "essence of administrative due process." SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. ARSENIO ALDECOA, ET AL. G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro Under the 1996 HLURB Rules of Procedure, as amended, an opposition to an application for a locational clearance for a cellular base station or a complaint for the revocation of a locational clearance for a cellular base station already issued, is within the original jurisdiction of the HLURB Executive Committee. There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of administrative remedies prior to instituting Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 before the RTC. Ordinarily, failure to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction will result in the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action. However, the Court herein will not go to the extent of entirely dismissing Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that respondents’ Complaint is

primarily for abatement of nuisance; and respondents alleged the lack of HLURB requirements for the cellular base station, not to seek nullification of petitioner’s locational clearance, but to support their chief argument that said cellular base station is a nuisance which needs to be abated. FACTS: Petitioner Smart Communications Inc. (Smart) entered into a contract of lease with Florentino Sebastian in which the latter agreed to lease to the former a piece of vacant lot. Smart immediately constructed and installed a cellular base station on the leased property. Around and close to the cellular base station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and establishments, including the properties of respondents. Respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint against petitioner for abatement of nuisance and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, declaring the cellular base station of petitioner a nuisance that endangered the health and safety of the residents of the place. The CA based its ruling on the following grounds: (1) the locational clearance granted to petitioner was a nullity due to the lack of approval by majority of the actual residents of the barangay and a barangay resolution endorsing the construction of the cellular base station; and (2) the sound emission of the generator at the cellular base station exceeded the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) standards. ISSUE: Whether it was proper for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance and rule upon the validity of nullity of locational clearance of the cellular base station RULING: The petition is partly meritorious. Based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of and rule upon the issue of the validity or nullity of petitioner’s locational clearance for its cellular base station. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Correlatively, the HLURB provides administrative remedies for non-compliance with its requirements. In 2000, when factual precedents to the instant case began to take place, HLURB Resolution No. R-586, series of 1996, otherwise known as the 1996 HLURB Rules of Procedure, as amended, was in effect. The original 1996 HLURB Rules of Procedure was precisely amended by HLURB Resolution No. R-655, series of 1999, "so as to afford oppositors with the proper channel and expeditious means to ventilate their objections and oppositions to applications for permits, clearances and licenses, as well as to protect the rights of applicants against frivolous oppositions that may cause undue delay to their projects. "Under the 1996 HLURB Rules of Procedure, as amended, an opposition to an application for a locational clearance for a cellular base station or a complaint for the revocation of a locational clearance for a cellular base station already issued, is within the original jurisdiction of the HLURB Executive Committee. There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of administrative remedies prior to instituting Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 before the RTC. While there are accepted exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, respondents never asserted nor argued any of them. Ordinarily, failure to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction will result in the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action. However, the Court herein will not go to the extent of entirely dismissing Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that respondents’ Complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 is primarily for abatement of nuisance; and respondents alleged the lack of HLURB requirements for the cellular base station, not to seek nullification of petitioner’s locational clearance, but to support their chief argument that said cellular base station is a nuisance which needs to be abated. The issue of whether or not the locational clearance for said cellular base station is valid is actually separate and distinct from the issue of whether or not the cellular base station is a nuisance; one is not necessarily determinative of the other. While the first is within the primary jurisdiction of the HLURB and, therefore, premature for the courts to rule upon in the present case, the latter is within the jurisdiction of the courts to determine but only after trial proper. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION/FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. Nos. 167274-75& G.R. No. 192576, September 11, 2013

J. Velasco, Jr. It is an established rule that when the dispositive portion of a judgment, which has meanwhile become final and executory, contains a clerical error or an ambiguity arising from an inadvertent omission, such error or ambiguity may be clarified by reference to the body of the decision itself. The very contents of the body of the Decision dated July 21, 2008 rendered by this Court in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 undoubtedly reveal that both CA G.R. SP No. 80675 and CA G.R. SP No. 83165 were the subject matter of the petition therein. FACTS: FTC filed before the CTA three (3) separate petitions for refund covering three different periods docketed as CTA Case No. 6365, CTA Case No. 6383 and CTA Case No. 6612. In three (3) separate decisions/resolutions, the CTA found the claims for refund valid and thus ordered

the payment thereof. Aggrieved, BIR Commissioner went to the CA on a petition for review assailing in CA-G.R.SP No. 80675 the CTA decision/resolution pertaining to consolidated CTA Case Nos. 6365 & 6383. A similar petition, docketed as CA G.R. SP No.83165, was subsequently filed assailing the CTA decision/resolution on CTA Case No. 6612. The CA, by Decision dated September 4, 2004, denied the Commissioner’s consolidated petition for review. Upon finality, petitioner filed a motion for execution praying for the issuance of a writ of execution of the Decision of the Honorable Court in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 dated July 21, 2008. The CTA issued a Writ of Execution and ordered refund to FTC. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an additional writ of execution praying that the CTA order the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to pay representing the amount of tax to be refunded in C.T.A. Case No. 6612. The CTA denied petitioner’s motion. FTC posits that the CTA should have issued the desired additional writ of execution in CTA Case No. 6612 since the body of the Decision of this Court in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 encompasses both CA G.R. Case No. 80675 which covers CTA Case Nos. 6365 and 6383 and CA G.R. Case No. 83165 which embraces CTA Case No. 6612. ISSUE: Whether the additional writ of execution should be issued RULING: The petition is granted. It is an established rule that when the dispositive portion of a judgment, which has meanwhile become final and executory, contains a clerical error or an ambiguity arising from a inadvertent omission, such error or ambiguity may be clarified by reference to the body of the decision itself. After a scrutiny of the body of the aforesaid July 21, 2008 Decision, the Court finds it necessary to render a judgment nunc pro tunc and address an error in the fallo of said decision.The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court done at a former time which was not then carried into the record, and the power of a court to make such entries is restricted to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action which has actually been taken.The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record, that has been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, not to supply non-action by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been.The Court would thus have the record reflect the deliberations and discussions had on the issue. In this particular case it is a correction of a clerical, not a judicial error. The body of the decision in question is clear proof that the fallo must be corrected, to properly convey the ruling of this Court. The very contents of the body of the Decision dated July 21,2008 rendered by this Court in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 undoubtedly reveal that both CA G.R. SP No. 80675 and CA G.R. SP No. 83165 were the subject matter of the petition therein. And as FTC would point out at every turn, the Court’s Decision passed upon and decided the merits of the September 28,2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases of CA G.R.SP Case Nos. 80675 and 83165 and necessarily CA G.R. SP No. 83165 was included in our disposition of G.R. Nos. 167274-75.

In the case of Ong Ching Kian Chung v. China National Cereals Oil and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation, the Court noted two (2) exceptions to the rule that the fallo prevails over the body of the opinion, viz: (a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment because the dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decision’s ratio decidendi; (b) where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision. Both exceptions obtain in the present case. We find that there is an ambiguity in the fallo of Our July 21, 2008 Decision in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 considering that the propriety of the CA holding in CA-G.R. SP No.83165 formed part of the core issues raised in G.R. Case Nos. 167274-75, but unfortunately was left out in the all-important decretal portion of the judgment. The fallo of Our July 21, 2008 Decision should, therefore, be correspondingly corrected.

LETICIA I. KUMMER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013 J. Brion The discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court. The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a public document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report need not be presented in court to identify, describe and testify how the report was conducted. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. FACTS: Petitioner and her son Johan were charged with homicide for allegedly shooting Jesus Mallo, Jr (Mallo) on July 19, 1998. Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The complaint was later amended changing the date of commission from July 19, 1998 to June 19, 1998. After trial, the RTC found both the petitioner and Johan guilty of homicide based on testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Amiel Malana who both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo which was coupled by the positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on the petitioner’s right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other prosecution witnesses.

The petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with the CA. She averred that the RTC erred, among others: (1) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence of Cuntapay and of Malana despite the discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct testimonies; (2) in considering the paraffin test results finding the petitioner positive for gunpowder residue. The petitioner also claimed that she was not arraigned on the amended complaint for which she was convicted. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1) Whether the discrepancies between the affidavit and testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses affect their credibility 2) Whether paraffin test results is admissible as evidence 3) Whether there is a need for the petitioner to be arraigned in the amended complaint RULING: Variance between the eyewitnesses’ testimonies in open court and their affidavits does not affect their credibility We have ruled that the discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court. In the present case, we find it undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively identified the petitioner as one of the assailants. This is the critical point, not the inconsistencies that the petitioner repeatedly refers to, which carry no direct bearing on the crucial issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, the inconsistencies refer only to minor details that are not critical to the main outcome of the case. Moreover, the basic rule is that the Supreme Court accords great respect and even finality to the findings of credibility of the trial court, more so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as in this case. Public documents are admissible in court without further proof of their due execution and authenticity The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a public document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report need not be presented in court to identify, describe and testify how the report was conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio who was presented in court to identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist who actually conducted the paraffin test on the petitioner, the report may still be admitted because the requirement for authentication does not apply to public documents. In other words, the forensic chemist does not need to be presented as witness to identify and authenticate the chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are prima facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of Johan and on the right hand of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the petitioner herself admitted the presence of

gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit ascribing their presence from a match she allegedly lighted. Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is merely a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended. It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. The act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which date the offense was committed, as the information will permit. Under the circumstances, the precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of homicide. Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment was of this nature and did not need a second plea. UNICAPITAL INC., ET AL. v. RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., ET AL./RAFAEL CONSING, JR. v. HON. MARISSA MACARAIG-GUILLEN, ETC., ET AL. G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants. In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s complaint properly states a cause of action since the allegations there insufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil Code. FACTS: Rafael Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), obtained a loan from Unicapital secured by Promissory Notes and a Real Estate Mortgage over parcel of land (subject property) registered in the name of Dela Cruz. Prior to

these transactions, Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a real estate company, was already interested to develop the subject property into a residential subdivision. PBI entered into a joint venture agreement with Unicapital, through its real estate development arm, URI. After further negotiations, Dela Cruz decided to sell the same to Unicapital and PBI. For this purpose, Dela Cruz appointed Consing, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact. After purchasing the subject property, Juanito Tan Teng (Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu) informed Unicapital that they are the lawful owners of the subject property. Upon further investigation PBI learned that Dela Cruz's title was actually of dubious origin. Thus, PBI and Unicapital sent separate demand letters to Dela Cruz and Consing, Jr., seeking the return of the purchase price they had paid for the subject property. Consing Jr. filed a complaint against Unicapital, et. al., claiming, among others, that Unicapital and PBI have used abusive manner in enforcing their claims against Consing, Jr. which has severely affected his personal and professional life. Unicapital, et al. filed separate Motions to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. RTC denied the motions to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision. ISSUE: Whether the complaint of Consing Jr. properly stated the cause of action RULING: A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants. Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from an analysis on whether or not the complaint is able to convey a cause of action; and not that the complainant has no cause of action. Lest it be misunderstood, failure to state a cause of action is properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court while the latter is not a ground for dismissal under the same rule. In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s complaint properly states a cause of action since the allegations there insufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil Code. Records disclose that Consing, Jr.’s complaint contains allegations which aim to demonstrate the abusive manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands against him. Among others, the complaint states that Consing, Jr. "has constantly been harassed and bothered by Unicapital and PBI, et al.; x x x besieged by phone calls from them; x x x has had constant meetings with them variously, and on a continuing basis, such that he is unable to attend to his work as an investment banker." In the same pleading, he also alleged

that Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s act of "demanding a postdated check knowing fully well that he does not have the necessary funds to cover the same, nor is he expecting to have them is equivalent to asking him to commit a crime under unlawful coercive force." Accordingly, these specific allegations, if hypothetically admitted, may result into the recovery of damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Records reveal that Consing, Jr., in his complaint, alleged that "he has come to discover that Unicapital and PBI, et al. are speaking of him in a manner that is inappropriate and libelous; and that they have spread their virulent version of events in the business and financial community such that he has suffered and continues to suffer injury upon his good name and reputation which, after all, is the most sacred and valuable wealth he possesses - especially considering that he is an investment banker."In similar regard, the hypothetical admission of these allegations may result into the recovery of damages pursuant to Article 26, and even Article2219(10), of the Civil Code. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS G.R. No. 20303, September 11, 2013 J. Carpio DPWH wanted to expropriate portions of the properties of BPI. BPI claimed for the inclusion of the value of its building in determining the just compensation although it was never taken by the government. The general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to is the market value. The general rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken; he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value. FACTS: The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) filed with the Regional Trial Court a case for expropriation against portions of the properties of Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and of Bayani Villanueva (Villanueva). DPWH needed BPI’s lot for the construction of the Zapote-Alabang Fly-Over. Neither BPI nor Villanueva objected to the propriety of the expropriation; hence, the trial court constituted a Board of Commissioners to determine the just compensation. The trial court thereafter required petitioner and BPI to submit their respective nominees and their oaths of office. Petitioner, instead of submitting its nominee, filed a Manifestation and Motion objecting to the propriety of paying just compensation for BPI’s building and praying that BPI’s claim for additional just compensation be denied, claiming that the building was never taken by the government. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that the demolition of the old building of BPI can be construed as a consequential damage suffered by BPI as a result of the expropriation. Petitioner was thus ordered to submit its nominee to the Board of Commissioners.

Savellano recommended the amount of P2,633,000.00, which was based on the appraisal conducted by an independent professional business and property consultant. On the other hand, Gervacio recommended the amount of P1,905,600.00, which was the market value indicated on the tax declaration of said building. Eventually, the RTC issued an order adopting the recommendation of Gervacio. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether the award of additional just compensation for BPI’s building in the amount fixed therefor is unfounded and without legal basis RULING: The general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to is the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be paid by the buyer and received by the seller. The general rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken; he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value. The rules on expropriation clearly provide a legal basis for the award of consequential damages. Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provided that the commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or public purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant consequential damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot of private respondent suffers from impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded to private respondent. MANUEL UY & SONS, INC. v. VALBUECO, INCORPORATED G.R. No. 179594, September 11, 2013 J. Peralta Actions based upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Non-fulfillment of the obligation to pay on the due date, that is, on November 15, 1974, would give rise to an action by the vendor, which date of reckoning may also apply to any action by the vendee to determine his right under R.A. No. 6552. The vendee, respondent herein, filed this case on March 16, 2001, which is clearly beyond the 10-year prescriptive period; hence, the action has prescribed.

Even though the ground of prescription was raised only for the first time before the Supreme Court, the respondent’s right to due process was not violated as it was given the opportunity to oppose such defense. It is well within the authority and discretion of the Court to resolve such issue of prescription as provided under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court. FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. is the registered owner of parcels of land located in Teresa, Rizal. On November 29, 1973, two Conditional Deeds of Sale were executed by petitioner, as vendor, in favor of respondent Valbueco, Incorporated. Respondent made partial payments. However, respondent suspended further payment as it was not satisfied with the manner petitioner complied with its obligations under the conditional deeds of sale. Consequently, on March 17, 1978, petitioner sent respondent a letter informing respondent of its intention to rescind the conditional deeds of sale and attaching therewith the original copy of the respective notarial rescission. On November 28, 1994, respondent filed a Complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner with the RTC of Antipolo City. However, it was dismissed without prejudice as respondent's counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference. On March 16, 2001, respondent again filed with the RTC of Manila a Complaint for specific performance and damages, seeking to compel petitioner to accept the balance of the purchase price for the two conditional deeds of sale and to execute the corresponding deeds of absolute sale. The RTC dismissed the complaint as petitioner had exercised its right to rescind the contracts. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. In its petition to the Supreme Court, petitioner argued that it is evident on the face of the complaint and the two contracts of conditional sale that the cause of action accrued in 1974; yet, the complaint for specific performance was filed after 27 years, hence the action has prescribed. ISSUE: Whether the cause of action has already prescribed RULING: Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provided that defenses and objections not pleaded whether in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. In Gicano v. Gegato, the Court held that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court); or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule16); or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings; or where a defendant has been declared in default.

What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence. Moreover, it was held in Dino v. Court of Appeals that even if the defense of prescription was raised for the first time on appeal in respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court's decision, this does not militate against the due process right of the petitioners. On appeal, there was no new issue of fact that arose in connection with the question of prescription, thus it cannot be said that petitioners were not given the opportunity to present evidence in the trial court to meet a factual issue. Equally important, petitioners had the opportunity to oppose the defense of prescription in their Opposition to the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the appellate court and in their Petition for Review in this Court. In this case, petitioner raised the defense of prescription for the first time before this Court, and respondent had the opportunity to oppose the defense of prescription in its Comment to the petition. Hence, the Court can resolve the issue of prescription as both parties were afforded the opportunity to ventilate their respective positions on the matter. The Complaint shows that the Conditional Deeds of Sale were executed on November 29, 1973, and payments were due on both Conditional Deeds of Sale on November 15, 1974. Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that actions based upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Non-fulfillment of the obligation to pay on the last due date, that is, on November 15, 1974, would give rise to an action by the vendor, which date of reckoning may also apply to any action by the vendee to determine his right under R.A. No. 6552. The vendee, respondent herein, filed this case on March 16, 2001, which is clearly beyond the 10-year prescriptive period; hence, the action has prescribed. S.C. MEGAWORLD CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. ENGR. LUIS U. PARADA, REPRESENTED BY ENGR. LEONARDO A. PARADA OF GENLITE INDUSTRIES G.R. No. 183804, September 11, 2013 J. Reyes The verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the complaint is not a jurisdictional but a formal requirement, and any objection as to non-compliance therewith should be raised in the proceedings below and not for the first time on appeal. Genlite Industries is merely the DTI-registered trade name or style of the respondent by which he conducted his business. As such, it does not exist as a separate entity apart from its owner, and therefore it has no separate juridical personality to sue or be sued. As the sole proprietor of Genlite Industries, there is no question that the respondent is the real party in interest who stood to be directly benefited or injured by the judgment in the complaint below. FACTS: S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation (petitioner) bought for its Read-Rite project electrical lighting materials from Genlite Industries, a sole proprietorship owned by Engineer Luis U. Parada (respondent). The petitioner was unable to pay on due date and blamed it on its failure to collect under its sub-contract with the Enviro Kleen Technologies, Inc. (Enviro Kleen). It was however able to persuade Enviro Kleen to agree to settle, but after paying the respondent, Enviro Kleen stopped making further payments, leaving an outstanding

balance. Petitioner denied the repeated demands of the respondent prompting the respondent to file a suit. The petitioner denied liability and averred that novation took place when the latter accepted the partial payment of Enviro Kleen in its behalf, and thereby acquiesced to the substitution of Enviro Kleen as the new debtor in the petitioner’s place. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner raised for the first time that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondent to implead Genlite Industries as "a proper party in interest", as provided in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA found that respondent is the sole proprietor of Genlite Industries, and therefore the real party-plaintiff. On motion for reconsideration, the petitioner, for the first time, questioned the validity of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the complaint because the SPA executed by the respondent did not specifically include an authority for Engr. Leonardo Parada (Leonardo) to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The CA denied the said motion for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1) Whether the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the complaint is valid 2) Whether there is a need to implead Gentile Industries as a party-plaintiff in a civil case RULING: The verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the complaint is not a jurisdictional but a formal requirement, and any objection as to non-compliance therewith should be raised in the proceedings below and not for the first time on appeal. We have emphasized, time and again, that verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite, as it is mainly intended to secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculation. The Court may order the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served. Moreover, granting that Leonardo has no personal knowledge of the transaction subject of the complaint below, Section 4 of Rule 7 provides that the verification need not be based on the verifier’s personal knowledge but even only on authentic records. Sales invoices, statements of accounts, receipts and collection letters for the balance of the amount still due to the respondent from the petitioner are such records. There is clearly substantial compliance by the respondent’s attorney-in-fact with the requirement of verification. Lastly, it is well-settled that a strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of substantial justice may be served. It is clear that the present controversy must be resolved on its merits, lest for a technical oversight the respondent should be deprived of what is justly due him. A sole proprietorship has no juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its owner, and need not be impleaded as a party-plaintiff in a civil case.

On the question of whether Genlite Industries should have been impleaded as a partyplaintiff, Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case. Article 44 of the New Civil Code provided that the following are juridical persons: (1) the State and its political subdivisions; (2) other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; (3) corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member. Genlite Industries is merely the DTI-registered trade name or style of the respondent by which he conducted his business. As such, it does not exist as a separate entity apart from its owner, and therefore it has no separate juridical personality to sue or be sued. As the sole proprietor of Genlite Industries, there is no question that the respondent is the real party in interest who stood to be directly benefited or injured by the judgment in the complaint below. There is then no necessity for Genlite Industries to be impleaded as a party-plaintiff, since the complaint was already filed in the name of its proprietor, Engr. Luis U. Parada. To heed the petitioner’s sophistic reasoning is to permit a dubious technicality to frustrate the ends of substantial justice. HERMINIO T. DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL./HERMINIO T. DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. Nos. 169823-24, September 11, 2013 J. Bersamin It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial. The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court. FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed two (2) informations charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 02-0575) and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act(Criminal Case No. 28002). Disini filed a motion to quash, alleging that the criminal actions had been extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash. Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad. He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations. The Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to quash and his subsequent motion for reconsideration. In his petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, Disini alleged, among others, that the two (2) informations charging him were not in compliance with the form and substance prescribed by the law.

ISSUE: Whether the two (2) informations are sufficient in form RULING: The petition is denied. The informations were sufficient in form and substance. It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not considered. The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial. The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court. The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers specifically put forth that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and presents to President Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his position as President, committed the offense in relation to his office, and in consideration of the gifts and presents offered, promised and given by Disini, President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos. The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are: 1) that the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and 2) that the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery. The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery. The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or

indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an essential element in direct bribery – the allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery. The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are: 1) that the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official; 2) that he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government; 3) that the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government. The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then having business, transaction, and application with the Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP. ELISEO AGUILAR v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ET AL. G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013 Per Curiam The Court observes that grave abuse of discretion taints a public prosecutor’s resolution if he arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause. In particular, case law states that probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. FACTS: Petitioner Eliseo Aguilar, father of Francisco M. Aguilar, alias Tetet, filed a criminal complaint for murder against the members of Occidental Mindoro Police Force, identified as respondents SPO3 Gregardro Villar (Villar), SPO1 Ramon Lara (Lara), SPO1 Alex Acaylar (Acaylar), PO1 Leo Dangupon (Dangupon), and PO1 Jovannie Balicol (Balicol), and members of the Philippine Army, namely, respondents 1st Lt. Philip Fortuno (Fortuno) and Cpl. Edilberto Abordo (Abordo). He averred that Tetet was arrested by respondents for alleged acts of extortion. Despite his peaceful surrender, he was maltreated by respondents. He was then

boarded on a military jeep and brought to the Viga River where he was gunned down by respondents. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed petitioner’s complaint against all respondents for lack of probable cause. The Provincial Prosecutor held that the evidence on record shows that the shooting of Tetet by Dangupon was done either in an act of self-defense, defense of a stranger, and in the performance of a lawful duty or exercise of a right of office. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the DOJ, which affirmed the Provincial Prosecutor’s ruling. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause to charge the respondents of the crime of murder RULING: It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the foregoing context, the Court observes that grave abuse of discretion taints a public prosecutor’s resolution if he arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause. In particular, case law states that probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief and, as such, does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. As pronounced in Reyes v. Pearl bank Securities, Inc.: A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. At this juncture, it must be noted that Dangupon’s theories of self-defense/defense of a stranger and performance of an official duty are not clear and convincing enough to exculpate him at this stage of the proceedings. To add, neither can the dismissal of the murder charge against Dangupon be sustained in view of his presumption of innocence. Jurisprudence holds that when the accused admits killing the victim, but invokes a justifying circumstance, the constitutional presumption of innocence is effectively waived and the burden of proving the existence of such circumstance shifts to the accused. The rule regarding an accused’s admission of the victim’s killing has been articulated in Ortega v. Sandiganbayan, to wit:

Well settled is the rule that where the accused had admitted that he is the author of the death of the victim and his defense anchored on self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove this justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. To do so, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for the accused himself had admitted the killing. The burden is upon the accused to prove clearly and sufficiently the elements of self-defense, being an affirmative allegation, otherwise the conviction of the accused is inescapable. Therefore, due to the ostensible presence of the crime charged and considering that Dangupon’s theories of self-defense/defense of a stranger and lawful performance of one’s duty and the argument on presumption of innocence are, under the circumstances, not compelling enough to overcome a finding of probable cause, the Court finds that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case against Dangupon. Consequently, the reversal of the CA ruling with respect to the latter is in order. The Court, however, maintains a contrary view with respect to the determination of lack of probable cause on the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar and Balicol. Records are bereft of any showing that the aforementioned respondents – as opposed to Dangupon, Fortuno, and Abordo – directly participated in the killing of Tetet at the Viga River. As observed by the DOJ, Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol were not with Tetet at the time he was shot; thus, they could not have been responsible for his killing. Neither could they be said to have acted in conspiracy with the other respondents since it was not demonstrated how they concurred in or, in any way, participated towards the unified purpose of consummating the same act. It is well-settled that conspiracy exists when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. Therefore, finding no direct participation or conspiracy on the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol, the Court holds that the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in affirming the Provincial Prosecutor’s dismissal of the charges against them. In this respect, the CA’s Decision must stand. ERNESTO DY v. HON. GINA M. BIBAT-PALAMOS G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013 J. Mendoza When a supervening event renders the execution of a judgment impossible or unjust, the interested party can petition the court to modify the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts. A supervening event is a fact which transpires or a new circumstance which develops after a judgment has become final and executory. This includes matters which the parties were unaware of prior to or during trial because they were not yet in existence at that time. In this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be considered a supervening event. Petitioner, who did not have possession of the ship, was only informed of its destruction when Colorado filed its Manifestation, dated July 29, 2010, long after the September 11, 2009 Decision of this Court in Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy and Lourdes Dy attained finality on January 19, 2010. During the course of the proceedings in the RTC, the CA and this Court, petitioner could not have known of the worsened condition of the vessel because it was in the possession of Colorado. FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Dy (petitioner) and his wife, Lourdes Dy (Lourdes), were the proprietors of Limchia Enterprises which was engaged in the shipping business. Limchia

Enterprises, with Lourdes as co-maker, obtained a loan from Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (respondent) to fund its acquisition of M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel. As additional security for the loan, Limchia Enterprises executed the Deed of Chattel Mortgage over M/V Pilar-I. Spouses Dy suffered losses when M/V Pilar-I was attacked by pirates because of this they failed to make the scheduled payments. After repeated demands of the respondent, Spouses Dy applied for the restructuring of their loan. Respondent filed the Complaint and Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Preferred Ship Mortgage with Urgent Prayer for Attachment with the RTC. The RTC ordered the seizure of M/V Pilar-I and turned over its possession to respondent. Respondent transferred all of its rights, title to and interests, as mortgagee, in M/V Pilar-I to Colorado Shipyard Corporation (Colorado). This was affirmed by the CA with the modification that Spouses Dy be ordered to reimburse the respondent for repair and dry docking expenses while the vessel was in the latter’s possession. Upon finality of judgment, petitioner filed a motion for execution of judgment. In the intervening period, Colorado filed its Manifestation/Motion informing the RTC that M/V Pilar-I, which was in its possession, had sunk in its shipyard because of its exposure to the elements. For this reason, it sought permission from the court to cut the sunken vessel into pieces, sell its parts and deposit the proceeds in escrow. The RTC granted the motion for execution but denied petitioner’s prayer for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same state in which it was taken by respondent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: Whether petitioner is estopped from asking for the return of the vessel in the condition it had at the time it was seized RULING: This Court is not unaware of the doctrine of immutability of judgments. When a judgment becomes final and executory, it is made immutable and unalterable, meaning it can no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. Its purpose is to avoid delay in the orderly administration of justice and to put an end to judicial controversies. Even at the risk of occasional errors, public policy and sound practice dictate that judgments must become final at some point. As with every rule, however, this admits of certain exceptions. When a supervening event renders the execution of a judgment impossible or unjust, the interested party can petition the court to modify the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts. A supervening event is a fact which transpires or a new circumstance which develops after a judgment has become final and executory. This includes matters which the parties were unaware of prior to or during trial because they were not yet in existence at that time. In this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be considered a supervening event. Petitioner, who did not have possession of the ship, was only informed of its destruction when Colorado filed its Manifestation, dated July 29, 2010, long after the September 11, 2009 Decision of this Court in Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy and Lourdes Dy attained finality on January 19, 2010. During the course of the proceedings in

the RTC, the CA and this Court, petitioner could not have known of the worsened condition of the vessel because it was in the possession of Colorado. It could be argued that petitioner and his lawyer should have had the foresight to ask for the return of the vessel in its former condition at the time respondent took possession of the same during the proceedings in the earlier case. Nonetheless, the modification of the Court’s decision is warranted by the superseding circumstances, that is, the severe damage to the vessel subject of the case and the belated delivery of this information to the courts by the party in possession of the same. Having declared that a modification of our earlier judgment is permissible in light of the exceptional incident present in this case, the Court further rules that petitioner is entitled to the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same condition in which respondent took possession of it. Considering, however, that this is no longer possible, then respondent should pay petitioner the value of the ship at such time. NARCISO SALAS v. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as recognition in a public instrument. It has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father. As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity. FACTS: Annabelle Mausoleum (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner); praying for, among others, support pendente lite and monthly support. She claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo. She alleged that petitioner enticed her by making her believe that he was a widower and promising that he will take care of her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought that she and her child will have a better life. When she became pregnant, petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed. After she gave birth, she filled out the form for the child’s birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child and drove her baby home. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Salas denied paternity of Christian Paulo and claimed that he was motivated by genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner RULING: Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines stated that the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father. As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity. The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. The Statement of Account from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondent’s child as an act of charity As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private

handwritten

instrument

signed

by

the

parent

concerned.

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO1 ALFREDO ALAWIG G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013 J. Del Castillo There is no eyewitness to the shooting of the victim. Prosecution’s key witness testified that he saw the respondents went to the house of the victim and he received a call from the victim asking for help. Likewise, the respondents tested positive for gunpowder nitrates. Nonetheless, jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. It is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. FACTS: In the early morning of November 30, 1996, PO3 Miel de Ocampo Café (victim) and MacGregor Reyes (Reyes) went to a nearby market. Upon their return, Reyes left the victim at the latter’s residence and came back at noon. He did not immediately enter the house as he noticed several policemen strategically positioned on the premises. He saw appellant and PO3 Romeo Ventinilla (PO3 Ventinilla), SPO2 Dabu, PO2 Armando de Vera (PO2 De Vera) and PO2 Vivencio Corpuz (PO2Corpuz). To avoid being noticed, Reyes used the alternative road and went inside the house through the back gate. From his position, he heard the conversation among appellant, PO3 Ventinilla and the victim. They informed the latter to bring his firearm because they have an operation regarding illegal drugs as instructed by SPO4 Ponciano Miraples (SPO4 Miraples). After the group left the victim’s residence, Reyes entered the house. While inside, he received a telephone call from the victim asking for help. Not long after, Reyes learned that the victim died from gunshot wounds in different parts of his body. Appellant, along with PO3 Ventinilla, SPO4 Miraples, PO2 De Vera, SPO2 Dabu and PO2 Corpuz were charged with murder for the killing of the victim. The RTC convicted appellant and SPO2 Dabu of murder qualified by treachery. On appeal, Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision but reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:

Whether there is enough circumstantial evidence to warrant conviction of the appellant RULING: Appellant claims that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was not sufficient to convict him. He argues that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of events that showed his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, he is entitled to enjoy the constitutional presumption of innocence. Indeed, no prosecution witness has actually seen the commission of the crime. But jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established." In this case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly synthesized the circumstances constituting circumstantial evidence as culled from the entire testimony of Reyes, the prosecution’s key witness, to wit: 1. Around x x x noon of November 30, 1996, Reyes saw appellant and the late PO3 x x x Ventinilla enter the house of the victim after the latter’s friend Tomas Beroy, opened the door upon the instruction of the victim; 2. Reyes saw appellant and [PO3] Ventinilla carrying an armalite rifle and [a] .38 caliber pistol; 3. Reyes heard appellant and [PO3] Ventinilla tell the victim that he was being instructed by SPO4 x x x Miraples, the Chief of Police of Police Kababayan Center I, Doña Ata Subdivision Station, Marulas, Valenzuela, to join a team of police which will apprehend a big person x x x involved in illegal drugs in Malanday, Valenzuela; 4. Because of the alleged instruction of the victim’s superior, Reyes saw the victim leave his house together with appellant and PO3 Ventinilla around 1:00 p.m. of November 30, 1996; 5. A few minutes thereafter, Reyes received a telephone call from the victim who nervously told him, "Pare wala pala kaming tatrabahuhin, ako palaang tatrabahuhin. Tulungan mo ako sumundo ka ng tao na tutulong sa akin."But before Reyes could respond, the line at the other end of the telephone wassuddenly cut x x x; and 6. Later in the afternoon, Reyes learned from his friend that the victim was already dead. The prosecution likewise presented corroborating evidence which constitute an unbroken chain leading to the inevitable conclusion that appellant is guilty of killing the victim. For instance, the presence of gunpowder nitrates on appellant after a paraffin test; the firearm used in the killing which could either be a .38 caliber or 9 mm pistol dovetails with the testimony of Reyes that he saw appellant carrying a .38 caliber short firearm which was later found to have been recently fired; and the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of the victim after a paraffin test which belies appellant’s claim that he was shot by the victim or that the latter exchanged fire with PO3 Ventinilla. "Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt." All the foregoing elements were sufficiently established in this case.

JUANITO VICTOR C. REMULLA v. ERINEO S. MALIKSI, ETC., ET AL. G.R. No. 171633, September 18, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe Remulla is not a party to the compromise but he has the legal standing to file the petition before the Court either in his personal capacity as taxpayer or as then Vice-Governor and, hence, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite. As a taxpayer, he may be allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance. As then Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite, he represents the interests of the province itself which is, undoubtedly, a real party in interest since it stands to be either benefited or injured by the execution of the compromise judgment. FACTS: Marietta O’Hara de Villa (de Villa) donated a portion of her property (subject property) in favor of the Province of Cavite, on which now stands various government offices and facilities. The Province of Cavite wanted to expropriate the remaining portion of subject property which the former intends to develop as the Provincial Capitol Site. While the case is pending the remaining portion of the subject property was sold to Goldenrod, Inc., a joint venture company owned by Sonya G. Mathay (Mathay) and Eleuterio M. Pascual, Jr. (Pascual).Subsequently, Mathay and Pascual intervened in the expropriation case. Respondent then Cavite Governor Erineo S. Maliksi (Maliksi) issued an Executive Order authorizing the creation of a committee which recommended the terms and conditions for the proper settlement of the expropriation case. The recommendations of the committee were then adopted in a Compromise Agreement. Thereafter, the subject compromise was approved by the RTC in a decision and an Amended Decision (compromise judgment), both of which were ratified by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Trece Martires City. Remulla, in his personal capacity as taxpayer and as then Vice-Governor and, hence, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite, filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA. He argued that the subject compromise is grossly disadvantageous to the government and Maliksi entered into the subject compromise without authority from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and sans any certification on the availability of funds as required by law. The CA dismissed the petition of Remulla based on the following grounds: (a) there was yet no disbursement of public funds at the time of its filing; thus, it cannot be considered as a taxpayer's suit; and (b) Remulla was not a real party in interest to question the propriety of the subject compromise as he was not a signatory thereto. Aggrieved, Remulla filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether Remulla is a real party in interest RULING:

The petition is granted. Remulla filed his petition for annulment of judgment in two capacities: first, in his personal capacity as a taxpayer; and, second , in his official capacity as then presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite. With respect to the first, jurisprudence dictates that a taxpayer may be allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance. In this case, public funds of the Province of Cavite stand to be expended to enforce the compromise judgment. As such, Remulla – being a resident-taxpayer of the Province of Cavite – has the legal standing to file the petition for annulment of judgment and, therefore, the same should not have been dismissed on said ground. Notably, the fact that there lies no proof that public funds have already been disbursed should not preclude Remulla from assailing the validity of the compromise judgment. Lest it be misunderstood, the concept of legal standing is ultimately a procedural technicality which may be relaxed by the Court if the circumstances so warrant. Anent the second, Remulla equally lodged the petition for annulment of judgment in his official capacity as then Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite. As such, he represents the interests of the province itself which is, undoubtedly, a real party in interest since it stands to be either benefited or injured by the execution of the compromise judgment. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEY BACATAN G.R. No. 203315, September 18, 2013 J. Reyes In rape cases, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance because it is not an element of rape. Hence, the absence of abrasions or contusions in AAA’s body is inconsequential. What is necessary is that the force employed against her was sufficient to consummate the purpose which he has in mind. Sufficient force does not mean great or is of such character that is irresistible; as long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point. FACTS: On the night of the incident, Joey Bacatan and Danilo Mabano were having a drinking spree outside the house of 18-year old private complainant, AAA. When they ran out of beer, Bacatan and Mabano decided to look for a store to buy some more. Mabano invited AAA to join them in buying beer. She declined at first but the two men prodded that store owners will surely sell to her than to them. AAA eventually obliged and they boarded a motorcycle. Upon arriving at Litmon Beach, Bacatan talked to an old man as Mabano held AAA. Thereafter, Batacan had sexual intercourse with AAA through the use of force. Mabano also wanted to have sexual intercourse with AAA but he decided not to do it upon the latter’s plea. Instead of doing the same thing, Mabano tried to exculpate himself by saying that he was just a witness in the incident.

On the part of the defense, Bacatan claimed that he and AAA were sweethearts and that she voluntarily went with them. AAA’s parents saw her board the vehicle but they expressed no objections. The RTC found Bacatan guilty, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether there is rape in the instant case RULING: The following elements of rape were proved beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) Bacatan had carnal knowledge of AAA; and (2) it was accomplished through the use of force. The first element is undisputed as it is an admission inherent in the sweetheart defense advanced by Bacatan, which in turn, was correctly, rejected by the courts a quo for lack of substantial corroboration. With the presence of the first element being settled, the prosecution only had to prove the employment of force upon AAA. Bacatan points out that the absence of abrasions in AAA’s body negates the employment of force upon her. She also did not put up tenacious resistance neither did she cry for help during and after the alleged rape incident despite the presence of other people in nearby areas. Neither was she or her family members threatened for her to succumb to the sexual congress. In rape cases, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance because it is not an element of rape. Hence, the absence of abrasions or contusions in AAA’s body is inconsequential. Also, not all victims react the same way. Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The failure of a rape victim to offer tenacious resistance does not make her submission to accused’s criminal acts voluntary. What is necessary is that the force employed against her was sufficient to consummate the purpose which he has in mind. Sufficient force does not mean great or is of such character that is irresistible; as long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point. In any event, AAA put up resistance by kicking and wiggling out of Bacatan whose entire weight was on top of her, but he proved too strong. He even mocked her defiance by telling her she’s like a horse. Moreover, there is no doubt that Bacatan employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate rape. At the time the crime was committed, AAA was only 18 years old, while Bacatan was a full-grown 32-year old man who stands six feet tall with stout bearing. There is thus a clear disparity of physical strength between them thus any resistance exerted by AAA proved in vain. More importantly, Mabano reduced her to helplessness when he held her hands as Bacatan inserted his sexual organ in hers. The combined might of two adult male constitutes more than sufficient force as it inescapably subdues the frailty of female strength rendering her vulnerable to their felonious appetite to fornicate. Bacatan’s submission that the contents of the medical certificate cannot be considered as corroborative of the claim of rape as the signatory himself did not testify cannot prosper. As held in People v. Alverio, medical evidence is dispensable evidence; it is not necessary to prove

rape in as much the time of its commission does not constitute a material ingredient of the crime. These circumstances do not pertain to the details and elements that produce the grava men of the offense that is – sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. SPOUSES CARMELITO AND ANTONIA ALDOVER v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 167174, September 23, 2013 J. Del Castillo The CA set for hearing on January 4, 2005, the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. This hearing did not push through. Although the scheduled January 4, 2005 hearing on the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction did not push through, the parties were nonetheless amply heard thru their pleadings. There is no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction where a party was not deprived of its day in court, as it was heard and had exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses. FACTS: Siblings Tomas and Sidra and their father Alfredo Reyes (the Reyeses) obtained a loan from Antonia Aldover (Aldover) secured by a Real Estate Mortgage (REM). Upon default of the Reyeses, Aldover foreclosed the property. At the foreclosure sale, Aldover emerged as the winning bidder. Thereafter, Aldover filed with the RTC of Pasig City a verified Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession which was later on granted. In the meantime, Aldover also caused the consolidation of title over the foreclosed property in her name. Aldover filed for writ of possessison with the RTC. The RTC granted her petition and issued a Writ of Possession. Thereafter, the sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate. However, the writ was not fully implemented because there are occupants on the lot that claimed ownership over the said property. Respondents filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title, Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction. Respondents alleged that the Reyeses sold to them portions of the lot they respectively occupy and that the REM is a fictitious transaction. Hence, the mortgage as well as the subsequent foreclosure sale is null and void. Meanwhile, in view of the Sheriff’s Partial Report, Aldover filed a Motion for Special Order of Demolition which was granted by the Court. Respondents filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which was dismissed by the CA. On reconsideration, the CA granted respondents’ prayer for the issuance of TRO. Petitioner contended that respondents’ ancillary prayer for injunctive relief lacked basis as they have no clear and unmistakable right that must be protected because Only 15 out of the 315 respondents are armed with proof of ownership. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction RULING:

A Writ of Preliminary Injunction is issued at any stage of an action prior to judgment or final order to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied or adjudicated. To justify its issuance, the applicants must prove the following requisites: (1) that they have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicants; and, (4) there is no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. In fine, the CA cannot be said to have acted capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically in issuing its January 3, 2005 Resolution and February 10, 2005 Writ of Preliminary Injunction to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury. There is preliminary showing that respondents have clear and unmistakable right over the disputed portions of the property which must be protected during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 86363. Indeed, the precipitate demolition of their houses would constitute material and substantial invasion of their right which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. Hence, the need for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Besides, it has been held that the trial court (or the CA in this case) has a wide latitude in determining the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to it for its determination. Hence, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the trial court’s disposition in injunctive matters is not generally interfered with by the appellate courts. Furthermore, we note that although the scheduled January 4, 2005 hearing on the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction did not push through, the parties were nonetheless amply heard thru their pleadings. At the time the CA issued its challenged January 3, 2005 Resolution, petitioners had already filed their Comment and Rejoinder where they argued at length why no injunctive relief should be granted in favor of the respondents. We have consistently held that there is no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction where a party was not deprived of its day in court, as it was heard and had exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses. Hence, when contending parties were both given ample time and opportunity to present their respective evidence and arguments in support of their opposing contentions, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the x x x court which issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, as it is given a generous latitude in this regard, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. HEIRS OF THE LATE SPS. FLAVIANO MAGLASANG AND SALUD ADAZA-MAGLASANG, NAMELY, OSCAR A. MAGLASANG, ET AL. v. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, NOW SUBSTITUTED BY FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT (SPV-AMC) G.R. No. 171206, September 23, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, respondent sought to

extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified, the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed. FACTS: Spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps. Maglasang) obtained a credit line from respondent which was secured by a real estate mortgage. Subsequently, Flaviano Flaviano died intestate. The probate court issued an Order granting the petition for administration of Edgar Maglasang and appointed him as the administrator of Flaviano’s estate. The probate court issued a Notice to the Creditors. Thus, the respondent notified the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano. When the probate proceedings terminated, loan obligations owed by the estate to respondent remained unsatisfied. Nonetheless, the probate court expressly recognized the rights of respondent under the mortgage and promissory notes executed by the Sps. Maglasang, specifically, its right to foreclose the same within the statutory period. In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the Sps. Maglasang’s properties and emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction. There, however, remained a deficiency on Sps. Maglasang’s obligation to respondent. Thus, respondent filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount against the estate of Flaviano, his widow Salud and petitioners. The RTC ordered petitioners to pay the deficiency. On appeal, petitioners averred that the remedies available to respondent under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court are alternative such that the election of one operates as a waiver or abandonment of the others. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether respondent is entitled to recovery of deficiency RULING: The petition is partly granted. Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the secured creditor has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness. In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one

effectively bars the exercise of the others. With respect to real properties, the Court in Bank of America v. American Realty Corporation pronounced: In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.4118. Anent the third remedy, it must be mentioned that the same includes the option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgage under Act No. 3135, as availed of by respondent in this case. However, the plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate. Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them: (1) To waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) To foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) To rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at anytime before it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency. In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extrajudicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE ET. AL G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe Respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief, assailing the constitutionality of certain sections of RA 9372. Private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled. Private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. FACTS:

Private respondents filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the constitutionality of the certain sections of RA 9372. Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings, averring that certain petitions (SC petitions) questioning the constitutionality of RA 9372 have been lodged before the Supreme Court. The said motion was granted. The Supreme Court promulgated its Decision in the Southern Hemisphere cases and thereby dismissed the SC petitions. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, contending that private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Supreme Court in the Southern Hemisphere cases. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the Supreme Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief was properly filed. Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the petition has met all the requisites for declaratory relief RULING: The petition is granted. The following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third , there must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth , adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. The Court observes that while the first, second, and third requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain wanting. As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one exists in this case. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration. A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere: without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency,"

where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds of one), the RTC should have dismissed private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief all the same. As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-discussed allegations in private respondents’ petition, remain highly-speculative and merely theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. This private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar. Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private respondents exists in the first place. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARTURO ENRIQUEZ Y DE LOS REYES G.R. No. 197550, September 25, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when "(i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved." Thus, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the non-compliance is an irregularity, a red flag that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti. In the case at bar, not only was there no justifiable ground offered for the non-compliance with the chain of custody requirement, there was an apparent failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the time of presentation in court. FACTS: Sometime in May 2003, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Edilberto David, SPO2 Ernesto Divina, and SPO1 Saturnino Garung received reports from the barangay office and other concerned citizens of drug-dealing activities in the locality of Porac, Pampanga. After confirming the reports, a test-buy was conducted. Thereafter, a team was organized to conduct a buy-bust operation. Upon completion of the transaction, the accused was apprehended and the plastic sachets were confiscated. On the other hand, the defense claimed that he was eating when three men, all in civilian clothes, approached him. One of the men asked Enriquez if he knew a certain truck

driver who is suspected of selling shabu. When he denied knowledge thereof, he was immediately handcuffed and detained. He was later told that he is being suspected of selling shabu. The RTC convicted Enriquez. The CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether there was an unbroken chain of custody RULING: As the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of both offenses, its identity and integrity must definitely be shown to have been preserved. "This means that on top of the elements of possession or illegal sale, the fact that the substance [possessed or illegally sold], in the first instance, the very substance adduced in court must likewise be established with the same exacting degree of certitude as that required sustaining a conviction." Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines "chain of custody” as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. Describing the mechanics of the custodial chain requirement, this Court, in People v. Cervantes, said: As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when "(i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved." Thus, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the non-compliance is an irregularity, a red flag that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti. In the case at bar, not only compliance with the chain of custody preserve the integrity and evidentiary corpus delicti from the time of seizure

was there no justifiable ground offered for the nonrequirement, there was an apparent failure to properly value of the seized items to ensure the identity of the to the time of presentation in court. In other words, the

prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the sachets of shabu presented in court were the very same items seized from Enriquez. Overall, the prosecution failed to observe the requirement that the testimonies of all persons who handled the specimen are important to establish the chain of custody. Of all the individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical possession of the shabu allegedly seized from Enriquez, only SPO2 David testified for the specific purpose of identifying the evidence. However, his testimony miserably failed to demonstrate an unbroken chain as it ended with his identification of the money and seized items he marked and documents he signed. In effect, the custodial link ended with SPO2 David when he testified that he brought the seized items, together with Enriquez, to the police station. Under the above premises, it is clear that there was a break in the chain of custody of the seized substances. The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence's chain of custody is fatal to its case as we can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GIOVANNI OCFEMIA Y CHAVEZ G.R. No. 185383, September 25, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro P02 Aldea marked the seized items not at the crime scene but at the police station in the presence of Ocfemia. The "chain of custody" requires that the "marking" of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.". "Immediate confiscation" has no exact definition. To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody, then, what is required is that the marking be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate confiscation. "Immediate confiscation" has no exact definition. In one case, the marking of the seized items at the police station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. FACTS: Based on a tip from a confidential informant, a team, headed by PS/INSP Vargas, composed of other agents/officers from PDEA and the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), conducted a buy-bust operation against Giovanni Ocfemia (Ocfemia). Upon completion of the transaction, the police officers apprehended Ocfemia. A body search was conducted and the police officers were able to retrieve only two of the five marked P100.00 bills from his possession. Afterwards, Ocfemia was brought to the police station. At the police station, PO2 Aldea marked with his initials the sachet of shabu sold to him by Ocfemia. PO2 Aldea then submitted the said sachet of shabu to their crime laboratory, together with PS/INSP Vargas’s letter-request for chemical analysis of the same. The submitted specimen yielded positive results.

Ocfemia was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The RTC rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, Ocfemia claimed the prosecution was not able to prove with moral certainty the identity of the corpus delicti for failure of the police officers to comply with Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the identity of the corpus delicti in the instant case was duly proved with moral certainty RULING: Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody. The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. As we held in People v. Cortez, testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. People v. Sanchez, however, explains that RA 9165 does not specify a time frame for "immediate marking," or where said marking should be done: "What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence –should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation." To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody, then, what is required is that the marking be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate confiscation. "Immediate confiscation" has no exact definition. Thus, in People v. Gum-Oyen, testimony that included the marking of the seized items at the police station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. In this case, the chain of custody of the sachet of shabu sold by accused-appellant could be continuously traced from its receipt by PO2Aldea, the poseur-buyer, during the buy-bust operation; its transfer to the police laboratory for examination; it being kept in police custody while awaiting trial; and its presentation as evidence before the RTC. PO2 Aldea himself marked the said sachet of shabu with his initials upon arriving at the police station with the arrested accused-appellant. He also personally submitted the same sachet of shabu to the PNP crime laboratory for forensic examination. When he testified before the RTC, PO2 Aldea identified the sachet of Shabu and confirmed his initials thereon. P/SUPT Arroyo was the forensic officer who conducted the chemical examination of the contents of the sachet bearing PO2 Aldea’s initials and she confirmed on the wit stand that the said contents tested positive for methamphetamine

hydrochloride. Thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the sachet of shabu presented in evidence against accused-appellant was properly preserved in substantial compliance with Section 21(1) of Republic Act No.9165. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN IBANEZ Y ALBANTE, ET AL. G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013 J. Perez The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father. On the other hand, Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provided that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Aniceta’s testimony is mainly hearsay, especially on the purported fight between Wilfredo and Jesus that ended in Wilfredo’s death. Aniceta’s testimony as such carries no probative weight. At best, Aniceta’s testimony is an independent relevant statement: offered only as to the fact of its declaration and the substance of what had been relayed to Aniceta by Marilou, not as to the truth thereof. FACTS: Appellants Edwin and Alfredo, with Jesus Monsillo y Taniares, were all charged in an Information for Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. On that day, Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog (Wilfredo) was invited by Alfredo to a drinking session with Jesus and Edwin. Rachel saw her father step away from the group to urinate. While Wilfredo relieved himself, Edwin snatched a t-shirt from a nearby clothesline, and hooded the t-shirt over the head and face of Wilfredo. Robbed of vision as his head was fully covered, Wilfredo was wrestled and pinned down by Edwin, while Alfredo boxed the left side of Wilfredo’s chest. Jesus, armed with a long iron bar, swung at and hit Wilfredo in the head. In defense, the two accused-appellants pointed to Jesus as the sole culprit and professed that they were only at the scene of the crime because of their curiosity for what had occurred. To corroborate their claim of innocence, the defense presented Aniceta Dosil (Aniceta), who testified that Rachel could not have witnessed the murder of Wilfredo because they were out on that day selling doormats and only returned at 6:00 p.m. Thus, they only witnessed the aftermath of the purported fight between Jesus and Wilfredo. Marilou, Jesus’ sister, recounted to Aniceta that Jesus had hit Wilfredo because Wilfredo was about to stab Jesus. The RTC convicted Edwin and Alfredo of Murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. The appellants averred that the CA erred in: 1) giving credence to Rachel as a witness despite her lack of education and inability to read and tell time and; 2) not giving credence to testimony of Aniceta. ISSUES:

1. 2.

Whether the testimony of Rachel should be given credence Whether the testimony of Aniceta should be given credence

RULING: We cannot take Rachel’s testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully. With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child. Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father. As regards Aniceta’s version of the events that Jesus was the sole perpetrator of the crime who attacked Wilfredo only in self-defense, we easily see the fatal flaw: Aniceta arrived after the supposed fight between Wilfredo and Jesus, and what transpired was merely relayed to her by Jesus’ sister, Marilou. Quite apparent from Aniceta’s narration of events is that she has no personal knowledge of Wilfredo’s killing. Aniceta’s testimony is mainly hearsay, specially on the purported fight between Wilfredo and Jesus that ended in Wilfredo’s death. Aniceta’s testimony as such carries no probative weight. At best, Aniceta’s testimony is an independent relevant statement: offered only as to the fact of its declaration and the substance of what had been relayed to Aniceta by Marilou, not as to the truth thereof. Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provided that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. CRISANTA GUIDO-ENRIQUEZ v. ALICIA I. VICTORINO, ET AL. G.R. No. 180427, September 30, 2013 J. Peralta Petitioner did not receive a notice of the August 15, 1988 Decision of the RTC in LRC Case No. 10371. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem. In land registration proceedings, being in rem, there is no necessity to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered in order to vest the courts with power and authority over the res. Moreover, since no issue was raised as to Antonia Victorino's compliance with the prerequisites of notice and publication, she is deemed to have followed such requirements. As a consequence, petitioner is deemed sufficiently notified of the hearing of Antonia's application. Hence, petitioner cannot claim that she is denied due process. FACTS:

Antonia Vda. De Victorino (Antonia) filed for an Application for Registration of Title over a lot. The Republic, thru the Director of Lands, opposed said application alleging that it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. It appeared that the subject lot is a portion of a large parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-2102, registered under the name of Antonia Guido, et al., and, at the same time, overlapped with another lot which was also a subject of an application for registration. There is a pending case filed by the republic for annulment of TCT No. 23377, the mother title of TCT No. M-2102, against Guido, et. al. (Guido case). The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Guido, et. al. On August 15, 1988, the RTC-Pasig granted the application of Antonia Victorino and issued an Order for the Issuance of the Decree directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission to implement the said Decision, considering the same has become final. However, the Land Registration Authority held in abeyance the issuance of the decree in favor of Antonia Victorino. On November 21, 1991, the Supreme Court issued a Decision in the Guido Case in favor of (Antonia Guido, et.al.) and declared TCT 23377 issued under the name of Guido, et. al. true and authentic. Private Respondent Alicia Victorino filed a Manifestation and Motion for an Alias Order for Issuance of a Decree in the Name of the New Owner-Transferee. Private Respondent alleged that Antonia Victorino sold the subject lot in her favor. Private Respondent prayed for the issuance of an order annotating these decisions of the Supreme Court and the RTC-Pasig in TCT M-2102 to segregate Antonia's portion. On November 19, 2002, the RTC-Pasig issued an order granting Private Respondent's Motion and directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree "in accordance with the adjudication of (the Trial Court's) Decision dated August 15, 1988 after payment of all taxes due on the land." The RTC-Pasig likewise ordered the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Morong Branch, to make an annotation on TCT M-2102. On December 4, 2002, Petitioner Crisanta Guido-Enriquez filed a Motion for Clarification, to clarify whether the August 15, 1988 decision ordered the segregation of the subject lot and whether the Land Registration Authority has the authority to move for said segregation. Petitioner’s motion was denied for being moot. The RTC ordered the issuance of the decree in the name of Antonia Vda. De Victorino. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied by the RTC. .Aggrieved, herein petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA, claiming that the August 15, 1988 Decision of the RTC in LRC Case No. 10371 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction as well as for denial of petitioner's right to due process because she did not receive a copy of such decision. The CA denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether the August 15, 1988 Decision of the RTC in LRC Case No. 10371 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction as well as for denial of petitioner's right to due process RULING: As to the alleged denial of petitioner's right to due process due to Antonia Victorino's failure to identify petitioner as indispensable party in her application for registration, as well as to serve her with actual and personal notice, Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 simply requires that the application for registration shall "state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners, if known, and, if not known, it shall

state the extent of the search made to find them." A perusal of Antonia Victorino's Application shows that she enumerated the adjoining owners. She also indicated therein that, to the best of her knowledge, no person has any interest or is in possession of the subject land. The fact that she did not identify petitioner as an occupant or an adjoining owner is not tantamount to denial of petitioner's right to due process and does not nullify the RTC Decision granting such application. Besides, the CA was correct in holding that a land registration case, like the one at bar, is a proceeding in rem. This Court has already ruled that in land registration proceedings, being in rem, there is no necessity to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered in order to vest the courts with power and authority over the res. Moreover, since no issue was raised as to Antonia Victorino's compliance with the prerequisites of notice and publication, she is deemed to have followed such requirements. As a consequence, petitioner is deemed sufficiently notified of the hearing of Antonia's application. Hence, she cannot claim that she is denied due process. GREGORIO SINGIAN, JR., v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) G.R. Nos. 195011-19, September 30, 2013 J. Del Castillo The grant or denial of a Demurrer to Evidence is left to the sound discretion of the court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. FACTS: Atty. Orlando L. Salvador was PCGG Consultant on detail with the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). He was also coordinator of a Technical Working Group tasked to examine and study the reports and recommendations of the Asset Privatization Trust relating to loan accounts in all government financing institutions. Among the accounts acted upon by the Committee were the loans granted to Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI) by the Philippine National Bank (PNB). It would appear that on ISI applied for a five-year confirmed irrevocable deferred letter of credit to finance its purchase of a complete line of machinery and equipment. PNB approved the loan, subject to certain stipulations. The said letter of credit was to be secured by collaterals. PNB further extended loan accommodations in various amounts and on different dates to ISI without sufficient collaterals. The Committee found that the loans extended to ISI bore characteristics of behest loans specifically for not having been secured with sufficient collaterals and obtained with undue haste. As a result, Atty. Orlando Salvador filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, herein petitioner was charged with nine (9) counts of violation of Section 3(e), and another nine (9) counts of violation of Section 3(g), of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The trial for the case ensued. After prosecution rested its case and submitted their Formal Offer of Evidence, petitioner with prior leave, filed a Demurrer to Evidence anchored on the following grounds: (1) lack of proof of conspiracy with any PNB official; (2) the contracts with PNB contained provisions that are beneficial, and not manifestly and grossly disadvantageous, to the government; (3) the loans could not be characterized as behest loans because they were secured by sufficient collaterals and ISI increased its capitalization; and (4) assuming the loans

are behest loans, petitioner could not be held liable for lack of any participation. The Sandiganbayan denied the Demurrer to Evidence and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether Demurrer to Evidence should be granted Ruling: A demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused. At the outset, we emphasize that "the resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. A lower court’s order of denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will not review the prosecution’s evidence and precipitately decide whether such evidence has established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, unless accused has established that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused, there by amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will not suffice." In this case, petitioner miserably failed to present an iota of evidence to show that the Sandiganbayan abused, much more, gravely abused, its discretion in denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. A closer scrutiny of the assailed Resolutions would indeed show that the Sandiganbayan meticulously discussed both testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution. It was only after a careful analysis of the facts and evidence presented did the respondent court lay down its findings and conclusions. Based on the evidence presented, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that all three elements of Section 3(g), RA 3019 were satisfactorily established. It found that PNB and ISI entered into several contracts or loan transactions. The Sandiganbayan also assessed that petitioner conspired with his co-accused in defrauding the government considering "(1) the frequency of the loans or closeness of the dates at which they were granted; (2) the quantity of the loans granted; (3) the failure of the bank to verify and to take any action on the failure of ISI to put up additional capitalization and additional collaterals; and (4) the eventual absence of any action by the Bank to collect full payment from ISI." OCTOBER 2013

CAMP JOHN HAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CENTRAL BOARD ASSESSMENT APPEALS, ETC., ET AL. G.R. No. 169234, October 2, 2013 J. Perez Section 252 emphatically directs that the taxpayer/real property owner questioning the assessment should first pay the tax due before his protest can be entertained. As a matter of fact, the words “paid under protest” shall be annotated on the tax receipts. Consequently, only after such payment has been made by the taxpayer may he file a protest in writing (within thirty [30] days from said payment of tax) to the provincial, city, or municipal treasurer, who shall decide the protest within sixty (60) days from its receipt. In no case is the local treasurer obliged to entertain the protest unless the tax due has been paid. A claim for exemption from payment of real property taxes does not actually question the assessor’s authority to assess and collect such taxes, but pertains to the reasonableness or correctness of the assessment by the local assessor, a question of fact which should be resolved, at the very first instance, by the LBAA. By providing that real property not declared and proved as tax-exempt shall be included in the assessment roll, Section 206 of RA No. 7160 implies that the local assessor has the authority to assess the property for realty taxes, and any subsequent claim for exemption shall be allowed only when sufficient proof has been adduced supporting the claim. FACTS: Respondent City Assessor of Baguio City assessed petitioner, Camp John Hay Development Corporation, for the real property taxes on its properties. The petitioner protested the assessment and filed an appeal with the the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals (BTAA). BTAA enjoined petitioner to first comply as to the payment under protest of the subject real property taxes before the hearing of its appeal. The CBAA denied petitioner’s appeal and remanded the case to the LBAA for further proceedings subject to a full and up-to-date payment of the realty taxes on subject properties. The CTA En Banc dismissed the petition finding that petitioner failed to comply with Section 252 of RA No. 7160. It adopted the CBAA’s position, ruling that it could not resolve the issue on whether petitioner is liable to pay real property tax or whether it is indeed a tax-exempt entity considering that the LBAA has not decided the case on the merits. ISSUES: 1) Whether petitioner may protest the assessment without payment 2) Whether the local assessor may include in the assessment realty claimed to be tax exempt pending proof of its tax exempt status RULING: 1) The taxpayer/real property owner questioning the assessment should first pay the tax due before his protest can be entertained. To begin with, Section 252 emphatically directs that the taxpayer/real property owner questioning the assessment should first pay the tax due before his protest can be entertained. As a matter of fact, the words “paid under protest” shall be annotated on the tax receipts.

Consequently, only after such payment has been made by the taxpayer may he file a protest in writing (within thirty [30] days from said payment of tax) to the provincial, city, or municipal treasurer, who shall decide the protest within sixty (60) days from its receipt. In no case is the local treasurer obliged to entertain the protest unless the tax due has been paid. Secondly, within the period prescribed by law, any owner or person having legal interest in the property not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city, or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may file an appeal with the LBAA of the province or city concerned, as provided in Section 226 of RA No. 7160. Thereafter, within thirty (30) days from receipt, he may elevate, by filing a notice of appeal, the adverse decision of the LBAA with the CBAA, which exercises exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all appeals from the decisions, orders, and resolutions of the Local Boards involving contested assessments of real properties, claims for tax refund and/or tax credits, or overpayments of taxes. In the present case, the authority of the assessor is not being questioned. Despite petitioners’ protestations, the petition filed before the court a quo primarily involves the correctness of the assessments, which are questions of fact, that are not allowed in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The court a quo is therefore precluded from entertaining the petition, and it appropriately dismissed the petition. 2) The local assessor has the authority to assess the property for realty taxes, and any subsequent claim for exemption shall be allowed only when sufficient proof has been adduced supporting the claim. Moreover, a claim for exemption from payment of real property taxes does not actually question the assessor’s authority to assess and collect such taxes, but pertains to the reasonableness or correctness of the assessment by the local assessor, a question of fact which should be resolved, at the very first instance, by the LBAA. In other words, by providing that real property not declared and proved as tax-exempt shall be included in the assessment roll, Section 206 of RA No. 7160 implies that the local assessor has the authority to assess the property for realty taxes, and any subsequent claim for exemption shall be allowed only when sufficient proof has been adduced supporting the claim. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION/ TAGANITO MINING CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE/ PHILEX MINING CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. 187485/G.R. No. 196113/G.R. No. 197156, October 8, 2013 J. Carpio A claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is construed strictly against the taxpayer. One of the conditions for a judicial claim of refund or credit under the VAT System is compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper, whether before, during, or after the effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi doctrine was adopted, which again reinstated the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional. Section 4 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that the "power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance," Section 7 of the same Code

does not prohibit the delegation of such power. Thus, "the Commissioner may delegate the powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of this Code to any or such subordinate officials with the rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be imposed under rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner." FACTS: This is a Resolution resolving the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed by San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque) and the Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR). San Roque prays that the rule established in the 12 February 2013 Decision be given only a prospective effect, arguing that the manner by which the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) actually treated the 120 + 30 day periods constitutes an operative fact the effects and consequences of which cannot be erased or undone. The CIR, on the other hand, asserts that Taganito Mining Corporation's judicial claim for tax credit or refund was prematurely filed before the CTA and should be disallowed because BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued by a Deputy Commissioner, not by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. ISSUES: 1) Whether the doctrine of operative fact applies to tax regulations 2) Whether the BIR Ruling issued by a Deputy Commissioner can be relied on RULING: 1) Since the law has already prescribed in Section 246 of the Tax Code how the doctrine of operative fact should be applied, there can be no invocation of the doctrine of operative fact other than what the law has specifically provided in Section 246. Clearly, for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a "legislative or executive measure," meaning a law or executive issuance, that is invalidated by the court. From the passage of such law or promulgation of such executive issuance until its invalidation by the court, the effects of the law or executive issuance, when relied upon by the public in good faith, may have to be recognized as valid. In the present case, however, there is no such law or executive issuance that has been invalidated by the Court except BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. To justify the application of the doctrine of operative fact as an exemption, San Roque asserts that "the BIR and the CTA in actual practice did not observe and did not require refund seekers to comply with the120+30 day periods." This is glaring error because an administrative practice is neither a law nor an executive issuance. Moreover, in the present case, there is even no such administrative practice by the BIR as claimed by San Roque. At the time San Roque filed its petition for review with the CTA, the 120+30 day mandatory periods were already in the law. Section112 (C) expressly grants the Commissioner 120 days within which to decide the taxpayer’s claim. The law is clear, plain, and unequivocal: "x x x the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes

within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents." Following the verbalegis doctrine, this law must be applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain, and unequivocal. The taxpayer cannot simply file a petition with the CTA without waiting for the Commissioner’s decision within the 120-daymandatory and jurisdictional period. The CTA will have no jurisdiction because there will be no "decision" or "deemed a denial" decision of the Commissioner for the CTA to review. In San Roque’s case, it filed its petition with the CTA a mere 13 days after it filed its administrative claim with the Commissioner. Indisputably, San Roque knowingly violated the mandatory 120-day period, and it cannot blame anyone but itself. Section 112(C) also expressly grants the taxpayer a 30-day period to appeal to the CTA the decision or inaction of the Commissioner To repeat, a claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is construed strictly against the taxpayer. One of the conditions for a judicial claim of refund or credit under the VAT System is compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper, whether before, during, or after the effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi doctrine was adopted, which again reinstated the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional. Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect. This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however, be a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith. A mere administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice may not be uniformly and consistently applied. An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general public and can be availed of only by those within formal contacts with the government agency. Since the law has already prescribed in Section 246 of the Tax Code how the doctrine of operative fact should be applied, there can be no invocation of the doctrine of operative fact other than what the law has specifically provided in Section 246. In the present case, the rule or ruling subject of the operative fact doctrine is BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated 10 December 2003. Prior to this date, there is no such rule or ruling calling for the application of the operative fact doctrine in Section 246. Section 246, being an exemption to statutory taxation, must be applied strictly against the taxpayer claiming such exemption. 2) Thus, "the Commissioner may delegate the powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of this Code to any or such subordinate officials with the rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be imposed under rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner." In asking this Court to disallow Taganito’s claim for tax refund or credit, the CIR repudiates the validity of the issuance of its own BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. "Taganito cannot rely on the pronouncements in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, being a mere issuance of a Deputy Commissioner."

Although Section 4 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that the "power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance," Section 7 of the same Code does not prohibit the delegation of such power. Thus, "the Commissioner may delegate the powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of this Code to any or such subordinate officials with the rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be imposed under rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner." COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. TEAM (PHILIPPINES) OPERATIONS CORPORATION [FORMERLY MIRANT (PHILIPPINES) OPERATIONS CORPORATION) G.R. No. 185728, October 16, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. For a taxpayer to be entitled to a tax credit or refund of creditable withholding tax, the following requisites must be complied with: First, The claim must be filed with the CIR within the two-year period from the date of payment of the tax; Second, It must be shown on the return of the recipient that the income received was declared as part of the gross income; and Third, The fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued by the payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withheld. FACTS: Respondent Team (Philippines) Operations Corporation entered into an Operating and Management Agreements with Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (MPagC) AND Mirant Sual Corporation (MSC). Payments received by the respondent for the services rendered were subjected to creditable withholding tax. Respondent filed an administrative claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate with the BIR for the alleged overpaid income tax or excess creditable withholding tax in the amount of P23,108,689 for the calendar year ended December 31, 2002. As the two-year prescriptive period for the filing of a judicial claim under Section 229 of the NIRC was about to lapse without action on the part of CIR, respondent elevated its case before the CTA Division by way of Petition for Review. Subsequently, CTA Division rendered a decision partially granting the respondents petition and ordered CIR to refund or issue a tax credit certificate in a reduced amount of P23, 053,919.22 representing the excess/unutilized creditable withholding tax for the taxable year 2002. It further found that the respondent complied with the substantiation requirements to be entitled to its claim. CIR filed a motion for partial reconsideration, but the same was denied. On appeal to the CTA En Banc, CIR’s petition was denied for lack of merit and the decision of the CTA Division was affirmed. Petitioner claims that the respondent is not entitled to the refund of excess or unutilized creditable withholding taxes for the taxable year 2002 for failure to comply with the requirements for refund of creditable withholding tax. ISSUE: Whether the respondent complied with the requirements for refund of creditable withholding tax RULING:

A taxpayer claiming for a tax credit or refund of creditable withholding tax must comply with the following requisites: 1. The claim must be filed with the CIR within the two-year period from the date of payment of the tax; 2. It must be shown on the return of the recipient that the income received was declared as part of the gross income; and 3. The fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued by the payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withheld. There is no dispute that respondent has complied with the first requirement when it filed its administrative claim for tax refund on March 17, 2004 and thereafter filed a petition for review with the CTA on April 27, 2004 or within two years from April 15, 2003, the date of filing of its Annual Income Tax Return. Respondent was also able to prove the second requirement by showing in tis ITR that the income upon which the creditable withholding taxes were paid was declared as part of its gross income for the taxable year 2002. As to the third condition, both the CTA First Division and the CTA En Banc ruled that respondent has sufficiently establish the fact of withholding by presenting the Certificates of Creditable Tax Withheld at Source issued by MPagC and MSC for the year 2002. We find no cogent reason to deviate from these findings. Oft-repeat is the rule that the court will not lightly set aside the conclusions reached by the CTA which, by the very nature of its function of being dedicated exclusively to the resolution of tax problems, has accordingly developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority. Thus, we are in accord with the findings of the CTA First Division and the CTA En Banc that respondent complied with the substantiation requirements for refund of creditable withholding tax. Here, respondent was able to establish the fact of withholding by submitting a copy of the withholding tax certificates duly issued by MPagC and MSC, as the withholding agent, indicating the name of the payor and showing the income payment basis of the tax withheld and the amount of tax withheld. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, it is not necessary for the person who executed and prepared the Certificates of Creditable Tax Withheld at Source to be presented and to testify personally as to the authenticity of the certificates. The copies of the said certificates when found by the duly commissioned ICPA to be faithful reproductions of the original copies would suffice to establish the fact of withholding. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GST PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. No. 190872, October 17, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe The two-year prescriptive period applies only to administrative claims and not to judicial claims. The 120-day and 30-day periods are not merely directory but mandatory. The taxpayer will always have 30 days to file the judicial claim even if the Commissioner acts only on the 120th day, or does not act at all during the 120-day period. With the 30-day period always available to the taxpayer, the taxpayer can no longer file a judicial claim for refund or tax credit of unutilized excess input VAT without waiting for the Commissioner to decide until the expiration of the 120-day period. Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the petition premature and thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the taxpayer’s petition.

However, the San Roque case provides exception to the strict compliance with the 120day period. Although the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional, the BIR Ruling No. DA489-03 dated December 10, 2003 provided a valid claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 of the Tax Code. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 expressly states that the "taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review. Thus, the BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 will shield the filing of a tax payer’s judicial claim from the vice of prematurity when such claim is filed during its effectivity. FACTS: GST is a duly registered VAT Enterprise and filed Quarterly VAT Returns showing its zero-rated sales for the taxable years 2004 and 2005. Claiming unutilized excess input VAT attributable to the zero-rated sales, GST filed before the BIR separate claims for refund on the following periods: June 9, 2004 for the 1st Quarter of 2004, August 12, 2004 for the 2nd Quarter of 2004, February 18, 2005 for the 3rd and 4th Quarter of 2004, May 11, 2005 for the 1st Quarter of 2005, November 18, 2005 for the 2nd and 3rd Quarter of 2005. For failure of the CIR to act on its administrative claims, GST filed a petition for review before the CTA on March 17, 2006. After due proceedings, the CTA First Division rendered a Decision on January 27, 2009 granting GST’s claims for refund but at the reduced amount. The CIR moved for reconsideration, which was denied prompting the elevation of the case to the CTA En Banc via petition for review. CTA En Banc affirmed the Decision of the CTA Division and denied CIR’s motion for reconsideration. The CIR argued that the judicial appeal to the CTA was filed beyond the reglementary periods prescribes in Section 112 of the Tax Code. ISSUES: 1) Whether GST’s judicial claim was premature for being filed simultaneously with the administrative claim 2) Whether the 120+30 day rule is mandatory and jurisdictional 3) Whether GST’s judicial claim for the second and third quarters of 2005 are valid pursuant to BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 4) Whether GST’s judicial claims for the other quarters must be denied RULING: 1) The judicial claim, which was simultaneously filed with its administrative claim, was found to be premature. The filing of the Petition for Review before the First Division has already prescribed with respect to the administrative claim filed on June 9, 2004; August 12, 2004; February 18, 2005; and May 11, 2005 for being filed beyond the 30th day provided under the second paragraph of Section 112 (D) of the NIRC of 1997. The petition is therefore dismissible for being out of time. Anent the administrative claim filed on November 18, 2005, the filing of the petition before the First Division is premature for failure of respondent to wait for the 120-day period to expire. It failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies. Hence, the instant petition is likewise dismissible for lack of cause of action.

2) The 120+30 day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional. The Court had already clarified in the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi), promulgated on October 6, 2010, that the two-year prescriptive period applies only to administrative claims and not to judicial claims. Moreover, it was ruled that the 120-day and 30day periods are not merely directory but mandatory. Accordingly, the judicial claim of Aichi, which was simultaneously filed with its administrative claim, was found to be premature. The taxpayer will always have 30 days to file the judicial claim even if the Commissioner acts only on the 120th day, or does not act at all during the 120-day period. With the 30-day period always available to the taxpayer, the taxpayer can no longer file a judicial claim for refund or tax credit of unutilized excess input VAT without waiting for the Commissioner to decide until the expiration of the 120-day period. Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the petition premature and thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the taxpayer’s petition. 3) BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 effectively shielded the filing of GST's judicial claim from the vice of prematurity. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was classified in San Roque as a general interpretative rule having been made in response to a query by a government agency tasked with processing tax refunds and credits – the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback Center of the Department of Finance. As such, all taxpayers can rely on said ruling from the time of its issuance on December 10, 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on October 6, 2010, where it was held that the 120+30 day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional. Therefore, GST can benefit from BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 with respect to its claims for refund of unutilized excess input VAT for the second and third quarters of taxable year 2005 which were filed before the CIR on November 18, 2005 but elevated to the CTA on March 17, 2006 before the expiration of the 120-day period (March 18, 2006 being the 120th day). BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 effectively shielded the filing of GST's judicial claim from the vice of prematurity. 4) GST's claims, however, for the four quarters of taxable year 2004 and the first quarter of taxable year 2005 should be denied for late filing of the petition for review before the CTA. GST's claims, however, for the four quarters of taxable year 2004 and the first quarter of taxable year 2005 should be denied for late filing of the petition for review before the CTA. GST filed its VAT Return for the first quarter of 2004 on April 16, 2004. Reckoned from the close of the first taxable quarter of 2004 on March 31, 2004, the administrative claim filed on June 9, 2004 was well within the required two-year prescriptive period from the close of the taxable quarter, the last day of filing being March 31, 2006. The CIR then had 120 days from June 9, 2004, or until October 7, 2004, to decide the claim. Since the Commissioner did not act on the claim within the said period, GST had 30 days from October 7, 2004, or until November 6, 2004, to file its judicial claim. However, GST filed its petition for review before the CTA only on March 17, 2006, or 496 days after the last day of filing. In short, GST was late by one year and 131 days in filing its judicial claim. For the second quarter of taxable year 2004, GST filed its administrative claim on August 12, 2004. The 120-day period from the filing of such claim ended on December 10, 2004, and the

30th day within which to file a judicial claim fell on January 9, 2005. However, GST filed its petition for review before the CTA only on March 17, 2006, or 432 days after the last day of filing. GST was late by one year and 67 days in filing its judicial claim. For the third and fourth quarters of taxable year 2004, GST filed its administrative claims on February 18, 2005. The 120th day, or June 18, 2005, lapsed without any action from the CIR. Thus, GST had 30 days therefrom, or until July 18, 2005, to file its judicial claim, but it did so only on March 17, 2006, or 242 days after the last day of filing. GST was late by 242 days in filing its judicial claim. Finally, for the first quarter of taxable year 2005, GST filed its administrative claim on May 11, 2005. The 120-day period ended on September 8, 2005, again with no action from the CIR. Nonetheless, GST failed to elevate its claim to the CTA within 30 days, or until October 8, 2005. The petition for review filed by GST on March 17, 2006, or 160 days after the last day of filing was, therefore, late. As may be observed from the Court's application of the 120+30 day periods to GST's claims, the 120-day period is uniformly reckoned from the date of the filing of the administrative claims. The CIR insists, however, that the filing of the administrative claim was not necessarily the same time when the complete supporting documents were submitted to the Commissioner. NOVEMBER 2013 NUCCIO SAVERIO AND NS INTERNATIONAL INC. v. ALFONSO G. PUYAT, G.R. No. 186433, November 27, 2013 J. Brion Petitioners filed review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the SC. Petitioners argue that the Breakdown of Account which the RTC used as a basis in awarding the claim, as affirmed by the CA , is hearsay since the person who prepared it was not presented in court to authenticate it. It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. The entries in the Breakdown of Account and their corresponding amounts are not supported by the respondent’s presented evidence. The itemized expenses, as repeatedly pointed out by the petitioners, were not proven, and the remaining indebtedness, after the partial payment of P600,000.00, was merely derived by the RTC from the Breakdown of

Account. It is unacceptable for the RTC to simply come up with a conclusion that the payment of P600,000.00 did not extinguish the debt, or, assuming it really did not, that the remaining amount of indebtedness amounts exactly to P460,505.86, without any showing of how this balance was arrived at. To our mind, the RTC’s ruling, in so far as the determination of the actual indebtedness is concerned, is incomplete. FACTS: Respondent granted a loan to NSI. The loan was made pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement and Promissory Note between the respondent and NSI, represented by Nuccio. The petitioners received a total amount of P300,000.00 and certain machineries intended for their fertilizer processing plant business. The proposed business, however, failed to materialize. On several occasions, Nuccio made personal payments amounting to P600,000.00. When the petitioners defaulted in the payment of the loan, the respondent filed a collection suit with the RTC. The petitioners insisted that they have already paid the loan as evidenced by the respondent’s receipt for the amount of P600,000.00. They submitted that their remaining obligation to pay the machineries’ value, if any, had long been extinguished by their business’ failure to materialize. The RTC ruled that the payment of P600,000.00 did not completely extinguish the petitioners’ obligation. The RTC also applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and ordered the petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay the balance of P460, 505.86. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA likewise held that since the petitioners neither questioned the delivery of the machineries nor their valuation, their obligation to pay the amount of P460, 505.86 under the Breakdown of Account remained unrefuted. Aggrieved, petitioners filed review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the SC. The petitioners averred that the CA gravely erred in ruling that a proper accounting was not necessary. They argue that the Breakdown of Account which the RTC used as a basis in awarding the claim, as affirmed by the CA is hearsay since the person who prepared it was not presented in court to authenticate it. They averred further that Nuccio’s mere ownership of forty percent (40%) does not justify the piercing of the separate and distinct personality of NSI. The respondent, on the other hand, claimed that the issues raised by the petitioners are questions of fact, thus beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition. ISSUE: Whether the questions of facts raised by the petitioner should be entertained. RULING: Petition granted After a review of the parties’ contentions, we hold that a remand of the case to the court of origin for a complete accounting and determination of the actual amount of the petitioners’ indebtedness is called for. The respondent questions the present petition’s propriety, and contends that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be

raised. He argues that the petitioners are raising factual issues that are not permissible under the present petition and these issues have already been extensively passed upon by the RTC and the CA. The petitioners, on the other hand, assert that the exact amount of their indebtedness has not been determined with certainty. They insist that the amount of P460,505.86 awarded in favor of the respondent has no basis because the latter failed to substantiate his claim. They also maintain that the Breakdown of Account used by the lower courts in arriving at the collectible amount is unreliable for the respondent’s failure to adduce supporting documents for the alleged additional expenses charged against them. With no independent determination of the actual amount of their indebtedness, the petitioners submit that an order for a proper accounting is imperative. We agree with the petitioners. While we find the fact of indebtedness to be undisputed, the determination of the extent of the adjudged money award is not, because of the lack of any supporting documentary and testimonial evidence. These evidentiary issues, of course, are necessarily factual, but as we held in The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, this Court may take cognizance even of factual issues under exceptional circumstances. In this cited case, we held: It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. We note in this regard that the RTC, in awarding the amount of P460,505.86 in favor of the respondent, principally relied on the Breakdown of Account. Under this document, numerous entries, including the cash loan, were enumerated and identified with their corresponding amounts. It included the items of expenses allegedly chargeable to the petitioners, the value of the machineries, the amount credited as paid, and the interest and penalty allegedly incurred. A careful perusal of the records, however, reveals that the entries in the Breakdown of Account and their corresponding amounts are not supported by the respondent’s presented evidence. The itemized expenses, as repeatedly pointed out by the petitioners, were not proven, and the remaining indebtedness, after the partial payment of P600,000.00, was merely derived by the RTC from the Breakdown of Account. Significantly, the RTC ruling neither showed how the award was computed nor how the interest and penalty were calculated. In fact, it merely declared the petitioners liable for the

amount claimed by the respondent and adopted the breakdown of liability in the Breakdown of Account. This irregularity is even aggravated by the RTC’s explicit refusal to explain why the payment of P600,000.00 did not extinguish the debt. While it may be true that the petitioners’ indebtedness, aside from the cash loan of P300,000.00, undoubtedly covered the value of the machineries, the RTC decision was far from clear and instructive on the actual remaining indebtedness (inclusive of the machineries’ value, penalties and interests) after the partial payment was made and how these were all computed. It is unacceptable for the RTC to simply come up with a conclusion that the payment of P600,000.00 did not extinguish the debt, or, assuming it really did not, that the remaining amount of indebtedness amounts exactly to P460,505.86, without any showing of how this balance was arrived at. To our mind, the RTC’s ruling, in so far as the determination of the actual indebtedness is concerned, is incomplete. What happened at the RTC likewise transpired at the CA when the latter affirmed the appealed decision; the CA merely glossed over the contention of the petitioners, and adopted the RTC’s findings without giving any enlightenment. To reiterate, nowhere in the decisions of the RTC and the CA did they specify how the award, including the penalty and interest, was determined. The petitioners were left in the dark as to how their indebtedness of P300,000.00, after making a payment of P600,000.00, ballooned to P460,505.86. Worse, unsubstantiated expenses, appearing in the Breakdown of Account, were charged to them. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ASIR GANI Y ALIH AND NORMINA GANI Y GALOS G.R. No. 198318, November 27, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro The buy-bust team failed to take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon seizure and at the site of accused-appellants’ apprehension, and to mark and make an inventory of the same in the presence of all the persons named in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Jurisprudence has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets at the place of arrest, do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. FACTS: Special Investigator Elson Saul (SI Saul) received information from a confidential informant that accused-appellant Normina Gani (Normina), alias Rohaima, was looking for a buyer of shabu. SI Saul agreed to meet the informant and accused-appellant Normina for negotiation .After the meeting, SI Saul reported back to the NBI Headquarters and they then set up a buy bust operation. Normina arrived at the target place on a motorcycle with a man, later on identified as accused-appellant Asir Gani (Asir).After the exchange of money and shabu the accusedappellants were arrested and duly advised of their constitutional rights. Incidental to accusedappellants’ arrest, the buy-bust team seized from accused-appellants’ possession two other sachets of shabu, the marked money, accused-appellant Asir’s .45 caliber pistol, and the

motorcycle. The buy- bust team and accused-appellants then proceeded to the FTI Barangay Hall. At the FTI Barangay Hall, SI Saul conducted an inventory of the items recovered from accused-appellants, including the two plastic sachets of shabu subject of the sale, which SI Saul marked with his initials and the date of the buy-bust. All these were done in the presence of accused-appellants and two barangay officials. SI Saul’s inventory report, however, did not include the two other sachets of shabu seized from accused-appellants’ possession. Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought accused-appellants to the NBI Headquarters in Manila. At the NBI Headquarters, accused-appellants were booked and further investigated. The following day, several members of the buy- bust team executed the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of accused-appellants. SI Saul also executed an incident report, requested for laboratory examination of the contents of the marked plastic sachets and submitted the said specimens to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division where they were received by NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo. The two plastic sachets submitted for laboratory examination had a combined weight of 98.7249 grams. Based on the forensic analysis by NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo and Forensic Chemist III Viloria-Magsipoc, the contents of said sachets tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. The RTC found accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged. The accused-appellants appealed to the CA the decision of the RTC. The accused-appellants pointed out the noncompliance of the buy-bust team with Sec. 21 of RA 9165, The CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the guilt of the accused-appellants have been proven beyond reasonable doubt RULING: Petition denied The combined testimonial, documentary, and object evidence of the prosecution produced a detailed account of the buy-bust operation against accused-appellants and proved all the essential elements of the crime charged against them. In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence. It has been clearly established herein that a buy-bust operation took place on May 6, 2004 conducted by a team of NBI agents. SI Saul, as the poseur-buyer, and accusedappellants, as the sellers, agreed on the price of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) for One Hundred (100) grams of shabu. After SI Saul handed over the buy-bust money to accused-appellants, the latter gave him, in exchange, two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. Thereafter, accused-appellants were immediately arrested by the buy-bust team. During the search incidental to accused-appellants’ arrest, a .45 caliber handgun, the buy-bust money, and two more sachets of suspected shabu were recovered from

their possession. Chemical examination confirmed that the contents of the two plastic sachets sold to SI Saul were indeed shabu. These two sachets of shabu, marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04" and with a total weight of 98.7249 grams, together with two other sachets, were duly presented as evidence by the prosecution before the RTC. Contrary to accused-appellants’ averment, prosecution witness, SI Saul, was able to explain why there were a total of four sachets of shabu presented during trial, when SI Saul only bought two sachets during the buy- bust operation. SI Saul testified that in addition to the two plastic sachets of shabu sold to him by accused-appellants, there were two more sachets of shabu recovered from accused-appellants’ possession by the buy-bust team during the body search conducted incidental to accused-appellants’ lawful arrest. The Court further finds that the arresting officers had substantially complied with the rule on the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs as provided under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Jurisprudence has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets at the place of arrest, do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In this case, testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution proved that immediately after accused-appellants’ arrest, they were brought to the FTI Barangay Hall. It was there, in the presence of two barangay officials, that SI Saul conducted an inventory of the two plastic sachets of shabu subject of the buy-bust operation, plus the other items seized from accused-appellants’ possession during the search conducted incidental to accused-appellants’ arrest. It was also at the barangay hall where SI Saul marked the two plastic sachets of shabu sold to him by accused-appellants as "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," representing SI Saul’s initials and the date of the buy-bust operation. Thereafter, the buy-bust team, with accused-appellants, proceeded to the NBI Headquarters. At the NBI Headquarters, SI Saul made a request for examination of the two plastic sachets of shabu, marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," and personally handed the same to NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo. NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo, together with NBI Forensic Chemist III Viloria-Magsipoc, conducted the laboratory examination of the contents of the two sachets marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES2 05-06-04" and kept said sachets in his custody until the same were submitted to the RTC as evidence during trial. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in its observation that the failure of the buy-bust team to take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon seizure and at the site of accusedappellants’ apprehension, and to mark and make an inventory of the same in the presence of all the persons named in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, are not fatal and did not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence given that the prosecution was able to trace and establish each and every link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs and, hence, the identity and integrity of the said drugs had been duly preserved. For the same reasons, it was not imperative for the prosecution to present as witnesses before the RTC the two barangay officials who witnessed the conduct of the inventory. At best, the testimonies of these two barangay officials will only be corroborative, and would have no significant impact on the identity and integrity of the seized drugs. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013

J. Villarama, Jr. Jody King Construction filed a money claim against the Province of Aklan with the RTC of Marikina. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities. Respondent’s collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money claim should have been first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal and before the CA FACTS: The Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (respondent) entered into a contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal.Likewise, Petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with respondent for the construction of Passenger Terminal Building, Respondent made a demand for payment of the unpaid balance, but the petitioner failed to pay. Respondent sued petitioner in the RTC of Marikina to collect payment. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Jody King Construction And Development Corporation. Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration but the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. The trial court issued a writ of execution ordering Sheriff IV Antonio E. Gamboa, Jr. to demand from petitioner the immediate payment to the respondent. Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111754. The trial court denied petitioner’s notice of appeal. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the aforesaid orders denying due course to its notice of appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114073. The CA’s First Division dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 111754 as it found no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court’s issuance of the writ of execution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration .Petitioner argued that it is the COA and not the RTC which has original jurisdiction over money claim against government agencies and subdivision. CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. On the matter of execution of the trial court’s decision, the appellate court said that it was rendered moot by respondent’s filing of a petition before the Commission on Audit (COA). CA’s Sixteenth Division dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 114073. The CA also held that petitioner is estopped from invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it only raised the issue of COA’s primary jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it. ISSUES: 1. Whether COA has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case

2. Whether the writ of execution issued by the RTC is valid RULING: The petition granted 1. COA has primary jurisdiction over private respondent’s money claims Petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by petitioner, a local government unit. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities. Section 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed, including non-governmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations through the government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government. Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987 Constitution and existing laws, the COA promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit. Rule II, Section 1 specifically enumerated those matters falling under COA’s exclusive jurisdiction, which include "money claims due from or owing to any government agency." Rule VIII, Section 1 further provides: Section 1. Original Jurisdiction - The Commission Proper shall have original jurisdiction over: a) money claim against the Government; b) request for concurrence in the hiring of legal retainers by government agency; c) write off of unliquidated cash advances and dormant accounts receivable in amounts exceeding one million pesos (P1,000,000.00); d) request for relief from accountability for loses due to acts of man, i.e. theft, robbery, arson, etc, in amounts in excess of Five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00). Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTC’s jurisdiction over the matter after it had filed its answer and participated in the subsequent proceedings. To this, we need only state that the court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as the

doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the parties. Respondent’s collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money claim should have been first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal and before the CA. There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the present case. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and void. 2) Writ of Execution issued in violation of COA’s primary jurisdiction is void Since a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is no judgment at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect and the void judgment can never be final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void. SPOUSES DAVID AND MARISA WILLIAMS v. ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ, A.C. No. 7329, November 27, 2013 J. Carpio Atty. Enriquez filed with the SC a petition for review dated 19 August 2011 challenging the IBP Board of Governors’ 5 June 2008 and 26 June 2011 Resolutions. The Spouses Williams filed opposed the petition for review because it was filed out of time. The IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions did not become final. Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors are only recommendatory and always subject to the Court’s review. The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. It exercises such disciplinary functions through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty to form its own judgment. Disbarment proceedings are exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the IBP’s recommendations imposing the penalty of suspension from the practice of law or disbarment are always subject to this Court’s review and approval. FACTS:

The Spouses Williams bought a portion of the property owned by Josephine L. Verar (Verar) covered by TCT No. T-19723, said sale was annotated on TCT No. T-19723. Atty. Enriquez, representing his clients filed with the MCTC a complaint against the Spouses Williams for forcible entry. The Court ordered the Spouses Williams to restore possession of the lot to the clients of Atty. Enriquez. As a result of the forcible entry suit filed against them, the Spouses Williams filed the present complaint against Atty. Enriquez, charging him of committing falsehood and of misleading the MCTC. The Court referred the matter to the IBP. Commissioner Concepcion found that Atty. Enriquez knowingly made untruthful statements in the complaint he filed against the Spouses Williams and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year. In its 5 June 2008 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Concepcion and, in its 26 June 2011 Resolution, denied Atty. Enriquez’s motion for reconsideration. Atty. Enriquez filed with the SC a petition for review dated 19 August 2011 challenging the IBP Board of Governors’ 5 June 2008 and 26 June 2011 Resolutions. The Spouses Williams filed opposed the petition for review because it was filed out of time. ISSUE: 1. Whether the IBP Board of Governors’ 5 June 2008 and 26 June 2011 Resolutions are already final. 2. Whether Atty. Enriquez is guilty of dishonesty warranting his suspension from the practice of law. RULING: Petition granted. 1. The IBP Board of Governors’ 5 June 2008 and 26 June 2011 Resolutions did not become final. Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors are only recommendatory and always subject to the Court’s review. In Ylaya v. Gacott, the Court held that: We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors are merely recommendatory and do not attain finality without a final action from this Court. Section 12, Rule 139-B is clear on this point that: Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.— (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. It exercises such disciplinary functions through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty to form its own judgment. Disbarment proceedings are exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court, and the IBP’s recommendations imposing the penalty of suspension from the practice of law or disbarment are always subject to this Court’s review and approval. 2. In administrative cases, the only issue within the ambit of the Court’s disciplinary authority is whether a lawyer is fit to remain a member of the Bar. Other issues are proper subjects of judicial action. In Anacta v. Resurreccion, the Court held that: x x x Thus, it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court’s disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary authority. On its face, the 12 September 2006 complaint filed by the Spouses Williams against Atty. Enriquez does not merit an administrative case. In order for the Court to determine whether Atty. Enriquez is guilty of dishonesty, the issue of ownership must first be settled. The Spouses Williams alleged that Verar was the owner of the property and that she sold a portion of it to them. On the other hand, Atty. Enriquez alleged that Desiderio, Francisco, Ramon, Umbac and Briones were the real owners of the property and that Verar was only a trustee. This was precisely the issue in Civil Case No. 390. Unfortunately, the MCTC was not able to make a definite ruling because the Spouses Williams failed to file their answer within the prescribed period. The issue of ownership of real property must be settled in a judicial, not administrative, case. In Virgo v. Amorin, the Court dismissed without prejudice a complaint against a lawyer because it could not determine his fitness to remain a member of the Bar without delving into issues which are proper subjects of judicial action. The Court held that: While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a respondent to remain as a member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of a related case, the Court, in this instance, however, cannot ascertain whether Atty. Amorin indeed committed acts in violation of his oath as a lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of the Virgo Mansion without going through the factual matters that are subject of the aforementioned civil cases, particularly Civil Case No. 01-45798. The allegations that Atty. Enriquez wrote "OCT" instead of "TCT" but with the same number T-19723, and "Veran" instead of "Verar," are too trivial to give rise to administrative sanction. Besides, these mistakes could have been made inadvertently. Atty. Enriquez's failure to attach the pages of TCT No. T-19723 bearing the annotation of the sale to the Spouses Williams did not prejudice the Spouses Williams because in forcible entry the issue is the fact of prior possession, not ownership. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARISSA CASTILLO Y ALIGNAY G.R. No. 190180, November 27, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro The appellant argues that the police officers who apprehended her failed to strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, specifically, the failure to take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized evidence,

and the lack of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official in the operation. Despite the seemingly mandatory language used in the procedural rule at issue, a perusal of Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 reveals the existence of a clause which may render non-compliance with said procedural rule non-prejudicial to the prosecution of drug offenses. Notwithstanding the procedural error, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in this case were duly preserved and the chain of custody of said evidence was shown to be unbroken. FACTS: PO2 Santos and his colleagues at the said office was informed by their confidential informant (CI) about the illegal activity of the accused Marissa Castillo and one alias "Ompong" who were reported to be selling shabu . They set up a buy bust operation. During the buy bust operation PO2 Santos was able to recover the Php200.00 buy bust money from the left hand of Marissa and the two other plastic sachets containing suspected shabu. Marissa’s companion, however, was able to run away. After PO2 Santos had arrested accused Castillo, he informed her of her rights and then put markings on the plastic sachets confiscated from the accused. Thereafter, the accused was brought to the office of the SDEU while the plastic sachets confiscated from the accused were brought to crime laboratory for examination. The examination shows that the contents of the plastic sachets tested positive for shabu. Two (2) informations were filed charging the appellant of violation of Sec 5 and 11 of RA 9165. During the trial, appellant denied the charges against her and claimed that she was framed by the police officers who arrested her. Marinel Castillo, the daughter of the accused, corroborated in some details the testimony of her mother. The RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the crimes charged. Aggrieved, the appellant appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The case was elevated to the SC. The appellant argues that the police officers who apprehended her failed to strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, specifically, the failure to take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized evidence, and the lack of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official in the operation. Hence, she should be acquitted of all charges against her as the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not properly established. ISSUE: 1. Whether the failure to comply with Section 21(1), Art II of RA 9165 would warrant acquittal of the accused 2. Whether the testimony of the accused as corroborated by her daughter would warrant the accused’s acquittal RULING:

Petition denied 1. Despite the seemingly mandatory language used in the procedural rule at issue, a perusal of Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 reveals the existence of a clause which may render non-compliance with said procedural rule non-prejudicial to the prosecution of drug offense. In the case at bar, we concur with appellant’s assertion that the arresting officers involved were not able to strictly comply with the procedural guidelines stated in Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. However, our affinity with appellant’s argument does not sway us towards granting her absolution because, notwithstanding the procedural error, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in this case were duly preserved and the chain of custody of said evidence was shown to be unbroken. With regard to the first link in the chain of custody, the testimony of PO2 Santos confirms the fact that three heat-sealed plastic sachets each containing 0.04 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu were seized from appellant during a buy-bust operation conducted by PO2 Santos, PO1 Chavez and an unnamed confidential informant. The seized drugs were immediately marked at the place where appellant was apprehended. The illegal drugs seized from appellant were then turned over to Police Senior Inspector Hoover SM Pascual (PSI Pascual), the team leader and investigator of the buy-bust operation, who prepared and signed a Memorandum requesting the laboratory examination of the three plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance previously marked by PO2 Santos as "MCA-1," "MCA-2" and "MCA-3," respectively. This document together with the marked specimens was then transmitted to the Eastern Police District (EPD) Crime Laboratory Office to determine if they contained dangerous drugs. As per Physical Sciences Report No. D-48606E, signed by Police Senior Inspector Isidro L. Carino (PSI Carino), the qualitative examination of the contents of the three plastic sachets yielded a positive result for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The same marked specimens were later identified by PO2 Santos in open court as the same items that he seized from appellant when confronted with them by Prosecutor Conrado Tolentino (Tolentino). After PO2 Santos positively identified them, Prosecutor Tolentino then requested the trial court that the three plastic sachets containing shabu be marked as Exhibits "G," "G-1," and "G-2," respectively. From the foregoing narrative, it is readily apparent that the other links in the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs have been sufficiently established. 2. With respect to her defense, appellant raised the claim that she was innocent of the charges and was merely framed by the police officers who arrested her. Nevertheless, in one case, we thoroughly explained why this Court is usually wary of a defense of denial in drug cases, thus: Further, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust are generally accorded full faith and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties. Hence, when lined against an unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the testimony of the officers who caught the accused red-handed is given more weight and usually prevails. In order to overcome the presumption of regularity, jurisprudence teaches us that there must be clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with ill-motive.

Appellant may argue that her denial is not entirely unsubstantiated because the same is corroborated by the testimony of her daughter, Marinell Castillo. However, contrasted with the credible and positive testimony of P02 Santos and POI Chavez, the corroborating testimony made by appellant s daughter is given lesser probative value than that of the prosecution s witnesses since this Court has consistently held that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Furthermore, we have recently reiterated that we give less probative weight to a defense of alibi when it is corroborated by friends and relatives. We apply the same principle in the case at bar and declare that for the defense of denial to prosper, like alibi, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. In so doing, we regard the testimony of appellant’s daughter, which in no way can be considered as disinterested and unbiased, as invalid corroboration unworthy of belief. Lacking unprejudiced testimony to support her denial and without her making any allegation as to any ill motive on the part of the police officers who arrested her during a legitimate buy-bust operation, this Court is not inclined to overturn appellant s conviction for the sale and possession of illegal drugs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO VELASCO G.R. NO. 190318, November 27, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro Accused denied the charges against him and pointed out that during the times and dates the alleged criminal acts took place, he was working at the construction site with his nephew. Roderick Palconet, nephew of the accused, was presented in court in order to corroborate his alibi. It is established by jurisprudence that in order for a corroboration of an alibi to be considered credible, it must necessarily come from disinterested witnesses. The testimony of appellant’s nephew, which is undoubtedly coming from a close relative, cannot, in any way, be described as disinterested and unbiased. FACTS: On the 27th, 28th and 29th of December 2001, Lisa was raped for the third consecutive time by Roberto Velasco (appellant) , the live-in partner of her mother AAA ,while they were alone in the house. A year thereafter, appellant attempted to insert his penis into Lisa’s vagina while the latter was sleeping on her folding bed. Although appellant succeeded in touching and kissing Lisa’s private parts, he did not push through with his intention of raping her for fear of getting caught. The medico legal report submitted by public physician Richard Ivan Viray states that Lisa is in a non-virgin state; that she had shallow healed hymenal lacerations at 2 and 3 o’clock positions and deep healed lacerations at 6 and 7 o’clock positions Informations were filed charging the accused of three counts of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised and acts of lasciviousness.

During the trial, Appellant denied the charges and claimed that he was at work on the 27th, 28th and 29th of December 2001 with his nephew Roderick Palconet while he was at home on the 21st of December 2002. Roderick Palconet, nephew of the accused, testified as the corroborating witness of the accused. The trial court convicted appellant of three counts of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but with modification. Appellant elevated the case to the SC. He averred that the medico-legal report’s conclusion that the "subject is in a non-virgin state physically" did not prove that the victim was indeed raped. Likewise, he pointed out the lack of resistance; delay in reporting the rape incidents; and continued residence in appellant’s place of dwelling even after she was raped numerous times militates against a finding that the allegations of rape are true. He also pointed out that during the times and dates the alleged criminal acts took place, he was somewhere else. ISSUES: 1. Whether the guilt of the accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt 2. Whether the defense of alibi of the accused would warrant his acquittal RULING: The petition denied. 1. It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide who among them is telling the truth. Lastly, in order for a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged since the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony. With regard to appellant’s argument that the findings of the medico-legal report do not support the allegation that the victim was indeed raped, we cannot give any credit to such claim in light of established jurisprudence holding that a medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. We have also recently reiterated that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape and the victim’s lack of resistance especially when intimidated by the offender into submission does not signify voluntariness or consent. Furthermore, it is doctrinally settled that "delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim" because "delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant." It is likewise settled in jurisprudence that human reactions vary and are unpredictable when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault, thus, not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone.

2. As his principal defense against all these criminal charges, appellant provided an alibi. He maintains that, at the time of the three rape incidents as well as the one instance of acts of lasciviousness, he was working at a construction site in Barangay Caingin, Malolos City, Bulacan with his nephew Roderick Palconet who was the only witness he presented in court in order to corroborate his alibi. Time and again, we have repeated the legal doctrine that for alibi to prosper, it must be proved that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. Furthermore, we have also established in jurisprudence that, in order for a corroboration of an alibi to be considered credible, it must necessarily come from disinterested witnesses. In the case at bar, the testimony of appellant’s sole corroborating witness reveals that the distance between the construction site and the appellant’s house where the instances of rape and acts of lasciviousness occurred is relatively short and can be covered by a mere fiveminute travel by motor vehicle. The testimony of appellant’s nephew, which is undoubtedly coming from a close relative, cannot, in any way, be described as disinterested and unbiased. Therefore, considering these factual circumstances, appellant’s defense of alibi certainly cannot prosper. SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSATIO SARAZA and FERNANDO SARAZA v. WILLIAM FRANCISCO G.R. No. 198718, November 27, 2013 J. Reyes William Francisco filed a complaint for specific performance with RTC of Imus, Cavite to compel the petitioners to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the a lot situated in Makati covered by TCT No. 220530 Fernando’s name. Petitioner Fernando claimed that RTC Imus lacked jurisdiction over the case as it involved an adjudication of ownership of a property situated in Makati City. Although the end result of the respondent’s claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondent’s action. It provides that personal actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff." Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper. FACTS: William Francisco (respondent) and Fernando Saraza (FErnando) executed an Agreement that provided for the latter’s sale of his 100-square meter share in a lot situated in Makati City, which at that time was still registered in the name of one Emilia Serafico and covered by TCT No. 40376 (later covered by TCT No. 220530), for a total consideration 3.2 Million. He made an initial payment while the balance was to be paid on installments to the

PNB, to cover a loan of Spouses Saraza, Fernando’s parents, with the bank. A final deed of sale conveying the property was to be executed by Fernando upon full payment of the PNB loan. It was also agreed upon that should the parties fail to transfer the subject property to the respondent’s name, the property covered by TCT No. 156126 and encumbered to PNB to secure the loan shall be considered collateral in favor of the respondent. The respondent was also allowed to take immediate possession of the property covered by TCT No. 156126 through a contract of lease. The petitioners likewise furnished PNB with an Authority, allowing the respondent to pay their obligations to the PNB, to negotiate for a loan restructuring, to receive the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan secured by its mortgage. When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached P226,582.13, the respondent asked for the petitioners’ issuance of a Special Power of Attorney that would authorize him to receive from PNB the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan. The petitioners denied the request. Upon inquiry from PNB, the respondent found out that the petitioners had instead executed an Amended Authority, which provided that the owner’s copy of TCT No. 156126 should be returned to the mortgagors upon full payment of the loan. Spouses Saraza also caused the eviction of the respondent from the property. These prompted to file a case for specific performance, sum of money and damages with the RTC of Imus, Cavite against the petitioners. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The RTC, however, declared that only Fernando should be held liable for the respondent’s claims, since the main action was for specific performance, specifically to compel him to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property already covered by TCT No. 220530 under Fernando’s name. On appeal, Fernando argued that the RTC of Imus lacked jurisdiction over the case as it involved an adjudication of ownership of a property situated in Makati City. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition ISSUE: Whether Imus is the proper venue for the action for specific performance RULING: Petition denied As to the issue of venue, the petitioners’ argument that the action should have been instituted with the RTC of Makati City, and not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is misplaced. Although the end result of the respondent’s claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made. Our ruling in Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction & Development Corporationis instructive. In the said case, a complaint for specific performance that involved property situated in Parañaque City was instituted before the RTC of Pasig City. When the case’s venue was

raised as an issue, the Court sided with therein petitioner who argued that "the fact that ‘she ultimately sought the conveyance of real property’ not located in the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig is x x x an anticipated consequence and beyond the cause for which the action [for specific performance with damages] was instituted." The Court explained: In La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. v. Ponferrada, private respondents filed an action for specific performance with damages before the RTC of Bacolod City. The defendants allegedly reneged on their contract to sell to them a parcel of land located in Bago City – a piece of property which the latter sold to petitioner while the case was pending before the said RTC. Private respondent did not claim ownership but, by annotating a notice of lis pendens on the title, recognized defendants’ ownership thereof. This Court ruled that the venue had properly been laid in the RTC of Bacolod, even if the property was situated in Bago. In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, private respondent filed a case for specific performance with damages before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that after it accepted the offer of petitioners, they sold to a third person several parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. The Supreme Court sustained the trial court’s order allowing an amendment of the original Complaint for specific performance with damages. Contrary to petitioners’ position that the RTC of Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the subject lots were located in Montalban, Rizal, the said RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint. The Court reiterated the rule that a case for specific performance with damages is a personal action which may be filed in a court where any of the parties reside. The Court compared these two cases with the case of National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals where the Court held that an action that seeks the execution of a deed of sale over a parcel of land is for recovery of real property, and not for specific performance, because the primary objective is to regain ownership and possession of the property. It was explained that the prayer in National Steel was not in any way connected to a contract that was previously executed by the party against whom the complaint was filed, unlike in Cabutihan where the parties had earlier executed an Undertaking for the property’s transfer, correctly giving rise to a cause of action either for specific performance or for rescission, as in this case. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondent’s action. It provides that personal actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff." Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper. GENEROSO ENESIO v. LILIA TULOP G.R. No. 183923, November 27, 2013 J. Brion Lilia Tulop filed an ejectment case against the Generoso Enesio with the MTC. MTC proceeded with the pre-trial conference and required the parties to submit position papers. Generoso posited that the MTC should have conducted a preliminary hearing and received evidence to determine the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. As expressly provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, ejectment cases merely require the submission by the parties of affidavits and position papers. The rule directs

courts to conduct hearings only when necessary to clarify factual matters. "This procedure is in keeping with the objective of the Rule of promoting the expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases." FACTS: Lilia Tulop (respondent) substituted by her heirs sued Generoso Enesio (petitioner) for "Ejectment, and Other Relief" before the MTC. Lilia alleged in her complaint that she was the owner of the lot in possession of the petitioner whose possession was by Lilia’s mere tolerance. She sent the respondent a demand letter asking him to vacate the premises but he refused. The petitioner in his answer, claimed that he had been an agricultural tenant of the land; that the case was an agrarian dispute cognizable by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board; and hence, the MTC must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The the pretrial conference the parties entered into stipulations. The MTC exercised jurisdiction over the case and held that the petitioner was not Lilia’s agricultural tenant. The RTC fully affirmed the MTC’s decision. The case was elevated to the CA. The petitioner pointed out that the MTC merely proceeded with the pre-trial conference and required the parties to submit position papers. He posited that the MTC should have conducted a preliminary hearing and received evidence to determine the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. The petitioner cited in this regard the procedures laid down by the Court in Bayog v. Hon. Natino. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling and ruled that the MTC does not lose jurisdiction over ejectment cases simply because tenancy relationship has been raised as a defense. It is only upon determination, after hearing that tenancy relationship exists that the MTC must dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. The MTC concluded, after hearing, that tenancy did not exist between the parties. In fact, the petitioner himself admitted that he had never shared any of his harvests with Lilia. Thus, sharing of harvest, an important element of tenancy relationship, was missing. The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the MTC should have conducted a preliminary hearing and received evidence to determine the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties RULING: Petition denied. As the CA correctly held, the petitioner’s reference to Bayog is misplaced as the factual situation in that case does not obtain in the present case. In Bayog, the Court faulted the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) for not receiving the defendant’s belated Answer. As ruled by the Court, had the MCTC not refrained from receiving the defendant’s Answer, the MCTC would have found that the defendant raised tenancy as an issue. While tenancy as a defense in ejectment cases does not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over ejectment cases, the MCTC should have heard and received evidence to determine whether the MCTC had jurisdiction over the case. If tenancy had indeed been an issue, the MCTC had no option but to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In the present case, the MTC correctly observed the proper procedure in ejectment cases. As expressly provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, ejectment cases merely require the submission by the parties of affidavits and position papers. The rule directs courts to conduct hearings only when necessary to clarify factual matters. "This procedure is in keeping with the objective of the Rule of promoting the expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases." Therefore, the petitioner’s assertion that the MTC did not receive testimonial or documentary evidence in resolving the case is not correct. In fact, it is from the evidence furnished by the parties that the MTC concluded that the petitioner never shared his produce with Lilia. Expectedly, the MTC ruled that the petitioner was not Lilia’s tenant and in this light, it had jurisdiction over the case. SPOUSES PIO DATO AND SONIA Y. SIA v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS G.R. No. 181873, November 27, 2013 J. Reyes The petitioner mortgaged the subject property to respondent bank. Upon maturity of the loan, petitioner failed to pay the loan despite demand. The property was foreclosed and sold in a public auction where respondent bank was the highest bidder. Spouses Sia filed suit questioning the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Petitioner, however, failed to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period. Respondent bank consolidated its ownership over the property and a new title was issued in its favor. Hence, it became the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession applied for by respondent bank. Despite the pending suit for annulment of the mortgage and Notice of Sheriff’s Sale, respondent bank is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the said case. FACTS: Spouses Pio Dato (Pio) and Sonia Y. Sia (Spouses Sia) applied for a P240,000.00 loan which was granted by BPI which was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land owned by Spouses Sia, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 102434. Subsequently, Spouses Sia availed of a P4 Million Revolving Promissory Note Line with a term of one year, secured by the same real estate mortgage over TCT No. 102434. Before their two (2) previous loans matured, Spouses Sia obtained a Credit Facility of P5.7 Million using the same collaterals offered in their previous loans and four additional parcels of land. Spouses Sia obtained P800,000.00 from their Credit Facility of P5.7 Million which was credited to their current account with BPI after executing a Promissory Note for the same amount. While Spouses Sia paid some of the interest on their loans, the amount was insufficient to cover the principal amount of said loans. Spouses Sia filed a complaint with the RTC of Cebu City praying for the issuance TRO to maintain status quo, award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation costs. In the said complaint, Spouses Sia alleged that BPI "deliberately refused to comply with the condition/undertaking of the loan for IGLF endorsement and approval" until the maturity date of the loan lapsed to their great prejudice and irreparable damage.

Despite repeated demands Spouses Sia failed to pay their loans. Hence, WBPI Extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage covered by TCT No. 102434 which secured Spouses Sia’s loans The lot was sold at a public auction with BPI as the sole bidder in the amount of P10,060,080.20. The certificate of sale was issued on August 10, 1993 upon payment of all the required registration fees. Spouses Sia amended their complaint claiming that the bank inserted and annotated a falsified/illegal Real Estate Mortgage of P5.7 Million, purportedly availed of by Spouses Sia. During the pendency of the instant case, the one-year redemption period had lapsed without Spouses Sia exercising their right to redeem the subject property. BPI prayed for the issuance writ of possession over foreclosed property and the occupancy of Spouses Sia on the foreclosed property entitles BPI to a reasonable compensation. The RTC rendered its judgment in favor of BPI. Spouses Sia filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but with modification. After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration .Spouses Sia raised the matter before SC via the instant petition for review on certiorari. Pending the resolution of this case, Spouses Sia filed on September 20, 2013 an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction alleging that in an Order Branch ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession over TCT No. 130468 (Formerly TCT No. 102434) after BPI filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession. Pursuant to the said Order, a writ of possession was issued directing Sheriff Generoso Regalado to issue a Notice to Vacate. Spouses Sia filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Spouses Sia then filed a Motion to Recall and to Quash Writ of Possession which was also denied. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. An Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by Spouses Sia on September 20, 2013 before the Court as they have received a Second Notice to Vacate on Writ of Possession. On October 17, 2013, Spouses Sia filed before the Court an Extremely Urgent Reiterative Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to Enjoin Enforcement of Third Notice to Vacate dated October 8, 2013, giving Spouses Sia ten (10) days from receipt thereof within which to vacate the premises. ISSUE: Whether the situation warrants the issuance of temporary restraining order RULING: Petition denied. In their Extremely Urgent Reiterative Motion For Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed on October 17, 2013, Spouses Sia referred to the ruling of this Court in Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court where it was held that an issue in a separate case wherein the validity of levy and sale of properties is questioned, is one that requires pre-emptive resolution.

A scrutiny of the above-cited case reveals that it is not applicable to this case. In Cometa, the property which was the subject of dispute was sold after levy and execution when the judgment award was not satisfied in another case for damages. Therein petitioner Herco Realty, assailed the validity of the execution sale and contended that the ownership of the lots had been transferred to it by Cometa before such execution sale. The ownership of the property sold in the execution sale was put into the very issue. Whereas in this case, the property owned by Spouses Sia covered by TCT No. 102434 was mortgaged to BPI as security for their loans. The same property was sold after it was extrajudicially foreclosed. Hence, the facts in Cometa and this case cannot be any more different. Spouses Sia cannot invoke the application of the Court’s ruling in Cometa to a case which is poles apart to it. The pending suit questioning the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage does not entitle Spouses Sia to a suspension of the issuance of writ of possession. The Court calls to mind its ruling in Baldueza v. CA: The Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals as respondent bank is entitled to possession of the subject property. In several cases, this Court has held: "It is settled [that] the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act 3135 as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court." The facts show that petitioner mortgaged the subject property to respondent bank. Upon maturity of the loan, petitioner failed to pay the loan despite demand. The property was foreclosed and sold in a public auction where respondent bank was the highest bidder.Petitioner failed to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period. Respondent bank consolidated its ownership over the property and a new title was issued in its favor. Hence, it became the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession applied for by respondent bank. Despite the pending suit for annulment of the mortgage and Notice of Sheriff’s Sale, respondent bank is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the said case. Based on the reasons discussed above, the Court holds that there is no basis for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction.. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FAISAL LOKS Y PELONYO, G.R. NO. 203433, NOVEMBER 27, 2013

J. REYES The buy-bust team failed to make an inventory and to take photographs of the subject drug. The non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 which identifies the said requirements does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible. What is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused are preserved. In this case, the defense failed to substantiate its claim that such integrity and evidentiary value of the subject drug was adversely affected by the police officers’ handling thereof. As the Court explained in People v. Mendoza: This Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, will not render [the accused]’s arrest illegal or the items seized from her inadmissible. FACTS: SPO1 Jerry Velasco (SPO1 Velasco) and SPO1 Rodolfo Ramos (SPO1 Ramos) testified for the prosecution. They testified that their confidential informant told them about the delivery of shabu to be made by a certain "Faisal” which was later identified as herein appellant. Hence, they organized a buy-bust operation. When Loks arrived at the target area, he approached the police’s confidential informant, who was then with SPO1 Velasco. SPO1 Velasco was introduced by the confidential informant to Loks as the buyer of shabu. The sale ensued between SPO1 Velasco and Loks. Loks handed to SPO1 Velasco 1.25 grams of shabu, while SPO1 Velasco paid the amount of P3,000.00 to Loks. When SPO1 Velasco executed the team’s pre-arranged signal, the other members of the buy-bust team approached to arrest Loks. SPO1 Ramos recovered the marked money from Loks, while SPO1 Velasco kept with him the purchased drug. Loks was then brought to the police station, where SPO1 Velasco marked the seized item. The specimen was turned over to one SPO1 Pama who brought it to the police crime laboratory examination. The examination conducted by Police Senior Inspector Marites F. Mariano confirmed that the seized specimen contained shabu. Faisal Loks (appellant) was accused of violating R.A. No. 9165 for the sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, weighing 1.300 grams. The RTC rendered a decision finding Loks guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC .Hence, this appeal. Apellant pointed buy-bust team’s failure to comply with Sec 21 of the IRR of RA 9165. ISSUE: Whether proven the guilt of the appellant had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. RULING:

Petition denied In the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the two essential elements of the offense must concur, namely: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In the case under consideration, all these elements have been established. The witnesses for the prosecution clearly showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur buyer (SPO1 Velasco) positively identified accused as the seller of the shabu. He categorically testified about the buy-bust operation – from the time he was introduced by the informant to accused as the buyer of the shabu; to the time when accused agreed to the sale; to the actual exchange of the marked money and the heat-sealed sachet containing a white crystalline substance; and until the apprehension of accused. His testimony was corroborated by SPO1 Ramos. Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish that the substance recovered from accused was indeed shabu Per Chemistry Report No D-D-911-06 of Police Senior Inspector Marites F. Mariano, the substance, weighing ONE POINT THREE ZERO ZERO (1.300) grams, which was brought by SPO2 Pama was examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The RTC’s appreciation of the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies vis-à-vis the defense offered by Loks and the other evidence presented during the proceedings before it deserves respect. It is a well-entrenched principle that "the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is conclusive on this Court as it is the trial court which had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of the witnesses." Further, we explained in People v. Naelga: It should be pointed out that prosecutions involving illegal drugs largely depend on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy- bust operation. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of the trial court. This Court will not interfere with the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses except when there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted. "It is equally settled that in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 9165, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary." In this case, the RTC gave greater weight to the testimonies of the police officers who testified against Loks, a ruling which even the CA affirmed on appeal. Upon review, the Court has determined that the testimony of SPO1 Velasco, who was the poseur-buyer in the sale and thus armed with sufficient personal knowledge on the transaction, indeed established Lok’s sale of the illegal drug and the validity of his arrest. "[A] buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors." Since Loks was caught by the buy-bust team in flagrante delicto, his immediate arrest was also validly made. The accused was caught in the act and had to be apprehended on the spot. From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant did not make the arrest illegal. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court authorizes a warrantless arrest by a peace officer and even a private person "when, in his

presence, the person to be arrested has committed or is attempting to commit an offense." The legitimate warrantless arrest also cloaks the arresting police officer with the authority to validly search and seize from the offender those that may be used to prove the commission of the offense. The drug seized during the buy-bust operation, which is considered the crime’s corpus delicti, was sufficiently established as containing shabu, a dangerous drug. SPO1 Velasco’s marking of the seized drug immediately upon his arrival at the police station qualified as a compliance with the marking requirement. Contrary to the argument of the defense, even the buy-bust team’s failure to make an inventory and to take photographs of the subject drug did not adversely affect the prosecution’s case. Time and again, the Court has recognized that noncompliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 which identifies the said requirements does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible. What is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused are preserved. In this case, the defense failed to substantiate its claim that such integrity and evidentiary value of the subject drug was adversely affected by the police officers’ handling thereof. As the Court explained in People v. Mendoza: This Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, will not render [the accused]’s arrest illegal or the items seized from her inadmissible. SKM ART CRAFT CORPORATION v. EFREN BAUCA ET AL. G.R. NO. 171282, November 27, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. The 23 respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals but only nine of the respondents had signed the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the petition. The general rule that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. However, that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification requirement. The verification signed by nine of the respondents substantially complied with the verification requirement since respondents share a common interest and cause of action in the case. The 23 respondents in G.R. No. 171282 were employed by petitioner SKM Art Craft Corporation which is engaged in the handicraft business. FACTS: The 23 respondents in G.R. No. 171282 were employed by petitioner SKM Art Craft Corporation which is engaged in the handicraft business. Unfortunately , a fire burned petitioners premises and caused millions in damages. Petitioner then informed respondents that

it will suspend its operations for six months. Only eight days after receiving notice of the suspension of petitioner’s operations, the 23 respondents (and other co-workers) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, docketed as NLRC NCR (South) Case No. 30-05-03012-00, 3005-03028-00 and 30-05-03045-00. The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed and ordered petitioner to reinstate them and pay them back wages of P59,918.41. On appeal, NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and ruled that there was no illegal dismissal. The case was elevated to the CA. the CA set aside the NLRC Decision and Resolution and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. The CA considered the merits of the petition for certiorari filed by respondents and the conflicting findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC as justification for its decision to decide the case on the merits even if only nine of the respondents had signed the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the petition. The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA gravely erred in not summarily dismissing the petition insofar to those who did not sign the verification and certification against forum shopping are concerned. RULING: Petition denied We hold that the verification signed by nine of the respondents substantially complied with the verification requirement since respondents share a common interest and cause of action in the case. The apparent merit of respondents’ CA petition and the conflicting findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC also justified the CA’s decision to rule on the merits of the case. The CA aptly noted that in Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, only two of the 25 petitioners therein signed the verification and certification against forum shopping. We said that the problem is not the lack of a verification, but the adequacy of one executed by only two of the 25 petitioners. These two signatories, we added, are unquestionably real parties in interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition. This verification is enough assurance that the matters alleged therein have been made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative. Hence, we ruled that the requirement of verification was substantially complied with. In Altres v. Empleo, we also ruled that the verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, as in this case. In Altres, we likewise stated the general rule that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. We also said, however, that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification requirement. In Torres, we also considered the apparent merits of the case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for allowing the petition. We noted the conflicting findings of the NLRC and

the Labor Arbiter and held this as ample justification for the CA’s review of the merits. We stressed that rules of procedure are established to secure substantial justice. Being instruments of the speedy and efficient administration of justice, they must be used to achieve such end, not to derail it. Technical requirements may thus be dispensed with in meritorious appeals. MORETO MIRALLOSA v. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC. G.R. No. 194538, November 27, 2013 CJ. Sereno Sometime in 1995, petitioner took over Lot No. 32. . A written demand letter was sent sometime in April 2002 .On January 14 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the MeTC. The one-year prescriptive period for filing a case for unlawful detainer is tacked from the date of the last demand, the reason being that the other party has the right to waive the right of action based on previous demands and to let the possessor remain on the premises for the meantime. When respondent sent petitioner a demand letter in April 2002 and subsequently filed the Complaint in January 2003, it did so still within the one-year prescriptive period imposed by the rules. FACTS: Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a Caloocan property known as the Pangarap Village. The property has a total land area of 156 hectares and consists of three parcels of land registered in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc. The lot that petitioner presently occupies is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by the titles registered in the name of the Carmel Farms, Inc. On 14 September 1973, President Marcos issued PD 293 which invalidated the titles of respondent and declared them open for disposition to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI). On the basis of P.D. 293, petitioner’s predecessor-ininterest, Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHAI, occupied Lot No. 32 and subsequently built houses there. On the other hand, respondent was constrained to allow the members of MHAI to also occupy the rest of Pangarap Village. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court promulgated Roman Tuason v. The Register of Deeds, Caloocan City (Tuason Case), which declared P.D. 293 as unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts. By virtue of the decision, the Register of Deeds restored respondent’s ownership of the entire property. Sometime in 1995, petitioner took over Lot No. 32 by virtue of an Affidavit executed by Pelagio M. Juan in his favor. As a consequence of Tuason case, respondent made several oral demands on petitioner to vacate the premises, but to no avail. A written demand letter which was sent sometime in April 2002 also went unheeded. On 14 January 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the MeTC. MeTC rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to vacate the subject property. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC. The RTC reversed the findings of the MeTC and ruled that respondent’s Complaint did not make out a case for unlawful detainer. The respondent appealed to the CA. The CA granted the appeal of the respondents and reinstated

the ruling of the MTC. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, the instant Petition. ISSUE: Whether the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case RULING: Petition denied The MeTC rightly exercised jurisdiction, this case being one of unlawful detainer. An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. Here, possession by a party was originally legal, as it was permitted by the other party on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, the possession became illegal when the other party demanded that the possessor vacate the subject property because of the expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the possessor refused to heed the demand. The importance of making a demand cannot be overemphasized, as it is jurisdictional in nature. The one-year prescriptive period for filing a case for unlawful detainer is tacked from the date of the last demand, the reason being that the other party has the right to waive the right of action based on previous demands and to let the possessor remain on the premises for the meantime. In this case, it is clear from the facts that what was once a legal possession of petitioner, emanating from P.D. 293, later became illegal by the pronouncement in Tuason that the law was unconstitutional. While it is established that tolerance must be present at the start of the possession, it must have been properly tacked after P.D. 293 was invalidated. At the time the decree was promulgated, respondent had no option but to allow petitioner and his predecessorin-interest to enter the property. This is not the "tolerance" envisioned by the law. As explained in Tuason, the decree "was not as claimed a licit instance of the application of social justice principles or the exercise of police power. It was in truth a disguised, vile stratagem deliberately resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous and disdainful disregard of the rights of others. It was in reality a taking of private property without due process and without compensation whatever, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in accordance with and as explicitly guaranteed by law." When respondent sent petitioner a demand letter in April 2002 and subsequently filed the Complaint in January 2003, it did so still within the one-year prescriptive period imposed by the rules. It matters not whether there is an ownership issue that needs to be resolved, for as we have previously held, a determination of the matter would only be provisional. In Heirs of Ampil v. Manahan, we said: In an unlawful detainer case, the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties, is the sole issue for resolution. But where the issue of ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon said issue in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is only an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue

of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court’s adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WELMO LINSIE Y BINEVIDEZ G.R. No. 199494, November 27, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro Appellant claimed that he was at work at the time of the AAA was raped. This was corroborated by another defense witness Allan Talinghale. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. In the case at bar, we find that appellant’s alibi did not sufficiently establish that he was working at a construction site when AAA was raped and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Likewise, the corroborating testimony of defense witness Talinghale does not discount the possibility that appellant may have left the construction site to commit the dastardly act he was charged with and came back afterwards. FACTS: On December 14, 2005, at around 11 in the morning, while resting AAA heard someone knocking on the door. Thinking it was her husband, she opened the door, but, instead, she saw Welmo Linsie (appellant). Appellant asked her if Edna was there to which she answered no. Knowing that she was alone, [appellant] pushed and closed the door, drew a knife which is about 6 to 8 inches long with a wood handle and pointed it to the center of her neck. The appellant asked AAA to remove her clothes, fearing for her life she followed his instruction. Thereafter, Appellant successfully had carnal knowledge with AAA despite her resistance. In defense, Appellant denied that he AAA and claimed that never left his place of work and it is physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. This was corroborated by another defense witness Allan Talinghale, who owns a store infront of the house being constructed by the appellant. Talinghale testified that on December 14, 2005, Between 11 and 11:30 in the morning, appellant, went to his store and bought ice and 2 sticks of Hope cigarettes. Thereafter, appellant went back to work at around 11:20 in the morning. RTC rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty of simple rape . Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty based solely on the incredible and uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant. 2. Whether it is physically impossible for appellant to be at the crime scene RULING: Petition denied

1. It is settled in jurisprudence that in reviewing rape convictions, we are guided by three principles, namely (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult for the complainant to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape as involving two persons, the rapist and the victim, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Unsurprisingly, the credibility of the rape victim’s testimony is a recurring crucial factor in the resolution of a case of rape. In fact, we have held that, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. The trial court concluded that AAA’s version of events is more credible than what appellant narrated after having had the opportunity to observe the deportment and manner of testifying of both parties. The same conclusion was likewise firmly upheld by the Court of Appeals. In People v. Deligero, we ruled that: [F]actual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are "entitled to great weight and respect, if not conclusiveness, for we accept that the trial court was in the best position as the original trier of the facts in whose direct presence and under whose keen observation the witnesses rendered their respective versions of the events that made up the occurrences constituting the ingredients of the offenses charged. The direct appreciation of testimonial demeanor during examination, veracity, sincerity and candor was foremost the trial court’s domain, not that of a reviewing court that had no similar access to the witnesses at the time they testified." We have repeatedly held that what is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused against the complainant has been sufficiently proven; and that inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal. Furthermore, we have recently reiterated that rape victims are not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that they might be trying to obliterate it from their memory, thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party. 2. For his ultimate defense, appellant puts forward denial and alibi. His alibi was corroborated by defense witness Talinghale who appears to be not related to appellant as borne by the records. However, we are not persuaded by appellant’s alibi despite corroboration from a disinterested witness. In People v. Piosang, we reiterated our frequent pronouncements regarding denial and alibi in this manner: Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was

somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. In the case at bar, we find that appellant’s alibi did not sufficiently establish that he was working at a construction site when AAA was raped and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Likewise, the corroborating testimony of defense witness Talinghale does not discount the possibility that appellant may have left the construction site to commit the dastardly act he was charged with and came back afterwards. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JONAS GUILLEN Y ATIENZA G.R. No. 191756, November 25, 2013 J. Del Castillo The RTC rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty of the rape. RTC took appellant’s silence and passiveness when he was confronted by "AAA" with the rape charge at the police station as an implied admission of guilt. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the accusation of "AAA" at the police station, he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that appellant’s silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel and any admission obtained in violation of this rule shall be inadmissible in evidence. FACTS: On May 20, 2002, Jonas Guillen (appellant) knocked at the door of AAA and when AAA opened the door appellant the entered the house of "AAA". Appellant poked a balisong at her neck, forcing her to lie down on the floor, pressing her with his thighs and removing her duster and panty and thereafter pulling down his brief and shorts, did then and inserted his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of "AAA" against the latter’s will and consent. "AAA" asked assistance from her sister-in-law. AAA’s" sister-in-law contacted the police. When the responding police officers arrived, appellant, who was readily identified by "AAA" since he was her neighbor, was immediately arrested. AAA underwent medical examination and the Medico-Legal Report Number MG-02-366 issued by Dra. Soliman shows that private complainant’s hymen had "deep healed laceration at 7 o’clock position;" positive for spermatozoa; and that there was "evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of the examination Information was filed charging appellant with the crime of rape. The RTC rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty of the rape. RTC took appellant’s silence and passiveness when he was confronted by "AAA" with the rape charge at the police station as an implied admission of guilt. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUES:

1. Whether trial court gravely erred when it deemed his silence as an implied admission of guilt. 2. Whether AAA’s" healed hymenal laceration does not prove rape RULING: Petition denied. 1. It should be borne in mind that when appellant was brought to the police station, he was already a suspect to the crime of rape. As such, he was already under custodial investigation. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides, viz: Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the accusation of "AAA" at the police station, he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that appellant’s silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel and any admission obtained in violation of this rule shall be inadmissible in evidence. In any case, we agree with the Decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape. The trial court’s Decision convicting appellant of rape was anchored not solely on his silence and so-called implied admission. More importantly, it was based on the testimony of "AAA" which, standing alone, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 2. Anent appellant’s contention that "AAA’s" healed hymenal laceration does not prove rape, we find the same irrelevant and immaterial. Hymenal laceration, whether fresh or healed, is not an element of the crime of rape. Even a medical examination is not necessary as it is merely corroborative. As we mentioned before, the fact of rape in this case was satisfactorily established by the testimony of "AAA" alone. All the elements of rape having been established beyond reasonable doubt, both the trial court and the CA properly found appellant guilty as charged and correctly imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. v. JESSIE E. CANTOS G.R. No. 180200, November 25, 2013 J. Del Castillo Pursuant to a court’s order respondent issued Warrants of Levy against several delinquent properties of the petitioner. These properties were advertised and sold at public auction. Digital Telecommunications made a request to the respondent to lift the warrant invoking the final Decision in Civil Case No. 3514 decreeing petitioner’s exemption from the payment of real property tax is binding upon respondent. Since the warrants remained unlifted, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Indirect Contempt.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice partylitigants or their witnesses during litigation. The acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of Levy and in effecting the public auction sale of petitioner’s real properties, were neither intended to undermine the authority of the court nor resulted to disobedience to the lawful orders of Branch IX. He merely performed a ministerial function which he is bound to perform under Sections 176 and 177 of RA 7160. FACTS: Petitioner wanted to renew its Mayors Permit but was informed that if petitioner failed to pay real property taxes, its operation would be restrained. Petitioner failed to pay the real property taxes, hence a cease and desist order was issued against the petitioner. Petitioner filed a case for Annulment of the Cease and Desist Order against the Mayor and Chief of the Permit and License Division. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3514 and raffled to Branch IX. RTC declared that the issuance of the Cease and Desist Order was without legal basis and that petitioner is only liable to pay real property taxes on properties not used in connection with the operation of its franchise. The then Mayor filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed his petition. The respondent issued seven (7) Warrants of Levy against several delinquent properties of the petitioner. Hence, the properties would be advertised and sold at public auction. Petitioner wrote respondent to request the lifting of the Warrants of Levy and to refrain from proceeding with the public sale of its property located in Balayan. It invoked the final Decision in Civil Case No. 3514 decreeing petitioner’s exemption from the payment of real property tax is binding upon respondent. But since the warrants remained unlifted, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Indirect Contempt and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO docketed as Civil Case No. 4051. The RTC granted petitioner’s prayer for TRO. Respondent, however, manifested that when said TRO was served upon him, he had already effected the public auction of petitioner’s real properties. Thus, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion to recall and nullify the auction sale and to order respondent and his counsel to explain why they should not be held in contempt for their blatant defiance of the TRO. The RTC denied petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injuction. Petitioner filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Null and Void the Sale Conducted which was however denied by the RTC. When petitioner elevated the denial to the CA but was dismissed. Meanwhile, the RTC dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Indirect Contempt and Prohibition against respondent (Civil Case No. 4051). The RTC ruled that since respondent was not a party in Civil Case No. 3514, he had no duty to render obedience to the Decision therein. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it. The CA denied the appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration of the petitioner. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: 1. Whether respondent is guilty of indirect contempt 2. Whether the final Decision in Civil Case No. 3514 is binding upon the respondent RULING: Petition denied. 1. Respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt. "Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during litigation." In this case, the acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of Levy and in effecting the public auction sale of petitioner’s real properties, were neither intended to undermine the authority of the court nor resulted to disobedience to the lawful orders of Branch IX. He merely performed a ministerial function which he is bound to perform under Sections 176 and 177 of RA 7160, viz: Section 176. Levy on Real Property. - After the expiration of the time required to pay the delinquent tax, fee, or charge, real property may be levied on before, simultaneously, or after the distraint of personal property belonging to the delinquent taxpayer. To this end, the provincial, city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, shall prepare a duly authenticated certificate showing the name of the taxpayer and the amount of the tax, fee, or charge, and penalty due from him. Said certificate shall operate with the force of a legal execution throughout the Philippines. Levy shall be effected by writing upon said certificate the description of the property upon which levy is made. At the same time, written notice of the levy shall be mailed to or served upon the assessor and the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is located who shall annotate the levy on the tax declaration and certificate of title of the property, respectively, and the delinquent taxpayer or, if he be absent from the Philippines, to his agent or the manager of the business in respect to which the liability arose, or if there be none, to the occupant of the property in question. In case the levy on real property is not issued before or simultaneously with the warrant of distraint on personal property, and the personal property of the taxpayer is not sufficient to satisfy his delinquency, the provincial, city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, shall within thirty (30) days after execution of the distraint, proceed with the levy on the taxpayer's real property. . A report on any levy shall, within ten (10) days after receipt of the warrant, be submitted by the levying officer to the sanggunian concerned. Section 177. Penalty for Failure to Issue and Execute Warrant. - Without prejudice to criminal prosecution under the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, any local

treasurer who fails to issue or execute the warrant of distraint or levy after the expiration of the time prescribed, or who is found guilty of abusing the exercise thereof by competent authority shall be automatically dismissed from the service after due notice and hearing. Noteworthy at this point is that there is nothing in the records which would show that petitioner availed of the tax exemption or submitted the requirements to establish that it is exempted from paying real property taxes. Section 206 of RA 7160 outlines the requirements for real property tax exemption, viz.: Sec. 206. Proof of Exemption of Real Property from Taxation. - Every person by or for whom real property is declared, who shall claim tax exemption for such property under this Title shall file with the provincial, city or municipal assessor within thirty (30) days from the date of the declaration of real property sufficient documentary evidence in support of such claim including corporate charters, title of ownership, articles of incorporation, by-laws, contracts, affidavits, certifications and mortgage deeds, and similar documents. If the required evidence is not submitted within the period herein prescribed, the property shall be listed as taxable in the assessment roll. However, if the property shall be proven to be tax exempt, the same shall be dropped from the assessment roll. Neither did petitioner avail of the remedy of paying the assessed real property tax under protest as prescribed in Section 252 of RA 7160. Suffice it to say that the availment of these remedies could have prevented respondent’s issuance of the Warrants of Levy and the conduct of the subsequent public auction sale of petitioner’s properties. Due to petitioner’s nonavailment of these remedies, respondent therefore remained duty bound to perform such acts, otherwise, he may be subjected to the penalties prescribed for non-performance of his ministerial duties as provincial treasurer. 2.

Respondent is not bound by the Decision in Civil Case No. 3514. Petitioner avers that respondent blatantly defied a final and binding Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 3514 declaring it exempt from paying taxes on its real properties. It argues that there is a shared identity of interest between the defendants in Civil Case No. 3514 and respondent. Therefore, respondent is barred by the Decision in the said case under the principle of res judicata.

The contention is specious. "Res judicata means ‘a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.’"For res judicata to apply there must among others be, between the first and the second actions, identity of the parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. Here, there is no identity of parties between Civil Case No. 3514 and the instant case. "Identity of parties exists ‘where the parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.’" In Civil Case No. 3514, the action was directed against Benjamin E. Martinez, Jr. and Francisco P. Martinez in their capacities as Mayor and Chief of the Permit and License Division of the Municipality of Balayan, Batangas, respectively. On the other hand, respondent, in the instant case, is being sued in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Batangas. While the defendants in both cases similarly sought to enforce the tax obligation of petitioner, they were sued under different capacities. Moreover, there is no identity in the causes of action between the two cases. In Civil Case No. 3514, the propriety of the municipal officials’ closure/stoppage of petitioner’s business operation in Balayan, Batangas

was the one in question while what is involved in this case is respondent’s act of issuing Warrants of Levy and proceeding with the auction sale of the real properties of petitioner. Clearly, the principle of res judicata does not apply. The RTC and the CA are therefore correct in ruling that respondent, not being a party thereto, is not bound by the Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 3514. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATALIO HILARION Y LALIAG G.R. No. 201105, November 25, 2013 J. Brion Natalio Hilarion was charged with statutory rape for raping AAA, a six (6) years old girl. AAA and her mother testified that AAA was six (6) years old at the time she was rape but no documentary evidence was presented to prove the same. In the present case, the records are completely devoid of evidence that the certificates recognized by law have been lost or destroyed or were otherwise unavailable. The mother simply testified without prior proof of the unavailability of the recognized primary evidence. Thus, proof of the victim’s age cannot be recognized, following the rule that all doubts should be interpreted in favor of the accused. We stress that age is an essential element of statutory rape; hence the victim's age must be proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself. FACTS: The RTC found the Natalio Hilarion (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC). It gave credence to the testimony of AAA that the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. It further held that AAA’s testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of the Philippine National Police medico-legal officer. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. The CA held that the victim's age had been sufficiently proven by the written and oral testimonies of AAA's mother, BBB. Hence, this petition. Appellant claimed that the victim's age had not been proven with certainty. ISSUE: Whether the age of AAA had been proven with certainty RULING: Petition denied In People v. Buado Jr., the Court reiterated the guidelines in appreciating the victim's age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, thus: In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim s mother or relatives concerning the victim s age, the complainant s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. 6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. In the present case, the records are completely devoid of evidence that the certificates recognized by law have been lost or destroyed or were otherwise unavailable. The mother simply testified without prior proof of the unavailability of the recognized primary evidence. Thus, proof of the victim’s age cannot be recognized, following the rule that all doubts should be interpreted in favor of the accused. To reiterate, while AAA’s mother, BBB, testified that her daughter was six (6) years old at the time of the rape, it had not been previously established that the certificate of live birth or other similar authentic document such as the baptismal certificate or school records have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable. Even AAA’s own testimony on cross examination that she was six (6) years old at the time of the incident would not suffice to prove her minority since her age was not expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. We stress that age is an essential element of statutory rape; hence the victim's age must be proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO GARCIA Y PADIERNOS G.R. No. 206095, November 25, 2013 J. MENDOZA Roberto Garcia was charged with rape for raping AAA, a three (3) year old girl. In People v. Arpon, the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows: 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. In this case, there is nothing on record to prove the qualifying circumstance that "the victim is a child below 7 years old." The testimony of AAA anent her age and the absence of denial on the part of Garcia are not sufficient evidence of her age. On the other hand, the information regarding the age of AAA as indicated in Medico Legal Report No. M-4356-04 is not reliable because there was no showing who supplied the same. Lamentably, her age was not one of the subjects of stipulation during the pre-trial conference. FACTS: AAA was three (3) years old when Roberto Garcia (Garcia) inserted his index finger into her vagina . AAA told her mother about the incident and when AAA urinated, blood oozed out of her vagina her mother brought her to the hospital. Information was filed against Garcia charging him with rape. The RTC rendered its judgment convicting Garcia of simple rape. Garcia appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA. The CA found Garcia guilty of qualified rape .CA held that the RTC erred in not appreciating the qualifying circumstance of minority. It was of the view that since the minority of AAA was alleged in the Information and proven during trial, through her testimony and Medico Legal Report No. M-4356-04, the imposition of the death penalty was warranted. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of minority RULING: Petition denied. In the case at bench, the CA held that the qualifying circumstance of minority was proven beyond reasonable doubt. According to the CA, the unrefuted testimony of AAA that she

was 3 years old when the incident happened, and Medico-Legal Report No. M-4356-04, which stated that AAA was 3 years old when she was examined for any evidence of sexual abuse, had established the qualifying circumstance that "the victim is a child below 7 years old." It further declared that since AAA was under 7 years old at the time of the commission of the object rape, Garcia should be convicted of qualified rape and meted the death penalty. The Court has to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged in the Information and duly proven with equal certainty as the crime itself. The victim’s minority must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself. In People v. Arpon, the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows: 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. In this case, there is nothing on record to prove the qualifying circumstance that "the victim is a child below 7 years old." The testimony of AAA anent her age and the absence of denial on the part of Garcia are not sufficient evidence of her age. On the other hand, the information regarding the age of AAA as indicated in Medico Legal Report No. M-4356-04 is not reliable because there was no showing who supplied the same. Lamentably, her age was not one of the subjects of stipulation during the pre-trial conference. It bears stressing that the prosecution did not adduce any independent and competent documentary evidence such as AAA’s original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal certificate, school records or any authentic documents indicating her date of birth, to show that the commission of the crime was attended by the subject qualifying circumstance of minority. The prosecution also failed to establish that the documents referred to above were lost,

destroyed, unavailable, or otherwise totally absent. Her mother or any member of her family, by affinity or consanguinity, never testified on her age or date of birth. Further, there is no showing that the testimony of AAA as to her age at the time of the commission of the crime was expressly and clearly admitted by Garcia. In the light of the foregoing, the subject qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated against Garcia. HEIRS OF THE LATE FELIX M. BUCTON v. SPOUSES GONZALO and TRINIDAD GO, G.R. No. 188395, November 20, 2013 J. Perez a. While it is true that a notarized document, like an SPA, carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor the presumption of regularity, this presumption, however, is not absolute. It may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In brushing aside the expert witness’ testimony, it was observed that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standard of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. However, when the dissimilarity between the genuine and false specimens of writing is visible to the naked eye and would not ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer, resort to technical rules is no longer necessary and the instrument may be stricken off for being spurious. When so established and is conspicuously evident from its appearance, the opinion of handwriting experts on the forged document is no longer necessary. b. Ownership and real rights over real property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years, provided that the occupant is in good faith and with just title. A prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired with color of title and good faith. However, it must be stressed that possession by virtue of a spurious title, as the Spouses Go believed it to be, cannot be considered constructive possession for the purpose of reckoning the ten-year prescriptive period. The conclusion of the appellate court that prescription has already set in is erroneously premised on the absence of forgery and the consequent validity of the deed of sale. FACTS: The suit concerns a parcel of land originally registered in the name of Felix M. Bucton, married to Nicanora Gabar and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT). Sometime in March 1981, Felix received a phone call from Gonzalo Go informing him that he has bought the property thru Benjamin Belisario who represented himself as the attorney-in-fact of Felix. Felix then learned that the owner’s duplicate certificate of title of the property was lost while in the possession of his daughter. The certificate of title then fell into the hands of Belisario thus depriving Felix of his ownership of the property. It was also annotated at the back of the title that the Spouses Bucton purportedly authorized Belisario to sell the property to third persons, as evidenced by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) allegedly signed by the Spouses Bucton. On the strength of the SPA, Belisario executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Spouses Go. With this, the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City cancelled TCT in the name of Felix and issued a new one in the names of the Spouses Go. In the meantime, Felix died leaving his heirs to claim against Spouses Go that there was forgery in the signature of Spouses Bucton on the SPA, alleging further that since the SPA was spurious, no valid title was conveyed to the Spouses Go. The Spouses Go refuted the allegations asserting that they are

buyers in good faith and for value, and that they are in actual possession of the property from the time it was purchased in 1981. The RTC ruled that the complaint filed by the Heirs of Felix is already barred by laches and prescription since from the time the alleged fraudulent transaction was discovered in 1981 up to 1996 the complainants failed to take any legal step to assail the title of the Spouses Go. The CA affirmed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint further explaining that the evidence adduced by the Heirs of Felix failed to preponderantly establish that the questioned SPA was a forgery. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the signatures were forged. 2. Whether or not the action of the heirs of Felix are already barred by laches and prescription. RULING: 1. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have been forged. While it is true that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor the presumption of regularity, this presumption, however, is not absolute. It may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In upholding the validity of the SPA, the Court of Appeals brushed aside the testimonial evidence of the expert witness and made an independent examination of the questioned signatures, and based thereon, ruled that there is no forgery. We are not unmindful of the principle that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standard of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. However, when the dissimilarity between the genuine and false specimens of writing is visible to the naked eye and would not ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer, resort to technical rules is no longer necessary and the instrument may be stricken off for being spurious. More so when, as in this case, the forgery was testified to and thus established by evidence other than the writing itself. When so established and is conspicuously evident from its appearance, the opinion of handwriting experts on the forged document is no longer necessary. 2. Ownership and real rights over real property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years, provided that the occupant is in good faith and with just title. A prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired with color of title and good faith. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

The Spouses Go miserably failed to meet the requirements of good faith and just title thus the ten-year prescriptive period is a defense unavailable to them. It must be stressed that possession by virtue of a spurious title cannot be considered constructive possession for the purpose of reckoning the ten-year prescriptive period. The conclusion of the appellate court that prescription has already set in is erroneously premised on the absence of forgery and the consequent validity of the deed of sale. And extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon the Spouses Go since the law requires 30 years of uninterrupted adverse possession without need of title or of good faith before real rights over immovable prescribes. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC., DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 165585, November 20, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe In this relation, jurisprudence dictates that an answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the Rules, resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings. As such, it is a form of judgment that is exclusively based on the submitted pleadings without the introduction of evidence as the factual issues remain uncontroverted. In this case, records disclose that in its Answer, GSIS admitted the material allegations of PGAI’s complaint warranting the grant of the relief prayed for. In particular, GSIS admitted that: (a) it made a request for reinsurance cover which PGAI accepted in a reinsurance binder effective for one year; (b) it remitted only the first three reinsurance premium payments to PGAI; (c) it failed to pay PGAI the fourth and final reinsurance premium installment; and (d) it received demand letters from PGAI. It also did not refute the allegation of PGAI that it settled reinsurance claims during the reinsured period. On the basis of these admissions, the Court finds that the CA did not err in affirming the propriety of a judgment on the pleadings. FACTS: The National Electrification Administration (NEA) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) insuring all real and personal properties mortgaged to it by electrical cooperatives under an Industrial All Risks Policy (IAR policy). Out of which, 95% was reinsured by GSIS with PGAI for a period of one year or from March 5, 1999 to March 5, 2000. GSIS agreed to pay PGAI reinsurance premiums in an amount per quarter. While GSIS remitted to PGAI the reinsurance premiums for the first three quarters, it, however, failed to pay the fourth and last reinsurance premium due on December 5, 1999 despite demands. This prompted PGAI to file, on November 15, 2001, a Complaint for sum of money (complaint) against GSIS before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1634. On December 18, 2001, PGAI filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings averring that GSIS essentially admitted the material allegations of the complaint, such as: (a) the existence of the MOA between NEA and GSIS; (b) the existence of the reinsurance binder between GSIS and PGAI; (c) the remittance by GSIS to PGAI of the first three quarterly reinsurance premiums; and (d) the failure/refusal of GSIS to remit the fourth and last reinsurance premium. Hence, PGAI prayed that the RTC render a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Section 1, Rule 34 of

the Rules of Court (Rules). GSIS opposed the foregoing motion by reiterating the allegations and defenses in its Answer. On January 11, 2002, the RTC issued an Order (January 11, 2002 Order) granting PGAI’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. It observed that the admissions of GSIS that it paid the first three quarterly reinsurance premiums to PGAI affirmed the validity of the contract of reinsurance between them. As such, GSIS cannot now renege on its obligation to remit the last and remaining quarterly reinsurance premium. It further pointed out that while it is true that the payment of the premium is a requisite for the validity of an insurance contract as provided under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 612, otherwise known as "The Insurance Code," it was held in Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp. v. CA (Makati Tuscany) that insurance policies are valid even if the premiums were paid in installments, as in this case. Thus, in view of the foregoing, the RTC ordered GSIS to pay PGAI the last quarter reinsurance premium in the sum of P32,885,894.52, including interests amounting toP6,519,515.91 as of July 31, 2000 until full payment, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. Dissatisfied, GSIS filed a notice of appeal. Meanwhile, PGAI filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal based on the following reasons: (a) GSIS’ appeal was patently dilatory since it already acknowledged the validity of PGAI’s claim; (b) GSIS posted no valid defense as its Answer raised no genuine issues; and (c) PGAI would suffer serious and irreparable injury as it may be blacklisted as a consequence of the non-payment of premiums due. PGAI also manifested its willingness to post a sufficient surety bond to answer for any resulting damage to GSIS. The latter opposed the motion asserting that there lies no sufficient ground or urgency to justify execution pending appeal. It also claimed that all its funds and properties are exempted from execution citing Section 39 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8291, otherwise known as "The Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997." On February 14, 2002, the RTC issued an Order (February 14, 2002 Order) granting PGAI’s Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, conditioned on the posting of a bond. It further held that only the GSIS Social Insurance Fund is exempt from execution. Accordingly, PGAI duly posted a surety bond which the RTC approved through an Order dated February 19, 2002, resulting to the issuance of a writ of execution 54 and notices of garnishment (February 19, 2002 issuances), all of even date, against GSIS. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s January 11, 2002 Order rendering judgment on the pleadings. RULING: Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. The rule is stated in Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules which reads as follows: Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. x x x.

In this relation, jurisprudence dictates that an answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the Rules, resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings. As such, it is a form of judgment that is exclusively based on the submitted pleadings without the introduction of evidence as the factual issues remain uncontroverted. In this case, records disclose that in its Answer, GSIS admitted the material allegations of PGAI’s complaint warranting the grant of the relief prayed for. In particular, GSIS admitted that: (a) it made a request for reinsurance cover which PGAI accepted in a reinsurance binder effective for one year; (b) it remitted only the first three reinsurance premium payments to PGAI; (c) it failed to pay PGAI the fourth and final reinsurance premium installment; and (d) it received demand letters from PGAI. It also did not refute the allegation of PGAI that it settled reinsurance claims during the reinsured period. On the basis of these admissions, the Court finds that the CA did not err in affirming the propriety of a judgment on the pleadings. GSIS’ affirmative defense that the non-payment of the last reinsurance premium merely rendered the contract ineffective pursuant to Section 77 of PD 612 no longer involves any factual issue, but stands solely as a mere question of law in the light of the foregoing admissions hence allowing for a judgment on the pleadings. Besides, in the case of Makati Tuscany, the Court already ruled that the non-payment of subsequent installment premiums would not prevent the insurance contract from taking effect; that the parties intended to make the insurance contract valid and binding is evinced from the fact that the insured paid – and the insurer received – several reinsurance premiums due thereon, although the former refused to pay the remaining balance, viz: We hold that the subject policies are valid even if the premiums were paid on installments. The records clearly show that petitioner and private respondent intended subject insurance policies to be binding and effective notwithstanding the staggered payment of the premiums. The initial insurance contract entered into in 1982 was renewed in 1983, then in 1984. In those three (3) years, the insurer accepted all the installment payments. Such acceptance of payments speaks loudly of the insurer’s intention to honor the policies it issued to petitioner. Certainly, basic principles of equity and fairness would not allow the insurer to continue collecting and accepting the premiums, although paid on installments, and later deny liability on the lame excuse that the premiums were not prepaid in full. GENESIS INVESTMENT, INC. v. HEIRS of CEFERINO EBARASABAL G.R. No. 181622, November 20, 2013 J. Peralta In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the Supreme Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts.

Although the causes of action of respondents pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of the contending parties over the contested property, the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC, the complaint, however suggests that the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. FACTS: The heirs of Ebarasabal filed against Genesis Inevstment, Inc. a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu. Genesis then filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the RTC has no jurisdiction to try the case on the ground that the case involves title to or possession of real property or any interest therein and since the assessed value of the subject property does not exceed P20,000.00, the action falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). In its initial order the RTC granted Genesis' Motion to Dismiss since the assessed value of the real property involved is determinative of which court has jurisdiction over the case. Heirs of Ebarasabal filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, arguing that the complaint consists of several causes of action, including one for annulment of documents, which is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, as such, falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC granted the Motion reversing its earlier order, from which Genesis filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the RTC denied it. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which the CA dismissed holding that the subject matter of respondents' complaint is incapable of pecuniary estimation therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that the main purpose in filing the action is to declare null and void the documents assailed therein. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. RULING: It is true that one of the causes of action of respondents pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of the contending parties over the contested property, the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. In filing their Complaint with the RTC, respondents sought to recover ownership and possession of their shares in the disputed parcel of land by questioning the due execution and validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well as the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by and between some of their co-heirs and herein petitioners. Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of partition of or recovery of shares or interest over the real property in question but includes an action for declaration of nullity of contracts and documents which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim

is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts. Well entrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted. Moreover, it is provided under Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court that where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein. FAR EASTERN SURETY AND INSURANCE CO. INC. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 170618, November 20, 2013 J. Brion Under Rule 41 of the Rules, an appeal from the RTC’s decision may be undertaken in three (3) ways, depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (1) an ordinary appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) a petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with the Court where only questions of law are raised or involved. The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and of law. The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of the Rules, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and of law. The third mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is filed with the Court only on questions of law. It is only where pure questions of law are raised or involved can an appeal be brought to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The rule in this jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive." However, when the petitioner questioned the RTC’s ruling, it was, in fact, raising the issues of falsity and of forgery of the signatures in the bail bond, which questions are purely of fact and must be resolved before the CA and not proper under Rule 45 certiorari petition. FACTS: A personal bail bond for the provisional release of accused Tuazon was filed before the RTC in a criminal case, which was approved by the RTC. The personal bail bond was under the signatures of Paul Malvar and Teodorico Evangelista as the petitioner’s authorized signatories. Subsequently, the Supreme Court required all bonding companies to accredit all their authorized agents with the courts, causing the petitioner to apply for its Certification of Accreditation and Authority to transact surety business with the courts designating Samuel Baui as its authorized representative. However, the accused failed to appear in the scheduled hearing for the criminal case prompting the RTC to issue an order requiring the petitioner to produce the body of the accused.

Samuel, who was then the petitioner’s designated representative, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to comply with the RTC’s order seeking the petitioner’s assistance for the use of its resources and agents outside Tarlac City. Thereafter, the petitioner allegedly verified from its register that it did not authorize the issuance of a bail bond allowing it to file with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Cancel Fake/Falsified Bail Bond. The petitioner alleged that the signature of Teodorico in the bail bond was forged; that Paul was not an authorized signatory. In support of the motion, petitioner attached copies of the Personal Bail Bond, Corporate Secretary’s Certificate, and Special Power of Attorney in favor of Patricio, and prayed to be relieved from any liability under the bail bond, from which the RTC denied on the ground that the petitioner had indirectly acknowledged the bond’s validity when it filed a motion for extension of time with the trial court. The petitioner sought reconsideration of the judgment, but the RTC denied the motion. Further, the RTC issued another order directing the issuance of a writ of execution. The petitioner responded by filing an omnibus motion to hold in abeyance or quash the writ, but the RTC denied this motion, prompting the petitioner to file a petition to assail the RTC orders under Rule 45. Respondent then contended that the petitioner used the wrong mode of review as the proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy. RULING: Under Rule 41 of the Rules, an appeal from the RTC’s decision may be undertaken in three (3) ways, depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (1) an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) a petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with the Court where only questions of law are raised or involved. The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and of law. The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of the Rules, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and of law. The third mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is filed with the Court only on questions of law. It is only where pure questions of law are raised or involved can an appeal be brought to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The issues of the authenticity and of the validity of the bail bond’s signatures and the authority of its signatories had never been resolved. When the petitioner questioned the RTC’s ruling, it was, in fact, raising the issues of falsity and of forgery of the signatures in the bail bond, which questions are purely of fact. Nothing in the order resolved the question of whether Teodorico’s signature had been forged. Neither was there any finding on the validity of the bail bond, nor any definitive ruling on the effects of the unauthorized signature of Paul. Missing as well was any mention of the circumstances that led to the RTC’s approval of the bond. We need all these factual bases to make a ruling on what and how the law should be applied. Thus, even if we are inclined to take equitable considerations into account in light of the alleged previous court approval of the bail bond, we cannot do so for lack of sufficient factual and evidentiary

basis. To be fair, we must know what we must be fair about and cannot simply rely on general allegations of overall unfairness. The rule in this jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive." This Court has emphatically declared that "it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court." Moreover, this Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision involving both questions of fact and law must first be brought before the Court of Appeals. As a final point, while we note the irregular procedure adopted by the RTC when it rendered a decision based on implications, we nevertheless hold that the proper remedy to question this irregularity is not through a Rule 45 petition. PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas v. MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45, November 20, 2013 J. Brion The rule on conclusiveness of factual findings is not an absolute one. Despite the respect given to administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual issues, review and re-evaluate the evidence on record and reverse the administrative agency’s findings if not supported by substantial evidence. Since, the CA found no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the respondents are guilty of the administrative charges against them, the Ombudsman’s findings can be reversed, as mere allegation and speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof. The theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. The records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they specifically allege that they saw Alingasa remit the collections to Erederos. However, their testimonies are still "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others." FACTS: Mendoza, Erederos, Alingasa, and Peque were administratively charged by private complainants with Grave Misconduct before the Deputy Ombudsman and criminal complaints for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The administrative and criminal charges arose from the alleged anomalies in the distribution at the LTO Cebu of confirmation certificates, an indispensable requirement in the processing of documents for the registration of motor vehicle with the LTO. It was alleged that Alingasa was selling the

confirmation certificates which are supposedly issued by the LTO free of charge, being a scheme that existed upon Mendoza's assumption in office as Regional Director of LTO Cebu. During preliminary conference, the respondents thru their counsels manifested their intention to submit the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on record after the submission of their memoranda/position papers. In the meantime, additional administrative and criminal complaints were filed by new complainants against the respondents, which subsequently are consolidated with the original pending complaints. The new complainants alleged that they had to pay P2,500.00 per pad to Alingasa before they could be issued confirmation certificates by the LTO Cebu, that Alingasa would give her collections to Erederos and to Mendoza, pointing Mendoza as the source of instructions. Further they were told that the previous administration’s issued confirmation certificates would no longer be honored under Mendoza s administration; hence, they had to buy new sets of confirmation certificates to process the registration of their motor vehicles with the LTO. With this, Mendoza denied the accusations against him and submitted the affidavits of desistance of some of the private complainants as there were no evidence to support the allegations against him. Nonetheless, this affidavit of desistance was retracted to because of the alleged threat made by Peque to the private complainants to sign the affidavit of desistance. On the other hand, Erederos and Alingasa also denied liability for the charges against them. The Deputy Ombudsman rendered a joint decision on the administrative aspect of the cases and a joint resolution on the criminal cases, finding Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa guilty of grave misconduct relying mainly on the affidavits and NBI/Progress report in support of the respondents’ guilt. On appeal, the CA reversed the Deputy Ombudsman’s joint decision in the administrative case ruling that the Deputy Ombudsman’s finding of grave misconduct was not supported by substantial evidence because the affidavits were not corroborated by any other documentary evidence and that the statements in the affidavits were hearsay, thus should not be given any evidentiary weight. The Deputy Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied the motion. In his stand, the Deputy Ombudsman argues that the evidence adduced by the complainants satisfied the requisite quantum of proof because the complainants’ personal knowledge can be gleaned from the preface of their narration; hence, their affidavits could not have been hearsay. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals may resolve factual issues already settled by the administrative agency. 2. Whether or not the statements in the affidavits are hearsay. RULING: 1. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the findings and conclusions of the Deputy Ombudsman on the ground that they were not supported by substantial evidence. It is well settled that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. Their factual findings are generally accorded with great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.

This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however, is not an absolute one. Despite the respect given to administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual issues, review and re-evaluate the evidence on record and reverse the administrative agency’s findings if not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, when the findings of fact by the administrative or quasi-judicial agencies (like the Office of the Ombudsman/Deputy Ombudsman) are not adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts. In the present case, the CA found no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the respondents are guilty of the administrative charges against them. Mere allegation and speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof. Since the Deputy Ombudsman’s findings were found wanting by the CA of substantial evidence, the same shall not bind this Court. 2. Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness. It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e. those which are derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits. The records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they specifically allege that they saw Alingasa remit the collections to Erederos. In fact, there is no specific allegation that they saw or witnessed Erederos or Mendoza receive money. That the complainants alleged in the preface of their affidavits that they "noticed and witnessed" the anomalous act complained of does not take their statements out of the coverage of the hearsay evidence rule. Their testimonies are still "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others." Based on these considerations, we cannot conclude that the complainants have personal knowledge of Erederos' and Mendoza's participation in the anomalous act. At most, their personal knowledge only extends to the acts of Alingasa who is the recipient of all payments for the processing of confirmation certificates. Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO BACAS G.R. No. 182913, November 20, 2013

J. Mendoza a. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Here, the Chabons did not make any mention of the ownership or occupancy by the Philippine Army and did not indicate any efforts or searches they had exerted in determining other occupants of the land. Such omission constituted extrinsic fraud. b. Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be taken against the Republic. It is a well-settled rule that the Republic or its government is not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. In any case, even granting that the said official was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot operate against the State. As in the case, the subject lands, being part of a military reservation, are inalienable and cannot be the subjects of land registration proceedings. FACTS: In 1938, President Quezon issued Presidential Proclamation No. 265 reserving for the use of the Philippine Army three parcels of the public domain. The parcels of land were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be." The Bacases and the Chabons filed their Application for Registration covering a parcel of land, alleging ownership in fee simple of the property and indicating the names and addresses of the adjoining owners. However, only the Bacases made a statement that the Philippine Army occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance. Based on the evidence presented, the Land Registration Court (LRC) held that the applicants had conclusively established their ownership in fee simple over the land. There being no appeal interposed by the Republic from the decision of the LRC, the decision became final and executory, resulting in the issuance of a decree and the certificate of title over the property. As a consequence of the LRC decisions in both applications for registration, the Republic filed a complaint for annulment of titles against the Bacases and the Chabons. The Republic claimed that the certificates of title issued to the Bacases and the Chabons were null and void because they fraudulently omitted to name the military camp as the actual occupant in their application for registration, and to state that the lot was part of Camp Evangelista. Further, the Republic argued that the property had long been reserved in 1938 for military purposes at the time it was applied for hence, it was no longer disposable and subject to registration. The RTC dismissed the complaints and ruled that the respondents did not commit fraud in their application for registration. It explained that the stated fact of occupancy by Camp Evangelista over certain portions of the subject lands in the applications for registration by the respondents was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law; that the Republic was given all the opportunity to be heard thus, it is already estopped from contesting the proceedings. Further, the RTC reasoned that assuming arguendo that respondents were guilty

of fraud, the Republic lost its right to a relief for its failure to file a petition for review on the ground of fraud within one year after the date of entry of the decree of registration. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the decisions of the LRC over the subject lands can still be questioned 2. Whether or not prescription or estoppel can lie against the government RULING: 1. Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for registration of land is required to contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come forward and show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted. Here, the Chabons did not make any mention of the ownership or occupancy by the Philippine Army. They also did not indicate any efforts or searches they had exerted in determining other occupants of the land. Such omission constituted fraud and deprived the Republic of its day in court. Not being notified, the Republic was not able to file its opposition to the application and, naturally, it was not able to file an appeal either. With respect to the Bacases, although the lower courts might have been correct in ruling that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law when they alleged that Camp Evangelista was an occupant, the Republic is not precluded and estopped from questioning the validity of the title. 2. The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the existence of actual and extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a judgment decreeing registration is null and void. Any title to an inalienable public land is void ab initio. Any procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the LRC never acquired jurisdiction over the property. All proceedings of the LRC involving the property are null and void and, hence, did not create any legal effect. A judgment by a court without jurisdiction can never attain finality. Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be taken against the Republic. It is a well-settled rule that the Republic or its government is not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. In any case, even granting that the said official was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot operate against the State. Consequently, the State may still seek the cancellation of the title because

such title has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked against the State. The subject lands, being part of a military reservation, are inalienable and cannot be the subjects of land registration proceedings. BIRKENSTOCK ORTHOPAEDIE GMBH AND CO. KG v. PHILIPPINE SHOE EXPO MARKETING CORPORATION G.R. No. 194307, November 20, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe The primordial policy is a faithful observance of procedural rules, and their relaxation or suspension should only be for persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. This is especially true with quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which are not bound by technical rules of procedure. While petitioner submitted mere photocopies as documentary evidence, it should be noted that the IPO had already obtained the originals in the related Cancellation Case earlier filed before it; hence, the IPO Director General’s relaxation of procedure was a valid exercise of his discretion in the interest of substantial justice. FACTS: Petitioner, which is a German corporation, applied for various trademark registrations before the IPO. However, registration proceedings of the applications were suspended due to an existing registration of the mark "BIRKENSTOCK AND DEVICE" in the name the predecessor-in-interest of respondent Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation. With this, petitioner filed a petition for cancellation of registration alleging that it is the lawful and rightful owner of the Birkenstock marks. Meanwhile, respondent and/or its predecessor-in-interest failed to file the required 10th Year Declaration of Actual Use for registration resulting in the cancellation of such mark. As a result, the applications of the petitioner were published in the IPO e-Gazette. In effect, respondent filed verified notices of oppositions to the subject applications claiming that it has been using Birkenstock marks in the Philippines for more than 16, that while it failed to file the 10th Year DAU, it continued the use of "BIRKENSTOCK AND DEVICE" in lawful commerce, and has filed a "re-application" of its old registration. The Bureau of Legal Affairs sustained respondent’s opposition ruling that the various certificates of registration submitted by petitioners were all photocopies and, therefore, not admissible as evidence. The IPO Director General reversed and set aside the ruling of the BLA. The CA reinstated the decision of the BLA, as it agreed with respondent that petitioner’s documentary evidence, being mere photocopies, were in violation of the Rules on Inter Partes Proceedings. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the photocopies are admissible as documentary evidence RULING: It is well-settled that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to

enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful observance of procedural rules, and their relaxation or suspension should only be for persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. This is especially true with quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which are not bound by technical rules of procedure. In the case at bar, while petitioner submitted mere photocopies as documentary evidence in the Consolidated Opposition Cases, it should be noted that the IPO had already obtained the originals of such documentary evidence in the related Cancellation Case earlier filed before it. Under this circumstance and the merits of the instant case, the Court holds that the IPO Director General’s relaxation of procedure was a valid exercise of his discretion in the interest of substantial justice. WILLIAM C. DAGAN v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 184083, November 19, 2013 J. Perez Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasijudicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Since, the Office of the Ombudsman’s Decision exonerating respondents from the administrative charges had resolved all issues raised by petitioner, it is in a proper exercise of discretion when it found the evidence adduced by petitioner as wanting to support the administrative charges brought against respondents. Further, considering that a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. FACTS: Dagan filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman against respondents, alleging that under Philracom-sponsored races, Philracom undertakes the payment of all prizes for the race to the winning horses or owners thereof, less the allotted horse owner's prize of the day with the understanding that either Philracom or Manila Jockey shall advance the same. He further accused Philracom of overpaying when it failed to deduct the allotted horse owner's prize of the day; that respondent Dilag caused the disbursement of funds of Philracom as reimbursement for promotional expenses without specifying the nature of promotion and without the necessary public bidding and prior approval of Philracom. The Office of the Ombudsman absolved the respondents of charges of grave misconduct, oppression, dishonesty, serious irregularities and violation of laws. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation but the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for lack of merit.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, wherein CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to avail of the correct mode of appeal. It explained that the assailed issuances of the Ombudsman are administrative in nature; hence the proper remedy is through a petition for review under Rule 43. Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari, as the remedy under Rule 43 applies only to a situation where the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is that of conviction, and since the decision of the Ombudsman is final and executory in case of exoneration, petitioner asserts his only recourse to reverse and nullify decision is through special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. ISSUE: Whether or not petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper recourse RULING: There are two instances where a decision, resolution or order of the Ombudsman arising from an administrative case becomes final and unappealable: (1) where the respondent is absolved of the charge; and (2) in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary. In the instant case, the respondents were absolved of the charges against them by the Office of the Ombudsman. Such decision is final and unappealable. However, petitioner is not left without any remedy. Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Considering that a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction should not to be taken to mean as granting parties seeking any of the writs an absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed. It is an established policy that a direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special, important and compelling reasons, clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition. In the same vein, while petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to show grave abuse of discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Hence, the petition must fail. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner -which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion

of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law -in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention. There is no showing that the assailed Decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Office of the Ombudsman’s Decision exonerating respondents from the administrative charges discussed at length and resolved all issues raised by petitioner. Essentially, then, the Office of the Ombudsman, in a proper exercise of discretion, found the evidence adduced by petitioner as wanting to support the administrative charges brought against respondents. ROLANDO P. DE LA CUESTA v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 164068-69, November 19, 2013 J. Abad But while it is true that the prosecution has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case is filed, any disposition the prosecutor may afterwards deem proper should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. It is the court’s bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the same. The rule is that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not by the caption of the information or the citation of the law allegedly violated but by the actual recital of facts in that information. Here the issue is whether the facts alleged in the informations in the subject criminal cases make out a case for the crime of technical malversation. However, the informations show that there is no allegation in the informations that the P2 million and P6 million grants to COCOFED had been earmarked for some specific expenditures. FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed two separate informations against former members of the Governing Board of the Philippine Coconut Administration, including its chairman, accused Rolando P. De La Cuesta, and a member, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., before the Sandiganbayan, having charged with granting financial assistance of P2 million to the COCOFED. Claiming that the informations were prematurely filed, the Sandiganbayan granted the accused leave to seek reconsideration of the resolution from the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the OMB. Subsequently, the OMB submitted to the Sandiganbayan the Memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer III bearing the approval of the Ombudsman recommending the dismissal of the cases, which prompted the accused to file motion to dismiss. The OSG then told the court that the documents needed to show probable cause had been submitted to the OMB at the preliminary investigation but were simply not adequately explained hence, not fully appreciated. Later, the OSP informed the Sandiganbayan that, even with the provided documents, it still found no new evidence sufficient to overturn its earlier findings that no probable cause existed against the accused. However, the Sandiganbayan ruled that probable cause existed to warrant the prosecution of the accused. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is bound by the findings and recommendations of the Ombudsman concerning the existence of probable cause 2. Whether or not the accused may be held for trial, using the same criminal informations, for

the crime of technical malversation under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. RULING: 1. But while it is true that the prosecution has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case is filed, any disposition the prosecutor may afterwards deem proper should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. It is the court’s bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the same. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial right of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law. There is probable cause when the evidence at hand will persuade a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the accused committed the offense of which he is charged. Only common sense, not the technical rules for weighing evidence, is required. But, although less than the evidence that would justify conviction is needed, probable cause demands more than bare suspicion. The corrupt practice committed by a public officer under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 consists in his "causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence." 2. Apparently conscious that its charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against the accused had not been strong, the prosecution claims that the latter may alternatively be prosecuted and tried under the same informations for two counts of technical malversation under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. The rule of course is that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not by the caption of the information or the citation of the law allegedly violated but by the actual recital of facts in that information. Consequently, the issue is whether the facts alleged in the informations in the subject criminal cases make out a case for the crime of technical malversation. The element in the crime of technical malversation that public fund be appropriated for a public use requires an earmarking of the fund or property for a specific project. Here, there is no allegation in the informations that the P2 million and P6 million grants to COCOFED had been earmarked for some specific expenditures. SYCAMORE VENTURES CORPORATION v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY G.R. No. 173183, November 18, 2013 J. Brion Act No. 3135 has no requirement for the determination of the mortgaged properties’ appraisal value. Nothing in the law likewise indicates that the mortgagee-creditor’s appraisal value shall be the basis for the bid price. Neither is there any rule nor any guideline prescribing the minimum amount of bid, nor that the bid should be at least equal to the properties’ current appraised value. Under the circumstances, no necessity of determining the mortgaged properties’ current appraised value or any showing of the existence of any prejudicial question warrants the suspension of the foreclosure proceedings. It must be noted that a prejudicial

question is a prior issue whose resolution rests with another tribunal, but at the same time is necessary in the resolution of another issue in the same case. FACTS: Sycamore and spouses Paz obtained from Metrobank a credit line secured by 10 real estate mortgages over Sycamore’s 11 parcels of land, together with their improvements. Sycamore and the spouses Paz withdrew from the credit line the total amount of P65,694,914.26, evidenced by 13 promissory notes. The petitioners failed to pay their loan obligations and for violations of the terms and conditions of their promissory notes, Metrobank instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over six real estate mortgages. The public auction sale was then set for various dates but the sale did not take place as Sycamore and spouses Paz asked for postponements. Later, Metrobank restructured Sycamore and spouses Paz’s loan, resulting in the issuance of one promissory note in lieu of the previously issued promissory notes and the execution of a single real estate mortgage covering the parcels of land. Despite reminders, petitioners still failed to settle their obligations, compelling Metrobank to file a second petition for auction sale. Then Sycamore and spouses Paz again asked for the postponement, to which Metrobank refused. With this, petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of the contract and of the real estate mortgage, disputing Metrobank’s alleged unilateral and arbitrary reduction of the mortgaged properties’ appraisal value, further requesting that Metrobank be enjoined and prevented from proceeding with the extrajudicial foreclosure. A TRO was subsequently issued which order was extended, until a writ of preliminary injunction was issued, to which Metrobank unsuccessfully resisted through a motion for reconsideration that was denied. Petition for certiorari was recourse to the CA questioning the RTC orders for grave abuse of discretion. However, the CA dismissed Metrobank’s petition for lack of merit and upheld the RTC’s issued injunction. Meanwhile, the proceedings in the main case continued, and the pettioners moved for the appointment of independent commissioners to determine the properties’ appraisal value. The RTC granted the petitioners’ motion, which the CA on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, granted Metrobank’s petition for certiorari and set aside the RTC’s orders. ISSUE: Whether or not the determination of the mortgaged properties’ appraisal value constitutes a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the foreclosure proceedings RULING: Act No. 3135 has no requirement for the determination of the mortgaged properties’ appraisal value. Nothing in the law likewise indicates that the mortgagee-creditor’s appraisal value shall be the basis for the bid price. Neither is there any rule nor any guideline prescribing the minimum amount of bid, nor that the bid should be at least equal to the properties’ current appraised value. What the law only provides are the requirements, procedure, venue and the mortgagor’s right to redeem the property. When the law does not provide for the determination of the property’s valuation, neither should the courts so require, for our duty limits us to the interpretation of the law, not to its augmentation.

Under the circumstances, we fail to see the necessity of determining the mortgaged properties’ current appraised value. We likewise do not discern the existence of any prejudicial question, anchored on the mortgaged properties’ appraised value, that would warrant the suspension of the foreclosure proceedings. A prejudicial question is a prior issue whose resolution rests with another tribunal, but at the same time is necessary in the resolution of another issue in the same case. As so defined, we do not see how the motion for the appointment of independent commissioners can serve as a prejudicial question. It is not a main action but a mere incident of the main proceedings; it does not involve an issue that is intimately related to the foreclosure proceedings; and lastly, the motion’s resolution is not determinative of the foreclosure’s outcome. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v. CRESENCIASTA.TERESA RAMOS G.R. No. 179181, November 18, 2013 J. Brion A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. Nevertheless, as an exception, when the lower courts grossly misunderstood the facts and circumstances that, when correctly appreciated, would warrant a different conclusion, a review of the lower courts' findings may be made. Nonetheless, an examination of the issues shows that the claimed errors primarily question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lower courts' conclusion that is proper for a question of fact. FACTS: At the core of the controversy are two parcels of land, in which the RCAM filed an application for registration of title of property, pursuant to Commonwealth Act C.A No. 141 or the Public Land Act. However, RCAM amended its application, wherein it claimed that it owned the property, having acquired the property during the Spanish time in open, public, continuous and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner. Later, the Republic, through the Director of Lands, filed an opposition to the application, claiming that the property is part of the public domain and cannot be subject to private appropriation. Respondent Cresencia, through her husband Francisco, filed her opposition to RCAM's application, whereby she alleged that the property formed part of the entire property that her family owns and has continuously possessed and occupied from the time of her grandparents, during the Spanish time, up to the present. The RTC then denied RCAM's application holding that RCAM failed to prove actual possession and ownership of the property applied for. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC's ruling. In its argument, RMAC posits that the CA erred and gravely abused its discretion. As such, Cresencia countered that the petition essentially questions the CA’s appreciation of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who attested to her actual, public and notorious possession of the property, arguing further that these are questions of fact that are not proper for a Rule 45 petition. ISSUE: Whether Rule 45 petition applies as remedy

RULING: The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of this Court over petitions for review on certiorari is limited to the review of questions of law and not of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. An examination of the RCAM's issues shows that the claimed errors indeed primarily question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lower courts' conclusion that Cresencia, and not the RCAM, had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the period required by law. When the presented question centers on the sufficiency of the evidence, it is a question of fact and is barred in a Rule 45 petition. Nevertheless, jurisprudence recognizes certain exceptions to the settled rule. When the lower courts grossly misunderstood the facts and circumstances that, when correctly appreciated, would warrant a different conclusion, a review of the lower courts' findings may be made. This, in our view, is the exact situation in the case. Moreover, the RCAM also questions the propriety of the CA’s confirmation of Cresencia's title over the property although she was not the applicant and was merely the oppositor in the present confirmation and registration proceedings. Stated in question form -was the CA justified under the law and jurisprudence in its confirmation of the oppositor's title over the property? This, in part, is a question of law as it concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to recognized facts. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BASILIO VILLARMEA Y ECHAVEZ G.R. No. 200029, November 13, 2013 J. Villarama, Jr. In criminal cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge had the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they were telling the truth or not. This deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the principle that when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to convict the accused. Since the eyewitness positively identified the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, no further defense could negate the lower court’s appreciation and finding of guilt. FACTS: Accused Villarmea was charged with murder for the killing of Arnaldo Diez. However, the original information was later amended to include other co-accused. It was further admitted that the Death Certificate and the fact and cause of death of the victim, is Hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds on the trunk and lower extremities. Subsequently, the prosecution presented the testimonies of several witnesses including the wife of the victim. The wife testified that her husband died from stab wounds and that her husband was stabbed because the latter allegedly mauled someone from appellant’s group. Further, one Jaime Candelada, the victim’s companion during the incident also testified, wherein he claimed that on the night of the killing,

he and the victim were buying something from a store. But, when they walked out of the store, seven persons followed them. On the other hand the defense presented as witness Basilio Villarmea, who denied that he participated in the assault. He testified that on the night of the incident, he went out of the premises of the construction site where he was a live-in construction worker where he saw coaccused Labora and Obatay who are still at-large, and also his fellow live-in construction workers at J. King Construction, playing computer games at a store near the well. He claimed that it was Candelada who allegedly kicked Labora. A fight immediately ensued without any heated argument or discussion. The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of Candelada who positively identified appellant as one of the assailants who attacked and stabbed the victim. Appellant sought to reverse his the RTC decision before the CA, to which CA found no reversible error in the lower court’s finding that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the murder of the victim, but ordered that the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded to his heirs be increased ISSUE: Whether or not full credence may be given to an eyewitness’ testimony. RULING: The defense of denial interposed by appellant cannot overcome the positive identification made by Candelada, an eyewitness in the case at bar, that he and his co-accused conspired in mauling and stabbing the victim. The attempt of appellant to impute an ulterior motive on the part of Candelada to testify against him was not supported by any concrete evidence. Lastly, the fact that appellant did not escape from the scene of the crime does not negate his guilt. As correctly observed by the appellate court, it does not lessen the evidence on record that sufficiently proves appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In sum, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the CA when it affirmed the factual findings of the trial court. We have consistently held that in criminal cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge had the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they were telling the truth or not. This deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the principle that when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to convict the accused. This is especially true when the factual findings of the trial court were affirmed by the appellate court. Thus, absent any showing that the trial court in this case had overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered would change the result of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses. CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIAL GASES, INC. v. ALABANG MEDICAL CENTER G.R. No. 181983, November 13, 2013 J. Reyes It is a settled rule that the Court examines only questions of law on appeal and not questions of facts. However, jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual

issues may be resolved by the Court, such as when the factual findings of the courts a quo are conflicting. As there has been conflicting finding between RTC and CA, a review of facts necessitates question of fact. Settled is the rule that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, which means those facts which are derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. When CIGI’s installation manager, testified a request in writing was made but no evidence was submitted, the testimony is a self-serving allegation, which is not equivalent to proof. However, it may be considered as an independently relevant statement and may be admitted to show that utterances were made. FACTS: CIGI entered into a Phase 1 installation project with AMC, whereby CIGI bound itself to provide labor and materials for the installation of a medical gas pipeline system for the first, second and third floors of the AMC’s hospital. Nonetheless, controversy arose after the parties entered into Phase 2 installation project, for the continuation of the centralized medical oxygen and vacuum pipeline system in the hospital’s fourth & fifth floors, having the same terms and conditions as that of the Phase 1 project. CIGI commenced works for Phase 2 while AMC made partial payment with the balance be paid through progress billing within 15 days from the date of receipt of the original invoice sent by CIGI. Later, CIGI sent the sales invoice for the unpaid balance for the Phase 2, which however was not paid, prompting CIGI to send a demand letter to AMC. Despite such, AMC still failed to pay, thus CIGI filed a collection suit claiming that AMC’s obligation to pay is already due and demandable. With this, AMC argued that its obligation to pay the balance has not yet accrued because CIGI still has not turned over a complete and functional pipeline system. During trial, CIGI presented the testimonies of its witnesses to confirm the unpaid balance of AMC. One of them is Tolentino who declared that CIGI failed to test the installed system because AMC did not supply the necessary electrical power. He claimed that CIGI verbally notified Dr. Ty, AMC’s Medical Director, on the need for electrical power for the test run but she did not respond, further stating that contrary to what was agreed in the contract, CIGI has not conducted commissioning and lecture on the proper operation and preventive maintenance of the system and that the seminar does not require the use of electricity. Nonetheless, the seminar can only be conducted once they have already fully turned over the system which is possible after performing a test run. On the other hand, AMC presented Dr. Ty and testified that the payment of the unpaid balance is not yet due because the project is incomplete and that the balance shall only be paid after CIGI finishes its work. AMC then filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Amended Answer with Counterclaims seeking the rescission of the contracts and for the return of its payment for an unfinished project. However, the RTC denied the motion as it will compel CIGI to substantially alter the presentation of its evidence thus, delaying the resolution of the case. After trial, the RTC adjudged AMC to have breached the contract for failure to perform its obligation of paying the remaining balance of the contract price. The CA found that CIGI reneged on its obligation and took into consideration AMC’s willingness to pay the balance on the condition that CIGI will turn over a fully functional centralized medical oxygen and vacuum pipeline system. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the appeal involves question of fact 2. Whether or not the testimony of Tolentino is hearsay RULING: 1. Primarily, the arguments proffered by CIGI involve questions of fact which are beyond the scope of the Court’s judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is a settled rule that the Court examines only questions of law on appeal and not questions of facts. However, jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by the Court, such as when the factual findings of the courts a quo are conflicting, as in this case. The incongruity in the findings of the RTC and CA is conspicuous. On one hand, the RTC granted CIGI’s complaint for sum of money and adjudged AMC as the defaulting party. On the other hand, the CA, while sustaining AMC’s liability for CIGI’s monetary claim, held the latter as the party who breached the installation contracts. A review of the contradicting findings of the courts a quo is thus in order so as to finally settle the conflicting claims of the parties. 2. CIGI failed to amply support its allegation that it requested for electrical facilities from AMC. Tolentino, CIGI’s installation manager, testified that they requested in writing for the electrical facilities but no evidence of such document was submitted. It is but a self-serving allegation, which by law is not equivalent to proof. Settled is the rule that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, which means those facts which are derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. While Tolentino’s testimony may be considered as independently relevant statement and may be admitted as to the fact that Pineda made utterances to him about the request for electricity, it is still inadequate to support the claim that AMC reneged on its obligation to provide electrical facilities. Admissibility of testimony should not be equated with its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN v. CHARLES MANCAO G.R. No. 182314, November 13, 2013 J. Peralta Although Section 2 of Rule 47 provides that a petition for annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence has recognized denial of due process as an additional ground. An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted indiscriminately. It is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no adequate or appropriate remedy available (such as new trial, appeal, petition for relief) through no fault of petitioner. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of

a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory. A review of the evidence presented reveals that respondent failed to show any artifice or extrinsic fraud being committed against the Spouses Paray, hence CA’s decision of setting aside the compromise agreement is grounded on surmises or conjectures. Further, the approved compromise agreement serves as the final judgment that settles the controversy. FACTS: Felix Gochan, Amparo Alo, and Jose A. Cabellon were co-owners of the property in controversy, whereas the petitioners are the successors-in-interest of Gochan and respondent are the buyers of the subdivided lots thereof. The respondents bought the lots from the children of Velez, who acquired the same from Alo. Later, petitioners filed a case against spouses Paray as purchasers of the lots from the heirs of Alo, for legal redemption of the other subdivided lots. The matter ended on a compromise agreement, whereby the spouses Paray conveyed to petitioners all their shares, interests, and participation over the properties. However, the respondents claimed that the redemption prejudiced their portion of the property, hence filed a suit before the CA for Declaration of Nullity of Final Decision and Compromise Agreement as the lots in controversy are road lots which could not be owned by any individual or entity as it is beyond the commerce of men. The respondents alleged that the petitioners are using the compromise agreement as tools to deny the respondents and other lot owners from free access to and from the subdivision lots, by placing barriers therein. Petitioners countered that the petition states no cause of action as the respondents are not real party-in-interest and that there was no extrinsic fraud nor lack of jurisdiction, hence the respondents’ filing of the petition is in violation of the rule on forum shopping and litis pendentia. Despite such CA ruled in favor of respondent thereby setting aside the compromise agreement and the registration of the decision with the Register of Deeds is declared null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the compromise agreement can be modified. RULING: The general rule is that, except to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries, a final and executory judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect, and that nothing further can be done but to execute it. A final and executory decision can, however, be invalidated via a petition to annul the same or a petition for relief under Rules 47 and 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 provide for the coverage and grounds for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions of the RTCs in civil action. Although Section 2 of Rule 47 provides that a petition for annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence has recognized denial of due process as an additional ground. In this case, extrinsic fraud was the basis of the CA in annulling the trial court’s judgment; thus, there is a need to examine the concept, as established by a plethora of jurisprudence and, thereafter, to determine whether the CA, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, correctly applied the same. We begin by restating that an action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party at

a trial which prevented a fair and just determination of the case, and which could have been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In contrast, extrinsic or collateral fraud is a trickery practiced by the prevailing party upon the unsuccessful party, which prevents the latter from fully proving his case; it affects not the judgment itself but the manner in which said judgment is obtained. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic "where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. We reverse the CA findings as it is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures. Upon examination of the records, the evidence presented by respondent are plainly wanting to show any specific trick, artifice, or device employed by petitioners that caused them to prevail over the Spouses Paray. In fact, when petitioners contended that extrinsic fraud must be present in an action to annul judgment, respondent erroneously countered that it is "immaterial" and even admitted that "the present case is based on the illegality of the acts of the petitioners arising from the nature of the lots dealt with and the resultant violation by the petitioners of the law declaring the act to be so." The Court has repeatedly stressed that an action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted indiscriminately. It is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no adequate or appropriate remedy available (such as new trial, appeal, petition for relief) through no fault of petitioner. It is an equitable principle as it enables one to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with. Yet, more importantly, the relief it affords is equitable in character because it strikes at the core of a final and executory judgment, order or resolution, allowing a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long elapsed into finality. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. P/SUPT. ARTEMIO E. LAMSEN G.R. No. 198338, November 13, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld. The unreliable character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a complaining witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going through the burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by the law enforcers, executing a criminal complaint-affidavit against the accused, attending trial and testifying against the accused, the said complaining witness would later on declare that all the foregoing is actually a farce and the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of recantation. FACTS:

Accused-appellants SPO1 Ramoz and PO2 Abulencia filed a motion for reconsideration and motion for new trial due to newly discovered evidence and P/Supt. Lamsen for reconsideration of the February 20, 2013 Resolution, which convicted the accused-appellants of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In their motions, the accused appellants stated that they obtained affidavits from prosecution witnesses Reyes and Domingo whose testimonies implicated accused-appellants of the crime of robbery with homicide. Further, it is provided in the affidavit that the witnesses made their testimonies under duress as they were forced by elements of the Philippine National Police, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the former mayor of San Carlos City, Pangasinan to point at accused-appellants as perpetrators of the aforesaid crime; that they did not actually see who committed the crime having testified out of fear of their own lives. ISSUE: Whether or not the recantation made by the prosecution witnesses after rendering of resolution affects their previous testimony. RULING: Verily, recantations are viewed with suspicion and reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it will later be repudiated. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld. Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken before a court of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions precisely sought to discourage and forestall falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who had given the testimony later on changed his mind. Such a rule will make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed. The unreliable character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a complaining witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going through the burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by the law enforcers, executing a criminal complaint-affidavit against the accused, attending trial and testifying against the accused, the said complaining witness would later on declare that all the foregoing is actually a farce and the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of recantation. And in situations, like the instant case, where testimony is recanted by an affidavit subsequently executed by the recanting witness, we are properly guided by the well-settled rules that an

affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented on the witness stand and that affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARILYN SANTOS and ARLENE VALERA G.R. No. 193190, November 13, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro The issue of whether or not there was indeed a buy-bust operation primarily boils down to one of credibility. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a contest of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. When it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimony does not negate positive finding of guilt specially, as in this case, where the inconsistencies pertains to minor details. Settled is the rule that discrepancies on minor matters do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses’ honesty. These inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the prosecution witnesses because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. FACTS: Appellants Marilyn Santos and Arlene Valera were convicted of the crime of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. During trial, the prosecution presented several witnesses who took part in the buy-bust operation. With this, PO2 Aninias testified that they received an information prompting their team leader to form a buy-bust team, where PO2 Aninias was designated as the poseur-buyer, while SPO2 Male was to act as the back-up arresting officer the buy-bust team proceeded to the area where their team leader gave PO2 Aninias four pieces of five hundred peso bills, to which PO2 Aninias placed his initials as a form of authentication. The informant returned together with two women and invited them to go inside the vehicle where PO2 Aninias as the buyer of drugs, was introduced. The meeting ended with the sale of shabu, to which SPO2 Male gave a "missed call" to their team leader. PO2 Aninias marked the box containing the shabu by placing the wording Exhibit "B," his initials, his signature, and the date April 20, 2006. He also marked the six pieces of plastic sachets as Exhibits "A-1" to "A-6" and he wrote his signature and the date on each of the sachets. After marking the items, the team went back to their office where the appellants were investigated upon and the team accomplished a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, an inventory of the items recovered and prepared requests for the physical and medical examination of the appellants. PO2 Aninias stated that he and SPO2 Male brought the confiscated drug specimens to the crime laboratory and it was received by the forensic chemist. SPO2 Male also testified on the conduct of the buy-bust operation stating that after receiving information SPO2 Male and his team proceeded to the place to conduct surveillance finding the place suitable for a buy-bust operation. Later, a buy-bust operation was planned and he was the designated driver and the back-up arresting officer while PO2 Aninias was the poseur-buyer. In the operation, it was agreed that PO2 Aninias will remove his bull cap as a signal for the consummated transaction, which signal was executed thus, SPO2 Male immediately dialed the number of their team leader. SPO2 Male further testified that he was present when the inventory was conducted.

On the other hand, the defense denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted by the police contending that they did not know the contents of the bag, further alleging that armed men in civilian clothing entered her house without search warrant, to which a search was conducted that resulted to the armed men finding a box that contained a white substance that looked like tawas. Nonetheless, the RTC convicted appellants of the crime of selling of illegal drugs, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not the incompatible statements of the prosecution witness affected the conviction of the accused. RULING: To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof." What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. The issue of whether or not there was indeed a buy-bust operation primarily boils down to one of credibility. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a contest of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. When it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. To our mind, the incompatible statements of PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male did not destroy their credibility. Nor are these statements utterly irreconcilable as appellants would like this Court to believe. As to the sale transaction itself, the testimony of PO2 Aninias is of greater relevance considering that he was the poseur-buyer who dealt directly, i.e., face to face, with appellants. On the other hand, SPO2 Male, who was sitting in the driver’s seat, merely listened to the conversation between PO2 Aninias and the appellants. SPO2 Male had no actual participation in the exchange of illegal drugs and boodle money. His recollection of events might not be as precise as that of PO2 Aninias. With respect to the other inconsistencies enumerated by appellants, the Court agrees with the rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the same pertain to insignificant and minor details that had nothing to do with the essential elements of the crime charged. Settled is the rule that discrepancies on minor matters do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses’ honesty. These inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the prosecution witnesses because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. What is important is that the testimonies agree on the essential facts and that the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a consistent and coherent whole.

Brushing aside the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court finds that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution duly established the fact that appellants sold to PO2 Aninias, the poseur-buyer, six heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that contained white crystalline substance that later tested positive for shabu. Thus, the elements of the crime charged had been sufficiently established. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. MARCELINO A. DECHAVEZ G.R. No. 176702, November 13, 2013 J. Brion The rule that the Court will not disturb the CA' s findings of fact is not an absolute rule that admits of no exceptions. A notable exception is the presence of conflict of findings of fact between or among the tribunals' rulings on questions of fact. This Court cannot be any clearer in laying down the rule on the quantum of evidence to support an administrative ruling: In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any findings. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming. An examination of the records shows that the Ombudsman's appreciation of the evidence is in accord with reason and common experience so that it successfully proved, Dechavez's dishonesty. FACTS: Dechavez was the president of the Negros State College of Agriculture. One Sunday, Dechavez and his wife used the college service Suzuki Vitara to go Negros Occidental. However, on their way back to the NSCA, they figured in a vehicular accident resulting in minor injuries and damage to the vehicle. To support his claim for insurance, Dechavez executed an affidavit before the GSIS, which granted Dechavez's claims and NSCA shouldered the other portion share in the vehicle's depreciation expense. Also, GSIS released an amount for Mrs. Dechavez's third-party liability claim. Later, some 20 faculty and staff members of the NSCA complained and asked the Commission on Audit to conduct an audit investigation of NSCA’s expenditures in the vehicular accident, with which the COA dismissed for lack of merit. The complainants then sought recourse with the Ombudsman and file a verified complaint charging Dechavez with Dishonesty under Section 46(b)(l), Chapter 6, Tile I of the Administrative Code, wherein the Ombudsman found Dechavez guilty of all accessory penalty and dismissed him from the service. The motion for reconsideration having been denied, the case was elevated to the CA where it reversed the findings of the Ombudsman. The CA found that the complainants failed to sufficiently show that Dechavez had deliberately lied in his affidavit, further explaining that Dechavez sufficiently proved that he went on an official trip, and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the Ombudsman. In its petition, the Ombudsman argues that the guilt of Dechavez has been proven by substantial evidence invoking that its findings, being supported by substantial evidence, deserve great weight and must be accorded full respect and credit. However, Dechavez counters that the present petition raises factual issues that are improper for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether the findings in the administrative ruling must be accorded respect and credit. RULING: The rule that the Court will not disturb the CA' s findings of fact is not an absolute rule that admits of no exceptions. A notable exception is the presence of conflict of findings of fact between or among the tribunals' rulings on questions of fact. The case before us squarely falls under this exception as the tribunals below made two critical conflicting factual findings. We are thus compelled to undertake our own factual examination of the evidence presented. This Court cannot be any clearer in laying down the rule on the quantum of evidence to support an administrative ruling: In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any findings. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming. Our own examination of the records tells us that the Ombudsman's findings and appreciation of the presented evidence are more in accord with reason and common experience so that it successfully proved, by the required quantum of evidence, Dechavez's dishonesty, at the same time that we find the respondent's reading of the evidence to be stretched to the point of breaking, as our analysis shows. We start with our agreement with the CA's view that the Ombudsman's finding by itself, is not sufficient basis for the conclusion that Dechavez's business on that day was not official. We, nevertheless, examined the other surrounding facts and are convinced that the spouses Dechavez's trip was a personal one; thus, Dechavez had been dishonest when he made the claim that he went on official business. BANI RURAL BANK INC. v. TERESA DE GUZMAN G.R. No.170904, November 13, 2013 J. Brion As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. An exception to this rule is the existence of supervening events which refer to facts transpiring after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances that developed after the judgment acquired finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time. The presence of strained relations between petitioner and respondent, consisted the supervening event that justified the NLRC in modifying its final resolution. Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct.

FACTS: Respondents as employees of the petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which however was initially dismissed by Labor Arbiter. On appeal, the NLRC reversed labor arbiter’s findings, and ruled that the respondents had been illegally dismissed, thus ordering the reinstatement of the two complainants to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and privileges. Nonetheless, the parties did not file any motion for reconsideration or appeal and as a result the resolution of the NLRC became final and executory and the computation of the awards was then remanded to the labor arbiter for execution purposes. Subsequently, the respondents appealed the labor arbiter’s computation with the NLRC, to which the NLRC modified the terms the resolution insofar as it clarified the phrase less earnings elsewhere. The NLRC additionally awarded the payment of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement. Motion for reconsideration was filed but was dismissed for being filed out of time. The latter decision of the NLRC lapsed to finality and became executory, resulting to the second computation of monetary awards. NLRC explained that the computation of backwages has already been settled and should no longer be disturbed. Appeal was made before the CA, which found the petition to be without merit as it held that certiorari was not the proper remedy since no error of jurisdiction was raised or no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the NLRC. As a result, the CA echoed the NLRC’s conclusions. ISSUES: 1. Whether the rule on immutability of judgment applies 2. Whether petition for certiorari under Rule 45 may be availed of in a labor case RULING: 1. As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. Any attempt on the part of the entities charged with the execution of a final judgment to insert, change or add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on immutability of judgments. An exception to this rule is the existence of supervening events which refer to facts transpiring after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances that developed after the judgment acquired finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time. Under the circumstances of this case, the existence of the strained relations between the petitioners and the respondents was a supervening event that justified the NLRC’s modification of its final March 17, 1995 resolution. The NLRC, in its July 31, 1998 decision, based its conclusion that strained relations existed on the conduct of the parties during the first execution proceedings before Labor Arbiter Gambito. The NLRC considered the delay in the respondents reinstatement and the parties conflicting claims on whether the respondents wanted to be reinstated. The NLRC also observed that during the intervening period from the first computation to the appeal and resolution of the correctness of the first computation, neither party actually did anything to implement the respondents reinstatement. The NLRC considered these, actions as indicative of the strained relations between the parties so that neither of them actually wanted to implement the reinstatement decree in the March 17, 1995 resolution. Unless

exceptional reasons are presented, these above findings and conclusion can no longer be disturbed after they lapsed to finality. 2. In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. Grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to or equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. There is grave abuse of discretion when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. With this standard in mind, we find no reversible error committed by the CA when it found no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC's ruling. We find the computation of backwages and separation pay in the September 28, 2001 decision of the NLRC consistent with the provisions of law and jurisprudence. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANIEL ALCOBER G.R. No. 192941, November 13, 2013 J. Leonardo-De Castro The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape. When the accused raised the affirmative defense that sexual relations exist between him and the victim, it necessarily entails that evidence must be adduced to support the claim. Pursuant to number 4 of the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, however, in the absence of the foregoing documents (certificate of live birth or authentic document), the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. In the case at bar, AAA testified that she was 13 years old on July 20, 1999 and that her birthday was in February. Further, when accusedappellant, insisted that the incident occurred on October 20, 1999, he admitted that AAA was still 13 years old when the rape was committed. FACTS: In an information, Alcober was charged for the rape of his common-law spouse’s minor daughter, wherein Alcober pleaded not guilty. During pre-trial Alcober admitted that he is the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother. The prosecution also proposed to have the accused-appellant admit that the victim was a minor at the time of the incident, but the court

insisted that it be proven with a Birth Certificate. As a result, the victim testified that she was around 10 years old and was in Grade 5 when Alcober and her mother started living together as husband and wife. Further, the victim stated that she was in second year high school and was thirteen years old, when Alcober raped her. In his defense, Alcober argued that the sexual intercourse between him and the victim was consensual. Further, the mother of the victim also testified stating that the victim was six years old when she and started living together and that the victim was 13 years old when the incident happened. The RTC found Alcober guilty of the crime of rape and was sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, which decision the CA affirmed with modification, thus sentencing Alcober to reclusion perpetua. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the sweet heart doctrine must be appreciated 2. Whether or not the age of the victim was proven RULING: 1. We must emphasize that when the accused in a rape case claims, as in the case at bar, that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense, it must be established with convincing evidence, such as by some documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like. The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape. This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; after the prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual. Other than his self-serving testimony, however, accused-appellant failed to adduce evidence of his supposed relationship with AAA. On the other hand, we are convinced that the sordid version of facts presented by accused-appellant is nothing but a depraved concoction by a very twisted and obnoxious imagination. Accused-appellant’s tale of being seduced by his 13year old stepdaughter who calls him "Tatay" or "Papa," and having sexual intercourse with her while her mother was watching and crying is not only nauseatingly repulsive but is likewise utterly incredible. 2. In People v. Pruna, the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows: 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s

mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. 6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. In the case at bar, no birth or baptismal certificate or school record showing the date of birth of AAA was presented. Pursuant to number 4 of the guidelines, however, in the absence of the foregoing documents (certificate of live birth or authentic document), the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. In the case at bar, AAA testified that she was 13 years old on July 20, 1999 and that her birthday was in February. Accused-appellant, who insists that the incident occurred on October 20, 1999, expressly and clearly admitted that AAA was still 13 years old on that date. Further, several more questions were propounded to accused-appellant to ascertain that he was aware of AAA’s minority at the time of the sexual intercourse, and accused-appellant’s answers plainly showed that he was fully cognizant of this fact. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KENNETH MONCEDA G.R. No. 176269, November 13, 2013 J. Brion The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor inconsistencies even enhance their veracity as the variances erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. Though inconsistent, the testimony of the prosecution witness was straightforward, hence minor inconsistencies that attended their testimony did not negate finding of guilt. The defense of alibi, frame-up is an allegation that can easily be concocted. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts of government officials. FACTS:

The accused were charged for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, due to selling and delivering to a poseur-buyer methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. They pleaded not guilty, trial ensued wherein the prosecution stated that a female informant told P/Inspector Arsenal that a "contact" was looking for a buyer of huge quantities of shabu, further disclosing that the "contact" preferred to be paid in casino chips and not in cold cash. With this, P/Inspector Arsenal immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation, which team was composed of PO3 Pastrana, who was designated as the poseur-buyer, P/Inspector Arsenal, and SPO3 Anasta. The operation was consummated at the parking lot of Sofitel Hotel wherein Monceda and Lai were arrested. Moceda and Lai were initially brought to Diamond Hotel where the high-ranking officers of the Narcotics Group had stationed themselves. PO3 Pastrana surrendered three plastic bags of shabu, to Col. Castillo. The bags and their contents were then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis and the appellants were brought to the PNP Headquarters in Camp Crame where they were subjected to physical examination. On the other hand, the defense had a different version of events, denying the selling of shabu and claimed that they were framed-up. Lai and five other witnesses, took the witness stand for the defense, but Monceda declined. Lai asserted that Monceda was her nephew and that she has been engaged in various businesses, further asserting that she is a member of an association engaged in lending money to casino players and that she arrived from China the night before her arrest. Lai further testified that on the day of the incident, she was at Hotel Sofitel carrying with her the income of the association amounting to P2,000,000.00 and US$30,000.00 in cash as she was to convert the money to chip checks when she received a call from Monceda, who told her that the police were arresting him at Diamond Hotel, causing her to leave a borrower to settle Monceda’s problem, and claimed that her son and a driver were waiting for her at Sofitel’s lobby that day. Further, Lai asserted that upon arriving at Diamond Hotel, some policemen searched her vehicle for shabu but found a paper bag of money instead; that the policemen thereafter brought her to Camp Crame. Nonetheless, Lai admitted of having knowledge of Monceda as a drug user. During the pendency of appeal to the CA, Monceda commited suicide. The CA nevertheless affirmed the RTC decision finding the prosecution witnesses were corroborated by physical evidence and that Lai’s defense was weak. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses affects the conviction of the accused 2. Whether or not the alibi of the accused would prosper RULING: 1. In a charge of illegal sale of shabu, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, (b) the identity of the object and the consideration of the sale; and (c) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment made. What assumes primary importance is the proof clearly showing that an illegal transaction actually took place, and the presentation in court of what was sold as evidence of the corpus delicti. Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operations. We generally defer to the trial court’s assessment of

the evidence as it had the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses, their demeanor, and their credibility on the witness stand. In this case, we find from the records sufficient evidence of the illegal sale with the accused as the sellers and see no compelling need to re-evaluate the trial court’s assessments. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were positive and straightforward. While there existed some inconsistencies in their individual testimonies compared with one another, these testimonies – considered in their totality – leave no doubt in our minds that an illegal sale of shabu had actually taken place with the accused as the sellers. We are not persuaded that this inconsistency is sufficient to taint the prosecution’s case to the point that it should fail. The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor inconsistencies even enhance their veracity as the variances erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 2. In People v. Zheng Bai Hui, we held that like the defense of alibi, frame-up is an allegation that can easily be concocted. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts of government officials. Lai, unfortunately for her, failed to corroborate her statements regarding the alleged arrest which occurred at Diamond Hotel. Her presented witnesses all testified on the events before or after her arrest. Lai’s lone testimony regarding the circumstances of arrest at Diamond Hotel, on the other hand, failed to overcome the positive and credible testimony showing the existence of the buy-bust operation at Sofitel Hotel. Worse, the two persons, her son and her driver, who accompanied her during the alleged arrest at Diamond Hotel, and who could have possibly shed light to her version of the events – both refused to testify. We find this development perplexing and is a matter which greatly weakened Lai’s frame-up allegations. MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION v. ROBERT H. CULLEN G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013 J. Peralta The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the allegations made by respondent in his complaint shows that the case principally dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by petitioner against respondent as well as the validity of petitioner’s act in preventing respondent from participating in the election of the corporation’s Board of Directors. Being corporate in nature, the issues should be threshed out before the RTC sitting as a special commercial court. The issues on damages can still be resolved in the same special commercial court just like a regular RTC which is still competent to tackle civil law issues incidental to intracorporate disputes filed before it.

FACTS: Robert Cullen purchased from MLHI condominium Unit of the Medical Plaza Makati, to which petitioner, demanded from respondent payment of unpaid association dues and assessments. Cullen averred that he had been religiously paying his dues as he was previously elected president and director of the condominium corporation. However, petitioner claimed that respondent’s obligation was a carry-over of that of MLHI, as such respondent was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the 2002 election of petitioner’s Board. This incident made respondent clarify from MLHI the petitioner’s claim, but MLHI stated all obligations had been settled, which prompted respondent to demand from petitioner an explanation why he was considered a delinquent payer. However, petitioner failed to make the explanation, resulting to the filing of Complaint for Damages by Cullen against petitioner and MLHI. Petitioner and MLHI filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction, wherein MLHI claimed that it is the HLURB which is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Petitioner, on the other hand, averred lack of jurisdiction as the case involves an intra-corporate controversy. The RTC granted petitioner’s and MLHI’s motions to dismiss explaining that the action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings, explaining that the controversy is an ordinary civil action for damages which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts. ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action RULING: It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the allegations made by respondent in his complaint shows that the case principally dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by petitioner against respondent as well as the validity of petitioner’s act in preventing respondent from participating in the election of the corporation’s Board of Directors. These issues are clearly corporate and the demand for damages is just incidental. Being corporate in nature, the issues should be threshed out before the RTC sitting as a special commercial court. The issues on damages can still be resolved in the same special commercial

court just like a regular RTC which is still competent to tackle civil law issues incidental to intracorporate disputes filed before it. To be sure, RA 4726 or the Condominium Act was enacted to specifically govern a condominium. Said law sanctions the creation of the condominium corporation which is especially formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area, in which the holders of separate interests shall automatically be members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units. Clearly, condominium corporations are not covered by the amendment. Thus, the intracorporate dispute between petitioner and respondent is still within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial court and not the HLURB. ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 171428, November 11, 2013 J. Leonen Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Further, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable through the original civil action of certiorari. What petitioner seeks to rectify pertain to the appellate court’s failure to uphold the findings of facts of the lower court. As such, the petition is simply a continuation of the appellate process proper for a petition under Rule 45. In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari, this Court has the discretion to treat a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the Petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a Petition for review; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. FACTS: Respondent Ruperto Tankeh as the president of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc, applied for a $3.5 million loan from Development Bank of the Philippines for the partial financing of an ocean-going vessel named the M/V Golden Lilac. To authorize the loan, DBP required that certain conditions be met, which was complied with by Tankeh. According to petitioner, Tankeh approached him to inform that he was operating a new shipping line business and that petitioner would be given 1,000 shares to be a director of the business. As such petitioner signed the Assignment of Shares of Stock with Voting Rights and subsequently signed the promissory note needed for loan approval. After which, the loan was approved by the DBP and the vessel was acquired. Later, Sterling Shipping through Tankeh executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of DBP, wherein it is stated that Sterling Shipping transfers and assigns in favor of DBP, its successors and assigns, future earnings of the mortgaged M/V "Sterling Ace," including proceeds of charter and shipping contracts, and shall continue to subsist for as long as the obligation remains unpaid. However, petitioner soon wrote a letter to Tankeh severing all ties and terminating his involvement with Sterling Shipping Lines and required that its board of directors pass a

resolution releasing him from all liabilities, particularly the loan contract with DBP, and to further notify DBP of such severance. Subsequently, the accounts of respondent corporation in DBP were transferred to public respondent Asset Privatization Trust. Nevertheless, at the time when petitioner was still bound as a debtor, DBP sold M/V Sterling Ace in Singapore for an amount which the petitioner found to be inadequate. As a result, petitioner filed complaints against respondents, alleging that Tankeh exercised deceit and fraud in order for petitioner to bind himself to pay DBP, thus praying that the promissory note be declared null and void and that he be absolved from any liability from the mortgage and the note in question. Tankeh countered that petitioner voluntarily signed the promissory note in favor of DBP with full knowledge of the consequences, further claiming that he did not employ any fraud or deceit to secure petitioner’s involvement in the company. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner ordering the annulment of the Promissory Note as it relates to plaintiff himself, which however, the CA reversed. Hence, this petition where respondents argue that the Petition is actually one of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review under Rule 45 is the proper remedy. RULING: Contrary to respondent’s imputation, the remedy contemplated by petitioner is clearly that of a Rule 45 Petition for Review. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Further, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable through the original civil action of certiorari. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment, appeal is the remedy. In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of judgment of the Court of Appeals. These errors pertain to the petitioner’s allegation that the appellate court failed to uphold the findings of facts of the lower court. He does not impute any error with respect to the Court of Appeals’ exercise of jurisdiction. As such, this Petition is simply a continuation of the appellate process where a case is elevated from the trial court of origin, to the Court of Appeals, and to this Court via Rule 45. Contrary to respondents’ arguments, the allegations of petitioner that the Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion" did not ipso facto render the intended remedy that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari, this Court has the discretion to treat a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the Petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a Petition for review; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. When this Court exercises this discretion, there is no need to comply with the requirements provided for in Rule 65.

CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE CO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LING NA LAU G.R. No. 188526, November 11, 2013 J. Peralta A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause, meaning the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched. And when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary. The application and the issuance of the search warrant is was coupled with the required probable cause as shown by the complainant’s trademark certificate. FACTS: Respondent Ling Na Lau, doing business under the name and style Worldwide Pharmacy, is the sole distributor and registered trademark owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap. Her representative, Ping wrote a letter to the NBI Director requesting assistance for an investigation on several drugstores which were selling counterfeit whitening papaya soaps bearing the general appearance of their products. As such, Agent Furing was assigned to the case and he executed an affidavit stating that he conducted an investigation thus, drawing a list of drugstores selling counterfeit papaya soaps, which included petitioner drugstores. Later, Agent Furing applied for the issuance of search warrants before the RTC Makati, against petitioners and other establishments for violations of the Intellectual Property Code for unfair competition and trademark infringement. The RTC granted the applications and issued several search warrants for trademark infringement against petitioners. Soon, Agent Furing filed his Consolidated Return of Search Warrants but, petitioners filed Motion to Quash the Search Warrants. During the pendency of the case, respondent filed a Submission in relation to the Motion to Quash attaching an Order of the IPO, whereby it approved the parties' Joint Motion To Approve Compromise Agreement. The compromise agreement was approved and later the RTC sustained the Motion to Quash the Search Warrants, applying the Rules on Search and Seizure for Civil Action in Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights. On appeals, the CA set aside the RTC’s decision on quashal of search warrants, finding that Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure was applicable. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the search warrants can be applied for. RULING: Thus, we agree with the CA that A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, which provides for the Rules on the Issuance of the Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights, is not applicable in this case as the search warrants were not applied based thereon, but in anticipation of criminal actions for violation of intellectual property rights under RA 8293. It was established that respondent had asked the NBI for assistance to conduct investigation and

search warrant implementation for possible apprehension of several drugstore owners selling imitation or counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap. Also, in his affidavit to support his application for the issuance of the search warrants, NBI Agent Furing stated that "the items to be seized will be used as relevant evidence in the criminal actions that are likely to be instituted." Hence, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure applies. A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause, meaning the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched. And when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary. The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. It is clear that the requisites for the issuance of the search warrants had been complied with and that there is probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense were in the places to be searched. The offense pertains to the alleged violations committed by respondents-appellees upon the intellectual property rights of herein private complainant-appellant, as holder of the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF under Certificate of Registration No. 4-2000-009881, issued on August 24, 2003 by the Intellectual Property Office. NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS v. PURIFICACION F. FELIPE G.R. No. 199067, November 11, 2013 J. Mendoza As can be gleaned, with respect to criminal actions for violation of BP 22, it is explicitly clear that the corresponding civil action is deemed included and that a reservation to file such separately is not allowed. The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. This rule more specifically applies when (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person’s acquittal must be based on the fact he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. Though the accused has been acquitted from the criminal charge, the acquittal was just based on

reasonable doubt and it did not change the fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently dishonored upon its presentment. FACTS: Purificacion’s son purchased a Nissan Terrano 4x4 SUV from Nissan Gallery-Ortigas, however the vehicle was not paid upon delivery. Despite non-payment, the son took possession of the SUV, used and enjoyed it for more than 4 months, causing Nissan to send demand letters but to no avail. A final demand letter was sent to Purificacion’s son with which the son requested a grace period within which to pay the obligation, but still no payment was made. With this, the son asked Purificacion to issue post-dated check for payment, to which Purificacion agreed. However, the checks were dishonoured upon presentment due to stop payment. Later, Nissan sent a demand letter to Purificacion, through her son, informing her of the dishonour and gave her 5 days to replace it with cash or manager’s check. Purificacion refused to replace the check and argued that she did not purchase a vehicle with Nissan, which caused Nissan to file a complaint for violation of BP 22 against Purificacion for issuing a post-dated check which was dishonoured due to STOP PAYMENT. This lead the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to find probable cause resulting to the filing of an information. During the preliminary investigation before the Assistant City Prosecutor, Purificacion gave P200,000.00 partial payment to amicably settle the civil aspect of the case. After trial, the MeTC acquitted Purificacion of the charge, but held her civilly liable to Nissan. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MeTC decision ruling that Purificacion was estopped from denying that she issued the check as a "show check" to boost the credit standing of Frederick and that Nissan agreed not to deposit the same, further explaining that Purificacion is an accommodation party. Motion for reconsideration was denied, and the CA ruled that no privity of contract existed between Nissan and Purification and that no civil liability could be adjudged against Purificacion since she was acquitted from the criminal charge. Nissan filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the acquittal from the criminal charge for violation of BP 22 negates civil liability. RULING: Well-settled is the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted upon the filing of a criminal action, subject to certain exceptions. Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. As can be gleaned, with respect to criminal actions for violation of BP 22, it is explicitly clear that the corresponding civil action is deemed included and that a reservation to file such separately is not allowed. The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. The civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. This rule more specifically applies when (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil

liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. It can, therefore, be concluded that if the judgment is conviction of the accused, then the necessary penalties and civil liabilities arising from the offense or crime shall be imposed. On the contrary, if the judgment is of acquittal, then the imposition of the civil liability will depend on whether or not the act or omission from which it might arise exists. A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person’s acquittal must be based on the fact he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged. The Court is also one with the CA when it stated that the liability of Purificacion was limited to her act of issuing a worthless check. The Court, however, does not agree with the CA when it went to state further that by her acquittal in the criminal charge, there was no more basis for her to be held civilly liable to Nissan. The acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt and it did not change the fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently dishonored upon its presentment. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDY ZULIETA a.k.a. "Bogarts," G.R. No. 192183, November 11, 2013 J. Del Castillo Appellant’s alibi, being inherently weak, deserves no credence at all especially when measured up against the positive identification by the prosecution witness pointing to appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Moreover, appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission. Settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and its assessment on the credibility of witnesses deserve utmost respect by this Court. In this case, we find no reason to deviate from the findings or assessment of the trial court there being no showing that it has overlooked or mis-appreciated some facts which if considered would materially impact on or change the outcome of the case. FACTS: An information was filed charging appellant for the Murder of Armando Labando, through the use of a Batangas knife. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty, thus trial ensued. The prosecution presented several witnesses, one of them is Bryan Pascua, who testified that he saw the appellant stab the victim on the chest, as well as the Death Certificate and Autopsy Report, before resting its case. On the other hand, the appellant denied the accusations against him and set up an alibi stating that, he was asleep with his wife and in-laws when the incident occurred. Further, the appellant claimed that he does not know the deceased nor Bryan Pascua and that his nickname is Andy not Bogarts. He, however, admitted that he was born in Sto. Niño, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he lived and stayed with his parents, until he got married

and transferred residence with his own family to Gingoog. Further, appellant’s wife testified in his favour, corroborating his earlier testimony. The RTC found appellant guilty of killing the victim Labando with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal and the CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision. Hence, this present appeal. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution proved the accused’s guilt RULING: Appellant’s alibi, being inherently weak, deserves no credence at all especially when measured up against the positive identification by the prosecution witness, Bryan Pascua, pointing to appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, nobody corroborated appellant’s alibi other than his wife who is obviously biased in his favor thus making her testimony selfserving. Moreover, appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission. As observed by the CA, Cagayan de Oro City could be traversed from Gingoog City within two hours; hence, it is not physically impossible for appellant to commit the crime in Cagayan de Oro City and still go home to Gingoog City after its commission. Aside from having been positively identified by prosecution witness Pascua, appellant failed to impute any ill motive to Pascua. Settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and its assessment on the credibility of witnesses deserve utmost respect by this Court. In this case, we find no reason to deviate from the findings or assessment of the trial court there being no showing that it has overlooked or mis-appreciated some facts which if considered would materially impact on or change the outcome of the case. On the contrary, we find that the trial court meticulously studied the case and properly weighed the evidence presented by the parties. Thus, we stand by its pronouncement thatAfter a careful review and analysis of the evidence for the prosecution and the defense and recalling the mien and manner of testimony by the witnesses, especially the positive testimony and identification by eyewitness Bryan Pascua of the accused, the Court is convinced that it is accused Andy Zulieta a.k.a. "Bogarts" who suddenly stabbed the deceased, resulting in his instantaneous death. GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the

requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing. The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. FACTS: The case involves the legality of Pork Barrel in the Philippine government setting. The concept of Pork Barrel is a political parlance of American-English origin. Adopted in the Philippines, Pork Barrel has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, although its usage evolved in reference to certain funds of the Executive. Historically, Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines was crafted during the premartial law era, for public work purposes. Through the years, the Pork Barrel evolved to cover various projects and scope, and has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. Further, pork funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously, owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the Pork Barrel in order to gain congressional support. With the Napoles controversy and the findings in the CoA Report, petitioner Samson Alcantara, President of the Social Justice Society, as well as petitioners Belgica, et al. and Villegas filed their respective petitions seeking that the Pork Barrel System be declared unconstitutional. Subsequently, the Court issued a Resolution issuing a TRO enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”. With this, the OSG filed a Comment seeking the lifting or the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.

The case was set for Oral Arguments, which was later on conducted. The Court then directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within 7 days, which the parties subsequently did. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy 2. Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review 3. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to sue 4. Whether or not the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez" and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management" bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis RULING: 1. By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions." The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds. As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014

budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient. 2. The Court must deny respondents‘ submission. Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution." To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint. 3. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizentaxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury." Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases. 4. The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply. On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue. Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa

resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle. As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.

DECEMBER 2013 HADJI HASHIM ABDUL v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 184496, DECEMBER 2, 2013 J. DEL CASTILLO For a court to exercise its power of adjudication there must be an actual case or controversy. Thus, where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however intellectually challenging. The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge operated as a supervening event that mooted the petition and a resolution on validity of the order or suspension could no longer affect his rights as a ranking public officer. FACTS: Abdul was elected as mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur in the May 1998 election and was re-elected for his secord term in succeeding election. While serving his second term, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an information charging Abdul of falsification of public documents, by making it appear that the Municipal Engineer, Engr. Murad prepared and signed some Local Budget Preparation Form. On arraignment, Abdul pleaded not guilty, however before trial ensued, the Office of Special Prosecutor moved for the suspension pendent lite of the petitioner citing the suspension as mandatory under RA 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On the contrary, petitioner argued that he cannot be suspended pendent lite as the crime charged is not among those enumerated under RA 3019 or Title Seven, Book II of the RPC, further contending that fraud upon government or public funds does not cover falsification of documents. Later, the Sandiganbayan found that the charge is within the ambit of Sec. 13, RA 3019 thereby suspending the petitioner from public office pendent lite. Motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari with prayer for TRO, alleging that the order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. However, the petition was dismissed and such attained finality, but the suspension was not implemented due to petitioner’s term’s expiration. This notwithstanding, in the May 2007 election, petitioner again won for mayoralty, but this time the OSP moved for his suspension pendent lite to implement the earlier suspension order.

Opposing such, petitioner argued that his defeat in the May 2004 election rendered the suspension order moot and academic, to which the Sandiganbayan ordered a new suspension of petitioner. Again, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO citing his earlier argument, with which the Court issued a TRO thus, enjoining the implementation of the new suspension order. Pending petition, the Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner from the criminal charge. ISSUE: Whether the acquittal in the criminal charge affected the status of the pending petition. RULING: For a court to exercise its power of adjudication there must be an actual case or controversy. Thus, where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however intellectually challenging. In the present case, the acquittal of the petitioner operates as a supervening event that mooted the present Petition. Any resolution on the validity or invalidity of the issuance of the order or suspension could no longer affect his rights as a ranking public officer, for legally speaking hi did not commit the offense charged. Notwithstanding the mootness of the present Petition, petitioner nevertheless implores us to make a clear and categorical resolution on whether the offense of falsification of public document under Article 171 of the RPC is included in the term “fraud” as contemplated under Section 13 of RA 3019.

REBECCA PACAÑA-CONTRERAS and ROSALIE PACAÑA v. ROVILA WATER SUPPLY, INC. G.R. NO. 168979, DECEMBER 2, 2013 J. BRION Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy for a denial of a motion to dismiss attended by grave abuse of discretion. While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to address an order of denial made without or in excess of jurisdiction. The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the period within which to file a motion to dismiss under the grounds enumerated. Specifically, the motion should be filed within the time for, but before the filing of, the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. Equally important to this provision is Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the following grounds: 1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) litis pendencia; 3) res judicata; and 4) prescription. Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be considered as waived in the event that they are not timely invoked. Where the respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed after the filing of an answer, the ground relied upon in the motion should have been raised as an affirmative defense, otherwise it is deemed waived. FACTS: Petitioners Rebecca and Rosalie, chidren of Lourder and Luciano Pacaña, filed the a complaint in their own names against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting and damages, alleging that Lilia was a former employee in the Rovila Water Supply, a family business, who hid business records and burned and ransacked the family files. In filing the complaint, Lourdes authorized Rosalie to represent her via SPA. The petitioners claimed that the corporation was surreptitiously formed having respondents as majority stockholders, who conspired with one another to usurp the family business’ registered name. Moreover, the petitioners contended that the respondents used the name of Lourdes as one of incorporators making it appear in the SEC documents that the family business was operated in a place other than the Pacaña residence; that the respondents used the Pacaña family’s receipts and deliveries and sales were made to appear as those of the respondent corporation. With this, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over an intra-corporate controversy, which the RTC denied. Subsequently Lourdes died causing the petitioners to amend their complaint. Nonetheless, they still attached the sworn declaration with SPA of Lourdes to Rosalie, but the caption of the amended complaint remained the same. Not too long, Luciano also died. During pre-trial, the respondents manifested that a substitution of the parties was necessary in light of the deaths of Lourdes and Luciano, stating further that dismissal is in place as the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to prosecute the case. Thereafter, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to institute and prosecute the case; as such they have no valid cause of action against the respondents. RTC denied the motion to dismiss explaining that the motion should have been filed within the time, but before, the filing of answer to the amended complaint. The motion for reconsideration having been denies, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA,

which granted the petition by ruling that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to the case. ISSUES: a. Whether petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy. b. Whether the motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, was timely filed. RULING: a. Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy for a denial of a motion to dismiss attended by grave abuse of discretion. While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to address an order of denial made without or in excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The history and development of the ground "fails to state a cause of action" in the 1940, 1964 and the present 1997 Rules of Court Preliminarily, a suit that is not brought in the name of the real party in interest is dismissible on the ground that the complaint "fails to state a cause of action." Pursuant to jurisprudence, this is also the ground invoked when the respondents alleged that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest because: 1) the petitioners should not have filed the case in their own names, being merely attorneys-in-fact of their mother; and 2) the petitioners should first be declared as heirs. A review of the 1940, 1964 and the present 1997 Rules of Court shows that the fundamentals of the ground for dismissal based on "failure to state a cause of action" have drastically changed over time. A historical background of this particular ground is in order to preclude any confusion or misapplication of jurisprudence decided prior to the effectivity of the present Rules of Court. All these considerations point to the legal reality that the new Rules effectively restricted the dismissal of complaints in general, especially when what is being invoked is the ground of "failure to state a cause of action." Thus, jurisprudence governed by the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court to the effect that the ground for dismissal based on failure to state a cause of action may be raised anytime during the proceedings, is already inapplicable to cases already governed by the present Rules of Court which took effect on July 1, 1997. As the rule now stands, the failure to invoke this ground in a motion to dismiss or in the answer would result in its waiver. b. Applying Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which provides for the grounds for the dismissal of a civil case, the respondents’ grounds for dismissal fall under Section 1(g) and (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, particularly, failure to state a cause of action and failure to comply with a condition precedent (substitution of parties), respectively. The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the period within which to file a motion to dismiss under the grounds enumerated. Specifically, the motion should be filed within the time for, but before the filing of, the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. Equally important to this provision is Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the following grounds: 1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) litis pendencia; 3) res judicata; and 4) prescription. Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four exceptions

may be considered as waived in the event that they are not timely invoked. As the respondents’ motion to dismiss was based on the grounds which should be timely invoked, material to the resolution of this case is the period within which they were raised. Both the RTC and the CA found that the motion to dismiss was only filed after the filing of the answer and after the pre-trial had been concluded. Because there was no motion to dismiss before the filing of the answer, the respondents should then have at least raised these grounds as affirmative defenses in their answer. The RTC’s assailed orders did not touch on this particular issue but the CA ruled that the respondents did, while the petitioners insist that the respondents did not. In the present petition, the petitioners reiterate that there was a blatant non-observance of the rules when the respondents did not amend their answer to invoke the grounds for dismissal which were raised only during the pre-trial and, subsequently, in the subject motion to dismiss. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss based on the grounds invoked by the respondents may be waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss or alleged in their answer. On the other hand, "the pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised. The purpose is to obviate the element of surprise, hence, the parties are expected to disclose at the pre-trial conference all issues of law and fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged or impeaching matter." The issues submitted during the pre-trial are thus the issues that would govern the trial proper. The dismissal of the case based on the grounds invoked by the respondents are specifically covered by Rule 16 and Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which set a period when they should be raised; otherwise, they are deemed waived.

MODESTO SANCHEZ v. ANDREW SANCHEZ G.R. NO. 187661, DECEMBER 4, 2013 J. PEREZ Furthermore, well settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss. The affirmative defense of prescription does not automatically warrant the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. If the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits, it cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses. However, Contrary to petitioner’s contention, it is not apparent from the complaint that the action had already prescribed. Upon closer inspection of the complaint, it would seem that there are several possible scenarios that may have occurred given the limited set of facts. It is also apparent from the pleadings that both parties denied each other’s allegations. Hence, the outright dismissal of the action is not proper where there are factual matters in dispute, which require presentation and appreciation of evidence. FACTS: A Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land covered by transfer certificate of title, originally registered in the name of respondent, was conveyed to petitioner via sale. This conveyance, however, was assailed by the respondent for being a sham and replete with falsehood and fraudulent misrepresentation. Nonetheless, the respondent admitted that he sent the pre-signed but undated and not notarized deed of sale to petitioner, in response to the latter’s offer to buy the property, but countering that the transaction did not materialize because during that time, the petitioner did not have the funds to purchase the property. Further, the respondent claimed that he tried to retrieve the deed but petitioner failed do so notwithstanding several demands; that despite refusal, respondent tolerated petitioner to occupy the property since their ancestral home was built thereon, which tolerance further extended to petitioner’s live-in partner Yap. Soon, petitioner and Yap offered to buy the property but respondent refused. Thereafter, respondent found that his certificate of title was missing, prompting him to file an affidavit of loss with the Registry of Deeds. Later, respondent learned that a Petition for Reconstitution of title was filed by petitioner on the basis of the deed of sale, which already appeared to have been notarized. This led respondent to file a complaint against petitioner, seeking for the annulment of the document. However, during the pendency of the case, petitioner’s title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of petitioner, which made respondent amend his complain to further seek cancellation of new title and reconveyance. Petitioner countered in his answer, stating lack of cause of action, prescription and laches. The RTC dismissed the case on the grounds of prescription and laches, as it considered the lapse of time between the date of the assailed document and the filing of the case. RTC concluded that respondent was time-barred because he has only 10 years to file an action based on written contract. On appeal, the CA held that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint of Andrew without the benefit of a trial.

ISSUE: Whether prescription and laches must be determined in a trial. RULING: The Court has consistently held that the affirmative defense of prescription does not automatically warrant the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. If the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits, it cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses. Contrary to Modesto’s contention, it is not apparent from the complaint that the action had already prescribed. Furthermore, it should be noted that it is the relief based on the facts alleged, and not the relief demanded, which is taken into consideration in determining the cause of action. Therefore, in terms of classifying the deed, whether it is valid, void or voidable, it is of no significance that the relief prayed for was Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale. The issue of prescription hinges on the determination of whether the sale was valid, void or voidable. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the issue of prescription in this case is best ventilated in a full-blown proceeding before the trial court where both parties can substantiate their claims. The trial court is in the best position to ascertain the credibility of both parties. Upon closer inspection of the complaint, it would seem that there are several possible scenarios that may have occurred given the limited set of facts. The statement "transaction did not push through since defendant did not have the financial herewithal to purchase the subject property" creates confusion and allows for several different interpretations. It is also apparent from the pleadings that both parties denied each other’s allegations. It is then but logical to review more evidence on disputed matters. On this score alone, it is apparent that the complaint on its face does not readily show that the action has already prescribed. We emphasize once more that a summary or outright dismissal of an action is not proper where there are factual matters in dispute, which require presentation and appreciation of evidence. Furthermore, well settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss. At this stage therefore, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is premature. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits, wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.

PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND CRISANTO G. DE GUZMAN G.R. NO. 173590, DECEMBER 9, 2013 J. PERLAS-BERNABE The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. When DeGuzman’s filed his petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA, there resulted a premature fling of the petition as the proper recourse is to seek relief before the CSC. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata. Since De Guzman pursued the remedies of petition for certiorari and appeal, that have long been held to be mutually exclusive, and not alternative or cumulative remedies, forum shopping was committed. It must be noted that the ultimate relief sought by De Guzman was the reversal of the resolution on his dismissal. In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action. In this case, there was no judgment on the merits as the dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman was a result of a fact-finding investigation only for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case exists. FACTS: Sometime in 1988, De Guzman, then a Postal Inspector at the Postal Services Office, was investigated by Regional Postal Inspector Atty. Buensalida due to an anonymous complaint charging him of dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Later, Atty. Buensalida made report that De Guzman must formally be charged with and relieved from his post to protect the employees and witnesses from harassment. The report was then forwarded to the DOTC–ISLES for further evaluation and approval, which however, recommended for the exoneration of De Guzman from charges against him for lack of merit. This recommendation was approved by DOTC via May 15, 1990 memorandum. Later, RA 7354 or the Postal Service Act was passed, which abolished the Postal Services Office under the DOTC, transferring all its powers, duties and rights, and absorbing all its officials and employees to PPC. Thereafter, De Guzman was charged by PPC for same acts recommended to be charged by Atty. Buensalida, to which a decision was made finding De

Guzman guilty and was dismissed from the service, to be implemented immediately. However the decision was not implemented until after 5 years when the Regional Direction issued a memorandum. Motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied, leading to the filing of a second motion for reconsideration, which was resolved in De Guzman’s favor, as it was clarified that when De Guzman was formally charged on July 16, 1993, the complainant was the PPC, which had its own charter and was no longer under the DOTC making the ISLES Memorandum recommendatory; that res judicata was unavailing as the decision exonerating De Guzman was only a dismissal after an investigative body and not a dismissal on the merits. Meanwhile, De Guzman elevated the matter to the CA via special civil action for certiorari and mandamus. Subsequently he appealed the latter resolution before the PPC Board, which however denied the appeal, causing De Guzman to appeal before the CSC, but denied. CA also rendered a decision reversing the 2 former PPC resolutions, citing that the revival of the case constituted grave abuse of discretion considering the clear and unequivocal content of the May 15, 1990 Memorandum that dismissed the complaint against De Guzman. ISSUES: a. Whether administrative remedies have been fully exhausted. b. Whether there is forum shopping. c. Whether there is res judicata. RULING: a. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. PPC claims that De Guzman failed to subscribe to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies since he opted to file a premature certiorari case before the CA instead of filing an appeal with the PPC Board, or of an appeal to the CSC, which are adequate remedies under the law. It is well-established that the CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and, as such, is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. The PPC, created under RA7354, is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. Thus, being an employee of the PPC, De Guzman should have, after availing of the remedy of appeal before the PPC Board, sought further recourse before the CSC. That the subject of De Guzman’s appeal to the Board was not the Resolution dated November 23, 2004 but the Resolution dated May 10, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration of the first - mentioned resolution is of no moment. An appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself. Thus, finding no cogent explanation on DeGuzman’s end or any justifiable reason for his premature resort to a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA, the Court holds that he failed to adhere to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies which should have warranted the dismissal of said petition.

b. Aside from violating the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, De Guzman was also guilty of forum-shopping by pursuing two separate remedies –petition for certiorari and appeal – that have long been held to be mutually exclusive, and not alternative or cumulative remedies. Evidently, the ultimate relief sought by said remedies which De Guzman filed only within a few months from each other is one and the same – the setting aside of the resolution dismissing him from the service. Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata. Similar thereto, the very evil that the prohibition on forum-shopping was seeking to prevent – conflicting decisions rendered by two (2) different tribunals–resulted from De Guzman’s abuse of the processes. Since De Guzman’s appeal before the PPC Board was denied in its Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 and June 29, 2006, De Guzman sought the review of said resolutions before the CSC where he raised yet again the defense of res judicata. Nonetheless, the CSC, in its Resolution No. 08081550 dated May 6, 2008, affirmed De Guzman’s dismissal, affirming "the Resolutions of the PPC Board of Directors dismissing De Guzman from the service for Dishonesty, Gross Violation of Regulations, and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. c. The investigation conducted by the ISLES, which "provides, performs, and coordinates security, intelligence, fact-finding, and investigatory functions for the Secretary, the Department, and Department-wide official undertakings," was intended precisely for the purpose of determining whether or not a prima facie case against De Guzman existed. Due to insufficiency of evidence, however, no formal charge was filed against De Guzman and the complaint against him was dismissed by Asst. Secretary Jardiniano. In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action. A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections; or when the judgment is rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point. In this case, there was no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the above-stated definition. The dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman in the Memorandum dated May 15, 1990 of Asec. Jardiniano was a result of a fact-finding investigation only for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case exists and a formal charge for administrative offenses should be filed. This being the case, no rights and liabilities of the parties were determined therein with finality.

RE: LETTERS OF LUCENA B. RALLOS, FOR ALLEGED ACTS/INCIDENTS/OCCURENCES RELATIVE TO THE RESOLUTION(S) ISSUED IN CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 BY COUIRT OF APPEALS EXECUTIVE JUSTICE PAMPIO ABARINTOS and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON PAUL HERNANDO and VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES. IPI No. 12-203-CA-J, DECEMBER 10, 2013 J. BERSAMIN We have consistently held that an administrative or disciplinary complaint is not the proper remedy to assail the judicial acts of magistrates of the law, particularly those related to their adjudicative functions. Indeed, any errors should be corrected through appropriate judicial remedies, like appeal in due course or, in the proper cases, the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition if the errors were jurisdictional. Having the administrative or disciplinary complaint be an alternative to available appropriate judicial remedies would be entirely unprocedural. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. This discretion is an acknowledgement of the fact that judges are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms. The decision on whether he should inhibit himself, however, must be based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. The rule does not give the judge the unfettered discretion to decide whether he should desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. The disqualification of a judge cannot be based on mere speculations and surmises or be predicated on the adverse nature of the judge’s rulings towards the movant for inhibition. FACTS: The case stemmed from a decision of the RTC involving the Heirs of Vicente Rallos, where they sought just compensation from the government of Cebu City, over parcels of land that had been maintained as public roads without Heirs’ consent. In this decision, the RTC held Cebu City liable to pay just compensation to the Heirs of Rallos, to which a motion for reconsideration was filed by Cebu City but was denied. Later, the Heirs of Rallos filed a motion for the execution pending of the earlier RTC decision, which was granted by the RTC by issuing 3 separate orders. Nonetheless, both parties moved for reconsideration of the orders, thus the RTC issued a consolidated order resolving the said motions. Both parties appealed the RTC decision to the CA-Visayas, wherein Cebu City’s appeal sas dismissed for failure to file record on appeal. Cebu moved for reconsideration but was denied, prompting Cebu to file petition for review which was also denied. Thereafter, Heirs of Rallos moved for the execution of the July 24, 2001 decision and the March 21, 2002 consolidated order, with which the RTC granted. However, it was found out that the RTC erred in executing the decision and the consolidated order, resulting to the Heirs of Rallos in filing an appeal with the CA to compel RTC to strictly comply with the tenor of the decision, which appeal was granted by the CA. Subsequently, Cebu City presented an omnibus motion to quash the writ of execution and to lift the notice of garnishment, but the RTC denied it. Thus, Cebu City filed a petition for the annulment of the RTC’s decisions of January 14, 2000 and July 24, 2001, and the consolidated order dated March 21, 2002 alleging that Vicente

Rallos and his heirs had been obliged under a compromise agreement called convenio, to donate, cede, and transfer the parcels of land to Cebu City; that Cebu City should not be made to pay just compensation for the parcels of land in question despite final and executory decision because the land were donated to Cebu City. Further, Cebu City sought the nullification of the RTC decisions and consolidated order as well as the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent release of government funds. As such, the case was raffled to the 18th Division of CA Visayas, which directed Cebu City to rectify defects prior to ruling on TRO application pending compliance with the order. Thereafter, Cebu City informed CA of its receipt of the Notice to Parties of Sale on Execution, alleging that the sale on execution could render the pending proceedings moot and academic, hence a TRO was issued. Soon, several CA Visayas Justices inhibited from participating in the case. Cebu City moved for preliminary injunction before the CA, which the CA granted. The Heirs of Rallos sought for reconsideration. Subsequently, On August 10, 2012, the Court received a letter-complaint from Rallos requesting an investigation of the allegedly unlawful and unethical conduct of several CA Visyas Justices in dealing with the controversial case between the Rolloses and Cebu City. Further, the Court received an affidavit-complaint from Rallos, charging several CA Visayas Justices that dealt on the case, with administrative and criminal offenses. ISSUES: a. Whether administrative complaints may be filed to assail the erroneous resolution of stice. b. Whether the decision was tainted with bias and negligence. RULING: Considering that the assailed conduct under both complaints referred to the performance of their judicial functions by the respondent Justices, we feel compelled to dismiss the complaints for being improper remedies. We have consistently held that an administrative or disciplinary complaint is not the proper remedy to assail the judicial acts of magistrates of the law, particularly those related to their adjudicative functions. Indeed, any errors should be corrected through appropriate judicial remedies, like appeal in due course or, in the proper cases, the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition if the errors were jurisdictional. Having the administrative or disciplinary complaint be an alternative to available appropriate judicial remedies would be entirely un-procedural. In Pitney v. Abrogar, the Court has forthrightly expressed the view that extending the immunity from disciplinary action is a matter of policy, for "to hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment." In addition, the Court reminds that the disregard of the policy by Rallos would result in the premature filing of the administrative complaints–a form of abuse of court processes. In A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, although Rallos had moved for the reconsideration of the June 26, 2012 resolution, she did not anymore wait for the resolution of the motion for reconsideration. Instead, she filed the complaint-affidavit. That, too, was impermissible, because her appropriate recourse was to await the resolution of the motion for reconsideration and then to appeal should the CA deny the motion. It is to be mentioned, too, that the CA had not yet resolved Cebu City’s main suit for the annulment of judgment on the merits; hence, it was premature and unprocedural for her to insist that the respondent Justices could have already

ruled on the grounds for annulment. That resolution should be awaited because the issue on the validity and effectiveness of the convenio would precisely still require the CA’s appreciation of the convenio as evidence. Nor were the principle of immutability of judgment and the applicability of any law or jurisprudence to bar Cebu City’s action for annulment of judgment already in effect, considering that the CA still had to discharge its adjudicatory function respecting the matter of the validity and effectiveness of the convenio. Anent the voluntary inhibitions of the respondent Justices concerned, it serves well to note that Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court set standing guidelines for that purpose. The guidelines have required just and valid causes to justify voluntary inhibitions. Thereby, the discretion to decide whether to voluntarily inhibit or not could not be unfettered, for, as fittingly said in Abrajano v. Heirs of Augusto F. Salas, Jr.: x x x. The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 1.Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in ny inferior court when his rulingor decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. Thus stated, the rule contemplates two kinds of inhibition: compulsory disqualification assumes that a judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case for the reasons stated in the first paragraph, while voluntary inhibition under the second paragraph leaves to the judge’s discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons with only his conscience to guide him. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. This discretion is an acknowledgement of the fact that judges are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms. The decision on whether he should inhibit himself, however, must be based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. The rule does not give the judge the unfettered discretion to decide whether he should desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. The disqualification of a judge cannot be based on mere speculations and surmises or be predicated on the adverse nature of the judge’s rulings towards the movant for inhibition. We do not subscribe to Rallos’ suggestion that the series of inhibitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 constituted a scheme to favor Cebu City. She presented no proof to validate her suggestion. In fact, she herself conceded that she was thereby only voicing out her suspicion of

an irregularity. To stress, their good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties, which are strong presumptions under our laws, should prevail unless overcome by contrary proof. Worth noting in that regard is that there was even no valid reason that could have prohibited the Justices charged in A.M. No. 12-9-08-CAfrom participating in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676. It serves well to consider, too, that none of the respondent Justices charged in IPI No. 12-203-CA-J is anymore participating in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676; and that the respondent Justices charged in A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA were chosen by raffle as required under pre-existing rules and regulations to replace the Justices who had meanwhile voluntarily inhibited themselves from further participation for valid reasons.

WELLER JOPSON v. FABIAN O. MENDEZ, JR. AND DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 191538 , DECEMBER 11, 2013 J. PERALTA The jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. Since the dispute between the petitioner and respondent involved a non-agricultural property and no tenancy relation exists between them, the decisions made by DARAB were without force and effect. FACTS: Spouses Laura and Jose owned a parcel land covered by transfer certificate of title, which was later or subdivided into 63 lots through a judicially approved subdivision and became part of Laura Subdivision. As such, the former certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued. Subsequently the spouses conveyed the some 31 parcel of land covered by TCT No. 986 to respondent DBP via dacion en pago, as evidenced by a Deed of Conveyance of Real Estate Property Payment Debt and a new certificate of title was issued in its favor. DBP then published an invitation to bid for the conveyance of the land, which was then sold to Mendez as the highest bidder causing a new certificate of title to be issued in his name. Later, a complaint was filed by petitioner Jopson with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) against the respondents for the annulment of sale, preemption/redemption and reinstatement, alleging that he is the bona fide tenant-farmer of the land sold to Mendez being the successor of his father Melchor Jopson, who was the original tenant thereof; that upon the instructions of Mendez, he was unlawfully ejected from the property; and that the sale of the landholding by DBP to petitioner is void. These allegations were denied by Mendez stating that Jopson has no cause of action against him, explaining further that PARAD had no jurisdiction over the case because the land sold was no longer classified as agricultural. PARAD declared the sale a nullity ordering DBP to execute the necessary transfer in favour of the Republic, further holding that while the subject landholding is situated within a district classified as secondary commercial zone and its subdivision was judicially approved, the same was not duly converted to non-agricultural use as prescribed by law. Respondents moved for reconsideration which the PARAD granted, thus petitioner appealed with the DARAB which reversed the PARAD’s ruling by declaring that there is a tenancy relationship between DBP and petitioner as evidenced by the sharing of harvest between them. Mendez filed a motion for reconsideration, while petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA arguing that the PARAD and the DARAB gravely abused their discretion in denying his right of redemption. CA denied petitioner’s petition and DARAB denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration. Soon, Mendez appealed with the CA, which however nullified and set aside DARAB’s decision. Motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the PARAD and DARAB have jurisdiction over the present case. RULING:

Anent the second issue, we rule that the PARAD and the DARAB have no jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim. Specifically, the PARAD and the DARAB have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the CARL under R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute in this wise: (d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under R.A. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. From the foregoing, it is clear that no agrarian dispute exists in the instant case, since what is involved is not an agricultural land and no tenancy relationship exists between petitioner and respondent DBP. As aptly held by the CA, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. Perforce, the ruling of the PARAD, as well as the decision and resolution of the DARAB which were rendered without jurisdiction, are without force and effect. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERDINAND BAUTISTA Y SINAON G.R. NO. 198113, DECEMBER 11, 2013 J. ABAD When prosecuting the sale or possession of dangerous drugs like shabu, the State must prove not only the elements of each of the offenses. It must prove as well the corpus delicti, failing in which the State will be unable to discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. To prove the corpus delicti, the prosecution must show that the dangerous drugs seized from the accused and subsequently examined in the laboratory are the same dangerous drugs presented in court as evidence to prove his guilt. To ensure that this is done right and that the integrity of the evidence of the dangerous drugs is safeguarded, Congress outlined in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 the mandatory procedure that law enforcers must observe following the seizure of such substance. The Court has of course held that non-compliance with the procedural safeguards provided in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR would not necessarily void the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs for as long as there is a justifiable ground for it and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. As the buy-bust team did not show

the that there was justifiable reason to deviate from the procedure, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, it must be stressed that the step-by-step procedure under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. FACTS: Accused-appellant Bautista was charged for violation of RA 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Acts for selling and possessing illegal drugs. Prosecution’s evidence showed that the Chief of PNP Meycauayan received an information regarding the sale of illegal drugs, led by Bautista. As such, Bautista was put through surveillance and upon confirmation of the information, police officers Tadeo, Viesca, Santos, and Mendoza were ordered to conduct a buybust operation against Bautista. In the operation, Tadeo approached Bautista’s house while the others positioned themselves nearby. Tadeo was successful in buying shabu from Bautista leading to the arrest of the latter. During the arrest, Bautista had a lady-companion named Rocel, from whom Viesca recovered plastics of shabu. Bautista was also asked to take out the contents of his pocket, which revealed the marked money and plastics of shabu. Viesca marked the shabu recovered from Rocel while Tadeo marked the plastics of shabu from the buy-bust operation and the other plastics recovered from Bautista. Thereafter, it was sent for forensic examination, which proved positive. On the contrary, Bautista and Rocel denied the charges setting up the defense that armed men trespassed their house demanding for Bautista, asking Bautista whether he was Jerry and immediately handcuffed him. They countered that they were false accused of the criminal charge because Bautista was accused of stealing coins from Tadeo’s videokarera. The RTC found Bautista guilty of the crime charged but acquitted Rocel for lack of required proof to sustain conviction. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the arresting officers preserved the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items despite their failure to observe the mandatory procedural requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR. RULING: When prosecuting the sale or possession of dangerous drugs like shabu, the State must prove not only the elements of each of the offenses. It must prove as well the corpus delicti, failing in which the State will be unable to discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. To prove the corpus delicti, the prosecution must show that the dangerous drugs seized from the accused and subsequently examined in the laboratory are the same dangerous drugs presented in court as evidence to prove his guilt. To ensure that this is done right and that the integrity of the evidence of the dangerous drugs is safeguarded, Congress outlined in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 the mandatory procedure that law enforcers must observe following the seizure of such substance. Clearly, the Congress and the Executive Department demand strict compliance of the procedure. It is only by such strict compliance that the grave mischiefs of planting evidence or

substituting it may be eradicated. Such strict compliance is also consistent with the doctrine that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. The first stage after seizure is the taking of inventory of the dangerous drugs seized from the suspect. It begins with the marking of the seized objects to fix its identity. Such marking should be made as far as practicable in the presence of the suspect immediately upon his arrest. Of course, the failure to mark the seized items at the place of arrest does not of itself impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. Marking upon "immediate" confiscation can reasonably cover marking done at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team, especially when the place of seizure is volatile and could draw unpredictable reactions from its surroundings. The law requires the apprehending officer or team to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and take photograph of the same in the presence of the accused, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given copies of the same. PO1 Tadeo categorically admitted that no elected official was present when the police made the arrest and when they conducted their investigation. PO1 Viesca admitted that no representative from the media or the DOJ were present during the inventory of the seized items. Further, although the prosecution witnesses averred that the physical inventory of the seized items was recorded in the police blotter, it did not bother to present a copy of the same with the required signatures or submit some valid justification for the omission. What is more, both PO1 Tadeo and PO1 Viesca were uncertain regarding whether they photographed the seized items. In fact, they failed to produce any such photograph. This is either sloppy police work or utter refusal to comply with what is required of them. The prosecution should not have filed the case absent proof of compliance with what the law requires. The Court has of course held that non-compliance with the procedural safeguards provided in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR would not necessarily void the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs for as long as there is a justifiable ground for it and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Here, however, the buy-bust team did not bother to show that they "intended to comply with the procedure but where thwarted by some justifiable reason or consideration." Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, this Court stresses that the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.

ADVANCE PAPER CORPORATION AND GEORGE HAW v. ARMA TRADERS CORPORATION G.R. NO.176897, DECEMBER 11, 2013 J. BRION A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008 which refer to the amendment of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. It deleted the Community Tax Certificate among the accepted proof of identity of the affiant because of its inherent unreliability. Nevertheless, the defective jurat in the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is not a fatal defect because it is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement that the Court may waive. Furthermore, we cannot simply ignore the millions of pesos at stake in this case. To do so might cause grave injustice to a party, a situation that this Court intends to avoid. The rule is that failure to object to the offered evidence renders it admissible, and the court cannot, on its own, disregard such evidence. When a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, it must so state in the form of a timely objection and it cannot raise the objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal. However, hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue. However, since the testimony of Haw was based not on his personal knowledge as he was not present during the document’s preparation, his testimony was hearsay. Further, the documents does not fall under the exception to the hearsay rule, but for failure to timely object on the matter, the sales invoice formed part of the records of the case. The issue of credibility of witnesses is to be resolved primarily by the trial court because it is in the better position to assess the credibility of witnesses as it heard the testimonies and observed the deportment and manner of testifying of the witnesses. Accordingly, its findings are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case. FACTS: On various dates, Arma Traders, upon the representation of Tan and Uy, purchased on credit paper products from Advance Paper. Having good business relations, Arma Traders was able to obtain 3 loans from Advance Paper for the settlement of its obligations to its other suppliers, and as payment for the transactions, Arma Traders issued some 82 post-dated check, bearing the signatures of Tan and Uy, payable to cash or to Advance Paper. Later, Advance Paper presented the checks to the drawee bank but were dishonored either for "insufficiency of funds" or "account closed." Despite repeated demands, Arma Traders failed to settle its account with Advance Paper, prompting Advance Paper to file a complaint for collection of sum of money against respondents Arma Traders, Tan, Uy, Ting, Gui, and Ng. The petitioners claimed that the respondents fraudulently issued the postdated checks as payment for the purchases and loan transactions knowing that they did not have sufficient funds with the drawee banks., to which the respondents argued that the purchases on credit were spurious, simulated and fraudulent since there was no delivery of the paper

products. The respondents also claimed that the loan transactions were ultra vires because the board of directors of Arma Traders did not issue a board resolution authorizing Tan and Uy to obtain the loans from Advance Paper. The respondents accused Tan and Uy for conspiring with the petitioners to defraud Arma Traders through a series of transactions known as rediscounting of postdated checks. The RTC ruled that the purchases on credit and loans were sufficiently proven by the petitioners, which decision was appealed to the CA. The CA held that the petitioners failed to prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of the purchases on credit and loans, hence this petition. The petitioners argue that Haw’s testimony is not hearsay, emphasizing that Haw has personal knowledge of the purchases and loan transactions, and stressing that the respondents never objected to the admissibility of the sales invoices on the ground that they were hearsay. On the contrary, respondents argue that the Petition for Review should be dismissed summarily for failure to comply with A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. ISSUES: a. Whether the petition for review should be dismissed. b. Whether failure to object to evidence presented would render hearsay evidence admissible. c. Whether there was preponderance of evidence. RULING: a. First, the respondents correctly cited A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008 which refer to the amendment of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. It deleted the Community Tax Certificate among the accepted proof of identity of the affiant because of its inherent unreliability. The petitioners violated this when they used Community Tax Certificate No. 05730869 in their Petition for Review. Nevertheless, the defective jurat in the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is not a fatal defect because it is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement that the Court may waive. Furthermore, we cannot simply ignore the millions of pesos at stake in this case. To do so might cause grave injustice to a party, a situation that this Court intends to avoid. Second, no less than the CA itself waived the rules on the period to file the motion for reconsideration. A review of the CA Resolution dated March 7, 2007, reveals that the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied because the allegations were a mere rehash of what the petitioners earlier argued – not because the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. b. The rule is that failure to object to the offered evidence renders it admissible, and the court cannot, on its own, disregard such evidence. When a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, it must so state in the form of a timely objection and it cannot raise the objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal. Because of a party’s failure to timely object, the evidence becomes part of the evidence in the case. Thereafter, all the parties are considered bound by any outcome arising from the offer of evidence properly presented. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue.

We agree with the respondents that with respect to the identification of the sales invoices, Haw’s testimony was hearsay because he was not present during its preparation and the secretaries who prepared them were not presented to identify them in court. Further, these sales invoices do not fall within the exceptions to the hearsay rule even under the "entries in the course of business" because the petitioners failed to show that the entrant was deceased or was unable to testify. But even though the sales invoices are hearsay, nonetheless, they form part of the records of the case for the respondents’ failure to object as to the admissibility of the sales invoices on the ground that they are hearsay. Based on the records, the respondents through Ng objected to the offer "for the purpose to which they are being offered" only – not on the ground that they were hearsay. c. Additionally, the issue of credibility of witnesses is to be resolved primarily by the trial court because it is in the better position to assess the credibility of witnesses as it heard the testimonies and observed the deportment and manner of testifying of the witnesses. Accordingly, its findings are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case. In the present case, the RTC judge took into consideration the substance and the manner by which Haw answered each propounded questions to him in the witness stand. Hence, the minor inconsistencies in Haw’s testimony notwithstanding, the RTC held that the respondents claim that the purchase and loan transactions were spurious is "not worthy of serious consideration." Besides, the respondents failed to convince us that the RTC judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case. On the other hand, we agree with the petitioners that the discrepancies in the photocopy of the sales invoices and its duplicate copy have been sufficiently explained. Besides, this is already a non-issue since the duplicate copies were surrendered in the RTC. Furthermore, the fact that the value of Arma Traders' checks does not tally with the total amount of their obligation with Advance Paper is not inconsistent with the existence of the purchases and loan transactions. As against the case and the evidence Advance Paper presented, the respondents relied on the core theory of an alleged conspiracy between Tan, Uy and Haw to defraud Arma Traders. However, the records are bereft of supporting evidence to prove the alleged conspiracy. Instead, the respondents simply dwelled on the minor inconsistencies from the petitioners' evidence that the respondents appear to have magnified. From these perspectives, the preponderance of evidence thus lies heavily in the petitioners' favor as the RTC found. For this reason, we find the petition meritorious.

MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION G.R. NO. 190566, DECEMBER 11, 2013 J. VILLARAMA, JR. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. FACTS: Petitioner was a teller at Casino Filipino, which was operated by PAGCOR. Petitioner alleged that while he was performing his functions as a teller, one customer named Cecilia approached him and handed to him some money in bills, and following the casino procedure, he laid the bills but made an error in declaring that the amount totalled to P40,000.00. With this, Cecilia asked petitioner to check the bills, to which petitioner complied and soon apologized for the mistake. However, petitioner claimed that Cecilia accused him of shortchanging and continuously berated him as a person. As a result, the casino’s security invited them to settle the issue and petitioner was required to file an incident report, to which petitioner did on the same day. Petitioner received a Memorandum from the casino Manager, informing petitioner that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the memorandum. To comply, petitioner submitted his letterexplanation but still received another Memorandum, stating that the respondent’s Board have found him guilty, imposing on petitioner a 30-day suspension. Motion for reconsideration was filed praying that if he is indeed guilty, the penalty should only be a reprimand, but such was denied. Later, PAGCOR issued another Memorandum which reiterated the contents of its earlier Memorandum. With this, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, wherein he averred that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal basis to support the finding of guilt against him, and that the decision of PAGCOR was tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it failed to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in

imposing the harsh penalty. The CA dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedy. ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. RULING: Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days. In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK v. CHRISTOPHER LUMBO AND MILAGROS LUMBO G.R. NO. 162757, DECEMBER 11, 2013 J. BERSAMIN If the redemption period expires without the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest redeeming the foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds, the title over the property consolidates in the purchaser. The consolidation confirms the purchaser as the owner entitled to the possession of the property without any need for him to file the bond required under Section 7 of Act No. 3135. The issuance of a writ of possession to the purchaser becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his name, while the mortgagor, by failing to redeem, loses all interest in the property. As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. FACTS: Respondents loaned from UCPB secured by a real estate mortgage on a beach resort they own. However, the respondents failed to settle the obligation necessitating UCPB to extrajudicially foreclose the property and thereby emerged as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, to which certificate of sale was issued. For failure of the respondents to redeem the property within the redemetion perion, title thereto was consolidated in the name of UCPB. As such, respondents brought an action for annulment of the foreclosure sale and injunction against UCPB. Pending resolution thereof, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to recover the property, which the RTC granted. Writ of possession was served to the respondents with a demand to vacate peacefully. Possession was then turned over to UCPB, though the respondents were temporarily allowed to remain on the property. Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition to cancel writ of possession and to set aside the foreclosure sale with a prayer for temporary restraining order to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession, which petition the RTC denied. Respondents then brought the matter to the CA via certiorari and/or mandamus petition, which the CA granted. UCPB sought for reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly granted the injunctive writ to enjoin the implementation of the writ of possession the RTC had issued to place UCPB in the possession of the mortgaged property.

RULING: With particular reference to an extra-judicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale may apply ex parte with the RTC of the province or place where the property or any part of it is situated, to give the purchaser possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor should it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of Act No. 3135; and the RTC, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession be issued, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall then execute said order immediately. We underscore that the application for a writ of possession by the purchaser in a foreclosure sale conducted under Act No. 3135 is ex parte and summary in nature, brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice being sent by the court to any person adverse in interest. The relief is granted even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the relief is sought. Its nature as an ex parte petition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the application for the issuance of a writ of possession a non-litigious proceeding. Indeed, the grant of the writ of possession is but a ministerial act on the part of the issuing court, because its issuance is a matter of right on the part of the purchaser. The judge issuing the order for the granting of the writ of possession pursuant to the express provisions of Act No. 3135 cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The reckoning of the period of redemption by the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest starts from the registration of the sale in the Register of Deeds. Although Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, specifies that the period of redemption starts from and after the date of the sale, jurisprudence has since settled that such period is more appropriately reckoned from the date of registration. If the redemption period expires without the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest redeeming the foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds, the title over the property consolidates in the purchaser. The consolidation confirms the purchaser as the owner entitled to the possession of the property without any need for him to file the bond required under Section 7 of Act No. 3135. The issuance of a writ of possession to the purchaser becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his name, while the mortgagor, by failing to redeem, loses all interest in the property. The property was sold at the public auction on January 12, 1999, with UCPB as the highest bidder. The sheriff issued the certificate of sale to UCPB on the same day of the sale. Considering that UCPB registered the certificate of sale in its name on February 18, 1999, the period of redemption was one year from said date. By virtue of the non-redemption by the respondents within said period, UCPB consolidated the title over the property in its name. It is clear enough, therefore, that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion but acted in accordance with the law and jurisprudence in denying the respondents’ application for the injunctive writ filed on February 14, 2002 in Special Proceedings No. 5884 to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession issued on December 4, 2001. Further, a preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a

prohibitory injunction is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past. Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction may be justified under circumstances. A right is in esse if it exists in fact. In the case of injunction, the right sought to be protected should at least be shown to exist prima facie. Unless such a showing is made, the applicant is not entitled to an injunctive relief. In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc., the Court has stressed the essential significance of the applicant for injunction holding a right in esse to be protected, stating: As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. However, the respondents made no such showing of their holding a right in esse. They could not do so simply because their non-redemption within the period of redemption had lost for them any right in the property, including its possession. The absence of a right in esse on their part furnishes a compelling reason to undo the CA's reversal of the RTC's denial of their application for injunction as well as to strike down the injunctive relief the CA afforded to the respondents. It cannot be otherwise, for they had no "right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law". REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), AND NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), G.R. NO. 201715, DECEMBER 11, 2013 J. BERSAMIN Consistently with the mandatory character of the pre-trial, the Rules oblige not only the lawyers but the parties as well to appear for this purpose before the Court, and when a party "fails to appear at a pre-trial conference be may be non-suited or considered as in default. The obligation in appear denotes not simply the personal appearance, or the mere physical presentation by a party of one’s self, but connotes as importantly, preparedness to go into the different subject assigned by law to a pre-trial. Petitioner’s State Solicitors’ initial attendance during the pre-trial conference could not be equated to the personal appearance mandated by Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The duty to appear during the pre-trial conference is not by mere initial attendance, but taking an active role during the said proceedings. FACTS:

MERALCO and NAPOCOR had entered into a contract for the sale of electricity (CSE) effective for 10 years starting from January 1, 1995, wherein NAPOCOR was obliged to supply and MERALCO was obliged to purchase a minimum volume of electric power and energy at rates approved by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). Included in the CSE is a provision requiring MERALCO to pay minimum monthly charges even if the actual volume of the power and energy drawn from NAPOCOR fell below the stated minimum quantities. However, on 2002, 2003 and 2004, due to circumstances MERALCO drew from NAPOCOR electric power and energy less than the minimum quantities stipulated in the CSE, hence MERALCO only paid the charges for the electric power and energy actually taken. With this, NAPOCOR claimed from MERALCO the contracted but undrawn electric power and energy, to which MERALCO objected and served notice of CSE termination. Subsequently, the parties submitted their dispute to mediation, wherein a settlement agreement was reached, covering the charges imposed by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, and also the payment agreed to by MERALCO. The settlement agreement was then filed via petition with the ERC, seeking the approval of the settlement agreement. Nonetheless, almost two years after the case was submitted for resolution, the OSG, representing the petitioner, filed in the ERC a motion for leave to intervene with motion to admit its attached opposition to the validity of the Settlement Agreement. As such ERC suspended the proceedings and deferred approval of the application, prompting MERALCO in filing an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, to which NAPOCOR prayed for resort to arbitration. Also, OSG moved to suspend the RTC proceedings but was denied, hence a motion to dismiss or to stay proceedings and to refer parties to arbitration was filed, which however, was also denied. Later, pre-trial was held but the presiding Judge of the RTC reset the proceedings due to non-appearance of the OSG representative. With this, the OSG filed a motion to cancel pre-trial and a motion for the inhibition of the RTC Judge, further bringing petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the CA alleging that respondent RTC Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, but was denied. ISSUE: Whether the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. RULING: The RTC’s proceeding with the pre-trial set on November 24, 2010 was entirely in accord with the Rules of Court. While it is true that the OSG had filed on November 22, 2010 the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, the CA did not restrain the RTC from thus proceeding. Absent any TRO or WPI stopping the RTC from proceeding, the mere filing or pendency of the special civil actions for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition did not interrupt the due course of the proceedings in the main case. This is quite clear from the revised Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which mandated that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case. As the foregoing rule also indicates, for the RTC not to proceed with the pre-trial on its scheduled date of November 24, 2010 despite the absence of any TRO or WPI enjoining it from doing so could have subjected its Presiding Judge to an administrative charge. We further concur with the holding of the CA that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in deeming the petitioner’s right to

participate in the pre-trial and its right to present evidence as waived through the third assailed pre-trial order dated November 24, 2010. The waiver appears to have been caused by the deliberate refusal of the petitioner’s counsel to participate in the proceedings. The TSN belies petitioner’s claim that despite its State Solicitor’s appearance and objection to the holding of the said hearing of 24 November 2010, public respondent proceeded to declare petitioner in default. A quo, public respondent did not categorically declare petitioner in default, but instead, decreed petitioner to have waived its right to participate in the pre-trial and present evidence in its behalf which is in accordance with Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court for the apparent reason that State Solicitor Lazo himself asked to be excused from participating in the pre-trial conference. The case of Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is enlightening on this point where the Supreme Court had the occasion to state therein that: "Consistently with the mandatory character of the pre-trial, the Rules oblige not only the lawyers but the parties as well to appear for this purpose before the Court, and when a party "fails to appear at a pre-trial conference be may be non-suited or considered as in default. The obligation in appear denotes not simply the personal appearance, or the mere physical presentation by a party of one’s self, but connotes as importantly, preparedness to go into the different subject assigned by law to a pre-trial.” Petitioner’s State Solicitors’ initial attendance during the pre-trial conference could not be equated to the personal appearance mandated by Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The duty to appear during the pre-trial conference is not by mere initial attendance, but taking an active role during the said proceedings. Petitioner has no valid reason to complain for its predicament now as it chose to withhold its participation during the pre-trial conference. From an objective view of the proceedings, the RTC’s deeming of the petitioner’s right to participate in the pre-trial and its right to present evidence as waived was reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, it did not act arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously. The dismissal of the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was correct and justified, for grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was not persuasively demonstrated by the petitioner. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HON. JUANITO CASTANEDA, JR., ET AL. G.R. NO. 208290; DECEMBER 11, 2013 Per Curiam In the absence of any convincing justification, a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed a month late from the lapse of the period to file the same will not warrant the relaxation of the Rules. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. While

there are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules FACTS: Garcia and Custodio Vestidas were charged before the CTA for the violation of Sections 2503 and 2530 (f) (i) and 1, (3) (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. According to the Information, Garcia and Vestidas as owner/proprietress and broker of Plinth Enterprise respectively, fraudulently imported into the Port of Manila 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus Software Kaspersky Internet Security which were inside a container van falsely declared to contain 40 pallets of CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case. It was alleged therein that the imported items have customs duties amounting to P3,341,245, of which only the amount of P100,362 was paid. During the trial, The prosecution presented a number of witnesses who essentially observed the physical examination of container van conducted by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and explained the process of electronic filing under the Electronic to Mobile (E2M) Customs Systems of the BOC and the alleged misdeclared goods therein. Garcia and Vestidas filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court, which was granted by the CA. Thereafter they filed the Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the reason that the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in court, the object evidence consisting of the allegedly misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence and none of the witnesses made a positive identification of the two accused as the ones responsible for the supposed misdeclaration. Subsequently, the CTA dismissed the case against Garcia and Vestidas for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration, but was denied. On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case. Subsequently, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was filed within the reglementary period. RULING: The petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for the filing thereof under Rule 65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution was received by the BOC two (2) days after its promulgation, or on May 17, 2013. Nonetheless, the RATS was only alerted by the developments in the case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M. Campos Jr. (Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. While there

are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules. Notably, the records show that the petition was filed only on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but it will also sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a tinge of merit that would deserve leniency. The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court processes that needed to be addressed by the office. Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on the part of an office tasked to effectively curb smuggling activities which rob the government of millions of revenue every year. The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court to suspect that the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by design from the start. The failure to present the certified true copies of documentary evidence; the failure to competently and properly identify the misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused in court; and, worse, the failure to file this petition on time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs of a reluctant and subdued attitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by the lawyers in government service rouses the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of justice. Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch should be reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Court will not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the government’s goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and similar activities. JANUARY 2014 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP v. JOVY CABCABAN UDK no. 14817, January 13, 2014 J. Abad Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counselled. FACTS: Shirly alleged that Shang Ko, her 14-year-old daughter, ran away from home causing Shirly to go to the police station in Bacolod City, upon receipt of information that Shang Ko was in the custody of respondent Cabcaban, a police officer in that station. Since Cabcaban refused to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help of the NBI to rescue her child. Later, Agent

Pura informed Shirly that Shang Ko was no longer with Cabcaban but was staying with a private organization called Calvary Kids. Pura told her, however, that the child was fine and had been attending school. With this Shirly filed a petition for habeas corpus against Cabcaban and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the CA rather than the RTC citing as reason several threats against her life in that city. The CA denied the petition for its failure to clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko, further explaining that habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person or who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of such person. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is available in custody cases. RULING: Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counselled. Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Bacolod City, it would be best that such issues be resolved by a Family Court in that city. Meantime, considering the presumption that the police authorities acted regularly in placing Shang Ko in the custody of Calvary Kids the Court believes that she should remain there pending hearing and adjudication of this custody case. Besides she herself has expressed preference to stay in that place. WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION AND CHERRYLL L. YU v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY G.R. NO. 161106, January 13, 2014 CJ. Sereno A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, hence, the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants. When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. However, a trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause. On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search warrant.

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. FACTS: Police Chief Inspector Villegas of PNP-RISOO filed applications for warrants before the RTC of Quezon City to search the office premises of petitioner WWC located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations amounting to theft and violation of PD 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of respondent PLDT. Subsequently, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants, wherein the applicant, Rivera, and Gali of PLDT testified as witnesses. According to the witnesses, before an international call can be considered legitimate, the international call should first pass through the local exchange or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to the toll center or one of the international gateway facilities (IGFs) in the Philippines. After which it is then transmitted to the other country through voice circuits before it passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the detination country, and the toll center would meter the call passing through the PSTN of the dialled number as completion. This process however, was allegedly bypassed by petitioner by rerouting the calls but using PLDT’s telephone line. During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular computers and servers that would be taken. Later, the RTC granted the search warrant application, which warrants were implemented by the RISOO operatives on the same day of warrant issuance. Upon the warrant’s implementation, hundreds of items were seized, to which petitioners filed a motion to quash the search warrants citing that the warrants were issued without probable cause; the act complained of was not a crime; and the warrants were general warrants thus, the objects seized pursuant thereto were fruits of the poisonous tree. With this, PLDT filed its opposition, but the RTC granted the petitioners’ motion to quash. Motion for reconsideration was denied prompting PLDT to appeal to the CA, which reversed the RTC Resolution. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied, thus petition for certiorari under Rule 45 was filed to assail CA decision. ISSUES: 1. Whether conformity of the public prosecutor is necessary, to gain personality to question the quashal of search warrant. 2. Whether an appeal lies in case of an order quashing the search warrant. 3. Whether there is probable cause on the issuance of the search warrants where the acts complained of do not constitute theft.

4. Whether the search warrants are general warrants. RULING: Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of "all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor. An application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action. The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action. For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant. Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein." Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the applications for search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom. There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. They determine probable cause based on "evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed" by the offender. On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search warrant. In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the test calls may have passed through other IGFs in

the Philippines, which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood. On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized." It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take. Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons. The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used to pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision. To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners a d was then able to confirm that they had utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations."

DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA G.R. NO 166995, JANUARY 13, 2014 J. Peralta A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court. However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. In the case, there is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial committed against petitioner, and that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA, hence the rule against double jeopardy operates making the judgment of acquittal final and no longer appealable.

FACTS: In an information for the crime of Qualified Theft thru Falsification of Commercial Document filed against Aliga, it was alleged that Aliga, then acoountant of Dentrade Inc., stole a UCPB check and thereafter falsified the amount indicated therein to be encashed and further misappropriating the amount for personal use and benefit. Upon arraignment, Aliga pleaded not guilty hence trial ensued. The prosecution presented its witnesses and documentary evidence to support the charge against Aliga. The RTC found Aliga guilty of the crime charged but absolved her from civil liability. As such, Aliga appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC decision, explaining that Aliga’s admission or confession before the NBI, having been a custodial investigation, is inadmissible in evidence because Aliga was not informed of her rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of her own choice. Further, the CA declared that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence of the Aliga. Motion for reconsideration was denied, thus petition for certiorari under Rule 45 was filed. ISSUES: 1. Whether petition for certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy in assailing judgment of acquittal. 2. Whether double jeopardy arises when judgment of acquittal is assailed. RULING: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed instead of herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The People may assail a judgment of acquittal only via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and separate remedies. A petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal. Under Section 1 of the said Rule, a party aggrieved by the decision or final order of the Sandiganbayan may file a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. However, the provision must be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order "unless the accused will thereby be placed in double jeopardy." The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for review. Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The rule is that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is

final and un-appealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to act in contemplation of law or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State. Thus, Green expressed the concern that "the underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty." Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. Unfortunately for petitioner, We find that these exceptions do not exist in this case. First, there is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial. In fact, petitioner did not make any allegation to that effect. What the records show is that during the trial, both parties had more than sufficient occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The same is true during the appeal before the CA. The State, represented by the OSG, was not deprived of a fair opportunity to prove its case.

And second, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA. It could not be said that its judgment was issued without jurisdiction, and, for this reason, void. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie. Upon perusal of the records, it is Our considered view that the conclusions arrived at by the CA cannot, by any measure, be characterized as capricious, whimsical or arbitrary. While it may be argued that there have been instances where the appreciation of facts might have resulted from possible lapses in the evaluation of the evidence, nothing herein detracts from the fact that relevant and material evidence was scrutinized, considered and evaluated as proven by the CA’s lengthy discussion of its opinion. We note that the petition basically raises issues pertaining to alleged errors of judgment not errors of jurisdiction which is tantamount to an appeal contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence. Conformably then we need not embark upon review of the factual and evidentiary issues raised by petitioner as these are obviously not within the realm of Our jurisdiction. RIVELISA REALTY, INC. v. FIRST STA. CLARA BUILDERS CORPORATION G.R. NO. 189618, JANUARY 15, 2014 J. PERLAS-BERNABE While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a petition for review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar motion seeking to extend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other courts. The 15-day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. Hence, the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period before a judgment becomes final and executory. FACTS: Rivelisa Realty entered into an agreement with First Sta. Clara for the construction and development of a residential subdivision. During the course of the project respondent hired a subcontractor to perform a part of the work, however respondent ran out of funds after only two months of construction, forcing petitioner to shoulder a part of the payment due to the subcontractor. Further, respondent manifested an intention to back out from the agreement and discontinue the operations when petitioner refused to advance additional funds until 60% of the project had been completed. With this, petitioner agreed to release respondent from the agreement and made an estimate of the actual accomplishment that included the payment made to the subcontractor. Nonetheless, respondent insisted on a different valuation of the accomplished works, to which petitioner agreed but emphasized that the amount is over its obligation in the agreement. Despite such and several demands made, the agreed amount remained unpaid, prompting respondent to file a complaint for rescission of the agreement with damages. As such, petitioner claimed that it was obliged to pay respondent any amount as the respondent failed to comply with its obligation.

The RTC dismissed the complaint and an appeal was made before the CA. The CA, however, found petitioner still liable for respondent’s actual accomplishments in the project, and explained that respondent is no longer obligated to comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement, after petitioner agreed on its dissolution. Later, petitioner received a copy of the CA decision, but moved for a 15-day extension within which to file its motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration. Nonetheless, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for extension as the 15-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended, and merely noted without action the subsequently filed motion for reconsideration, but eventually the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether a 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration can be extended. RULING: While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a petition for review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar motion seeking to extend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other courts. This rule was first laid down in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon 25 wherein it was held that: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. Restating the rule in Rolloque v. CA, the Court emphasized that the 15-day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. Hence, the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period before a judgment becomes final and executory. In this case, Rivelisa Realty only had until March 18, 2009 within which to file either a motion for reconsideration before the CA or a petition for review of the CA Decision to the Court. But it committed the fatal error of filing instead a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration before the CA which – as expressed in Rolloque – did not toll the running of the period for the finality of the latter’s decision. Verily, a party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed by law loses the right to do so as the decision, as to him, becomes final and binding. Since the CA Decision had already become final and executory due to the lapse of the reglementary period, not only did the CA properly deny Rivelisa Realty’s belatedly-filed motion for reconsideration but also the remedy of review before the Court had already been lost. The Court has repeatedly held that the failure to perfect an appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by law renders the decision sought to be appealed final, with the result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. Considering that the CA Decision had long become final and unalterable by the time Rivelisa Realty elevated the same, the Court must hereby deny the instant petition.

DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D. v. HANZ CALAPIZ G.R. NO. 163753, JANUARY 15, 2014 J. BERSAMIN Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. The acquittal of an accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. FACTS: Spouses Calapiz brought their son, Hanz, to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital for an emergency appendectomy, which was attended to by the petitioner, and who suggested that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no added cost. With the parents’ consent, the petitioner performed the circumcision after the appendectomy. The following day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters and his testicles were swollen. Also, the parents noticed that Hanz urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the catheter, but the petitioner declared such was normal. Later, Hanz was discharged from the hospital over his parents’ protestations, and was directed to continue taking antibiotics. Nevertheless, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of a formation in his penis, to which the petitioner presumed to be ulceration brought about by appendicitis. As such, the petitioner referred Hanz to an urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was operated on three times to repair his damaged urethra. When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and reconstructed, Hanz’s parents brought a criminal charge against the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses, including an expert witness, who testified on the injury sustained by Hanz and explaining that the injury to the urethra had been caused by trauma, without however, determining the kind of trauma that had caused the injury. With this, petitioner denied the charges. The RTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the evidence, but declared that petitioner was liable for moral damages because there was a preponderance of evidence showing that Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by the petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, sustaining the award of moral damages. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether civil liability attaches despite acquittal from criminal charge. RULING:

It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals, the Court elucidates on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the different effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused, viz: Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist." Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of based on mere preponderance of evidence. In this connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not require that the complainant’s recovery of civil liability should be through the institution of a separate civil action for that purpose. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly liable. With the RTC and the CA both finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and that the trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur with their uniform findings. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GUARIÑA AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. NO. 160758, January 15, 2014 J. Bersamin The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only prescribe the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become and remain the law of the case in all other steps below or above on subsequent appeal. Without the rule there would be no end to criticism, reagitation, reexamination, and reformulation. In short, there would be endless litigation.

The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal. FACTS: Respondent applied for a loan from DBP to finance the development of its resort complex, to which respondent executed a promissory note, real estate mortgage, and chattel mortgage as security for the repayment of the loan. Also, prior to the release of the loan, DBP required respondents to put up a cash equity for the construction of the buildings and other improvements on the resort complex. Thereafter, the loan was released in several instalments from which DBP withheld the interest. Respondent demanded the release of the balance of the loan, but DBP refused and directly paid some suppliers of respondent over its objection. Upon inspection, DBP found that the construction of the resort project had not been completed, prompting DBP to demand from respondent the completion thereof and warned respondent of foreclosing the property if the project could not be completed. Nonetheless, respondent objected, causing DBP to initiate an extra-judicial foreclosure over the property. Notice of foreclosure sale was sent to respondent, which was soon published, leading to the clients of respondent to think that its business operation had slowed down, and that its resort had closed. Respondent sued DBP in the RTC to demand specific performance and to stop the foreclosure of the mortgages, to which DBP moved for dismissal stating that the mortgaged properties had been sold at a public auction to satisfy respondent’s obligation. As such, respondent amended the complaint to seek nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and cancellation of the certificate of sale, and thereafter trial ensued. Meantime, DBP applied for the issuance of a writ of possession by the RTC, which the RTC initially denied but later granted upon reconsideration. Feeling aggrieved, respondent assailed the decision via certiorari before the CA, which CA dismissed causing DBP to seek the issuance of writ of possession. The RTC nullified the extra-judicial sales of the mortgaged properties, which the CA sustained. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether law of the case doctrine is applicable. RULING: Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. The concept of law of the case is well explained in Mangold v. Bacon, 41 an American case, thusly:

The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only prescribe the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become and remain the law of the case in all other steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded on convenience, experience, and reason. Without the rule there would be no end to criticism, re-agitation, re-examination, and reformulation. In short, there would be endless litigation. It would be intolerable if parties litigants were allowed to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the chance of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given case. An itch to reopen questions foreclosed on a first appeal would result in the foolishness of the inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it grew. Courts are allowed, if they so choose, to act like ordinary sensible persons. The administration of justice is a practical affair. The rule is a practical and a good one of frequent and beneficial use. The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like damages. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal. The foregoing understanding of the concept of the law of the case exposes DBP's insistence to be unwarranted. To start with, the ex parte proceeding on DBP's application for the issuance of the writ of possession was entirely independent from the judicial demand for specific performance herein. In fact, C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP, being the interlocutory appeal concerning the issuance of the writ of possession while the main case was pending, was not at all intertwined with any legal issue properly raised and litigated in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491, which was the appeal to determine whether or not DBP's foreclosure was valid and effectual. And, secondly, the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not settle any question of law involved herein because this case for specific performance was not a continuation of C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP (which was limited to the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of DBP), and vice versa. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNABE PAREJA G.R. NO. 202122, JANUARY 15, 2014 J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court." Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally expected. Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness.

Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case. A medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. FACTS: Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape. Upon arraignment, Pereja pleaded not guilty, and after pre-trial conference, trial ensued. During the trial, the victim narrated on how Pereja committed the crime charged. Further, the prosecution also presented the Medico-Legal Report to corroborate the testimony of the victim, which indicated that there is clear evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma, confirming that the victim was raped. Pereja denied the charges, averring that it was impossible for the incident to happen, by describing the layout of their house, but admitted that he knew the victim for being the daughter of his live-in partner. The RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him of the crime of rape. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment. ISSUE: 1. Whether testimony of the victim is credible, despite inconsistencies. 2. Whether medical certificate is necessary to prove rape. RULING: When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez, we enumerated them as follows: First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses. Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded. And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court." While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this

Court has found no substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility. Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally expected. Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an offense is not analogous to a person’s achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone. Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness. The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter pertaining to AAA’s ordeal. The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes important only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. In other words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant’s narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime." Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case. A medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at the time she was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination actually bolsters AAA’s claim of being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not just by anal penetration. However, as the prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG v. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014 PER CURIAM A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. FACTS: Bansig filed a Petition for Disbarment against respondent Atty. Celera for Gross Immoral Conduct, alleging that respondent and Bansig’s sister, Gracemarie, entered into a contract of marriage on May 8, 1997 as evidence by a certified Xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by Civil Registry of Manila; that despite the validity of the prior marriage, respondent contracted another marriage with Alba on January 8, 1998, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila. In a Resolution, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on the instant complaint. However, respondent failed to submit his comment, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt. Thus, the Court, in another Resolution, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint against him. Subsequently, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion praying that respondent's failure to file his comment be deemed a waiver to file the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition. Nonetheless, respondent though a Motion, claimed that he did not know of the nature or cause of the administrative case as he received no pleading or any processes thereof, save that of Bansig’s Omnibus Motion. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint. Later, the Court required Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of the complaint and to submit proof of such service, further requiring respondent to comment on the complaint. With this, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof of service which is evidenced by Registry Receipt, however, respondent failed anew to file his comment. This prompted the Court to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, to which respondent, in his Explanation, reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the complaint and asked for Bansig to furnish him with the complaint; this the Court again granted. Later, Bansig via Manifestation, lamented the dilatory tactics undertaken by respondent, asserting that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She further attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing with Registry Receipt thereof. Later, the Court issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail. Further, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order sent to respondent, and required Bansig to submit the correct and present address of respondent. With this, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his correspondence with the Court the submitted address as his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig also averred that in a civil case pending before the RTC of Tuguegarao City, respondent used the mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City." Thus the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order to respondent’s new address.

Due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint the Court resolved imposed upon respondent a fine and required respondent to comply with the Resolution filing the required comment. Further, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the Court's latter Resolutions, the Court ordered that the filing of respondent’s comment be dispensed with and that respondent be arrested, and further referred the complaint to the IBP. The return of warrant, however, showed that respondent cannot be located in the new address as the new address used by respondent was a vacant lot. Meanwhile, the IBP reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal. Respondent also failed to appear before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, despite several notices, causing respondent to be declared in default and the case was submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent, however, respondent failed to take any action on the matter. ISSUE: Whether there is quantum of evidence required in an administrative proceeding. RULING: A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar. Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. RODOLFO LABORTE and PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY v. PAGSANJAN TOURISM CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE and LELIZA S. FABRICIO G.R. NO. 183860, January 15, 2014 J. Reyes Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is clear that the court considers the evidence only when it is formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the trial court to base its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly on the evidence offered by the parties. A piece of document will remain a scrap of paper without probative value unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which it is offered. The formal offer of evidence allows the parties the chance to object to the presentation of an evidence which may not be admissible for the purpose it is being offered. However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted, provided, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case. The records of the case show that the petitioners were able to present evidence that have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded, and these were also on the records of the RTC. The respondents had the chance to object to the documents that were identified and marked, but no objections were raised causing the documents to be admitted by the court. FACTS: PTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation that used to operate the Philippine Gorge Tourist Zone (PGTZ) Administration Complex (PTA Complex), a declared tourist zone in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Respondent PTCC is a cooperative organized since 1988 under RA 6938. In order to help the PTCC as a cooperative, PTA allowed it to operate a restaurant business located at the main building of the PTA Complex and the boat ride services to ferry guests and tourists to and from the Pagsanjan Falls, paying a certain percentage of its earnings to the PTA. Soon PTA implemented a re-organization and reshuffling in its top level

management, wherein petitioner Laborte was designated as Area Manager, CALABARZON area with direct supervision over the PTA Complex and other entities at the Southern Luzon. Subsequently, Laborte notified respondents to cease the operations of the restaurant and boat ride services because of the rehabilitation project of the PTA Complex. Consequently, the PTCC filed with the RTC, a Complaint for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages praying for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit Laborte from causing the PTCC to cease the operations of the restaurant and boat ride services and from evicting the PTCC’s restaurant from the main building of the PTA Complex. The RTC issued the TRO but Laborte opposed to such, averring that PTCC does not own the restaurant facility because it was merely tolerated by PTA as a form of assistance. Later, PTCC filed a Petition for Contempt with Motion for early resolution alleging that Laborte defied the TRO, which however, Laborte denied. Subsequently, the individual respondents who are employees and boatmen of the PTCC, filed a Complaint-in-Intervention against defied the TRO. With this, PTCC filed an Amended Complaint to include PTA as defendant, but PTA alleged that PTCC has no cause of action against PTA as PTA is the owner of the complex and no contract binds it and PTCC. RTC decided in favour of PTCC and intervenors, prompting Laborte and PTA to appeal to CA, which however, affirmed the RTC decision. ISSUE: Whether the evidence not formally offered may be considered. RULING: Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the general rule, to wit: Sec. 34. Offer of Evidence. – The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. From the above provision, it is clear that the court considers the evidence only when it is formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the trial court to base its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly on the evidence offered by the parties. A piece of document will remain a scrap of paper without probative value unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which it is offered. The formal offer of evidence allows the parties the chance to object to the presentation of an evidence which may not be admissible for the purpose it is being offered. However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted. Citing People v. Napat-a and People. v. Mate, the Court in Heirs of Romana Saves, et al., v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al., enumerated the requirements for the evidence to be considered despite failure to formally offer it, namely: "first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case." In People v. Vivencio De Roxas et al., the Court also considered exhibits which were not formally offered by the prosecution but were repeatedly referred to in the course of the trial by the counsel of the accused. In the instant case, the Court finds that the above requisites are attendant to warrant the relaxation of the rule and admit the evidence of the petitioners not formally offered. As can be seen in the records of the case, the petitioners were able to present evidence that have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded. To identify is to prove the identity of a person or a

thing. Identification means proof of identity; the proving that a person, subject or article before the court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged or reputed to be. Undeniably, these pertinent evidence that Laborte identified, were also found in the records of the RTC, i.e. : (a) the letter informing the Chairman of PTCC about the decision of PTA main office regarding the repair works to be conducted; (b) Office Order No. 1018-93 from a person named Mr. Anota, relative to the suspension of the boat ride services at the Complex; (c) the letter to PTCC informing it of the repair at the Complex; (d) the certificates of availability of funds for the guesthouse of the PTC Complex and for the repainting, repair works at the Pagsanjan Administration Complex respectively; (e) the program of works dated July 22, 1993 for the renovation of the Pagsanjan Complex and of the swimming pool at the guesthouse respectively; (f) the program of works referring to the repainting and repair works at the Complex dated August 6, 1993; and (g) a memorandum from Mr. Oscar Anota, Deputy General Manager for Operation of the PTA, dated December 8, 1993 addressed to the security office of the Pagsanjan Administration Complex, instructing the same not to allow the entry of anything without clearance from the main office in Manila into the Pagsanjan Complex. In all these, the respondents had all the chance to object to the documents which Laborte properly identified and marked and which are found in the records of the trial court. Considering that no objections were made by the respondents to the foregoing documents, the Court sees no reason why these documents should not be admitted. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TETRO ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED G.R. NO. 183015, January 15, 2014 J. Peralta Clearly, the only thing the RTC was asked to do when the case was remanded to it by the CA was to determine the damages respondent is entitled to for the loss of the use and enjoyment of the property when the property was taken from it in 1974. Thus, when the case was remanded to the RTC for the purpose of computing the damages, the case was not considered a new case where an amendment of the complaint may still be allowed. Rather, it is merely a continuation of the trial of the original complaint filed in 1992 only for the purpose of receiving the evidence of the damages which respondent allegedly suffered as alleged in the original complaint, since no evidence proving damages was received and passed upon when the RTC issued its Order dated March 29, 1996. Therefore, the Section 2 and 3, Rule 10, Rules of Civil Procedure on amendments of pleading find no applicability in this case. FACTS: On February 10, 1992, respondent Tetro Enterprises filed a Complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner Republic represented by DPWH, wherein it is alleged that Tetro is the registered owner of a piece of land that has been expropriated for construction of road by petitioner without undergoing the legal process. Also, respondent alleged that despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to return the lot and pay rent thereto, thus respondent prayed for the lots return in its original state and payment of damages thereto. On the other hand, petitioner contended that respondent has no cause of action as the State has not given its consent to be sued, and that petitioner was was willing to pay the fair market value of the lot at the time of taking, plus interest. As the return of the subject lot was no longer feasible, the RTC, with the parties' conformity, converted the action for recovery of possession to eminent domain and expropriation. Upon agreement of the parties, the RTC issued an order creating a Board of Commissioners to determine the actual value of the lot which shall be the basis for an amicable

settlement or the decision to be rendered. Later, the Board submitted its report recommending the just and reasonable price to be paid to respondent. The RTC took into consideration the report submitted by the Board and rendered a decision fixing the price of the lot. Motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner, but was denied, prompting petitioner to appeal, which the RTC denied since the decision had become final and executory. With this, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but was dismissed. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, which reversed the CA decision and ordered RTC to approve petitioner's notice of appeal. Consequently, petitioner's appeal was taken up in the CA, which modified the earlier appealed decision and ordered for the case to be remanded to the RTC. Respondent filed a petition for review with SC, which was denied. The case was then remanded to the RTC for computation of damages, and was scheduled for mediation proceedings, which failed, thus, the case was set for a pre-trial conference. At the pre-trial, when petitioner presented the proposed issue, respondent moved for the amendment of its original complaint, which the presiding Judge granted. As such, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied for being premature. Later, respondent filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, attaching the amended complaint; this the RTC admitted. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, thus, petition for certiorari was filed with the CA, which affirmed the RTC order. The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the amended complaint. ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended complaint. RULING: The CA found that the amendment of the original complaint filed in 1992 is sanctioned by Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, which provide: Section 2. Amendments as a matter of right. — A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. — Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard. We are not persuaded. To begin with, the original case which respondent filed in 1992 was for recovery of possession, which the RTC, with the parties' conformity, converted into an expropriation case as recovery of the subject lot was no longer possible. Thus, the pre-trial of the case had long taken place in 1994. The expropriation case was then decided by the RTC on March 29, 1996, fixing the value of the subject lot in the total amount of P75,858,000.00 as just compensation. Such

decision was modified by the CA's Former Third Division in a Decision dated May 24, 2001, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 60492, reducing the amount of just compensation to P252,869.00 plus 6% interest from 1974 until full payment thereof and ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further determination of other damages respondent suffered for the loss of use and enjoyment of its property. The CA decision was brought to us in a petition for review on certiorari which, in a Resolution dated October 2, 2002, denied the same and affirmed the CA decision. Clearly, the only thing the RTC was asked to do when the case was remanded to it by the CA was to determine the damages respondent is entitled to for the loss of the use and enjoyment of the property when the property was taken from it in 1974. Thus, when the case was remanded to the RTC for the purpose of computing the damages, the case was not considered a new case where an amendment of the complaint may still be allowed. Rather, it is merely a continuation of the trial of the original complaint filed in 1992 only for the purpose of receiving the evidence of the damages which respondent allegedly suffered as alleged in the original complaint, since no evidence proving damages was received and passed upon when the RTC issued its Order dated March 29, 1996. Therefore, the above-quoted provisions (Section 2 and 3, Rule 10, Rules of Civil Procedure) on amendments of pleading find no applicability in this case. While we find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint filed in 1992, such finding does not necessarily establish that Presiding Judge Simbulan had exhibited bias or partiality in favor of respondent, as petitioner claims, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence. MAGDALENA T. VILLASI v. FILOMENO GARCIA G.R. NO. 190106, January 15, 2014 J. Perez It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent "separate action" to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. However, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building as they were unable to present credible evidence to prove their ownership. All that the Spouses raised were their postulation as title holders of the land and the presumption of ownership over improvements built thereon; whereas Villasi, on the other hand, was able to show documentary proof of ownership. FACTS:

Petitioner Villasi engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building. However, Villasi failed to fully pay the contract price despite several demands, thus, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money before the RTC, wherein FGCI prayed, for the payment of the unpaid accomplishment billings. With this, Villasi denied the allegations, contending that FGCI has no cause of action against her, further averring that she delivered the total amount to FGCI but the latter accomplished only 28% of the project. Pre-trial conference termninated without amicable settlement being reached, thus trial ensued. The RTC decided in favour of FGCO brushing aside Villasi’s allegations of excess payment. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that an overpayment was made by Villasi and thus FGCI was ordered to return the excess payment. Thereafter, FGCI filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, which however, was denied for being filed out of time. The resolution became final and executory, to which Villasi filed a motion for execution that was favourably acted upon by the RTC and a writ of execution was issued. Later, the sheriff levied on a building covered by a tax declaration in the name of FGCI and built in the lots registered under the names of Spouses Garcia. Mandatory posting and publication of notice of sale was made, and a public auction was scheduled. On the other hand, to forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming that they are the lawful owners of the property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff. Moreover, the Spouses Garcia argued that the building covered by the levy was mistakenly assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI. Nonetheless, Villasi opposed the motion and insisted that its ownership belongs to FGCI and not to Spouses Garcia as shown by the tax declaration. Thus, the RTC issued an Order directing the Sheriff to hold in abeyance the conduct of the sale on execution. Villasi’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence Villasi filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was dismissed and reconsideration thereof refused, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the remedy of terceria is applicable. RULING: It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent "separate action" to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, the person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim. Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is

to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya, we declared that for a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently establish his right on the property: A third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of the court which authorized such execution. Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to restore the property to the claimant's possession if warranted by the evidence. However, if the claimant's proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied. Our perusal of the record shows that, as the party asserting their title, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in question. Aside from their postulation that as title holders of the land, the law presumes them to be owners of the improvements built thereon, the Spouses Garcia were unable to adduce credible evidence to prove their ownership of the property. In contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily establish the ownership of FGCI thru the pieces of evidence she appended to her opposition. Worthy to note is the fact that the building in litigation was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and not in the Spouses Garcias’. While it is true that tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute credible proof of claim of title over the property. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES G.R. NO.172551, JANUARY 15, 2014 J. BRION As a general rule, the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure questions of law. The test in determining whether a question is one of law or of fact is "whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law." Any question that invites calibration of the whole evidence, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, is a question of fact and thus proscribed in a Rule 45 petition. The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence,

absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. FACTS: Respondent Yatco was the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land covered by transfer certificate of title, which property the government placed under the coverage of CARP. Pursuant to EO 405, the LBP valued the property, but Yatco did not find the valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the DAR- PARAD, which then conducted summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation. The PARAD computed the value of the property at P16,543,800.00 by using the property’s current market value as shown by the tax declaration Yatco submitted, and applied the formula "MV x 2." Further, PARAD noted that the LBP did not present any verified or authentic document to back up its computation; hence, it brushed aside the LBP’s valuation. On the other hand, LBP did not move to reconsider PARAD’s ruling, and instead filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the judicial determination of just compensation. The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at P200.00 per square meter, thus arriving at a valuation by adopting the valuation set by the RTC Calamba City, Branch 35 in a civil case, which in turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC Calamba City, Branch 36 arrived at in a civil case. Also, the RTC-SAC did not give weight to the LBP’s evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and likewise failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Section 17 of the CARL. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence LBP appealed to the CA, which dismissed LBP’s appeal and reconsideration thereto. ISSUE: 1. Whether the factual-issue-bar rule applies. 2. Whether the court may take judicial notice of certain facts prevailing in another case. RULING: As a general rule, the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference exists as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Negatively put, Rule 45 does not allow the review of questions of fact. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test in determining whether a question is one of law or of fact is "whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law." Any question that invites calibration of the whole evidence, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, is a question of fact and thus proscribed in a Rule 45 petition. We find the presented issue clearly one of law. Resolution of this question can be made by mere inquiry into the law and jurisprudence on the matter, and does not require a review of the parties’ evidence. We, therefore, disagree with Yatco on this point as we find the present petition compliant with the Rule 45 requirement.

The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. We note that Yatco offered in evidence copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the LBP opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however, that the April 21, 2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatco’s offer in evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it) constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on Branch 36’s previous ruling – to be legally erroneous. After considering these factors and formula, we are convinced that the RTC-SAC completely disregarded them and simply relied on Branch 36’s valuation. For one, the RTC-SAC did not point to any specific evidence or cite the values and amounts it used in arriving at the P200.00 per square meter valuation. It did not even consider the property’s market value based on the current tax declaration that Yatco insists the RTC-SAC considered in addition to Branch 36’s valuation. Assuming that the RTC-SAC considered the property’s market value (which, again, we find that it did not), this alone will not suffice as basis, unless justified under Item II.A.3 of DAR AO 5-98 (as provided above). Then too, it did not indicate the formula that it used in arriving at its valuation or which led it to believe that Branch 36’s valuation was applicable to this case. Lastly, the RTC-SAC did not conduct an independent assessment and computation using the considerations required by the law and the rules. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMMANUEL OÑATE G.R. NO. 192371, JANUARY 15, 2014 J. Del Castillo For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. Before entries made in the course of business may qualify under the exception to the hearsay rule and given weight, the party offering them must establish that: (1) the person who made those entries is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made at, or near the time of the transaction to which they refer; (3) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated therein; (4) the entries were made in the professional capacity or in the course of duty of the entrant; and, (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. In the case, Land Bank neither identified the persons who made the entries in the passbooks nor established that they are already dead or unable to testify. While the deposit entries in the bank’s passbook enjoy a certain degree of presumption of regularity, they are mere prima facie proof of what are stated therein

FACTS: From 1978 to 1980, Oñate opened and maintained seven trust accounts with Land Bank, with each trust account being covered by an Investment Management Account (IMA) with full discretion and corresponding passbook. It is indicated in the IMA that petitioner was appointed as respondents agent to hold, invest and reinvest respondent’s fund and keep the same invested, in the sole discretion of petitioner. However, in a letter, petitioner demanded from respondent the return ofP4 million it claimed to have been inadvertently deposited to respondent’s trust account, to which respondent refused. With the parties failure to settle the miscrediting matter, petitioner soon unilaterally applied the outstanding balance in all of resondent’s trust accounts against his resulting indebtedness by reason of the "miscrediting" of funds, thereby exhausting all of respondent’s accounts, without however, satisfying the obligation. Hence, to recoup the remaining balance of Oñate’s indebtedness, Land Bank filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against respondent, to which respondent denied knowledge or involvement between petitioner and its clients, and asserted that petitioner made a setoff without legal and factual bases. Respondent further claimed that the funds in his accounts came from legitimate sources and was unaware with the alleged miscrediting. Upon respondent’s motion, the RTC issued an Order creating a Board of Commissioners to examine the records of respondent’s seven trust accounts, as well as to determine the total amount of deposits, withdrawals, funds invested, earnings, and expenses incurred. Reports were submitted by the board, and as summarized by the RTC it found that the reports revealed that there were undocumented and over withdrawals and drawings from respondent’s trust accounts. Respondent asserted that the undocumented withdrawals should not be considered as cash outflows, but instead it should be treated as unauthorized transactions which must be credited back to his accounts. Thereafter, the RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint but explained that under IMA, petitioner had the authority to withdraw funds from respondent’s account even without a letter of instruction or withdrawal slip from respondent. Further, RTC denied petitioner’s claim for negative balances as it was never sought in the complaint. The CA denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the RTC decision. Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition. Petitioner argued that under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the entries in the passbooks must be accepted as proof of the regularity of the transactions reflected in the trust accounts for they were made in the regular course of business. On the contrary, respondent argued that the argument of petitioner raises question of fact which is not proper under a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUE: 1. Whether the petition raises question of fact. 2. Whether the entries in the passbook are sufficient to meet the rule on presumption of regularity of entries in the course of business, under Section 43, Rule 130. RULING: A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, none exists in this case. Anent Land Bank’s contention that the determination of whether the CA erred in retroactively applying the 2008 MORB poses a legal question, the same deserves scant consideration. True, the CA included in its ratio decidendi a discussion on the 2008 MORB to give emphasis to the duties of banks to keep an accurate record and regularly apprise their clients of the status of their accounts. But the issue of whether Land Bank failed to comply with those duties can be resolved even without the MORB as the same duties are also imposed on Land Bank by the IMAs, the contract that primarily governs the parties in this case. "As a general rule, a contract is the law between the parties. Thus, ‘from the moment the contract is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfilment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.’ Also, ‘the stipulations of the contract being the law between the parties, courts have no alternative but to enforce them as they were agreed [upon] and written’." Based on the factual milieu of this case even without touching on the MORB, we found that Land Bank still failed to perform its bounden duties to keep accurate records and render regular accounting. We also found no cogent reason to disturb the other factual findings of the CA. But before entries made in the course of business may qualify under the exception to the hearsay rule and given weight, the party offering them must establish that: (1) the person who made those entries is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made at, or near the time of the transaction to which they refer; (3) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated therein; (4) the entries were made in the professional capacity or in the course of duty of the entrant; and, (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. Here, Land Bank has neither identified the persons who made the entries in the passbooks nor established that they are already dead or unable to testify as required by Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Also, and as correctly opined by the CA, "while the deposit entries in the bank’s passbook enjoy a certain degree of presumption of regularity," the same do "not indicate or explain the source of the funds being deposited or withdrawn from an individual account." They are mere prima facie proof of what are stated therein – the dates of the transactions, the amounts deposited or withdrawn, and the outstanding balances. They do not establish that the total amount of P4,086,888.89 deposited in Oñate’s Trust Account No. 01-125 in November 1980 came from the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans of Land Bank’s corporate borrowers. It would be too presumptuous to immediately conclude that said amount came from the checks paid to Land Bank by its corporate borrowers just because the maturity dates of the loans coincided with the dates said total amount was deposited. There must be proof showing an unbroken link between the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans and the

amount allegedly "miscredited" to Oñate’s Trust Account No. 01-125. As a bank and custodian of records, Land Bank could have easily produced documents showing that its borrowers preterminated their loans, the checks they issued as payment for such loans, and the deposit slips used in depositing those checks. But it did not.

HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR v. JUANA GONZALES G.R. NO. 185922, JANUARY 15, 2014 J. Perez Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived. FACTS: Dr. Favis was married to Capitolina with whom he had seven children. When Capitolina died Dr. Favis took Juana as his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano. Later, Dr. Favis and Juana got married and Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita, with whom he has four children. Soon, Dr. Favis died intestate leaving residential lands, commercial building, house, and an orchard. However, it is alleged that Dr. Favis executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying the residential land and the building erected therein in favor of his grandchildren with Juana. With this, petitioners being Dr. Favis’ children with Capitolina, claimed that the donation prejudiced their legitime and filed for annulment if the Deed of Donation before the RTC against respondents. Respondents, however, asserted that the properties donated do not form part of the estate of the late Dr. Favis because the donation was made inter vivos. The RTC, limited the issues to the validity of the deed of donation and whether respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. Thus, in its decision, RTC nullified the Deed of Donantion finding Dr. Favis at age 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have jad full control of his metal capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation, and further declared Juan and Mariano as legitimate heirs. As such, respondents appealed to the CA challenging the RTC decision on ground of vitiated consent. The CA dismissed the same not on the grounds invoked by respondents but for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the case is not subject to compromise as it involves future legitime, which the CA rejected, observing that while the action is between members of the same family it does not involve a testator and a compulsory heir. Moreover, the appellate court pointed out that the subject

properties cannot be considered as "future legitime" but are in fact, legitime, as the instant complaint was filed after the death of the decedent. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made. RULING: The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The appellate courts’ decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, which it correlated with Section 1, par (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The appellate court’s reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action. Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin, cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr., the Court held: The motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is kept within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of Rule 9. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a ground for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between members from the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground for a motion to dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim." The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived.

Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action. In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code, which provision as then Article 222 of the New Civil Code was described as "having been given more teeth"21 by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rule of Court, it is safe to say that the purpose of making sure that there is no longer any possibility of a compromise, has been served. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DONALD VASQUEZ G.R. NO. 200304, JANUARY 15, 2014 J. Leonardo-De Castro Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for information against them before their arraignment, appellants are questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction.

be made before the the quashing of the now estopped from upon their voluntary

This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. Credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary. FACTS: In an information, Vasquez was charged for violation of dangerous drugs for selling shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride. Upon arraignment, Vasquez pleaded not guilty and

trial on the merits ensued. During the trial, prosecution presented the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo, who both took part in the buy-bust operation conducted by the police to capture Vasquez. P/Insp. Fajardo testified that they received a confidential information about Vasquez being engaged in illegal drug activity and claimed about being an employee of the NBI. This information was relayed to their commanding officer, and thus a team was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation. The informant and the team went to the location with P/Insp. Fajardo acting as the potential buyer. The deal to buy shabu was closed, with an agreement to meet the following day for the delivery of the drugs. As such, the buy-bust team went to the agreed meeting place, but Vasquez told P/Insp. Fajardo to have the sale take place in a more secured place, to which Fajardo agreed and the exchange of money and shabu took place in the new agreed place with Vasquez and companion being captured therein. With this, Fajardo took custody of the shabu and placed her initials therein, further Vasquez and companion were brought to the police station where their rights were read to them. Thereafter, P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug specimen and brought the same to the Crime Laboratory. Further, P/Insp. Fajardo testified that she noticed that there were markings on the envelope that read "DD-931303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but she did not bother to check out what they were for or who made them, however, upon interrogation it was revealed that the same was submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory and that Vasquez was working as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. PO2 Trambulo also testified and corroborated that of Fajardo. The defense denied the prosecution’s allegation of events, contending Vasquez was framed up. The RTC convicted Vasquez giving more credence to the prosecution’s evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. ISSUE: 1. Whether the search and arrest done by the police officers were valid. 2. Whether testimony of prosecution witness supports conviction. RULING: At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis that "any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction." Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for,

while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person. In People v. Ting Uy, the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary." In the instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe, much less satisfactorily prove, any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would falsely incriminate him. The appellant himself even testified that, not only did he not have any misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his arrest, he in fact did not know them at all. In the absence of evidence of such ill motive, none is presumed to exist. It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes charged. HERMINIA ACBANG v. HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON G.R. No. 164246, JANUARY 15, 2014 J. Bersamin A judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersede s bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Since the Acbangs perfected an appeal but failed to file the required superseadeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment in an ejectment suit cannot be stayed. The filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate execution without the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals. Facts: Respondent Spouses Lopez commenced an ejectment suit against the petitioner, her son Benjamin and his wife Jean in the MTC of Alcala, Cagayan. The defendants did not file their answer. Thus, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses Lopez. The petitioner appealed to the RTC. In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved for the execution of the decision pending appeal in the RTC, alleging that the defendants had not filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution. The Acbangs opposed the motion, insisting that the failure of the Spouses Lopez to move for the execution in the MTC constituted a waiver of their right to the immediate execution; and that, therefore, there was nothing to stay, rendering the filing of the supersedeas bond

unnecessary. The motion for execution pending appeal was granted there being no Motion to Fix Supersedeas bond filed by the Acbangs as of the date of the filing of the Motion. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied. Later, petitioner brought the petition for prohibition directly in the Supreme Court submitting that Judge Luczon committed grave error in granting the motion for immediate execution of the Spouses Lopez without first fixing the supersedeas bond. Later, the RTC rendered decision on the appealed case, finding that the petitioner had not received the summons, and that the sheriff’s return did not show the steps taken by the server to insure the petitioner’s receipt of the summons, hence, the nonservice of the summons resulted in the MTC not acquiring jurisdiction over petitioner; and that the MTC’s decision was void as far as petitioner was concerned. In the petition, the petitioner insists that Spouses Lopez’s motion for execution pending appeal should be filed before she posted a supersedeas bond. She argues that even if the MTC’s decision was immediately executory, it did not mean that a motion for execution was dispensable; and that the Spouses Lopez waived their right to the immediate execution when they did not file a motion for execution in the MTC. ISSUE: Whether immediate execution of judgment can be stayed. RULING: The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals is instructive on the means of staying the immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to wit: As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision (Section 19, Rule 70) requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and imperative." Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.

In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersede s bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Although the petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez should file a motion for execution pending appeal before the court may issue an order for the immediate execution of the judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that they were entitled to the immediate execution of the judgment in view of the Acbangs failure to comply with all of the three abovementioned requisites for staying the immediate execution. The filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate execution without the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals. THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO

G.R. NO. 156407, JANUARY 15, 2014 J. Bersamin The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to. The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.” Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory. There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. FACTS: Emigdio Mercado died intestate and was survived by his second wife, Teresita and their five children, and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin and petitioner Thelma. Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime, owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty and Cebu Emerson. Later, he assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Cebu to Mervir Realty. Subsequently, Thelma filed before the RTC a petition for appointment of Teresista as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate, to which the RTC granted and letters of administration was issued in favour og Teresita. Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the approval by the RTC, indicating therein that at the time of Emigdio’s death, he had left only personal properties. However, Thelma claimed that Emigdio owned other properties which were excluded from the

inventory, thus, Thelma moved that RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion and Teresita filed a compliance thereto. Again, Thelma moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory; that Thelma be allowed file a formal opposition or comment on the inventory. With this, the RTC the issued an order expressing the need for parties to present evidence to enable it to resolve the motion for the approval of the inventory, but Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory. After series of hearings, the RTC found that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included. Thereafter, Teresita and the other heirs of Emigdio sought for reconsideration claiming that one of the real properties affected had already been sold to Mervir Realty and that the land covered by deed of assignment had been registered and in the possession of Mervir Realty. The RTC, however, denied the motion for reconsideration stating that there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or excluded from the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue. The CA partly granted the petition for certiorari filed by Teresita, reversing the inclusion of lands but affirmed all other respects, further explaining that because the order of the RTC directing new inventory was interlocutory, petition for certiorari was the proper remedy. Also, the CA ruled that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it directed the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that the properties had been transferred by sale or exchange of corporate shares by decedent during his lifetime. ISSUES: 1. Whether special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy. 2. Whether probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator. RULING: The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila–Garrido v. Tortogo, the Court distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows: The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay

the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to. The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings. Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, the Court pointed out: All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non–appealable. Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings. Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted. Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.

The usage of the word all in Section 1, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity. The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.” Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion.” As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said inAgtarap v. Agtarap: The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title. However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to

the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC. v. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY G.R. NO. 159926 , JANUARY 20, 2014 J. Bersamin A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. Given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order, Pinausukan must be mindful of and should closely comply with the following statutory requirements for the remedy as set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. FACTS: Bonier, then President of Pinausukan executed four real estate mortgages involving the petitioner’s parcel of land situated in Pasay City in favor of Far East Bank and Trust Company (now Bank of Philippine Islands). When the unpaid obligation had ballooned the Bank commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages. Thereafter, the sheriff issued the notice of sheriff’s sale and public auction was set. Upon learning of the impending sale, Pinausukan brought against the Bank and the sheriff an action for the

annulment of real estate mortgages in the RTC, averring that Bonier had obtained the loans only in his personal capacity and had constituted the mortgages on the corporate asset without Pinausukan’s consent. The RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute, thereafter the order attained finality. Later, the sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale, which was received by Pinausukan a week later. Pinausukan claimed surprise over the turn of events, thus, it inquired from the RTC and learned that its cousel had not informed it about the order of dismissal. Pinausukan brought a petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the dismissal order, stating that its counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence in failing to keep track of the case he was handling, and in failing to apprise Pinausukan of the developments on the case. However, the CA dismissed the petition citing the failure to attach the affidavits of witnesses attesting to and describing the alleged extrinsic fraud supporting the cause of action as required by Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether judgment may be annulled. RULING: The Court has expounded on the nature of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order in Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals, viz: A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper. The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. The remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the assailed

judgment or final order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each error allegedly committed by the trial court. Given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order, Pinausukan must be mindful of and should closely comply with the following statutory requirements for the remedy as set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This means that the remedy, although seen as "a last remedy," is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for relief. The petition must aver, therefore, that the petitioner failed to move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition for relief without fault on his part. But this requirement to aver is not imposed when the ground for the petition is lack of jurisdiction (whether alleged singly or in combination with extrinsic fraud), simply because the judgment or final order, being void, may be assailed at any time either collaterally or by direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless the ground of lack of jurisdiction is meanwhile barred by laches. The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does. Fraud is extrinsic, where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented the petitioner from having his day in court. Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. The need for particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the circumstances constituting either fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal requirement in the rules of pleading. The petition is to be filed in seven clearly legible copies, together with sufficient copies corresponding to the number of respondents, and shall contain essential submissions, specifically: (a) the certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, to be attached to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner; (b) the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or

defense; and (c) the sworn certification that the petitioner has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the CA or the different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the CA, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the said courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five days therefrom. The purpose of these requirements of the sworn verification and the particularization of the allegations of the extrinsic fraud in the petition, of the submission of the certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, and of the attachment of the affidavits of witnesses and documents supporting the cause of action or defense is to forthwith bring all the relevant facts to the CA’s cognizance in order to enable the CA to determine whether or not the petition has substantial merit. Should it find prima facie merit in the petition, the CA shall give the petition due course and direct the service of summons on the respondent; otherwise, the CA has the discretion to outrightly dismiss the petition for annulment.

LZK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK G.R. NO. 187973, January 20, 2014 J. Reyes The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that "when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them." In the case, the judgment rendered in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the CA under its jurisdiction and was a judgment on the merits. Further, the parties involved in the previous case and the case at bar were the same parties raising the same relief. The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a nonlitigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. FACTS: LZK Holdings obtained a loan from Planters Bank secured with a Real Estate Mortgage over its lot located in La Union. Subsequently, the lot was sold at a public auction after Planters Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage due to failure of LZK Holdings to pay its loan, wherein Planters Bank emerged as the highest bidder. As such, LZK Holdings filed before a

complaint for annulment of extra judicial foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory note and damages, further praying for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the consolidation of title over the lot by Planters Bank. Later, Planters Bank filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in the RTC-San Fernando. 3 days before the expiration of LZK Holdings' redemption period, the RTC-Makati issued a TRO enjoining Planters Bank from consolidating its title over the property. In the meantime, Planters Bank succeeded in consolidating its ownership over the property. However, the proceedings for its ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession was suspended by the RTC-San Fernando in view of the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC-Makati. This prompted Planters Bank to move for reconsideration, which however, was denied. Then upon motion of LZK Holdings, the RTCMakati declared as null and void the consolidated title of Planters Bank, which ruling was affirmed by the CA. When the matter reached the Supreme Court via G.R. No. 164563, the SC sustained the CA's judgment. Further, Planters Bank appealed the order of the RTC-San Fernando which held in abeyance the resolution of its ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which appeal was ruled in favour of Planters Bank. Aggrieved, LZK Holdings sought recourse with the SC in a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 167998, wherein the SC affirmed the CA's ruling and decreed that Planters Bank may apply for and is entitled to a writ of possession as the purchaser of the property in the foreclosure sale. Soon, Planters Bank filed a motion to set ex-parte hearing for the issuance of a writ of possession, which the RTC-San Fernando granted and the CA affirmed. ISSUES: 1. Whether doctrine of res judicata by conclusive of judgment is present. 2. Whether hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. RULING: The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that "when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them." All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Banks's right to apply for and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved in the present case. Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank's right to a writ of possession over the subject property because the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of such particular issue. No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. This is clear from the following disquisitions in Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils. which reiterates the settled rules on writs of possession, to wit:

The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a nonlitigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Given the ex-parte nature of the proceedings for a writ of possession, the RTC did not err in cancelling the previously scheduled hearing and in granting Planters Bank's motion without affording notice to LZK Holdings or allowing it to participate. SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA J. MARQUEZ v. SPOUSES ALINDOG G.R. NO. 184045, January 22, 2014 J. Perlas-Bernabe It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor. It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. The trial court has no discretion on this matter. Hence, any talk of discretion in connection with such issuance is misplaced. The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right. The issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, who had already consolidated their title over the extra-judicially foreclosed property, is merely ministerial in nature. FACTS: Petitioner Anita extended a loan to Gutierrez secured by a real estate mortgage over a land registered under the name of Sps. Gutierrez. The mortgage was annotated at the back of the certificate of title and was verified by Sps. Marquez as clean prior to the mortgage. Sps. Gutierrez defaulted, hence, Anita sought for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the property, upon

which a public auction was held wherein Anita emerged as the highest bidder. Gutierrez failed to redeem the property, leading to the consolidation of title in the name of Anita Marquez, married to Nicasio Marquez. However, it bore an annotation of adverse claim in the names of respondents, as the annotation was copied from an earlier annotation made after the property was mortgaged to Sps. Marquez. Subsequently, respondents filed a civil case for the annulment of the real estate mortgage and certificate of sale, alleging that the respondents purchased the property from Gutierrez prior to the property’s being mortaged to Sps. Marquez, but respondents were unable to secure a certificate of title in their names as Gonzales – to whom they have entrusted said task – had deceived them. Separately, respondent’s averred that when the mortgage was executed in favor of Sps. Marquez, Gutierrez was already dead. In their defense, Sps. Marquez disputed respindent’s ownership over the property, arguing that the purported sale in the latter’s favor was never registered and therefore, not binding upon them. Further, they insisted that their certificate of title was already indefeasible, and cannot be attacked collaterally. Meanwhile, Anita filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC, claiming that it is ministerial on the court’s part following the consolidation of her and her husband’s title over the property. Impleaded in petition are Sps. Gutierrez, including all persons claiming rights under them. With this, the RTC granted the ex-parte petition, to which the respondents sought a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction that was granted in their favour. However, under the Sheriff’s return, the writ of possession was implemented. After further proceedings on the injunction case, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the property until after the controversy has been fully resolved on the merits. Sps. Marquez moved for reconsideration and respondents filed a Motion for Approval of Cash Bond and to Regain Possession of the property. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration but granted respondent’s motion. The CA denied Sps. Marquez’s petition. ISSUE: Whether writ of possession may be issued. RULING: It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor. Strictly, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a situation wherein the purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month period for redemption. Upon the purchaser’s filing of the ex parte petition and posting of the appropriate bond, the RTC shall, as a matter of course, order the issuance of the writ of possession in the purchaser’s favour. It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the

redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. The trial court has no discretion on this matter. Hence, any talk of discretion in connection with such issuance is misplaced. The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right. In the recent case of Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno, citing the case of China Banking Corp., the Court illumined that "the phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor’ contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a coowner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party adversely to the judgment obligor." In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, who had already consolidated their title over the extra-judicially foreclosed property, is merely ministerial in nature. The general rule as herein stated – and not the exception found under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules – should apply since Sps. Alindog hinged their claim over the subject property on their purported purchase of the same from its previous owner, i.e., Sps. Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the original mortgagor). Accordingly, it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Alindog are only the latter’s (Sps. Gutierrez) successors-in-interest who do not have a right superior to them. A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. v. EMMA MONDEJAR G.R. NO. 200804, JANUARY 22, 2014 J. Perlas-Bernabe Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy. FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent an amount representing unpaid water bills. Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision; that respondent and her family were unable to pay their water consumption despite repeated demands. In defense, respondent claimed that she religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate; that notwithstanding their agreement that the rate would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments far above the average daily water consumption. In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for not paying the adjusted water charges. The MTCC ruled in favour of respondent and disregarded the petitioner’s reliance on the HLURB decision as the source of petitioner’s authority to impose new rates. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC, to which the RTC dismissed finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy on small claim cases. RULING: Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that: SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties. The decision shall be final and unappealable. Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled: Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari. In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC’s apprehension that respondent’s recourse before it (was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims

cases, because it asks the court to supplant the decision of the lower court with another decision directing the private respondent to pay the petitioner a bigger sum than what has been awarded." Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy. In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling. Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition. AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS AND CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS v. ATTY. ELISEO M. CAMPOS A.C. NO. 8644, January 22, 2014 J. Reyes Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers. In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. FACTS: Eliseo and Aida were married and 2 children –Alistair and Charmaine – were born therefrom. Eliseo soon purchased a lot and thereafter applied for the issuance of a title in his son’s name, to which an Original Certificate of Title covering the property was issued in the son’s name. Subsequently, Eliseo filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. Thereafter he executed an Affidavit of Loss wherein he represented himself as the owner of the property covered by the OCT and further declared that he unknowingly lost the owner’s certificate of title. Later, he caused the annotation of the said affidavit in the copy of OCT. As such, Alistair filed a complaint for perjury against Eliseo, stating that the owner’s copy of OCT was in his possession and Eliseo was aware of such fact. Eliseo, however, insisted that he is the owner of the property covered by OCT as he never intended to give it to Alistair.

Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed for lack of probable cause Alistair’s complaint for perjury against Eliseo. Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed before the OCA an administrative complaint for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty against Eliseo, and a formal investigation was thereafter conducted. Pending the resolution of the administrative complaint, Eliseo resigned from his judicial post. Subsequently, after the conclusion of a hearing on the Annulment case, Judge Casalas called the parties for a conference in his chambers, however, a scuffle ensued inside the chamber. As such, a police blotter was filed indicating that Eliseo choked his daughter and attempted to box his son. Petitioners then filed a complaint for disbarment against Eliseo, alleging that Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in causing the issuance of OCT in Alistair’s name; misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot; falsely declaring under oath in the Affidavit of Loss that the owner’s copy of OCT is missing despite his knowledge that the said title is with Alistair; stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit admitting to his children that he has an intimate relation with another woman; and choking and boxing his children. This, the Court referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. During the hearing, Eliseo insisted that the allegations against him of immorality and psychological incapacity in having extra-marital affairs; and serious misconduct in the execution of the Affidavit of Loss need not be resolved anymore in the instant disbarment complaint since they are already the subjects of other pending cases. CBD recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the dismissal of the disbarment complaint against Eliseo for lack of evidence. The IBP Board of Governors, however, reversed the findings of CBD. ISSUE: Whether there is automatic conversion of administrative cases against judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. RULING: In Samson v. Caballero, the Court emphasized what "automatic conversion of administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers" means, viz: This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar," provides: "Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. x x x. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution." x x x x Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." xxx In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court. The above-cited case suggests the superfluity of instituting a disbarment complaint against a lawyer when an administrative case had been previously filed against him or her as a magistrate. Ideally therefore, the instant disbarment complaint should have been consolidated with A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761. However, it is well to note that Samson v. Caballero was promulgated by the Court on August 5, 2009 subsequent to the filing of the instant disbarment complaint on April 6, 2009. Further, while all the allegations in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are replicated in the instant disbarment complaint, the last issue of engagement in the scuffle is an addition to the latter. Hence, this Court shall now resolve the said issue to write finis to the parties’ bickerings. CARLITO VALENCIA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 198804, January 22, 2014 J. Reyes The rule on chain of custody under the foregoing enactments expressly demands the identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court. Moreover, as a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case, the prosecution must still prove that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. Further, the non-compliance

with the procedures must be justified by the State’s agents themselves. The arresting officers are under obligation, should they be unable to comply with the procedures laid down under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to explain why the procedure was not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their own convenience. FACTS: Valencia was charged in an Information with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Upon arraignment, Valencia pleaded not guilty, thus, trial ensued. According to the prosecution, P/Supt. Cuaton, received a call from a concerned citizen regarding the rampant sale of illegal drugs in Caloocan, causing for the organization a team to conduct surveillance and a possible buy-bust operation in the said area. The team immediately proceeded to the target area, wherein PO3 Modina and PO2 Rosales approached a group of 6 persons playing cara y cruz, and PO3 Modina posed as a bettor. While watching the game, PO3 Modina saw Valencia, place a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance as a bet. Thereupon, PO3 Modina introduced himself as a police officer, confiscated the plastic sachet, and arrested Valencia. When asked to empty his pockets, Valencia brought out another transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance from his right pocket. PO3 Modina then apprised Valencia of his constitutional rights and Valencia was brought to the police station, together with the confiscated transparent plastic sachets. At the police station, the two plastic sachets that were confiscated were turned over to PO2 Hipolito for investigation and were then marked by PO2 Hipolito, thereafter were sent to the crime laboratory for investigation. Upon examination, it yielded a positive result for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Valencia denied the allegations against him. The RTC convicted Valencia, which the CA affirmed by ruling that the prosecution was able to show an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs. ISSUE: Whether the rule on chain of custody was complied with. RULING: In the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and, in sustaining a conviction therefor, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug’s unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165 fails.

There must be strict compliance with the prescribed measures to be observed during and after the seizure of dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the custody and transfer thereof for examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court. The rule on chain of custody under the foregoing enactments expressly demands the identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court. Moreover, as a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. In People v. Gonzales, the Court explained that: The first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching, planting or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value. A perusal of the foregoing testimonies of PO3 Modina and PO2 Rosales shows that there are significant lapses in the chain of custody of the plastic sachets that were confiscated from Valencia. Indeed, while the prosecution was able to prove that the two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance that were confiscated from Valencia were marked as "CVC-1" and "CVC-2" by PO2 Hipolito, after the same were turned over to him at the police station for investigation, there was no showing that the marking had been done in the presence of Valencia or his representatives. Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case, the prosecution must still prove that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. Further, the non-compliance with the procedures must be justified by the State’s agents themselves. The arresting officers are under obligation, should they be unable to comply with the procedures laid down under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to explain why the procedure was not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law would

merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their own convenience. PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO G.R. NO. 173540, January 22, 2014 J. Perez While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents. Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence. Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that the loss may be shown by any person who knows the fact of its loss, or by anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument has indeed been lost. FACTS: This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now deceased. Respondent Tecla instituted a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina on the ground that Tecla, is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio. In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in rites officiated by the Parish Priest. According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, which however, were destroyed due to the war. Thus, only a Certification was issued by the LCR. Further, Tecla claimed that during the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four children. Howver, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. Later, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura who later died without any issue. Subsequently, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. On the contrary, Peregrina averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died in Davao City, as their

marriage was celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City, further contending that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio. Trial ensued and Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence. On the other hand, Peregrina testified and likewise presented documentary evidence, among which is the Marriage Contract between her and the Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979. The RTC denied Tecla’s petition, which decision was reversed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the original document. RULING: Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, we said, citing precedents, that: While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals. Thus: It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus: x x x The court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents. x x x x Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be proven by other competent evidence. Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that "the loss may be shown by any person who knows the fact of its loss, or by anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument has indeed been lost." In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELINO DADAO G.R. NO. 201860, January 22, 2014 J. Leonardo-De Castro The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of the witness, which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. Where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well-settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. FACTS: In an information, accused-appellants were charged of murder for the death of Yacapin. Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty and trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution presented several witnesses, including Ronie and Edgar the stepsons of the victim and Nenita the widow of the victim, as eyewitnesses. In his testimony, Ronie stated that he saw the appellants helping each other with the use of firearms and bolos, shot to death the victim in their house. This statement was corroborated by Edgar and Nenita. In all, the witnesses presented by prosecution all point to the appellants as the perpetrator of the crime. On the contrary, the

defense also presented witnesses to negate the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Amongst the defense’s witnesses are P/Insp. Armada, who testified that the paraffin test on the appellants yielded negative result; Eddie one of the accused who provided for an alibi, which was corroborated by his co-accused. The RTC found the accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged, which decision was affirmed by the CA. On petition to the SC, the appellants reiterate that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were afflicted with inconsistencies and improbabilities, thus, making them of doubtful veracity. ISSUE: Whether the eyewitness’ testimonies are credible to sustain conviction despite inconsistencies. RULING: We have consistently held in jurisprudence that the resolution of such a factual question is best left to the sound judgment of the trial court and that, absent any misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion, the findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed. In People v. De la Rosa,11 we yet again expounded on this principle in this wise: The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of the witness, which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. In the case at bar, no imputation of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses was ever made by appellants. Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well-settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness. Notwithstanding their conflicting statements on minor details, Ronie, Edgar and Nenita positively identified appellants as the perpetrators of the dastardly crime of murder committed on the victim which they categorically and consistently claimed to have personally witnessed. In order to counter the serious accusation made against them, appellants put forward the defense of alibi which necessarily fails in the face of positive identification. It is a time-honored principle in jurisprudence that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily

be fabricated and is inherently unreliable. Hence, it must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused. An examination of the record would indicate that Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi were unable to present a corroborating witness to support their alibi that they were working at a farm owned by a certain Boyle on the date and time of Pionio Yacapin’s murder. While the witnesses presented by the defense to corroborate the respective alibis of Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao consisted of friends and relatives who are hardly the disinterested witnesses that is required by jurisprudence. PEBLIA ALFARO AND THE HEIRS OF PROSPEROUS ALFARO v. SPOUSES EDITHO AND HERA DUMALAGAN G.R. NO. 186622, January 22, 2014 J. Perez Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. The Bagano case has been settled by the court having jurisdiction and was based on the merits. Nonetheless, the Bagano case and the present controversy does not point to similarity of the parties or to the cause of action presented, hence res judicata cannot be raised to bar determination of the issue. An independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence, such intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the scope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenor’s case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from that of the original parties; the proper course is for the would–be intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit. Intervention is not intended to change the nature and character of the action itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The remedy of intervention is not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial of the action. Hence, the issue of double sale as alleged cannot be injected into the Bagano case, which is based on facts peculiar to the transaction between Bagano and petitioners. FACTS: Bagano sold a lot, which is registered in his name, to petitioner Spouses Alfaro. Thereafter, petitioners caused the immediate transfer of title in their name and at the same time paid the real property tax thereon, and constructed a perimeter fence around it. However, respondents filed their claim thereto, alleging that they are the real owners of a portion of the property as evidenced by a Certificate of Completion and a Certificate of Occupancy as well as electric bills. It was further alleged that right after the respondents bought the same from Bagano, they immediately took possession of the property and constructed a nipa hut therein, which was later on leased to Quiñineza, who then occupied the subject property until end of 1997. Since then, several tenants have occupied the subject property, paying monthly rentals to respondent. Since then, several tenants have occupied the subject property, paying monthly rentals to respondent. Meanwhile, Spouses Bagano filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Sale with Damages and Preliminary Injunction against petitioners, wherein the SC sustained the validity of

the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between petitioners and Spouses Bagano. However, in the present case, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, which decision the CA reversed explaining that the petitioners cannot claim good faith as there were annotations written at the back of Bagano’s title. Motion for reconsider was denied, hence, this petition wherein, Spouses Alfaro claimed that the SC decision in the Bagano case constituted res judicata. ISSUE: 1. Whether the decision made by the SC in the Bagano case constituted res judicata. 2. Whether non-intervention by respondents in the Bagano case bound him by the judgment for bad faith and/or laches. RULING: Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. Our decision in the Bagano case on the merits has long been final. Also, the court a quo has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. However, on the issue on identity of parties and cause of action, We rule in the negative. In the Bagano case, the parties are herein petitioner Spouses Alfaro and the Spouses Bagano, as privies to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 June 1995. In the case at bar, the parties are petitioner Spouses Alfaro and respondent Spouses Dumalagan basing their rights on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3 December 1993. There is, thus, no identity of parties. In the Bagano case, the cause of action is the alleged forgery of the Deed of Absolute Sale by petitioners; the crux of the case being the validity of the sale between Bagano and petitioners. In the case at bar, the cause of action is the violation of right of ownership of respondent Spouses Dumalagan. Clearly, there is no identity of cause of action. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable in the case at bar. The appellate court did not reverse a Supreme Court decision. Petitioners’ claim must fail. In Mactan–Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Estanislao Miñoza, et. al., this Court clarified that: xxx an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence, such intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the scope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenor’s case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from that of the original parties; the proper course is for the would–be intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit. Intervention is not intended to change the nature and character of the action itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The remedy of intervention is not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial of the action.

In line with this ruling, the issue on double sale, which concerns the present case cannot be injected into the Bagano case, which is based on facts peculiar to the transaction between Bagano and petitioners. For one, herein respondents claim ownership of only a portion of the property litigated in the Bagano case, and the basis of respondents’ claim is a prior sale to them by Bagano, whose authority as a seller was an unquestioned fact. Neither of the parties in the second Bagano sale made any mention of the first sale of a part of the property to respondents.

DIONES BELZA v. DANILO T. CANONERO G.R. NO. 192479, January 27, 2014 J. Abad A client has of course the right to dismiss and replace his counsel of record as provided in the second paragraph of Section 26 above. But this assumes that such client has given counsel a notice of dismissal so the latter could immediately cease to represent him. Indeed, it would have been more prudent for newly hired counsel to refrain from entering his appearance in the case until he has ascertained that the previous counsel has been dismissed from it. Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC specifically requires that a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties. b) A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period of perfecting an appeal. Insisting on such requirement even on appeal is a prerogative of the NLRC under its rule making power considering the great volume of appeals filed with it from all over the country. FACTS: Petitioner DNB hired respondents as technicians assigned to repair and maintain its clients' electronic and communications equipment. Respondent technicians were particularly assigned at the Makati Medical Center, one of its clients. However, DNB lost in the bidding for the services it was rendering to the medical center. As a consequence, DNB terminated respondent technicians from employment without giving them new assignments or paying separation pays. Subsequently, respondent technicians filed a complaint against DNB for constructive illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation pay. Following DNB’s failure to file its position paper despite notice, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding it liable for illegal dismissal and ordering it to pay respondent technicians "backwages from the time they were dismissed up to the filing of the complaint" plus separation pay of one month salary for every year of service. DNB appealed but the NLRC dismissed the same as a non-perfected appeal given that DNB did not accompany its memorandum of appeal with the required certification of non-forum shopping. Later, DNB filed,

through new counsel, Atty. Carpio, a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC’s dismissal order with a belated certification of non-forum shopping. A few days later the original counsel of record, Atty. Claveria, filed for DNB a separate motion for reconsideration of the same order. The NLRC issued a Resolution ignoring the motion for reconsideration that Atty. Carpio filed for DNB considering that Atty. Claveria, the counsel of record, had not yet withdrawn from the case; and denying the motion for reconsideration that the latter counsel filed for lack of merit. This prompted DNB to appeal to the CA, which dismissed the petition and affirmed that of the NLRC. ISSUES: 1. Whether a client may dismiss counsel of record any time. 2.

Whether an appeal to the NLRC requires accompaniment of certification of non-forum shopping.

RULING: Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides: Section 26. Change of Attorneys.— An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party. A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place x x x. A client has of course the right to dismiss and replace his counsel of record as provided in the second paragraph of Section 26 above. But this assumes that such client has given counsel a notice of dismissal so the latter could immediately cease to represent him. Indeed, it would have been more prudent for newly hired counsel to refrain from entering his appearance in the case until he has ascertained that the previous counsel has been dismissed from it. As it happened, apparently unaware that Atty. Carpio had already filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Order dismissing DNB’s appeal, Atty. Claveria filed still another motion for reconsideration on its behalf. He had no inkling that his client had decided to replace him. Clearly, the fault in this case did not lie with the NLRC but with DNB which failed in its duty to inform Atty. Claveria of his dismissal. And, since DNB had no right to file two motions for reconsideration, the NLRC would have been well within its right to altogether disregard both motions. Instead, however, it chose the more lenient option of acting on the one filed by the original counsel of record who had not withdrawn from the case or been properly substituted. This action cannot be regarded as constituting grave abuse of discretion. b. Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC specifically requires the submission of such certification of non-forum shopping in appeals to the NLRC. Thus:

Section 4. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties. b) A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period of perfecting an appeal. The fact that DNB had not actually engaged in forum shopping is not an excuse for its failure to comply with the requirement, an omission that allowed the period for perfecting the appeal to run inexorably. The NLRC was, therefore, justified in dismissing DNB’s appeal. DNB points out that the requirement of certification of non-forum shopping has no meaning in relation to its appeal from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC since such a certification is required under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court only in initiatory pleadings and since it was respondent technicians, not DNB, who initiated the labor case with their complaint. But insisting on such requirement even on appeal is a prerogative of the NLRC under its rule making power considering the great volume of appeals filed with it from all over the country. In Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held that substantial compliance with the requirement may be allowed when justified under the circumstances but the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on NLRC's part when it found no such justification in this case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORO MANIGO G.R. NO. 194612, January 27, 2014 J. Del Castillo Factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their probative weight are given great respect if not conclusive effect, unless it ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, as in this case, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and have the offender apprehended and punished. In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the Court has adopted the totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into consideration: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the

witness’s degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. FACTS: Appellant was charged for the rape of AAA, a 13-year old minor, to which appellant pleaded not guilty. In the trial, the prosecution present AAA to testify as to the events that took place resulting to the crime charged. However, it appears that AAA’s testimony during trial and statement in her affidavit are somehow inconsistent. Further, the prosecution also presented the medical findings of the doctor that examined AAA, revealing swelling on the posterior portion of AAA’s private part. In his defense, appellant raised denial and alibi, claiming that there could have been no rape as appellant was at their home on the day of the alleged rape and that appellant does not know the victim. The RTC accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of "AAA" on how the incident happened and her positive identification of the appellant, thereby rejecting appellant’s defense of denial. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, sustaining the credibility of AAA and her out-of-court identification of appellant. ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the victim deserves full faith and credence, despite inconsistencies. RULING: "AAA’s" testimony deserves full faith and credence. Appellant’s contentions basically relate to the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its factual findings based thereon. "The legal aphorism is that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their probative weight are given great respect if not conclusive effect, unless it ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case." A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the case at bench is not an exception. Like the lower courts, we find the narration of "AAA" to be candid, frank and straightforward. There is nothing therein that appears to be unnatural or illogical. Moreover, "AAA’s" claim of rape is supported by the medical findings of Dr. Perez, another prosecution witness. "Where a victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place. A rape victim’s account is sufficient to support a conviction for rape if it is straightforward, candid and corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, as in the present case." Also, "courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, as in this case, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and have the offender apprehended and punished."

Insofar as the alleged inconsistency between "AAA’s" statements in her affidavit and testimony in open court is concerned, it has often been noted by this Court that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness, the latter should be given more weight since affidavits being taken ex-parte are usually incomplete and inaccurate. Besides, the inconsistency respecting the physical appearance of appellant has no bearing on the principal question of whether appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. Neither the failure of "AAA" to describe the tricycle will dent her credibility. Suffice it to say that these matters are not so material in the prosecution of the crime. In Vidar v. People, the Court laid down the following: In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the Court has adopted the totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into consideration: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Guided by the above, we find "AAA’s" out-of-court identification of appellant not tainted with any irregularity. THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, ALL SURNAMED DIMAGUILA v. JOSE AND SONIA A. MONTEIRO G.R. NO. 201011, January 27, 2014 J. Mendoza Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. In relation thereto, Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of

performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. FACTS: The respondent Spouses Monteiro filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages before the RTC, against the petitioners, wherein it was alleged that all the parties were coowners and prayed for the partition of a residential house and lot. Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila. The Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no co-ownership, alleging that the property, then owned by Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its southern-half portion assigned to Perfecto and the northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They further claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with the property as they were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano. During the course of the proceedings, several motions and notices were initiated. Upon resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint, which the RTC granted. The amended complaint abandoned the original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and other defendants. In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas' admission in their original answer that the subject property had been partitioned between Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. In contrary, the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject property was inherited by, and divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their original answer that it had been actually divided into southern and northern portions. Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial Partition mentioned only the division of the subject property "into two and share and share alike." Further, Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a certified true copy of the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners and Tolentino, a record officer of the DENR, testified that as part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of surveyed land, including cadastral maps from the region. Asuncion Dimaguilas also testified that their first counsel made a mistake when he alleged in their original answer that the property had already been partitioned into northern and southern portions between the two brothers, as the original answer had been rushed and they were never given a copy of it. The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and the CA affirmed such decision declaring that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a preponderance of evidence thru their presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, the cadastral map and the municipal assessor's records. It likewise ruled that the petitioners were estopped from denying their admission of partition after the respondent spouses had relied on their judicial admission. ISSUES: 1. Whether admission made in the course of proceeding in the same case was made through palpable mistake. 2. Whether there was a violation of the hearsay rule and best evidence rule.

RULING: Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them. This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Furthermore, the Court notes that this position was adopted by the petitioners only almost eight (8) years after their original answer was filed, in response to the amended complaint of the respondent spouses. In their original answer to the complaint for partition, their claim that there was already a partition into northern-half and southern-half portions, was the very essence of their defense. It was precisely this admission which moved the respondent spouses to amend their complaint. The petitioners cannot now insist that the very foundation of their original defense was a palpable mistake. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners' admission and so amended their original complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the property. Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners would actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to corroborate the petitioners' admission. Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record. Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person

in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they presented no evidence to contradict the evidence of the respondent spouses. Thus, even without the admission of the petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of evidence that there had indeed been a partition of the subject property. GRAND ASIAN SHIPPING LINES, INC., EDUARDO P. FRANCISCO AND WILLIAM HOW v. WILFREDO GALVEZ G.R. NO. 178184, January 29, 2014 J. Del castillo In order to perfect an appeal from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter granting monetary award, the Labor Code requires the posting of a bond, either in cash or surety bond, in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. Nonetheless, we have consistently held that rules should not be applied in a very rigid and strict sense. This is especially true in labor cases wherein the substantial merits of the case must accordingly be decided upon to serve the interest of justice. When there has been substantial compliance, relaxation of the Rules is warranted. In termination disputes, the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a just or valid cause rests on the employers. Failure on their part to discharge such burden will render the dismissal illegal. The quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. Here, the mere filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the dismissal valid. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees. However, the rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application when the employer denies having dismissed the employee. The employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal before shifting to the employer the burden of proving the validity of such dismissal. FACTS: Petitioner GASLI is a domestic corporation engaged in transporting LPG from Petron Corporation’s refinery to Petron’s Plant and Petron’s Depot, while respondents are crewmembers of one of GASLI’s vessels, M/T Dorothy Uno. Sometime in January 2000, one of the vessel’s Oilers, Abis reported to GASLI’s Office and Crewing Manager Montegrico, an alleged illegal activity being committed by respondents aboard the vessel. Abis revealed that a substantial volume of fuel oil is unconsumed and stored in the vessel’s fuel tanks. However,

Gruta would misdeclare it as consumed fuel in the Engineer’s Voyage Reports, with the saved fuel oil being siphoned and sold to other vessels out at sea. The proceeds thereof were then divide by respondents among themselves. Hence, an investigation on the alleged pilferage was conducted, which revealed for the period June 30, 1999 to February 15, 2000 fuel oil consumption was overstated. Subsequently, a formal complaint for qualified theft was filed against respondents, which respondents denied the charge by alleging that the complaint was based on conflicting and erroneous computation/estimates of fuel consumption. CIDG referred the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, which filed the corresponding Information for Qualified Theft with the RTC. Meanwhile, GASLI placed respondents under preventive suspension and after administrative hearings, decided to terminate respondents from employment. Respondents except Sales, were thus served with notices informing them of their termination for serious misconduct, willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime or offense against their employer. Respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, to which the Labor Arbiter found that the dismissal of the respondents were illegal as the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against them did not justify their termination from employment. Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal With A Very Urgent Motion to Reduce Bond before the NLRC and posted a cash bond. The NLRC denied petitioners’ motion to reduce bond and directing them to post an additional bond otherwise the appeal would be dismissed. Petitioners failed to comply with the Order, prompting respondents to move for the dismissal of the appeal. The NLRC later on reduced the amount of appeal bond and gave due course to petitioner’s appeal. Respondents filed their motion for reconsideration and petitioner their motion for partial reconsideration. The NLRC denied the motion of the respondents and granted that of the petitioners. On appeal to CA, the CA set aside the NLRC decision. ISSUES: 1. Whether strict implementation of the rules may be relaxed to avoid miscarriage of justice. 2. Whether the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just and valid cause. RULING: In order to perfect an appeal from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter granting monetary award, the Labor Code requires the posting of a bond, either in cash or surety bond, in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides: ART. 223. Appeal. – Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. Nonetheless, we have consistently held that rules should not be applied in a very rigid and strict sense. This is especially true in labor cases wherein the substantial merits of the case

must accordingly be decided upon to serve the interest of justice. When there has been substantial compliance, relaxation of the Rules is warranted. In the case at bench, petitioners appealed from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter awarding to crewmembers the amount of P7,104,483.84 by filing a Notice of Appeal with a Very Urgent Motion to Reduce Bond and posting a cash bond in the amount of P500,000.00 and a supersedeas bond in the amount of P1.5 million. We find this to be in substantial compliance with Article 223 of the Labor Code. It is true that the NLRC initially denied the request for reduction of the appeal bond. However, it eventually allowed its reduction and entertained petitioners’ appeal. We disagree with the CA in holding that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion as the granting of a motion to reduce appeal bond lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon showing of the reasonableness of the bond tendered and the merits of the grounds relied upon. Hence, the NLRC did not err or commit grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of petitioners’ appeal before it. In termination disputes, the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a just or valid cause rests on the employers. Failure on their part to discharge such burden will render the dismissal illegal. After examination of the evidence presented, however, we find that petitioners failed to substantiate adequately the charges of pilferage against respondents. "[T]he quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence. x x x Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise." Here, the mere filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the charge should be evaluated to see if the degree of proof is met to justify respondents’ termination. The affidavit executed by Montegrico simply contained the accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage, which allegations remain uncorroborated. "Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees." 54 The other bits of evidence were also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage. The findings made by GASLI’s port captain and internal auditor and the resulting certification executed by De la Rama merely showed an overstatement of fuel consumption as revealed in the Engineer’s Voyage Reports. The report of Jade Sea Land Inspection Services only declares the actual usage and amount of fuel consumed for a particular voyage. There are no other sufficient evidence to show that respondents participated in the commission of a serious misconduct or an offense against their employer. However, the rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application when the employer denies having dismissed the employee. The employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal before shifting to the employer the burden of proving the validity of such dismissal. We give credence to petitioners’ claim that Sales was not dismissed from employment. Unlike the other respondents, we find no evidence in the records to show that Sales was preventively suspended, that he was summoned and subjected to any administrative hearing and that he was given termination notice. From the records, it appears Sales was not among those preventively suspended on February 26, 2000. To bolster this fact, petitioners presented the Payroll Journal Register for the period March 1-15, 2000 showing that Sales was still included in the payroll and was not among those who were charged with an offense to warrant

suspension. In fact, Sales’ signature in the Semi-Monthly Attendance Report for February 26, 2000 to March 10, 2000proves that he continued to work as Chief Mate for the vessel M/T Dorothy Uno along with a new set of crewmembers. It is likewise worth noting that in the Supplemental Complaint Affidavit of Montegrico, Sales was not included in the list of those employees who were accused of having knowledge of the alleged pilferage. This only shows that he was never subjected to any accusation or investigation as a prelude to termination. Hence, it would be pointless to determine the legality or illegality of his dismissal because, in the first place, he was not dismissed from employment. UNILEVER PHILIPPINES, INC. v. MICHAEL TAN a.k.a. PAUL D. TAN G.R. NO. 179367, January 29, 2014 J. Brion The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is essentially an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation; and their findings with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally not subject to review by the Court. Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is "probability of guilt." FACTS: Agent of the NBI applied for issuance of search warrants for the search of a warehouse allegedly owned by respondent, wherein it is alleged that the respondent had in his possession counterfeit shampoo products which were being sold or intended to be disposed of, in violation of Section 168, in relation with Section 170, of RA 8293 or Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. On the same day, Judge Eugenio, Jr. granted the application and issued Search Warrants. Armed with the search warrants, the NBI searched the premises and seized the alleged counterfeit shampoo products. The NBI thereafter filed with the DOJ a complaint against the respondent for violation of R.A. No. 8293. Respondent claimed that he is "Paul D. Tan," and not "Michael Tan" as alluded in the complaint; he is engaged in the business of selling leather goods and raw materials for making leather products, and he conducts his business under the name "Probest International Trading," registered with DTI; he is not engaged in the sale of counterfeit Unilever shampoo products; the

sachets of Unilever shampoos seized from his are genuine shampoo products which they use for personal consumption; he does not own and does not operate the searched warehouse. State Prosecutor Abad of the DOJ dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence. The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ, which the Acting Secretary of Justice, Merceditas N. Gutierrez, dismissed. Petitioner thereafter sought, but failed, to secure a reconsideration. As such, petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner failed to establish facts and circumstances that would constitute acts of unfair competition. Under the present petition, petitioner argues that while it may be possible that the respondent is not the owner of the warehouse, the overwhelming pieces of evidence nonetheless prove that he is the owner of the counterfeit shampoo products found therein. The petitioner also maintains that the voluminous counterfeit shampoo products seized from the respondent are more than sufficient evidence to indict him for unfair competition. ISSUE: Whether the determination of probable cause lies within the competence of the public prosecutor. RULING: The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is essentially an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation; and their findings with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally not subject to review by the Court. Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts can neither override their determination nor substitute their own judgment for that of the latter. They cannot likewise order the prosecution of the accused when the prosecutor has not found a prima facie case. Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. The Constitution itself allows (and even directs) court action where executive discretion has been gravely abused. In other words, the court may intervene in the executive determination of probable cause, review the findings and conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or nonexistence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. An examination of the decisions of the State Prosecutor and of the DOJ shows that the complaint’s dismissal was anchored on the insufficiency of evidence to establish the

respondent’s direct, personal or actual participation in the offense charged. As the State Prosecutor found (and affirmed by the DOJ), the petitioner failed to prove the ownership of the warehouse where counterfeit shampoo products were found. This finding led to the conclusion that there was insufficient basis for an indictment for unfair competition as the petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that the respondent was the owner or manufacturer of the counterfeit shampoo products found in the warehouse. The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is "probability of guilt." Its determination, too, does not call for the application of rules or standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. Thus, in concluding that there is probable cause, it suffices that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the very offense charged. It is also important to stress that the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented. As previously discussed, these matters are better ventilated during the trial proper of the case. FEBRUARY 2014 THE NAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 191215, February 3, 2014 J. Del Castillo A petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days. However, there are exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day period rule, such as (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. However, the counting 60 days from private respondent’s counsel’s receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009 to file her petition or a motion for extension, as September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009, which date is beyond the expiration of the period sought to be extended.

FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint for death benefits unpaid salaries, sickness allowance, refund of medical expenses against petitioner, alleging that she is the widow of Guillermo Mendigorin who was employed by petitioner and died of colon cancer during term of employment contract. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favour of private respondent, which the NLRC reversed. Private respondent moved for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit. Later, she received NLRC’s resolution and 62 days thereafter, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari before the CA alleging that her counsel was saddled and occupied with equally important cases, thus it would be impossible for him to file the petition on time. Later, private respondent filed her Petition for Certiorari before the CA, but the CA noted that private respondent’s Petition for Certiorari was filed 15 days late and suffers from procedural infirmities. Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the CA entertained the petition and directed private respondent to cure the technical flaws in her petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Dismiss private respondent’s Motion for Extension to File Petition for Certiorari for being an absolutely prohibited pleading. Petitioners also contended that even assuming that an extension is still allowable, private respondent’s motion for extension is nevertheless a useless piece of paper as it was filed beyond the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari. The CA denied petitioners’ motion and gave private respondent one last opportunity to fully comply with its Resolution by submitting clear and legible copies of the still lacking pleadings within five days from notice thereof. Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. RULING: In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. we had the occasion to settle the seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. In said case we stated that the general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s sound discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. "If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that ‘no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.’ Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the court’s sound discretion." Then in Labao v. Flores, we laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day period rule, thus: [T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4)

the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel’s receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009 to file her petition or a motion for extension, as September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009. It is a fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have become final and executory. Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of the litigant invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was unable to abide by the rules. Here, the reason offered for availing of the motion for extension is the heavy workload of private respondent’s counsel, which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated in Labao. Time and again, we have held that the excuse of "heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule." Thus, private respondent’s motion for extension should have been denied outright. We do not approve of the CA’s ruling on the matter because, as the motion for extension should have been denied outright, it necessarily follows that the Petition for Certiorari is, in the words of petitioners, a "mere scrap of paper with no remedial value whatsoever." In Negros Slashers, Inc. v. Teng, which likewise dealt with the late filing of a petition for certiorari, we recognized that although procedural rules ought to be strictly enforced by courts in order to impart stability in the legal system, we have, nonetheless, relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure in several cases to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is because the ends of justice would be better served if the parties were given the chance to argue their causes and defenses. We are likewise constantly reminded that the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the opposing claims of the competing parties and always be guided by the principle that procedure must not hinder but, rather, promote the administration of justice. Concomitant thereto: Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity. THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO G.R. NO. 175723 , February 4, 2014 J. Peralta There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the

instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. A perusal of RA 9282 amending RA 1125 would show that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it. The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. On the strength of the constitutional provisions under Article VIII, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. FACTS: Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, assessed taxes against private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay assessment under protest. However, private respondents filed a complaint denominated for Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They further averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice. RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction causing petitioners to file a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied. Thereafter, petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the RTC orders, but the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition, since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals. ISSUES: 1. Whether Rule 65 petition for certiorari is the proper remedy. 2. Whether the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. RULING: 1. Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such

dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari. 2. A perusal of the above provisions (RA 9282 amending RA 1125) would show that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it. The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v. COMELEC, Garcia v. De Jesus, Veloria v. COMELEC, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, this Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such power. It must be observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, these rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 8249 now provides that the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of BP 129 gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total. Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice. UNITED TOURIST PROMOTIONS vs. HARLAND B. KEMPLIN G.R. No. 205453, February 5, 2014 J. Reyes It is settled that Rule 45 limits us merely to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. The Court is generally bound by the CA’s factual findings, except only in some instances, among which is, when the said findings are contrary to those of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated. The steps on how to comply with procedural due process in terminating an employee: (1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. (2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or (3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.

Although letters were sent to Kemplin, such letters were lame attempt to comply with the notice requirement, for the charges against Kemplin were not specified. Further, it merely made a declaration on the expiration of the employment, without however, specifying the criminal suits filed against Kemplin. FACTS: In 1995, Jersey, with the help of two American expatriates, Kemplin and the late Mike Dunne, formed UTP. UTP employed Kemplin to be its President for a period of five years "renewable for the same period, subject to new terms and conditions". Howeverm Kemplin continued to render his services to UTP even after his fixed term contract of employment expired. Further, Kemplin, signing as President of UTP, entered into advertisement agreements with Pizza Hut and M. Lhuillier. Thus, UTP’s legal counsel sent Kemplin a letter, informing Kemplin that his Employment Contract had been expired. As such, Kemplin filed before the NLRC a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries, 13 th month and separation pay against UTP and its officers. Kemplin claimed that even after the expiration of his employment contract he rendered his services as President and General Manager of UTP. UTP, on its part, argued that the termination letter sent to Kemplin was based on the expiration of the fixed term employment contract and an employer’s prerogative to terminate an employee, who commits criminal and illegal acts prejudicial to business. The Labor Arbiter found that Kemplin was illegally dismissed. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision explaining that after the expiration of Kemplin’s term of employment, his employment until separation is classified as regular. The CA affirmed the LA and NLRC decision, ruling that the the validity of an employer’s dismissal from service hinges on the satisfaction of the two substantive requirements for a lawful termination. In support of their petition, UTP and Jersey reiterate their averments that Kemplin is a fugitive from justice since warrants of arrest for grave oral defamation and grave coercion had been issued against him by the MTC of Pasay City, and for qualified theft by the RTC of Angeles City. ISSUE: Whether there is substantial evidence to the decision. RULING: It is settled that Rule 45 limits us merely to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. The Court is generally bound by the CA’s factual findings, except only in some instances, among which is, when the said findings are contrary to those of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated. In the case before us now, the LA, NLRC and CA uniformly ruled that Kemplin was dismissed sans substantive and procedural due process. While we need not belabor the first two factual issues presented herein, it bears stressing that we find the rulings of the appellate court and the labor tribunals as amply supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, we note the advertisement agreements with Pizza Hut and M. Lhuillier entered into by Kemplin, who signed the documents as President of UTP on May 12, 2009, or more than two years after the supposed expiration of his employment contract. They validate Kemplin’s claim that he, indeed, continued to render his services as President of UTP well beyond March 2, 2007. Moreover, in the letter dated July 30, 2009, Kemplin was ordered to cease and desist from entering the premises of UTP.

In Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Maria Ruby M. Rivera, the Court laid down in detail the steps on how to comply with procedural due process in terminating an employee, viz: (1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees. (2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement. (3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment. Prescinding from the above, UTP’s letter sent to Kemplin on July 30, 2009 is a lame attempt to comply with the twin notice requirement provided for in Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The charges against Kemplin were not clearly specified. While the letter stated that Kemplin’s employment contract had expired, it likewise made general references to alleged criminal suits filed against him. Corollarily, in the absence of a hearing and investigation, the existence of just cause to terminate Kemplin could not have been sufficiently established. SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO G.R. NO. 185145, February 5, 2014 J. Del Castillo As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25. One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness

stand as its witness. Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand. Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. In the case, Metrobank’s officers were sought to be presented by the petitioner as its initial witness and to present documents in the possession of Metrobank, which move cannot be allowed in the petitioner’s presentation of its evidence-in-chief. FACTS: Petitioners, spouses Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against respondents Metrobank and Ortega. Upon the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobank’s officers to appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ land. With this, Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that the Motion must be denied for lack of proper notice of hearing as it is a litigated motion. Petitioners replied by stating that the lack of proper notice was cured by Metrobank’s filing of Opposition, hence the defect may be ignored. The RTC denied petitioner Motion. Motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied. Subsequently, petition for certiorari was raised to the CA, which it later on dismissed holding that petitioners’ Motion is a litigated motion that requires a proper notice of hearing to the parties specifying the date and time of hearing, as contained under Section 4 and 5 of Rule 15. Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence, the present Petition. ISSUE: Whether the request by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do not require notice to other parties to the action. RULING: As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25. One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written interrogatories might bring. Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony, compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its

case through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling party’s cause. Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand. Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the court’s precious time, if not pointless entertainment. In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly authorized agents – as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access to Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own defense. It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the adverse party who has not served written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very principles of justice and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to prosecute and build their case from the start. This they may not be allowed to do. PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES vs. GLENN SALVADOR and DORY ANN PARCON G.R. NO. 190621, February 10, 2014 J. Del Castillo In a buy-bust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the items seized from the accused will not render his arrest illegal or the items confiscated from him inadmissible in evidence as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the said items have been preserved. FACTS: An Information for violation of Section 5 (illegal sale), Article II of RA 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was filed against appellant and Parcon, while an Information for violation of Section 11(illegal possession) of Article II, RA 9165 was filed against Parcon. Upon motion of the prosecution, the cases were consolidated.

The prosecution presented PO2 Sofjan Soriano (PO2 Soriano) to testify on the entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of appellant and Parcon. Trial ensued. Parcon failed to attend the scheduled hearings, hence, she was tried in absentia. To claim innocence, Salvador used denial and frame up as a defense. The RTC rendered a decision finding Salvador and Parcon guilty of the offenses charged. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this appeal filed by Salvador. ISSUE: Whether Salvador is guilty of the offense charged RULING: All the elements for the prosecution of illegal sale of shabu were sufficiently established in this case. Prosecutions for illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Their narration of the incident, "buttressed by the presumption that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, must be given weight." Here, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling that the testimonies and facts stipulated upon were consistent with each other as well as with the physical evidence. Thus, there is no justification to disturb the findings of the RTC, as sustained by the CA, on the matter. The defenses of denial and frame-up are unavailing. Denial cannot prevail against the positive testimony of a prosecution witness. "A defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative matters." Appellant cannot likewise avail of the defense of frame-up which "is viewed with disfavor since, like alibi, it can easily be concocted and is a common ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law." To substantiate this defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show that the buy-bust team was inspired by improper motive or was not properly performing its duty. Non-compliance with Section 21(Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photographed the objects confiscated does not ipso facto result in the unlawful arrest of the accused or render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. This is due to the proviso added in the implementing rules stating that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have not been preserved. "What is crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved for they will be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." "The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as long as the chain of custody of the same are duly established." "‘Chain of Custody’ means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of

the person who had temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition." There are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, namely: "first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and, fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court." In this case, the prosecution established clearly the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu. Lastly, appellant’s argument that the entrapment operation is fatally flawed for failure of the buy-bust team to coordinate with the PDEA deserves scant consideration. "Coordination with PDEA, while perhaps ideal, is not an indispensable element of a proper buy-bust operation;" it is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR G.R. NO. 189538, February 10, 2014 J. Peralta While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of. FACTS: Respondent requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the MTCC, Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of Olaybar, the RTC granted the petition for cancellation of entries in Olaybar’s marriage contract. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding

RULING: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy is granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated. A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, and other related laws. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts, as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al. vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO.183191, February 11, 2014 J. Villarama The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. FACTS: Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, Frannie Greenmeadows Pastures, Inc., Isabel Greenland Agri-based Resources, Inc., Isabel Evergreen Plantations, Inc., Michelle Farms, Inc., Isabel Greenmeadows Quality Products, Inc., Ernesto Baricuatro, Claudio Villo, and Efren Nuevo (hereinafter, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al.) are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental. The landholding consists of a total area of 641. 7895 hectares - about 200 hectares thereof are devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed 479.8905 hectares of the said landholding under the coverage of RA 6657 between March 1995 and July 2000. Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were subsequently issued in favor of the agrarian reform beneficiaries. On June 10, 2004, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, a Petition for Declaration of Unconstitutionality Through Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order against the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the DAR, and the beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), docketed as Special Civil Action No. 04-02-V. The DAR filed its Answer. Subsequently, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition and for Admission of the Amended Petition in order to change the nature of the action from a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to an ordinary action of annulment of land titles. The DAR, et al. opposed the motion. On October 26, 2004 RTC it issued the Order admitting the amended petition and ruling that it had jurisdiction over the case. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Order of the RTC directing it to dismiss the civil action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the original and amended petitions filed by Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al

RULING: In the case at bar, the CA has correctly and succinctly synthesized that both the original petition for the "Declaration of Unconstitutionality Through Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order" and the amended petition for "Judicial Review Through an Action to Annul Titles, and Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunctions with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order" contain the same allegations. The case at bar deals with acts of the DAR and the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of RA 6657 - issues which do not involve the "special jurisdiction" of the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court. Hence, when the court a quo heard and decided the instant case, it did so without jurisdiction. All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature." In said case, it was noted that the main thrust of the allegations in the Complaint was the propriety of the Notice of Coverage and "not x x x the 'pure question of law' spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 - but x x x the annulment of the DAR' s Notice of Coverage." In this case, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. cloaked the issue as a constitutional question - assailing the constitutionality of administrative issuances promulgated to implement the agrarian reform law - in order to annul the titles issued therein. It is, however, evident that the constitutional angle was an attempt to exclude the case from the ambit of the jurisdictional prescriptions under RA 6657. In case of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies, 'even if the question[s] involved [are] also judicial in character. In the instant case, however, there is hardly any doubt that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Consequently, it did not have authority to perform any of the following: order the admission of the amended petition of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al., decide the amended petition on the merits, or issue a permanent prohibitory injunction. In any case, such injunction issued by the RTC is a nullity in view of the express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Court's Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002 enjoining all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, viz.: SECTION 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. - No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program. SATURNINO C. OCAMPO vs. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, et al. G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014 Sereno, CJ. Issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance of a warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact that are normally not within the purview of a petition for certiorari, such as the petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases.

FACTS: P C/Insp. Almaden of the PNP sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte. The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members. The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP. Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation VD. Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP. Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty. On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the Order of Judge Abando and the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero. Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others was then pending before the RTC Makati. Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion. ISSUES: 1. Whether the preliminary investigation was validly conducted 2. Whether Ocampo was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero 3. Whether petitioner availed of the proper remedy in this case 4. Whether there is double jeopardy RULING: On the validity of the preliminary investigation A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice. In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.

The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's defense. What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process. Pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses. Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Ocampo, Lim, Palejaro and Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Ladlad and Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their respective counsels. Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses. In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. On Ocampo’s right to appeal the resolution of Prosecutor Vivero As to Ocampo’s claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal: Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied) On whether petitioner availed of the proper remedy in this case At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance of a warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact that are normally not within the purview of a petition for certiorari, such as the petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases. On whether there is double jeopardy The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against petitioners prior to a determination by the trial court that the murders were committed in furtherance of rebellion. We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows. The proof

showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions. As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit: SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n) If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy. Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states: SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment. To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others. However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944. Even before the indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and

Ladlad had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and independence. When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944. We eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach. P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN vs. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA'O G.R. NO. 205956, February 12, 2014 J. Mendoza The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. However, A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice. FACTS: Petitioner P/Supt. Marantan is the respondent in G.R. No. 199462, a petition filed on December 6, 2011, but already dismissed although the disposition is not yet final. Respondent La ‘O is one of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty. Diokno is her counsel therein. G.R. No. 199462 relates to criminal cases pending before the RTC Branch 256 of Pasig City, where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide. In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in the Province of Quezon, where Marantan was the ground commander in a police-military team, which resulted in the death of thirteen men (Atimonan incident). This encounter, according to Marantan, elicited much negative publicity for him. Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan incident, La’O and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and one Ernesto Manzano, organized and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press conference. During the press conference, they maliciously made intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in handling G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC, branding Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident. ISSUE: Whether respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court RULING: The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the

administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: x x x (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.] The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to be protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights. The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462. As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court. As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLITA PALOMARES y COSTUNA G.R. No. 200915, February 12, 2014 J. Abad In the case at bar, the evidence is unclear as to where the responsible police officer marked the seized substance and whether it was done in Merlita’s presence. In fact, it is also not clear

from the evidence which police officer did the marking. This uncertainty concerning a vital element of the crime warrants overturning the judgment of conviction. Though Merlita's denial and alibi as a defense are weak, such cannot relieve the prosecution the burden of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an illegal transaction actually took place. FACTS: On March 21, 2007 the City Public Prosecutor charged Merlita with selling prohibited drugs in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 before the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Manila in Criminal Case 07-251767. On March 18, 2008, the trial court found Merlita guilty as charged and sentenced her to life imprisonment with a fine of P500,000.00 and liability for the cost of suit. Upon review, the CA rendered judgment, affirming in full the RTC Decision, hence, the present appeal to this Court. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding, like the RTC before it, that the prosecution succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that accused Merlita sold dangerous drugs in violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 RULING: To secure conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the identity of the prohibited drug seized from the accused must be proved with moral certainty. The prosecution must establish with such measure of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered as evidence in court. Proof of the chain of custody from the time of seizure to the time such evidence is presented in court ensures the absence of doubt concerning the integrity of such vital evidence. This requires as a minimum that the police mark the seized item (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation. Of course, the Court has ruled that immediate marking could be made at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. Here, however, the evidence is unclear as to where the responsible police officer marked the seized substance and whether it was done in Merlita’s presence. In fact, it is also not clear from the evidence which police officer did the marking since P02 Mallari and P02 Flores gave conflicting testimonies on this point. This uncertainty concerning a vital element of the crime warrants overturning the judgment of conviction. Besides, neither P02 Mallari nor P02 Flores testified that they conducted a physical inventory and took photos of the article that was seized from Merlita. In fact, their joint affidavit of arrest made no mention of any inventory taking or photographing of the same. And they did not bother at all to offer some justification for the omission. Parenthetically, barangay kagawad Lizano, an elected public official, testified that he saw the police officers enter Merlita's shanty and arrest her on the date in question. This testimony from a neutral party strikes at the heart of the prosecution's theory that they arrested Merlita at Unit 52, Building 8, of Paradise Heights in Balut, Tondo. Though Merlita's denial and alibi as a defense are weak, such

cannot relieve the prosecution the burden of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an illegal transaction actually took place. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BIGNAY EX-IM PHILIPPINES, INC G.R. NO. 171590, February 12, 2014 J. Del Castillo Non-payment of docket fees is a jurisdictional defect. Anent the counterclaims interposed by defendant for the collection of certain sum of money adverted earlier hereof, this Court could not exercise jurisdiction over the same as defendant did not pay the docket fees therefor. Although the counterclaims were denominated as compulsory in the answer, the matters therein alleged were not connected with the plaintiff’s complaint. The counterclaims could stand independently from the plaintiff’s complaint hence they are a sic permissive counterclaims. FACTS: On March 21, 1994, Bignay filed Civil Case No. 94-1129 for breach of warranty against eviction under Articles 1547 and 1548 of the Civil Code, with damages, against Union Bank and Robles. Union Bank interposed a Motion to Dismiss grounded on lack of or failure to state a cause of action, claiming that it made no warranties in favor of Bignay when it sold the property to the latter. The RTC deferred the resolution of the motion on finding that the ground relied upon did not appear to be indubitable. Union Bank thus filed its Answer Ad Cautelam, where it alleged that Bignay was not an innocent purchaser for value. It interposed a counterclaim as well, grounded on two promissory notes signed by Siy in favor of the bank – 1) Promissory Note No. 90-1446 dated December 20, 1990 for the amount of P1.5 million payable on demand with annual interest of 33%, and 2) Promissory Note No. 91-0286 dated February 26, 1991 for the amount of P2 million payable on demand with annual interest of 30% – which resulted in outstanding liabilities, inclusive of interest and penalties, in the total amount of more than P10.4 million as of December 20, 1996. Evidence for the main action and for the counterclaim were received by the trial court. The RTC held that Bignay was entitled to the return of the value of the, as well as the cost of the building erected thereon, since Union Bank acted in bad faith. At the same time, the trial court held that the bank’s counterclaim was not at all connected with Bignay’s Complaint, which makes it a permissive counterclaim for which the docket fees should accordingly be paid. Since the bank did not pay the docket fees, the trial court held that it did not acquire jurisdiction over its counterclaim; thus, it dismissed the same. The Court of Appeals rendered a judgment ordering Bignay to pay Union Bank the principal amounts due under the promissory notes plus the stipulated interests and stipulated penalty charges from date of maturity of the loans until full payment thereof. The CA held that Union Bank timely paid the docket fees at the time it filed its Answer Ad Cautelam as shown by official receipts to such effect and the rubberstamped mark on the face of the answer itself. It added that since the trial court received the bank’s evidence on the counterclaim during trial, it should have made a ruling thereon. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the court can dismiss permissive counterclaims in the event of non-payment of docket fees for the said counterclaims

RULING: Bignay correctly observes that if the bank indeed paid the docket fees therefor, the trial court would have so held in its March 21, 2000 Decision; yet in its judgment, the trial court specifically declared that the docket fees remained unpaid at the time of its writing. Anent the counterclaims interposed by defendant for the collection of certain sum of money adverted earlier hereof [sic], this Court could not exercise jurisdiction over the same as defendant did not pay the docket fees therefor. Although the counterclaims were denominated as compulsory in the answer, the matters therein alleged were not connected with the plaintiff’s complaint. The counterclaims could stand independently from the plaintiff’s complaint hence they are a [sic] permissive counterclaims. During the pre-trial, this Court had already ruled that the counterclaims were permissive yet the records showed that defendant had not paid the docket fees. This Court therefore has not acquired jurisdiction over said case. And if it is true that the bank paid the docket fees on its counterclaim as early as in 1994, it would have vigorously insisted on such fact after being apprised of the trial court’s March 21, 2000 Decision. It is indeed surprising that the supposed payment was never raised by the bank in a timely motion for reconsideration, considering that the trial court dismissed its counterclaim; if there is any opportune time to direct the court’s attention to such payment and cause the counterclaim to be reinstated, it was at that point and no other. All it had to do was prove payment by presenting to the court the official receipts or any other acceptable documentary evidence, and thus secure the proper reversal of the ruling on its counterclaim. Still, nothing was heard from the bank on the issue, until it filed its brief with the CA on appeal. Indeed, "whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance." More than the above, this Court finds true and credible the trial court's express declaration that no docket fees have been paid on the bank's counterclaim; the trial court's pronouncement enjoys the presumption of regularity. Indeed, the sudden appearance of the receipts supposedly evidencing payment of the "docket fees is highly questionable and irregular, and deserves to be thoroughly investigated; the actuations of the bank relative thereto go against the common experience of mankind, if they are not entirely anomalous. ATTY. EMMANUEL D. AGUSTIN, et al. vs. ALEJANDRO CRUZ-HERRERA G.R. NO. 174564, February 12, 2014 J. Reyes It has been repeatedly emphasized that in the case of natural persons, the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties themselves and not by the attorney. The certification against forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by the attorney. For such certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Hence, the petition is dismissible outright for being accompanied by a defective certification of non-forum shopping having been signed by Atty. Agustin instead of the complainants as the principal parties. FACTS:

Respondent Herrera was the President of Podden while complainants were assemblers and/or line leader assigned at the production department. In 1993, the complainants were terminated from employment due to financial reverses. Upon verification, however, with the Department of Labor and Employment, no such report of financial reverses or even retrenchment was filed. This prompted the complainants to file a complaint for illegal dismissal, monetary claims and damages against Podden and Herrera. They engaged the services of Atty. Agustin to handle the case. The Labor Arbiter issued an order to immediately reinstate the complainants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with full backwages from date of dismissal up to actual date of reinstatement. Podden and Herrera were further ordered to pay complainants their money claims representing their underpayment of wages, 13th month pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days and service incentive leave pay to be computed by the Fiscal Examiner of the Research, Information and Computation Unit of the Commission in due time. Podden and Herrera were furthermore ordered to pay each complainant moral and exemplary damages, as well as ten (10%) of the total awards as attorney’s fee. No appeal was taken from the foregoing judgment hence, a motion for execution was filed. Herrera filed a Manifestation and Motion to deny issuance of the writ stating, among others, that Podden ceased operations on almost four years before judgment was rendered by the LA on the illegal dismissal complaint and that nine of the eleven employees have executed Waivers and Quitclaims rendering any execution of the judgment inequitable. Atty. Agustin opposed Herrera’s motion and argued that the issuance of a writ of execution is ministerial because the LA decision has long been final and executory there being no appeal taken therefrom. He further claimed that the alleged Waivers and Quitclaims were part of a scheme adopted by Podden to evade its liability and defraud the complainants. The LA denied the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The LA sustained as valid the Waivers and Quitclaims signed by all and not just nine of the complainants. The NLRC reversed the LA Order for the reason that it unlawfully amended, altered and modified the final and executory LA Decision. The quitclaims were also held invalid based on the unconscionably low amount received by each of the complainants as against the judgment award for each individual complainant. Herrera filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the issuances of the NLRC. During the pendency of the petition, a joint compromise agreement was submitted to the CA. The CA approved the joint compromise agreement and entered judgment in accordance therewith. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the petition filed by Atty. Agustin is meritorious RULING: The petition is dismissible outright for being accompanied by a defective certification of nonforum shopping having been signed by Atty. Agustin instead of the complainants as the principal parties. Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it

actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification. The Court has espoused leniency and overlooked such procedural misstep in cases bearing substantial merit complemented by the written authority or general power of attorney granted by the parties to the actual signatory. However, no analogous justifiable reasons exist in the case at bar neither do the claims of Atty. Agustin merit substantial consideration to justify a relaxation of the rule. It cannot be said that Herrera negotiated for the compromise agreement in bad faith. It remains undisputed that Podden has ceased operations almost four years before the LA Decision was rendered. In view thereof, the implementation of the award became unfeasible and a compromise settlement was more beneficial to the complainants as it assured them of reparation, albeit at a reduced amount. This was the same situation prevailing at the time when Herrera manifested and reiterated before the CA that a concession has been reached by the parties. Thus, the motivating force behind the settlement was not to deprive or prejudice Atty. Agustin of his fees, but rather the inability of a dissolved corporation to fully abide by its adjudged liabilities and the certainty of payment on the part of the complainants. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PATENTES Y ZAMORA G.R. NO. 190178, February 12, 2014 J. Perez The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law. The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the quantum of proof to support a conviction. FACTS: AAA alleged that Patentes forcibly took her to his house on December 5, 1998 and raped her for more than a week. To free herself from her predicament, AAA promised to marry Patentes and convinced him to accompany her to her mother to tell the latter about their marital plans. Patentes on the other hand, argues that their December 5 meeting was pursuant to their previous agreement. AAA stayed in appellant’s house together with the latter’s relatives. AAA slept in the same room with appellant and had consented sexual intercourse. Throughout AAA’s stay, she was free to roam around the house and even helped in the household chores. Pursuant to their marital plans, AAA’s grandfather went to appellant’s house on 7 December 1998. As a result, they agreed to set the wedding date on 27 May 1999. Appellant’s mother also went to AAA’s house to discuss the marital plans on 14 December 1998. However, AAA’s mother rejected the marriage proposal because of appellant’s social standing.

Eight sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape were filed by AAA against Patentes where RTC rendered a decision finding the latter guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC with modification. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether Patentes is guilty of the crime charged RULING: Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident as the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. Nevertheless, the Court must be guided by established principles. In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. So long as the private complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the quantum of proof to support a conviction. We are mindful that appellant’s bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers. There is such corroboration in this case. To support its sweetheart theory, the defense presented appellant and AAA’s common friend, Enriquez, who attested to the veracity of appellant’s claim. A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation. The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law. RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 188694, February 12, 2014 J. Perslas-Bernabe Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The rule is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal. FACTS: On March 24, 1995, Dario requested Atibula to insert a Decision dated September 26, 1968 in one of the volumes of the CA Original Decisions, but Atibula refused. Atienza later offered Atibula the amount of P50,000.00 in exchange for Volume 260, which the latter turned down. Atibula reported the incident to Atty. Macapagal, the Assistant Chief of the CA Reporter’s Division, who then instructed him to hide Volumes 260, 265 and 267 in a safe place. On May 9, 1995, Atibula discovered that Volume 266 was missing. He immediately reported the same to Atty. Macapagal. On May 18, 1995, a certain Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporter’s Division, handed to Atibula a bag containing the missing Volume 266. He claimed that it was Castro who asked him to deliver the said package to Atibula. Atibula compared the contents of Volume 266 with the index of the decisions and noticed that there were two new documents inserted therein. Consequently, Atibula reported his findings to Atty. Macapagal who, in turn, informed Atty. Tablate, then Chief of the CA Reporter’s Division, of the same. They tried to verify the genuineness, authenticity and existence of the subject resolution and decision, and found that the compilation of the duplicate original decisions/resolutions of Justice Enriquez did not bear the said promulgations. Atty. Tablate reported the incident to then CA Presiding Justice Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. who immediately requested the NBI to conduct an investigation on the matter. The NBI investigation found that: (a) Volume 266 had indeed been altered; and (b) the signatures of the CA Justices in the subject resolution and and their standard/sample signatures "were not written by one and the same person," leading to the conclusion that the questioned signatures were forgeries. Meanwhile, sometime in the second week of July 1995, an inspection of the air-conditioning units at the office of the CA Reporter’s Division was conducted. Said investigation yielded the following findings: (a) there were no signs of forcible entry; (b) the perpetrators gained entry to the office of the CA Reporter’s Division "by passing through the hole on the concrete wall after removing the air conditioning unit" located on the right most [sic] end from the main door; (c) there was conspiracy to commit the crime of Falsification of Public Document between Atienza and Dario in view of their "concerted efforts through previous or simultaneous acts and deeds;" and (d) Castro assisted Atienza and Dario "to profit from the effects of the crime by returning safely the missing volume. A criminal complaint was filed by the NBI and the Ombudsman against Atienza, Castro, and Dario before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB, charging them Falsification of Public Document. After investigation, it was determined that there existed probable cause to charge Atienza, Castro, and Dario for the crimes of Robbery, and of Falsification of Public Document.The RTC found Atienza and Castro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners’ conviction for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document should be upheld on account of the circumstantial evidence in this case proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt RULING: Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. Stated differently, the test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. Applying these principles to the facts that appear on record, the Court finds that no sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented in this case to establish the elements of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the RPC and Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(6) of the same code, or of petitioners’ supposed conspiracy therefor. Also, it bears mentioning that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the falsification case since Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) of the RPC, which is punishable by prision correccional falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC and MCTC. While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect for the first time in the present petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same. HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO vs. MATILDE S. PALICTE, Respondent. G.R. No. 159691, February 17, 2014 J. Bersamin The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration. There is no question that the ultimate objective of each of the actions was the return of the properties to the Estate in order that such properties would be partitioned among the heirs. In the other cases, the petitioners failed to attain the objective because Palicte’s right in the properties had been declared exclusivse. There was between Civil Case No. CEB-24293 and the other cases a clear identity of the parties, of subject matter, of evidence, and of the factual and legal issues raised. The Court saw through the petitioners’ "ploy to countermand the previous decisions’ sustaining Palicte’s rights over the properties."

FACTS: The instant case is the fifth suit to reach the Court dividing the several heirs of the late Don Filemon Y. Sotto respecting four real properties that had belonged to Filemon’s estate. The first case held that Matilde. one of four declared heirs of Filemon, had validly redeemed the four properties pursuant to the assailed deed of redemption, and was entitled to have the title over the four properties transferred to her name, subject to the right of the three other declared heirs to join her in the redemption of the four properties within a period of six months. The second was the civil case filed by Pascuala against Matilde (to annul the former’s waiver of rights, and to restore her as a co-redemptioner of Matilde with respect to the four properties. The third was an incident in a suit brought by the heirs of Carmen Rallos against the Estate of Sotto wherein the heirs of Miguel prayed for their inclusion as Matilde’s co-redemptioners. The fourth was a case whereby the Court expressly affirmed the ruling rendered by the probate court in Cebu City denying the administrator’s motion to require Matilde to turn over the four real properties to the Estate of Sotto. The fifth is this case. It seems that the disposition by the Court of the previous cases did not yet satisfy herein petitioners despite their being the successors-in-interest of two of the declared heirs of Filemon who had been parties in the previous cases either directly or in privity. They now pray that the Court undo the decision declaring their action for the partition of the four properties as already barred by the judgments previously rendered. In its June 13, 2013 decision, the Court has given Atty. Mahinay the chance to explain why he should not be sanctioned for violating the rule against forum shopping. ISSUE: Whether Atty. Mahinay is guilty of forum shopping when he filed this action for partition notwithstanding the earlier rulings favoring Matilde’s exclusive right over the four properties RULING: There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court." Forum shopping is an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes. It degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of

the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration. There is no question that the ultimate objective of each of the actions was the return of the properties to the Estate in order that such properties would be partitioned among the heirs. In the other cases, the petitioners failed to attain the objective because Palicte’s right in the properties had been declared exclusivse. There was between Civil Case No. CEB-24293 and the other cases a clear identity of the parties, of subject matter, of evidence, and of the factual and legal issues raised. The Court saw through the petitioners’ "ploy to countermand the previous decisions’ sustaining Palicte’s rights over the properties." Atty. Mahinay’s disclosure of the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-24293 in filing the Motion to Require Matilde Palicte To Turn Over And/or Account Properties Owned by the Estate in Her Possession is not enough compliance with the rule against forum shopping. The disclosure alone of the pendency of a similar case does not negate actual forum shopping. The acts of a party or his counsel clearly constituting willful and deliberate forum shopping shall be ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice, and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as be a cause for administrative sanctions against the lawyer. Forum shopping can be committed in either of three ways, namely: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); or (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). If the forum shopping is not willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. But if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice. In view of the foregoing, Atty. Mahinay was guilty of forum shopping. Under Revised Circular No. 28-91, any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his counsel through the filing of multiple petitions or complaints to ensure favorable action shall constitute direct contempt of court. Direct contempt of court is meted the summary penalty of fine not exceeding P2,000.00. EMILIO RAGA y CASIKAT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 200597, February 19, 2014 J. Villarama, Jr. When the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The straightforward, candid and intrepid revelation in coming forward to avenge the immoral defilement upon her person is more convincing and plausible compared to the weak and uncorroborated defense of petitioner. Despite the minor inconsistencies in her testimony, her general statements remained consistent throughout the trial as she recounted the sordid details of her tormenting experience in the hands of her own father.

FACTS: Complainant AAA is the daughter of petitioner and BBB. One night, sometime in the year 2000, while AAA’s mother, BBB, was out of the house and while AAA and her other siblings were sleeping, AAA, who was then five years old, was suddenly awakened when petitioner removed her clothes and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. When petitioner was unsuccessful in inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina, he inserted his finger instead. He did that several times while holding his penis. A white substance later came out of his penis. AAA told BBB what petitioner did to her, but BBB did nothing. One night in May 2004, AAA, who was then already nine years old, was sleeping in the room while her siblings were sleeping with their father in the living room. AAA was suddenly awakened when her father carried her from the room to the living room. Petitioner then let AAA watch bold movies but AAA turned away. Petitioner, who was half-naked waist down, thereafter removed AAA’s clothes. He then laid on top of AAA and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. As he was unsuccessful in inserting his penis into her vagina, he inserted his finger instead. Because AAA was afraid of petitioner who used to whip her, she did not do anything. According to AAA, petitioner raped her several times but she could only remember two dates: one during the year 2000 and the other in May 2004. On September 2, 2004, two Informations for the crime of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 5 of the Revised Penal Code were filed against petitioner. On May 24, 2010, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of petitioner and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the accused should be acquitted on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the petitioner’s guilt for the crimes charged RULING: Time and again, we have held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The trial judge enjoys the advantage of observing the witness’s deportment and manner of testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" -- all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness’s honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

From our own careful examination of the records, we are convinced that there is no reason to disturb the assessment and determination of AAA’s credibility by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The straightforward, candid and intrepid revelation in coming forward to avenge the immoral defilement upon her person is more convincing and plausible compared to the weak and uncorroborated defense of petitioner. Despite the minor inconsistencies in her testimony, her general statements remained consistent throughout the trial as she recounted the sordid details of her tormenting experience in the hands of her own father. Nonetheless, while this Court also upholds petitioner’s conviction, we modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL INC., et al. vs. LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL G.R. No. 193966, February 19, 2014 C. J. Sereno Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the parties, a court cannot simply allow or disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground that the latter heard the testimony of another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent's counsel to protect the interest of his client during the presentation of other witnesses. If respondent actually believed that the testimony of Kenneth would greatly affect that of Stephen's, then respondent's counsel was clearly remiss in his duty to protect the interest of his client when he did not raise the issue of the exclusion of the witness in a timely manner. FACTS: Eristingcol bought Pergo flooring from Design Sources. The flooring was installed in her house, but the same later turned out to be defective. Eristingcol insisted on the repair or replacement of the flooring at the expense of the latter but Design Sources did not comply with the demand. A complaint for damages was thus filed by the Private Respondent before the RTC. During the hearing, the RTC issued an order refusing to allow Stephen Sy to testify as to material matters in the case. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order, but their motion was denied by the RTC on the ground that "the Court deems it no longer necessary to allow Stephen Sy from testifying when a different witness could testify on matters similar to the intended testimony of the former." The Order also stated that "to allow Stephen Sy from testifying would work to the disadvantage of the plaintiff as he already heard the testimony of witness Kenneth Sy." Petitioners filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration but the same was likewise denied by the RTC. The CA sustained the orders of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders disallowing petitioners from presenting Stephen as their witness RULING: The controversy arose from the objection of respondent’s counsel to the presentation of Stephen as petitioners’ witness. However, as aptly found by the CA, respondent failed to substantiate her claim that there was a prior request for the exclusion of other witnesses during

the presentation of Kenneth. Respondent did not even allege in her Comment that there was any such request. Section 15, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: SEC. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing with one another until all shall have been examined. Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time another witness is testifying, or ordering that these witnesses be kept separate from one another, is primarily to prevent them from conversing with one another. The purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify to the truth by preventing them from being influenced by the testimonies of the others. In other words, this measure is meant to prevent connivance or collusion among witnesses. The efficacy of excluding or separating witnesses has long been recognized as a means of discouraging fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. However, without any motion from the opposing party or order from the court, there is nothing in the rules that prohibits a witness from hearing the testimonies of other witnesses. There is nothing in the records of this case that would show that there was an order of exclusion from the RTC, or that there was any motion from respondent’s counsel to exclude other witnesses from the courtroom prior to or even during the presentation of the testimony of Kenneth. We are one with the CA in finding that under such circumstances, there was nothing to prevent Stephen from hearing the testimony of Kenneth. Therefore, the RTC should have allowed Stephen to testify for petitioners. The RTC and the CA, however, moved on to determine the materiality of the testimony of Stephen, which became their basis for not allowing the latter to testify. Applying Sandal, the CA ruled that the absence of a showing of how his testimony would bolster the position of petitioners saved the judgment of the RTC in issuing the order of exclusion. We agree with petitioners that the application of Sandal is misplaced. Contrary to the present case, in Sandal there was a court order for exclusion which was disregarded by the witness. The defiance of the order led to the exercise by the court of its discretion to admit or reject the testimony of the witness who had defied its order. Again, in this case, there was no order or motion for exclusion that was defied by petitioners and their witnesses. Thus, the determination of the materiality of Stephen's testimony in relation to the strengthening of petitioners' defense was uncalled for. Respondent is bound by the acts of her counsel, including mistakes in the realm of procedural techniques. The exception to the said rule does not apply herein, considering that there is no showing that she was thereby deprived of due process. At any rate, respondent is not without recourse even if the court allows the presentation of the testimony of Stephen, considering the availability of remedies during or after the presentation of witnesses, including but not limited to the impeachment of testimonies. CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, et al. vs. ATTY. BRAIN S. MASWENG G.R. No. 188913, February 19, 2014 J. Villarama

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Respondent’s willful disregard and defiance of this Court’s ruling on a matter submitted for the second time before his office cannot be countenanced. By acting in opposition to this Court’s authority and disregarding its final determination of the legal issue pending before him, respondent failed in his duty not to impede the due administration of justice and consistently adhere to existing laws and principles as interpreted in the decisions of the Court. FACTS: The City Government of Baguio issued an order for the demolition of illegal structures that had been constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation. A petition for injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction was filed, and Atty. Brain Masweng, the Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP-CAR, issued two temporary restraining orders directing petitioner and all persons acting in its behalf from enforcing the demolition orders and demolition advices for a total period of 20 days. Subsequently, the NCIPCAR, through respondent, granted the application for preliminary injunction. On appeal, the CA affirmed the injunctive writ issued by the NCIP-CAR against the demolition orders. The SC reversed and set aside the ruling of the CA and dismissed NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-06. Thereafter, petitioner, through the Office of the Mayor, issued Demolition Advices against owners of structures built on the Busol Watershed. The latter, however, filed a petition for the identification, delineation and recognition of their ancestral land and enforcement of their rights as indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. A petition for injunction with urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction before the NCIP against petitioner and the City Building and Architecture Office was further filed. On the same day, respondent issued two separate 72-hour temporary restraining orders. Subsequently, respondent issued two separate extending the 72-hour temporary restraining orders for another 17 days. The respondent also issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction followed by a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. ISSUE: Whether the respondent should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the subject temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction RULING: The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised, however, such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. The court must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint, with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. In this case, respondent was charged with indirect contempt for issuing the subject orders enjoining the implementation of demolition

orders against illegal structures constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City. In the Decision dated February 4, 2009 rendered in G.R. No. 180206, the Court indeed upheld the authority of the NCIP to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction to preserve the rights of parties to a dispute who are members of indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples. However, the Court categorically ruled that Elvin Gumangan, et al., whose houses and structures are the subject of demolition orders issued by petitioner, are not entitled to the injunctive relief granted by herein respondent. The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents’ ancestral land claim was indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their right thereto may be protected by an injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is directed are violative of said right. In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments and counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the Busol Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar and G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer), we are constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the instant petition. Respondent’s willful disregard and defiance of this Court’s ruling on a matter submitted for the second time before his office cannot be countenanced. By acting in opposition to this Court’s authority and disregarding its final determination of the legal issue pending before him, respondent failed in his duty not to impede the due administration of justice and consistently adhere to existing laws and principles as interpreted in the decisions of the Court. LUCENA D. DEMAALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 173523, February 19, 2014 J. Del Castillo Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet he failed to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court. Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. FACTS: Petitioner Lucena D. Demaala is the Municipal Mayor of Narra, Palawan, and is the accused in criminal cases for violations of Section 3(h) of RA 3019, which cases are pending before the Sandiganbayan. On January 9, 2006, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed before the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend the Accused Pursuant to Section 13, RA 3019arguing that under Section 13 of RA 3019, petitioner’s suspension from office was mandatory. The Sandiganbayan held that preventive suspension was proper to prevent Demaala from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.

On March 23, 2006, Demaala filed her Motion for Reconsideration. Her Motion for Reconsideration, which was originally set for hearing on April 26, 2006, was reset to August 2 and 3, 2006 via the Sandiganbayan’s April 21, 2006 Order. Nonetheless, before the said date could arrive, the anti-graft court supposedly precipitately issued the assailed May 23, 2006 Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration, thus depriving her of the opportunity to be heard. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its May 23, 2006 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration without conducting a hearing thereon RULING: A reading and understanding of the April 21, 2006 Order of the Sandiganbayan indicates that what it referred to were the two hearing dates of April 26 and 27, 2006 covering the continuation of the trial proper – the ongoing presentation of the prosecution’s evidence – and not the single hearing date of April 26, 2006 for the determination of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial itself unmistakably specified that what was being reset was the trial proper which was scheduled on April 26 and 27, 2006 pursuant to the court’s previous January 19, 2006 Order; it had nothing at all to do with petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. If petitioner truly believed that the prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial referred to the April 26, 2006 hearing of her Motion for Reconsideration, then she should have attended the scheduled April 21, 2006 hearing thereof to reiterate her motion or object to a resetting. Her failure to attend said hearing is a strong indication that she did not consider the manifestation and motion to reset trial as covering or pertaining to her Motion for Reconsideration which she set for hearing on April 26, 2006. On the other hand, petitioner’s failure to attend the scheduled April 26, 2006 hearing of her own Motion for Reconsideration is fatal to her cause. Her excuse – that she no longer bothered to go to court on April 26, 2006 since "she had no business to be there" – is unavailing. By being absent at the April 21, 2006 hearing, petitioner did not consider the prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial as related to her pending Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, it was incumbent upon her to have attended the hearing of her own motion on April 26, 2006. Her absence at said hearing was inexcusable, and the Sandiganbayan was therefore justified in considering the matter submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision

can be based. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE ROM G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014 J. Perez Settled is the rule that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. As such, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. Evidently, the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the appellant’s guilt for the offense of illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. FACTS: In three separate Informations all dated 1 September 2000, the appellant was charged with violation of Sections 15, (illegal sale of shabu) 15-A(maintenance of a drug den and 16(illegal possession of shabu), Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The RTC rendered a decision finding herein Rom guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged. On appeal is the Decision dated 9 August 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00579 affirming with modification the Decision dated 24 June 2002 of the The Court of Appeals, however, modified and reduced the penalty in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062 and CBU-55063 to an imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in convicting the appellant in spite of the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt HELD: After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to overturn the findings of both lower courts, which were adequately supported by the evidence on record. Evidently, the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the appellant’s guilt for the offense of illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. On the occasion of the appellant’s arrest for having been caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, PO3 Yanson conducted a body search on the former resulting to the recovery of four more heat-sealed plastic packets containing white crystalline substance inside his wallet that was tucked in his pocket. Definitely, the records do not show that the appellant has the legal authority to possess the four heat-sealed plastic packets of shabu. Settled is the rule that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. As such, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi, which the appellant in this case miserably failed to do.

There is also no truth on the appellant’s claim that the entry in the house was illegal making the search and the seizure in connection thereto invalid, rendering the pieces of evidence obtained by the police officers inadmissible for being the "fruit of a poisonous tree." The appellant, in this case, was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, thus, he was lawfully arrested. Following Dimacuha, the subsequent seizure of four heat-sealed plastic packets of shabu in the appellant’s wallet that was tucked in his pocket was justified and admissible in evidence for being the fruit of the crime. With the foregoing, this Court is fully convinced that the prosecution had likewise proved beyond a shadow of reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty of the offense of illegal possession of shabu in violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Going to the charge of maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the prosecution had also established appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his attempt to exonerate himself, the appellant vehemently asserts that he was no longer the owner of the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, and he was no longer residing therein. The defense also presented Teresita Bitos to corroborate this claim of the appellant, but the testimony of Teresita Bitos corroborating the appellant’s testimony was not credible. She herself admitted that the appellant requested her to testify in his favor. Also, considering the seriousness of the charges against the appellant, he did not bother to present his daughter, who is the alleged owner of the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, to bolster his claim. Time and again, this Court held that denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Inherently weak, denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of the appellant, as in this case. The defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecution’s evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which is not the case here. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the prosecution witness who testified on affirmative matters. Moreover, there is a presumption that public officers, including the arresting officers, regularly perform their official duties. In this case, the defense failed to overcome this presumption by presenting clear and convincing evidence. Furthermore, this Court finds no ill motive that could be attributed to the police officers who had conducted the buy-bust operation. Even the allegation of the appellant that PO2 Martinez got angry with him when he failed to pinpoint the big time pusher cannot be considered as the ill motive in implicating the appellant on all the three charges against him for this is self-serving and uncorroborated. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERVIN GAHI G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014 J. Leonardo-De Castro It is a fundamental principle in jurisprudence involving rape that the accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. In this regard, we defer to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of AAA’s testimony, most especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. FACTS:

On October 9, 2002, two criminal Informations, each charging appellant with one count of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code were filed by a 16-year old girl, who happened to be the appellant’s niece by affinity. The trial court convicted appellant Mervin Gahi of two counts of rape defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt RULING: According to the prosecution, appellant used force or intimidation in order to successfully have unlawful carnal knowledge of AAA. To be exact, appellant is alleged to have utilized, on two occasions, a knife and the threat of bodily harm to coerce AAA into submitting to his evil sexual desires. A careful perusal of AAA’s testimony in open court reveals that she was clear and straightforward in her assertion that appellant raped her twice in the manner described by the prosecution. We sustain as proper the appellate court’s findings regarding the first instance of rape. Appellant questions the weighty trust placed by the trial court on the singular and uncorroborated testimony of AAA as the basis for his conviction. On this point, we would like to remind appellant that it is a fundamental principle in jurisprudence involving rape that the accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. In this regard, we defer to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of AAA’s testimony, most especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Anent the inconsistent statements made by AAA in her testimony which were pointed out by appellant, we agree with the assessment made by the Court of Appeals that these are but minor discrepancies that do little to affect the central issue of rape which is involved in this case. Instead of diminishing AAA’s credibility, such variance on minor details has the net effect of bolstering the truthfulness of AAA’s accusations. We have constantly declared that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed testimony. Notable is the fact that no ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse appellant was ever brought up by the defense during trial. This only serves to further strengthen AAA’s case since we have consistently held that a rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is credible where she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused. It is also equally important to highlight AAA’s young age when she decided to accuse her kin of rape and go through the ordeal of trial. In a bid to exculpate himself, appellant argues that he could not have possibly been guilty of rape because the time period between the rape incidents and the birth of the alleged fruit of his crime is more than the normal period of pregnancy. He also points out that defense witness Jackie Gucela’s admission that he was AAA’s lover and the father of her child should suffice to negate any notion that he raped AAA twice. Lastly, he puts forward the defense of alibi.

We are not convinced by appellant’s line of reasoning which appears ostensibly compelling, at the outset, but is ultimately rendered inutile by jurisprudence and the evidence at hand. It is well-entrenched in our case law that the rape victim’s pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. Likewise, we assign no significance to the testimony of defense witness Jackie Gucela. For the ["sweetheart"] theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence renders his claim to be self-serving and of no probative value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there should be a corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a substantiation by tokens of such a relationship such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like. In any event, even assuming for the sake of argument that AAA had a romantic attachment with a person other than the accused at the time of the rape incidents or thereafter, this circumstance would not necessarily negate the truth of AAA’s statement that the appellant, her aunt’s husband, twice had carnal knowledge of her through force and intimidation and without her consent. We are similarly unconvinced with appellant’s defense of alibi. We have consistently held that alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. Moreover, we have required that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., et al. vs. MANUEL O. SANCHEZ G.R. No. 182738, February 24, 2014 J. Peralta In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Court’s mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The recourse provided for in the Rule 71 is clear enough: the person adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these were not done in this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory. FACTS: On July 1, 2002, Sanchez, a stockholder of petitioner Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc. filed a petition for the nullification of the annual meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002 and the special meeting of stockholders of April 23, 2002. Petitioners, along with their co-defendants, filed an Answer with Counterclaims and, thereafter, a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses, which was denied by the RTC. On August 12, 2002, Sanchez filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents, which the court granted in an Order dated September 10, 2002. Capitol Hills Inc. filed a motion for

reconsideration of the Order which denied their motion for preliminary hearing. Subsequently, they filed a Supplement to Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration, and a Motion for Deferment of Implementation of the production and Inspection Order. The RTC denied the petitioners’ MR of the Order denying the motion for preliminary hearing and ordered the immediate implementation of the Production and Inspection Order. Capitol Hills Inc. elevated the case to the CA but the same was denied. A petition for review was filed before the SC, but the same was likewise denied. Respondent sought to enforce the Production and Inspection Order but Capitol Hills Inc. failed to show willingness to comply. In order to give both the plaintiff and defendants one last chance to comply with the order dated September 10, 2002, the RTC reiterated the said order with a warning that failure of the defendants to comply with all the requirements of the said will result in this court citing all the defendants in contempt of court. Petitioners questioned the said resolution via Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that there is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the threatened citation for contempt is proper RULING: A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party as non-suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of discovery shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others." To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings. Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a verified petition. In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent’s answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.

The second mode of initiating indirect contempt proceedings is through a verified petition. In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of court, courts have the duty to ensure that all the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings have been complied with. It behooves them too to docket the petition, and to hear and decide it separately from the main case, unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of the contempt proceedings and the main action. But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court, the above rules, as clarified in Regalado, do not necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates the proceedings, there can be no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to inform the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her right to due process. This formal charge is done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the respondent to explain why he or she should not be cited in contempt of court. In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Court’s mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of the longoverdue order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal to comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence. Even if We are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt," this would still not work to petitioners’ advantage. Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper remedy from a judgment in indirect contempt proceedings. It states: Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.––The judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or final order. The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these were not done in this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.

LETICIA P. LIGON vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 56 AT MAKATI CITY, et al. G.R. No. 190028, February 26, 2014 J. Perlas-Bernabe Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Applying these principles to this case, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders as these issuances essentially disregarded, inter alia, Ligon’s prior attachment lien over the subject property patently anathema to the nature of attachment proceedings which is well-established in law and jurisprudence. FACTS: On November 20, 2002, Ligon filed an amended complaint before the Quezon City RTC for collection of sum of money and damages, rescission of contract, and nullification of title with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, against Sps. Baladjay, Marasigan, Polished Arrow, and its incorporators, as well as the latter’s spouses. On February 18, 2003, a similar complaint for collection of sum of money, damages, and cancellation of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was lodged before the Makati City RTC by Sps. Vicente against Sps. Baladjay, Polished Arrow, and other corporations. During the proceedings therein, a writ of preliminary attachment also against the subject property was issued and annotated on the title. Thereafter, but before the Quezon City Case was concluded, the Makati City RTC rendered a decision rescinding the transfer of the subject property from Sps. Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in fraud of creditors. Meanwhile, the Quezon City RTC rendered a decision directing Sps. Baladjay to pay Ligon. When Ligon sought its execution, she discovered that the December 3, 2002 attachment annotation had been deleted from TCT No. 9273 when the subject property was sold by way of public auction. In this regard, Ligon learned that the Makati City RTC had issued an order directing the registration of the Officer’s Final Deed of Sale; and the cancellation of the title in the name of Sps. Baladjay and issue a new title in the name of Ting, free from any liens and encumbrances.On June 7, 2007, Atty. Garing issued a title in the name of Ting, free from any liens and encumbrances. Later, Ting sold the subject property to respondent Techico. Ligon filed, a certiorari petition alleging, among others, that the Makati City RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders. Consolidated with Ligon’s certiorari petition is a complaint for indirect contempt against respondents, whereby it was alleged that the latter unlawfully interfered with the court processes of the Quezon City RTC, particularly by deleting the December 3, 2002 attachment annotation. The CA dismissed Ligon’s certiorari petition. Likewise, it dismissed the indirect contempt charge for lack of sufficient basis. Hence, this petition. ISSUES:

1. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the Makati City RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders 2. Whether Judge Laigo should be cited in contempt and penalized administratively RULING: Issuance of the Assailed Orders vis-à-vis Grave Abuse of Discretion Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner’s debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. Thus, a prior registration of an attachment lien creates a preference, such that when an attachment has been duly levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes the property subject to the said attachment. As provided under PD 1529, said registration operates as a form of constructive notice to all persons. Applying these principles to this case, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders as these issuances essentially disregarded, inter alia, Ligon’s prior attachment lien over the subject property patently anathema to the nature of attachment proceedings which is well-established in law and jurisprudence. The grave abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies with its directive to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Ting free from any liens and encumbrances. This course of action clearly negates the efficacy of Ligon’s attachment lien and, also, defies the legal characterization of attachment proceedings. It bears noting that Ligon’s claim, secured by the aforesaid attachment, is against Sps. Baladjay whose ownership over the subject property had been effectively restored in view of the RTC’s rescission of the property’s previous sale to Polished Arrow Thus, Sps. Ligon’s attachment lien against Sps. Baladjay as well as their successors-in-interest should have been preserved, and the annotation thereof carried over to any subsequent certificate of title, the most recent of which as it appears on record is TCT No. 31001 in the name of Techico, without prejudice to the latter’s right to protect his own ownership interest over the subject property. Indirect Contempt Charges Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. Contempt of court is of two (2) kinds, namely: direct and indirect contempt. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt.

The indirect contempt charges in this case involve an invocation of paragraphs b, c, and d, Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which read as follows: Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: x x x x (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, x x x; (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; Examining the petition, the Court finds that Ligon failed to sufficiently show how the acts of each of the respondents, or more specifically, Judge Laigo, constituted any of the acts punishable under the foregoing section tending towards a wilful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In issuing the Assailed Orders, Judge Laigo merely performed his judicial functions pursuant to the December 9, 2004 Decision in the Makati City Case which had already attained finality. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (PWU-AGLO) G.R. No. 180962, February 26, 2014 J. Del Castillo While a government office may prohibit altogether the filing of a motion for reconsideration with respect to its decisions or orders, the fact remains that certiorari inherently requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration, which is the tangible representation of the opportunity given to the office to correct itself. Unless it is filed, there could be no occasion to rectify. Worse, the remedy of certiorari would be unavailing. Simply put, regardless of the proscription against the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same may be filed on the assumption that rectification of the decision or order must be obtained, and before a petition for certiorari may be instituted. FACTS: This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks a review and setting aside of the September 20, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100324, as well as its December 14, 2007 Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. On the ground that it was suffering business losses, petitioner Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc., a local land transportation company engaged in the business of carrying passengers and freight, retrenched 21 of its employees. Consequently, the company union, PWU-AGLU, filed a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment, claiming that petitioner engaged in unfair labor practices. Unable to settle their differences at the scheduled preliminary conference, the case was thereafter referred to the Secretary of Labor. Acting DOLE Cruz issued a ordering Philtranco to reinstate to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights, the illegally terminated 17 "union officers", x x x, and pay them backwages from the time of termination until their actual or payroll reinstatement, provided in the computation of backwages among the seventeen (17)

who had received their separation pay should deduct the payments made to them from the backwages due them. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent, on the other hand, submitted a "Partial Appeal." The Secretary of Labor declined to rule on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and private respondent’s "Partial Appeal", citing a DOLE Regulation which provided that voluntary arbitrators’ decisions, orders, resolutions or awards shall not be the subject of motions for reconsideration. The CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Philtranco, holding that, in assailing the Decision of the DOLE voluntary arbitrator, petitioner erred in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules, when it should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 thereof, which properly covers decisions of voluntary labor arbitrators. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether Philtranco availed of the proper remedy in this case 2. Whether the petition was filed on time RULING: On whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 5 is proper It cannot be said that in taking cognizance of NCMB-NCR CASE No. NS-02-028-07, the Secretary of Labor did so in a limited capacity, i.e., as a voluntary arbitrator. The fact is undeniable that by referring the case to the Secretary of Labor, Conciliator-Mediator Aglibut conceded that the case fell within the coverage of Article 263 of the Labor Code; the impending strike in Philtranco, a public transportation company whose business is imbued with public interest, required that the Secretary of Labor assume jurisdiction over the case, which he in fact did. By assuming jurisdiction over the case, the provisions of Article 263 became applicable, any representation to the contrary or that he is deciding the case in his capacity as a voluntary arbitrator notwithstanding. It has long been settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a decision or resolution of the Secretary of Labor is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. There is no distinction: when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor case in an industry indispensable to national interest, "he exercises great breadth of discretion" in finding a solution to the parties’ dispute. "The authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute." This wide latitude of discretion given to the Secretary of Labor may not be the subject of appeal. Accordingly, the Secretary of Labor’s Decision in Case No. OS-VA-2007-008 is a proper subject of certiorari. It is procedurally feasible as well as practicable that petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 against the decisions of the Secretary of Labor rendered under the Labor Code and its implementing and related rules be filed initially in the Court of Appeals. Paramount

consideration is strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of the courts, emphasized in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, on "the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction." On the question of whether the Petition for Certiorari was timely filed The Court agrees with petitioner’s submission. Rule 65 states that where a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than 60 days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. This can only mean that even though a motion for reconsideration is not required or even prohibited by the concerned government office, and the petitioner files the motion just the same, the 60-day period shall nonetheless be counted from notice of the denial of the motion. The very nature of certiorari – which is an extraordinary remedy resorted to only in the absence of plain, available, speedy and adequate remedies in the course of law – requires that the office issuing the decision or order be given the opportunity to correct itself. Quite evidently, this opportunity for rectification does not arise if no motion for reconsideration has been filed. This is precisely what the Court said in the ABS-CBN Union Members case, whose essence continues to this day. Thus: Section 8, Rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides: "The Secretary shall have fifteen (15) calendar days within which to decide the appeal from receipt of the records of the case. The decision of the Secretary shall be final and inappealable." x x x The aforecited provision cannot be construed to mean that the Decision of the public respondent cannot be reconsidered since the same is reviewable by writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As a rule, the law requires a motion for reconsideration to enable the public respondent to correct his mistakes, if any. In Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Inc., vs. NLRC, this Court held: "Hence, the only way by which a labor case may reach the Supreme Court is through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Such petition may be filed within a reasonable time from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision." x x x Clearly, before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to afford an opportunity for the correction of the error or mistake complained of. So also, considering that a decision of the Secretary of Labor is subject to judicial review only through a special civil action of certiorari and, as a rule, cannot be resorted to without the aggrieved party having exhausted administrative remedies through a motion for reconsideration, the aggrieved party, must be allowed to move for a reconsideration of the same so that he can bring a special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Petitioner received a copy of the Acting Secretary of Labor’s Decision on June 14, 2007. It timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 25, which was a Monday, or the first working day following the last day (Sunday, June 24) for filing the motion. But for lack of procedural basis, the same was effectively denied by the Secretary of Labor via his August 15, 2007 Order which petitioner received on August 17. It then filed the Petition for Certiorari on August 29, or well within the fresh 60-day period allowed by the Rules from August 17. Given these facts, the Court finds that the Petition was timely filed. CORAZON MACAPAGAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 193217, February 26, 2014 J. Peralta The disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal. FACTS: On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal on August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing RTC Decision convicting Macapagal of the crime of Estafa; the Order denying her Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial; and the Order dated denying her Notice of Appeal. ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in issuing the assailed orders RULING: Petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit: SEC. 2. Where to appeal. – The appeal may be taken as follows: xxxx (b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and xxxx SEC. 3. How appeal taken. – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x x x. Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a

lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal. Even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case. Even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the trial court’s decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation of the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders, resolutions, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying on the case records of the lower court. Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioner’s repeated disregard of the Rules and the Court’s lawful orders. Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice. It is the duty of the counsel to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, to determine which court has appellate jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for appeal. Any error in compliance may be fatal to the client's cause. It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. The requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded at whim. In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these rules with greater fidelity in order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR and HONORE R. HERNANDEZ vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al. G.R. NO. 197307, February 26, 2014 J. Velasco

The Ombudsman-imposed penalties in administrative disciplinary cases are immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when it ruled that the penalties imposed by the Ombudsman against petitioners are immediately executory. Immediate execution argues against the outlandish notion that the Ombudsman can only recommend disciplinary sanctions. FACTS: In June 2003, PNP-CIDG conducted an investigation on the lavish lifestyle and alleged nefarious activities of certain personnel of the Bureau of Customs, among them Aguilar, then Chief of the Miscellaneous Division, and Hernandez. Aguilar’s SALNs do not reflect any income source other than her employment. The spaces for her spouse’s name and business interest were left in blank. Following weeks of surveillance and lifestyle probe, the PNP-CIDG investigating team executed a Joint-Affidavit depicting as owning properties not declared or properly identified in her SALNs. It was also discovered that Aguilar took 13 unofficial trips abroad, accompanied most of the time by daughter Josephine. During the same period, her two other daughters also collectively made nine travels abroad. In view of what it deemed to be a wide variance between Aguilar’s acquired assets and what she spent for her four-year overseas travels, on one hand, and her income, on the other, the PNP-CIDG, on a finding that she has violated R.A. 1379 in relation to R.A. 3019 and 6713 charged her with grave misconduct and dishonesty. Hernandez was charged too with the same offenses. Upon evaluation of the complaint and of the evidence presented, the Ombudsman created an investigating panel which then conducted administrative proceedings on the complaint. The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty and dismissed them from the service. The CA affirmed the ruling of the Ombudsman. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether a Rule 43 petition to assail the findings or decisions of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is proper RULING: Petitioners properly appealed to the CA. The Ombudsman has defined prosecutorial powers and possesses adjudicative competence over administrative disciplinary cases filed against public officers. What presently concerns the Court relates to the grievance mechanism available to challenge the OMB’s decisions in the exercise of that disciplinary jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his administrative disciplinary jurisdiction had, after due investigation, adjudged petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty and meted the corresponding penalty. Recourse to the CA via a Rule 43 petition is the proper mode of appeal. Rule 43 governs appeals to the CA from decisions or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. This brings us to the issue on the nature of the Ombudsman’s decisions in administrative disciplinary suits. Administrative disciplinary authority of the OMB does not end with a

recommendation to punish. This court held in Ombudsman v. De Leon that, as early as 2000, rules were already enforced by the OMB that provide for the immediate execution of judgments pending appeal. As pointed out in De Leon, Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 prescribes the rules on the effectivity and finality of the OMB’s decisions: SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. x x x x In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) The then Sec. 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 07) or the Rules of Procedure of the OMB, in turn, stated: Sec. 7. Finality of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770. (Emphasis supplied.) The Court, in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, has interpreted the above-quoted provision to mean that the sanctions imposed by the Ombudsman other than public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month or a fine equivalent to one month salary are not immediately executory and can be stayed by an appeal timely filed. The pertinent ruling in Lapid has, however, been superseded. On August 17, 2000, AO 14-A was issued amending Sec. 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the OMB. The rule, as thus amended, pertinently reads: Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where x x x the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed x x x. Then came AO 17 dated September 15, 2003 further amending Sec. 7 of Rule III. Thus, the section now provides: Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals x x x. Clearly then, as early as August 17, 2000, when AO 14-A was issued, the OMB-imposed penalties in administrative disciplinary cases were already immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. In this case, it must be noted that the complaint dated July 28, 2003 was filed on August 20, 2003 or after the AO 14-A has come into effect. Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when it ruled that the penalties imposed by the Ombudsman against petitioners are immediately executory. Immediate execution argues against the outlandish notion that the Ombudsman can only recommend disciplinary sanctions.

RUFA A. RUBIO, ET AL. vs. LOURDES ALABATA G.R. NO. 203947, February 26, 2014 J. Mendoza Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result. Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were represented by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO, SAC-PAO in particular, failed them, Hence, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxed the rules and decides to allowed the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners. FACTS: Petitioners and respondent were protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of declaration of heirship and sale, reconveyance and damages before RTC of dumaguete. The case was decided in favor of petitioner. The decision was appealed the decision to the CA, but the same was withdrawn. The decision, thereafter became final and executory, but the petitioners, never knew of this because when they followed up the case, they were informed that the appeal was still pending. It appears from the records that a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, who had resigned. Unfortunately, she failed to inform petitioners of the said entry of judgment before her resignation. She also failed to inform PAO-Dumaguete of such development. It was only in November 2007, when petitioners actually discovered that their victory was already final after their nephew secured a copy of the entry of judgment from RTC-43. On December 5, 2007, petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival of judgment. After respondent filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses, the RTC granted her Motion to Dismiss and ordered petitioners’ case for revival of judgment dismissed on the ground of prescription. The CA affirmed the dismissal of their case for revival of judgment. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the court a quo erred in strictly applying the procedural rules on prescription and dismissing the case based on the said ground, in spite of the fact that petitioners will suffer manifest injustice and deprivation of their property due to a fault not attributable to them RULING: Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: SEC.6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. Indeed, both the RTC-42 and the CA were acting in accordance with the rules and jurisprudence when they dismissed the action for revival of judgment.

An action for revival of judgment is governed by Article 1144 (3), Article 1152 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus, Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: xxx Article 1152 of the Civil Code states that “the period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.” To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an injustice to petitioners considering (1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to petitioners. Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were represented by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO, SAC-PAO in particular, failed them. SAC-PAO never informed them of the abandonment by respondent of her appeal or of the entry of judgment. Under the circumstances, they could not be faulted for their subsequent actions. They went to PAO-Dumaguete and they were told that the case was still pending on appeal. Due to their penury and unfamiliarity or downright ignorance of the rules, they could not be expected to bypass PAO-Dumaguete and directly verify the status of the case with the SAC-PAO. They had to trust their lawyer and wait. No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her appeal.1âwphi1 Withdrawing her appeal means that she respected the RTC-43 Decision, which voided the "Declaration of Heirship and Sale," dismissed respondent’s counterclaim, and ordered her to reconvey the entire subject property to petitioners and to pay moral and exemplary damages plus the cost of suit. Since the decision became final and executory, she has been in possession of the property which rightfully belongs to petitioners. She will continue to hold on to the property just because of a technicality. Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxes the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners. The Court believes that it is its bounden duty to exact justice in every way possible and exercise its soundest discretion to prevent a wrong. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANOLITO LUCENA y VELASQUEZ G.R. NO. 190632, February 26, 2014 J. Perez The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. In the case at bench, AAA’s categorical, straightforward and positive testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life and personal safety. FACTS:

On June 24, 2003, three informations for the crime of rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended were filed against Lucena. The information alleged that Lucena, a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by means of force, threat or intimidation and with the use of a gun did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her will and consent. The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus, offered a different version of the story. The RTC rendered a decision finding Lucena guilty of three counts of rape. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether Lucena is guilty of the crime charged RULING: Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Further, it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death. In the case at bench, AAA’s categorical, straightforward and positive testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life and personal safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened despite AAA’s plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge. It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved desires. While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of sexual intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was still within appellant’s reach, therefore, he could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any resistance to his evil desires. AAA’s lack of physical resistance, therefore, is understandable and would not in any way discredit her testimony.

In his attempt to ruin AAA’s credibility, the appellant puts stress on the portion of the result of AAA’s medical examination disclosing that even her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object, which she never mentioned in her testimony. To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not even work to appellant’s advantage and would not in any way cast doubt on the veracity of AAA’s testimony. As this Court has previously stated, a medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape. Moreover, even though AAA made no mention of any anal penetration, such omission would not change the fact that she was, indeed, raped by the appellant. For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these defenses are totally inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was committed without force or intimidation thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA was consensual.This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill-motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against him. As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron, insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3) penetrations because he was motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious. In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping motions. From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein for only one count of rape despite the three successful penetrations because there is no indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the accused decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3) counts of rape. It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable. MARCH 2014 JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO v. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION G.R. NO. 196894, MARCH 3, 2014 J. MENDOZA

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. Consequently, the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14 were null and void. To turn a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule as improper the recourse to Rule 65 by the lack of legal standing is to prolong the denial of due process to the persons whose interests are indispensible to the final disposition of the case. It will only result in a protracted litigation as Spouses Crisologo will be forced to rely on a petition for the annulment of judgment before the CA (as the last remaining remedy), which may again reach this Court. To prevent multiplicity of suits and to expedite the swift administration of justice, the CA should have applied liberality by striking down the assailed orders despite the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo to file the Rule 65 petition before it. Besides, this lacking requirement, of which Spouses Crisologo were not even at fault, is precisely the reason why this controversy arose. FACTS: Petitioners were the plaintiffs in two collection cases against Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al. Respondent JEWM was the successor-in-interest of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another collection case against the same defendants. Based on a compromise agreement, ownership over the subject property was vested in Sy Sen Ben. The title over the subject property was later transferred to JEWM. A year thereafter, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate collection. When this decision attained finality, a writ of execution was eventually issued. A public auction was scheduled and a notice of sale was posted including, among others, the subject properties now, in the name of JEWM. In the same proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its Affidavit of Third Party Claim and the Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam. It prayed for the exclusion of the subject properties from the notice of sale. Upon the denial of the petition, Spouses Crisologo posted a bond in order to proceed with the execution. JEWM filed a separate action for cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to prevent the public sale of the subject properties and the issuance of a permanent injunction order after trial on the merits. Spouses Crisologo filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the denial of the application for writ or preliminary injuction filed by JEWM and asking for their recognition as parties. No motion to intervene was, however, filed as the Spouses Crisologo. The RTC denied the said motion and granted JEWM’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Spouses prayed for reconsideration and the setting aside of its September 27, 2010 Order. This was denied in the for lack of legal standing in court considering that their counsel failed to make the written formal notice of appearance. However, on October 27, 2010, they received another order, likewise dated October 7, 2010, giving JEWM time to comment on their Very Urgent Omnibus Motion filed on October 1, 2010. On November 9, 2010, however, RTC denied the said motion. On November 12, 2010, JEWM moved to declare the "defendants" in default which was granted in an order given in open court on November 19, 2010. Spouses Crisologo then filed their Very Urgent Manifestation, dated November 30, 2010, arguing that they could not be

deemed as defaulting parties because they were not referred to in the pertinent motion and order of default. Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the RTC orders denying their motion to be recognized as parties. They also prayed for the issuance of a TRO and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The CA denied the application for a TRO, but directed Spouses Crisologo to amend their petition. Pending disposition of the Amended Petition by the CA, JEWM filed a motion on asking for the resolution of the case on the merits. The RTC ruled in favor of JEWM. The CA affirmed the order of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of discretion in failing to recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of lien. RULING: The petition is granted. In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, to wit: Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. -No erasure, alteration or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificates have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; x x x or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper. In Southwestern University v. Laurente, the Court held that the cancellation of the annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered without giving notice to the parties annotated in the certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an error for a judge to contend that no notice is required to be given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the back of a certificate of title. Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo’s liens were indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676. As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should

have been joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by Spouses Crisologo to be recognized as indispensable parties, failed to implement the mandatory import of the aforecited rule. This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. Despite the clear existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14, JEWM asserts technical grounds on why the CA did not err in dismissing the petition via Rule 65. At any rate, the remedy against an interlocutory order, not subject of an appeal, is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Only then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to. Based on the above, recourse to the CA via Rule 65 would have already been proper, except for one last issue, that is, Spouses Crisologo’s legal standing to file the same. JEWM cites DBP v. COA where the Court RULING: The petition for certiorari under Rule 65, however, is not available to any person who feels injured by the decision of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions. The ‘person aggrieved’ under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a party in the proceedings before the court a quo, or in this case before the COA. To hold otherwise would open the courts to numerous and endless litigations. Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct in their averment that the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo in the case before RTC-Br. 14 prevents the latter’s recourse via Rule 65. This case, however, is an exception. In many instances, the Court has ruled that technical rules of procedures should be used to promote, not frustrate the cause of justice.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP G.R. NO. 171496, MARCH 3, 2014 J. LEONEN Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A motion for reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if it puts an end to a particular matter, leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the decision. An appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself. It is an appeal from a final decision or order. FACTS: Ortigas is the owner of a parcel of land in Pasig City. Upon the request of the Department of Public Works and Highways, respondent Ortigas caused the segregation of its property into five lots and reserved one portion for road widening for the C-5 flyover project. The title was then inscribed with an encumbrance that it was for road widening and subject to Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only 396 square meters of the 1,445-square-meter allotment for the project. Consequently, respondent Ortigas further subdivided the portion actually used for road widening and the unutilized portion. On February 14, 2001, respondent Ortigas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the government the unutilized portion. Respondent Ortigas alleged that the Department of Public Works and Highways requested the conveyance of the property for road widening purposes. Despite due notice, no one appeared to oppose respondent Ortigas’ petition. The RTC issued an order, authorizing the sale of to petitioner Republic of the Philippines. On June 27, 2001, petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition, alleging that respondent Ortigas' property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. On June 29, 2001, petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order. The same was denied; this prompted the Republic to file a notice of appeal with the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal based on technicalities RULING: The petition is denied. Appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 must raise both questions of fact and law Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only pure questions of law

are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In which case, the appeal shall not be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed outright. Appeals from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of law must, in all cases, be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by notice of appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is proper if the appellant raises questions of fact or both questions of fact and questions of law. There is a question of law when the appellant raises an issue as to what law shall be applied on a given set of facts. Questions of law do “not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented.” Its resolution rests solely on the application of a law given the circumstances. There is a question of fact when the court is required to examine the truth or falsity of the facts presented. A question of fact “invites a review of the evidence.” The sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the Court of Appeals is whether respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to it only by donation, in accordance with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. This question involves the interpretation and application of the provision. It does not require the Court of Appeals to examine the truth or falsity of the facts presented. Neither does it invite a review of the evidence. The issue raised before the Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question purely of law. The proper mode of appeal is through a petition for review under Rule 45. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal on this ground. Nevertheless, we take time to emphasize that Rule 41, Section 1, paragraph (a) of the Rules of Court, which provides that “[n]o appeal may be taken from [a]n order denying a x x x motion for reconsideration,” is based on the implied premise in the same section that the judgment or order does not completely dispose of the case. In other words, what Section 1 of Rule 41 prohibits is an appeal taken from an interlocutory order. Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A motion for reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if “it puts an end to a particular matter,” leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the decision. The trial court’s order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ motion for reconsideration of the decision granting respondent Ortigas the authority to sell its property to the government was not an interlocutory order because it completely disposed of a particular matter. An appeal from it would not cause delay in the administration of justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the former used the wrong mode of appeal.

CO SAY COCO PRODUCTS PHILS, INC., et al. v. BENJAMIN BALTASAR, ET AL. G.R. NO.188828, MARCH 5, 2014 J. PEREZ It is entrenched in our jurisprudence that perfection of an appeal in a manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of making judgment final and executory. While dismissal of an appeal on technical grounds is frowned upon, Article 223 of the Labor Code which prescribes the appeal bond requirement, however, is a rule of jurisdiction and not of procedure. Hence, there is a little leeway for condoning a liberal interpretation thereof, and certainly none premised on the ground that its requirements are mere technicalities. The finding of the Labor Arbiter holding the petitioners liable for illegal dismissal is binding on them. Not having been timely appealed, this issue is already beyond our jurisdiction to resolve, and the finding of the Labor Arbiter can no longer be disturbed. FACTS: Co Say, thru its President, entered into a Contract for Cargo Handling Services with petitioner. To jumpstart the operation of its cargo handling services, Tanawan Port employed respondents as Crane Operators, as Crane Helper, and as Fork Lift Operator. Due to lack of clientele, the business venture of Tanawan Port failed to gain momentum causing serious alarm to the company. Not long after respondents were hired, Tanawan Port decided to cease operation. As a result, respondents were terminated from employment but were accordingly given their corresponding separation pay and 13th month pay. Barely a month after they received their separation pay, respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal and non-payment of labor standard benefits against petitioners. The LA held that petitioners are liable for illegal dismissal for failure to comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of terminating employment due to closure of business operations. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC Decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in reversing the NLRC decision on the ground that petitioners failed to perfect their appeal RULING: The petition is denied. Time and again we reiterate the established rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the reexamination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect, but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, when supported by substantial evidence.

The NLRC ruled that petitioners were able to post the surety bond and timely perfect their appeal before the expiration of the 10-day reglementary period, while the Court of Appeals oppositely ruled although both findings are based on the same pieces of evidence available on record. The crucial issue in the resolution of the instant petition concerns the timely posting of the appeal bond. The pertinent rule on the matter is Article 223 of the Labor Code. The Labor Code and its IRR explicitly provide that an appeal from the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC must be perfected within ten calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter. In a judgment involving a monetary award, the appeal shall be perfected only upon; (1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; (2) posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company; and (3) filing of a memorandum of appeal. The conclusion that the First Certification necessarily leads to is the lateness of the perfection of the appeal to the NLRC. Ostensibly, the Second Certification puts the appeal within the required perfection period of ten days from receipt of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. However, the fact behind what seems to be is that both certifications state, directly by the first while distortedly by the second, that the appeal by petitioners to the NLRC was perfected beyond the provided period. In a seeming attempt to avoid the direct fact of untimeliness in the First Certificate, the Second Certificate mentions two dates, one which is within the 10-day period and the other, the late date of 28 October 2003 which is even beyond the 2 October 2003 issuance of the First Certificate. The first date, 24 September 2003 was depicted in the Second Certificate as the date of posting while the date 28 October 2003 was described as the date of receipt by the DOLE-RAB. Apart from saying that the appeal bond was timely “posted” on 24 September 2003, the Second Certification would also justify why on the date of the First Certification, 2 October 2003, there was yet no posted appeal bond on record, the reason, although unstated being that the “posted” bond was “received” only on 28 October 2003. The Second Certificate is not a document of timeliness of petitioners’ appeal bond. It is even confirmatory of the fact of tardiness that the First Certification stated doubtlessly. The NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it considered as correct the statement in the Second Certificate that “x x x respondent in re: RAB-V Case No. 10-004860-02 x x x posted Surety Bond x x x dated on September 24, 2003.” Without a straight statement, the Second Certification seems to consider posting as mailing such that the date 24 September 2003 should be the reckoning date that determines timeliness and not the date 28 October 2003 which was the date of receipt of the surety bond. Even such insinuation, strained and all, is unacceptable considering the absence of proof of mailing, it being the fact that there was no mention at all in any of the pleadings below that the surety bond was mailed. The Court of Appeals therefore, correctly ruled that petitioners failed to perfect their appeal on time. In holding so, the appellate court only applied the appeal bond requirement as already well explained in our previous pronouncements that there is legislative and administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should give utmost regard to this intention. The clear intent of both statutory and procedural law is to require the employer to post a cash or surety bond securing the full amount of the monetary award within the ten 10-day reglementary period. Rules on perfection of an appeal, particularly in labor cases, must be strictly construed because to extend the period of the appeal is to delay the case, a circumstance which would give the employer a chance to wear out the efforts and meager resources of the worker to the point that the latter is constrained to give up for less than what is due him. This is to assure the

workers that if they finally prevail in the case the monetary award will be given to them both upon dismissal of the employer’s appeal. It is further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of their obligations to the employees. The appeal bond requirement precisely aims to prevent empty or inconsequential victories secured by laborers in consonance with the protection of labor clause ensconced and zealously guarded by our Constitution. All considered then, the finding of the Labor Arbiter holding the petitioners liable for illegal dismissal is binding on them. Not having been timely appealed, this issue is already beyond our jurisdiction to resolve, and the finding of the Labor Arbiter can no longer be disturbed without violating the fundamental principle that final judgment is immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusion of fact and law.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW BDO UNIBANK, INC.) v. ARTURO P. FRANCO, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: MAURICIA P. FRANCO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 180069, MARCH 5, 2014 J. PERALTA When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, he need not prove nonpayment for it is presumed. The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been discharged by payment. In this case, respondent's possession of the original copies of the subject Trust Indenture Certificates strongly supports his claim that petitioner Bank's obligation to return the principal plus interest of the money placement has not been extinguished. The TICs in the hands of respondent is a proof of indebtedness and a prima facie evidence that they have not been paid. FACTS: Arturo P. Franco decided to save up for his retirement and to invest his hard earned money with PCIB which later on merged with defendant Equitable Banking Corp. and is now known as Equitable PCIBank. He chose defendant PCIB for the latter’s representation that by making such investment, he was actually providing for his future since his investment would be commingled, pooled and automatically rolled-over for better investment return and which will provide for his needs upon retirement, without need for him to take any further action. He secured from defendant Trust Indenture Certificates, and that despite demands, defendants refused and still refuses to return to plaintiff the trust amounts, plus the stipulated interest. Respondent Arturo P. Franco died on July 23, 2008. However, his son, Alexander P. Franco, also passed away on September 5, 2012. PCIB alleged that the four TICs were already paid or cancelled, or that respondent’s participation therein was already withdrawn. This prompted Arturo P. Franco to file an action for damages against PCIB where the RTC rendered a decision ordering defendant PCIB, to pay plaintiff. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the claim of respondent is already barred by prescription RULING: The petition is denied. Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, he need not prove nonpayment for it is presumed. The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been discharged by payment.

In this case, respondent's possession of the original copies of the subject TICs strongly supports his claim that petitioner Bank's obligation to return the principal plus interest of the money placement has not been extinguished. The TICs in the hands of respondent is a proof of indebtedness and a prima facie evidence that they have not been paid. Petitioner Bank could have easily presented documentary evidence to dispute the claim, but it did not. In its omission, it may be reasonably deduced that no evidence to that effect really exist. Worse, the testimonies of petitioner Bank's own witnesses, reinforce, rather than belie, respondent's allegations of non-payment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY CARANTO Y PROPETA G.R. 193768, MARCH 5, 2014 J. PEREZ The lower courts erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the performance that a police officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill motive that would induce him to falsify his testimony. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. It should be noted that the presumption is precisely just that – a presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, it cannot be regarded as binding truth. FACTS: Jerry was arrested in a buy bust operation organized by the Taguig PNP Drug Enforcement Unit. He was, thereafter, charged in a criminal information for a violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It was alleged that he sold one (1) heat sealed transparent sachet containing 0.39 gram of “shabu”, a dangerous drug for Php 500. The RTC found Jerry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and imposed upon him the penalty of life imprisonment. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged RULING: The petition is granted. A buy-bust operation resulting from the tip of an anonymous confidential informant, although an effective means of eliminating illegal drug related activities, is “susceptible to police abuse.” Worse, it is usually used as a means for extortion. It is for this reason, that the Court must ensure that the enactment of R.A. No. 9165 providing specific procedures to counter these abuses is not put to naught. Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, par. 1 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165 The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a

representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. This Court recognizes that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions, many of them far from ideal. For this reason, the Implementing Rules provide that non-compliance with the strict directive of Section 21 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case because courts recognize the possible occurrence of procedural lapses. However, we emphasize that these lapses must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved. In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to present any explanation to justify the non-observance of the prescribed procedures. Therefore, the non-observance by the police of the required procedure cannot be excused. It likewise failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted. The “chain of custody” rule requires that the “marking” of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches. “Marking” means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. A perusal of the records will show that the procedure of preserving the chain of custody as laid down by jurisprudence was not observed. Ultimately, when the prosecution evidence is wanting, deficient to the point of doubt that the dangerous drug recovered from the accused is the same drug presented to the forensic chemist for review and examination, or the same drug presented to the court, an essential element in cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti, is absent. The lower courts erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the performance that a police officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill motive that would induce him to falsify his testimony. SPOUSES MARIO AND JULIA CAMPOS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 184371. MARCH 5, 2014 J. BRION The general rule that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review and only those errors assigned will be considered applies in the absence of certain exceptional circumstances. As exceptions to the rule, the Court has considered grounds not raised or assigned as errors in instances where: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal, whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise

or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are closely related to the assigned error/s; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal, whose determination is necessary to rule on the question/s properly assigned as errors. The present case falls into the exceptions. We find no error by the CA in resolving the issues on the nature and duration of the petitioners’ possession and on the alienable character of the subject land. These issues were apparently not raised by the Republic in its appeal before the CA, but are crucial in determining whether the petitioners have registrable title over the subject land. FACTS: On November 17, 2003, the petitioners applied for the registration of a 6,904 square meter-parcel of land situated in Baccuit, Bauang, La Union. The MTC approved the application of registration of title of Lot No. 3876, Cad-474-D, Case 17, Bauang Cadastre, filed by the spouses Mario and Julia Campos (petitioners). The CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling on non-issues and on established and undisputed facts that were not raised by the Republic as errors in its appeal RULING: The petition is denied. First, we address the procedural issue raised by the petitioners. Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides: SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. – No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical errors. The general rule that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review and only those errors assigned will be considered applies in the absence of certain exceptional circumstances. The Court has, however, considered grounds not raised or assigned as errors in excepted instances. The present case falls into the exceptions. We find no error by the CA in resolving the issues on the nature and duration of the petitioners’ possession and on the alienable character of the subject land. These issues were apparently not raised by the Republic in its appeal before the CA, but are crucial in determining whether the petitioners have registrable title over the subject land. In Mendoza v. Bautista, the Court held that the appellate court reserves the right, resting on its public duty, to take cognizance of palpable error on the face of the record and proceedings, and to notice errors that are obvious upon inspection and are of a controlling character, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice due to oversight. In deciding on the merits of the present petition, we affirm the CA in dismissing the petitioners' application for registration of title.

Persons applying for registration of title under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 152911 must prove: (1) that the land sought to be registered forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As the CA did, we find that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The oldest documentary evidence presented by the petitioners was a 1948 tax declaration over the subject land in the name of Margarita Laigo. The petitioners failed to present evidence of their possession prior to 1948. In fact, the petitioners, in their application for registration, base their possession of the subject land only from 1948, and not "since June 12, 1945, or earlier" as required by law. We emphasize that since the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 13 on January 25, 1977, it must be shown that possession and occupation of the land sought to be registered by the applicant himself or through his predecessors in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, which totally conforms to the requirement under Section 14(1) of P.D. No 1529. A mere showing of possession and occupation for thirty (30) years or more is no longer sufficient. SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA v. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON GOLOSENO G.R. NO. 172909, MARCH 5, 2014 J. BRION A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom notwithstanding. Upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC, the question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it. FACTS: On August 28, 1997, the CA ruled that among the Plaza siblings, Barbara was the owner of the subject agricultural land. The decision became final and executory and Barbara's successors, have continued occupying the property. On September 14, 1999, the petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction, Damages, Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the respondents and the City Government of Butuan. In their answer, the respondents pointed out that they were never delinquent in paying the land taxes and were in fact not aware that their property had been offered for public auction. Moreover, the auction sale was tainted with irregularity as the bidder was a government employee disqualified in accordance with Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The petitioners are not buyers in good faith either. On the contrary, they were in bad faith for having falsified the tax declaration they redeemed the property with. For these irregularities, the

petitioners had no right to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order prayed for against them. The RTC reconsidered its earlier order, denied the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and ordered that the possession and occupation of the land be returned to the respondents. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence this petition. Meanwhile, on August 8, 2013, the RTC dismissed the main. ISSUE: Whether petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction RULING: The petition is denied. The petitioners maintain that they did not falsify the tax declaration they reimbursed the property with. These factual contests are not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court is not a trier of facts. The Court will not revisit, re-examine, and reevaluate the evidence and the factual conclusions arrived at by the lower courts. In the absence of compelling reasons, the Court will not disturb the rule that factual findings of the lower tribunals are final and binding on this Court. Moreover, the petitioners may not invoke Section 18118 of the Local Government Code of 1991 to validate their alleged title. The law authorizes the local government unit to purchase the auctioned property only in instances where “there is no bidder” or “the highest bid is xxx insufficient.” A disqualified bidder is not among the authorized grounds. The local government also never undertook steps to purchase the property under Section 181 of the Local Government Code of 1991, presumably because it knew the invoked provision does not apply. Neither can the Court agree with the petitioners’ stance that the respondents’ defense — the petitioners’ defective title — must fail for want of deposit to the court the amount required by Section 267 of the Local Government Code. Clearly, the deposit precondition is an ingenious legal device to guarantee the satisfaction of the tax delinquency, with the local government unit keeping the payment on the bid price no matter the final outcome of the suit to nullify the tax sale. This renders inapplicable the petitioners’ insistence that the respondents should have made a deposit to the court. The suit filed by the petitioners was an action for injunction and damages; the issue of nullity of the auction was raised by the respondents themselves merely as a defense and in no way converted the action to an action for annulment of a tax sale. The petitioners failed to show clear and unmistakable rights to be protected by the writ. Tuazon had no ownership to confer to the petitioners despite the latter’s reimbursement of Tuazon’s purchase expenses. “To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. When the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper.” Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC, the question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more issue between the parties or object that can be served in

deciding the merits of the case. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the question of the nonissuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it. Also, the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping based on litis pendentia. Not only were the parties in both cases the same insofar as the City Government of Butuan is concerned, there was also identity of rights asserted and identity of facts alleged. The cause of action in the specific performance case had already been ruled upon in the present case, although it was still pending appeal before the CA. Likewise, the prayer sought in the specific performance case-for the City Government of Butuan to execute a deed of sale in favor of the petitioners -had been indirectly ruled upon in the present case when the R TC declared that no certificate of sale could be issued because there had been no valid sale.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGIPIT, ET AL. G.R. NO. 204894. MARCH 10, 2014 J. ABAD The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead. This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the accused. FACTS: Enojas, driver of a taxi which was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop, was spotted by POs2 Gregorio and Pangilinan. Enojas was invited to the police station for further questioning and he voluntarily went with the police officers. On their way to the police station, the police officers stopped the car infront of the 7-11 store because PO2 Pangilinan needed a restroom break. As he approached the store’s door, he saw two suspected robbers and a shootout ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape before he himself was shot dead. PO2 Gregorio left the mobile car and exchanged shots with the running suspects, but the latter were able to board a taxi and escape. Upon returning to his mobile car, PO2 realized that Enojas had fled. Suspecting that Enojas, was involved in the attempted robbery, the police officers who came to PO2 Gregorio’s backup searched the abandoned taxi and found Enojas’ mobile phone. They monitored the messages in the said phone and concluded that Enojas is in connivance with the robbers. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently,the police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused. On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged Enojas, Arnold Gomez, Santos, and Jalandoni with murder. The RTC rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. The CA affirmed in toto the conviction of the accused. The CA, however, found the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime before committing it. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the appellants cannot be convicted despite the prosecution’s failure to produce direct evidence RULING: The petition is denied.

It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the accused. 1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojasas the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop x x x Subsequent inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained messages which led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers; 2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station x x x He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi; 3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away from the scene of the shooting; 4. The text messages identified “Kua Justin” as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages also referred to “Kua Justin” as the one who was hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused; 5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages; 6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made references to the7-11 shootout and to the wounding of “Kua Justin,” one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death; 7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities; 8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his taxicab. The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In “aid of armed men,” the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to murder. Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them. The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But, assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it. The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.

PEDRO LUKANG v. PAGBILAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ G.R. NO. 195374. MARCH 10, 2014 J. MENDOZA A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued upon the concurrence of the following essential requisites, to wit: (a) the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. While a clear showing of the right is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. Hence, to be entitled to the writ, it is sufficient that the complainant shows that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. In the present case, the Court finds the RTC grant of injunction to be in order. There is no question that when the Pagbilao Development Corporation bought the properties from the vendors, it had full knowledge that there were questions involving ownership of the parcels of land it bought. Likewise there is no question that Pagbilao Development Corporation did not take any step to have the annotation or encumbrance in each title cancelled. Inevitably, PDC is deemed to have obtained the properties subject to the outcome of the litigation among the heirs of Arsenio. FACTS: Arsenio, and Mercedes lived as husband and wife in Calamba, Laguna, from 1922 to 1934 and begot three (3) children, namely, Domingo, Rosalina and Olympia. In 1935, he started cohabiting with Leoncia, with whom he had ten (10) children, namely, Elpidio, Socorro, Manuel, Pedro, Teresita, Simeon, Eugenio, Hilaria, Concepcion, and Carlos. During their cohabitation in Lucena, Quezon, they acquired 4 real properties located in Pagbilao, Quezon (Pagbilao properties). The said properties were then registered in the name of “ARSENIO LUKANG, married to Mercedes Dee, ½ share and Leoncia Martinez, single, ½ share.” Arsenio and Leoncia later acquired four (4) more parcels of land (later acquired poperties). It was allegedly agreed that the said properties should be registered in the name of Simeon, one of their children, in trust for the other heirs and should be owned in common by their family. When Arsenio died in 1976, his 13 children and Mercedes, executed the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, in which they agreed to adjudicate and transfer among themselves the rights, interest and ownership of the Pagbilao properties. There was, however, no agreement to partition the properties. Years after, Mercedes, together with her three (3) children, Rosalina, Domingo, and Olympia, executed another document wherein the parties declared that they were the only heirs of Arsenio and partitioned the half portion of the Pagbilao properties among themselves, with Mercedes waiving her supposed share in favor of her three (3) children. In 1988, Simeon, alleging that the certificates of title of the later acquired properties were lost, filed a petition for the issuance of the owner’s duplicate copy. As a result, new owner’s duplicate copies of the allegedly lost titles were issued in his favor. Thereafter, Simeon, in a deed of donation, transferred the said properties in favor of his children, Benedict, Heile and Madeleine. Consequently, TCT Nos. T-103094, T125348 and T-125349 were cancelled, and TCT No. T-241034 was issued in the name of Benedict; TCT No. 241035 in the name of Heile;

and TCT No. 241036 in the name of Madeleine. Furthermore, Simeon purportedly sold the land covered by TCT No. 101425 in favor of Mercedes, Rosalina, Leoncia, and Elpidio. In the meantime, on February 15, 1989, Mercedes, through Rosalinda, filed the Petition for the Issuance of the Owner’s Duplicate of TCTs covering the Pagbilao properties. The RTC granted the petition and new titles were issued in favor of Mercedes. Unknown to Leoncia, Rosalina caused the segregation of the one-half portion of the said properties in her (Leoncia’s) favor and the division of the remaining half among her and her siblings, Domingo and Olympia. On September 26, 1990, Leoncia and her children, claiming that the titles of the Pagbilao property were not lost but in her (Leoncia’s) possession, filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial partition, affidavit of segregation and annulment of the new certificates of title. The said case was consolidated with a case for recovery of four (4) owner’s duplicate copy of TCTs filed by Simeon against his brother Pedro. Subsequently, Leoncia, through Pedro, registered her adverse claim on February 3, 1989 on TCTs covering the later acquired properties. He further caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCTs coverin the subject properties. During the pendency of the cases, respondent PDC purchased from Simeon, Mercedes and Rosalina the six (6) properties which were the subject of the two cases. Thus, TCTs were issued in favor of PDC. Accordingly, the annotations were carried over to PDC’s titles. When Pedro and the other heirs learned of the sale of the subject properties to PDC, they filed a motion to require Simeon and Rosalina to explain why they sold the properties without permission from the RTC. On April 23, 2008, they also filed an application for a writ of preliminary injunction with ex-parte prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO). The RTC granted the issuance of the TRO effective for a period of twenty (20) days. On May 13, 2008, the RTC likewise granted the petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA nullified and set aside the order of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the writ of preliminary injunction RULING: The petition is granted. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to a main suit, as well as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully heard. Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, an application for a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if the following grounds are established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or

acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. The well-entrenched rule is that the grant or denial of the writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is given a wide latitude in this regard. Thus, in the absence of a manifest abuse, such discretion must not be interfered with. “Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.” In the present case, the Court finds the RTC grant of injunction to be in order. There is no question that when the Pagbilao Development Corporation bought the properties from the vendors, it had full knowledge that there were questions involving ownership of the parcels of land it bought. Likewise there is no question that Pagbilao Development Corporation did not take any step to have the annotation or encumbrance in each title cancelled. Inevitably, PDC is deemed to have obtained the properties subject to the outcome of the litigation among the heirs of Arsenio. With regard to the issue of the injunctive bond, the Court has time and again ruled that the posting of the bond is a condition sine qua non before a writ of preliminary injunction may issue. Its purpose is to secure the person enjoined against any damage that he may sustain in case the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. The rule, does not mean, however, that the injunction maybe disregarded since it becomes effective only after the bond is actually filed in court. In fine, it is erroneous for the CA to rule that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion simply because it failed to fix the amount of the bond. This error caused "no substantial prejudice" that would warrant the quashal of the writ of injunction. (As a matter of fact, Pedro posted a bond in the amount of One Million Pesos, the sufficiency or insufficiency of which was never questioned by PDC before the RTC. Hence, the Court will not discuss the sufficiency of the bond not only because the issue was not raised before the RTC but also it involves a question of fact.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SHERWON BIS Y AVELLANEDA G.R. NO. 191360, MARCH 10, 2014 J. DEL CASTILLO The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with and in such case, the burden of proof rests on the appellant. Here, appellant miserably failed to discharge this burden. Moreover, and as aptly observed by the CA, appellant did not seasonably question these procedural gaps before the trial court. Suffice it to say that objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. FACTS: Bis was arrested in a buy bust operation organized by the San Fernando City Police. He was, thereafter, charged in a criminal information for a violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It was alleged that he sold three (3) heat sealed transparent sachet containing a total of 0.068 gram of “shabu”, a dangerous drug for Php 1000. The RTC found Bis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and imposed upon him the penalty of life imprisonment. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether the appellant’s guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt RULING: The petition is denied. Appellant points out that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, render them incredible witnesses. The Court is not convinced. While there are indeed minor contradictions in Espejo and Arce’s testimonies, the same are nevertheless inconsequential and do not detract from the proven elements of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It is now too well-settled to require extensive documentation that “inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused.”16 Significantly, in the case at bench, the testimonies of the said witnesses for the prosecution were in harmony with respect to their positive identification of appellant as the one who sold the illegal drugs to Espejo, the poseurbuyer, in a planned buy-bust operation, as well as to the other surrounding circumstances that transpired during the said operation. Appellant posits that the prosecution did not strictly comply with the procedures laid down in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations regarding the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items. Non-compliance therewith, he argues, casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and the identity of the suspected shabu allegedly bought and confiscated from him.

On the matter of handling the confiscated illegal drugs after a buy-bust operation, Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165 provides: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Accordingly, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 which implements the aforequoted provision reads: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; Case law has it that noncompliance with the abovequoted provision of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. “What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.” In the present case, the totality of the prosecution’s evidence shows the integrity of the drugs seized to be intact. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with” and in such case, the burden of proof rests on the appellant. Here, appellant miserably failed to discharge this burden. Moreover, and as aptly observed by the CA, appellant did not seasonably question these procedural gaps before the trial court. Suffice it to say that objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Appellant’s defense hinges principally on denial. But such a defense is unavailing considering that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate buy-bust operation. “The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.”

SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA v. FRANCISCO LINDO AND WELHILMINIA LINDO, et al. G.R. NO. 208232. MARCH 10, 2014 J. VELASCO, JR. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs. The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation. It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. FACTS: Bautista, petitioner’s predecessor, sold a free-patent land located in Davao Oriental to herein respondents via a notarized deed of absolute sale. Two months later, TCTs were issued in favor of the vendees. Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents, anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of the Public Land Act. Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and laches, as defenses. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner Epifania. Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to Epifania a 3,230 sq.m.-portion of the property as well as to waive all claims and counterclaims against each other. The compromise was approved by the RTC. Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered and that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint question since the property which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below the jurisdictional ceiling. The RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter RULING: The petition is granted.

Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129, which reads: Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases..Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: 1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; 2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. On the other hand, jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129, which provides: Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases..Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x x 3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation. It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil, wrote that “in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim.” But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs. Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, 1. Actions for specific performance; 2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status; 3. The right to support of the plaintiff; 4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts; 5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts; 6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation. The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance. The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a free patent. While the deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is subject to repurchase by the applicant within a period of five (5) years from the date of conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and made part of the deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract. Although a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law

which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties. Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to enforce. That is precisely what he did. He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to recover the lot subject of free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or analogous to one of specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC. Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an interest therein which falls under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as the total selling price is only PhP 16,000 way below the PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the postulation of respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water. This is because respondents have actually participated in the proceedings before the RTC and aggressively defended their position, and by virtue of which they are already barred to question the jurisdiction of the RTC following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel. In Heirs of Jose Fernando v. De Belen, it was held that the party raising defenses to the complaint, actively participating in the proceedings by filing pleadings, presenting his evidence, and invoking its authority by asking for an affirmative relief is deemed estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court. Here, we note that aside from the belated filing of the motion to dismiss––it having been filed nine (9) years from the filing of the complaint–– respondents actively participated in the proceedings through the following acts: 1. By filing their Answer and Opposition to the Prayer for Injunction19 dated September 29, 1994 whereby they even interposed counterclaims, specifically: PhP 501,000 for unpaid survey accounts, PhP 100,000 each as litigation expenses, PhP 200,000 and PhP 3,000 per daily appearance by way of attorney’s fees, PhP 500,000 as moral damages, PhP 100,000 by way of exemplary damages, and costs of suit; 2. By participating in Pre-trial; 3. By moving for the postponement of their presentation of evidence; 4. By presenting their witness; and 5. By submitting the compromise agreement for approval. Having fully participated in all stages of the case, and even invoking the RTC’s authority by asking for affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the said trial court. Simply put, considering the extent of their participation in the case, they are, as they should be, considered estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the dismissal of the action.

DR. FERNANDO SOLIDUM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 192123, MARCH 10, 2014 J. BERSAMIN Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. FACTS: Gerald was born an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Solidum is part of the team of anesthesiologists assigned to Gerald. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move. Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Luz lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending physicians. Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely against Dr. Solidum. The RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein 2. Whether Dr. Solidum was negligent 3. Whether Ospital ng Maynila should be held jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum RULING: The appeal is meritorious.

1. Applicability of res ipsa loquitur Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by nonexpert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate. Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the patient.

2. Negligence of Dr. Solidum Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In affirming the conviction the Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt because the circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent to Gerald. In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the attendingphysician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainant’s wife and newborn baby, this Court held that: “In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’” In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of anaesthesia, the committee find that the same were all in accordance with the universally accepted standards of medical care and there is no evidence of any fault or negligence on the part of the anaesthesiologists. 3. Liability of Ospital ng Maynila In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.48 It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the CA overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following observations for the instruction of the Bench and Bar. For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with.

ENRIQUE ALMERO Y ALCANTARA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. G.R. NO. 188191. MARCH 12, 2014 C.J. SERENO In the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. FACTS: Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and multiple physical injuries. After private respondents reserved the right to institute a separate action for damages, trial ensued. On 8 January 2007, the MTC found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Petitioner filed an Application for Probation. On 22 February 2007, the MTC denied his application, prompting petitioner to file a special civil action with the RTC. While his first Petition raised the sole issue of the denial of his application for probation, he filed a Supplemental Petition, which a) assailed the validity of the promulgation of the 8 January 2007 judgment; and b) impleaded private complainants Mirasol Bartolome, Clarita P. Matias, Rosendo P. Matias and Antonio P. Matias. The RTC found that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering judgment without first ruling on his Formal Offer of Exhibits since, technically, petitioner had not yet rested his case. It also ruled that the promulgation of judgment was similarly tainted with grave abuse of discretion, because petitioner was not present at the time, in violation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining whether the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for probation, and that inasmuch as the grant of probation rests solely on the discretion of the court, the denial thereof cannot be considered grave abuse. ISSUE: 1. Whether the CA erred in ruling that private complainants have personality to appeal the 28 January 2008 Decision of the RTC 2. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying petitioner’s judgment of conviction. 3. Whether the CA committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to probation RULING: The petition is denied. 1. On private complainants’ personality to appeal

Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, sec. 6, par. 3 and 4 states: “The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address. “In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or through his counsel.” While the present petition originated from a criminal proceeding, what petitioner filed with the RTC was a special civil action, in which he himself impleaded private respondents. He cannot now belatedly change his stance to the prejudice of private respondents, who would otherwise be deprived of recourse in a civil action they did not initiate. In any case, this Court has consistently ruled that private parties may be clothed with sufficient personality if the facts show that the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and if the issues in the action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner. In Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz,12 citing People v. Calo, Jr.,13 the Supreme Court ruled: While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceeding pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals, the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adao’s order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private petitioner’s) father. 2. and. 3. On the petitioner’s conviction and the denial of his petition for probation Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction. This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction – even if the sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid. Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects the diametrically opposed positions taken by accused petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects committed by the trial court during the promulgation of the judgment, thus casting doubt on the judgment itself. Yet in the same breath, he persists in his application for probation, despite the waiver and admission of guilt implicit in any procedure for probation – precisely the unhealthy wager the law seeks to prevent.

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND INC. AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANBO E. VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARI A.M. OCA IPI NO. 12-204-CA-J. MARCH 11, 2014 J. BERSAMIN Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The complainant may be held liable for indirect contempt of court as a means of vindicating the integrity and reputation of the judges and the Judiciary. In the instant case, AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment against respondent Justices. Hence, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized representative to show cause in writing why they should not be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the unfounded and baseless charges against respondent Justices not only once but twice. FACTS: AMALI brought this administrative complaint against Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, all members of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their oaths on account of their promulgation of the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994 entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. v. The Honorable Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San Juan, and AMA Land, Inc. AMALI brought this administrative complaint alleging that respondent Justices had conspired with the counsels of WWRAI in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. RULING: The administrative complaint is bereft of merit. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the complaint by substantial evidence. Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge against any official of the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial evidence. But when the charge equates to a criminal offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal

from the service, the showing of culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in character. AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment against respondent Justices. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense. Article 204, Revised Penal Code, provides that any judge who “knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision” is punished with prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender must be a judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely committed an error of judgment or taken the unpopular side of a controversial point of law. The complainant must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust decision. The failure of the judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him administratively liable. Only a superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved may make determine and declare that the judgment or final order that the judicial officer knowingly rendered or issued was unjust. Moreover, AMALI’s allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the CA through an administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious practice by disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of resorting to administrative charges against sitting judges instead of exhausting all their available remedies. We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the judicial issues involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice and further clog the courts’ dockets. Those who seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and abuse of court processes in their efforts to vindicate their rights. Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita, its Senior Assistant Vice President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of AMALI who had authorized Usita to file the present complaint, to show cause in writing why they should not be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the unfounded and baseless charges against respondent Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the filing of unfounded and baseless administrative charges against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be

heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority; (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES/ IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 189505 & G.R. NO. 189434, MARCH 12, 2014 C.J. SERENO Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that: Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court. There is potential custody when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly recognized by law. While the subject properties are in the US, the the Republic’s interest over the Arelma assets has already been recognized in an earlier decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. FACTS: On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The anti-graft court found that the totality of assets and properties acquired by the Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials, and that petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie presumption of ill gotten wealth, pursuant to Section 2 of RA 1379. ISSUE: 1. Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because a) the Republic had earlier stated that it will file a separate forfeiture action regarding the assets of Arelma and b) Civil Case No. 0141 had already terminated; and 2. Whether the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or the Arelma proceeds, which are held by Merrill Lynch in the United States. RULING: The petition is denied. 1. On the granting of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment It is clear from our 25 April 2012 Decision that the said Petition for Forfeiture described among others, a corporate entity by the name “Arelma, Inc.,” which maintained an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly organized for the purpose of hiding ill-gotten wealth. The Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 152154 affirmed the partial summary judgment only over the Swiss deposits which the Sandiganbayan declared as forfeited in favor of the State.

This cannot be construed as a bar to a subsequent judgment over numerous other assets and properties expressly sought to be forfeited in Civil Case No. 0141. Respondent Republic’s success in obtaining summary judgment over the Swiss accounts does not mean its preclusion from seeking partial summary judgment over a different subject matter covered by the same petition for forfeiture. The Swiss Deposits Decision, G.R. No. 152154, dealt only with the summary judgment as to the five Swiss accounts, because the 2000 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 7 March 2000 specifically identified the five Swiss accounts. It did not include the Arelma account. To subscribe to the view of petitioners is to forever bar the State from recovering the assets listed above, including the properties involved in Civil Case No. 0141, including the properties it had specifically identified in its petition for forfeiture. As we have discussed in our Decision, the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is rightly characterized as a separate judgment, and allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36: Separate judgments.—When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until the rendition of subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered. Petitioners further insist that “Civil Case No. 0141 does not involve the Arelma account because the respondent unequivocally reserved its right to file a separate forfeiture petition concerning it.” However, petitioners failed to prove that such a reservation was made, and never even substantiated how such reservation could operate to deprive the State of its right to file for separate judgment. There is nothing in Republic Act 13793 or in the Rules which prohibits the graft court from taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment only because of statements allegedly made by one party. This Court cannot countenance the view advanced by petitioners defeating the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. Nos. 3019 and 1379,4 where the laws themselves do not provide for such limitations. 2. On Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over over the Arelma account It is basic that the execution of a Court’s judgment is merely a ministerial phase of adjudication. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to rule on the character of these assets as illgotten cannot be conflated with petitioner’s concerns as to how the ruling may be effectively enforced. More importantly, petitioner should be reminded of his earlier insistence that R.A. 1379 is penal, therefore petitions for forfeiture filed under this law are actions in personam, not in rem. Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that: Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter

condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court. The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by respondent, is not at all new. As early as Perkins v. Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-resident, the Court RULING: “In order that the court may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should take actual custody of the property, potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly recognized by law.” Finally, we take note of the Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court on 26 June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the foreign court agreed with the dismissal of the turnover proceeding against the Arelma assets initiated by alleged victims of human rights abuses during the Marcos regime. It reasoned that the Republic was a necessary party, but could not be subject to joinder in light of its assertion of sovereign immunity: (The Republic's) national interests would be severely prejudiced by a turnover proceeding because it has asserted a claim of ownership regarding the Arelma assets that rests on several bases: the Philippine forfeiture law that predated the tenure of President Marcos; evidence demonstrating that Marcos looted public coffers to amass a personal fortune worth billions of dollars; findings by the Philippine Supreme Court and Swiss Federal Supreme Court that Marcos stole related assets from the Republic; and, perhaps most critically, the recent determination by the Philippine Supreme Court that Marcos pilfered the money that was deposited in the Arelma brokerage account. Consequently, allowing the federal court judgment against the estate of Marcos to be executed on property that may rightfully belong to the citizens of the Philippines could irreparably undermine the Republic's claim to the Arelma assets. xx xx The Republic's declaration of sovereign immunity in this case is entitled to recognition because it has a significant interest in allowing its courts to adjudicate the dispute over property that may have been stolen from its public treasury and transferred to New York through no fault of the Republic. The high courts of the United States, the Philippines and Switzerland have clearly explained in decisions related to this case that wresting control over these matters from the Philippine judicial system would disrupt international comity and reciprocal diplomatic selfinterests. These statements made by the foreign court; based on principles of comity and reciprocity, are highlighted if only to assuage petitioner's concerns on the effective enforcement of the Decision and this Resolution.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERWIN TAMAYO Y BAUTISTA G.R. NO. 196960, MARCH 12, 2014 J. ABAD Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwin’s liability is not diminished since he and the others with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation. FACTS: While the group of Joeywas having a drinking session beside the Iglesia Ni Cristo chapel, someone from the group of the accused who was also having a drinking session hurled empty bottles of gin at them. Joey’s group, in turn, threw stones and empty gin bottles at accused Erwin and his companions. Enraged, the latter group gave chased after Joey and his companions. Unfortunately, Joey tripped and fell to the ground. He was in this position when Erwin and his companions attacked and mauled him. Some, including Erwin, stabbed Joey with their knives. The assailants scampered away afterwards. Joey was rushed to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but died shortly after arrival. Erwin and John were originally charged homicide and theft of a necklace, but the prosecution amended the charge to murder, qualified by taking advantage of superior strength and employing means to weaken the defense and afford impunity. It also claimed the attendance of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Trial took place only as to Erwin since John jumped bail and remained at-large. On November 21, 2008 the RTC found accused Erwin guilty of murder but innocent of the separate charge of theft. Although it did not find sufficient evidence of treachery, evident premeditation, or employment of means to weaken the defense and afford impunity, the RTC elevated the crime that Erwin committed from homicide to murder based on its finding that abuse of superior strength attended the killing. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution’s failure to identify the who among Erwin’s group inflicted the fatal wounds that caused Joey’s death is a ground for Erwin’s acquittal RULING: The petition is denied. The Court has always been inclined, with few exceptions, to defer to the findings of fact of the trial court since it had the opportunity to observe how each witness expressed himself and whether his eyes agreed with his lips. The Court finds nothing from the transcripts that would indicate that the trial court and the CA misapprehended the facts. The Court also finds no error in the RTC and the CA’s rejection of his alibi. The site of the murder was not far from where he lived. Besides, he presented no corroborating testimony

that he was then at his house. As to his lament that the RTC and the CA should not have given credit to Norman’s testimony for he had a grudge against him, Erwin presented no proof apart from his word that this was so. At any rate, the accounts of the remaining eyewitnesses were just as positive, straightforward, consistent, and clear. They all testified that Erwin stabbed Joey with a knife. Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwin’s liability is not diminished since he and the others with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation. Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their one helpless victim, relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head, and stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead, there is no question that the accused took advantage of their superior strength.

SPOUSES FERNANDO AND MA. ELENA SANTOS v. LOLITA ALCAZAR, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT DELFIN CHUA G.R. NO. 183034, MARCH 12, 2014 J. DEL CASTILLO While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere photocopy, there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence by the party proponent. Hence, Respondent’s failure to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment during the taking of her testimony for the second time, and the presentation of a mere photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not materially affect the outcome of the case. Moreover, the rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless the adverse party specifically denies them under oath, applies only to parties to such instrument. Hence only Fernando may be held liable for the judgment amount of P1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was not a signatory to the Acknowledgment. FACTS: Alcazar, proprietor of LCC, instituted through her attorney-in-fact Delfin Chua a Complaint for sum of money against the spouses Santos, to collect the value of paint and construction materials obtained by the latter from LCC amounting to P1,456,000.00, which remained unpaid despite written demand. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9954 and assigned to Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City. Respondent’s cause of action is based on a document entitled “Acknowledgment” apparently executed by hand by petitioner Fernando Respondent presented her evidence and testified in court as the lone witness. Petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which respondent opposed. Petitioners argued that the Acknowledgment – respondent’s Exhibit “A” which was presented in court – was not an original copy and thus inadmissible; petitioners’ receipt of the written demand was not proved; the alleged deliveries of paint and construction materials were not covered by delivery receipts; and respondent’s testimony was merely hearsay and uncorroborated. The RTC denied petitioners’ demurrer for lack of merit. On March 20, 2006, or the day of the scheduled hearing, petitioners’ counsel failed to appear, prompting the trial court to issue an Order 1) denying petitioners’ March 15, 2006 motion to reset for lack of merit and for violating Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; 2) declaring that petitioners have waived their right to present evidence; and 3) declaring that Civil Case No. 9954 is deemed submitted for decision. Petitioners went up to the CA on certiorari. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 93889, the Petition questioned the denial of petitioners’ demurrer. Meanwhile, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the March 20, 2006 Order denying their motion to reset, but the trial court denied the same in an Order dated April 24, 2006. The RTC rendered judgment ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff.

In two separate dates, the CA issued decisions sustaining both the RTC’s denial of their demurrer and the RTC judgment ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff. ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in denying the petitioner’s demurrer to evidence RULING: The petition is denied. Respondent’s failure to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment during the taking of her testimony for the second time, and the presentation of a mere photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not materially affect the outcome of the case. It was a mere procedural inadvertence that could have been cured and did not affect petitioners’ cause in any manner. As conceded by them and as held by the CA, the original exists and was made part of the records of the case when respondent’s evidence was first taken. Though respondent now claims that she had lost the original, the CA proclaimed that the document resides in the record. This would explain then why respondent cannot find it in her possession; it is with the court as an exhibit. Besides, it evidently appears that there is no question raised on the authenticity and contents of the photocopy that was presented and identified in court; petitioners merely insist that the photocopy is inadmissible as a result of respondent’s failure to present the original, which they nevertheless admit to exist and is found and included in the record of the case. While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere photocopy, there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence by the party proponent. More to the point is the fact that petitioners failed to deny specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment in their Answer. The effect of this is that the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed admitted. “By the admission of the genuineness and due execution [of such document] is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that the signature is a forgery x x x; or that it was unauthorized x x x; or that the party charged signed the instrument in some other capacity than that alleged in the pleading setting it out x x x; or that it was never delivered x x x, are cut off by the admission of its genuineness and due execution.” “There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party.” With the consequent admission engendered by petitioners’ failure to properly deny the Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with its proper authentication, identification and offer by the respondent, not to mention petitioners’ admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of their Answer that they are indeed indebted to respondent, the Court believes that judgment may be had solely on the document, and there is no need to present receipts and other documents to prove the claimed indebtedness. The Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary acknowledgment receipt, is “valid and binding between the parties who executed it, as a document evidencing the loan agreement they had entered into.” The absence of rebutting evidence occasioned by petitioners’ waiver of

their right to present evidence renders the Acknowledgment as the best evidence of the transactions between the parties and the consequential indebtedness incurred. Indeed, the effect of the admission is such that “a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and entitles him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a special defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the defendant.” However, as correctly argued by petitioners, only Fernando may be held liable for the judgment amount of P1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was not a signatory to the Acknowledgment. She may be held liable only to the extent of P600,000.00, as admitted by her and Fernando in paragraph 5 of their Answer; no case against her may be proved over and beyond such amount, in the absence of her signature and an acknowledgment of liability in the Acknowledgment. The rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless the adverse party specifically denies them under oath, applies only to parties to the document. DIAMOND TAXI AND/OR BRYAN ONG v. FELIPE LLAMAS, JR. G.R. NO. 190724, MACRH 12, 2014 J. BRION In this jurisdiction, courts generally accord great respect and finality to factual findings of administrative agencies. These findings, however, are not infallible. This doctrine espousing comity to administrative findings of facts cannot preclude the courts from reviewing and, when proper, disregarding these findings of facts when shown that the administrative body committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically or arbitrarily disregarding evidence or circumstances of considerable importance that are crucial or decisive of the controversy. FACTS: Llamas worked as a taxi driver for petitioner. On July 18, 2005, Llamas filed before the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners. In its position paper, Petitioners argued that Llamas’ acts – traffic violations, insubordination and refusal to heed management instructions – constitute grounds for the termination of Llamas’ employment. Llamas failed to seasonably file his position paper. The LA rendered a decision dismissing Llamas’ complaint for lack of merit. Llamas received a copy of this LA decision on January 5, 2006. Meanwhile, he filed his position paper on December 20, 2005. In his position paper, Llamas claimed that he failed to seasonably file his position paper because his previous counsel, despite his repeated pleas, had continuously deferred compliance with the LA’s orders for its submission. Hence, he was forced to secure the services of another counsel on December 19, 2005 in order to comply with the LA’s directive. On January 16, 2006, Llamas filed before the LA a motion for reconsideration of its decision dismissing Llama’ complaint. The LA treated Llamas’ motion as an appeal per Section 15, Rule V of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 NLRC Rules) (the governing NLRC Rules of Procedure at the time Llamas filed his complaint before the LA). The NLRC dismissed respondent Llamas’ appeal for nonperfection. This CA decision reversed and set aside the resolution of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred when it reviewed the merits of the NLRC resolution RULING: The petition is denied. As presented by the petitioners, the petition before us involves mixed questions of fact and law, with the core issue being one of fact. Whether the CA, in ruling on the labor case before it under an original certiorari action, can make its own factual determination requires the consideration and application of law and jurisprudence; it is essentially a question of law that a Rule 45 petition properly addresses. In the context of this case, however, this legal issue is inextricably linked with and cannot be resolved without the definitive resolution of the core factual issue – whether Llamas abandoned his work or had been constructively dismissed. As a proscribed question of fact, we generally cannot address this issue, except to the extent necessary to determine whether the CA correctly found that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Llamas’ appeal on purely technical grounds. For raising mixed questions of fact and law, we deny the petition outright. Even if this error were to be disregarded, however, we would still deny the petition as we find the CA legally correct in reversing the NLRC’s resolution on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. We agree that remanding the case to the NLRC for factual determination and decision of the case on the merits would have been, ordinarily, a prudent approach. Nevertheless, the CA’s action on this case was not procedurally wrong and was not without legal and jurisprudential basis. In this jurisdiction, courts generally accord great respect and finality to factual findings of administrative agencies. These findings, however, are not infallible. This doctrine espousing comity to administrative findings of facts cannot preclude the courts from reviewing and, when proper, disregarding these findings of facts when shown that the administrative body committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically or arbitrarily disregarding evidence or circumstances of considerable importance that are crucial or decisive of the controversy. Hence, in labor cases elevated to it via petition for certiorari, the CA can grant this prerogative writ when it finds that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at its factual conclusions. To make this finding, the CA necessarily has to view the evidence if only to determine if the NLRC ruling had basis in evidence. It is in the sense and manner that the CA, in a Rule 65 certiorari petition before it, had to determine whether grave abuse of discretion on factual issues attended the NLRC’s dismissal of Llamas’ appeal. Accordingly, we do not find erroneous the course that the CA took in resolving Llamas’ certiorari petition. The CA may resolve factual issues by express legal mandate and pursuant to its equity jurisdiction. In sum, the CA correctly found equitable grounds to warrant relaxation of the rule on perfection of appeal (filing of the certificate of nonforum shopping) as there was patently absent sufficient proof for the charge of abandonment. Accordingly, we find the CA legally correct in reversing and setting aside the NLRC's resolution rendered in grave abuse of discretion.

SOUTH EAST INTERNATIONAL RATTAN, INC. AND/OR ESTANISLAO AGBAY v. JESUS J. COMING G.R. NO. 186621, MARCH 12, 2014 J. VILLARAMA Petitioners’ admission that the five affiants were their former employees is binding upon them. While they claim that respondent was the employee of their suppliers Mayol and Apondar, they did not submit proof that the latter were indeed independent contractors; clearly, petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving their own affirmative allegation. FACTS: Estanislao Agbay is the President and General Manager of SEIRI, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and exporting furniture to various countries with principal place of business at Paknaan, Mandaue City. On November 3, 2003, respondent Jesus J. Coming filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, with prayer for reinstatement, back wages, damages and attorney’s fees. The LA ruled that respondent is a regular employee of SEIRI and that the termination of his employment was illegal. The NLRC set aside and vacated the LA decision and dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed the NLRC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly appreciated the evidence presented by both parties RULING: The petition is denied. The issue of whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists in a given case is essentially a question of fact. As a rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court. This rule is not absolute, however, and admits of exceptions. For one, the Court may look into factual issues in labor cases when the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA are conflicting. Here, the findings of the NLRC differed from those of the Labor Arbiter and the CA, which compels the Court’s exercise of its authority to review and pass upon the evidence presented and to draw its own conclusions therefrom. The CA gave more credence to the declarations of the five former employees of petitioners that respondent was their co-worker in SEIRI. One of said affiants is Vicente Coming’s own son, Gil Coming. Vicente averred in his second affidavit that when he confronted his son, the latter explained that he was merely told by their Pastor to sign the affidavit as it will put an end to the controversy. Vicente insisted that his son did not know the contents and implications of the document he signed. As to the absence of respondent’s name in the payroll and SSS employment report, the CA observed that the payrolls submitted were only from January 1, 1999 to December 29, 2000 and not the entire period of eighteen years when

respondent claimed he worked for SEIRI. It further noted that the names of the five affiants, whom petitioners admitted to be their former employees, likewise do not appear in the aforesaid documents. According to the CA, it is apparent that petitioners maintained a separate payroll for certain employees or willfully retained a portion of the payroll. x x x As to the “control test”, the following facts indubitably reveal that respondents wielded control over the work performance of petitioner, to wit: (1) they required him to work within the company premises; (2) they obliged petitioner to report every day of the week and tasked him to usually perform the same job; (3) they enforced the observance of definite hours of work from 8 o’clock in the morning to 5 o’clock in the afternoon; (4) the mode of payment of petitioner’s salary was under their discretion, at first paying him on pakiao basis and thereafter, on daily basis; (5) they implemented company rules and regulations; (6) [Estanislao] Agbay directly paid petitioner’s salaries and controlled all aspects of his employment and (7) petitioner rendered work necessary and desirable in the business of the respondent company. We affirm the CA. In their comment to the petition filed by respondent in the CA, petitioners emphasized that in the certifications issued by Mayol and Apondar, it was shown that respondent was employed and working for them in those years he claimed to be working for SEIRI. However, a reading of the certification by Mayol would show that while the latter claims to have respondent under his employ in 1997, 1998 and 1999, respondent’s services were not regular and that he works only if he wants to. Apondar’s certification likewise stated that respondent worked for him since 1999 through his brother Vicente as “sideline” but only after regular working hours and “off and on” basis. Even assuming the truth of the foregoing statements, these do not foreclose respondent’s regular or full-time employment with SEIRI. In effect, petitioners suggest that respondent was employed by SEIRI’s suppliers, Mayol and Apondar but no competent proof was presented as to the latter’s status as independent contractors. Petitioners’ admission that the five affiants were their former employees is binding upon them. While they claim that respondent was the employee of their suppliers Mayol and Apondar, they did not submit proof that the latter were indeed independent contractors; clearly, petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving their own affirmative allegation. There is thus no showing that the five former employees of SEIRI were motivated by malice, bad faith or any illmotive in executing their affidavit supporting the claims of respondent. In any controversy between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence are resolved in favor of the laborer. As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article 279 of the Labor Code and may only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, otherwise the dismissal becomes illegal. NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR. v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ A.C. NO. 9116, MARCH 12, 2014 J. VILLARAMA The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the

charges. The Court found no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have no personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the present suit was merely instituted to harass him. FACTS: Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association before the RTC of Quezon City for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way. The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm, appealed to the CA. On February 5, 1999, the CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution became final. Eight years later, complainants as members of the Association, filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court. On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a resolution suspending Atty. Jimenez from the practice of law for a period of six months for breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 186 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ISSUE: Whether the IBP correctly found him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility RULING: The petition is denied. The Court finds no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have no personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the present suit was merely instituted to harass him. The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct “is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome.” The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not

confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Records show that respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellant’s brief 95 days after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of the homeowner’s association. To justify his inexcusable negligence, respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous motion had been filed but “due to the health condition of the undersigned counsel…he was not able to finish said Appellants’ Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by him.” Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case. A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice.

DREAMLAND HOTEL RESORT AND WESTLEY J. PRENTICE v. STEPHEN B. JOHNSON G.R. NO. 191455, MARCH 12, 2014 J. REYES In an appeal to the SC of a CA decision dismissing a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 47 for lack of proof of authority and affidavit of service of filing as required by Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, the court held that “While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which are the attainment of justice and the protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, as in the instant case, should no longer be subject to cavil.” FACTS: Dreamland is a corporation engaged in the hotel, restaurant and allied businesses. Prentice is its current President and Chief Executive Officer, while Respondent is an Australian

citizen who came to the Philippines as a businessman/investor without the authority to be employed as the employee/officer of any business. According to Johnson, he contacted petitioners to inquire on the terms for employment offered in response to the petitioners’ advertisements for a resort manager for Dreamland Hotel. It was Prentice who offered employment and convinced Johnson to give out a loan, purportedly so the resort can be completed and operational by August 2007. Believing the representations of petitioner, respondent accepted the employment as Resort Manager and loaned money to petitioners to finish construction of the resort. From the start of August 2007, as stipulated in the Employment Agreement, respondent Johnson already reported for work. It was then that he found out that the resort was far from finished. However, he was instructed to supervise construction and speak with potential guests. Johnson remained unpaid since August 2007. He was also denied the benefits promised him as part of his compensation. Johnson was also not given the authority due to him as resort manager. Worse, he would even be berated and embarrassed in front of the staff. Thus, on November 3, 2007, respondent Johnson was forced to submit his resignation. In deference to the Employment Agreement signed, Johnson stated that he was willing to continue work for the three month period stipulated therein. However, in a text message sent by Prentice to Johnson on the same day, he was informed that “… I consider [yo]ur resignation as immediate”. Despite demand, petitioners refused to pay the salaries and benefits due to Johnson. On January 31, 2008, Johnson filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, among others, against the petitioners, where the LA rendered a Decision dismissing Johnson’s complaint for lack of merit with the finding that he voluntarily resigned from his employment and was not illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. Consequently, the petitioners elevated the NLRC decision to the CA by way of Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 47, but the CA dismissed the petition for lack of proof of authority and affidavit of service of filing as required by Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition without giving due consideration to its merits RULING: The petition is partially granted. “While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which are the attainment of justice and the protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, as in the instant case, should no longer be subject to cavil.”

Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. “From time to time, however, we have recognized exceptions to the Rules but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.” “It is true that procedural rules may be waived or dispensed with in the interest of substantial justice.” Brushing aside technicalities, in the utmost interest of substantial justice and taking into consideration the varying and conflicting factual deliberations by the LA and the NLRC, the Court shall now delve into the merits of the case. As it could not be determined with absolute certainty whether or not Johnson rendered the services he mentioned during the material time, doubt must be construed in his favor for the reason that “the consistent rule is that if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and that by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.” What is clear upon the records is that Johnson had already taken his place in the hotel since July 2007. The petitioners also maintain that they have paid the amount of P7,200.00 to Johnson for his three weeks of service. Even so, the amount the petitioners paid to Johnson as his threeweek salary is significantly deficient as Johnson’s monthly salary as stipulated in their contract is P60,000.00. In light of this deficiency, there is more reason to believe that the petitioners withheld the salary of Johnson without a valid reason. Another argument posited by the petitioners is that the employment contract executed by the parties is inefficacious because the employment contract is subject to the presentation of Johnson of his AEP and TIN. Again, this statement is wanting of merit. Johnson has adduced proof that as a permanent resident, he is exempted from the requirement of securing an AEP. Anent the requirement of securing a TIN to make the contract of employment efficacious, records show that Johnson secured his TIN only after his resignation as operations manager. Nevertheless, this does not negate the fact that the contract of employment had already become effective even prior to such date. In addition to the foregoing, there is no stipulation in the employment contract itself that the same shall only be effective upon the submission of AEP and TIN. The petitioners did not present any proof to support this agreement prior to the execution of the employment contract. As regards the NLRC findings that Johnson was constructively dismissed and did not abandon his work, the Court is in consonance with this conclusion with the following basis: Even the most reasonable employee would consider quitting his job after working for three months and receiving only an insignificant fraction of his salaries. There was, therefore, not an abandonment of employment nor a resignation in the real sense, but a constructive dismissal, which is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely x x x. Since Johnson was constructively dismissed, he was illegally dismissed. An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible

because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.

MINDA S. GAERLAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 192717., MARCH 12, 2014 J. VILLARAMA In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised. When there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law. In the present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and the question presented before us calls for a review of the CA’s conclusion that the documents and evidence presented by petitioner are insufficient to support her application for registration of title. Hence, the petition is properly filed. FACTS: On April 10, 1992, petitioner filed an Application for original registration of title over a parcel of land known as Lot 18793, Cad-237 of Cagayan Cadastre, with an area of 1,061 square meters. On August 25, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an Opposition to petitioner’s application for registration. On November 20, 2001, the trial court rendered Judgment granting petitioner’s application for registration of title. The CA reversed and set aside the Judgment of the RTC and dismissed the application for registration of title filed by petitioner. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in denying her application for registration of title RULING: The petition is denied. Prefatorily, we address the issue raised by respondent that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Indeed, the principle is well established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised. The distinction between a “question of law” and a “question of fact” is settled. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and the question does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law. In Republic v. Vega, the Court held that when petitioner asks for a review of the decision made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.

In the present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and the question presented before us calls for a review of the CA’s conclusion that the documents and evidence presented by petitioner are insufficient to support her application for registration of title. Hence, the petition is properly filed. Now, on the merits. Petitioner asserts that the land subject of her application has been declared alienable and disposable in 1925 and that her possession through her predecessorsin-interest started in 1929. However, after a careful examination of the evidence adduced by petitioner, we find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing petitioner’s application for registration of title for the failure of petitioner to prove satisfactorily the requirements for registration provided under the law. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows: (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein. Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.–Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect “entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer,” x x x. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public documents. x x x Moreover, the CENRO certification attached by petitioner to her petition deserves scant consideration since it was not presented during the proceedings before the trial court or while the case was pending before the appellate court. Petitioner only presented the said certification for the first time before this Court. The genuineness and due execution of the said document had not been duly proven in the manner required by law. Also, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. In the present case, petitioner did not offer any explanation why the CENRO certification was not presented and submitted during the proceedings before the trial court to justify its belated submission to this Court. As to the second and third requisites, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner failed to establish that she and her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land on or before June 12, 1945. In fine, since petitioner failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) she and her predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, her application for registration of title of the subject property under P.D. No. 1529 should be denied. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION G.R. NO. 192100. MARCH 12, 2014 J. VILLARAMA As a rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. In this case, the only legal issue raised by petitioner is whether the trial court based its determination of just compensation on the factors provided under existing laws and jurisprudence. In this case, we find that the trial court did not judiciously determine the fair market value of the subject property as it failed to consider other relevant factors such as the zonal valuation, tax declarations and current selling price supported by documentary evidence. Indeed, just compensation must not be arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different factors. FACTS: On March 1, 2002, petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings against the respondent over a portion of their property. The affected area, shall be traversed by the expansion of the San Simon Interchange, an integral component of the construction, rehabilitation and expansion

of the NLEX Project. Subsequently, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for issuance of writ of possession, stating that it deposited with the Land Bank the amount of P607,200.00 (100% of the value of the property based on current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue [BIR]) in accordance with Section 4(a) of R.A. 8794, and hence the court has the ministerial duty to place petitioner in possession pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on TRB’s authority to expropriate the subject property but disagreed as to the amount of just compensation. The parties eventually agreed to submit the issue of just compensation to three Commissioners. The RTC rendered a decision ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant in the amount of Php2,024,000.00 representing the net amount of just compensation after deducting the partial payment of P607,200.00 based on the valuation of Php1,300.00 per square meter on the expropriated portion of the subject property plus legal interest of 12% per annum from the time of taking (March 21, 2002) until fully paid less taxes due on the land. The CA partially affirmed RTC decision and reduced the annual legal interest awarded from 12% to 6% per annum. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the main issue of just compensation and the findings thereon by the trial court as affirmed by the CA is a question of fact which can not be disturbed by this Court RULING: We grant the petition. As a rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by this Court in the exercise of its power to review. The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is established. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. This being so, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. In this case, the only legal issue raised by petitioner is whether the trial court based its determination of just compensation on the factors provided under existing laws and jurisprudence. Section 5 of R.A. 8974 enumerates the standards for assessing the value of expropriated land taken for national government infrastructure projects, thus: SECTION 5. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated Sale. – In order to facilitate the determination of just compensation, the court may consider, among other wellestablished factors, the following relevant standards: (a) The classification and use for which the property is suited; (b) The developmental costs for improving the land; (c) The value declared by the owners; (d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity; (e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the

removal and/or demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the value of the improvements thereon; (f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land; (g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented; and (h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those required from them by the government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible. In this case, the trial court considered only (a) and (d): (1) the classification of the subject property which is located in an area with mixed land use (commercial, residential and industrial) and the property’s conversion from agricultural to industrial land, and (2) the current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity – the only factors which the commissioners included in their Report. It also found the commissioners’ recommended valuation of P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per square to be fair and just despite the absence of documentary substantiation as said prices were based merely on the opinions of bankers and realtors. We find that the trial court did not judiciously determine the fair market value of the subject property as it failed to consider other relevant factors such as the zonal valuation, tax declarations and current selling price supported by documentary evidence. Indeed, just compensation must not be arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different factors. We agree with the trial court that it was not bound by the assessment report of the commissioners and that it had the discretion to reject the same and substitute its own judgment on its value as gathered from the record, or it may accept the report/recommendation of the commissioners in toto and base its judgment thereon. However, the decision of the court must be based on all established rules, upon correct legal principles and competent evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its judgment on speculations and surmises. Nonetheless, we cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that just compensation for the subject property should not exceed the zonal valuation (P300.00 per square meter). Zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate. By itself, this index cannot be the sole basis of “just compensation” in expropriation cases. Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon. The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.30 To be just, the compensation must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker.31 It is settled that the final conclusions on the proper amount of just compensation can only be made after due ascertainment of the requirements set forth under R.A. 8974 and not merely based on the declarations of the parties. Since these requirements were not satisfactorily complied with, and in the absence of reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned property, remand of this case to the trial court is in order. This case is remanded to the trial court for the proper determination of just compensation, in conformity with this Decision.

MARYLOU CABRERA v. FELIX NG G.R. NO. 201601, MARCH 12, 2014 J. REYES A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon. Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is deemed realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied with. FACTS: On February 14, 2004, Ng filed a complaint for sum of money with the RTC against the Cabrera nspouses alleging that the latter issued to him 3 Metrobank checks that were dishonored upon presentment. However, they claimed that they paid the respondent the amount represented by the said checks through the latter’s son Richard Ng. Further, they deny having issued Metrobank Check No. 0244745 to the respondent, alleging that the said check was forcibly taken from them by Richard Ng. On August 7, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, which ordered the spouses Cabrera to pay the respondent the total face value of the three checks plus interest and damages. On August 8, 2007, the spouses Cabrera received a copy of the RTC Decision. On August 14, 2007, the spouses Cabrera filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration, which they set for hearing on August 17, 2007. On even date, the spouses Cabrera sent a copy of their motion for reconsideration to the respondent thru registered mail; it was actually received by the respondent on August 21, 2007. The said motion for reconsideration, however, was not heard on August 17, 2007 as the new acting presiding judge of the said court had just assumed office. On December 19, 2007, the RTC issued an Order which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera. The CA affirmed the RTC order. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Order dated December 19, 2007, which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera. RULING: The petition is granted. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provide that: Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at

least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process. “The purpose of the three-day notice requirement, which was established not for the benefit of the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein.” “A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon.” “Being a fatal defect, in cases of motions to reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency.” Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is deemed realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied with. It is undisputed that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera was reset by the R TC twice with due notice to the parties; it was only on October 26, 2007 that the motion was actually heard by the RTC. At that time, more than two months had passed since the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration on August 21, 2007. The respondent was thus given sufficient time to study the motion and to enable him to meet the arguments interposed therein. Indeed, the respondent was able to file his opposition thereto on September 20, 2007. Notwithstanding that the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration four days after the date set by the spouses Cabrera for the hearing thereof, his right to due process was not impinged as he was afforded the chance to argue his position. Thus, the R TC erred in denying the spouses Cabrera's motion for reconsideration based merely on their failure to comply with the three day notice requirement. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. JOSE T. CAPULONG G.R. NO. 201643, MARCH 12, 2014 J. REYES The preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on the merits of the case. The aggrieved party may then seek redress from the courts through a petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. While it is true that the primary relief prayed for by Capulong in his petition has already been voluntarily corrected by the Ombudsman by the issuance of the order lifting his preventive suspension, we must not lose sight of the fact that Capulong likewise prayed for other remedies. There being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65.

FACTS: The case arose from the Complaint-Affidavit for violation of Section 85 of R.A. No. 67136, Perjury under Article 183 of the RPC, and serious dishonesty and grave misconduct under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, filed on July 27, 2009, before the Ombudsman by Joselito P. Fangon, Acting Director of the General Investigation Bureau of the Ombudsman, against Capulong, Customs Operation Officer V of the Bureau of Customs. On March 30, 2011, Capulong received an undated Order issued by the Ombudsman placing him under preventive suspension without pay which shall continue until the case is terminated but shall not exceed six months effective from receipt of the Order. Capulong filed an Urgent Motion to Lift/Reconsider Order of Preventive Suspension with Motion to Resolve. Questioning the preventive suspension and wary of the threatening and coercive nature of the Ombudsman’s order, Capulong, on April 19, 2011, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA granted the petition and issued a TRO enjoining and prohibiting the Ombudsman and any person representing them or acting under their authority from implementing the preventive suspension order. Meanwhile, the Ombudsman issued an order lifting Capulong’s preventive suspension. On the same date, in the scheduled hearing, the Ombudsman’s representative manifested in open court that the assailed order of preventive suspension had already been lifted, thus the CA held in abeyance the application for preliminary injunction. On July 29, 2011, the CA granted Capulong’s petition and dismissed the criminal charge. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter and can grant reliefs, whether primary or incidental, after the Ombudsman has lifted the subject order of preventive suspension RULING: The petition is denied. As a rule, it is the consistent and general policy of the Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. It is within the context of this well-entrenched policy that the Court proceeds to pass upon the validity of the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. While it is an established rule in administrative law that the courts of justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, the courts may not be bound by such findings of fact when there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial; and when there is a clear showing that the

administrative agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or in a capricious and whimsical manner, such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. These exceptions exist in this case and compel the appellate court to review the findings of fact of the Ombudsman. In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive suspension order against Capulong does not render the petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the courts from passing upon the validity of a preventive suspension order, it being a manifestation of its constitutionally mandated power and authority to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on the merits of the case. The aggrieved party may then seek redress from the courts through a petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. While it is true that the primary relief prayed for by Capulong in his petition has already been voluntarily corrected by the Ombudsman by the issuance of the order lifting his preventive suspension, we must not lose sight of the fact that Capulong likewise prayed for other remedies. There being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65. The decision of the appellate court to proceed with the merits of the case is included in Capulong’s prayer for such “other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the premises.” Such a prayer in the petition justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for. More importantly, we have ruled that it is the allegations in the pleading which determine the nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and proof even if no such relief is prayed for. Significantly, the power of adjudication, vested in the CA is not restricted to the specific relief claimed by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary and expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or preventing further disputes, provided said matter for determination has been established by competent evidence during the hearing. The CA is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that all disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding. The requisites for the Ombudsman to issue a preventive suspension order are clearly contained in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. The Court, however, can substitute its own judgment for that of the Ombudsman on this matter, with a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. Undoubtedly, in this case, the CA aptly ruled that the Ombudsman abused its discretion because it failed to sufficiently establish any basis to issue the order of preventive suspension. Capulong’s non-disclosure of his wife’s business interest does not constitute serious dishonesty or grave misconduct. Nothing in the records reveals that Capulong deliberately placed “N/A” in his SALN despite knowledge about his wife’s business interest. As explained by Capulong, the SEC already revoked the registration of the corporations where his wife was an incorporator; hence, he deemed it not necessary to indicate it in his SALN. Ineluctably, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative

complaint. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from this rule. However, the crime of perjury for which Capulong was charged, requires a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood in a statement under oath or in an affidavit, and the statement or affidavit in question here is Capulong's SALNs. It then becomes necessary to consider the administrative charge against Capulong to determine whether or not he has committed perjury. Therefore, with the dismissal of Capulong's administrative case, the CA correctly dismissed its criminal counterpart since the crime of perjury which stemmed from misrepresentations in his SALNs will no longer have a leg to stand on.

LUI ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS G.R. NO. 193494, MARCH 12, 2014

J. LEONEN There should be no inexplicable delay in the filing of a motion to set aside order of default. Even when a motion is filed within the required period, excusable negligence must be properly alleged and proven. The Regional Trial Court of Makati declared Lui Enterprises in default when it failed to answer the complaint within the required period. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside order of default without an acceptable excuse why its counsel failed to answer the complaint. It failed to prove the excusable negligence. Thus, the Makati trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the order of default. FACTS: Lui Enterprises and Zuellig Pharma entered into a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel of land located in Davao City. On January 10, 2003, Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it. Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation. According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending with the RTC Davao barred the filing of the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the motion to dismiss should be denied for having been filed late, they likewise moved that Lui Enterprises be declared in default. The RTC denied Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss and declared it in default. Lui manifested that the RTC Davao allegedly issued an order directing all of Lui Enterprises’ lessees to “observe status quo with regard to the rental payments” and continue remitting their rental payments to Lui Enterprises while the nullification of deed of dation in payment case was being resolved. The Regional Trial Court of Makati only noted the manifestation. It was only one year after the issuance of the order of default, that Lui Enterprises

filed a motion to set aside order of default in the Makati trial court on the ground of excusable negligence. While the motion to set aside order of default was still pending for resolution, Lui Enterprises filed the manifestation and motion to dismiss. It manifested that the Davao court issued another order directing the Philippine Bank of Communications to inform Zuellig Pharma to pay rent to Lui Enterprises while the Davao trial court’s order dated April 1, 2004 was subsisting. Without resolving the motion to set aside order of default, the Makati trial court denied the manifestation with motion to dismiss on the ground that Lui Enterprises already lost its standing in court. Lui Enterprises did not file any motion for reconsideration. The RTC ruled that Lui Enterprises “was barred from any claim in respect of the rental payments” since it was declared in default. The CA sustained the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal for lack of subject index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited, and the statement of issues in Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief; Whether the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside order of default; Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati; and

RULING: The petition is denied. 1. On Lui Enterprises’ failure to comply with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s brief Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the appellant’s brief lack specific requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f). These requirements are the subject index of the matter in brief, page references to the record, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged and with textbooks and statutes cited. Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises’ appeal. There are exceptions to this rule. In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the appellants substantially complied with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s brief. Thus, this court excused the appellants’ procedural lapses. In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s brief. It admitted that its appellant’s brief lacked the required subject index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. However, it did not even correct its admitted “technical omissions” by filing an amended appellant’s brief with the

required contents. Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation of the rules. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal. 2. On Lui Enterprises’ failure to show that its failure to answer the complaint within the required period was due to excusable negligence When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or she is required to answer within 15 days from the day he or she was served with summons. The defendant may also move to dismiss the complaint “within the time for but before filing the answer.” Thus, a defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from service of summons either presents no defenses against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint or was prevented from filing his or her answer within the required period due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In either case, the court may declare the defendant in default on plaintiff’s motion and notice to defendant. The court shall then try the case until judgment without defendant’s participation and grant the plaintiff such relief as his or her complaint may warrant. A defendant declared in default loses his or her standing in court. However, the defendant declared in default “does not waive all of his or her rights.” He or she still has the right to “receive notice of subsequent proceedings.” Also, the plaintiff must still present evidence supporting his or her allegations “despite the default of the defendant.” After notice of the declaration of default but before the court renders the default judgment, the defendant may file, under oath, a motion to set aside order of default. The defendant must properly show that his or her failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. The defendant must also have a meritorious defense. Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Section 3. Default; declaration of. – x x x x (b) Relief from order of default. – A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. If the defendant discovers his or her default after judgment but prior to the judgment becoming final and executory, he or she may file a motion for new trial under Rule 37, Section 1, paragraph (a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. If he or she discovers his or her default after the judgment has become final and executory, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure may be filed. Appeal is also available to the defendant declared in default. He or she may appeal the judgment for being contrary to the evidence or to the law under Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He or she may do so even if he or she did not file a petition to set aside order of default. The remedies of the motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, and petition for relief from judgment are mutually exclusive, not alternative or cumulative. This is to compel defendants to remedy their default at the earliest possible opportunity. Depending on when the default was discovered and whether a default judgment was already rendered, a defendant declared in default may avail of only one of the three remedies. In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its default before the Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered judgment. Thus, it timely filed a motion to set aside order of default, raising the ground of excusable negligence.

Excusable negligence is “one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.” The circumstances should be properly alleged and proved. In this case, we find that Lui Enterprises’ failure to answer within the required period is inexcusable. Lui Enterprises’ counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not immediately take steps to remedy its default and took one year from discovery of default to file a motion to set aside order of default. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui Enterprises only “conveniently blamed its x x x counsel for the late filing of the answer” without offering any excuse for the late filing. This is not excusable negligence under Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b)127 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not err in refusing to set aside the order of default. Lui Enterprises argued that the Regional Trial Court of Makati should have been liberal in setting aside its order of default. However, the basic requirements of Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure must first be complied with131 The defendant’s motion to set aside order of default must satisfy three conditions. First is the time element. The defendant must challenge the default order before judgment. Second, the defendant must have been prevented from filing his answer due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Third, he must have a meritorious defense. As discussed, Lui Enterprises never explained why its counsel failed to file the motion to dismiss on time. It just argued that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default. Even assuming that it had a meritorious defense and that its representative and counsel had to fly in from Davao to Makati to personally appear and manifest in court its meritorious defense, Lui Enterprises must first show that its failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. This Lui Enterprises did not do. Lui Enterprises argued that Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to compel Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications to litigate their claims. Thus, “declaring the other claimant in default would ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit.” The Regional Trial Court of Makati should not have declared Lui Enterprises in default. Under Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person may file a special civil action for interpleader if conflicting claims are made against him or her over a subject matter in which he or she has no interest. The action is brought against the claimants to compel them to litigate their conflicting claims among themselves. An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against those who have conflicting claims over the rent due for the property leased. This remedy is for the lessee to protect him or her from “double vexation in respect of one liability.” He or she may file the interpleader case to extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent, remove him or her from the adverse claimants’ dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims to litigate among themselves. In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to extinguish its obligation to pay rent. Its purpose in filing the interpleader case “was not defeated” when the Makati trial court declared Lui Enterprises in default. At any rate, an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in default. Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant who fails to answer within the required period may, on motion, be declared in default. The consequence of the

default is that the court may “render judgment barring the defaulted claimant from any claim in respect to the subject matter.” 3. On whether the nullification of deed in dation in payment case bar the filing of the interpleader case Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of litis pendentia: Section 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: x x x x (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; x x x x Litis pendentia is Latin for “a pending suit.” It exists when “another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action x x x.” The subsequent action is “unnecessary and vexatious” and is instituted to “harass the respondent [in the subsequent action].” The requisites of litis pendentia are: (1) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. All of the requisites must be present. Absent one requisite, there is no litis pendentia. In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the nullification of deed of dation in payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig. There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case. All told, the trial court did not err in proceeding with the interpleader case. The nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending with the Regional Trial Court of Davao did not bar the filing of the interpleader case with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. HEIRS OF AMADA A. ZAULDA v. ISAAC Z. ZAULDA G.R. NO. 201234, MARCH 17, 2014

J. Mendoza The almost four months that lapsed before the records reached the ponente’s office was caused by the gross incompetence and inefficiency of the division personnel at the CA. It was the height of injustice for the CA to dismiss a petition just because the motion for extension reached the ponente’s office beyond the last date prayed for. The petitioners could not also be faulted that the motion for extension of time was received by the CA on September 13, 2010. The rules allow parties to file a pleading by registered mail. They are not required to ensure that it would be received by the court on or before the last day of the extended period prayed for. Though no party can assume that its motion for extension would be granted, any denial thereof should be reasonable. FACTS: Petitioners, as heirs of Amada Zaula, were co-owners of a parcel of land in Aklan. Sometime in March 2000, respondent, through force and intimidation, forcibly entered the

subject property and, there and then, cut and took with him bamboos and other forest/agricultural products. On March 29, 2000, respondent, together with two other unidentified persons, forcibly entered the subject property and, with threat and intimidation, constructed and built a house made of light material, and that petitioners demanded respondent to vacate and turn over the subject property to them but the latter refused to do so. The heirs of Zaulda then filed a complaint for recovery of possession and declaration of ownership against respondent, before the MCTC, where the Court rendered judgment declaring plaintiffs the lawful owners entitled to possession of the Lots 1, 3 and 6, and declaring Lots A and B as co-owned by plaintiffs, defendant, and intervenors. The RTC, partly modified the decision of the MCTC and declared respondent as the owner and possessor of lots 1 and 3 Petitioner Eleseo Zaulda, the lone surviving heir of Amada Aguila-Zaulda, after his coheir Rodolfo Zaulda passed away, filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time and for lack of competent evidence on affiant’s identity on the attached verification and certification against forum shopping. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time despite the motion for extension of time having been timely filed RULING: The petition is granted. Petition for review from the RTC to the CA is governed by Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, x x x. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x. Upon proper motion x x x, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. In this case, the petitioners complied with the requirements laid down in the above quoted provision. Records show that on March 10, 2010, petitioners timely filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of the RTC decision (dated January 20, 2010, received by petitioners on February 25, 2010), but the same was denied in the RTC Order, dated August 4, 2010, copy of which was received by petitioners on August 10, 2010. Thus, they had until August 25, 2010 within which to file a petition for review pursuant to said Section 1, Rule 42. On August 24, 2010, petitioners filed their Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review before the CA, paying the docket and other lawful fees and deposit for costs and prayed for an additional period of fifteen (15) days from August 25, 2010 or until September 9, 2010, within which to file the said petition. On September 9, 2010, they filed the Petition for Review.

As earlier stated, the Motion For Extension Of Time To File Petition For Review, which was filed through registered mail on August 24, 2010, was filed on time. It was physically in the appellate court’s possession long before the CA issued its Resolution on February 11, 2011, dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time. The record shows that the CA received the motion for extension of time to file petition for review on September 13, 2010 but the CA Division received the motion on September 14, 2010, and the ponente’s office received it on January 5, 2011. Indeed, there was a delay, but it was a delay that cannot be attributed at all to the petitioners. The almost four (4) months that lapsed before the records reached the ponente’s office was caused by the gross incompetence and inefficiency of the division personnel at the CA. It was the height of injustice for the CA to dismiss a petition just because the motion for extension reached the ponente’s office beyond the last date prayed for. Clearly, the petitioners were unreasonably deprived of their right to be heard on the merits because of the CA’s unreasonable obsession to reduce its load. In allowing the petitioners to be fatally prejudiced by the delay in the transmittal attributable to its inept or irresponsible personnel, the CA committed an unfortunate injustice. The petitioners could not also be faulted that the motion for extension of time was received by the CA on September 13, 2010. The rules allow parties to file a pleading by registered mail. They are not required to ensure that it would be received by the court on or before the last day of the extended period prayed for. Though no party can assume that its motion for extension would be granted, any denial thereof should be reasonable. Granting that the petition was filed late, substantial justice begs that it be allowed and be given due course. Indeed, the merits of petitioners’ cause deserve to be passed upon considering that the findings of the RTC were in complete contrast to the findings of the MCTC which declared petitioners as the lawful owners entitled to possession of the lots in question. As regards the competent identity of the affiant in the Verification and Certification, records show that he proved his identity before the notary public through the presentation of his senior citizen card. The Rules on Notarial Practice provide that a senior citizen card is one of the competent identification cards recognized in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. For said reason, there was compliance with the requirement. Contrary to the perception of the CA, attachment of a photocopy of the identification card in the document is not required by the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Even A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, amending Section 12 thereof, is silent on it. Thus, the CA’s dismissal of the petition for lack of competent evidence on the affiant’s identity on the attached verification and certification against forum shopping was without clear basis. Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required, non-attachment thereof would not render the petition fatally defective. It has been consistently held that verification is merely a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, affecting merely the form of the pleading such that non-compliance therewith does not render the pleading fatally defective.

SPOUSES EDMUNDO DELA CRUZ AND AMELIA CONCIO-DELA CRUZ v. SPOUSES RUFINO R. CAPCO AND MARTY C. CAPCO G.R. NO. 176055, MARCH 17, 2014

J. DEL CASTILLO The requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how entry into the property was made by the defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness of the filing of the complaint before the MTC. However, the timeliness of the filing of the Complaint for unlawful detainer is not an issue in this case. Hence, the failure of the Complaint to allege when and how the spouses Capco came into possession of the property does not mean that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it. “The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property, possession de facto and not possession de jure.” But “where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property.” Here, both parties anchor their right to possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela Cruz by their own ownership while the spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of the alleged true owner of the property. Thus, the MeTC and the RTC correctly passed upon the issue of ownership in this case to determine the issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized that “the adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.” FACTS: On October 6, 2003, the spouses Dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the spouses Capco before the MeTC of Pateros. They alleged that Teodora, mother of petitioner Amelia, acquired ownership over a piece of land by virtue of a Decision rendered by the RTC of Pasig in Land Registration Case No. 9511. The said property was eventually registered in her name under TCT No. 31873. Teodora, out of neighborliness and blood relationship, tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation thereof. Subsequently, the subject property was conveyed to the spouses Dela Cruz. Intending to construct a house thereon and utilize the space for their balut and salted eggs business, the spouses Dela Cruz thus demanded that the spouses Capco vacate the property. As the spouses Capco refused, the matter was brought before the Barangay Lupon for conciliation wherein several meetings were held but to no avail. In their Answer, the spouses Capco pointed out that the Complaint is defective for failing to allege the exact metes and bounds of the property. Neither is a title attached thereto to show that the spouses Dela Cruz are the owners of the disputed property. The MeTC concluded that since the spouses Capco’s possession of the subject property was by mere tolerance of the spouses Dela Cruz, the latter have the better right to possess and thus may recover the same upon demand. The RTC affirmed the MetC Ruling. The CA set aside the RTC decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in setting aside the rulings of the MeTC and then RTC RULING: The petition is granted.

It must be stated at the outset that this Court is not a trier of facts. However, the conflicting findings of facts of the MeTC and the RTC on one hand, and the CA on the other, compel us to revisit the records of this case for proper dispensation of justice. Contrary to the CA’s pronouncement, the Complaint sufficiently makes out a case for unlawful detainer. The CA intimated in its assailed Decision that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the spouses Dela Cruz’ Complaint for ejectment since the same failed to describe how the spouses Capco’s entry to the property was effected or how and when the dispossession started, as held in Go and Melchor. Such a requirement, however, does not apply in this case. The Court has already clarified in Delos Reyes v. Odones that: The requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how entry into the property was made by the defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness of the filing of the complaint before the MTC x x x. This is because, in forcible entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of defendants’ actual entry into the property; whereas, in unlawful detainer cases, it is counted from date of the last demand to vacate. Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on time, there is a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint is one for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer; and since the main distinction between the two actions is when and how defendant entered the property, the determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint. The timeliness of the filing of the Complaint for unlawful detainer is not an issue in this case. Hence, the failure of the Complaint to allege when and how the spouses Capco came into possession of the property does not mean that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it. “To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.” A complaint, to sufficiently make out a case for unlawful detainer and fall under the jurisdiction of the MeTC, must allege that: 1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; 2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; 3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and; 4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. Here, the Complaint alleged that the spouses Dela Cruz’ predecessor-ininterest, Teodora, is the registered owner of the property per TCT No. 31873 and that she tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation of the lot. The spouses Dela Cruz subsequently acquired the property through conveyance and they extended the same tolerance to the spouses Capco. The spouses Dela Cruz demanded for the spouses Capco to vacate the property but to no avail; hence, they sent the latter a formal demand letter which, per the attached copy to the Complaint, is dated September 1, 2003.39 The Complaint was filed on October 6, 2003 or within one year from the time the formal demand to vacate was made. Clearly, the Complaint sufficiently established a case for unlawful detainer as to vest the MeTC jurisdiction over it.

“The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property, possession de facto and not possession de jure.” But “where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property.” Here, both parties anchor their right to possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela Cruz by their own ownership while the spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of the alleged true owner of the property. Thus, the MeTC and the RTC correctly passed upon the issue of ownership in this case to determine the issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized that “[t]he adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.” The spouses Dela Cruz were able to prove by preponderance of evidence that they are the owners of the lot. Their allegation that the subject property was adjudicated to Teodora by virtue of a decision in a land registration case and was later conveyed in their favor, is supported by (1) a copy of the Decision in the said land registration case; (2) the title of the land issued to Teodora (TCT No. 31873), and, (3) the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Teodora wherein the latter’s heirs agreed to convey the said property to Amelia. All told, the Court agrees with the MeTC's conclusion, as affirmed by the RTC, that the spouses Dela Cruz are better entitled to the material possession of the subject property. As its present owners, they have a right to the possession of the property which is one of the attributes of ownership.

METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC., et al. v. PROSPERITY CREDIT RESOURCES, INC. et al. G.R. NO. 154390, MARCH 17, 2014

J. BERSAMIN The contested deed of real estate mortgage was a public document by virtue of its being acknowledged before notary public. As a notarized document, the deed carried the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and had in its favor the presumption of regularity. Hence, it was admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity, and was entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To rebut its authenticity and genuineness, the contrary evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the deed should be upheld. Petitioners undeniably failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence against the genuineness and authenticity of the deed. Instead, their actuations even demonstrated that their transaction with respondents had been regular and at arms-length, thereby belying the intervention of fraud. FACTS: In July 1984, MFI sought from PCRI a loan in the amount of P3.5 million with 24% interest per annum and a term of ten years. MFI allegedly entrusted to PCRI 7 titles, with an aggregate area of 3.3 hectares and left it to defendants to choose from among the 7 titles those which would be sufficient to secure the loan. On September 4, 1986, MFI received a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale announcing the auction of the seven lots due to unpaid indebtedness of P10.5 million. MFI protested the foreclosure,

and the auction was reset to October 27, 1986. At the auction sale, PCRI was the sole bidder for P6.5 million. On January 16, 1990 and again on March 5, 1990, PCRI sent the plaintiffs a letter demanding that they vacate the four remaining lots. On March 19, 1990, PCRI executed an affidavit of non-redemption of TCT Nos. 317699, 317702, 317703 and 317704. On June 7, 1990, S.G. del Rosario, PCRI’s vice-president, wrote MFI reiterating their demand to vacate the premises and remove pieces of machinery, equipment and persons therein, which MFI eventually heeded. On October 9, 1991, MFI filed a case for nullification of the mortgage contract and of the foreclosure with damages on the ground of fraud. The RTC rendered a decision declaring the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure by respondents null and void, and ordering the reconveyance of the foreclosed properties to petitioners. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the mortgage and foreclosure of the subject four (4) parcels of land should be declared null and void RULING: The petition is denied. It is settled that the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court unless there is a showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. Indeed, the trial court’s findings are always presumed correct. Nonetheless, the CA is not precluded from making its own determination and appreciation of facts if it considers the conclusions arrived at by the trial court not borne out by the evidence, or if substantial facts bearing upon the result of the case were overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied. As an appellate court, the CA is not necessarily bound by the conclusions of the trial court, but holds the exclusive authority to review the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the weighing of conflicting evidence. In view of the conflicting findings and appreciation of facts by the RTC and the CA, we have to revisit the evidence of the parties. Petitioners insist that respondents committed fraud when the officers of MFIwere made to sign the deed of real estate mortgage in blank. According to Article 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when one of the contracting parties, through insidious words or machinations, induces the other to enter into the contract that, without the inducement, he would not have agreed to. Yet, fraud, to vitiate consent, must be the causal (dolo causante), not merely the incidental (dolo incidente), inducement to the making of the contract. Causal fraud is defined as “a deception employed by one party prior to or simultaneous to the contract in order to secure the consent of the other.” Fraud cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Whoever alleges fraud affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, because a person is always presumed

to take ordinary care of his concerns, and private transactions are similarly presumed to have been fair and regular. To be remembered is that mere allegation is definitely not evidence; hence, it must be proved by sufficient evidence. The contested deed of real estate mortgage was a public document by virtue of its being acknowledged before notary public. As a notarized document, the deed carried the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and had in its favor the presumption of regularity. Hence, it was admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity, and was entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To rebut its authenticity and genuineness, the contrary evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the deed should be upheld. Petitioners undeniably failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence against the genuineness and authenticity of the deed. Instead, their actuations even demonstrated that their transaction with respondents had been regular and at arms-length, thereby belying the intervention of fraud. The totality of the evidence presented tended to indicate that fraud was not attendant during the transactions between the parties. Verily, as between the duly executed real estate mortgage and the unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, the Court affords greater weight to the former. Moreover, the Action to assail the mortgage already prescribed. It appears that the original stance of petitioners was that the deed of real estate mortgage was voidable. In their complaint, they averred that the deed, albeit in printed form, was incomplete in essential details, and that MFI, through its president, signed it in good faith and in absolute confidence. Yet, petitioners now claim that the CA committed a reversible error in not holding that the absence of consent made the deed of real estate mortgage void, not merely voidable. In effect, they are now advancing that their consent was not merely vitiated by means of fraud, but that there was complete absence of consent. Although they should be estopped from raising this issue for the first time on appeal, the Court nonetheless opts to consider it because its resolution is necessary to arrive at a just and complete resolution of the case. As the records show, petitioners really agreed to mortgage their properties as security for their loan, and signed the deed of mortgage for the purpose. Thereafter, they delivered the TCTs of the properties subject of the mortgage to respondents. Consequently, petitioners' contention of absence of consent had no firm moorings. It remained unproved. With the contract being voidable, petitioners' action to annul the real estate mortgage already prescribed. Article 1390, in relation to Article 1391 of the Civil Code, provides that if the consent of the contracting parties was obtained through fraud, the contract is considered voidable and may be annulled within four years from the time of the discovery of the fraud. The discovery of fraud is reckoned from the time the document was registered in the Register of Deeds in view of the rule that registration was notice to the whole world. Thus, because the mortgage involving the seven lots was registered on September 5, 1984, they had until September 5, 1988 within which to assail the validity of the mortgage. But their complaint was instituted in the RTC only on October 10, 1991. Hence, the action, being by then already prescribed, should be dismissed.

HEIRS OF TERESITA MONTOYA, et al. v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al G.R. NO. 181055, MARCH 19, 2014

J. BRION The petitioners essentially assail in this petition the validity of the NHA’s acquisition of the property, in view of the prohibition on sale or disposition of agricultural lands under E.O. No. 228, in relation to P.D. No. 27 and Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Resolution of this petition’s core issue requires the proper interpretation and application of the laws and the rules governing the government’s agrarian reform program, as well as the laws governing the powers and functions of the NHA as the property’s acquiring entity. As presented, therefore, this petition’s core issue is a question of law that a Rule 45 petition properly addresses. This notwithstanding, the resolution of this petition’s core issue necessitates the prior determination of two essentially factual issues, i.e., the validity of the property’s conversion and the petitioners’ claimed ownership of the property. As questions of fact, they are proscribed in a Rule 45 petition—The settled rule is that the Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari is limited to resolving only questions of law. FACTS: In 1992, the Gonzaleses donated a portion of their landholding in Pampanga as a resettlement site for the displaced victims of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. The Gonzaleses gave the landholding’s tenants one-half share of their respective tillage with the corresponding title at no cost to the latter. The Gonzaleses retained the property (pursuant to their retention rights) and registered it in Dorita Gonzales-Villar’s name. Still needing additional resettlement sites, the NHA purchased the property on February 20, 1996. An application filed by the NHA to convert the property to residential form was later approved by the DAR. In their complaint filed before the PARAD, the petitioners claimed that the sale between the NHA and the Gonzaleses were intended to circumvent the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The PARAD denied the Complaint for Injunction and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale filed by the Heirs of Teresita Montoya, et al. The PARAD decision was affirmed by both the DARAB and the CA. ISSUE: Whether a Rule 45 petition is proper in this case RULING: The petition is denied. The petition’s arguments present proscribed factual issues. The petitioners essentially assail in this petition the validity of the NHA’s acquisition of the property, in view of the prohibition on sale or disposition of agricultural lands under E.O. No. 228, in relation to P.D. No. 27 and Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Resolution of this petition’s core issue requires the proper interpretation and application of the laws and the rules governing the government’s agrarian reform program, as well as the laws governing the powers and functions of the NHA as the

property’s acquiring entity. As presented, therefore, this petition’s core issue is a question of law that a Rule 45 petition properly addresses. This notwithstanding, the resolution of this petition’s core issue necessitates the prior determination of two essentially factual issues, i.e., the validity of the property’s conversion and the petitioners’ claimed ownership of the property. As questions of fact, they are proscribed in a Rule 45 petition. The settled rule is that the Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari is limited to resolving only questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt exists as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Under these significations, we clearly cannot resolve this petition’s issues without conducting a re-examination and reevaluation of the lower tribunals’ unanimous findings on the factual matters (of the property’s conversion and of the petitioners’ ownership of the property), including the presented evidence, which the Court’s limited Rule 45 jurisdiction does not allow. Moreover, this Court generally accords respect, even finality to the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, i.e., the PARAD and the DARAB, when these findings are supported by substantial evidence. The PARAD and the DARAB, by reason of their official position have acquired expertise in specific matters within their jurisdiction, and their findings deserve full respect; without justifiable reason, these factual findings ought not to be altered, modified, or reversed. To be sure, this Rule 45 proscription is not iron-clad and jurisprudence may admit of exceptions. A careful review of this case’s records, however, justifies the application of the general proscriptive rule rather than the exception. Viewed in this light, we are constrained to deny the petition for raising proscribed factual issues and because we find no reason to depart from the assailed rulings. Even if we were to disregard this procedural lapse and decide the case on its merits, we are inclined to deny the petition and affirm as valid the NHA’s acquisition of the property on three main points, which we will discuss in detail below. The property was validly converted to residential from agricultural uses In declaring the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale valid, all three tribunals found that the property has already been removed from the agrarian reform’s coverage as a result of its valid conversion from agricultural to residential uses. We find no reason to disturb their findings and conclusion on this matter. BARRY LANIER AND PERLITA LANIER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 189176, MARCH 19, 2014

J. PEREZ While the determination of probable cause is primarily an executive function, the Court would not hesitate to interfere if there is a clear showing that Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached.

When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of evidence based on the lone fact that the raiding team arrived ahead of the search team, he, in effect went into the merits of the defense. When he made a determination based on his own appreciation of the pieces of evidence for and against the accused, he effectively assumed the function of a trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction. FACTS: In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, SPO1 Gorion and PO2 Remaneses attested that Task Force Roulette of the Aklan Police and the PDEA received information from an asset that petitioners Barry and Perlita were engaged in selling illegal drugs in Boracay Island. The police operatives conducted a test-buy at petitioners’ residence where they were able to purchase P5,000.00 worth of shabu and P1,000.00 worth of marijuana from petitioners. On the basis of the test-buy operation, they were able to secure a search warrant from the RTC of Aklan. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Kalibo filed an Information charging petitioners of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. A Motion to Quash the Information was filed before the RTC. The RTC denied the Motion to Quash and remanded the case to the provincial prosecutor for preliminary investigation. In a Resolution dated 8 March 2004, the provincial prosecutor upheld the Information and directed the return of the records to the trial court for disposition. Petitioners, however, filed a petition for review before the DOJ assailing the Resolution of the provincial prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice acted on the petition favorably and directed the withdrawal of the Information which directive the provincial prosecutor heeded by filing a Motion to Withdraw Information before the trial court. The trial court granted the Motion to Withdraw Information. On appeal, the CA nullified and set aside the DOJ Resolutions and the RTC Order and reinstated the Information against petitioners. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating the Information against petitioners RULING: The petition is denied. Petitioners defend the Secretary of Justice in ordering the withdrawal of the Information on the ground that the pieces of evidence obtained through an illegal search becomes inadmissible in evidence. Petitioners explain that the search was illegal because it violated Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure when the search was not made in the presence of the lawful occupants of the house. It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers, dictating that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and balances, whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari, has been tasked by the present Constitution to determine whether or not there has

been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation. Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the executive branch; it may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. As a requisite to the filing of a criminal complaint, probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to incite a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. Only such facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. The presence of these elements was attested to by evidence such as the Joint Affidavit of Arrest and the Receipt of the Properties seized. The police officers averred that they recovered 3 sachets of shabu weighing 10.4 grams inside a jewelry box on petitioners’ living room. They also seized one (1) big gift pack containing dried marijuana leaves weighing more or less 950 grams and two (2) gift packs containing nine (9) bricks of dried marijuana leaves weighing 800 grams on top of the head board of petitioners’ bed. Moreover, the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within the premises of the house of the accused is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi. When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of evidence based on the lone fact that the raiding team arrived ahead of the search team, he, in effect went into the merits of the defense. When he made a determination based on his own appreciation of the pieces of evidence for and against the accused, he effectively assumed the function of a trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction. Regarding the submission of petitioners that the remedy from the RTC’s Order to withdraw the filing of the Information should have been an ordinary appeal, we rule that on a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the RTC Order may be elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. There is, here, a basis for such finding. When confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding farther with the trial. While the

Secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. When the trial court’s Order rests entirely on the assessment of the DOJ without doing its own independent evaluation, the trial court effectively abdicates its judicial power and refuses to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The RTC erroneously held that it has not yet effectively acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused as no commitment order has yet been issued against them. At the risk of sounding repetitive, we must emphasize that the trial court, having acquired jurisdiction over the case, is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the Secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. All told, the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error when it nullified and set aside the Resolutions and Order, rendered by the Secretary of Justice and the RTC, respectively. HEIRS OF CORNELIO MIGUEL v. HEIRS OF ANGEL MIGUEL G.R. NO. 158916, MARCH 19, 2014

J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The. For res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment to apply, identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of parties and identity of issues. As the issues of whether Lot J of Psd. 146880 is one of the properties donated by the spouses Cornelio and Nieves to Angel and whether such donation was valid have been necessarily settled in Civil Case No. 1185, they can no longer be relitigated in Civil Case No. 2735. FACTS: Cornelio was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Puerto Princesa City. He had the property subdivided into ten smaller lots which were designated as Lots A to J of Psd-146880. Cornelio sold nine of the lots to his children, with Lot G going to his son Angel, predecessor-ininterest of the respondents in this case. The remaining lot, Lot J, Cornelio kept for himself and his wife, Nieves. In a deed of donation inter vivos, the spouses Cornelio and Nieves donated two lots to Angel. Angel accepted the donation in the same instrument. Subsequently, however, Cornelio filed a complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation on the alleged ground that one of the properties subject of the donation, Lot 2-J of Psd-146879, was given the technical description of Lot J of Psd-146880. On Angel’s motion, it was dismissed for lack of cause of action. Angel, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Registrar of Deeds to issue a certificate of title in his favor. The petition was granted and TCT No. 11349 was issued in

the name of Angel over Lot J of Psd-146880. Angel later on caused the subdivision of Lot J of Psd-146880 into four smaller lots which he correspondingly donated to each of his four sons. On July 7, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Angel’s TCT No. 11349 and its derivative titles, as well as of the respective deeds of donation Angel executed in favor of his sons. The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for the nullification of deeds of donation and reconveyance of property. The CA affirmed the Order of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA misapplied the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment RULING: The petition is denied. The following are the elements of res judicata: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Section 47(b) of the said Rule and (2) conclusiveness of judgment as explained in Section 47(c) of the same Rule. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a “bar by prior judgment” would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as “conclusiveness of judgment” applies. Nabus v. Court of Appeals clarifies the concept of conclusiveness of judgment further: The doctrine states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The only identities thus required for the operation of the judgment as an estoppel x x x are identity of parties and identity of issues. In this case, the Court of Appeals held the following as regards the issue of identity of parties: As further held, conclusiveness of judgment calls for identity of parties, not causes of action, and “there is identity of parties not only when the parties are the same but also those on privity with them, as between their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigation for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity, or when there is substantial identity of parties.” In the present case, appellants were the successors in interest of petitioner Cornelio in Civil Case No. 1185 against respondent Angel, whereas in Civil Case No. 2735, appellees were the successors in interest of Angel. Undeniably, there is substantial identity of parties in the said two cases. And since the matter

directly controverted and determined in Civil Case No. 1185 is the lot which is also the bone of contention in Civil Case No. 2735, the judgment rendered in the first case is conclusive in the second case. The petitioners do not question the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there is identity of parties in Civil Case No. 1185 and Civil Case No. 2735. What the petitioners principally contend is that the judgment in Civil Case No. 1185 cannot bar Civil Case No. 2735 as the two cases involve different causes of action and different subject matters. However, for res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment to apply, identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue. The claim of the petitioners that Civil Case No. 1185 was dismissed not because they have no cause of action but because they failed to state such a cause of action is wrong. The Order dated January 31, 1986 in Civil Case No. 1185 ruled that Cornelio and the petitioners had no cause of action in connection with the reformation of the deed of donation executed by the spouses Cornelio and Nieves in favor of Angel because the said deed of donation is a simple donation and therefore not a proper subject of an action for reformation. For purposes of conclusiveness of judgment, identity of issues means that the right, fact, or matter in issue has previously been either “directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action” by a competent court. In this case, the issue of the transfer pursuant to the deed of donation to Angel of Lot J of Psd. 146880 and, corollarily, his right over the said property has been necessarily involved in Civil Case No. 1185. The petitioners argued that none of the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1185 is also involved in Civil Case No. 2735. The primary issue in Civil Case No. 1185 is whether the true intention of the spouses Cornelio and Nieves as donors was to donate to Angel the property described in the deed of donation, that is, Lot J of Psd. 146880. The issue in Civil Case No. 1185 is therefore the identity of one of the properties donated by the spouses Cornelio and Nieves for which Cornelio and the petitioners sought reformation of the deed of donation. On the other hand, the subject matter of Civil Case No. 2735 is the recovery of Lot J of Psd. 146880 on the petitioners’ claim that a clerical error prevented the deed of donation from conforming to the true intention of the spouses Cornelio and Nieves as to the identity of the property they intended to donate to Angel. As the issues of whether Lot J of Psd. 146880 is one of the properties donated by the spouses Cornelio and Nieves to Angel and whether such donation was valid have been necessarily settled in Civil Case No. 1185, they can no longer be relitigated again in Civil Case No. 2735. The Order dated January 31, 1986 effectively held that the said property had been donated to Angel. It follows that he had properly sought its registration in his name under TCT No. 11349 and he had validly partitioned and donated it to his four children who acquired TCT Nos. 20094, 20095, 20096, and 20097 in their respective names.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY OBOGNE G.R. NO. 199740, MARCH 24, 2014

J. Del Castillo

In a rape case filed by a mental retardate, the Court held that mental retardation per se does not affect a witness’ credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness. Only those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others are disqualified. FACTS: Appellant Jeny Obogne was charged with the crime of rape of a 12-year old mental retardate. The RTC rendered a Judgment finding Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape committed against “AAA.” The trial court did not consider “AAA’s” mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance considering that the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of “AAA’s” mental disability. The CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the court erred in giving credence to the testimony of “AAA” despite her mental disability RULING: The petition is denied. Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide: Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. -Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. x x x x Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons cannot be witnesses: (a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others; (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. In this case, “AAA” is totally qualified to take the witness stand notwithstanding her mental condition. As correctly observed by the trial court: “This Court finds “AAA” a very credible witness, even in her mental condition. Contrary to defense counsel’s objection that “AAA” was not capable of intelligently making known her perception to others, “AAA” managed to recount the ordeal she had gone through in the hands of the accused, though in a soft voice and halting manner x x x. “AAA’s” simple account of her ordeal clearly reflects sincerity and truthfulness. While it is true that, on cross-examination, “AAA” faltered in the sequence of events x x x this is understandable because even one with normal mental condition would not be able to recall, with a hundred percent accuracy, events that transpired in the past. But “AAA” was certain that ‘it was a long time x x x after the incident’ when it was reported to the police. Likewise, she was very certain that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina x x x.” In the same vein, the appellate court found “AAA” qualified to take the witness stand, viz: “Our own evaluation of the records reveals that “AAA” was shown to be able to perceive, to make known her perception to others and to remember traumatic incidents.”

We stress that, contrary to accused-appellant’s assertions, mental retardation per se does not affect a witness’ credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness. Finally, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of simple rape and properly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266B, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly ruled that “AAA’s” mental disability could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance because the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of such mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime. By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not call for the imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such mental disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution. Under Article 266-B(10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. As such this circumstance must be formally alleged in the information and duly proved by the prosecution. Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information. x x x But in the absence of a specific or particular allegation in the information that the appellant knew of her mental disability or retardation, as well as lack of adequate proof that appellant knew of this fact, Article 266-B (10), RPC, could not be properly applied x x x

BJDC CONSTRUCTION v. NENA E. LANUZO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 161151, MARCH 24, 2014

J. Bersamin The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has the burden to establish the allegation with competent evidence. If the action based on negligence is civil in nature, the proof required is preponderance of evidence. Hence, the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, who failed to establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino could not recover damages. FACTS: This case involves a claim for damages arising from the death of a motorcycle rider in a nighttime accident due to the supposed negligence of a construction company then undertaking re-blocking work on a national highway. The plaintiffs insisted that the accident happened because the construction company did not provide adequate lighting on the site, but the latter countered that the fatal accident was caused by the negligence of the motorcycle rider himself. The trial court decided in favor of the construction company, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision and ruled for the plaintiffs. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur despite and contrary to the finding by the trial court that the proximate cause of the accident is the victim’s own negligence RULING: The petition is granted. Inasmuch as the RTC and the CA arrived at conflicting findings of fact on who was the negligent party, the Court holds that an examination of the evidence of the parties needs to be undertaken to properly determine the issue. The Court must ascertain whose evidence was preponderant, for Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court mandates that in civil cases, like this one, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not evidence. Generally, the party who denies has no burden to prove. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court, but it may rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises affirmative defense or defenses, which if proved, will exculpate him from liability. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. Upon a review of the records, the Court affirms the findings of the RTC, and rules that the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino. In our view, the RTC properly gave more weight to the testimonies of Zamora and SPO1 Corporal than to those of the witnesses for the Lanuzo heirs. There was justification for doing so, because the greater probability pertained to the former. Moreover, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of their testimonies is preferred to that of the appellate court’s because of the trial court’s unique first-hand opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor as such. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” For the doctrine to apply, the following requirements must be shown to exist, namely: (a) the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct that would make the plaintiff

responsible is eliminated. This rule is grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human experience, and it is on the basis of such experience or common knowledge that negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, the rule is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be fairly ascribed to the company considering that it has shown its installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in the project site. In that context, the fatal accident was not caused by any instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company. In contrast, Balbino had the exclusive control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records disclose that he himself did not take the necessary precautions. As Zamora declared, Balbino overtook another motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could not avoid hitting a barricade at the site, causing him to be thrown off his motorcycle onto the newly cemented road. SPO1 Corporal’s investigation report corroborated Zamora’s declaration. This causation of the fatal injury went uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs. Hence, the Lanuzo heirs could not recover damages.

SUTHERLAND GLOBAL SERIVES (PHILIPPINES), INC. AND JANETTE G. LAGAZO v. LARRY S. LABRADOR G.R. NO. 193107. MARCH 24, 2014

J. Brion Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, confines this Court to a review of the case solely on pure questions of law. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the challenged NLRC decision. The CA gravely misappreciated the import of the evidence on record and can even be said to have disregarded it. The NLRC glossed over Labrador’s repeated violations that led the latter to request that he be allowed to resign to preserve his reputation for future employment, rather than be dismissed from the service. FACTS: Sutherland hired Labrador as one of its call center agents with the main responsibility of answering various queries and complaints through phoned-in calls. In his two years of working at Sutherland, Labrador committed several infractions. But it was only on June 17, 2008 that Labrador was finally charged with violation for transgressing the “Non-Compliance Sale Attribute” policy clause stated in the Employee Handbook. Under Sutherland’s Employee Handbook, Labrador’s action is classified as an act of dishonesty or fraud. On May 24, 2008, Sutherland sent Labrador a Notice to Explain in writing why he should not be held administratively liable. On May 28, 2008, an administrative hearing was conducted that took into consideration Labrador’s past infractions. After investigation, a recommendation was issued finding Labrador guilty of violating the Employee Handbook due to gross or habitual neglect of duty. The recommendation further stated: “With the request of Mr. Larry Labrador for resignation instead

of termination, SGS Management allows his request of resigning from the company, ergo: he shall resign from the company effective immediately.” On June 17, 2008, Labrador submitted his resignation letter. On October 27, 2008, Labrador filed a complaint for constructive/illegal dismissal before the NLRC. On February 27, 2009, LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Notwithstanding the defects in Labrador’s appeal memorandum, the NLRC reversed the LA’s ruling. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC. ISSUES: Whether the CA correctly determined if the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case RULING: The petition is granted. At the time this case was appealed to the NLRC, the then governing rule was the 2005 NLRC Rules whose Section 4, Rule VI provided: Section 4. Requisites For Perfection Of Appeal. – a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties. Sutherland insists that the failure to state the material dates is fatal to Salvador’s appeal to the NLRC and to his present position in this case. We do not find Sutherland’s argument meritorious as technical rules are not necessarily fatal in labor cases; they can be liberally applied if – all things being equal – any doubt or ambiguity would be resolved in favor of labor. These technicalities and limitations can only be given their fullest effect if the case is substantively unmeritorious; otherwise, and if the defect case), we have the discretion not to consider them fatal. The same reasoning applies to the failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping. We can likewise relax our treatment of the defect. Additionally, while the 2005 NLRC Rules specifically stated that a certificate of non-forum shopping should be attached, the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure21 no longer requires it. Jurisprudence, too, is replete with instances when the Court relaxed the rules involving the attachment of the certificate of non-forum shopping.22 Under these circumstances, we see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in admitting the petition. We, however, do not agree with the findings of the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, that Labrador was illegally dismissed. In this jurisdiction, the findings of the NLRC are generally binding and should be treated with finality. The CA only looks at the facts to determine if a tribunal, board or officer exercising

judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in appreciating the facts. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, confines this Court to a review of the case solely on pure questions of law. In Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, we said that in ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the challenged NLRC decision. The CA gravely misappreciated the import of the evidence on record and can even be said to have disregarded it. The NLRC glossed over Labrador’s repeated violations that led the latter to request that he be allowed to resign to preserve his reputation for future employment, rather than be dismissed from the service. Thus, it was within Sutherland’s prerogative to terminate Labrador’s employment when he committed a serious infraction and, despite a previous warning, repeated it. To reiterate, he opened another client account without the latter’s consent, with far-reaching and costly effects on the company. For one, the repeated past infractions would have resulted in negative feedbacks on Sutherland’s performance and reputation. It would likewise entail additional administrative expense since Sutherland would have to address the complaints – an effort that would entail investigation costs and the return of the doubly-delivered merchandise. As a rule, “an employer cannot be compelled to continue with the employment of workers when continued employment will prove inimical to the employer's interests.” To Sutherland’s credit, it duly complied with the procedural requirement in dismissing an employee; it clearly observed both substantive and procedural due process. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY T. GO G.R. NO. 168539, MARCH 25, 2014

J. Peralta The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. FACTS: The SC in in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to PIATCO for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy NAIA IPT III. Subsequent to the above Decision, Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Enrile in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. An information charging Go of the said offense was filed before the Sandiganbayan. On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him. On June 2, 2005, the SB quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the SB erred in dismissing the case on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over respondent Go RULING: The petition is granted. At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged. The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone. Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as coprincipals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual

degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy. Respondent claims that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with Secretary Enrile for allegedly entering into another agreement which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The SB granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court. In a minute resolution, this Court affirmed the SB ruling. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case. The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it has been held that: When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. x x x x Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x. In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person. As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise

would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders. BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, et al. vs. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., et al. G.R. NO. 174758, MARCH 26, 2014

J. Mendoza The supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when the Olairez group visited the school to demand their compliance with the decision was not borne out of a contumacious conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to hinder the implementation of a judgment. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which is clearly not the case here. On the contrary, SLU was well within its rights to appeal the decision and not immediately heed the demand of the Olairez group. Records reveal that the Olairez group violated the three-day notice rule on hearing of motions as provided in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when they scheduled the hearing on their “Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants In Contempt” just one day after they filed the said pleading. As a rule, any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be received for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, subject only to some exceptions, such as where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice or if there was substantial compliance. FACTS: SLU is an educational institution based in Baguio City. While the members of the Olairez group were fourth-year graduating students of SLU’s College of Medicine who filed a Complaint for Mandatory Injunction against Dean Dacanay and other individuals challenging the implementation of the revised version of the Comprehensive Oral and Written Examination, a prerequisite for graduation from SLU’s medicine course. The RTC granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. In their Fourth Amended Complaint, the Olairez group disclosed that while they were allowed to march and attend the commencement exercises, Dean Dacanay refused to issue certifications of graduation in their favor. Thus, the Olairez group prayed that Dean Dacanay and SLU be ordered to forward their final grades to the Registrar’s Office for recording; to issue their clearances, certificate of graduation, diploma and include them in the SLU Registry of Graduates; to cease and desist from exerting pressure on the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges to recall their certifications granting their internship and on Baguio General Hospital to pull them out from their internship; to declare the Revised COWE as moot and academic insofar as they were concerned; and to pay them damages. On July 16, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Olairez group as graduates of the College of Medicine, SLU. However, SLU did not comply with the order of the RTC. Hence, the Olairez group filed a “Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants in Contempt,” which was granted by the RTC. The RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution and likewise found SLU guilty of indirect contempt.

Meanwhile, SLU appealed the order of the RTC finding it guilty of indirect contempt before the CA. The CA reversed the order of the RTC. Thus, the Olairez group filed a petition review on certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUES: 1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari; and 2. Whether the CA erred in finding that the three-day notice rule was violated RULING: The petition is denied. 1. On CA’s dismissal of the petition The Olairez group argues that the CA erred in ruling that SLU and its officials were denied of due process as they were not given the opportunity to comment and be heard on the contempt charges against them. Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority; (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a) In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor is considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative of its character. A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes

proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be done wilfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. The supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when the Olairez group visited the school on July 17, 2003 to demand their compliance with the decision was not borne out of a contumacious conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to hinder the implementation of a judgment. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which is clearly not the case here. On the contrary, SLU was well within its rights to appeal the decision and not immediately heed the demand of the Olairez group. 2. On the petitioner’s violation of the three-day notice rule Records reveal that the Olairez group violated the three-day notice rule on hearing of motions as provided in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when they scheduled the hearing on their “Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants In Contempt” on July 18, 2003 or just one day after they filed the said pleading on July 17, 2003. As a rule, any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be received for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, subject only to some exceptions, such as where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice or if there was substantial compliance. Under the attendant circumstances, there was no substantial compliance with procedural due process because although the hearing on the said motion was reset to July 22, 2003, the disputed writ of execution was actually issued on July 18, 2003 and served on SLU and its officials on July 19, 2003 before the rescheduled hearing date. while their counsels on record received their copies on July 21, 2003. In due process, the parameter required is the presence of an opportunity to be heard, as well as the time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. This was not properly afforded to SLU. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JOHNI GLENN D. RUNES A.M. NO. P-12-3055, MARCH 26, 2014

C.J. Sereno Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as “frequent unauthorized absences from duty during office hours.” The word “frequent” connotes that the employees absent themselves from duty more than once. Respondent’s two absences from his post, being without authority, can already be characterized as frequent. It constitutes inefficiency and dereliction of duty, which adversely affect the prompt delivery of justice. Substantial evidence shows that respondent is guilty of loafing. The investigation conducted by the investigating lawyers of the OCA revealed at least two (2) instances when he was out of his assigned post/station during regular office hours. He failed to sufficiently refute these findings. FACTS: In a letter dated 20 February 2009, the Office of the Ombudsman, endorsed a Complaint received through ephemeral electronic communication (text message) to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). On 22 May 2009, then Executive Judge Manalastas submitted a Confidential Report finding the complaint against subjects Mr. Glen Runez and Mr. Conrado

Gonzales being “fixers” in the San Courts is factual. The impression that these two (2) employees give is that their actions are condoned and tolerated by the Court since the motions for reduction of bail are usually granted. They have been at this illegal activity for a long time since no one has dared to openly prevent them from doing so for fear that their employment or their cases be jeopardized. On 31 July 2009, the matter was referred to the NBI for entrapment operations. Failing to get a response from the NBI, the OCA organized sometime in January 2010, an investigating team composed of lawyers. The team was asked to conduct a discreet investigation to determine the veracity of an anonymous Complaint on alleged case fixing in the MeTC of San Juan City. Thus, in a Memorandum addressed to Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez dated 9 September 2010, Wilhelmina Geronga, Chief, OCA Legal Office, recommended that the alleged case fixing be denied due course for insufficiency of evidence. In the course of the investigation, however, the investigating team found that respondent had the habit of loafing during office hours. He was found loafing in two (2) instances: (1) on 26 January 2010 when he was nowhere to be found in his station; and (2) on 26 April 2010 wherein he left his post at 1:45 p.m. and was caught leaving the parking area in a Toyota Corolla sedan bearing plate number JLL 933. In both instances, he declared in his Daily Time Records (DTRs) complete working hours of 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. In a Memorandum dated 21 February 2012, the OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of the offense of loafing with the penalty of suspension for three (3) months without pay. ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of the offense of loafing RULING: Respondent is guilty of loafing Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as “frequent unauthorized absences from duty during office hours.” The word “frequent” connotes that the employees absent themselves from duty more than once. Respondent’s two absences from his post, being without authority, can already be characterized as frequent. It constitutes inefficiency and dereliction of duty, which adversely affect the prompt delivery of justice. Substantial evidence shows that respondent is guilty of loafing. The investigation conducted by the investigating lawyers of the OCA revealed at least two (2) instances when he was out of his assigned post/station during regular office hours. He failed to sufficiently refute these findings. It is imperative that as Clerk III, respondent should always be at his station during office hours; hence, if his absence were indeed because of some errand, he has yet again failed to provide sufficient proof that those errands were official in nature. As previously mentioned, he had not filed any application for leave, nor did he possess any written authority to travel to justify his absence. Absent such proof, his absence remains indubitably unauthorized. He maintains that his DTRs, which were signed by him and certified as true and correct by the Clerk of Court, support his claim that he never left his station. He cannot rely on the certification made by the Clerk of Court in his DTR because, as clearly shown therein, the

latter’s verification pertains to the prescribed office hours, and not to the correctness of the entries therein. In Lopena v. Saloma, this Court ruled: Respondent is reminded that all judicial employees must devote their official time to government service. Public officials and employees must see to it that they follow the Civil Service Law and Rules. Consequently, they must observe the prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment thereof for public service if only to recompense the government and ultimately the people who shoulder the cost of maintaining the judiciary. To inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees are at all times behooved to strictly observe official time. This is because the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the last and lowest of its employees. Thus, court employees must exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as service in the judiciary is not only a duty; it is a mission. Respondent is found guilty of loafing. Accordingly, he is hereby suspended for six (6) months and one (1) day, with a very stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION v. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS HOTELS AND RESORTS, INC., et al. G.R. NO. 197942-43/G.R. NO. 199528, MARCH 26, 2014

J. REYES Subject to Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 the, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72) hours provided herein. The Court does not now find that Judge Jurado acted in bad faith or with ill will or malicious motive when he granted the TRO extension and later the preliminary injunction. It would have been irregular and unreasonable for him to act on the extension of the 72-hour TRO on June 6, 2011 when the cases were first raffled to him, and besides, under Rule 58 he had 24 hours to act thereon. Moreover, PAGCOR is not justified in failing to file a requisite motion for reconsideration, and to observe the hierarchy of courts. While the question of whether to give due course to the petitions is addressed to the discretion of the Court, it behooves PAGCOR to observe the applicable rules and keep in mind that the Court will not take lightly any non-observance of our settled rules as if they are mere technicalities. A motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the special civil action of certiorari. FACTS:

Respondents entered into a MOA with PAGCOR whereby Thunderbird committed to invest in their gaming and leisure operations in Fiesta Hotel and Casino (FHC) in Eastbay Arts Recreational and Tourism Zone, Binangonan, Rizal. With the passage of R.A. No. 9487, which extended PAGCOR’s franchise to for another 25 years, respondents sought the formal extension of their authority to operate (ATOs) to be made co-terminus with PAGCOR’s new franchise, as well as extension of their development and investment schedules. On May 30, 2011, insisting that the respondents’ ATOs had expired without a renewal, PAGCOR served notice upon the respondents to cease their casino operations, as well as gave them until June 3, 2011 to signify their unconditional acceptance of its new terms of reference for their new licenses, or “PAGCOR will have no choice but to initiate cessation proceedings.” Believing that they are entitled to a new franchise co-terminus with that of PAGCOR, Thunderbird Pilipinas and ERI each filed separate complaints against PAGCOR with the RTC for specific performance and damages, with application for TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. RTC Executive Judge Reyes issued an ex-parte 72-hour TRO, later extended to 20 days by Presiding Jurado, who later on also issued a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction. Without seeking a reconsideration of the said order, PAGCOR filed directly with this Court two certiorari petitions, G.R. Nos. 197942 and 197943. Meanwhile, respondents filed a Supplemental Complaint for actual damages of P35 Million with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, where the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in favor of Thunderbird Pilipinas. PAGCOR filed its third petition, G.R. No. 199528, to set aside the aforesaid order. ISSUE: Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed orders RULING: The petitions are denied. With the parties agreeing to end their differences before trial proper, the instant petitions have ceased to present a justiciable controversy for us to resolve. However, as PAGCOR itself has importuned, there are procedural as well as substantive issues of such importance which it hopes this Court would help clarify for the guidance of future litigants. So shall We proceed. On one particular point of controversy, PAGCOR has been insistent that the court a quo has no power to extend an “already” expired 72-hour ex-parte TRO. But the facts will clarify the matter. Civil Case Nos. 11-125832-33 were filed on June 3, 2011, a Friday, and at 4:30 that same afternoon, Judge Reyes issued an ex-parte 72-hour TRO to hold off any cessation proceedings threatened by PAGCOR against the respondents. The next two days being a weekend, it was only on June 6, 2011, Monday, that the cases were raffled to Judge Jurado. On June 7, 2011, Tuesday, Judge Jurado conducted a summary hearing on the respondents’ TRO application, and when he granted the same, PAGCOR verbally moved for reconsideration on the ground that Judge Reyes’ 72-hour TRO had already expired and could no longer be extended. Judge Jurado denied the motion, saying that his TRO was based on his summary hearing wherein testimonies and documents were presented by the parties, whereas

the 72-hour TRO issued by Judge Reyes was based merely on the respondents’ initiatory pleadings. On June 13 and 16, 2011, the trial court heard the respondents’ applications for writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction against PAGCOR’s cessation order. On June 23, 2011, the 20th and last day of the TRO, Judge Jurado issued the writ. As already noted, without moving for reconsideration, PAGCOR went up directly to this Court on certiorari. Concerning the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction or a TRO, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court are found in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58, viz: SEC. 4. x x x (c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied by service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant’s affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines. However, where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a non-resident thereof, the requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply. (d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriff’s return of service and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle and to which the records shall be transmitted immediately. SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted. The Court shall also determine, within the same period, whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order. However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the

temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72) hours provided herein. The Court does not now find that Judge Jurado acted in bad faith or with ill will or malicious motive when he granted the TRO extension and later the preliminary injunction. It would have been irregular and unreasonable for him to act on the extension of the 72-hour TRO on June 6, 2011 when the cases were first raffled to him, and besides, under Rule 58 he had 24 hours to act thereon. On the other hand, PAGCOR should have refrained, but deliberately did not, from serving its closure orders on the respondents on June 7, 2011, knowing very well that a summary hearing was to be held that same morning on their TRO application. Indeed, seen in light of the preceding acts of PAGCOR, it can hardly be said that it acted with fairness toward the respondents so as to be permitted now to blithely take issue with the extension of the 72hour TRO. For truly, what is of compelling consideration here is that PAGCOR was accorded notice and a chance to be heard, and when the trial court later resolved to grant the writ of preliminary injunction, it did so after hearing it out, within the 20-day TRO. Moreover, PAGCOR is not justified in failing to file a requisite motion for reconsideration, and to observe the hierarchy of courts. While the question of whether to give due course to the petitions is addressed to the discretion of the Court, it behooves PAGCOR to observe the applicable rules and keep in mind that the Court will not take lightly any non-observance of our settled rules as if they are mere technicalities. A motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the special civil action of certiorari. The settled rule is that a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. As will become more evident in our latter discussion, there is no justification for PAGCOR dispensing with a motion for reconsideration, since an earlier case, PAGCOR v. Fontana Development Corporation, has delved into the same points it raised here. At their roots, these petitions deal with the manner PAGCOR has exercised its licensing and regulatory powers over the respondent casino operators. The Court sees no novel issues of transcendental importance to justify its action of skipping the hierarchy of the courts and coming directly to us via certiorari petition. As explained in Emmanuel A. De Castro v. Emerson S. Carlos, although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not exclusive but

concurrent with that of the CA and RTC. The petitioner has no unrestricted freedom of choice of forum, but must strictly observe the hierarchy of the courts. Settled is the rule that “the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.” A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition. A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket. In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his Reply and after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.

Anonymous Complaint Against Otelia Lyn G. Maceda, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court, Palapag, Northern Samar A.M. No. P-12-3093, March 26, 2014

J. Leonado-De Castro A court employee who was charged with dishonesty cannot claim that the admission of documentary evidence which were mere photocopies and were obtained without her consent constitute a violation of her right to due process. Proceedings in administrative investigation are not strictly governed by the technical rules of evidence. They are summary in nature. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. FACTS: An anonymous complainant filed a letter-complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Maceda, Court Interpreter, MTC, Palapag, Northern Samar, of falsifying her attendance in court so she could attend her law classes at UEP in Catarman, Norther Samar. The OCA referred the aforementioned letter-complaint to Executive Judge Falcotelo, who later submitted a report finding recommending the dismissal of the letter-complaint against Maceda, considering that Maceda pursued her law studies for self-improvement and that Maceda merely relied on Judge Lagrimas’ permission for her to attend her classes at UEP.

Upon receipt of Judge Falcotelo’s Report, the OCA directed Maceda to file her comment on the letter-complaint against her. Maceda made a general denial of any wrongdoing in the performance of her job and reporting of her official time, and that her only intention was to enrich her knowledge in relation to her work in the judiciary by pursuing her law studies, for which she was granted permission by the presiding judge of her court. The OCA submitted its Report recommending that the instant administrative matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular complaint for Dishonesty against Maceda, Court; and that respondent be found GUILTY of Dishonesty and be SUSPENDED for six (6) months without pay, effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. On October 15, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution re-docketing the case as a regular administrative matter. ISSUE: Whether Maceda is guilty of dishonesty RULING: Maceda questions the anonymity of the complainant and suspects that the complainant. At the outset, we stress that an anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an unknown author. However, a complaint of such sort does not always justify its outright dismissal for being baseless or unfounded for such complaint may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence. As this Court ruled in Anonymous Complaint Against Gibson A. Araula10: Although the Court does not as a rule act on anonymous complaints, cases are accepted in which the charge could be fully borne by public records of indubitable integrity, thus needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by complainant, whose identity and integrity could hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest. x x x. Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and would diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary cannot be countenanced. Hence, anonymous complaints of this nature should be acted upon by this Court. Second, Maceda contests the admissibility of the documentary evidence attached to the letter-complaint, particularly, the photocopies of her certificate of registration at UEP; her grades for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd year law subjects; and her Daily Time Records (DTRs) filed with the court, for said documents were obtained without her authorization/consent or that of the officers who are in custody of the documents. Maceda even insinuates the possibility of a conspiracy between the complainant and the custodian of the said documents. Maceda’s opposition to the documentary evidence against her was grounded on how the documents were obtained, but not on the falsity of the said documents or their contents. Maceda argues that her consent was necessary for the release of copies of the documents attached to the letter-complaint but she did not specifically cite the relevant court and school rules to this effect. In so far as Maceda’s DTRs are concerned, these formed part of her employee records, which the OCA and the Court can freely access even without her consent.

Moreover, proceedings in administrative investigation are not strictly governed by the technical rules of evidence. They are summary in nature. As we have declared in Office of the Court Administrator v. Indar13: It is settled that “technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.” It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. Maceda cannot claim that the admission and consideration of the documentary evidence attached to the letter-complaint violated her right to due process. She undeniably had the opportunity to contest the truth of the documents and/or submit controverting evidence to the same, but she failed to do so. Lastly, Maceda prays for additional time before resolution of this administrative matter so she can engage the services of a lawyer to represent her. She points out that she was not assisted by counsel in the earlier proceedings. Maceda has knowingly and voluntarily participated in the administrative investigation conducted by Judge Falcotelo, by the OCA, and finally, by this Court. The administrative investigation began as early as November 10, 2010, but it was only in Maceda’s Manifestation dated February 5, 2012 before this Court that she insisted on engaging the services of a legal counsel. We can no longer accommodate Maceda’s request this far along into the proceedings. Being a court employee and law student, Maceda is capable of understanding the charges against her and adducing her defenses herself. We already clarified in Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission the extent of the right to counsel, thus: However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. Maceda was accorded her right to due process during the administrative investigation conducted in the instant case. She was given an opportunity to answer and be heard on the charges against her, and that, it has often been said, is the essence of procedural due process. Now, we proceed to determining Maceda’s liability for falsification of her DTRs. We see no reason to disturb the finding of the OCA that Maceda did indeed falsify her DTRs and is, therefore, guilty of dishonesty. Considering that Maceda has not been previously charged with an administrative offense in her eleven (11) years in government service and that there is no proof of her being

remiss in the performance of her duties as court interpreter or causing specific damage or prejudice to the court for her dishonest act, we find Maceda to be guilty of Less Serious Dishonesty, for which the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is proper.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESUS BURCE G.R. NO. 201732, MARCH 26, 2014

J. Leonardo-de Castro After a careful review, this Court is convinced that AAA’s unwavering narration of how she was raped, together with her positive identification of her own father as the one who raped her, are worthy of belief. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places. FACTS: Upon the sworn complaint of AAA's mother, the Assistant Prosecutor of Naga City filed with the RTC five Informations, all dated May 7, 2007, charging Burce with raping his 14-yearold daughter AAA on five separate occasions. To claim innocence, the accused used denial and alibi as his defenses. The RTC rendered its decision convicting Burce of rape only in Criminal Case No. RTC’08-0169 and acquitting him of the four other charges. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the court a quo erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one count of qualified rape RULING: The petition is denied. We stress, at the outset, that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is required to establish, by the necessary quantum of proof, the elements of rape for each charge. Therefore, Burce’s acquittal in RTC’08-0170 to RTC’08-0173 does not necessarily result in his acquittal in RTC’08-0169. While the prosecution presented the same witnesses for all the cases, the content, credibility, and weight of their testimonies differ for each charge. It is also important to note that only Burce’s conviction in RTC’080169, i.e., for the rape that occurred on December 10, 2005, that is the subject of the appeal before us. We can no

longer touch upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the RTC in its final and executory decision in RTC’08-0170 to RTC’08-0173 acquitting Burce. Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon us. As a general rule, on the question of whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial court’s choice is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to conclude so, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and deportment on the witness stand as they gave their testimonies. The trial court is, thus, in the best position to weigh conflicting testimonies and to discern if the witnesses were telling the truth. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed. After a careful review, this Court is convinced that AAA’s unwavering narration of how she was raped on December 10, 2005, together with her positive identification of her own father as the one who raped her, are worthy of belief. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places. Burce failed to demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been home on the night of December 10, 2005. Not only was Burce’s alibi uncorroborated, Burce’s work as tricycle driver would have allowed him to go home with ease anytime he wanted. In fact, BBB, his own wife, testified that Burce would go home late at night to sleep and just leave early in the morning to work again: Equally baseless is Burce’s contention that AAA is only charging him with rape because she is interested in getting monetary compensation. Once more, other than Burce’s bare allegations, there is no evidence that his minor daughter, AAA, could be so induced by malice and materialism as to concoct a rape charge against her own father, that would destroy her own and her father’s honor, as well as tear her family apart, all for P10,000.00. In this case, Burce’s carnal knowledge of AAA was established by AAA’s testimony, corroborated by Dr. Alcantara’s finding of blunt force injuries to AAA’s hymen, probably caused by penetration by an erect male organ. Also based on AAA’s testimony, Burce used force against her by holding both her hands and pinning her legs beneath his so he could successfully have carnal knowledge of her. Moreover, Burce is AAA’s father and his moral ascendancy over his minor daughter is sufficient to take the place of actual force, threat, or intimidation. LEONORA A. PASCUAL v. JOSEFINO L. DAQUIOAG, ET AL. G.R. NO. 162063, MARCH 31, 2014

J. Bersamin As a general rule, a writ of execution should strictly conform to every particular of the judgment to be executed, and not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed; the execution is void if it is in

excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. However, a writ of execution issued upon a final judgment adjudicating the ownership of land to a party may authorize putting her in possession although the judgment does not specifically direct such act. FACTS: On January 24, 1984, petitioner filed a Free Patent Application over Lot No. 13194, Lot No. 13212 and Lot No. 13214. Respondent Catalina Almazan-Villamor presented a protest, claiming that Pascual had no right to apply for title over the properties. The Regional Executive Director of the DENR gave due course to the protest of Almazan-Villamor, and rejected the free patent application of Pascual. The same decision was affirmed by The Secretary of DENR, the Office of the President and the CA. On July 3, 2000, the Regional Executive Director of the DENR issued the writ of execution directing the CENRO to execute the decision of the OP. Accordingly, CENRO Daquioag issued a memorandum directing respondents to execute the Decision of the OP by placing the winning party, Catalina Almazan-Villamor in the premises of the land in question. Assailing the issuance of the memorandum and the execution proceedings, Pascual brought a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance of writ of injunction in the RTC. The same petition was dismissed by the RTC. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in sustaining the decision of the RTC to dismiss the petition for certiorari RULING: The petition is denied. As a general rule, a writ of execution should strictly conform to every particular of the judgment to be executed, and not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed; the execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. Admittedly, the phrase “placing the winning party, Catalina Almazan Villamor in the premises of the land in question” was not expressly stated in the dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR. But the absence of that phrase did not render the directive to enforce invalid because the directive was in full consonance with the decision sought to be executed. A judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, for it embraces whatever is necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. The denial of Pascual’s free patent application was based on the recognition of Almazan Villamor’s ownership of the subject properties. The consequence of the denial was the directive for Pascual to refrain from entering the property, and from possessing the subject property declared to be owned by Almazan Villamor. Upon the final finding of the ownership in the judgment in favor of Almazan Villamor, the delivery of the possession of the property was deemed included in the decision, considering that the claim itself of Pascual to the possession had been based also on ownership.

Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Whoever owns the property has the right to possess it. Adjudication of ownership includes the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of her rejected claim of ownership. In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed the writ of execution awarding possession of land, notwithstanding that the decision sought to be executed did not direct the delivery of the possession of the land to the winning parties. Accordingly, Daquioag’s memorandum placing Almazan-Villamor in possession of the properties was not inconsistent with the decision of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, as affirmed by the OP. With the clear recognition of Almazan-Villamor’s ownership, and in default of any credible showing by Pascual of any valid justification for her to continue in possession of the properties despite the denial of her free patent application, possession must be restored to Almazan-Villamor as the rightful owner and possessor of the properties. Finally, we also conclude that the CA rightly sustained the RTC’s dismissal of Pascual’s petition for certiorari because of the impropriety of her chosen remedy. A special civil action for certiorari is the proper action to bring when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The exercise of judicial function consists in the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. The term quasi-judicial function applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies that are required to investigate facts or to ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. However, the issuance by Daquioag of the assailed memorandum implementing the writ of execution did not derive from the performance of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. He was not thereby called upon to adjudicate the rights of the contending parties or to exercise any discretion of a judicial nature, but only performing an administrative duty of enforcing and implementing the writ. REVELINA LIMSON v. EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ G.R. NO. 162205, MARCH 31, 2014

J. Bersamin The petition for review of Limson projects issues of fact. It urges the Court to undo the findings of fact of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice and the CA on the basis of the documents submitted with her petition. But the Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and weigh evidence. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court explicitly requires the petition for review on certiorari to raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. Accordingly, the petition for review of Limson is outrightly rejected for this reason. FACTS: Limson filed a criminal charge against Gonzalez for falsification. The charge is based on Limson’s assertion that EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ pretends to be the architect ‘EUGENIO GONZALEZ’ registered with the PRC.

The Prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge against Gonzalez, finding that indeed EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALES is the architect registered in the PRC. The Secretary of Justice affirmed the findings of the Prosecutor. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Limson filed a new letter complaint against Gonzalez, with the Secretary of Justice. She alleged the same basic facts, evidence, and charges, but adding the accusation that because Gonzalez used various combinations of his name, in different signature, on different occasions, Gonzalez had also violated Republic Act No. 6085 (the Anti-Alias Law). The Prosecutor dismissed the new complaint. The Secretary affirmed the findings of the Prosecutor. Limson assailed on certiorari the adverse resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in the CA. On July 31, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing the petition for certiorari. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice RULING: The petition is denied. To start with, the petition for review of Limson projects issues of fact. It urges the Court to undo the findings of fact of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice and the CA on the basis of the documents submitted with her petition. But the Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and weigh evidence. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court explicitly requires the petition for review on certiorari to raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. Accordingly, the petition for review of Limson is outrightly rejected for this reason. Secondly, Limson appears to stress that the CA erred in concluding that the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence submitted to the OCP. She would now have us reverse the CA. We cannot reverse the CA. We find that the conclusion of the CA about the Secretary of Justice not committing grave abuse of discretion was fully warranted. Based on the antecedents earlier rendered here, Limson did not persuasively demonstrate to the CA how the Secretary of Justice had been gravely wrong in upholding the dismissal by the OCP of her charges against respondent. In contrast, the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice were quite exhaustive in their exposition of the reasons for the dismissal of the charges. And, even assuming that the Secretary of Justice thereby erred, she should have shown to the CA that either arbitrariness or capriciousness or whimsicality had tainted the error. Yet, she tendered no such showing. She should be reminded, indeed, that grave abuse of discretion meant either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised by the Secretary of Justice in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the Secretary of Justice evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the Secretary of Justice, while exercising judicial or quasijudicial powers, acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Thirdly, the discrepancy between photographs supposedly taken in 1941 and in 1996 of respondent did not support Limson’s allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

Secretary of Justice. It is really absurd to expect respondent, the individual depicted on the photographs, to look the same after 55 long years. And, fourthly, on the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the Court observes that respondent’s aliases involved the names “Eugenio Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Gonzales”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez”, “Eugenio J. Gonzalez”, and – per Limson – “Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and that such names were not different from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in law.

EMMANUEL M. OLORES v. MANILA DOCTORS COLLEGE AND/OR TERESITA O. TURLA G.R. NO. 201663, MARCH 31, 2014

J. PERALTA The rationale for the requirement of first filing a motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari is that the law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had. In the instant case, the NLRC had all the opportunity to review its ruling and correct itself. Hence, the CA erred in dismissing the Rule 65 petition filed by Olores. FACTS: Respondent is a private higher educational institution. Petitioner was hired as a part-time faculty of respondent on 07 November 2005. From 03 November 2008, petitioner signed fixed term employment contracts, this time as a full- time instructor. Petitioner submitted the final grades of his students to Bernardo, the chair of the Humanities Area. On 13 April 2010, Bernardo charged petitioner with gross misconduct and gross inefficiency in the performance of duty. Petitioner was accused of employing a grading system not in accordance with the system. Meanwhile, summer classes started on 15 April 2010 without [petitioner] having signed an employment contract. Acting on the report of Bernardo, respondent created the Manila Doctors Tribunal (MDT) which was tasked to ascertain the truth. The MDT sent notices of hearing to petitioner. On 31 May 2010, the MDT submitted its recommendation to the president of respondent. The culpability of [petitioner] was established, hence, dismissal was recommended. On 07 June 2010, respondent terminated the services of [petitioner] for grave misconduct and gross inefficiency and incompetence. Aggrieved by the decision of respondent, [petitioner] filed a case for: a) illegal dismissal. In a Decision4 dated December 8, 2010, the Labor Arbiter found merit in petitioner’s charge for

illegal dismissal. However, it dismissed petitioner’s claim for regularization. The NLRC reversed the LA’s ruling. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s Rule 65 petition. RULING: The petition is granted. In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decisions of the Labor Arbiter. The lawmakers clearly intended to make the bond a mandatory requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer as inferred from the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected “only upon the posting of a employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. Here, it is undisputed that respondent’s appeal was not accompanied by any appeal bond despite the clear monetary obligation to pay petitioner his separation pay in the amount of P100,000.00. Since the posting of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the decision of the Labor Arbiter sought to be appealed before the NLRC had already become final and executory. Therefore, the NLRC had no authority to entertain the appeal, much less to reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Nevertheless, assuming that the NLRC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the instant case, this Court would still be inclined to favor petitioner because the instant case falls under one of the recognized exceptions to the rule that a motion for reconsideration is necessary prior to the filing of a certiorari petition. The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. However, said rule is subject to several recognized exceptions: (a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) Where petitioner

was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. In the instant case, the NLRC had all the opportunity to review its ruling and correct itself. The NLRC issued a ruling on February 10, 2011 in favor of petitioner dismissing respondent’s appeal on the ground that the latter failed to file an appeal bond. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the NLRC completely reversed itself and set aside its earlier resolution dismissing the appeal. The NLRC had more than enough opportunity to pass upon the issues raised by both parties on appeal of the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and the subsequent motion for reconsideration of its resolution disposing the appeal. Thus, another motion for reconsideration would have been useless under the circumstances since the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been duly raised and passed upon by the NLRC. All told, the petition is meritorious. However, since this Court is not a trier of facts, we cannot rule on the substantive issue of the case, i.e., whether petitioner has attained regular status, inasmuch as the CA has not yet passed upon the factual issues raised by the parties.