Remedial Law Case Digests First Set

2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

CAPALLA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 201112; June 13, 2012

Facts:

On July 10, 2009, the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections,(AES Contract). The contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM Smartmatic-TIM was one of “lease of the AES with option to purchase (OTP) the goods goods listed in the contract.” In said contract, the Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the option. In September 2010, the Comelec partially exercised its OTP 920 units of PCOS machines with corresponding canvassing/consolidation system (CCS) for the special elections in certain areas in the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan. In a letter dated December 18, 2010, Smartmatic-TIM, through its Chairman Flores, proposed a temporary extension of the option period on the remaining PCOS machines until March 31, 2011, waiving the storage costs and covering the maintenance costs. The Comelec did not exercise the option within the extended period. Several extensions were given for the Comelec to exercise the OTP until its final extension on March 31, 2012. On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued a Resolution resolving to accept Smartmatic-TIM’s Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until March 31, 2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for and on behalf of the Comelec the Agreement on the Extension of the OTP Under the AES Contract (Extension Agreement). Comelec again issued a Resolution resolving to approve the Deed of Sale between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter’s PCOS machines to be used in the upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the Comelec. The Deed of Sale was forthwith executed.

Issue:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Comelec in issuing the assailed Resolutions and in executing the assailed Extension Agreement and Deed.

Ruling: No, Comelec did not abuse its discretion when it issued the resolutions and excecuted the Extension Agreement and Deed A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the parties are given the right to amend the contract which may include the period within which to exercise the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective. The Comelec still retains P50M of the amount due Smartmatic-TIM as performance security, which indicates that the AES contract is still effective and not yet terminated. Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the contract, the provisions thereof may still be amended by mutual agreement of the parties provided said amendment is in writing and signed by the parties. Considering, however, that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a government agency, the

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

CAPALLA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 201112; June 13, 2012

Facts:

On July 10, 2009, the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections,(AES Contract). The contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM Smartmatic-TIM was one of “lease of the AES with option to purchase (OTP) the goods goods listed in the contract.” In said contract, the Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the option. In September 2010, the Comelec partially exercised its OTP 920 units of PCOS machines with corresponding canvassing/consolidation system (CCS) for the special elections in certain areas in the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan. In a letter dated December 18, 2010, Smartmatic-TIM, through its Chairman Flores, proposed a temporary extension of the option period on the remaining PCOS machines until March 31, 2011, waiving the storage costs and covering the maintenance costs. The Comelec did not exercise the option within the extended period. Several extensions were given for the Comelec to exercise the OTP until its final extension on March 31, 2012. On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued a Resolution resolving to accept Smartmatic-TIM’s Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until March 31, 2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for and on behalf of the Comelec the Agreement on the Extension of the OTP Under the AES Contract (Extension Agreement). Comelec again issued a Resolution resolving to approve the Deed of Sale between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter’s PCOS machines to be used in the upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the Comelec. The Deed of Sale was forthwith executed.

Issue:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Comelec in issuing the assailed Resolutions and in executing the assailed Extension Agreement and Deed.

Ruling: No, Comelec did not abuse its discretion when it issued the resolutions and excecuted the Extension Agreement and Deed A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the parties are given the right to amend the contract which may include the period within which to exercise the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective. The Comelec still retains P50M of the amount due Smartmatic-TIM as performance security, which indicates that the AES contract is still effective and not yet terminated. Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the contract, the provisions thereof may still be amended by mutual agreement of the parties provided said amendment is in writing and signed by the parties. Considering, however, that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a government agency, the

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

rights and obligations of the parties are governed not only by the Civil Code but also by RA 9184. Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was not previously available to the other bidders. The bidders were apprised that aside from the lease of goods and purchase of services, their proposals should include an OTP the subject goods. The amendment of the AES contract is not substantial. The approved budget for the contract was P11,223,618,400.00 charged against the supplemental appropriations for election modernization. Bids were, therefore, accepted provided that they did not exceed said amount. The competitive public bidding conducted for the AES contract was sufficient. A new public bidding would be a superfluity. The amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous a dvantageous to the Comelec and the public because the P7,191,484,739.48 rentals paid for the lease of goods and purchase of services under the AES contract was considered part of the purchase price. For the Comelec to own the subject goods, it was required to pay only P2,130,635,048.15. If the Comelec did not exercise the option, the rentals already paid would just be one of the government expenses for the past election and would be of no use to future elections.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

CALLO-CLARIDAD vs. ESTEBAN G.R. No. 191567; March 20, 2013 Facts:

Petitioner is the mother of Cheasare Armani “Chase” Callo Claridad , whose lifeless and bloodied body was discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007 between vehicles parked at the carport of a residential house located inside Ferndale Homes, Quezon City. It was alleged that Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban less than an hour before the discovery of his lifeless body Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for murder against respondents Philip and Teodora on the strength of the several pieces of circumstantial evidence. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint based on the observation that there was lack of evidence, motive and circumstantial evidence sufficient to charge respondent with homicide, much less murder. On petition for review, the Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the complaint stating that the confluence of lack of an eyewitness, lack of motive, insufficient circumstantial evidence, and the doubt as to the proper identification of Philip by the witness resulted in the lack of probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with the crime alleged. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner resorted to the correct remedy when she filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals to review the Secretary of Justice’s resolution on the determination of probable cause.

Ruling:

No, the petitioner did not resort to the correct remedy.

A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicia;l officers, agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. Here, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially Executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was committed and whether there was probable cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof. The courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when 4

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the Executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers.

AIR ADS vs. TADECO G.R. No. 160736; March 23, 2011 Facts:

A civil case for damages entitled Elva O. Pamento vs. Tagum Agricultual Development Corporation (TADECO) and Edwin Yap was filed in RTC Davao City Branch 15. Respondent, through counsel ACCRA Law Office, filed an answer with compulsory counterclaims and motion for leave to file third party complaint, impleading petitioner Air Ads, Inc and Pioneer Insurance Surety Corporation as third-party defendants. The same was admitted however upon realizing that Pioneer was a client of its Makati Office, ACCRA Law filed a notice of dismissal without prejudice to third party complaint only against Pioneer. Consequently, TADECO filed through another counsel Dominguez Law Office, a motion to withdraw notice of dismissal without prejudice of third party complaint only against Pioneer or motion for reconsideration, alleging that the notice of dismissal filed by ACCRA had been made without its consent. The RTC granted the notice of dismissal filed by ACCRA. A month later, RTC also granted the motion to withdraw notice of dismissal filed by TADECO through its new counsel and set aside the dismissal of the third party complaint against Pioneer. Tadeco, through Dominguez Law Office, filed a motion to admit third party complaint in substitution of the third party complaint filed by the third party plaintiff’s former counsel. The third party complaint, however, contained allegations pertaining only to Pioneer as third party defendant. Notwithstanding this, the RTC granted said motion. Air Ads filed a motion to dismiss against the third party complaint averring that it had been dropped as third party defendant under TADECO’s substitute third party complaint. TADECO, now represented by ACCEA, countered that it had never been the intention of Dominguez Law to file a new third party complaint against Air Ads because the latter represented TADECO only in regards to the third party complaint against Pioneer. The RTC denied Air Ads motion to dismiss holding tthat the notice of dismissal filed by ACCRA did not have the effect of dropping Air Ads as a third party defendant due to the notice being expressly restrictive. Air Ads filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. A subsequent petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Air Ads before the Court 5

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

of Appeals was also denied for failure to attach the board resolution designating the petitioner’s duly authorized representative to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, Air Ads filed a new petition for certiorari and prohibition already including the proper board certificate. Issue:

Whether or not the filing of an identical petition following the dismissal of the first petition on the ground of defective and insufficient verification and certification constitute forum shopping.

Ruling: No, the filing of an identical petition following the dismissal of the first petition on the ground of defective and insufficient verification and certification does not constitute forum shopping. Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines the effect of the failure to comply with the requirements for the certification against forum shopping. Said section expressly provides that the dismissal of a petition due to failure to comply with the requirements therein is withpout prejudice unless otherwise provided by the court. Accordingly, the plaintiff or petitioner is not precluded from filing a similar action in order to rectify the defect in the certification where the court states in its order that the action is dismissed due to such defect, unless the court directs that the dismissal is with prejudice, in which case the plaintiff is barred from filing a similar action by res judicata. In the context of the aforementioned rule, the dismissal, being without any qualification, was a dismissal without prejudice, plainly indicating that Air Ads could not be barred from filing the second petition.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB G.R. No. 188471; April 20, 2010

Facts:

Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents showing that his father acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government of the Philippine Islands in or about the year 1911 in accordance with the Friar Lands Act. Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found out from the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Cebu City that title to Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been "administratively reconstituted from the owner’s dupli cate" in the name of United Service Country Club, Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. After Cebu Country Club refused to heed to the demand of the petitioner to to restore to him the ownership and possession of said lot within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, he filed with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City. RTC decided in favor of Cebu Country Club. Both parties appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Such denial prompted petitioner to appeal to the Supreme Court. On January 31, 2002, the Supreme Court denied the petition for review and ruled that the disputed lot belonged to the Government of the Philippines. Petitioners sought a reconsideration which was denied, thus making the decision final and executory. In 2004, the Government, filed in the RTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution which was opposed by Cebu Country Club. The RTC denied the OSG’s motion. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the denial of the OSG’s motion. The RTC denied the petit ioners’ motion for reconsideration citing that the party who had a direct interest in the execution of the decision and the reconsideration of the denial of the motion for execution was the Government

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

represented only by the OSG; hence the petitioners had no legal standing to file the motion for reconsideration. Issue:

Whether or not petitioners were the real parties-in-interest to question the denial by the RTC of the OSG’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

Ruling: No, petitioners are not the real parties-in-interest to question the denial by the RTC of the OSC’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court found that petitioners did not validly acquire ownership of Lot No 727-D-2 and that the same belonged to the Government. This pronouncement renders beyond dispute that the non-execution of the judgment would not adversely affect the petitioners, who now hold no right whatsoever in said lot. Otherwise put, they are not the proper parties to assail the questioned orders of the RTC because they stand to derive nothing from the execution of the judgment against Cebu Country Club, Inc. A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.

AMPATUAN vs DE LIMA G.R. No. 197291; April 3, 2013 Facts:

Fifty seven innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other suspects, for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre. Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation. DOJ resolved to file the corresponding informations for murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoenas to several persons. Twenty-five informations for murder were also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, in Cotabato City. A panel of Prosecutors charged one hundred ninety six individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. It appears that in issuing the joint resolution the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag. Petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already 8

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. Petitioner reiterated the request twice. Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request. Petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila, seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC. Respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed. RTC of Manila issued the assailed order dismissing the petition for mandamus. Issue:

Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag, as an accused for multiple murder despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.

Ruling: No, respondents may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder despite his admission to the WPP. The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court. Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

CHU vs. SPOUSES CUNANAN G.R. No. 156185; September 12, 2011

Facts: Spouses Chu executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving their five parcels of land, in favour of Trinidad N. Cunanan. The parties stipulated that the ownership of lots would remain with the spouses as the vendors and would be transferred to Cunanan only upon complete payment of the total consideration and compliance with the terms of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. Thereafter, the Chus executed an SPA authorizing Cunanan to borrow the amount of consideration from any banking institution and to mortgage the lots as security, and then to deliver the proceeds to the Chus. Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the lots to her name without the knowledge of the Chus, and was able to borrow money with the lots as security without paying the balance and the purchase price to the Chus. She later transferred two of the lots to Spouses Garcia. As a result, the 10

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

Chus caused the annotation of an unpaid vendor’s lien on three of t he lots. Nonteheless, Cunanan still assigned the remaining lots to Cool Town Realty. The Chus commenced Civil Case No. G1936 in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance from Spouses Fernando and Trinidad Cunanan (Cunanans), which complaint was later on amended to seek the annulment of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and of the TCTs issued pursuant to the deed, and to recover damages. They impleaded Cool Town Realty and the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as defendants. By virtue of the sale by the spouses Carlos of the two lots to Benelda Estate, the Chus further amended the complaint to Benelda Estate as additional defendant. Benelda Estate filed its answer with a motion to dismiss, claiming, among others, that the amended complaint stated no cause of action. The same was denied by the RTC which prompted the former to assail the denial on certiorari in the CA. The CA annulled RTC’s denial and dismissed the civil case as against Benelda Estate. Said dismissal of the case was later on upheld by the Supreme Court in a subsequent case involving the same parties. Subsequently, the Chus, Cunanans and Cool Town Realty entered into a compromise agreement whereby the Cunanans transferred to the Chus their 50% share in all the parcels of land registered in the name of Cool Town Realty for an in consideration of the full settlement of the case, which the RTC approved. Thereafter, the Chus brought another suit against the Carloses and Benelda Estate seeking t he cancellation of the titles in Benelda Estate’s names. The petitioners then amended their complaint to implead the Cunanans as additional defendants. The Cunanans and the Carloses moved for the dismissal of the case on several grounds including res judicata. The RTC denied both motions holding that the action was not barred by res judicata because there was no identity of parties and subject matter between the present case and the first case. Reconsideration was sought by the Cunanans but the same was denied, prompting them to file a petition for certiorari in the CA which was granted. Issue:

Whether or not Civil Case No. 12251 is barred by res judicata although the compromise agreement did not expressly include Benelda Estate as a party and although the compromise agreement made no reference to the lots registered in the name of Benelda Estates.

Ruling: Yes, Civil Case No. 12251 is barred by res judicata although the compromise agreement did not expressly include Benelda Estate as a party and although the compromise agreement made no reference to the lots registered in the name of Benelda Estates. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It encompasses the objects specifically stated therein, although it may include other objects by necessary implication, and is binding on the contracting parties, being expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement between them. It has the effect and authority of res judicata upon the parties. The intent of the parties to settle all their claims against each other is expressed in the phrase “any and all their respective claims against each other as alleged in the pleading they respectively filed in connection with this case, which was broad enough to cover whatever claims the 11

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

petitioners might asset based on the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage covered all the five lots. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The first requisite of res judicata – that the former judgment must be final –is attendant in the case. Civil Case No. 6-1936 was already terminated under the compromise agreement, for the judgment, being upon a compromise, was immediately final and unappealable. As to the second requisite, the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action in the first case, the action being incapable of pecuniary estimation. Lastly, that the compromise agreement explicitly settled the entirety of the first case by resolving all claims of the parties against each other, indicated that the third requisite was also satisfied. Hence all three requisites concur. Thus Civil Case No. 12251 is barred by res judicata

CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION vs. CRUZ G.R. No. 157049; August 11, 2010 Facts:

Respondent Carlo Romulo Cruz maintained a savings and checking account at petitioner’s Loyola Heights Branch. The account was closed due to the negligence of one of the latter’s tellers. Due to the closure, the respondent sustained extreme embarrassment for the checks he issued would not be honoured although his savings account was sufficiently funded and the accounts were maintained under

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

the petitioner’s check -o-matic. The respondent sued in the RTC to claim for damages from the petitioner. After the trial, the RTC ruled in favour of the respondent, and ordered the petitioner to pay him P 100,000.00 as moral damages, P 20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The RTC found that the petitioner failed to properly supervise its teller in which the respondent sustained embarrassment and humiliation, entitling him to damages. The petitioner appealed to the CA, arguing that the RTC erred in ordering it to pay moral and exemplary damages. The CA affirmed the RTC. The petitioner sought for reconsideration but CA denied it for lack of merit. Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is liable to respondent for moral and exemplary damages.

Ruling:

Yes, the petitioner is liable to respondent for moral and exemplary damages.

In several decisions of the Court, the banks, defendants therein, were made liable for negligence, even without sufficient proof of malice or bad faith on their part, and the Court awarded moral damages of P 100,000.00 each time to the suing depositors in proper consideration of their reputation and their social standing. The respondent should be similarly awarded for the damage to his reputation as an architect and businessman. It is never overemphasized that the public always relies on a bank’s profession of diligence and meticulousness in rendering irreproachable service. Its failure to exercise diligence and meticulousness warranted its liability for exemplary damages and for reasonable attorney’s fees.

CONSING vs PEOPLE G.R. No. 161075; July 15, 2013

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

Facts: Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia, various loans totalling 18 Million pesos from Unicapital, secured by real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land registered under the name of Cecilia. In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of P 21, 221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes ofe Cecilia and petitioner in the amount of 18 million pesos and paying an additional amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital. Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by Cecilia. TCT No. 687599 held by Cecilia appeared to be spurious. On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 that had been paid to and received by Cecilia and Petitioner, but the latter ignored the demands. Petitioner filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City RTC for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of the P41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother. On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document against petitioner and Cecilia in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office. Unicapital sued petitioner in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Petitioner and Cecilia an information for estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati City. Petitioner moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001, petitioner reiterated his motion for deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion. A week later, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question and subsequently denied the Prosecution’s motion for reconsideration. The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari. The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252, dismissing the petition for certiorari and upholding the RTC’s questioned orders. Subsequently, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself. Petitoner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion through the second assailed resolution. Issue: Whether or not an independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party raises a prejudicial question. Ruling: No, an independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, it is well-settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. 14

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

Here, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by Consing and Cecilia in selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not Consing merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. The determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 169823-24; September 11, 2013 Facts:

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002). In this two actions it alleged his confederations with the late President Marcos and His family. Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their immediately family but also of their relatives, subordinates and close associates.

Issue:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the offenses charged

Ruling: Yes, Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses charged. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving: (a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense; (b) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office; 16

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

and (c) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status. Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249. Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. To include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini’s being a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the offenses charged.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

FDC vs. AGCAOILI G.R. No. 165025; August 31, 2011 Facts:

Interchem Laboratories Incorporated (Interchem) purchased Fedman Suites Buildings Unit 411 under a contract to sell. FDC executed a Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions, and formed the Fedman Suite Condominium Corporation (FSCC) to manage FSB and hold title over its common areas. Interchem, with FDCs consent, transferred all its rights in Unit 411 to respondent Federico Agcaoili. The centralized air-conditioning unit of FSBs fourth floor broke down. Being thereby adversely affected, Agcaoili wrote to Eduardo X. Genato (Genato, demanding the repair of the air-conditioning unit. Not getting any immediate response, Agcaoili sent follow-up letters to FSCC reiterating the demand, but the letters went unheeded. He then informed FDC and FSCC that he was suspending the payment of his condominium dues and monthly amortizations. FDC cancelled the contract to sell involving Unit 411 and cut off the electric supply to the unit. Agcaoili was thus prompted to sue FDC and FSCC in the RTC, Makati City, Branch 144 for injunction and damages. The parties later executed a compromise agreement that the RTC approved. Immediately thereafter, FDC again disconnected the electric supply of Unit 411. Agcaoili thus moved for the execution of the RTC decision dated August 26, 1985. On July 17, 1986, the RTC issued an order temporarily allowing Agcaoili to obtain his electric supply from the other units in the fourth floor of FSB until the main meter was restored. Agcaoili lodged a complaint for damages against FDC and FSCC in the RTC, which was raffled to Branch 150 in Makati City. FDC claims that there was a failure to pay the correct amount of docket fee herein because the complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees; that the payment of the prescribed docket fee by Agcaoili was necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case despite failure by Agcaoili to pay the correct amount of docket fee.

Ruling: Yes, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case despite failure by Agcaoili to pay the correct amount of docket fee. The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at the time of filing, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time   as the court may grant, barring prescription. The 18

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

prescriptive period that bars the payment of the docket fees refers to the period in which a specific action must be filed, so that in every case the docket fees must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period, as provided in the applicable laws, particularly Chapter 3, Title V, Book III, of the Civil Code, the principal law on prescription of actions. Even where the clerk of court fails to make a deficiency assessment , and the deficiency is not paid as a result, the trial court nonetheless continues to have jurisdiction over the complaint, unless the party liable is guilty of a fraud in that regard, considering that the deficiency will be collected as a fee in lien within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule 141 (as revised by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC. The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not fair if the party has acted in good faith. Here, the docket fees paid by Agcaoili were insufficient considering that the complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Agcaoili paid the assessed   docket fees. Such payment negated bad faith or intent to defraud the Government. Nonetheless, Agcaoili must remit any docket fee deficiency to the RTCs clerk of court.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

GALVEZ vs CA G.R. No. 157445; April 3, 2013 Facts:

Spouses Eustacio and Segundina used to own a property located in Barangay District II, Babatngon, Leyte. After their marital relationship turned sour, Eustacio and Segundina separated and cohabited with other partners. Eustacio sold the property to their daughter Jovita without the knowledge or consent of Segundina. After the sale, Jovita constituted a mortgage on the property on March 9, 1981 to secure her loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Jovita failed to pay her obligation. Hence, PNB had the property extrajudicially foreclosed. In the ensuing foreclosure sale, PNB was the highest bidder. There being no redemption, the property became PNB’s acquired asset. Respondents Spouses Honorio and Susana Montaño purchased the property from PNB. Thereafter, the Montaños tried to get the actual possession of the property, but Segundina refused to vacate. Accordingly, the Montaños sued Segundina for recovery of ownership and possession, and damages in the Municipal Trial Court of Babatngon, Leyte (MTC). Segundina countered that the sale of the property by Eustacio to Jovita was null and void for having been done without her knowledge and consent; that the sale to PNB as well as to the Montaños were consequently void; and that the Montaños were also buyers in bad faith. The MTC ruled in favor of the Montaños. Segundina appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tacloban City. The RTC affirmed the MTC’s decision. Segundina filed a motion for reconsideration against the RTC’s decision but the RTC denied the same. Thereafter, Segundina appealed to the CA by petition for review. The CA promulgated its first assailed resolution dismissing outright the petition, stating thus: “A cursory perusal of the instant  petition for review   shows that no copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations thereof were attached as annexes in violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure”. Segundina moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, arguing that it was within her judgment as petitioner to decide what documents, pleadings or portions of the records would support her petition; that her exercise of

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

judgment was not a technical error that warranted the outright dismissal of her petition; that the rule requiring all pleadings and material portions of the records to be attached to the petition was an “absurd requirement”; and that attaching the pleadings and other portions of the record was not an indispensable requirement the non-compliance with which would cause the denial of the petition. CA denied Segundina’s motion for reconsideration. Issue:

Whether or not the mere failure to attach copies of pleadins and other material portions of the recored as would support the allegations causes the outright dismissal of a petition for review.

Ruling: No, the mere failure to attach copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations should not cause the outright dismissal of a petition for review. The Court has laid down three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching the pleadings and portions of the records to the petition. First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition. Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached. Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits. The Court considers the attachments of Segundina’s petition for review (i.e., the certified true copies of the MTC decision dated February 4, 2000, the RTC decision dated November 29, 2000, and the RTC order dated April 22, 2002) already sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon her assigned errors and to resolve her appeal even without the pleadings and other portions of the records. To still deny due course to her petition for not attaching the complaint and the answer despite the MTC decision having substantially summarized their contents was to ignore the spirit and purpose of the requirement to give sufficient information to the CA.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

GOLANGCO vs. FUNG G.R. No. 157952; September 8, 2009 Facts:

In 1995, petitioner Golangco, as complainant, initiated a prosecution for libel against the respondent Fung in the Regional Trial Court. Allegedly, the respondent had issued an office memorandum maliciously imputing against the petitioner the commission of bribery and had sent copies of the mrmorandum to the petitioner’s superiors in the POEA and to other public officers and personalities not connecter with the POEA, causing damage and prejudice to the petitioner. On hearing day, the prosecution still failed to present its witness because no subpoena had been issued to and served on him for the purpose. The RTC judge issued an order terminating the prosecution’s presentation of evidence. Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari to assail the order and claimed that the RTC judge committed grave buse of discretion for not issuing the subpoena to require the witness to appear and testify in the hearing. He contended that his prior request for the subpoena for an earlier hearing date should have been treated as a continuing request for the subpoena considering that the Rules of Court did not require a party to apply for a subpoena again should it not be served in the first time. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for ce rtiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for certiorari of the petitioner.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

Ruling: Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled when it dismissed the petition for certiorari The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in his action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He thereby ignored that the People of the Philippines were indispensable parties due to his objective being to set aside the trial court’s order. The omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his petition for certiorari. The petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to his petition for certiorari. At the very least, he should ave furnished a copy of the petition for certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing thereof, but even that he did not do. The petitioner now needs to be reminded that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy to correct a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when an appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is not available. In this regard, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction whenever the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.

HEIRS OF SIMON vs CHAN G.R. No. 157547; February 23, 2011

Facts:

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the MeTC of Manila an information charging the late Eduardo Simon with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. More than three years later, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00). On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon. Eight days thereafter, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages. Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon the urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages. The MTC cites the grounds of litis pendentia and that the case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required. Chans motion for reconsideration was denied as well as his appeal with the RTC. On the CA, Chan's appeal was granted. Issue:

Whether or not Chan’s civil action (Civil Case No. 915 -00) was an independent civil action.

Ruling:

No, Chan’s civil action was not an independent civil action.

There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which relevantly provides: "The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed." Supreme Court Circular 57-97 also provides that: "1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized."

HEIRS OF GARCIA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES G.R. No. 162217; July 22, 2015 Facts:

Melecio R. Bueno brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of Iba, Zambales claiming that the municipality constructed the public market on his lands without his consent. After due proceedings, the MTC ruled in favor of Bueno. Then the municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal, but the MTC denied due course to the notice of appeal. The Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC assailing MTC’s denial. The petition for certiorari was granted. Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed the petition for review for not being the proper mode of appeal observing that the assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Although admitting that their petition

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

for review under Rule 42 was inappropriate, the petitioners pray that the Court exercise its equity jurisdiction because a stringent application of the Rules of Court would not serve the demands of substantial justice. Issue:

Whether or not the Court should exercise its equity jurisdiction and give due course to the petition.

Ruling: No. The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. Verily, the CA has the discretion whether to due course to the petition for review or not. The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. Appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. As the parties invoking the privilege, the petitioners should have faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so forfeited their privilege to appeal. Indeed, any liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be properly invoked only in cases of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but definitely not in cases like now where a liberal application would directly subvert the essence of the proceedings or results in the utter disregard of the Rules of Court . Moreover, the petitioners did not give any good reason or cause that could warrant the relaxation of the rules in their favor. Their bare plea for substantial justice was not enough ground to suspend the rules. Acceding to their plea would conceal their shortcomings in procedure, and thereby belittle the lofty objectives of instituting rules of procedure.

HEIRS OF SOTTO vs PALICTE G.R. No. 159691; January 13, 2013 Facts:

In June 1967, Pilar Teves (Pilar) and other heirs of Carmen Rallos (Carmen), the deceased wife of Filemon, filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City a complaint against the Estate of Sotto ( Civil Case No. R-10027 ) seeking to recover certain properties that Filemon had inherited from Carmen, and damages. The CFI rendered judgment awarding to Pilar and other heirs of Carmen damages of P 233,963.65, among other reliefs . On July 24, 1980, Matilde filed in Civil Case No. R10027, a motion to transfer to her name the title to the four properties. However, the CFI denied her motion, and instead declared the deed of redemption issued in

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

her favor null and void, holding that Matilde, although declared in Special Proceedings No. 2706-R as one of the heirs of Filemon, did not qualify as a successor-in-interest with the right to redeem the four properties. The other heirs of Filemon failed to exercise their option granted in the decision of September 21, 1987 to join Matilde as co-redemptioners within the six-month period. Accordingly, on October 5, 1989, the trial court issued an order in Civil Case No. R-10027 approving Matilde’s motion to transfer the title of the four lots to her name, and directing the Register of Deeds of Cebu to register the deed of redemption and issue new certificates of title covering the four properties in Matilde’s name. Pascuala who earlier executed a document expressly waiving her rights to the properties changed her mind and decided to file on September 23, 1996 in the RTC in Cebu City a complaint to seek the nullification of her waiver of rights, and to have herself be declared as a co-redemptioner of the four properties (Civil Case No. CEB-19338). However, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. CEB-19338 on the ground of its being barred by laches. In November 1998, the heirs of Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. R-10027 of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16, praying that the order issued on October 5, 1989 be set aside, and that they be included as Matilde’s coredemptioners. After the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit on April 25, 2000, they assailed the denial by petition for certiorari  and prohibition. On September 10, 1999, the heirs of Marcelo and the heirs of Miguel instituted the present action for partition against Matilde in the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 20 (Civil Case No. CEB-24293), alleging in their complaint that despite the redemption of the four properties having been made in the sole name of Matilde, the four properties still rightfully belonged to the Estate of Sotto for having furnished the funds used to redeem the properties, they prayed that the RTC declare the four properties as the assets of the Estate of Sotto, and that the RTC direct their partition among the heirs of Filemon. The heirs of Pascuala did not join the action for partition whether as plaintiffs or defendants. Instead of filing her answer, Matilde moved to dismiss the complaint, stating, among others, that a similar case entitled Pahang v. Palicte (Civil Case No. 19338) had been dismissed with finality by Branch 8 of the RTC in Cebu City. The RTC granted Matilde’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint. Following the denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners appealed the dismissal of Civil Case No. CEB-24293 to the CA, which affirmed the dismissal. After the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, they brought this present appeal to the Court. Issue:

Whether or not the action for partition was already barred by prior judgment.

Ruling:

Yes, the action for partition was already barred by prior judgment

Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action these elements are present, namely: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequenst actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions, (ii) identity of subject matter or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (iii) identity of caused of action 26

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

in both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. The first three elements are present. What remains to be determined is whether civil case no. CEB -24293 and the previous cases involved the same parties, the same subject matter, the same causes of action an the same factual and legal issues. Indeed, civil case no. CEB-24293 was no different from the previous cases. In other words, it is an undisguised relitigation of the same settled matter concerning Matilde’s ownership of t he four properties. In all the five cases, an identity of parties existed because the parties were the same or there was privity among them or some of the parties were successors in interest litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary because a shared identity of interest sufficed for res judicata to apply. Moreover, mere substantial identity of parties, oven community of interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter were not impleaded in the first case could be sufficient. Secondly, the subject matter of all the actions was the same, that is, Matilde’s right to the four properties. On the one hand, Matilde insisted that she had the exclusive right to them while, on the other hand, the other declared heirs of Filemon, like petitioners’ predecessors in interest maintained that the properties belonged to the estate of Sotto. And, lastly, a judgment rendered in the other cases, regardless of which part was successful could amount to res judicata in relation to civil case no. CEB-24293.

Hi, in the same case forum shopping was discussed. Thus, please be guided by this SC pronouncement on forum shopping: Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: 1. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (LITIS PENDENTIA) 2. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (RES JUDICATA) 3. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (SPLITTING OF CAUSES OF ACTION WHERE THE GROUND FOR DISMISSAL IS ALSO EITHER LITIS PENDENTIA OR RES JUDICATA) If the forum shopping is not considered wilful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the forum shopping is wilful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.

HEIRS OF PRODON vs HEIRS OF ALVAREZ G.R. No. 170604; September 2, 2013

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

Facts:

The heirs of Spouses Maximo S. Alvarez Sr. and Vzalentina have claimed that they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797 pertaining to the land they inherited from their parents, that the entry of the Deed of sale with Right to Repurchase on the original TCT did not exist and that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon. Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Sr had executed the deed of sale with right to repurchase on September 9, 1975 and this had been registered with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title. She had then become the absolute owner of the property due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period. The custodian of the recored of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila. RTC rendered judgment in favour of Prodon. It opined that the contents of the Deed of Sale could be proven by secondary evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its execution or existence and of the cause of its unavailability being without bad faith when defendant Prodon swore that she purchased the land and her testimony has been confirmed by the Notarial Register of Notary Public Eliseo Razon and by the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling, saying that: “A party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its discretion may change this order if necessary. The CA also found circumstances that put doubt on the existence of the alleged deed of sale as evidence on record showed that Maximo Sr. was hospitalized between August 23 to September 3, 1975 and suffered from palaysis on half of his body and blindness due to cataract., and then was again later hospitalized and subsequently died on October of 1975 without having left the hospital

Issue:

Whether or not the Best Evidence Rule applies in an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase.

Ruling: No, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply in an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase. This action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue was whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed. The Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue . The lower court should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the "existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence. The presentation of evidence other than the original document, like the testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without first proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed. The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish and explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because the deed, although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document, the original of the document must be reproduced in court. The rule excludes an evidence other than the original writing to prove the contents thereof, unled the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before court.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

HEIRS OF SPOUSES RETERTA vs. SPOUSES LOPEZ G.R. No. 159941; August 17, 2011 Facts:

The Petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land (the land) situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, having inherited the same from their father who had died on July 11, 1983; that their late father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation; that their late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents. Respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to the land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence the same.

The RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding that considering that the land is a friar land and not land of the public domain, consequently Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands, and that the determination whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands. Hence this Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of this action. On the second ground relied upon by the defendants in their Motion To Dismiss, suffice it to state that the Court deemed not to discuss the same. The petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same. Petitioners assailed the dismissal via  petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition. Petitioners filed a motion for but the same was denied by the CA. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. However the same was dismissed as it cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Finally, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration Issue: Whether or not it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction over the action for quieting of title. Ruling: title.

No, the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over the action for quieting of

The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of Batas Pa,bansa Plg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No, 7691, which provides: Section 19.  Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts  shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (2)In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value 30

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; Conformably with the provision,  because an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one’s title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby sought. The respondents reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to sustain their position that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had exclusive jurisdiction was without basis. the authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to the administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners action for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a private person and title duly issues in the l atter’s name. By ignoring the petitioners showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983 and by disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

JOSE vs JAVELLANA G.R. No. 158239; January 25, 2012 Facts:

Margarita sold for a consideration of P160,000.00 to Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale, two parcels of land in Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would pay P 80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P 80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System, and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal, and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration. After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision. Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the RTC in Malolos, Bulacan, averring that he had paid the full consideration and that in 1996, Priscilla had called to inquire about the mortgage constituted on the parcels of land and that he had told her then that the parcels of land had not been mortgaged but had been sold to him. He prayed for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor. Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription and that the complaint did not state a cause of action The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion. However upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the same. Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the presentation of evidence of full payment was not necessary at that stage of the proceedings and that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint were hypothetically admitted and only the allegation in the complaint should be considered. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb the order. Javellana filed a notice of appeal which the RTC gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals. Priscilla countered that the order was not appealable, that the appeal was not perfected on time and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping as it appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail orders dimissing his complaint. The dismissed the petition for certiorari. CA

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

reversed and set aside the dismissal of the civil case and remanded the records to the RTC for further proceedings in accordance with law. CA denied the motion for reconsideration Issue:

Whether or not the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss was an interlocutory order.

Ruling: No, the denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory order but a f inal order which puts an end to the particular matter involved. First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory of final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does the order or judgment leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;” but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then it is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

LORENO SHIPPING vs. DMAP G.R. No. 155849; August 11, 2011 Facts:

MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO 213) entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates  promulgated by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 24, 1994. Seven years later, the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution advising respondent Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153). In order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the LetterResolution, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari  and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 65463). The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari  and prohibition and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution. Later, the CA denied DMAPs motion for reconsideration. DMAP appealed to the Supreme Court but the Court denied DMAPs petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court also denied with finality DMAPs motion for reconsideration. DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of which DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its President, and Cora Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update. Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt against the respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted indirect contempt of court for patently, unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and, worse, that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo to the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

Issue:

Whether or not the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constituted or amounted to indirect contempt of court.

Ruling: No, the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update did not constitute or amount to indirect contempt of court. Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court   is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts. Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court. The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed. Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any action. They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal contempt   consists in conduct that is directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. A civil contempt  consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein. It is at times difficult to determine whether the proceedings are civil or criminal. In general, the character of the contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in which the contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide  or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt of court.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

MANALANG vs BACANI G.R. No. 156995; January 12, 2015

Facts:

Petitioners were co-owners for lot in question and caused a relocation and verification survey which showed that respondents had encroached on a portion of said lot. When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached portion and to surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the petitioners commenced this action for unlawful detainer. MTC dismissed the action on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. RTC reversed the decision of the MTC and remanded case on appeal. MTC ultimately dismissed case. Another appeal to RTC was made. RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation of encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor. The RTC then reversed the MTC’s decision.

Issue

Whether or not RTC shall conduct a rehearing or trial de novo.

Ruling:

No, the The RTC shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de novo.

Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Courtclearly provides: Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. The RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin.

MACASLANG vs. ZAMORA G.R. No. 156375; May 30, 2011 Facts:

Respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC, alleging that the petitioner sold to them a residential land located in Sabang, Danao City and that the former requested to be allowed to live in the house with a promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a new residence. They further alleged that despite their demand after a year, the petitioner failed or refused to vacate the premises. Despite the due service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the petitioner did not file her answer. The MTCC declared her in default upon the respondents’  motion to declare her in default, and proceeded to receive the respondents’ oral testimony and documentary evidence. The MTCC rendered judgment against petitioner ordering her to vacate the properties in question, to pay to respondents Attorneys Fees in the sum of P10,000.00 and monthly rental of P5,000.00 starting December, 1997 until the time the defendant shall have vacated the properties in question. Petitioner appealed to the RTC, averring that extrinsic fraud was practiced upon her which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which she has been impaired of her rights; and that she has a meritorious defense in that there was no

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

actual sale considering that the absolute deed of sale relied upon by respondents is a patent-nullity as her signature therein was procured through fraud and trickery. The RTC rendered judgment in favour of petitioner and dismissed the complaint filed by respondents, for failure to state cause of action without prejudice to the refilling of the same. The respondents appealed to the CA, assailing the RTCs decision for disregarding the allegations in the complaint in determining the existence or non-existence of a cause of action. The CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision and reinstated the MTCCs decision in favor of the respondents. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Issue:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction is limited to the assigned errors in the Memorandum or brief filed before it

Ruling: No, the Regional Trial Court is not limited in its review of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the issues assigned by the appellant, but can decide on the basis of the entire records of the proceedings of the trial court and such memoranda or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. The petitioner’s appeal being taken from the decision of the MTCC to the RTC, was governed by a different rule, specifically Section 18 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 18. xxx xxx The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.  (7a)

As such,the RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction, was not limited to the errors assigned in the petitioners appeal memorandum, but could decide on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the trial court and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be  submitted by the parties or required   by the RTC. The difference between the procedures for deciding on review is traceable to Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. As its compliance with the requirement of Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to adopt special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical rules, the Court promulgated the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,   whereby it institutionalized the summary procedure for all the first level courts. Later on, the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, effective on July 1, 1997, and incorporated in Section 7 of Rule 40 thereof the directive to the RTC to decide appealed cases on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed. As a result, the RTC presently decides all  appeals from the MTC based on the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda or briefs as are filed in the RTC. Yet, even without the differentiation in the procedures of deciding appeals, the limitation of the review to only the errors assigned and properly argued in the 38

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

appeal brief or memorandum and the errors necessarily related to such assigned error sought not to have obstructed the CA from resolving the unassigned issues by virtue of their coming under one or several of the following recognized exceptions to the limitation, namely: (a) When the question affects jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) Matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) Matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice; (d ) Matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some bearing on the issue submitted that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored; (e) Matters closely related to an error assigned; and ( f ) Matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent. Consequently, the CA improperly disallowed the consideration and resolution of the two errors despite their being: (a)necessary in arriving at a just decision and acomplete resolution of the case; and (b) matters of record having some bearing on the issues submitted that the lower court ignored.

MAHOGANY GROVE HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION vs. SPOUSES TORNO G.R. No. 206243; December 10, 2014

SC Pronouncement on Motion to Dismiss based on Lack of Jurisdiction It is well-settled that in a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the movant hypothetically admits the veracity of the allegations in the complaint and accordingly, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or theories set forth in an answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it would become almost entirely dependent upon the whims and caprices of the defendant or movant. Verily, the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for determine the nature of the action and of which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. 39

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

Note: Full text of the case is not available. The only available reference was the notice signed by AJ Bersamin relative to the case.

MANGILA vs. PANGILINAN G.R. No. 160739; July 17, 2013 Facts:

Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa and illegal recruitment were filed in the MTCC of Puerto Princesa City. A preliminary investigation was conducted by Judge Heriberto Pangilinan (respondent), presiding judge of the MTCC. Thereafter a warrant for the arrest of petitioner was issued. Mangila was then arrested and detained at the NBI headquarters in Taft Avenue, Manila.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

Claiming that respondent judge did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention, averring that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest considering that respondent judge had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant. Tha CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit, explainaing that as a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or could have been procured by resort to another general remedy. Mangila moved for the reconsideration of the denial of her petition for habeas corpus, but the CA denied the same. Issue:

Whether or not habeas corpus was the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention.

Ruling: No, habeas corpus  was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention Habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

SPOUSES MENDIOLA vs CA G.R. No. 159746; July 18, 2012 42

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

Facts:

Shell entered into an agreement for the distribution of Shell petroleum products by a single proprietorship belonging to petitioner Ramon G. Mendiola. To secure Pacific’s performance of its obligations under the agreement, petitioners executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Shell covering their real estate and its improvements, located in the then Municipality of Paraanaque, Rizal. Pacific ultimately defaulted on its obligations, impelling Shell to commence extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.. Having received a notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure scheduled to be held at the main entrance of the Paranaque Municipal Hall, petitioners proceeded to the announced venue on the scheduled date and time but did not witness any auction being conducted and did not meet the sheriff supposed to conduct the auction despite their being at the lobby. They later learned that the auction had been held as scheduled by Deputy Sheriff Bernardo San Juan of the Regional Trial Court in Makati, and that their mortgaged realty had been sold to Tabangao Realty, Inc. (Tabangao), as the corresponding certificate of sale bears out. They further learned that Tabangao s winning bidder bid of P670,000.00 had topped Shell s bid of P660,000.00. After application of the proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific, a deficiency remained. The deficiency was not paid by Ramon. Thus, Shell sued in the RTC in Manila to recover the deficiency. In his answer with counterclaim Ramon asserted that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the filing of the action were made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights. Pending the Manila case, petitioners commenced in the RTC in Makati an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure which was assigned to Branch 134 (Makati case). As defendants in the Makati case, Shell and Tabangao separately moved for dismissal, stating similar grounds, namely: (a) that the Makati RTC had no jurisdiction due to the pendency of the Manila case; (b) that the complaint stated no cause of action, the Makati case having been filed more than a year after the registration of the certificate of sale; (c) that another action (Manila case) involving the same subject matter was pending; (d) that the venue was improperly laid; and (e) that the Makati case was already barred by petitioners failure to raise its cause of action as a compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. After the Makati RTC denied both motions Shell filed its answer ad cautelam, whereby it denied petitioners allegation that no auction had been held; insisted that there had been proper accounting of the deliveries made to Pacific and its clients; and averred that petitioners failure to file their compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case already barred the action. Pending the trial of the Makati case, the Manila RTC rendered its judgment in favor of Shell. As sole defendant in the Manila case, Ramon appealed, but his appeal was decided adversely to him, with the CA affirming the Manila RTC s decision and finding that he was guilty of forum shopping for instituting the Makati case. Undaunted, he next appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied his Petition for Review and upheld the foreclosure of the mortgage. The decision of the Court became final and executor. Nonetheless, the Makati RTC resolved the Makati case, finding that there had been no auction actually conducted on the scheduled date; that had such auction taken place, petitioners could have actively participated and enabled to raise their

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

objections against the amount of their supposed obligation; and that they had been consequently deprived of notice and hearing as to their liability. Shell sought the reconsideration of the decision while Tabango adopted Shell’s motion for reconsideration. The Makati RTC denied Shell s motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved by the decision of the Makati RTC, Shell and Tabangao filed a joint notice of appeal. Instead of filing their appellees brief, petitioners submitted a motion to dismiss appeal, mainly positing that Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court prohibited an appeal of the order denying a motion for reconsideration. The CA denied petitioners motion to dismiss appeal through the first assailed resolution. The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration through the second assailed resolution.½ll Issue:

Whether or not the Makati case was barred in view of litis pendentia or res  judicata.

Ruling:

Yes, the Makati case was barred in view of res judicata.

Bar by res judicata avails if the following elements are present, to wit: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (d) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. The Manila RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on the merits Shell s complaint to recover the deficiency, and its decision rendered on May 31, 1990 on the merits already became final and executory. Hence, the first, second and third elements were present. Anent the fourth element, the Makati RTC concluded that the Manila case and the Makati case had no identity as to their causes of action. The foregoing conclusion of the Makati RTC on lack of identity between the causes of action was patently unsound. The identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party may easily escape the operation of res judicata  by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain the actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the actions. If the same facts or evidence will sustain the actions, then they are considered identical, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. 42 Petitioners Makati case and Shell s Manila case undeniably required the production of the same evidence. In fact, Shell s counsel faced a dilemma upon being required by the Makati RTC to present the original copies of certain documents because the documents had been made part of the records of the Manila case elevated to the CA in connection with the appeal of the Manila RTC s judgment . 43 Also, both cases arose from the same transaction (i.e., the foreclosure of the mortgage), such that the success of Ramon in invalidating the extrajudicial foreclosure would have necessarily negated Shell s right to recover the deficiency.

Hi, in relation to res judicata and because the facts mentioned something about the petitioner filing an Answer with compulsory counterclaim being filed, please refer to the SC pronouncement on compulsory counterclaim: 44

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a compulsory counterclaim as one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the following, to wit: (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata  bar a subsequent suit on defendant s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff s claim as well as the defendant s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relation between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim. Such relationship exists when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties. If these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

METROBANK vs. TOBIAS G.R. No. 177780; January 25, 2012 Facts:

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of public documents in relation to his loan with petitioner. He filed a motion for re-investigation but the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause against him and recommended that he be charged. Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice which issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. Metrobank moved to reconsider but the same was denied. Metrobank challenged the adverse resolutions through certiorari  with the Court of Appeals which denied the same. It stressed that the determination of probable cause was an executive function within the discretion of the public prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary of Justice, and the courts of law could not interfere with such determination; that the private complainant in a criminal action was only concerned with its civil aspect; that should the State choose not to file the criminal action, the private complainant might initiate a civil action based on Article 35 of the Civil Code. Metrobank sought reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion for that purpose, emphasizing that the presumption that metrobank firmly relied upon was overcome by Tobias sufficiently establishing his good faith and lack of criminal intent

Issue:

Whether or not the Secretary of Justice has the prerogative to review the resolutions of the public prosecutor in terms of determining the existence of probable cause.

Ruling: Yes, the Secretary of Justice has the prerogative to review the resolutions of the public prosecutor in terms of determining the existence of probable cause. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

METROBANK vs. JUDGE SANDOVAL G.R. No. 169677; February 18,2013 Facts:

In 1987, the Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants. Fourteen years later or in 2001, the Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in order to implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence against the original defendants in Civil Case No. 0004, it moved to hold a separate trial against Asian Bank. Commenting on the motion, Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the motion until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and documentary evidence the Republic had already presented against the original defendants, and contended that it would be deprived of its day in court if a separate trial were to be held against it without having been sufficiently apprised about the evidence the Republic had adduced before it was brought in as an additional defendant. The Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was proper because its cause of action against Asian Bank was entirely distinct and independent from its cause of action against the original defendants The Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution granting the Republic’s motion for separate trial. Asian Bank moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but the Sandiganbayan denied its motion through its second assailed resolution.

Issue:

Whether or not the Republic was entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank ( or its successor-in-interest, Metrobank)

Ruling:

No, the Republic was not entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank.

The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court , which reads: Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, thirdparty complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party. In actions at law, the general practice is to try all the issues in a case at one time; and it is only in exceptional instances where there are special and persuasive reasons for departing from this practice that distinct causes of action asserted in the same case may be made the subjects of separate trials. Whether this reasonably may be done in any particular instance rests largely in the court’s discretion. The Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum that a "single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the courts." Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply. The justification of the Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did not constitute a special or compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To begin with, the issue relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated. In that context, the separate trial would not be in furtherance of convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian Bank was necessarily connected with the cause of action against the original defendants.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

NERWIN INDUSTRIES vs. PNOC-EDC G.R. No. 167057; April 11, 2012 Facts:

In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of cross-arms needed in the country’s Rural Electrification Project. The qualified bidder submitted their financial bids where Nerwin emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract. NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection of Nerwin’s manufacturing plants and facilities, including its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEA’s requirements. Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to enjo in respondents’ proposed bidding for the wooden poles. Respondents sought the dismissal of the case, stating that the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president had no authority to sign and file the complaint. The RTC granted the TRO. Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order and also to set aside the order of default and to admit their answer to the complaint. The RTC denied re spondents motions for reconsideration, to set aside order of default, and to admit answer Respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari, alleging that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondents’ counsel from representing them. The CA granted the petition. Nerwin moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not it was proper for the RTC to grant the TRO despite the express prohibition in RA 8975 on the issuance of the same and preliminary injunctions, on government project.

Ruling : No, it was not proper for the RTC to grant the TRO despite the express prohibition in RA 8975 on the issuance of the same, and preliminary injunctions, on government project. Ruling: Sections 3 and 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any TRO, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the Government’s direction from (a) acquiring, clearing and developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project. The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left to the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon nerwin obedience to them. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a particular act/s. It is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is established that: (a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance or non-performance of the at or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act/s probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. It is never the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case, or to decide controverted facts. It is but a preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled. A Regional Trial Court that ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a government contract or project acts contrary to law.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

NHA vs. JUDGE ROXAS G.R. No. 161204; April 6, 2011

Facts:

PHHC (NHA’s predecessor) was the registered owner of two large parcels of land which was later subdivided into 17,387 lots, more or less, under several survey plans. The subdivided lots were sold and disposed off to NHAs beneficiaries/lot buyers. NHA delivered its owner’s copy of TCT No. 1356 to the QCRD to facilitate the numerous partial cancellations of TCT No. 1356 on account of the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of the beneficiaries. However, fire razed the entire premises of QCRD and destroyed the original and the owners duplicate copies of TCT No. 1356, along with many other records and documents then in the possession and custody of QCRD. NHA filed a petition for the reconstitution of TCT No. 1356 in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). Its petition was raffled to Branch 227 of the RTC, presided by respondent Judge Vicente Q. Roxas. NHA attached to its petition documents to prove its ownership and the identity of the lands involved. The RTC set the petition for initial hearing and directed NHA to submit twelve copies of the petition, certified true copies or originals of the annexes, certified true copies of tax declarations and tax receipts, and other jurisdictional requirements as provided by law. NHA failed to comply with the directive and to appear at the initial hearing. Thus, the RTC issued an order archiving said case until compliance by NHA with the

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

jurisdictional requirements. Subsequently, RTC issued a resolution denying the NHAs petition for reconstitution for lack of merit. NHA sought reconsideration. The RTC set NHAs motion for reconsideration for hearing and directed NHA to comply with the legal requirements in order to show its good faith. However, despite compliance on the part of NHA, the RTC issued two orders denying NHAs motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. NHA filed a notice of appeal seeking to elevate the dismissal for review by the CA. However, the RTC dismissed the appeal, pointing out that NHA had only a day left within which to file its notice of appeal due to NHAs having filed its motion for reconsideration that interrupted the running of the period for appeal on the fourteenth day; and that the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the appellate court docket fees were made way past the deadline to perfect its appeal. Aggrieved, NHA filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. The CA summarily dismissed the petition for certiorari because of the failure of NHA to attach to the petition the certified true copies of all the relevant pleadings and documents. After NHAs motion for reconsideration was denied upon the additional ground that NHAs notice of appeal had been filed out of time in the RTC, NHA now appeals. Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed NHA’s petition for certiorari.

Ruling: Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed NHA’s petition for certiorari. NHA, as the petitioner, had the obligation to comply with the basic requirements for the filing of a petition for certiorari  prescribed in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court , specifically to accompany the petition with a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. At the time the RTC issued its resolution denying due course to NHAs notice of appeal, the applicable rule was Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court , which stated that the period for taking an ordinary appeal is within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration interrupted the running of the period of appeal, which began to run again from the movants receipt of notice of the order denying the motion. Thus, NHA had only the balance of the period within which to perfect an appeal, the balance being the number of days remaining in its reglementary period after deducting the time during which the motion was pending, that is, from the date it filed the motion for reconsideration to the date it received the notice of denial of its motion for reconsideration. Considering that NHA filed its motion for reconsideration on the last day of the reglementary period, its appeal must be brought within the day following the service to it of the order denying its motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, NHAs notice of appeal was undeniably filed out of time. NHAs stance might be correct under the Neypes Rule where the Court has allowed a fresh period  of 15 days within which an aggrieved party may file the notice of appeal in the RTC, reckoned from the receipt of the order denying said partys motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Although Neypes has been intended to standardize the appeal periods under the Rules of Court , and has been applied retroactively in some cases due to its being a dictum on remedial law, the pronouncement could not now benefit NHA considering that the issue of whether or 52

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

not the RTC had been guilty of grave abuse of discretion the precise subject matter of its petition for certiorari  should be determined on the basis of the rules and jurisprudence then prevailing.

PAHILA-GARRIDO vs. TORTOGO G.R. No. 156358; August 17, 2011 Facts:

Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an action for ejectment with prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict several defendants, including the respondents herein, from his properties. He amended the complaint to implead the spouses of some of the defendants. However, he died during the pendency of the action, and his surviving spouse, herein petitioner Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was substituted for him. The defendants in Civil Case No. 23671 were divided into two groups. The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff. All the defendants appealed. The RTC in Bacolod City affirmed the decision of the MTCC. Only the second group, which includes respondents herein, appealed the RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals, insisting that the land was foreshore land and that the petitioner’s title was not valid. Considering that the first group did not appeal, the RTCs decision became final and executory as to them. The CA dismissed the second groups appeal, and later denied their motion for reconsideration. The respondents appealed the

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

dismissal to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari , but the Court rejected their recourse and issued an entry of judgment. In the meantime, the MTCC amended its decision to correct typographical errors in the description of the properties involved. None of the parties objected to or challenged the corrections. The MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioners motion, which writ was duly served upon all the defendants. The respondents filed a motion to quash against the writ of execution and its aliases, and a motion to stay the execution of both the first and the amended decision, anchoring their motions on the supposedly supervening finding that the lot covered by the writ of execution was foreshore land belonging to the State. The MTCC denied the respondents motion to quash, observing that the cancellation of the petitioners TCT No. T-55630 was an event that might or might not happen, and was not the supervening event that could stay the execution. The MTCC also denied their motion for reconsideration. More than a year after the writ of execution was served upon the defendants, the respondents , led by respondent Elisa M. Tortogo filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer that a TRO and a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction be issued. The RTC granted the respondents prayer for a TRO. The petitioner sought a clarificatory order, moving that the TRO be vacated due to its being effective for only twenty days and because such effectivity could neither be extended nor be made indefinite. The RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction Issue:

Whether or not the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction despite the already final and executor nature of the decision of the MTCC.

Ruling: No, the RTC did not lawfully issue the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction The respondents elevated to the Supreme Court the CA decision dated December 6, 1999 and resolution dated April 17, 2000 via a petition for certiorari. T he Court dismissed the petition on July 19, 2000, and the dismissal became final and executory because the respondents did not timely file a motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the MTCC rightly issued the writ of execution on April 5, 2000. Based on the sheriffs return of service, the writ of execution was duly served upon all the defendants . Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a final judgment must now be absolutely and unconditionally applied against the respondents. Even as their right to initiate an action in court ought to be fully respected, their commencing SCA Case No. 01-11522 in the hope of securing a favorable ruling despite their case having been already fully and finally adjudicated should not be tolerated. Their move should not frustrate the enforcement of the judgment, the fruit and the end of the suit itself. Their right as the losing parties to appeal within the prescribed period could not defeat the correlative right of the winning party to enjoy at last   the finality of the resolution of her case through execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which would be the life of the law. To frustrate the winning party’s right through dilatory schemes is to frustrate all the 54

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

efforts, time and expenditure of the courts, which thereby increases the costs of litigation. It is true that nnotwithstanding the principle of immutability of final judgments, equity still accords some recourse to a party adversely affected by a final and executory judgment, specifically, the remedy of a petition to annul the judgment based on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, or the remedy of a petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court . He may also have a competent court stay the execution or prevent the enforcement of a final judgment when facts and circumstances that render execution inequitable or unjust meanwhile transpire; or when a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief. Neither of such remaining equitable remedies is available anymore to the respondents, however, for the time for such remedies is now past. Indeed, it is now high time for the respondents to bow to the judgment, and to accept their fate under it.

PATULA vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 164457; April 11, 2012 Facts:

Petitioner was charged with estafa under an information filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City. Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of facts was had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

During its presentation of evidence, the prosecution called to the witness stand, Karen Guivencan, whom Footluckers employed as its store auditor. She submitted to Go a written report denominated as List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman Lerima Patula w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997. The Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioners various customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive. Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court. With that, petitioners counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the information. Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as evidence Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite their being private documents that were not duly authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court . Issue:

Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioner’s guilt for estafa as charged despite their not being duly authenticated.

Ruling: No, the ledgers and receipts were not admissible as evidence of petitioner’s guilt for estafa. Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a public document and a private document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence. The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d ) when the document is not being offered as genuine. There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents because private individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence against 56

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court .

PEOPLE vs. CRISTOBAL 57

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

G.R. No. 159450; March 30, 2011 Facts:

Accused was charged of the offense qualified theft. After the accused pleaded not guilty   at arraignment, the Stated presented its witnesses. When the State rested its case against the accused, her counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence, praying for the dismissal of the charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did not suffice to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis that her filing her demurrer to evidence without express leave of court as required by Section 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court  had waived her right to present evidence. The RTC rendered its decision finding and pronouncing the accused guilty of qualified. The accused appealed, but the CA affirmed her conviction, albeit modifying the penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not Cristobal waived the presentation of her evidence when she filed her "Demurrer To Evidence and Motion to Defer Evidence" without prior leave of court.

Ruling: Yes, Cristobal waived the presentation of her evidence when she filed her “Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Evidence”, without prior leave of court. Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides: xxx If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to have waived her right to present evidence because she did not obtain the express leave of court for her demurrer to evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary and knowing waiver of her right to present evidence. The RTC did not need to inquire into the voluntariness and intelligence of the waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer to evidence without first obtaining express leave of court effectively waived her right to present her evidence. The accused and her counsel should not have ignored the potentially prejudicial consequence of the filing of a demurrer to evidence without the leave of court required in Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court . They were well aware of the risk of a denial of the demurrer being high, for by demurring the accused impliedly admitted the facts adduced by the State and the proper inferences therefrom.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

PEOPLE vs. GONZALES G.R. No. 182417; April 3, 2013 Facts:

Gonzales was formally charged in the RTC with a violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165. At arraignment, Gonzales entered a plea of not guilty. During trial, the prosecution presented PO1 Dimla as sole witness. PO1 Dimla testified that before he acted as poseur buyer in the afternoon of June 13, 2013, he marked with his own initials "ED" each of the two P100.00 bills to be used as the buy-bust money, and then recorded the marked bills in the police blotter. He also testified that Gonzales handed to him a plastic sachet containing white substances, and in turn he handed the two marked P100.00 bills to Gonzales. Further, Dimla testified that after arresting Gonzales, he immediately marked the plastic sachet with his initials "ED." The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office certified that the contents the plastic sachet were 0.194 gram of shabu. For the part of the defense, Gonzales denied the accusation and attested that he was only resting in front of his house when five armed men approached and forced him inside his house and that after searching his house, they brought him to Camp General Alejo Santos. This testimony was corroborated to by her sister. The RTC convicted Gonzales of the crime charged. Gonzales appealed, to the Court of Appeals, insisting that the RTC erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the Prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Finding no error on the part of the RTC, however, the CA affirmed the conviction of Gonzales.

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove Gonzales’ guilt for violation of Section 5, Artile II of RA 9165, beyond reasonable doubt.

No, the prosecution was not able to prove Gonzales’ guilt for violation of Ruling: Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, beyond reasonable doubt. To secure a conviction of the accused charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Anent the second element, it is indispensable for the State to establish that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale and subsequently examined in the laboratory are the same dangerous drugs presented in court as evidence. The identity of the dangerous drugs is essential to proving the corpus delicti. To achieve that end, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 (IRR) define the procedures to be followed by the apprehending officers in the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs. These provisions obviously demand strict compliance, for only by such strict compliance may be eliminated the grave mischiefs of planting or substitution of 59

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

evidence and the unlawful and malicious prosecution of the weak and unwary that they are intended to prevent. Such strict compliance is also consistent with the doctrine that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused.13 "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition; Given the high concern for the due recording of the authorized movements and custody of the seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment, the presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of and recovered during the illegal sale is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.17 Without such dangerous drugs being presented as evidence, the State does not establish the corpus delicti, which, literally translated from Latin, refers to the body of the crime, or the actual commission by someone of the particular offense charged Further review of the records underscores that poseur-buyer PO1Dimla nowhere recalled in court that he and PO2 Chua had conducted the physical inventory and photographing of the shabu subject of the sale by Gonzales. In fact, in their joint affidavit of arrest ,24 PO1 Dimla and PO2 Chua did not mention any inventory and photographing. The omission can only mean that no such inventory and photographing were done by them. The omission of the inventory and photographing exposed another weakness of the evidence of guilt, considering that the inventory and photographing to be made in the presence of the accused or his representative, or within the presence of any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any elected official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory, were really significant stages of the procedures outlined by the law and its IRR.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

MALLARI vs. GSIS G.R. No. 157659; January 25, 2010 Facts:

In 1968, the petitioner obtained two loans totaling P34,000.00 from respondent GSIS. To secure the performance, he mortgaged two parcels of land registered under his and his wife Marcelina Mallari’s names. However, he paid GSIS about ten years after contracting the obligations only P10,000.00 and P20,000.00 Nearly three years later (1984), GSIS applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by reason of his failure to settle his account. He requested an updated computation of his outstanding account. He persuaded the sheriff to hold the publication of the foreclosure to await action on his pending request for final accounting (that is, taking his payments of P30,000.00 made in 1978 into account). GSIS responded to his request. It finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against him because he had meanwhile made no further payments. The petitioner sued GSIS for preliminary injunction. The RTC decided in his favor, nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale. GSIS appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC. Petitioner elevated the CA decision to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court denied his petition for review and motion for reconsideration. As a result, the CA decision became final and executory, rendering unassailable both the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale. GSIS acceded to petitioner’s request for an extension of time to vacate the properties, yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties, but instead filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Quash the Writ of Execution and Motion to Hold GSIS in Contempt of Court for painting the fence of the properties during the pendency of his said motion. To prevent the Presiding Judge of Branch 44 of the RTC from resolving the pending incidents, GSIS moved to inhibit him for alleged partiality. The case was then re-raffled to Brancg 48, whose presiding judge, on February 11, 2002, denied his motion for reconsideration. By petition for certiorari dated March 15, 2002 filed in the CA, the petitioner assailed the orders of February 11, 2002, July 30, 2001 (denying Motion to Hold in Contempt), October 21, 1999 (Grainting the Writ of execution cum writ of possession), and October 8, 1999. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition for certiorari before the CA was filed out of time.

Ruling:

Yes, the petition for certiorari was filed out of time.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 denied by the order dated February 11, 2002 was in reality and effect a prohibited second motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the orders dated October 21, 1999 and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999 could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already improper and tardy for being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed “not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution,” or, in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, “the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.” It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is considered inextendible, because the limitation has been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. PEOPLE vs. VILLAFLORES G.R. No. 184926; April 11, 2012 Facts:

Marita, a four years and eight month-old child was notice by her mother to be missing on July 2, 1999. In her desperation to find her child who remained missing the next day, Julia sought out a clairvoyant who hinted that Marita might be found only five houses away from their own. Following the clairvoyants direction, they found Maritas lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack inside the comfort room of an abandoned house about five structures away from their own house. The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovy Solidum. Both witnesses narrated that they saw Villaflores leading Maria by the hand. At noon, the three used shabu for a while, but the witnesses did not see Marita in the vicinity of Villaflores’ house. It was only on 3:00PM that they heard cries of a child. At about 7:00PM both witnesses saw Villaflores carrying a yellow sack which appears heavy, the same sack that they saw when they were still inside Villaflores’ house. The wife of the accused also gave a supporting testimony that on the night of July 2, 1999 she saw his husband place some sack sunder their house and then went closer and saw a protruding elbow i ns id e t he sa ck , w he n s he c o n f r o n t e d h i s h u s b a n d w h o w a s o n d r u g s , Villaflores said it was nothing. The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the RTC the information charging Villaflores with rape with homicide. The RTC convicted Villaflores, holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Issue:

Whether or not the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide was established beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence.

Ruling: Yes, the guilt of Villaflores for rape with hokmicide was established beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an 62

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. To be clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting a felon free Section 4, Rule 133, of the  Rules of Court specifies when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, viz : (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5) In resolving to convict Villaflores, several circumstances, which when appreciated together and not piece by piece, were seen as strands which create a pattern when interwoven, and formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with homicide. Firstly, the witnesses saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand leading the child through the alley going towards the direction of his house econdly, Marita went missing after that and remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless body on the following day. Thirdly, Solidum passed by Villaflores house and heard the crying and moaning of a child coming from inside. Fourthly, Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his house carrying a yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and going towards the abandoned house where the childs lifeless body was later found. Fifthly , the father of Marita, identified the yellow sack as the same yellow sack that covered the head of his daughter at the time he discovered her body. Manito also mentioned that a blue sack covered her body. Sixthly ,  a hidden pathway existed between the abandoned house where Marita’s body was found and Villaflores house, because his house had a rear exit that enabled access to the abandoned house without having to pass any other houses. Seventhly ,  several pieces of evidence recovered from the abandoned house, like the white rope around the victims neck and the yellow sack, were traced to Villaflores. Eighthly , the medico-legal findings showed that Marita had died from asphyxiation by strangulation, which cause of death was consistent with the ligature marks on her neck and the multiple injuries including abrasions, hematomas, contusions and punctured wounds. Ninthly, Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh blood from her genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body tested positive for spermatozoa. And, tenthly , the body of Marita was already in the second stage of flaccidity at the time of the autopsy of her cadaver, indicating that such stage of flaccidity confirmed that she had been dead for more than 24 hours. These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality has brought a moral certainty of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

PEOPLE vs. PO2 VALDEZ G.R. No. 175602; January 18, 2012 Facts:

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in the RTC with three counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson. On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella) was at the canteen, preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the evening. Estrella’s son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen and managed the betting station. At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella’s other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrella’s family and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the party. At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle in front of the  jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was then attending to customers who were buying  jai alai  tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not heed his mother’s warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants threaten Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin na kita?” Moises replied “huwag.” Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a burger machine.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime. The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua  for each count of murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions. Accused, assails, in the appeal they filed before the Supreme Court, the credibility of the State’s witnesses by pointing to inconsistencies and weaknesses in their testimonies; challenges the finding of conspiracy between the accused; and contends that the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently established the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Ruling: No, the prosecution circumstances of treachery.

did

not

sufficiently

establish

the

qualifying

Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself. For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. The averments of the information to the effect that the two accused “with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx “assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims by 65

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

then and there shooting them with a gun, hitting them on various parts of their bodies which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths”  did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not  per se  treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery   constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the information.

PEOPLE vs. TAPERE G.R. No. 178065; February 20, 2013

Facts:

At around 7:30 p.m. on September 2, 2002, elements of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) arrested Tapere for selling shabu to a poseur buyer during a buy-bust operation conducted against him in Purok San Antonio, Iligan City. Prior to the buy-bust operation, Tapere was already included in the PDEA’s drug watch list as a drug pusher based on the frequent complaints made against him by residents of Purok San Antonio, Iligan City. It appears that SPO2 Diosdado Cabahug of the PDEA, a neighbor, had warned Tapere to stop his illegal activities, but he apparently ignored the warning and continued to sell shabu in that locality. Such continuing activity on the part of Tapere was the subject of the report of PDEA informant Gabriel Salgado. An entrapment was executed in order to arrest Tapere in the act of selling shabu while vending lanzones along side Tipanoy. Accused alleged that he was just asked by Salgado to buy the shabu where disobeying him is not an option for him. He further alleged that the way he was arrested was by instigation which is absolutory in nature entitling him to acquittal.

Issue:

Whether or not Tapere’s arrest resulted from a legitimate entrapment.

Ruling:

Yes, Tapere’s arrest resulted from a legitimate en trapment.

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Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to commit a crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not be committed. Hence, it is exempting by reason of public policy; otherwise, the peace officer would be a coprincipal. It follows that the person instigating must not be a private person, because he will be liable as a principal by inducement. On the other hand, entrapment signifies the ways and means devised by a peace officer to entrap or apprehend a person who has committed a crime. With or without the entrapment, the crime has been committed already. Hence, entrapment is not mitigating. Although entrapment is sanctioned by law, instigation is not. The difference between the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent – in entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal, but in instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests it to the accused, who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. Tapere was caught in flagrante delicto committing the illegal sale of shabu during the buy-bust operation. In that operation, Salgado offered to buy from him a definite quantity of shabu for P100.00. Even if, as he claims, he was unaware that Salgado was then working as an undercover agent for the PDEA, he had no justification for accepting the offer of Salgado to buy the shabu. His explanation that he could not have refused Salgado's offer to buy for fear of displeasing the latter was implausible. He did not show how Salgado could have influenced him at all into doing something so blatantly illegal. What is clear to us, therefore, is that the decision to peddle the shabu emanated from his own mind, such that he did not need much prodding from Salgado or anyone else to engage in the sale of the shabu; hence, he was not incited, induced, instigated or lured into committing an offense that he did not have the intention of committing.

PEOPLE vs. SALAFRANCA G.R. No. 173476; February 22, 2012 Facts:

Johnny Bolanon (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca (Salafranca) on the night of July 31, 1993, after the said incident, the assailant ran away. Bolanon still being able to walk, went to his uncle, Rodolfo B. Estaño to seek help. After having known of the incident, Estaño then brought Bolanon to PGH. On their way to the hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon confided to Estaño about the incident and told him that it was Salafranca who stabbed him and a certain Augusto Mendoza witnessed the said incident. At around 2:30am, despite receiving medical attention, Bolanon succumbed to death.

Issue:

Whether or not the utterance made by Balanon can be considered a dying declaration.

Ruling: Yes, the utterance made by Balanon is not only considered as a dying declaration but also as part of the res gestae.

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The statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking incident borel all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae, either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. All the requisites were met. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathin. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statgements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Here, the requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e. his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital; and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator. The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which are the undersigned’s incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act. In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances 68

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

PEOPLE vs. TAGUIBUYA G.R. No. 180497 Facts:

The accused was charged with two counts of rape and a violation of Republic Act No. 7610, committed against his own minor daughter. The RTC accorded credence to the testimony of the minor victim and found the accused guilty of two counts of qualified rape due to the minority of the victim at the time of the commission of the rapes and because he had admitted being her father. The RTC acquitted him of the violation of Republic Act No. 7610 on the ground that the information did not allege that the victim had been been a child below eighteen years of age but over twelve years. Consequently the accused was ordered to pay seventy five thousand and fifty thousand pesos in each case as civil indemnity and by way of moral damages, respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC but it however reduced the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the two (2) counts of consummated rape and ordered the accused to indemnify the victim for each of the two counts of consummated rape the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals ordered the correct civil indemnities for the two counts of rape.

Ruling: No, the Court of Appeald did not order the correct civil indemnities for the two counts of rape.

Civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages, which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of its discretion. In contrast, moral damages are granted to the victim in rape in such amount as the court shall deem just and reasonable without the necessity of pleading or proof. Indeed, the fact that the victim suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings that constituted the bases for moral damages is too obvious to still require the recital of such sufferings by the victim at the trial; the trial court itself assumes and acknowledges her agony as a gauge of her credibility. To expect and to require her to still provide the proof of her pains and sufferings is to demand that she render a very superfluous testimonial charade. Exemplary damages, which are intended to serve as deterrents to serious wrongdoings and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct, are awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The term aggravating circumstances as used by the Civil Code should be understood in its broad or generic sense, not in the sense of prescribing a heavier punishment on the offender; hence, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance should be a distinction that was of consequence only to the criminal, as contrasted from the civil, liability, thereby entitling the offended party or victim to an award of exemplary damages regardless of whether the aggravating circumstance was ordinary or qualifying. Being the victim of two counts of qualified rape, the minor daughter, was entitled to recover for each  count of rape the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. 70

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

PEOPLE vs. TEODORO G.R. No. 175876; February 20, 2013 Facts:

Two informations, both dated March 25, 1998, charged Teodoro with statutory rape for allegedly having carnal knowledge over his eight-year-old stepdaughter, AAA, on December 18, 1997 and February 8, 1998. At his arraignment, Teodoro pleaded not guilty. Although he subsequently manifested a willingness to change the pleas to guilty , he balked when he was re-arraigned by qualifying that he had only "fingered" AAA. Accordingly, the RTC reinstated his pleas of not guilty . During the trial, AAA and her mother, BBB, testified for the Prosecution, but two years later recanted and turned hostile towards the Prosecution, now telling the RTC that Teodoro had only touched AAA’s vagina on the nights of the alleged rape. The RTC rendered its judgment convicting Teodoro on both counts of statutory rape notwithstanding the recantations by AAA and BBB. The RTC rejected AAA’s recantation of her accusation for being inconsistent with the testimony of Dr. Abrenillo showing that the redness on the edges of the protective structure of her vaginal opening had been caused by friction from the forceful introduction of an erect penis; and that such forceful introduction of an erect penis had led to the gaping of the labia minora and labia majora of AAA. On appeal, the CA sustained the RTC, and ignored AAA’s recantation for being dictated by her family’s financial difficulties. It agreed with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General to the effect that AAA’s recantation should not be considered because it came about after she had returned home from the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

Issue:

Whether or not the recantation made by AAA should be accepted by the court.

Ruling:

No, the recantation made by AAA should not be accepted by the court.

As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation of her testimony by a vital witness of the State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable, and secondly because there is always the possibility that such recantation may later be repudiated. Indeed, to disregard testimony solemnly given in court simply because the witness recants it ignores the possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations may have caused the recantation. Court proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation is required to be truthful under all circumstances, are trivialized by the recantation. The trial in which the recanted testimony was given is made a mockery, and the investigation is placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous witness. Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too willing to accept it, but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected to cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the motivations for it. The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances, including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate

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its re-examination, the reason being that the trial court is in a better position to hear first-hand and observe the deportment, conduct and attitude of the witnesses.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

PEOPLE vs. ZAKARIA G.R. No. 181042; November 26, 2012 Facts:

confidential informant went to the CALABARZON Regional Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna and informed Chief Supt. Abe Lemos that he had entered into a drug deal with alias   Danny and alias   Joana to take place at 287 Tamayo Compound on Caliraya Drive, in Taguig City. Thereafter, Chief Supt. Lemos tasked Insp. Julius Ceasar Ablang to form a team for a buy-bust operation, made up of PO2 Aninias as poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Gerry Abalos, SPO1 Miguel Lapitan, SPO1 Norman Jesus Platon, PO3 Ronald Valdez, PO3 Sherwin Bulan, and PO3 Danilo Leona as the other team members. Insp. Ablang gave a P500.00 bill to PO2 Aninias to serve as the buy-bust money. PO2 Aninias wrote his initials “LLA” on the P500.00 bill, and then placed the marked bill on the bundle of boodle money that seemingly amounted to P98,000.00. He put the boodle money in a white window envelope. PO2 Aninias, PO3 Valdez and the confidential informant surveyed the target area in order to confirm if drug activities were taking place there. PO2 Aninias observed there about ten persons going in and out of the target area. About 30 minutes later, PO2 Aninias and his companions left the target area and returned to the Regional Office to report their observations. The next day, the confidential informant contacted Danny to tell him that he had a buyer. They agreed to have the deal at the target area. Insp. Ablang prepared a pre-operation report, and coordinated with the PDEA National Office. Using a Toyota Revo and a Mitsubishi Adventure, the buy-bust team arrived at the target area. PO2 Aninias parked the Revo some 10 meters away from the target area, while the other driver parked the Adventure about 50 meters from the Revo. The confidential informant then called Danny and told him that he and the buyer were already in the vicinity, but Danny advised them to wait for the shabu to be prepared. PO2 Aninias moved the Revo closer to the target area. Not long after, Danny arrived. The confidential informant, whom Danny personally knew, motioned to Danny to get on board the Revo. Once Danny got in the Revo, the confidential informant introduced PO2 Aninias to Danny as the buyer of shabu. Danny asked PO2 Aninias about the money. PO2 Aninias showed to Danny the white window envelope containing the P500.00 bill and boodle money. Saying that the shabu was with his wife, Danny then got out of the Revo to fetch her. After nearly 15 minutes, Danny returned with a woman. The confidential informant requested the two to board the Revo. Danny introduced the woman to PO2 Aninias as his wife Joana. Danny again asked for the money. PO2 Aninias once more flashed the white window envelope to Danny and asked to see the shabu. Danny pulled three sachets containing white crystalline substance from his pocket and handed the sachets to PO2 Aninias, who turned over the white window envelope to Joana and forthwith made a missed call to PO3 Valdez. The missed call was the pre-arranged signal indicating that the transaction was consummated. As Danny was about to count the money in the envelope, PO2 Aninias drew and pointed his gun at Danny and Joana. The rest of the team, who had meanwhile rushed towards the Revo as soon as PO3 Valdez received PO2 Aninias’ missed call, quickly arrested the two suspects.

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Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor!  - GMDC06062017

2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

Issue:

Whether or not the chain of custody have been observed.

Ruling:

No, the chain of custody has not been observed.

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, “planting” or contamination of evidence.48 A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires. The records show that the buy-bust team did not observe the mandatory procedures under Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR. Although PO2 Aninias supposedly marked the confiscated shabu with his initials immediately upon seizure, he did not do so in the presence of the accused or of their representatives and any representative from the media and Department of Justice (DOJ), or any elected public official. If he had, he would have readily stated so in court. In fact, both PO2 Aninias and PO3 Valdez themselves revealed that no media or DOJ representative, or elected public official was present during the buy-bust operation and at the time of the recovery of the evidence at the target area. Instead, the media were only around in the PDEA regional headquarters. The certificate of inventory, although signed by a media representative and a barangay official, was nonetheless discredited by PO2 Aninias’ admission that only the confidential informant and the members of the buy-bust team were present at the time of the recovery of the sachets of shabu from Samin. Verily, although PO2 Aninias declared having personally seen the media representative and the barangay official affixing their signatures on the certificate of inventory, he gave no indication at all that the certificate had been signed in the presence of the accused or of their representative. Another serious lapse committed was that the buy-bust team did not take any photographs of the sachets of shabu upon their seizure. The photographs were intended by the law as another means to confirm the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. The last paragraph of Section 21 (a) of the IRR, supra, contains a saving proviso to the effect that “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.” But in order for the saving proviso to apply, the Prosecution must first recognize and explain the lapse or lapses in procedure committed by the arresting lawmen. That did not happen here, because the Prosecution neither recognized nor explained the lapses.

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Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor!  - GMDC06062017