[REM] Loanzon

Pointers in Remedial Law Bar Exams 2015 by Professor Victoria V. Loanzon with the assistance of Atty. Clemente L. Reyes IV and Atty. Zarah Suarez (Both admitted to the Practice of Law on April 24, 2015)

Note that some laws and cases cited may be beyond the date coverage but the principles cited therein were cited in earlier cases covered by this year’s Bar Exam Syllabus. Q. Is venue synonymous with jurisdiction? A. No. Hon. [Justice] Florenz D. Regalado differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties. (Nocum v Lucio Tan, 2005) Q. Can inanimate objects be parties in environmental cases? A. The Supreme Court invoked the newly-adopted Rules on Environmental Cases holding that since the resident mammals of Tanon Strait are represented by natural persons acting as stewards of creation, the Court may take cognizance of the case to protect the interests of the mammals. In the case, Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards cited the 1972 United States case Sierra Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton, wherein Justice William O. Douglas, dissenting to the conventional thought on legal standing, opined: “The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage, x x x. Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes. So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modem life. The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water—whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a

logger—must be able to speak for the values which the river represents and which are threatened with destruction. (Citations omitted.)” (Resident Mammals v. Reyes, 2015) Q. A filed a case for forcible entry before a first level court of Manila against B praying that the latter be ejected from a parcel of land situated at the boundary of Manila and Quezon City. B filed a motion to dismiss claiming venue was improperly laid as the larger part of the real property is situated in Quezon City. Is B correct? A. No. Section 1. of Rule 4 states that actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. It is also worth pointing out that B should not have filed a motion to dismiss based on an objection to venue as said motion is a prohibited pleading in an ejectment case under Sec. 13 Rule 70. Q. What if A filed a motion to dismiss based on the fact that resort to conciliation had not been previously resorted to? A. The motion to dismiss may be allowed as the rules allow said motion if based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and failure to comply with the conciliation requirement under Section 12, Rule 70. (Sec. 13, Rule 70 in relation to Section 12, Rule 70) Q. What are the factors to determine which court has jurisdiction? A. Nature of action and amount claim will determine jurisdiction in civil actions while nature of the offense, imposable penalty, and territorial jurisdiction will determine jurisdiction in criminal actions. In some criminal cases, you will have to consider who the accused is (ex. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over some offenses of public officers regardless of where the crime was committed) or who the victim is (where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, family Courts have jurisdiction over the criminal case, RA 8396, Sec. 5) Q. What is the rule on jurisdiction over cases involving real property? A. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts [include] "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) [outside Metro Manila or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. Q. Suppose an action for reconveyance of real property valued at P19,999.99 is filed before a Municipal Trial Court, would it be correct to ask for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter as reconveyance is incapable of pecuniary estimation? A. No. In a number of cases, the Court has held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein. (San Pedro v. Asdala, 2009) This means that the jurisdiction over the case will be determined based on the assessed value of the real property involved. *Please refer to previous question.

Q. What is the rule on jurisdiction over money claims and personal property? A. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interests, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property exceeds Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) outside Metro Manila or Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) in Metro Manila, the Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction. (Section 19 (8) of BP 129, as amended - paraphrased) Q. What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction? A. If a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. Note that the courts of law HAVE jurisdiction but will defer to administrative bodies because of their expertise. (Euro –Med Laboratory v. Province of Batangas, 2006) Q. What is the doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction? A. Once the court acquires jurisdiction by virtue of a valid complaint, that jurisdiction shall continue up to the end of the case. Intervening facts will not deprive the courts of jurisdiction. (Example: when a public officer resigns during the pendency of a case against him before the Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan should not dismiss the case because of this principle as it had already acquired jurisdiction.) Q. What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies? A. The court will defer to the administrative agency before taking cognizance of the case. Otherwise stated, a party must exhaust all remedies before administrative bodies before judicial recourse unless case falls within the exceptions. Q. What are the exceptions? A. x x x (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings (Republic v Lacap, 2007.) Q. Which cases are within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under R.A. 10660? (approved by the President on April 16, 2015. There may be a surprise question involving Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction as the Chairperson of the Bar examinations was a former Presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan. Just go over and be familiar with this provision. Note that as expressly written, the coverage of your exam limits jurisprudence up to March 31, 2015 but no such express limitation covers laws)

A. SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: “a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: “(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ’27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: “(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads: “(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; “(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; “(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; “(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent and higher; “(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; “(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. “(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; “(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; “(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and “(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. “b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a. of this section in relation to their office. “c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. “Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos (P1,000,000.00). “Subject to the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, the cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under this section shall be tried in a judicial region other than where the official holds office. “In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ’27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional

trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. “The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. “The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. “The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14A, issued in 1986. “In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. “Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.” Q. When may the Supreme Court En Banc take cognizance of a case? A. (a) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question; (b) criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty or reclusion perpetua; (c) cases raising novel questions of law; (d) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; (e) cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit;

(f) cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the dismissal of a judge, the disbarment of a lawyer, the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one year, or a fine exceeding forty thousand pesos; (g) cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement in the judiciary of a dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the lifting of a judge’s suspension or a lawyer’s suspension from the practice of law; (h) cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding Justice, or any Associate Justice of the collegial appellate court; (i) cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by a Division may be modified or reversed; (j) cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions; (k) cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained; (l) Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on businesses or affects the welfare of a community; (m) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion of at least three Members of the Division who are voting and present, are appropriate for transfer to the Court en banc; (n) Cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention; and (o) all matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of all courts and their personnel. (Sec. 3, Rule 2 A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC) Please take note of letter (n) just in case you forget any specific ground. Q. How do you determine the sufficiency of a cause of action? A. The test is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint (Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. vs. David). To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matter aliunde are not considered but the court may consider in addition to the complaint the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records (Zepeda v. China Banking Corp, 2006).

Q: Distinguish question of law from question of fact. (Ponencia of Chairperson) A. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.49 Civil Procedure. As a general rule, subject to exceptions, a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he has been misled by the representations of another must not have been misled through his own want of reasonable care and circumspection (F.A.T Kee Computer Systems, Inc. v. Online Networks International, Inc., 2011).

Q: May the Supreme Court look into or determine questions of fact? A. As a general rule, the Supreme Court may not look into the questions of facts passed to it on an appeal. However, the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the lower courts in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Q. What is forum shopping? A. “Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable decision. x x x It is expressly prohibited xxx because it trifles with and abuses court processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congest our court dockets. A willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also constitute direct contempt. (Orpiano v. Spouses Tomas (2013) Q. Atty. Santos filed a pleading before the trial court. In the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, he signed it on behalf of his client. Atty. Reyes, opposing counsel, moved to dismiss the case. As judge, will you grant the Motion to Dismiss? A. I will grant the Motion to Dismiss. The Court held in a decided case: “In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed Anderson’s Petition for Review on the ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any authority to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by later submitting an SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing of the petition, this does not automatically denote substantial compliance. It must be remembered that a defective certification is generally not curable by its subsequent correction, and while it is true that in some cases the Court considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping.” (Anderson v. Ho, 2013) Q. What would suffice as compliance to the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping? A. In any case, it is settled that the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping are not jurisdictional. Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative.

Non-compliance with the verification requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective, and is substantially complied with when signed by one who has ample knowledge of the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true ad correct. On the other hand, the certification against forum shopping is required based on the principle that a party litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora. While the certification requirement is obligatory, non-compliance or a defect in the certificate could be cured by its subsequent correction or submission under special circumstances or compelling reasons or on the ground of “substantial compliance.”(Sps. Eugene L. Lim and Constancia Lim v. CA, 2013) Note: Liberal Application of the Rule in the following instances: It is settled that with respect to the contents of the certification against forum shopping, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances, as the Court finds in the instant case. As to respondents' certification on non-forum shopping, a reading of respondents’ Verification/Certification reveals that they, in fact, certified therein that they have not commenced any similar action before any other court or tribunal and to the best of their knowledge no such other action is pending therein. The only missing statement is respondents' undertaking that if they should thereafter learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, they shall report such fact to the court. This, notwithstanding, the Court finds that there has been substantial compliance on the part of respondents. (Estel v. Diego, 2012) Q. May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a case without conducting any proceeding without violating the principle of due process? A. Yes. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action. Q: X was the Chancellor for University of Science and Technology (UST). He retired as chancellor and was subsequently hired by Aliga, the Dean for the College of Law, in the same University, to teach Law subjects as a substitute professor. Musli, the new chancellor, wrote a letter addressed to X requiring him to retire. X then filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the RTC. The case was dismissed by the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the case is an illegal dismissal complaint. X then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, prompting him to file a petition under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA granted the petition filed by X and reversed the omnibus motion dismissing the complaint directing the RTC to hear the case. The case being remanded back to the RTC, X filed an amended complaint impleading UST as a defendant. X then filed a motion for summary judgment. The RTC then granted the summary judgment ruling in favor of X and subsequently the motion for execution pending appeal. Musli, aggrieved, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari in his personal capacity.

The CA denied the petition. Musli then filed a motion for reconsideration. UST then decided to intervene. May UST intervene? (Ponencia of Chairperson) A. No. While undoubtedly, UST has a legal interest in the outcome of the case, it may not avail itself of the remedy of intervention in this particular case where Musli filed the present appeal in his personal capacity; and not on behalf of UST. Therefore, UST is not a third party in the proceedings herein. Jurisprudence describes intervention as a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. The right to intervene is not an absolute right; it may only be permitted by the court when the movant establishes facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing it. In X's Amended Complaint before the RTC, UST was already impleaded as one of the defendants in the first civil case. UST came under the jurisdiction of the RTC when it was served with summons and participated in the case. Evidently, the rights and interests of UST were duly presented before the RTC in the former Civil Case. Intervention requires that they were not impleaded in a former proceedings so as not to enable them to protect or preserve their right. (The Board of Regents of Mindanao State University v. Osop, 2012). Q. An election protest was filed by Montilla against Datu. The service of summons has been done through registered mail: this is according to their internal rules: “In cases filed before the Tribunal involving distant legislative districts and provinces, it has been its practice to serve the summons through registered mail, it being impracticable to send the same by personal service to protestee or respondents who reside in said far provinces.” Datu was unable to file his answer to counter the protest even after 43 days so HRET entered a general denial for him. When Datu learned this, he filed a motion for reconsideration to accept his answer but it was denied. May summons in HRET cases be served by registered mail? (Ponencia of Chairperson) A. The 2004 HRET Rules on summons is silent on how the summons should be served on the protestee. Significantly, Rule 80[15] of the 2004 HRET Rules provides that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies by analogy or suppletorily in so far as the latter may be applicable and not inconsistent therewith as well as with the orders, resolutions and decisions of the HRET. In view of the failure of the HRET Rules to specify the authorized modes of service of summons, resort then is necessary to Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: “SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.”

In the case at bar, the service of the summons was made through registered mail, which is not among the allowed modes of service under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. In Federico S. Sandoval II v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Aurora Rosario A. Oreta, this Court has held that in the matter of service of summons, Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to the Rules of the HRET. If in ordinary civil cases (which involve only private and proprietary interests) personal service of summons is preferred and service by registered mail is not allowed on jurisdictional and due process grounds, with more reason should election cases (which involve public interest and the will of the electorate) strictly follow the hierarchy of modes of service of summons under the Rules of Court. (Mangudadatu v. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 2008). Q. What are the elements of res judicata? (Ponencia of Chairperson) A. 1) an identity between the parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; 2) a similarity of rights asserted and relief prayed for (that is, the relief is founded on the same facts); and 3) identity in the two particulars is such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, fully adjudicate or settle the issues raised in the action under consideration (RCBC v. Hilario, 2012). Q. Under the Rules, what are the two concepts of res judicata and when can each be applied? (Ponencia of Chairperson) A. Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Section 47(b) of the said Rule and (2) conclusiveness of judgment as explained in Section 47(c) of the same Rule. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a “bar by prior judgment” would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as “conclusiveness of judgment” applies. Identity of parties is a requisite in the application of conclusiveness of judgment. So long as the parties or their privies are identical, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. For res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment to apply, identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue. For purposes of conclusiveness of judgment, identity of issues means that the right, fact, or matter in issue has previously been either “directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action”45by a competent court (Heirs of Miguel v. Heirs of Angel Miguel, 2014). Q. May a minute resolution be considered for purposes of res judicata? A. Yes. A "minute resolution may amount to a final action on the case but it is not a precedent x x x x it cannot bind non-parties to the action.” Corollary thereto, we can conclude that a minute resolution, while not a precedent relative to strangers to an action, nonetheless binds the parties therein, and calls for res judicata’s application. x x x x for purposes of the application of res

judicata, minute resolutions issued by this Court are as much precedents as promulgated decisions, hence, binding upon the parties to the action. (PNB v. LIM, 2013) Q. Valentino Development Co. moved to dismiss the case filed by Production Bank against it since the new complaint raises the same issues in a prior case which has become final and executory? As judge, will you grant the motion? A. Yes. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is binding and conclusive on the parties. The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them .(LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank, 2014) Q: What are the elements of litis pendentia? (Ponencia of Chairperson) A: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration (PND v. Gateway Property Holdings, 2012). Q. What is the Neypes Doctrine? A. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court ruled that a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration should be given to litigants (Neypes v. CA,2005) Q. Is the Neypes Doctrine applicable to criminal cases? A. Yes. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure . First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Yu v. Samson-Tatad, 2011) Q. Is the Neypes Doctrine applicable to administrative cases? A. No. The Neypes ruling applies to judicial proceedings only as the reason for such ruling also known as the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules of Court. (Panolino v. Tajala, 2010)

Q: Members of the Ibaloi Tribes of Baguio City claim that their parents inherited from their ancestors several parcels of land in the Busol Watershed Reservation. They then applied for a TRO before the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) seeking to enjoin The Baguio Cleaning Movement Inc. and others from fencing the Busol Watershed Reservation. The NCIP granted the TRO application. It also ruled that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims and dispute involving rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples, and thus may issue injunctive writs. The Baguio Cleaning Movement Inc. argued that NCIP has no jurisdiction over the case. Does RA 8975, the law which prohibits TROs against national government project cover TROs issued by NCIP? (Ponencia of Chairperson) A. No. The law provides: “Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary in junction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts: Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national government project; Bidding or awarding of cont ract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof; Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or project; Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/ project. xxx Should a judge violate the preceding section, RA 8975 provides the following penalty: Section6. Penal Sanction. — In addition to any civil and criminal liabilities he or she may incur under existing laws, any judge who shall issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in violation of Section 3 hereof, shall suffer the penalty of suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay.” It is clear from the foregoing provisions of RA. 8975 that the prohibition against government projects covers only judges, and does not apply to the NCIP or its hearing officers. In this respect, Republic Act No. 8975 conforms to the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 605and Presidential Decree No. 1818, both of which enjoin only the courts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, cannot nullify the preliminary injunction order issued by NCIP on the ground of violation of said laws (The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng, 2013).

Q: Under the foregoing facts, is Baguio Cleaning Movement, Inc. entitled to its own application of injunction against the tribes? A: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction, it was not convinced that the tribes were entitled to the relief granted by the Commission. 23 Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive recognition of the tribe’s ancestral land claim, as it merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation, but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. Since it is required before the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that claimants show the existence of a right to be protected, this Court, in G.R. No. 180206, ultimately granted the petition of the City Government of Baguio and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein. The conclusions of this Court in both the case at bar and that in G.R. No. 180206 as regards private respondents’ ancestral land claim should therefore be considered provisional, as they are based merely on the allegations in the complaint or petition and not on evidence adduced in a full-blown proceeding on the merits by the proper tribunal. The tribes are therefore not barred from proving their alleged ancestral domain claim in the appropriate proceeding, despite the denial of the temporary injunctive relief prayed for (The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng, 2013). Q. Esteban is not a party to a case which has become final and executory. He was forewarned that the sheriff is about to execute the judgment which would adversely affect his substantive right. What remedy is available to Esteban? A. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent “separate action” to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, the person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya (260 Phil. 401 [1990]) we declared that for a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently establish his right on the property. (Villasi v. Garcia 2014) Q. A. What is the nature of orders covering support pendete lite? B. May they be appealed? A. They are interlocutory in nature. The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendent lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support, and conjugal assets. (Calderon V. Baldevia v. Roxas, 2013) B. No. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in

excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner’s appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA. (Calderon V. Baldevia v. Roxas, 2013) Q. Distinguish a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 from a petition for review under Rule 43. (Ponencia of Chairperson) A. A petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a special civil action for certiorari is an extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. It is basic remedial law that the two remedies are distinct, mutually exclusive, and antithetical. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper if the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law. A petition for review, on the other hand, seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer (Dee Ping Wee v. Lee Hiong Wee, 2010). Q. If a decision is rendered with grave abuse of discretion, should there always be resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65? A. No. The general rule is that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits is appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision (Sawadjaan v. CA, 2005) Besides, the Rules expressly provide: Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. Q. Y was adjudged loser in an ejectment case. Considering that ejectment is summary proceeding, what remedy is available to Y to postpone the effectivity of the judgment? A. As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being “ministerial and imperative.” Hence, if the defendantappellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal. In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file

a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. (Acbang v. Hon. Luczon, Jr. 2014) Q. Gabby filed an unlawful detainer case against Ali and won. Ali filed a petition for relief from judgment before the same MTC that rendered the decision in the unlawful detainer case. Was Ali correct? A. No. A Petition for relief from judgment is a prohibited pleading in an ejectment case under Section 13(4) of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Q. May Ali file his petition for relief from judgment before the RTC? A. No. The RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition. Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides: “SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings. - When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.” Q. What is Ali’s remedy? What court has jurisdiction? A. The remedy is to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC. (Agdal v. Carlos, 2010) *Note that the Court treated the petition for relief from judgment before the RTC as a petition for certiorari in this case. Q. Rosario filed a suit in the Small Claims Court. The judge ruled in her favor. When can she ask for execution of the judgment? A. Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that the decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties. Q. Can Fernando, the losing party appeal the ruling of the Small Claims Court? A. No, because said decision is unappealable. To question the decision, a petition for certiorari must be filed. Considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. (A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Mondejar, 2014) Q: May the determination of heirs be made in an action for recovery of ownership of property? (Ponencia of Chairperson) A. No. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil

action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. In the case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property. However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit: “It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.” In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding (Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, 2009). Q. What is criminal jurisdiction? A. It is the power of the State to try and punish a person for a violation of its penal laws. Q. What is the rule on jurisdiciton and venue in criminal cases? A. In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional

Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides: (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. (b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival. (c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law. (d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed(the case must be filed, generally, where the crime is committed – exceptions are provided by law and the rules such as the venue of actions for libel under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code which provides multiple venues) Q. What are the requisites for a valid exercise of jurisdiction? 1. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter - the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of. 2. Jurisdiction over the Territory - the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction. 3. Jurisdiction over the Person of the Accused - the person charged with the offense must have been brought to its presence for trial, by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court. Q. What are the distinctions between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts? A. The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. Applying this analogy to [a case under BP22 or the Bouncing Checks Law], knowledge of insufficiency of funds is the ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while dishonor of the check presented within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge. (Bautista v. CA, 2001) Q. What is the relevance of such distinction? A. Every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information, matters of evidence – as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense – do not need to be alleged. Q. Does it, then, follow, that a motion for bill of particulars cannot be used by an accused to request that he be furnished with evidence? A. Yes. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters

of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of factual information included in the bill of particular. (Enrile v. People, 2015) Q. When should a motion to quash be filed instead of a bill of particulars? A. If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order. But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused cannot prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper remedy. Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct and separate remedies, the latter presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an offense. (Enrile v. People, 2015) Q. How must a conspiracy be alleged? A. A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts (People v. Quitlong) Q. What are the elements of a prejudicial question? A. (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed (Sec. 7, Rule 111). Q. Is it possible that an action before an administrative body may be the basis to suspend a criminal case due to a prejudicial question? A. Yes. The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’ submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. (San Miguel v. Perez, 2013) Q. What are the elements of double jeopardy? A. Double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment. (Ocampo v. Hon. Abando, 2014.)

Q. When is bail a matter of right and when is it discretionary? A. The general rule is x x x x that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized. As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong. On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015) Q. Who determines whether the evidence of guilt is strong? A. For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015) Q. What must the trial judge consider in granting bail in favor of an accused charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment? In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to

comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit: “In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended); 1. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,) 2. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and 3. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19) Otherwise petition should be denied.” (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015) Q. Can bail be granted based on humanitarian grounds, independent of the legal merits of the case? A. Yes. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial. Granting bail x x x on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court: x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail;47 x x x [G]ranting provisional liberty to [ill accused] will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. [The grant of bail is proper if it will aid in accused’s] adequate preparation of his defense [and], more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial. 1. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015) Q. Gerry, Ricky and Nikki were charged with violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Upon finding probable cause, the Ombudsman directed that a case be filed against the three accused. During trial, the Ombudsman wanted to grant the request for immunity sought by Gerry and Ricky so that they may testify against the mastermind of the corrupt act, Nikki. Is the power of the Ombudsman to grant immunity still subject to the provisions of the Rules of Court? A. Yes. RA 6770 provides: Sec. 17. Immunities. x x x. Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not

exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office. (Quarto v. Ombudsman, 2011) Q. What are the requirements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness? What is the effect of an order granting the discharge of an accused as a state witness? A. The requirements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are: MAD SM Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that: (ADSuMM) (a) There is Absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) The is no other Direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be Substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the Most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving Moral turpitude. Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. The effect of the discharge of an accused as a state witness is that of an acquittal under Section 18 which states: Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. — The order indicated in the preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge. Q. Where can a party question orders and resolutions of the office of the Ombudsman? A. It depends. If what the party wishes to question is an order or resolution in an administrative case, the party may appeal before the CA via Rule 43. If it involves orders and resolutions involving criminal cases such as determination of probable cause (Baviera v. Zoleta, 2006) or an order granting immunity to an accused (Quarto v. Ombudsman, 2011) and there is grave abuse of discretion, the party may question the orders or resolutions before the Supreme Court via Rule 65. Q: Can the courts interfere in the COMELEC's finding that probable cause exists? A: Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELEC’s exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. It is for the presentation of only such evidence as may engender a wellgrounded belief that an offense has been committed, and the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Q. What is the Best Evidence Rule? A. Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record Q. Mr. Cayetano is the custodian of the record of birth of Charie Mae. He executed an affidavit attesting to the truthfulness of the fact of birth of Charie Mae and he attached her duly-authenticated birth certificate of birth to his affidavit. Must Mr.Cayetano affirm his affidavit in open court? A. No. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Dimaguila v. Monteiro, 2014) Q. What is the Parol Evidence Rule? A. The Parol Evidence Rule applies to “the parties and their successors in interest.” Conversely, it has no application to a stranger to a contract. For purposes of the Parol Evidence Rule, a person who claims to be the beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour autrui in a contract (such as petitioners) may be considered a party to that contract. It has been held that a third party who avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui under a contract becomes a party to that contract. This is why under Article 1311, a beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui is required to communicate his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. Moreover, to preclude the application of Parol Evidence Rule, it must be shown that “at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.” A beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the contract. He therefore cannot claim to be a stranger to the contract and resist the application of the Parol Evidence Rule. Thus, even assuming that the alleged oral undertakings invoked by petitioners may be deemed stipulations pour autrui, still petitioners’ claim cannot prosper, because they are barred from proving them by oral evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule. (Heirs of Pacres vs. Heirs of Ygoña, 2010) Q. Does a Protection Oder issued by a Barangay Chairman have any efficacy? A. Yes. The issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical

harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.” Q. Can a trial court issue a Temporary Protection Order without hearing without violating the constitutional guarantee to due process? A. Yes. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests. (Tua v. Hon. Mangrobang, 2014) Q. What is the nature of search warrant proceedings? A. A search warrant proceeding is a special criminal and judicial process akin to a writ of discovery. It is designed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since it is at most incidental to the main criminal case, an order granting or denying a motion to quash a search warrant may be questioned only via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Q: After receiving a complaint from PLDT of the illegal activity of X Corporation of using Mabuhay card and other equipment capable of receiving and transmitting calls from the USA to the Philippines without these calls passing through the facilities of PLDT, PAOCTF filed two applications for the issuance of search warrant for Violation of Article 308 of the RPC for Theft of Telephone Services and for Violation of P.D. 401 for unauthorized installation of telephone communication. The trial court issued two search warrants for the said violations. In implementing the search warrants, the police team searched the premises of X Corporation and seized the articles specified in the search warrants. Subsequently, the prosecutor conducted a preliminary investigation and found that the officers of X Corporation were probably guilty thereof. X Corporation and its officers sought to quash the search warrants on the grounds that there was no probable cause; and that the search warrants were general warrants and were wrongly implemented. Should the trial court grant the Motion to Quash? What is probable cause? Are the search warrants in this case in the nature of general warrants? (Ponencia of Chairperson) A. The court should not grant the Motion to Quash the search warrants on the ground that there was no probable cause. Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. PLDT was able to produce pieces of evidence that, if taken together, are more than sufficient to support a finding that probable cause necessary to engender a belief that X

Corporation, et al. had probably committed the crime of Theft through illegal activities. Evidence to show probable cause to issue a search warrant must be distinguished from proof beyond reasonable doubt which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is not required. The subject search warrants are not general warrants because the items to be seized were sufficiently identified and specifically identified by stating their relation to the offenses charged which are Theft and Violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 through the conduct of illegal ISR activities. A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution. In Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, the Court explained the purpose of the aforementioned requirement for a valid search warrant, to wit: A Search Warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant - what articles they shall seize, to the end that “unreasonable searches and seizures” may not be made, - that abuses may not be committed (HPS Software and Communication v. PLDT, 2012). Q: Does the issuance of a Hold Departure Order impair one's right to travel and is the violation of the right to travel covered by the Writ of Amparo?(Ponencia of Chairperson) A. A Hold Departure Order does not automatically impair a person's right to travel. There should be proof to establish that the right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy (Reverend Father Robert Reyes v. CA, 2009). Q: May a writ of amparo or other reliefs granted by the writ be filed in another court if a criminal action has been filed or is pending? A. No. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The writ or any relief available under the writ should be filed by filing in the same court where the criminal action was pending (Reverend Father Robert Reyes v. CA, 2009). Q: Does failure to photograph or inventory the seized illegal drugs render them inadmissible as evidence against the accused? May this failure be raised as a ground for the first time on appeal? (Ponencia of Chairperson) A. Failure to photograph or inventory the confiscated illegal drugs is not fatal to the prosecution of the case against the accused. The seized items may still be admitted in evidence as long as the evidentiary value thereof is preserved. Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA9165 reads: Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.-The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the

Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] On the other hand, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165, which implements said provision, stipulates: (a)The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/ or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.” The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal (People vs. Taculod, 2013). Q. Can an action to rescind a donation be joined with an action for partition? A. As a general rule, no. An action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action. Q. Is the foregoing rule absolute? A. No. [I]f there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action. x x x It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of

action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity. (Ada v. Baylon, 2012)