Remedial Law Must Read Cases

CIVIL PROCEDURE Panay Railways Inc., Vs. Heva Management And Development Corporation, Pamplona Agro-Industrial Corporation, And Spouses Candelaria Dayot And Edmundo Dayot, G. R. No. 154061, January 25, 2012) Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.” More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees on time. Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal. SM Land, Inc. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc.) and Watsons Personal Care Store, Phils., Inc. Vs. City of Manila, Liberty Toledo, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, et al. G.R. No. 197151. October 22, 2012 In fact, this Court has held that even if there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping, the Court may still proceed to decide the case on the merits, pursuant to its inherent power to suspend its own rules on grounds, as stated above, of substantial justice and apparent merit of the case. Audi AG v. Mejia, G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007; De los Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 138297, January 27, 2006 Hierarchy of courts meant that while the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue original writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, such concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of court to which filing thereof may be directed. Petitions should be filed with the court of lower level unless the importance of the issue involved deserves the action of a higher court. Omictin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007 The court cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining technical or intricate matters of fact.

Abad, et. al. v. RTC of Manila, et. al. G.R. No. L-65505, October 12, 1987 Jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be ousted by the happening of subsequent events even of such character which should have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. “The rule of adherence of jurisdiction (exists) until a cause is finally resolved or adjudicated”. Fe V. Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie F. Aparejado, represented by Edgar Aparejado Vs. Hon. Judge Maximino R. Ables, of RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT. Edison Rural, et al. G.R. No. 171855. October 15, 2012 It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968 A party may be barred from raising the defense of lack of jurisdiction or jurisdiction may be waived on the ground of estoppel by laches. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Concha v. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12, 2007 In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of, or for cancellation of title, to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve “title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.” Heirs of Telesforo Julao v. Spouses De Jesus, G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014 The assessed value must be alleged in the complaint to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint, which contains the concise statement of the ultimate facts of a plaintiffs cause of action. Flores v. Mallare-Philips, L-66620, September 24, 1986 Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 1

The causes of action in favor of two or more plaintiffs or against two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 3 SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSATIO SARAZA and FERNANDO SARAZA v. WILLIAM FRANCISCO. G.R. No. 198718, November 27, 2013 Although the end result of the respondent’s claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondent’s action. It provides that personal actions “may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.” Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper. SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA v. FRANCISCO LINDO AND WELHILMINIA LINDO, et al. G.R. NO. 208232. MARCH 10, 2014 In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs. LZK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK. G.R. NO. 187973, January 20, 2014 By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Paglaum Management & Development Corp. And Health Marketing Technologies, Inc., Vs. Union Bank Of The Philippines, Notary Public John Doe, And Register Of

Deeds Of Cebu City And Cebu Province, $J. King & Sons Co., Inc. Intervenor, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012 Civil Case No. 01-1567, being an action for Annulment of Sale and Titles resulting from the extrajudicial foreclosure by Union Bank of the mortgaged real properties, is classified as a real action. In Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a case seeking to annul a foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is a real action, viz: An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950). While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner’s primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action. Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. vs. Fil-Estate Land, Inc., G.R. No. 152272, March 5, 2012 The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be asserted by the defendant. SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY. G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013. The allegation of petitioners that they are not the owners of the subject property, thus making them unable to remove the installed surveillance cameras on the corporation’s building, cannot be upheld especially when the corporation who is managed by the family of petitioners. They are thus considered parties-in-interest in the present case. HEIRS OF FAUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN MESINA v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN YRAY, et al. G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013 The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable. Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. G.R. No. 193753. September 26, 2012 REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 2

The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make one an indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Theodore And Nancy Ang, Represented By Eldrige Marvin B. Ceron, Vs. Spouses Alan And Em Ang, Respondents. G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012 Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest. El Hogar Filipino v. Seva, No. 36627, November 19, 1932 Where said parcels are the objects of one and the same transaction, the venue is in the court where ANY of the provinces (places) where a parcel of land is situated. Mijares, et al. v. Piccio, et al., L-10458 April 22,1957 If parcels of land are subject of separate and distinct transactions where there is no common venue, separate actions should be laid in the court of the province where each parcel of land is situated Polytrade Corp. v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, 1969 In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words (e.g. only, solely, exclusively in this court, in no other court save, particularly, nowhere else but/except) venue stipulation is merely permissive and not exclusive which means that the stipulated venue is in addition to the venue provided for in the rules Calo v. Ajax, L-20865, March 13, 1968 A counterclaim, even if otherwise compulsory, but the amount exceeds the jurisdiction of the inferior court, will only be considered permissive. Hence, the fact that it is not set-up in the inferior court will not bar plaintiff from instituting a separate action to prosecute it. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BIGNAY EX-IM PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. NO. 171590, February 12, 2014 Non-payment of docket fees on one’s counterclaim is a jurisdictional defect. Anent the counterclaims interposed by defendant for the collection of certain sum of money adverted earlier hereof, this Court could not exercise jurisdiction over the same as defendant did not pay the

docket fees therefor. Although the counterclaims were denominated as compulsory in the answer, the matters therein alleged were not connected with the plaintiff’s complaint. The counterclaims could stand independently from the plaintiff’s complaint hence they are a sic permissive counterclaims. Georgia T. Estel, vs. Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr., G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012 Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991 Ultimate Facts are those important and substantial facts which form the basis of the primary right of the plaintiff and which make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. They are the principal, determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 7993738, February 13, 1989 Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment Sps. Go v. Tong, G.R. 151942, Nov. 27, 2003 Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, nonpayment of which at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case for as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Re: In The Matter of Clarification of Exemption From Payment of All Court And Sheriff’s Fees of Cooperatives Duly Registered in Accordance with Republic Act No. 9520 Otherwise Known as the Philippine Cooperative Code Of 2008, Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (Phcci), A.M. No. 12-2-03-0 , March 13, 2012 With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court (Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, which denied the petition of the GSIS for recognition of its exemption from payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, 11 February 2010; Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes, 26 February 2010), it is evident that the exemption of cooperatives from payment of court and sheriff’s fees no longer stands. Cooperatives can no longer invoke Republic REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 3

Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees. Rosario v. Carangdang, G.R. No. L-7076, April 28, 1955 If the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court then the court cannot admit the amended complaint. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the original complaint, the lower court has neither the power nor the jurisdiction to act on the motion for the admission of the amended complaint, much less to allow such amendment, since it is elementary that the court must first acquire jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly therein. Surigao Mine Exploration Co. v. Harris, G.R. No. L45543, May 17, 1939 The cause of action must exist at the time the action was begun, and the plaintiff will not be allowed by an amendment to introduce a cause of action which had no existence when the action was commenced. OAMINAL v. CASTILLO, G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003 The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief — to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration — are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Having invoked the trial courts jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief, respondents cannot — after failing to obtain the relief prayed for — repudiate the very same authority they have invoked REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC. and NEPTUNE SHIP MANAGEMENT SVCS, PTE., LTD. v. CAPTAIN FRANCISCO B.GUEVARRA. G.R. No. 157020, June 19, 2013. The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually covers a situation where the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Precisely, what such clarification wanted to address is the erroneous claim that “the period of extension” in such a case “is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period.” The correct rule, according to the clarification, is that “any extension of time to file the required pleading should x x x be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.” SPOUSES BENEDICT and SANDRA MANUE vs. RAMON ONG G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014 Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant’s address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant. What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.

Planters Development Bank, Vs. Julie Chandumal, G.R. No. 19561905 September 2012 In this case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons due to his failure to serve it personally. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the requisites for a valid substituted service of summons, summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service – the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service; (2) specific details in the return – the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service; (3) a person of suitable age and discretion – the sheriff must determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons, which matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person in charge, who must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. GEORGE PIDLIP P. PALILEO and JOSE DE LA CRUZ vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK G.R. No. 193650, October 8, 2014 The service and filing of pleadings by courier service, as made by the respondent to the petitioners, is a mode not provided in the Rules. Realizing its mistake, PDB re-filed and re-sent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired. PDB’s Notice of Appeal, which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was tardy; it had only up to August 1, 2006 within which to file the same. The trial court therefore acted regularly in denying PDB’s notice of appeal. Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their coheirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014 Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed “within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 4

compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Go v. Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 58986, April 17, 1983 What causes the loss by a plaintiff of the right to effect dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant’s answer with the court but the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Where the plaintiff filed the notice of dismissal of his action in the court after the filing of defendant’s answer but before service thereof, the plaintiff’s notice to that effect ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the pending action without need of any order from the trial court VIRGINIA S. DIO and H.S. EQUITIES, LTD vs. SUBIC BAY MARINE EXPLORATORIUM, INC., represented by its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, TIMOTHY DESMOND G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014 Petitioners filed counterclaim against respondents. However, the latter alleged that the dismissal of the main action results to the dismissal of the counterclaims. The Court ruled that as the rule now stands, the nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of the complaint does not ipso jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim, and the latter may remain for independent adjudication of the court, provided that such counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor under any infirmity that may warrant its outright dismissal. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the court over the counterclaim that appears to be valid on its face, including the grant of any relief thereunder, is not abated by the dismissal of the main action. The court’s authority to proceed with the disposition of the counterclaim independent of the main action is premised on the fact that the counterclaim, on its own, raises a novel question which may be aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own merits and evidentiary support. Natividad Lim vs. National Power Corporation, Sps. Roberto Ll. Arcinue and Arabela Arcinue, G.R. No. 178789. November 14, 2012 Lim points out that an answer-in-intervention cannot give rise to default since the filing of such an answer is only permissive. But Section 4, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the original parties to file an answer to the complaint-in-intervention within 15 days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. This changes the procedure under the former rule where such an answer was regarded as optional. Thus, Lim’s failure to file the required answer can give rise to default. STA. RITA & CO., INC. AND ARLENE STA. RITA KANAPI v. ANGELINE M. GUECO. G.R. No.193078, August 28, 2013 Persons who are not parties to a case, either as petitioners, defendants or intervenors, they cannot participate in the proceedings of the same. Consequently, they also cannot be adversely affected by the outcome of such proceeding. A complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an

independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and a supplement of the principal action. The complaint-inintervention essentially latches on the complaint for its legal efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads to its concomitant dismissal. Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. And Trebel International, Inc., Vs. Banco De Oro Universal Bank And Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr., In His Capacity As Ex-Officio Sheriff Of The Rtc Of Makati City, G.R. No. 192716, June 13, 2012 While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to do so within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently. This case had been at the pre-trial stage for more than two years and petitioners have not shown special circumstances or compelling reasons to convince us that the dismissal of their complaint for failure to prosecute was unjustified. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112710, May 30, 2001 Deposition is a written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination or in response to written interrogatories and where an opportunity is given for crossexamination. EAGLE RIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN vs. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No. 204700, November 24, 2014 Cameron Granville filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s April 10, 2013 decision. Cameron Granville posited that the motion for production was filed out of time and that the rule on parole evidence is applicable. However, the Court ruled that the availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pretrial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court “upon due application and a showing of due cause.” Nenita Gonzales, Et. Al. Vs. Mariano Bugaay And Lucy Bugaay, G.R. No. 173008, February 22, 2012 In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment. Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment. Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in granting the demurrer and dismissing the Amended Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an available remedy to respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC had correctly done. TEOFILO B. ADOLFO vs. FE T. ADOLFO G.R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015 REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 5

Judgment on the pleadings is proper where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An answer would “fail to tender an issue” if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would naturally be improper. Spouses Ramon Villuga And Mercedita Villuga, Vs. Kelly Hardware And Construction Supply Inc., Represented By Ernesto V. Yu, Executive Vice-President And General Manager, G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012 A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine. Philippine Business Bank vs. Chua, 15 November 2010 A partial summary judgment as a rule is not appealable sepearately from the judgment in the entire case, unless allowed by the court under Sec.1(f) Rule 41. Hence, the failure to appeal separately from a partial summary judgment or to challenge it by a special civil action for certiorari does not make the same final and executory. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDY ZULIETA a.k.a. “Bogarts,” G.R. No. 192183, November 11, 2013. GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013 The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. CECILIA PAGADUAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014

The principle of res judicata is applicable either by way of “bar by prior judgment” or by “conclusiveness of judgment.” Here, Salvador’s defense was res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment. Contrary to Salvador’s contention , however, there appears to be no identity of issues and facts in the two administrative cases. The first case involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador falsified her PDS. The second one involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Falsification was the main issue in the first case, while it was no longer an issue in the second case. The only fact to consider in the second administrative complaint is the fact of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. It must be borne in mind that both administrative complaints were based on different grounds. The grounds were separate and distinct from each other and entailed different sets of facts. LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014 All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Bank’s right to apply for and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved in the present case. Neypes v. CA, GR 141524, September 14, 2005 The aggrieved party has a “fresh period” of 15 days from the denial of motion for reconsideration or new trial within which to file his appeal. This applies to Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45. Yu v. Samson Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011 While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that [t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction. SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. AND OSCAR VIOLAGO, PETITIONERS, vs. MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015 It is settled that the “fresh period rule” in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals. The “fresh period rule” shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 6

Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Fortune Life Insurance Co., Inc. v. COA, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015 The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial. We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes applied. GREGORIO DE LEON, DOING BUSINESS AS G.D.L. MARKETING vs. HERCULES AGRO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION AND/OR JESUS CHUA AND RUMI RUNGIS MILK G.R. No. 183239, June 02, 2014 The CA correctly ordered that De Leon’s appellant’s brief be stricken off the records. De Leon’s motion for time praying for an additional 10 days to file his motion for partial reconsideration is validly denied by the RTC, since such motion is a transgression of the mandatory prohibition on the filing of a motion for extension to file a motion for reconsideration. Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules. The perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and executory. Priscilla Alma Jose, Vs. Ramon C. Javellana, Et Al., G.R. No. 158239 “The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.” Casupanan vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, 26 August 2002

A dismissal for forum-shopping under Sec. 5 Rule 7 is without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the dismissal order. Under Sec. 1 Rule 41, no appeal lies from an order dismissing a case without prejudice and hence a party may file an appropriate civil action under Rule 65. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A. ROBLES vs. AURORA A. SALVAÑA G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014 The present rule is that a government party is a “party adversely affected” for purposes of appeal provided that the government party that has a right to appeal must be the office or agency prosecuting the case. The grant of the right to appeal in administrative cases is not new. In Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service Law of 1959, appeals “by the respondent” were allowed on “the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service rendered in an administrative case involving discipline of subordinate officers and employees.” Thus, LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision. Perez v. Ombudsman, GR. No. 131445, May 27, 2004 Appeals from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are no longer appealable to the SC but to the CA via a petition for review (Rule 43) (Fabian v. Desierto, GR. No. 129742, Sept. 16, 1998). However, the remedy of an aggrieved party from a decision or order of the Office of the Ombudsman in a criminal case is to file a petition for certiorari before the SC. JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME, represented by his attorneys-in-fact and acting in their personal capacities, RODOLFO and RUBY BARTOLOME vs. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and CAROLINA N. MORALES G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014 A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of judgment or final order. The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. A petition for relief of judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief from judgment may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. A motion for reconsideration is required before a petition for certiorari is filed to grant the court which rendered the assailed judgment or order an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. In this case, petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal, considering that their former counsel received a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision on June 24, 2010. Since petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, the trial court correctly denied the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 7

judgment within the reglementary period, petitioners failed to prove that their former counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a mistake or excusable negligence. Dare Adventure Farm Corporation Vs. Spouses Felix and Nenita Ng, Spouses Martin and Azucena Ng and Agripina R. Goc-ong, et al. G.R. No. 161122. September 24, 2012 A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. Leticia Diona, rep. by her attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona Vs. Romeo A. Balangue, Sonny A. Balangue, Reynaldo A. Balangue, and Esteban A. Balangue, Jr. G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013 While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law. HEIRS OF RETERTA VS MORES & LOPEZ, G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011 The concept of ‘final’ judgment, as distinguished from one which has ‘become final’ (or ‘executory’ as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A ‘final’ judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal), this is what is referred to as the final judgment for purposes of appeal. Ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes ‘final’ or, to use the established and more distinctive term, ‘final and executory.’ MAGDALENA T. VILLASI v. FILOMENO GARCIA G.R. NO. 190106, January 15, 2014

Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. However, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building as they were unable to present credible evidence to prove their ownership. All that the Spouses raised were their postulation as title holders of the land and the presumption of ownership over improvements built thereon; whereas Villasi, on the other hand, was able to show documentary proof of ownership. Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. United Planners Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015 Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. While it appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the execution of a confirmed arbitral award, it is the Court’s considered view that the Rules’ procedural mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but necessarily extend to a confirmed award’s execution in light of the doctrine of necessary implication which states that every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. CORONA INTERNATIONAL VS CA, G.R. No. 127851. October 18, 2000 In upholding the disallowance of the execution pending appeal ordered by the trial court, albeit on different grounds, we are guided by the rule that execution pending appeal must be strictly construed being an exception to the general rule. So, too, execution pending appeal is not to be availed of and applied routinely, but only in extraordinary circumstances. Here, with the alleged collapse of petitioner’s business operations rendered doubtful, we find no good reason to order execution pending appeal. INFANTE VS. ARAN BUILDERS, INC., G.R. NO.156596, 24 AUGUST 2007 If the action affects title to or possession of real property or any interest therein, the action for revival must be filed with the court having jurisdiction over the place where the real property or any portion thereof is situated. Otherwise, the action for revival of judgment is a personal action wherein the venue lies with the residence of either the plaintiff or defendant, at the option of the plaintiff. VILLARIN VS MUNASQUE, G.R. No. 169444, September 17, 2008 REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 8

Based on the foregoing, the sheriff is required to first demand of the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution before a levy can be made. The sheriff shall demand such payment either in cash, certified bank check or any other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the judgment obligor cannot pay by these methods immediately or at once, he can exercise his option to choose which of his properties can be levied upon. If he does not exercise this option immediately or when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. CALUAG VS PECSON, October 29, 1948, G.R. No. L-1403 Judgment for Specific acts pertains to a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or other documents or to perform any specific act which may be performed by some other person, or in some other way provided by law with the same effect, as in the present case, section 10, and not said section 9 of Rule 39 applies; and under the provision of said section 10, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party, by some other person appointed or designated by the court, and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party himself. SPOUSES VERSOLA VS. CA, G.R. NO. 164740,31 JULY 2006 It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set and proved to the sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. CHING vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124642, FEBRUARY 23, 2004) Upon application of the third person through a motion to set aside the levy on attachment, the court shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment. The court may order the sheriff to release the property from the erroneous levy and to return the same to the third person. In resolving the application, the court cannot pass upon the question of title to the property with any character of finality but only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. HELEN CABLING assisted by her husband ARIEL CABLING vs. JOSELIN TAN LUMAPAS as represented by NORY ABELLANES, G.R. No. 196950, June 18, 2014 Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages, the possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the property in a capacity adverse to the judgment obligor. It contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such

as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary, who possesses the property in his own right, and is not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SECURITIES CORPORATION vs. EDGARDO V. GUEVARA G.R. No. 167052, March 11, 2015 In an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, the Court has limited review over the decision rendered by the foreign tribunal. The Philippine courts cannot pass upon the merits of the case pursuant to the incorporation clause of the Constitution, unless there is proof of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Calo v. Roldan, G.R. No. L-252, March 30, 1946 The provisional remedies denominated attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, and delivery of personal property, provided in Rules 59, 60, 61, and 62 of the Rules of Court, respectively, are remedies to which parties litigant may resort for the preservation or protection of their rights or interest, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action. If an action, by its nature, does not require such protection or preservation, said remedies can not be applied for and granted. Davao Light v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 343 A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. Equitable v. Special Steel, G.R. No. 175350, June 13, 2012 A writ of preliminary attachment is too harsh a provisional remedy to be issued based on mere abstractions of fraud. Rather, the rules require that for the writ to issue, there must be a recitation of clear and concrete factual circumstances manifesting that the debtor practiced fraud upon the creditor at the time of the execution of their agreement in that said debtor had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay the creditor. Executive Secretary, et al. Vs. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013 It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only upon a showing of the applicant’s “clear legal right” being violated or under threat of violation by the defendant. “Clear legal right,” within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right “clearly founded in or granted by law.” Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 9

force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances. These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is rendered against them.

Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam-in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages involved. As an “action in rem,” the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein.

FLORD NICSON CALAWAG v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS, ET AL./ MICAH P. ESPIA, ET AL. v. DR. CARLOS BAYLON, ET AL. G.R. No. 207412/207542, August 07, 2013 Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction presents a fourth requirement: it is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper.

Hao v. Andres, A.M. No. P-07-2384, June 18, 2008 The rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. Under Section 6, Rule 60, the Sheriff should have waited no less than 5 days in order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond.

SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA v. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON GOLOSENO. G.R. NO. 172909, MARCH 5, 2014 A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom notwithstanding. Upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC, the question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it. Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen, G.R. No. 157494, December 10, 2004 A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated. SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. G.R. No. 182963, June 3, 2013. Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed. BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 102 The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession.

Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147382, April 6, 2005 Interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. Wack-Wack Golf v. Won 70 SCRA 165 It must be noted that a stockholder should use reasonable diligence, that is, by filing the interpleader suit within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. Almeda v. Bathala Marketing Industries, 542 SCRA 470 Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice. The court took cognizance on the case, despite the fact that a separate action was pending in another court because in the instant case no breach was committed. Jumamil v. Café, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005 The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 10

Lokin v. COMELEC, 621 SCA 385 Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of the COMELEC in approving the withdrawal of his nomination. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Vergara v. Rugue, G.R. No. L-32984, August 25, 1977 The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. It is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Angchangco v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997 Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberti P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013 A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. Galang v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011 A petition for certiorari was filed questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest was within the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.

Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al. filed a petition for certiorari when the CA extended the freeze order against their properties. Ligot, et al. should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order over their properties. THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIACUERDO. G.R. NO. 175723 , February 4, 2014 The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. On the strength of the constitutional provisions under Article VIII, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755 The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008 The Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate. The distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78″ under Section 253 of the OEC, petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate Spouses Rosales v. Spouses Alfonso, G.R. No. 137792, August 12, 2003 This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period ‘from the date of service of the order,’ and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any longer. Sepulveda v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005 Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 11

co-ownership between him and the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co- owner of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. Sarmiento v. Manalite Home Owners Association, G.R. No. 182953, October 11, 2010 In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or building “after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. Reyes v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. L- 33213 June 29, 1979 There are three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real pro. property, namely, (1) the summary action for forcible entry or detainer (denominatedaccion interdictal under the former law of procedure, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one year in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (3) accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership (which of course includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi) also brought in the Court of First Instance. Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 139137, March 31, 2000 The action for unlawful detainer was based on the expiration of the contract of lease, a demand to vacate was not necessary for judicial action after the expiration of the terms of the lease. There being no need for any demand or notice, there was likewise no necessity to wait for five (5) days upon notice or demand before an action for unlawful detainer may be filed. CHARLIE LIM vs. SPOUSES DANILO LIGON and GENEROSA VITUG-LIGON G.R. No. 183589, June 25, 2014 As a result of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case, Spouses Ligon were evicted from the subject property. They filed a complaint against defendant Lim for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession to restore them to their possession of the subject property. The legal limitation, despite the finality of the ruling in the ejectment case, is that the concept of possession or prior possession which was established in favor of defendant’s predecessors-in-interest in the ejectment case pertained merely to possession de facto, and not possession de jure. The favorable judgment in favor of defendant’s predecessors-in-interest cannot

therefore bar an action between the same parties with respect to who has title to the land in question. Juanita Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitaño v. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013 At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Anthony Parungao, Narciso B. Nieto, in their capacity as Undersecretaries of Legal Affairs and Field Operations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, et al., G.R. No. 197507. January 14, 2013 Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. Inoturan v. Limsiaco, Jr. 458 SCRA 48 It is only the judge, who orders the confinement of a person for contempt of court, who can issue the order of release. CASTILLEJOS CONSUMNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CASCONA) vs. JOSE S. DOMINGUEZ, ET AL. G.R. No. 189949, March 25, 2015 A criminal contempt involves a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Civil contempt on the other hand, consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 12

Montañer vc CA, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009 A special proceeding, “by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,” has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO. G.R. NO. 156407, JANUARY 15, 2014 There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Uriarte vs CFI Of Negros, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970 The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Leo C. Romero and David Amando C. Romero vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012 In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings. Romero vs CA, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012 In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to (1) approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; (2) to determine who are the heirs of the decedent; (3) the recognition of a natural child; (4) the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the testator; and (5)to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights. Pereira vs CA, G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989 When a person dies leaving property, the same should be JUDICIALLY ADMINISTERED and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order

established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. Neri, at al. vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy., G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012 Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity. Nufable vs Nufable, G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999 As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribes by law. The question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Ajerovs.CA, G.R.No.106720 September 15, 1994 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. Emilio A.M. Suntay III vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay., G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012 The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate. Ocampo vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010 The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 13

Estate of Olave vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-29407 July 29, 1983 The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persons to enable the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by prorata portion in the due course of the administration. Gutierrez vs. Baretto-Datu, G.R. No. L-17175, July 31, 1962 The word “claims” as used in statutes requiring the presentation of claims against a decedent’s estate is generally construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money judgments; and among these are those founded upon contract. Stronghold Insurance vs. Republic-Asahi, G.R. No. 147561, June 22, 2006 Generally, death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation and only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor as these claims are not actually extinguished. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013 A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature – the claim depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. De Bautista v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-28298, November 25, 1983 The only instance wherein a creditor can file an action against a distributee of the debtor’s asset is under Sec. 5, Rule 88 of the Rules of Court. The contingent claims must first have been established and allowed in the probate court before the creditors can file an action directly, against the distributes, such is not the situation in the case at bar. Natcher vs. CA, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001 Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it, form there, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can

be established; and it is only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Solivio vs. CA, G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990 As a general rule, the better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action. Torbela vs. Rosario, G.R. No. 140528 G.R. No. 140553, December 7, 2011 It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot acquire by prescription a property entrusted to him unless he repudiates the trust. Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa., G.R. No. 192413, June 13, 2012 Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the issuance of individual notices upon respondents was a jurisdictional requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on them rendered the Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of jurisdiction. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem, whereby an action is brought against the thing itself instead of the person. Thus, an action may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the depositors or other claimants . Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res.]Consequently, a judgment of escheat is conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement, as publication is considered a general and constructive notice to all persons interested. Republic vs. CA & Solano, G.R. No. 143483, January 31, 2002 The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment. Oropesa vs. Oropesa, G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012 A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well. REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 14

Napoleon D. Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers, Rosa D. Neri-Millan, Douglas D. Neri, Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos and Victoria D. Illut- Piala vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy., G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012 Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court. IN RE: Stephanie Garcia, GR 148311, March 31, 2005 Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Suarez vs.. Republic, L-20914 December 24, 1965 The adoptee may use the surname of the adopter. The minor cannot bear adopter’s surname as a married woman, for her husband has not joined in the petition for adoption and cannot join it, because he has children by a previous marriage and to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter (where the husband had not), would mislead the public into believing that she (adoptee) has also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP v. JOVY CABCABAN. UDK no. 14817, January 13, 2014 Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counselled. Feria vs. CA, G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000 Consequently, the writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Lee Yick Hon vs. Insular Collector Of Customs, G.R. No. L-16799, March 30, 1991

Peremptory writ of habeas corpus, is one which unconditionally commands the respondent to have the body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified. The order served in the case before us was merely a preliminary citation or one which merely requires the respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted. Velasco vs.CA G.R.No.118644 July 7,1995 It must be kept in mind that in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and “reaches the body but not the record,” while the latter assails directly the judgment and “reaches the record but not the body.” RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO,* G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012 The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure Amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013 It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mindboggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced. Secretary of Defense vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008 The writ applies to extralegal/extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof while a search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court.

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Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013 If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough o that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights. Canlas vs. Napico, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008 The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Egardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising vs. Virginia Pardico, for and in behalf in representation of Benhur Pardico., G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012 For the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation. x x x IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, petitioner vs. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name “HARRY,” ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN “BONG” PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN, G.R. No. 191805 The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate

interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or even administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The totality of evidence as a standard for the grant of the writ was correctly applied by this Court. x x x In the matter of the petition for the writ of Amparo and the writ of Habeas Data in favor of Francis Saez, petitioner vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22Nn MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY GOMEZ, respondents, G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012 Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his claims, the reliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a claimant is dispensed with the onus of proving his case. “Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands some adequate evidence. JOY MARGATE LEE vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGA G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014 A Habeas Data Petition is dismissible if it fails to adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Moreover, it is equally dismissible if it is not supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR. G.R. NO. 189538, February 10, 2014 While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of. Silverio vs. Republic G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007 However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 16

of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Republic vs. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008 Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. Lee v. CA, G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001 Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. What is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, vs. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO,SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS., G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012 Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RAMONCITA O. SENADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 201620, March 6, 2013 If the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial. Mary Rose A. Boto vs. Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Villena, A.C. No. 9684, September 18, 2013 The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneous or separately with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the libellous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

Bureau of Customs v. Peter Sherman, et al, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011. It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators. Thus, all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws, however, the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor; but this designation does not detract from the public prosecutor having control and supervision over the case. LETICIA I. KUMMER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013 Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment – it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. JOEL C. MENDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX APPEALS G.R. No. 179962, June 11, 2014 Dr. Joel Mendez was charged with tax evasion. However, the prosecutor filed amended complaint which changed the date of the commission of the offense. The court ruled that amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original one; or do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal amendments. People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Feliciano Jr., et. al, G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014 It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. People v. Oso, 62 Phil 271 In case of variance between the complaint filed by the offended party and the information in crimes against chastity, the complaint controls

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PEOPLE vs. GULLERMO LOMAQUE, GR 189297, June 5, 2013 A variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. While the information clearly states that the crime was committed by appellant’s insertion of his penis inside AAA’s vagina, the latter solemnly testified on the witness stand that appellant merely put his penis in her mouth. Nevertheless, appellant failed to register any objection that the Information alleged a different mode of the commission of the crime of rape. Thus, appellant’s conviction for rape by sexual assault must be sustained, the variance notwithstanding. Honesto General vs. Hon. Graduacion Reyes Claravall, et al., 195 SCRA 623 In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interest of clarity and certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court — because the offended party has not waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action — the rule is as follows: (1) when the amount of the damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information filed in court, then the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof in court for trial; and (2) in any other case, however — i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the complaint or information filed in court the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual damages. RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 161075. JULY 15, 2013 An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL. G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013 The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs. Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. This was precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus: Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question of the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, iun the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. xxx In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar. GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, vs. HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014 The preliminary investigation is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. The scope of the investigation does not approximate that of a trial before the court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused be removed. As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove the duration of the victims’ need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation. P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012 There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or requires the prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accused’s counteraffidavit. To illustrate the non-mandatory nature of filing a Reply in preliminary investigations, Section 3 (d) of Rule 112 gives the prosecutor, in certain instances, the right to resolve the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit, viz: “(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, of if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.” On the other hand, petitioner was entitled to receive a copy of the Counter- affidavit filed by Aguillon. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENGR. RODOLFO YECYEC ET AL. G.R. No. 183551, November 12, 2014 REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 18

It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and the courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. In this case, there is no question that the Information filed against the respondents was sufficient to hold them liable for the crime of Theft because it was compliant with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, a review of the resolutions of the MCTC, the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA shows that there is substantial basis to support finding of probable cause against the respondents. Hence, as the Information was valid on its face and there was no manifest error or arbitrariness on the part of the MCTC and the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC and the CA erred when they overturned the finding of probable cause against the respondents.

of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers and employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors, however, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. People vs. Mabuyo, 63 SCRA 532; People vs. Lazo; 198 SCRA 274 The accused who is denied the mandatory preliminary investigation may refuse to enter a plea upon arraignment and to object to the continuation of further proceedings based on lack of preliminary investigation. If he pleads without objection, he cannot raise the issue on appeal.

Iris Kristine Balois Alberto vs. CA, GR No. 182130, June 19, 2013 Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is based merely on opinion and reasonable belief. Accordingly, probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

Imelda S. Enriquez vs. Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011, August 7, 2006 A preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an inquest. A “preliminary investigation” is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. “An inquest” is a summary inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for the purpose of determining whether the warrantless arrest of a person was based on probable cause.”

Manila Electric Company, represented by Manolo C. Fernando v. Vicente Atilano, et al., G.R. No. 166758, June 27, 2012 The determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. As a rule, in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch; the public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information and courts will not interfere with his findings unless grave abuse of discretion can be shown. In this case, the Supreme Court found no error in the public prosecutor’s determination that no probable cause existed to justify the filing of a criminal complaint.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon, Rosabella M. Tormis, AM No. MTJ-12-1817, March 12, 2013 Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that the court shall not order the arrest of the accused unless he fails to appear whenever required. In this case, Judge Tormis claimed that the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused in the Librando case was justified because of the accused’s failure to appear during her arraignment despite notice. However, as clearly found by the OCA, Judge Tormis’ order requiring the accused to appear and submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses within ten days from receipt of the order was not yet served upon the accused when she issued the warrant. In doing so, Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence.

Alfredo Romulo A. Busuego vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 196842, October 9, 2013 The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission in relation to office, had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II vs. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, and affirmed in subsequent cases: The Constitution, Section 15

People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et al, G.R. No. 180452. January 10, 2010. An arrest made during the commission of a crime does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants’ contention, there was REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 19

indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused- appellants – who were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amended – is valid. People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Velasco, G.R. No. 190318, November 27, 2013 Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Nevertheless, even if appellant’s warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario would still not provide salvation to appellant’s cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. LEVISTE v. CA A finding that none of the bail negating circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. However, if the appellate court determines the existence of any of the bail negating circumstances, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed TRINIDAD LACHICA v. JUDGE ROSABELLATORMIS It is undisputed that respondent judge personally received the cash bail bond for the accused. For this act alone, respondent is already administratively liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should such cash be kept in his office.

Yap v. CA and the People, G.R. No. 141529 (2001) Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the SC found that the setting of the amount at P5.5M is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of A’s right to bail. People v. Ortega, 276 SCRA 166 (2003)
 An accused may not be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right. WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014 Speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining whether the accused’s right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. While the Court recognizes the accused’s right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. Anna Lerima Patula vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012 Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice. People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014 There are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. This court has taken into account the “uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 20

made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.” RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al, G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014 Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the said section have been complied with, as in this case. As in ordinary search warrant applications, they “shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court.” “The Executive Judges of these RTCs and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges” are authorized to act on such applications and “shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.” The Court observes that all the abovestated requirements were complied with in this case. As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa, particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized in connection with the heinous crime of Murder. Finding probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search Warrant which, as the rules state, may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC. FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ vs. REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO B. JOSON, G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015 Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration before the DOJ. However, the lapse of almost 1 year and 7 months warranted the application of the limitation of the period for suspending arraignment. While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIEKARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL, NORA EVAD y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON a.k.a LARINA PERPENIAN and JOHNDOES, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013 The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused.

People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003 In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are as follows: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. ESTHER P. MAGLEO vs. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT ATTY. ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, A.M. No. RTJ-122336, November 12, 2014 Accused’s Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the merits of the case which is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed. The current scenario, however, is an exception to the general rule. The demurrer to evidence was premature because it was filed before the prosecution rested its case. The RTC had not yet ruled on the admissibility of the formal offer of evidence of the prosecution when Magleo filed her demurrer to evidence. Hence, Judge Quinagoran had legal basis to overturn the order granting the demurrer to evidence as there was no proper acquittal. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE RAFAEL R. LAGOS, et al. G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013. A motion to file a demurrer was granted after the prosecution’s presentation of the testimonies of the apprehending officers because the prosecution failed to REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 21

present the testimony of the confidential informant. It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court finds and so holds that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by prevailing jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion. MERENCILLO V. PEOPLE (2007) Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses’ honesty. The test is whether the testimonies agree on essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other so as to make a consistent and coherent whole. Thus, inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be successfully invoked as grounds for acquittal. Marino B. Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No. 185960, January 25, 2012 Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when his counsel failed to assist him during the promulgation of the judgment. He faults the Sandiganbayan for proceeding with the promulgation despite the petitioner not then being assisted by his counsel, and being a layman he is not familiar with court processes and procedure. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered.However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.” There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on accused and his counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced. People of the Philippines vs. Val Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 130714 & 139634, October 16, 2012 At the outset, the Court notes that these cases were elevated to Us on automatic review in view of the RTC’s imposition of the death penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997 Decision. However, with the Court’s pronouncement in the 2004 case of People vs. Mateo, providing for and making mandatory the intermediate review by the CA of cases involving the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course of action would be to remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an intermediate review.

DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA. G.R. NO 166995, JANUARY 13, 2014 A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court. CHAN v. HONDA MOTORS The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 686 The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge himself in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them. Luz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012 It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search. Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines., G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011 Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 22

across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent. EVIDENCE El Greco Ship Maning and Management Corporation vs. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 177188, December 4, 2008 It does not apply to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings as administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of the rules obtaining in the court of law. People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57) The forwarder, who discovered “leaves” from a box sent to it by Marti, sent a request to the NBI to subject the leaves to a laboratory testing which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. The Court held that there was no violation of constitutional rights because the rights granted by the Constitution are protection from arbitrary exercise of power by the government, and not by third parties, in this case, the forwarder. Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111 Ortanez presented three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between his wife and unidentified persons. The Court held that the cassette tapes are not admissible since absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. Ogawa v. Menigishi, 676 SCRA 14, 21, July 9, 2012 The burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her right. In a counterclaim, the burden of proving the existence of the claim lies with the defendant. Morales v. Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc., 664 SCRA 110 In administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings like those conducted before the NLRC, the standard of proof is substantial evidence which is understood to be more than just a scintilla or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Calamba Steel Center, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 151857, April 28, 2005 Court of Appeals ignored the existence of the tax return extant on the record. As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records in other cases tried or pending in the same court, even when those cases were heard or are actually pending before the same judge. However, an exception is when reference to such records is sufficiently made without objection from the opposing parties. People vs. Tundag, G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsel’s admission. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Latip v. Chua, G.R. No. 177809, October 16, 2009 Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation v. Central Colleges of the Philippines, 666 SCRA 540 It is an established principle that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who makes the same, absent any showing that this was made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it. CIR vs. Petron Corporation, G.R. No. 185568, 21 March 2012 CIR and Petron jointly stipulated before the CTA that Petron did not participate in the procurement and issuance of the Tax Credit Certificates. This stipulation of fact by the CIR amounts to an admission and, having been made by the parties in a stipulation of facts at pretrial, is treated as a judicial admission. NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM AND THE EAST ASIATIC CO., LTD. vs. GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES, LTD. G.R. No. 156330, November 19, 2014 It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of the foreign country or state will be presumed to be the same as our local or domestic law. This is known as processual presumption. While the foreign law was properly pleaded in the case at bar, it was, however, proven not in the manner provided by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. While a photocopy of the foreign statute relied upon by the court a quo to relieve the common carrier from liability, was presented as evidence during the trial, the same however was not accompanied by the required attestation and certification. ALBERTO ALMOJUELA y VILLANUEVA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 183202, June 2, 2014 Although based on the evidence adduced by both parties, no direct evidence points to Almojuela as the one who stabbed REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 23

Quejong. A finding of guilt is still possible despite the absence of direct evidence. Conviction based on circumstantial evidence may result if sufficient circumstances, proven and taken together, create an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the author of the crime. People v. Yau, G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014 It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings, such as its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive effect. Such factual findings and conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA. In the case at bench, the RTC gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses compared to those of the accused appellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. People v. Larrahaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, July 21, 2005 An object evidence, when offered in accordance with the requisites for its admissibility, becomes evidence of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than witnesses put together. The presence of the victim’s ravished body in a deep ravine with handcuffs on her wrist is a physical evidence that bolsters the testimony of the witness. People v. Vallejo, 382 SCRA 192 A rape-slay case of a 9-year old girl, admitted in evidence the DNA samples of the victim which were found in the bloodstained garments of the accused. Vaginal swabs taken from the victim were also admitted and were found to show the DNA profile of the accused who was subsequently convicted. People vs. Cardenas, G.R. No. 190342. March 21, 2012 Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation. What is essential is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. People vs. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242 (1959) When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in

evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others. Pacasum vs. People, G.R. No. 180314, April 16, 2009 Only a photocopy of the Employee Clearance was presented in evidence. The Court held that the photocopy is admissible as evidence since an exception to the best evidence rule is when the document sought to be presented is in the possession of the person against whom it is to be offered and such party fails to present it even after reasonable notice. National Power Corporation vs. Codilla, G.R. No. 170491. April 3, 2007 The evidence offered by NAPOCOR were photocopies. The Court held that the photocopies were not equivalent to the original documents based on the Rules on Electronic Evidence. The information contained in the photocopies submitted by NAPOCOR will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633. October 17, 2007 The Court held that the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are not electronic evidence. Thus, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law. Cruz vs. CA, 192 SCRA 209 The parol evidence rule is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement. A receipt is not such a document as it merely attests to the receipt of money and it is not and could have not been intended by the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. Maulini vs. Serrano, 28 Phil 640 Serrano introduced parol evidence to prove that he was merely acting as an agent without any consideration. The Court held that Serrano can introduce such parole evidence because the case at bar is not one where the evidence offered varies, alters, modifies, or contradicts the terms of indorsement admittedly existing. Heirs of Lacsa vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 234 (1991) The ancient document rule applies to the two Spanish documents and should thus be admitted without the need for evidence on its authenticity and execution. They meet the 3 requisites of the ancient document rule, namely: (1) be at least thirty (30) years old (2) found in the proper custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion and (3) that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988) REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 24

Respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines’ does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25.

Under the Dead Man’s Statute Rule, if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro Caparas that he entered into a sharing of leasehold rights with Modesta Garcia and Cristina Salamat cannot be used as evidence against Dominga Caparas as the latter would be unable to contradict or disprove the same.

People vs. Burgos, 200 SCRA 67 (1991) The Order disallowing the printing of the material encoded in the diskettes is void. There was neither testimonial evidence nor any physical evidence on the diskettes that might indicate they had actually been tampered or their contents altered in order to secure the conviction of the accused. The mere fact that the diskettes had been in the possession of the prosecution does not necessarily imply that it had tampered with the evidence to suit its prosecutorial objectives.

Lichauco vs. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 The Dead Man’s Statute disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties; officers and/or stockholders of a corporation, therefore, are not disqualified from testifying for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such person.

People vs. Solomon, 229 SCRA 402 The acceptance of a witness depends on the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the court. The testimony of Soria was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible despite her slurred speech and the use of leading questions. People vs. Mendoza, 254 SCRA 18 Paul, a five-year-old boy, testified that Rolando boxed his wife then burned her. The testimony of Paul shows that he is of above average intelligence, that he is capable of giving responsive answers, of recalling events, and of relating his recollections. For a child witness to be competent, it must be shown that he has the capacity of (1) observation, (2) of recollection, and (3) of communication. Ordono vs. Saquigan, 62 SCRA 270 When an offense directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other. Using the criterion, it can be concluded that in the law of evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife (the victim’s mother). People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 By his testimony imputing the commission of the crime against his wife, the husband is considered to have waived all his objections to the testimony of his wife. It is to be expected that after giving such a testimony, it is but normal for his wife to rebut the allegation. APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased mother, Modesta Garcia, and CRISTINA SALAMAT v. DOMINGA ROBLES vda de CAPARAS. G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013.

People vs. Carlos 47 Phil. 626 (1925) Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. Uy Chico vs. Union Life, 29 Phil. 163 (1915) It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff’s attorney with a third person. A communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. Such communication is between the third person and the client, the attorney being merely an agent. People vs. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997) The period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. in other words, If the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client’s consent. Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 273 (1992) In order that the disqualification by reason of physicianpatient privilege be successfully claimed, the following requisites should concur: (1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (2) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (4) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; (5) the information was REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 25

confidential and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient. Krohn vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146 (1994) Where the person against whom the privilege is claimed is the patient’s husband who testifies on a document executed by medical practitioners, his testimony does not have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. Plainly, this does not fall within the prohibition. Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 (1986) The privilege under Section 21, Rule 130 is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this rule will not be applicable. The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question. Dela Paz vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 65 (1987) The mere fact that the witness died after giving his direct testimony is no ground in itself for excluding his testimony from the record so long as the adverse party was afforded an adequate opportunity for cross- examination but through fault of his own failed to cross-examine the witness. The right to cross-examine Loreto was waived by Petitioners through their repeated absence and motions to postpone the cross- examination. People vs. Del Castillo, 25 SCRA Section 14, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the court may grant or withhold leave to recall a witness, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require; and We believe that it was the better part of discretion and caution on the part of the trial court to have denied as it did, the request of the defense to recall Ceribo. The record is loaded with circumstances tending to show insidious attempts, too obvious to be overlooked, to tamper with the witnesses for the prosecution. Under the circumstances, to allow such a procedure would only encourage the perversion of truth and make a mockery of court proceedings. Viacrusis vs. Court of Appeals, 44 SCRA 176(1972) The testimony and the public document are declarations adverse to the interest of the Costelos which is admissible in evidence. The previous recognition by a party in physical possession of the property in dispute of the ownership in another constitutes a declaration against the interest of the former and ay be received in evidence not only against such party who made the declaration or his successors in interest but also against 3rd persons. People vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979) The silence of an accused (or in this case, the three appellants) under custody, or his failure to deny statements

by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. People vs. Alegre, 94 Phil. 109 (1979) As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. People vs. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941 (1955) The rule regarding statements made by a co-conspirator refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of its object and not to a confession made long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Under the rule on multiple admissibility of evidence, the confession of a coaccused may be inadmissible against his co-accused for being hearsay but may nevertheless be admissible against the declarant’s own guilt. People vs. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996) The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the “exclusionary rule” because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens. The accused cannot be made to affix their signatures on evidence without complying with the Bill of Rights. By affixing their signatures on the evidence, the accused are in effect made to tacitly admit the crime charged for, in this case, mere possession of prohibited drugs is a crime. These signatures amount to uncounseled extra-judicial confession prohibited by the Bill of Rights and therefore inadmissible as evidence. People vs. Irang, 64 Phil. 285 (1937) While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime. People vs. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083 (1957) While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not necessary in the crime of murder through TREACHERY or EVIDENT PREMEDITATION (remember that the character of the wounds show that the deceased was killed in a lying position). The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 26

justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary. U.S. Vs. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913) Generally, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing: 1. that he has made contradictory statements; or
2. by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. U.S. Vs. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980) A statement is not prohibited by the hearsay rule if it is merely offered for proving the fact that the statement was made, and not as a means of proving the truth of the fact asserted therein. Implied assertions, which are inferences that can be drawn from the conduct of persons, are not covered by the hearsay rule unless they are intended to be an assertion concerning the matter in inquiry. (Ex. Testimony that a person pointed to a person in a police line up) Estrada vs. Desierto, 356 SCRA (2001) The ban on hearsay does not cover independently relevant statements, which consist of statements that are independently relevant of the truth asserted therein. They belong to two classes: 1. Those statements which are the very facts in issue, 2. Those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes the following: Statement of a person showing his state of mind; Statement of a person showing his physical condition; Statement of a person to infer a state of mind of another person; Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; Statements to show a lack of credibility of a witness. People vs. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 (1985) The declaration of the deceased is not admissible as an antemortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, “at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule.” It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANECITO ESTIBAL Y CALUNGSAG G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014 Res gestae means the “things done.” It refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no

opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.” There are then three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582 (1997) Where a party claims a right to the part of the estate of the declarant, the declaration of the latter that the former is her niece is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. Fuentes vs. CA, 253 SCRA 430 (1996) To admit declarations against interest as exceptions to the hearsay rule: (a) the declarant must not be able to testify due to death, mental incapacity or physical incompetence rather than mere absence from the courts;; (b) the declaration must concern a matter of fact cognizable by the declarant;; (c) the circumstances render it improbable that a motive to falsify exists. People vs. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (1993) Entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries. They are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated since they would be incomplete or inaccurate. THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, ALL SURNAMED DIMAGUILA v. JOSE AND SONIA A. MONTEIRO. G.R. NO. 201011, January 27, 2014 As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The document’s trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. People v. Lee, 382 SCRA 596 The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 27

popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. Interpacific Transit vs. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990) Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it was formally offered, and not when the particular document is marked is identified and marked as an exhibit. Vda. de Onate vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 283 (1995) Evidence not formally offered may be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.

exception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed the formal-offer rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted. Jurisprudence enumerated the requirements so that evidence, not previously offered, can be admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of the case. In the present case, we find that the requisites for the relaxation of the formal-offer rule are present. As it is correctly observed, Godofredo identified the Certification to File an Action during his cross-examination. Although the Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as Exhibit “1” and attached to the records of the case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN IBANEZ Y ALBANTE, ET AL. G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013 The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competence. Petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father. On the other hand, Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provided that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Aniceta’s testimony is mainly hearsay, especially on the purported fight between Wilfredo and Jesus that ended in Wilfredo’s death. Aniceta’s testimony as such carries no probative weight. At best, Aniceta’s testimony is an independent relevant statement: offered only as to the fact of its declaration and the substance of what had been relayed to Aniceta by Marilou, not as to the truth thereof. EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN v. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013. Under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. FEDERICO SABAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 192150, October 01, 2014 Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot consider any evidence that has not been formally offered. This rule, however, admits of an REMEDIAL LAW MRC AY 15-16 | 28