Rejoinder Affidavit Liwag

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA

) ) S.c.

REJOINDER-AFFIDAVIT

I, ROLLY L. LIWAG do hereby solemnly affirm, after being duly sworn to in accordance with law submit this Rejoinder-Affidavit, as follows: 1. I have gone through the “Reply to Respondent’s Counter-Affidavit” dated 14 September, 2011 filed by complainant Mario T. Papa, and I am making this affidavit in rejoinder thereto; 2. Unless specifically admitted by me hereunder, each and every allegation made therein is denied as false; 3. I say and submit that, contrary to the averments in PARAGRAPHS 1, 2 AND 3 of the Reply, “Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-265460” and “Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-265459” are genuine titles duly issued by the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and correctly plotted by the Land Registration Authority; 4. In Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals1, the Court reiterated the hornbook principle that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an INDEFEASIBLE TITLE to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein; 5. Complainant is muddling up details by fallaciously equating the Original Certificate of Title No. 614, Decree No. 6667, GLRO Rec. No. 5975 issued by the Land Registration Commission with his purported Decree No. 6667 issued by the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province, because the PIEDAD ESTATE was registered in Original Certificate of Title No. 614 in the name of the Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act No. 496 and was placed under the administration of the Director of Lands2. 6. A simple perusal of the cited cases by Complainant in PARAGRAPH 2 in his Reply would show that they are merely obiter dicta, as such, Complainant committed an erroneous invocation of jurisprudence, since the mentioned cases have already been superseded, overruled and reversed by the Supreme Court, laying to rest all questions regarding the authenticity of the Original Certificate of Title No. 614 in Leonero et. al. v. Barba et. al.3, wherein it held: “Xxx. Firstly, Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree4 provides that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can only be altered, modified or cancelled in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. 1 2 3 4

G.R. No. 121038, July 22, 1999, 311 SCRA 18. Pinlac v. CA, G.R. No. 91486, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 635. G.R. No. 159788 : December 23, 2009. Presidential Decree No. 1529. Page 1 of 5

In Foster-Gallego v. Galang5, the Court held that the issue of whether a title was procured by falsification or fraud should be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose, Xxx. Secondly, as early as 2001 in Pinlac v. Court of Appeals6, the Court categorically struck down the Partial Decision issued in Civil Case No. Q-35672, upon which herein petitioners base their claim that respondents' TCTs are spurious. The Court ruled that said Partial Decision was null and void. Thus, in Cañete v. Genuino Ice Company, Inc.7, the Court emphasized that: First, their initial claim that OCT 614 – of which all the other subject titles are derivatives – is null and void, has been proven wrong. As held in Pinlac and other cases, OCT 614 DID LEGALLY EXIST and was previously issued in the name of the Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496. Second, the Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of Natural Resources, which was specifically tasked to investigate the historical background of the Piedad Estate, found that as early as the period prior to the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate had already been disposed of. Third, the Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system of land registration, which means that all lots therein are titled. Xxx.” 7. I further say and submit that Complainant is misrepresenting facts in PARAGRAPH 4; the “Report” of the Task Force Titulong Malinis No. 99-0151 of the Land Registration Authority is a finding of fact after an intensive investigation conducted by an administrative agency; 8. The findings of fact of an administrative agency which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect, but finality. Such findings deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed; 9. Moreover, BENJAMIN V. FLESTADO is a public officer with designation of “Director of the Land Registration Authority,” hence, his report was undertaken in the exercise of the position, and being a public officer, enjoys the presumption of regularity in the exercise of his functions;

5 6 7

G.R. No. 130228, July 27, 2004, 435 SCRA 27. G.R. No. 91486, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 635. G.R. No. 154080, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 206. Page 2 of 5

10. While PARAGRAPH 5 is flawed for Complainant is oblivious to the fact that the Court of Appeals decision in “Republic v. RTC-Pasay City Branch 111, et. al.,” CA-G.R. SP Nos. 70014 and 104604, promulgated last December 11, 2009 has attained finality. That under the DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGMENT, the Supreme Court in Juani v. Alarcon8 has stressed the importance of said doctrine, to wit: “Xxx. [It] is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice. In fact, nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Xxx.” 11. I vehemently deny the allegations in PARAGRAPH 6, because I have never “issued” a falsified land title. The “TCT No. N-265460” and “TCT No. N-265459” are systemgenerated Certified True Copies which have been certified by the Land Registration Authority that it is a true electronic copy of the document on file in the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City; 12. Complainant has inaccurately quoted a decision of the Supreme Court, because the correct citation of the case, should have been “Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v. Atty. Ernesto H. PILLA” (and not PILIA), aside from the date of promulgation which should have been “January 24, 2001” (and not 2004); notwithstanding, the decision is obiter dictum, since the case of Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. dealt primarily with the forgery of the signatures appearing on the Special Power of Attorney; 13. While the docket number of “People v. Sendaydiego” was incorrectly cited by Complainant, which should have been G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 (and not G.R. No. L-332252-254); aside from the fact that the decision is obiter dictum, since the case was about malversation of falsified provincial vouchers; 14. Since I have been overindulgent with Complainant’s preposterous allegations on land ownership which has resulted in the gross deviation from his initial charge of malicious mischief; I will now revert back to the purported reason for this complaint; 15. The elements9 of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: a. That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; b. That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; and c. That the act of damaging another’s property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it. 16. The 3rd element presupposes that the offender acted due to hate, revenge or other evil motive. As such, the word "accidentally" is very crucial in determining criminal 8 9

G.R. No. 166849, September 5, 2006, 501 SCRA 135. REYES, LUIS B. THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Vol. II, 15th Edition, 2001. p. 837. Page 3 of 5

liability because under the Revised Penal Code, to be guilty of malicious mischief, the offender should have DELIBERATELY caused damage to the property of another; but in this case, Annex “D” to Annex “D-6” of Complainant’s Counter-Affidavit unmistakably and undeniably show that the concrete posts and barbed wire were not destroyed but were just lying on the ground; hence, there was no damage or destruction of property to speak of; 10

17. As held by the Supreme Court in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace, et. al., “Xxx. The necessity of the special malice for the crime of malicious mischief is contained in the requirement of Art. 327 of our Revised Penal Code, already quoted, that the offender "shall deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter", i.e., not punishable as arson. It follows that, in the very nature of things, malicious mischief can not be committed through negligence, since culpa (negligence) and malice (or deliberateness) are essentially incompatible. Xxx.” 11

18. While in U.S. v. Gerale et. al.,

“Xxx. The crime of damage to property is not determined solely by the mere act of inflicting injury upon the property of a third person, but it must be shown that the act had for its object the injury of the property merely for the sake of damaging it. Without this circumstance the essential element of the crime is lacking and the criminal intention of the culprit can not be established. Xxx.” 19. Further, if indeed the concrete posts and barbed wire were removed and uprooted; such acts were well within the lawful exercise of my rights in DEFENSE OF PROPERTY 12 which is subsumed in Paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code: “Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur; First. Unlawful aggression. Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Xxx.” 20. The acts of Complainant in erecting the concrete posts and barbed wire on the private property of my children constitute an unlawful aggression which was an illegal invasion and usurpation to the land or its possession; and that the removal and uprooting of those temporary fences was reasonable under the circumstances to protect the proprietary or possessory rights of the legitimate owners; as well as the fact that we were in peaceful possession of the parcels of land when 10 11 12

G.R. No. L-6641 July 28, 1955, 97 Phil. 342. G.R. No. 1768, February 17, 1905. Act No. 3815, as amended. Page 4 of 5

Complainant’s group clandestinely implanted the fence on the property with the intention of enclosing it permanently without our consent; 21. Complainant therefore has no cause of action against me. He has failed to discharge his burden of proving or substantiating malice, hate, or revenge in his “ComplaintAffidavit” and “Reply to Respondent’s Counter-Affidavit,” consequently, he is therefore not entitled to any relief whatsoever; 22. In view of the above facts, it is unambiguous and crystal that despite all the repeated attempts by the Complainant to falsify facts and stretch the truth, I am actually and factually the victim of harassment and extortion from the squatting syndicate led by the Complainant; 23. Undoubtedly, Mario T. Papa's complaint is UNFOUNDED and should be DISMISSED OUTRIGHT. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 9th day of October 2011 at Quezon City, Philippines.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of October 2011 at Quezon City; affiant having exhibited to me his Philippine Passport No. XX3587912 issued on 28th day of April 2009 at the Philippine Consulate General, Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

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