Rem2 DLP Midterms Add Cases

NG WEE V. TANKIANSEE (REMEDIAL) For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor. In the instant case, petitioner's affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that respondent committed fraud. As to the participation of the respondent in the transaction, the affidavit merely states that respondent, an officer and director of Wincorp, connived with the other defendants in the civil case to defraud petitioner of his money placements. In other words, petitioner has not shown any specific act or deed to support the allegation that respondent is guilty of fraud. Considering therefore, that in this case, petitioner has not fully satisfied the legal obligation to show the specific acts constitutive of the alleged fraud committed by respondent, the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of respondent. We are not unmindful of the rule enunciated in GB Inc. v. Sanchez, that the merits of the main action are not triable in a motion to discharge an attachment, otherwise, an applicant for the dissolution could force a trial of the merits of the case on his motion. ALEJANDRO NG WEE vs TIANKANSEE 545 SCRA GR Nos. 171124 February 18, 2008 FACTS: Petitioner made several placements P210 Million with Wetsmont Invetsment Corporation a domestic entity engaged in the business of an investment house. Petitioner receieved disturbing news about WINCORP's financial condition prompting him to inquire about and investigate the company's transaction with its borrowers. He discovered that WINCORP extended a loan to POWER MERGE. This credit facility originated from another loan extended by WINCORP to HOTTICK HOLDINGS. Hottick Virata (HOTTICK's President) assumed the obligation of surety.Under the scheme of WINCORP & Virata, petitioner's money placements were transferred without his knowledge and consent to the loan account of POWER MERGE thus agreement that freed the latter from any liability. Through false representations to WINCORP and its officers , petitioner was enticed to roll over the same to Virata / POWER MERGE. Petitioner files for damges with RTC. RTC ordered issuace of a writ of attachment against the properties of the defendants. The writ was consequently issued on Nov. 6, 2000.

Respondent moved for the discharge of the writ of attachment arguing that attachment was improperly issued and the bond furnished was inssuficient . RTC denied all the motions. On September 14, 2005 , the appellate court rendered the assailed decision reversing and setting aside the aforementioned orders of RTC and lifting the November 6, 2000 Writ of preliminary Attachment to the extent that it concerned the respondent's properties. Petitoner moved for reconsideration of the said ruling , but CA denied the same on its January 6, 2006. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appelas committed serious legal error in resolving favorably the grounds alleged by the respondent in his petition and lifting the writ of preliminary attachment ? HELD: No.A writ of attachment can only be granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averment quoting prefunctorily the words of the rules. Connivance cannot also be based on mere association but must be particularly alleged and established as a fact. Respondent further contends that the trial court in resolving the Motion to dsicharge Attachment , need not actually delve into thye merits of the case.The applicant must be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditors. Petitioner's affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that the respondent committed fraud or how he connived with the otehr defendant to commit fraud in the transaction sued upon. In application of writ under the same ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about what constituted the fraud and how it was prepetrated becuase established rule that fruad can never be presumed. Let it be stressd that the provisional remedy of wit of preliminary attachment is harsh and rigoruous for it exposed the debtor to humiliation and annoyance. The rule overning its issuance are, therefore strictly construed against the applicant, such that if the requisited for its grant are not shown to be all present , the court shall refrain from issuing it, for otherwise the court which issues its acs in excess of jurisdiction. Likwise should not be abuse to cause unncessary prejudice. If is wrongfully issued on the basis of false or inufficient allegations , it should at once be corrected.

Wherefore, premises considered the petition is denied . The September 14, 2005 decision and January 6, 2006 Resolution of the CA are affirmed.

Luzon Dev. Bank vs Krishman Party Seeking A Stay Of The Attachment Under Section 5 Rule 57 Is Required To Deposit An “Amount” Of Money Or Cash Equal To The Attachment Bond, “Amount” Being A Term Plainly Associated With Money… The Facts: Erlinda in her Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages against petitioners Luzon Development Bank, Tomas Clemente Jr., and Oscar Ramirez alleged that she is a client of the bank and maintained several deposits including time deposits. When she presented her Certificates of Time Deposits for payment because they have become due, the petitioners refused to honor it for the reason they were fraudulent. She likewise applied for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment which the trial court granted. Thus, the petitioner bank’s accounts in BPI ( P28,597,472.70 ) and Central Bank (P49,000,000.00) were garnished. The petitioners then filed an urgent Motion To Recall Quash And/Or Lift Attachment or Garnishment, which the respondent opposed. They filed on March 9, 2001 an urgent motion to substitute their garnished accounts with government securities. Again respondent opposed the motion. The RTC then required the petitioners to justify their motion to discharge. On September 8, 2003, the RTC lifted the garnishment; Erlinda moved to reconsider and for the judge to inhibit. The judge denied the motion for reconsideration but granted the motion for inhibition. Erlinda then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals thru a petition for certiorari, which the appellate court granted. It directed the petitioners to file a counter bond in accordance with Sec. 12 Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure within 10 days from finality of the decision otherwise, the RTC shall immediately reinstate the writ of attachment previously issued. Since their appeal to the Supreme Court was denied, the case was remanded to the RTC which required Erlinda to post a new attachment bond in the amount of P35,000,000.00, and for petitioners to file a counter bond within 10 days from notice of the filing and approval of Erlinda’s bond. Erlinda filed her attachment bond on June 25, 2009, and the same was approved by the RTC on July 7, 2009. Petitioners then filed an Omnibus Motion to determine the sufficiency of the bond and for them to be allowed to deposit Certificates of Titles of real property, and that the issuance of the writ of attachment be held in abeyance. The RTC denied the motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration; petitioners assailed the denial of their motions thru a petition for certiorari with the CA, which also denied them. Thus, they appealed to the Supreme Court. The Issue: Whether or not real property may be posted, in lieu of cash or counter bond, to secure any continent lien on the petitioners’ property, since Section 2 of Rule 57 only mentions “deposit”, thus it cannot be confined or construed to refer to cash. The Ruling:

We rule in the negative. Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that “[a]n order of attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand or the value of the property to be attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs.”

Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that “[t]he sheriff enforcing the writ shall without delay and with all reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, only so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to be attached, exclusive of costs.” From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds that petitioner’s argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead of depositing cash or filing a counter-bond to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is unmeritorious. In fact, in Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-Infante,1 we held that one of the ways to secure the discharge of an attachment is for the party whose property has been attached or a person appearing on his behalf, to post a counterbond or make the requisite cash deposit in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment.2 Apropos, the trial court aptly ruled that while it is true that the word deposit cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash, a broader interpretation thereof is not justified in the present case for the reason that a party seeking a stay of the attachment under Section 5 is required to make a deposit in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to be attached. The proximate relation of the word “deposit” and “amount” is unmistakable in Section 5 of Rule 57. Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely concluded that Section 5 requires the deposit of money as the word “amount” commonly refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of money. In Alcazar v. Arante,3 we held that in construing words and phrases used in a statute, the general rule is that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning. The words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious signification, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. Words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptation.4 Thus, petitioners should not give a special or technical interpretation to a word which is otherwise construed in its ordinary sense by the law and broaden the signification of the term “deposit” to include that of real properties. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition isDENIED. The Decision dated March 27, 2012 and Resolution dated September 11, 2012 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Evelina G. Chavez, et al. vs.Court of Appeals and Atty. Fidela Y. Vargas, G.R. No. 174356, January 20, 2010. Receivership. In any event, we hold that the CA erred in granting receivership over the property in dispute in this case. For one thing, a petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the prevention of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy is not receivership. Here Fidela’s main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the land’s produce. She does not claim that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela claim that the land has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and preservation. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations, Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she has not. Indeed, in none of the other cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has that remedy been granted her. Besides, the RTC dismissed

Fidela’s action for lack of jurisdiction over the case, holding that the issues it raised properly belong to the DARAB. The case before the CA is but an offshoot of that RTC case. Given that the RTC has found that it had no jurisdiction over the case, it would seem more prudent for the CA to first provisionally determine that the RTC had jurisdiction before granting receivership which is but an incident of the main action. Evelina G. Chavez, et al. vs.Court of Appeals and Atty. Fidela Y. Vargas, G.R. No. 174356, January 20, 2010. EVELINA CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ -DELES vs. CA and ATTY. FIDELA VARGAS 610 SCRA GR. no. 174356 FACTS: Respondent Vargas is the owner of a coconut lad and rice fields in Sorsgon. Chavez had been staying on a remote portion of the land wiht her family , plating coconut and supervising he harvest there. The parties agreed to divid ethe gorss sales of all the prpducts between themselves. Since Vargas was busy with her law practice , Chavez took to hold in turst Vargas half of the profits. However Chavez failed to remit Vargas her shares. Despite demands to turn ove rthe administration of the property to Vargas, petitioner failed o do so. Vargas filed for recovery of possession with prayer for immediate appointment receiver. Chavez claimed that the TC has no jurisdiction since it was an agrarian dispute.Th CA granted Vargas' motion for appoinment of a receiver of the land noting that there need to preserve the property and its fruits. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in granting the receivership . HELD: Yes. For one thing, a petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the prevention of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy is not receivership. Here Fidela’s main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the land’s produce. She does not claim that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela claim that the land has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and preservation. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations, 7 Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she has not. Indeed, in none of the other cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has that remedy been granted her. 8 Besides, the RTC dismissed Fidela’s action for lack of jurisdiction over the case, holding that the issues it raised properly belong to the DARAB. The case before the CA is but an offshoot of that RTC case. Given that the RTC has found that it had no jurisdiction over the case, it would seem more prudent for the CA to first provisionally determine that the RTC had jurisdiction before granting receivership which is but an incident of the main action. Receivership is not action but an auxilliary remedy, a mere inicdient of the suit to help

achive its purpose. She does not claim that the land or its productive capacity would disppear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver or that the land has been injured , necessating its protection and preservation. The Court granted the petition. The receivership is lifted. G.R. No. 201043

June 16, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), Petitioner, vs.DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent. The Court Recognizes The Importance Of Granting Support To Minor Children, Provided That The Filiation Of The Child Is Proven… III Republic v. Yahon is an analogous case because it involved the grant of support to the spouse of a retired member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In Republic v. Yahon, Daisy R. Yahon filed a Petition for the Issuance of Protection Order under Republic Act No. 9262.7 She alleged that she did not have any source of income because her husband made her resign from her job.8 The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, a portion of which stated: To insure that petitioner [Daisy R. Yahon] can receive a fair share of respondent’s retirement and other benefits, the following agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension [,] and other benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders from the court: 1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; 2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; 6

The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City. 9 (Emphasis in the original) The trial court subsequently granted Daisy’s Petition and issued a permanent protection order 10 and held: Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007, respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and other claims that may be due or released to him from the government and the said share of petitioner shall be automatically deducted from respondent’s benefits and claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon. 3.

Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer of Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City for their guidance and strict compliance.11 In that case, the AFP Finance Center filed before the trial court a Manifestation and Motion stating that “it was making a limited and special appearance”12 and argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Hence, the Armed Forces of the Philippines is not bound by the trial court’s ruling. 13

The Armed Forces of the Philippines also cited Pacific Products, where this Court ruled that: A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of

garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.14 (Citations omitted) This Court in Republic v. Yahon denied the Petition and discussed that because Republic Act No. 9262 is the later enactment, its provisions should prevail,15thus: We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule above stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman “[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary“16 (Emphasis in the original) The Case Daisy married Sgt. Charles, a soldier in 2003. Sgt. Charles retired from military service in 2006. In 2006, Daisy filed a petition for temporary protection order before the RTC against Charles, alleging physical abuse by Charles. The RTc, in its order granting the petition for temporary petition order, mandated Charles’ employer, the AFP Finance Center, to set aside to withhold the salary and retirement benefits of Charles to insure a fair share of spousal support to Daisy. Because of continued violation of the TPO by Charles, the TPO became permanent. The RTC directed the AFP Finance Center to withhold 50 per cent of the retirement benefits of Charles and give it to Daisy. The AFP Finance Center thereafter filed its special appearance before the RTC. It argued that it is a stranger to the TPO between Daisy and Charles, hence, execution could not issue against it as no proper service of summons was served to it. The RTC denied the motion of the AFP. According to the RTC, the order had long become final and executory. The AFP then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Daisy on the other hand filed her comment and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stop the AFP from releasing the pension checks to Charles. The Court of appeals denied the petition for certiorari filed by the AFP and granted the prayer for writ of preliminary injunction by Daisy. In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the AFP Finance Center argued that they cannot be compelled to release half of the proceeds to Daisy due to the following laws: 1.) Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638, which states: Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.), and

2.) R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the “Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997,” which reads: SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien — x x x xxxx The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.” Morevoer, the AFP argues, the AFP cannot be forced to segregate the pension benefits of Charles as they still remain public funds. The Supreme Court: “It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will. We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman “[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary.” xxx “Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term “employer,” which includes in its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or government. It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement legislation. In the United States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act allow garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As these provisions were designed “to avoid sovereign immunity problems” and provide that “moneys payable by the Government to any individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings,” the law is clearly intended to “create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession.” This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon[ the issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the

implementation of a protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice against women. We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law, viz: The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party. Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address one form of violence committed against women – economic abuse. D. “Economic abuse” refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following: 1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code; 2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common; 3. Destroying household property; 4. Controlling the victims’ own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties. The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who are victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats to their personal safety and security. “The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.”

G.R. No. 193707. December 10, 2014. * NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minorchild RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, respondent. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Hierarchy of Courts; Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 674 SCRA 320(2012), lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court maybe brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court (SC) withoutviolating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts .·At the outset, let it beemphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petitiondespite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the SupremeCourt, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation , 674 SCRA 320 (2012), which lays downthe instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought onappeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrineof hierarchy of courts Foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien. ISSUE: Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law? RULING: Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto. Petitioner: First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia Respondent: The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, The Honor Committee of 2014 of the PMA and HC members, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) Ponente: Peralta, J. Date: February 24, 2014

Facts: Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the Philippine Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy Cadet graduate and be commissioned as an ensign of the Navy. Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for two minutes in his ENG 412 class, other cadets were also reported late for 5 minutes. The DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers and were logged and transmitted to the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation. Cudia incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per violation of the Honor Code. Lying that is giving statements that perverts the truth in his written appeal stating that his 4 th period class ended at 3:00 that made him late for the succeeding class. Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC constituted a team to conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it recommended the case be formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty verdict and upon the order of the Chairman, the HC reconvened in the chambers, after, the Presiding Officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict. The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted a formal review and checking of findings. Special orders were issued placing Cudia on indefinite leave of absence and pending approval of separation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting his re-instatement. The matter was referred to Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision. Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings of the CRAB. CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding probable cause for Human Rights Violations. Issue: 1. Whether utter disregard or not of his theright PMA to committed due process grave and abuse in holding of discretion that he in violated dismissing the Honor Cudia Code in through lying 2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs Ruling: 1. No. The determination of whether PMA of cadet rights to due process, education, and property should be placed in thethe context the has Honor Code. All the administrative remedies were exhausted. A student of a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interest for the proper functioning of the institution. The PMA may impose disciplinary measures and punishments as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the institution. PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of the internal rules and regulations. 2. Yes. the Constitution. The court is The part court’s of themandate checks-and-balance (according tomachinery Section 1,mandated Article 8) is byexpanded Article VIIIthat of the duty of the courts is not only to “settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. No one is above the law, including the military, especially in violations of Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Dispositive: The petition is denied. The dismissal of Cudia from PMA is affirmed Cudia filed a petition forcertiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the court should avoid interfering with military matters. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper. 2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings. HELD: I. Mandamus is not proper Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA should be compelled to reinstate him as well as to give him his supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts, even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of restoring Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Further, such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is within PMA’s academic freedom as an educational institution – and such performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts. Certiorari is allowed The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and its responsible officers acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual controversies and to determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule. Ardiente v Provincial Sheriff GR 148448 (August 17, 2004) Sps. Ardiente obtained a loan in the amount of P100K from thePeninsula Development Bank (PDB) to be amortized in six (6)years on account of which they executed a PN. To secure the loan,the Ardientes executed in favor of PDB a REM over a parcel of landat Mabutag, Quezon and three (3) parcels of land at Guinayangan,Quezon. Out of the proceeds of the loan, the Ardientes purchased aminibus costing P81K. The minibus met an accident and as a result of which, it sustainedheavy damages and rendered the Ardientes unable to pay theirloan. They later on were granted by PDB an addtl loan of P43K. After several demands for the payment of their obligation to thebank, the Ardientes failed to settle the same. PDB then extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and the parcels ofland were sold at a public auction to the bank, which was thehighest bidder.

The bank later notified the Ardientes that they had one (1) year toredeem the property. Two days before expiration of the period toredeem, the sps filed before the RTC a complaint against the bank,sheriff and the RD for Annulment of Auction Sale with PI andDamages. They capitalized on the alleged lack of notice to them ofthe Òjudicial foreclosure auction saleÓ. The defendants maintained that there was notice, coupled with apublication of Notice of Public Auction Sale in a newspaper of gencirculation supported by publishersÕ affidavit attached to the recordin the office of the Provincial Sheriff. The TC, noting the absence of documentary evidence showingstrict compliance with the statutory reqs on publication of notice ofextra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, declared the foreclosure andthe sale of the mortgaged properties null and void. PDB appealed to the CA. CA reversed the decision of the trial courtafter finding the argument of the PDB tenable that the lack ofrequired notice and publication of the extrajudicial foreclosure ofmortgage was not averred in the complaint cannot be the basis ofan adverse judgment. The issue of lack of posting and publicationwas not even discussed nor even touched in the testimony ofRustico Ardiente. Moreover, lack of personal notice to themortgagors is not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. ISSUE: W/N the lack of notice to the mortgagors warrants the nullity of aforeclosure sale? NO SC: It is settled that personal notice to the mortgagor in extra-judicialforeclosure proceedings is not necessary, hence, not a ground to set asidethe foreclosure sale.Despite petitionersÕ non-allegation of lack of publication of notice offoreclosure in their Complaint, the bank pleaded in its Answer (1) "thatpetitioners were duly notified of the extrajudicial foreclosure and publicauction sale" and "there was sufficient notice and publication served to allconcerned of said public auction sale," and (2) that it and the Office of theprovincial Sheriff "fully complied with the requirements of law under Act3135, more specifically with regard to notices of the public auction as well asthe extra-judicial foreclosure in accordance with law."Unfortunately, petitioner presented no evidence before the trial court toprove the absence of publication of the notice despite the fact that PDB in its Answer, squarely pleaded as a defense the foreclosure sale and petitionerÕsreceipt of the "notice of the sale which was published in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation." That the lack of publication of the notice of foreclosurewas never raised in issue by petitioner and that it is not within the issuesframed by the parties in the trial court are then too obvious. DOCTRINE: - the issue of lack of publication of notice cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.- it is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosuresales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the noticeand the sale at least voidable. Real Estate MortgageProvision Cited:Section 2, Rule 68, Rules of Court Title:Rolando Robles. v. Fernando Yapcinco et al.Source, Date: GR No. 169568, 22 October 2014Facts :The property in litis was originally registered in the name of Fernando F. Yapcinco. InMay 4, 1944, Yapcinco constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of Jose C.Marcelo to secure the performance of his obligation. In turn, Marcelo transferred hisrights as the mortgagee to Apolinario Cruz. When Yapcinco did not pay the obligation,Apolinario Cruz brought an action for judicial forecl

osure of the mortgage in the Court ofFirst Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, and the property was sold at a public auction. ApolinarioCruz was adjudged the highest bidder in the public auction. In his favor was then issuedthe certificate of absolute sale, and he took possession of the property in due course.However, he did not register the certificate of sale; nor was a judicial confirmation of saleissued.In 1972, Apolinario Cruz donated the property to his grandchildren, which includesApolinario Bernabe. In 2000, the respondents, all heirs of the Spouses Yapcinco,instituted an action against one of the grandchildren, Apolinario Berna be and his co-vendees in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tarlac City for the annulment of TCT No.243719, document restoration, reconveyance and damages. They claimed that althoughthe property had been mortgaged, the mortgage had not been foreclo sed, judicially orextra judicially; that the property was released from the mortgage per Entry No. 32-2182in the Memorandum of Incumbrances; and that the deed of absolute sale betweenFernando Yapcinco and Bernabe, et al . was void and ineffectual because the SpousesYapcinco had already been dead as of the dat e of the sale. Issue :Whether the respondents have a valid right over the subject property. Held :NO Ruling :The registration of the sale is required only in extrajudicial foreclosure sale because the date of the registration is the reckoning point for the exercise of the right of redemption.In contrast, the registration of the sale is superfluous in judicial foreclosure because onlythe equity of redemption is granted to the mortgagor, except in mortgages with bankinginstitutions. The equity of redemption is the right of the defendant mortgagor toextinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debtwithin the 90day period after the judgment becomes final, or even after the foreclosuresale but prior to the confirmation of the sale.Consequently , the late Fernando F. Yapcinco and the respondents as his successors-in-interest were divested of their right in the property, for they did not duly exercise theequity of redemption decreed in the decision of the trial court. With Yapcinco havingthereby effectively ceased to be the owner of the property sold, the property was takenout of the mass of the assets of Yapcinco upon the expiration of the equity ofredemption.

ZACARIAS V. ANACAY (G.R. NO. 202354, SEPTEMBER 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 508, 521) IN SAID CASE THE PETITIONER ARGUED THAT UNLAWFUL DETAINER WAS THE PROPER REMEDY, CONSIDERING THAT SHE MERELY TOLERATED RESPONDENTS’ STAY IN THE PREMISES AFTER DEMAND TO VACATE WAS MADE UPON THEM. THEY HAD, IN FACT, ENTERDD ·INTO AN AGREEMENT .AND SHE WAS ONLY FORCED TO TAKE LEGAL ACTION WHEN RESPONDENTS RENEGED ON THEIR PROMISE TO VACATE THE PROPERTY AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE PERIOD AGREED UPON. THE COURT HELD THAT THE. MCTC CLEARLY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AS THE COMPLAINT DID NOT SATISFY THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF A VALID CAUSE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

Full Case Title: RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION GONZALES AND LUIS MANALANG, Petitioners, vs. BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI, Respondents. G.R. No.: G.R. No. 156995 Date: 12 January 2015 Ponente: Bersamin, J. Facts: Petitioners were co-owners for lot in question and caused a relocation and verification survey which showed that respondents had encroached on a portion of said lot. When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached portion and to surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the petitioners commenced this action for unlawful detainer. MTC dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. RTC reversed the decision of the MTC and remanded case on appeal. MTC ultimately dismissed case. Another appeal to RTC was made. RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation of encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor. The RTC then reversed the MTC’s decision. Issue (1) Can RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction conduct a relocation and verification survey of lot in question? (2) Was an action for unlawful detainer proper? Ruling: The RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de novo. In this connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Courtclearly provides: Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. xxxx The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a) Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin. (2) CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto. The MTC dismissed the action because it did not have jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal was correct. It is fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by the

complaint determine the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over the action. To be clear, unlawful detainer is an action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. However, the allegations of the petitioners’ complaint did not show that they had permitted or tolerated the occupation of the portion of their property by the respondents; or how the respondents’ entry had been effected, or how and when the dispossession by the respondents had started. All that the petitioners alleged was the respondents’ “illegal use and occupation” of the property. As such, the action was not unlawful detainer. ESPERANZA SUPAPO et al vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS et al. G.R. No. 198356 April 20,2015 Brion, J.: FACTS: The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus with the MeTC of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City, and registered under petitioners⠀™ name. The land has an assessed value of Php39,980.00. Petitioners did not reside on the lot but made sure to visit at least twice a year. During one of their visits, they saw two houses built on the lot without their knowledge and permission. They learned that respondents occupied both houses. They demanded the surrender of the lot by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a certificate to file action for failure of the parties to settle amicably. The Spouses Supapo filed a criminal case against the respondents for violating PD No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law). The trial court convicted the respondents. On appeal, the CA dismissed the case because Congress enacted R.A. No. 8368 repealing the Anti-Squatting Law. Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents’ civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The RTC granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. Respondents moved to quash it but the RTC denied their motion. They filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA granted it and ruled that with the repeal of the AntiSquatting Law, the criminal and civil liabilities of respondents were extinguished, but it also said that recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession. Thus, the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana. After filing their Answer, the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing and argued that there is another action pending between the same parties, the complaint is barred by statute of limitations, and the petitioners⠀™ cause of action is barred by prior judgment. The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari of respondents because the action has prescribed and accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision; hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction. 2. Whether or not the cause of action has prescribed. 3. Whether or not the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata. HELD: 1. YES. Under BP 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of real property is plenary. However, R.A. No. 7691 granted the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Php20,000 ot Php50,000 if the property is located in Metro Manila. Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value. It is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level. In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot located in Metro Manila is Php39,980. Thus, the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana. 2. NO. Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Even it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the other persons⠀™ occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated. 3. NO. Res judicata is not present in the case because: a. First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint was prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. The accion publiciana was filed in the name of the Spouses Supapo. b. There is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property. c. There is no identity of causes of action. The People of the

Philippines filed the case to protect governmental interests, while the spouses filed the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests. PETITION GRANTED.