Re-Educating Turkey: AKP Efforts to Promote Religious Values in Turkish Schools

January 24, 2019 | Author: Center for American Progress | Category: Justice And Development Party (Turkey), Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Secularism, Hijab
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Following its dominant electoral victory on November 1, the AKP government is likely to continue it efforts to enhance t...

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Re-Educati Re -Educating ng Turkey Turkey AKP Efforts to Promote Religious Values Values in Turkish Schools By Alan Makovsky

 

December 2015

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Re-Educ Re -Educating ating Turkey Turkey AKP Efforts Effor ts to Promot Promotee Religious Values in Turkish Turkish Schools By Alan Makovsky

December 2015

Contents

1 Introduction and summary 2 Secularism vs. religious conservatism: A fulcrum of Turkish politics 5 Growth of Imam-Hatip schools  14 Religious electives in secular schools  20 Implications for the the United States States   21 Conclusion   23 Endnotes

Introduction and summary  Alhough he issue o educaion played played litle role in urkey’s urkey’s recen recen parliamenary elecions, ew areas o urkish public lie generae more hea in public discourse han educaion. Ye, he mos inense conroversies regarding educaional policies are no abou issues such as suden achievemen or eacher-suden eacher-suden raios. Raher, like so many oher conroversies in urkey�paricularly urkey�paricularly over he pas wo decades�hey are ocused on he proper role o Islam in urkish sociey. sociey. For he ruling Jusice and Developmen Pary, known by is urkish acronym  AKP,  AKP, and is de aco leader, leader, urkish urkish Presiden Recep ayyip ayyip Erdoğan, increasing boh he reach o sae-sponsored sae-sponsored parochial schools and he religious conen o curricula in radiional sae secular schools is vial v ial o achieving Erdoğan’ Erdoğan’s 1 saed vision o raising a “dindar nesil,” nesil,” or pious generaion.  Tis, in urn, serves Erdoğan’s larger goal o achieving a new urkey ha is less in une wih he radically secular values o Aaurk’s Aaurk’s republic and more consonan wih w ih he religious  values o is Otoman predecessor predecessor sae. sae. Less grandly bu jus as imporanly, he AKP considers he expansion o parochial schools, known as Imam-Haips, as he righing o a hisorical wrong: he near-evisceraion o hose schools ollowing he miliary’s 1997 inervenion in domesic poliics. Te AKP also has a poliical moive or providing significan religious conen in urkish educaion: urks who are commited o Islam, or a leas appreciaive o is role in urkish sociey, are generally more likely o voe or he AKP. o urkish seculariss, hese AKP effors o increase he religious conen o educaion are par o a broader campaign o impose religious values on sociey wih he aims o eroding urkey’s urkey’s secular srucure, loosening is ies wih he Wes, and ulimaely hreaening hreaening secular liesyles, no o menion securing he  he  AKP’s poliical poliical dominance.

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Secularism vs. religious conservatism: A fulcrum f ulcrum of Turkish Turkish politics Conroversy over he religious conen o educaion is paricularly sharp among parisans o urkey’s urkey’s wo leading paries: par ies: he conservaive and religious AKP and he srongly secularis Republican People’s Pary, known by is urkish acronym CHP. CHP. In ac, disagreemens over educaional policy were reporedly among he  he major impedimens ha conribued o he ailed negoiaions o esablish an  AKP-CHP coaliion ollowing ollowing he parliamenary elecion in June 2015.2 Te AKP-majoriy governmen, which has ruled r uled urkey urkey since lae 2002, sharpsharp ened is ocus on recasing urkey’s urkey’s educaional policy during is hird erm, rom 2011 o 2015. During his period, he AKP was buoyed by a 49.8 percen voe in he 2011 parliamenary elecions and liberaed by he poliical sidelining o an uncompromisingly secularis miliary. Tis allowed he AKP o more assiduously implemen is vision o “raising a pious generaion.” 3 Te cenerpiece o his effor was he passage o wo major educaion bills in 2012 and 2014. Te firs vasly expanded he sae-sponsored Imam-Haip Imam-Haip religious school sysem, while he second sough o ensure he dominance o religiously conservaive pro-AKP p ro-AKP personnel over urkey’s urkey’s educaional bureaucracy. bureaucracy. Many seculariss viewed hese laws, and oher similarly pro-religious measures, as evidence o gradual Islamizaion o he urkish educaional sysem. For is par, he AKP says is religion-oriened educaional educaional reorms are inended o broaden democracy; o righ pas wrongs infliced on he religious communiy; and, unapologeically, unapologeically, o pursue he vision o a pious generaion.  Wih he AKP having recapured a solid solid parliamenary majoriy in November November 1, 2015, elecions, Presiden Erdoğan’s and he AKP’s projec o expanding religious educaion and providing a more religious amosphere in schools will likely coninue. Bu even i he AKP had los he elecion, some o is religion-oriened educaional reorms�paricularly he expansion o he Imam-Haip Imam-Haip school sysem and he liberalizaion o dress codes o allow girls o cover heir heads�are now sufficienly rooed in he educaional landscape ha hey probably would no  be rolled back even by a CHP governmen. governmen. 2 Center for American Progress Progress | Re-Educating Turkey

For he Unied Saes and he Wes, i is unclear wha significance, i any, an increased ocus on religious educaion in urkey could hold. A reflexive reacion migh be ha a urkey wih more emphasis on religious educaion will produce a more religiously conscious urkey, urkey, which, in urn, is a urkey more likely o ideniy wih is Middle Easern neighbors han wih w ih is long-ime Wesern Wesern allies�all o which are overwhelmingly over whelmingly Chrisian. Tis ransiion would imply a urkey urkey ha is less likely o ac as a reliable ally. ally.4 Bu ha could be alse reasoning: More religious educaion will no necessarily make urkey urkey a more religiously conscious naion. Even i i were o have ha effec, effec , urkey urkey could sill emerge as a srongly democraic counry, which, in urn, could srenghen urkey’s ideniy and commimen o is Wesern allies.5 Te Republic o urkey has been searching or he righ blend o religion and secularism almos since is birh. On he one hand, many o is ciizens are deeply religious; on he oher, i is inimaely ied o he Wes hrough economic and securiy relaions. Te lae scholar Samuel Huningon amously called urkey a “orn counry,” sharply divided div ided beween he secular and religious componens o ur her is populace.6 Te AKP governmen’s effor o swing he social pendulum urher oward he religious side han i has been in nearly a cenury�in par hrough educaional policies�may or may no have a proound effec on urkey’s urkey’s uure ideniy, sabiliy, sabiliy, and regional poliics. Te possibiliy ha i could have a powerul effec, however, bears waching. waching. Te purpose o his repor is o review ha effor�alhough i is oo early o render a judgmen as o is effec. Educaion is likely o remain a cenral batlefield in urkey’s urkey’s poliical sruggle  beween hose who consider hemselves secular and wan wan Islam o be a sricly pri vae mater and hose hose who avor a prominen public role role or Islam. For For shorhand, his paper will w ill reer o his clash o worldviews as “secularis” versus “religious.”7 I should be kep in mind, however, ha some religious urks urks avor a minimal public role or religion and ha some secular, i.e., non-religious, urks urks are comorable  wih a larger role or religion religion in public lie. Tis repor will wil l avoid use o he erm “Islamis” as applied o he AKP and is ollowers. Te reason is ha, as undersood in mos o he Islamic world, an Islamis is an advocae or governance according o sharia, or Islamic law. law. Alhough many urkish seculariss ear Erdoğan’s and he AKP’s long-erm inenion may indeed  be a sharia-based sae, sae, he AKP has hus ar neiher advocaed advocaed or applicaion o sharia law nor made any effor o apply i. Nor has i, o his wrier’s knowledge,

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sough o promoe Islamism Islamism in he educaional sysem; he curriculum o he Imam-Haip Imam-Haip sae-sponsored parochial parochial schools, on which much o his repor is ocused, does no promoe poliical Islam, religious radicalism, or sharia as a basis or sae law�even hough individual eachers reporedly have done so a imes.8 During his final erm as prime miniser, rom 2011 o 2015, Presiden Erdoğan Erdoğan pursued a our-pronged our-pronged approach o his “pious generaion” generaion” projec: firs, expanding he sae-sponsored sae-sponsored religious school sysem; second, broadening religious educaion in secular schools; hird, enrenching religiously conservaive pro-AKP personnel in schools and in he proessional educaion bureaucracy; and ourh, providing a more conservaive culural environmen or sudens. He has made headway in all our areas�paricularly in he firs.

4 Center for American Progress Progress | Re-Educating Turkey

Growth of Imam-Hatip schools Te AKP’s mos significan educaional reorm has been he vas expansion o he Imam-Haip Imam-Haip religious school sysem. Enrollmen in Imam-Haips Imam-Haips increased nearly fifeen-old over he years o AKP governance, rom 65,000 o 932,000; he percenage o middle-school sudens in Imam-Haips increased rom zero o 10.5 percen; and he percenage o high-school sudens in Imam-Haips increased rom 2.6 percen o 12.9 percen. p ercen. Tose figures are likely li kely o increase urher. ur her. (see (see able able 1) Officially classified as vocaional schools due o heir original mission o raining religious officials, 9 Imam-Haip  Imam-Haip schools uncion in much he same way as parochial schools do in he Unied Saes, providing sudens wih an educaion ha blends secular and religious sudies.10 Sudens a hese generally gender-segregaed schools spend roughly one-quarer o one-hird o heir ime on religious subjecs, including he sudy o he Quran, he lie o Muhammad, and he Arabic language. Te remainder remainder o heir ime is spen sudying he same secular sub jecs�mah, lieraure, lieraure, hisory, hisory, and science�as heir peers in secular schools, schools, albei or ewer hours. Imam-haip Imam-haip schools are popular boh or he conservaive environmen ha hey offer and he religious curriculum, as well as or, some  would argue, he superior educaion hey provide�even provide�even in secular subjecs.11 Te main and mos significan way ha Imam-Haip Imam-Haip schools differ rom U.S.-syle parochial schools is ha he ormer are unded by he sae raher han privaely. privaely. 12 Imam-haip schools each only Sunni Islam o he Hanafi  school o law, hisorically he dominan religious legal school in urkey. Ye, he axes o all urkish ciizens�including hose o he esimaed 15 percen o 20 percen non-Sunni porion o he populaion13�suppor Imam-Haip Imam-Haip schools.14 Te mos noable o he AKP governmen’s educaional reorms�and he acion ha has done he mos o expand he Imam-Haip schools�was a law passed in March 2012, widely known as “4+4+4.”15 Te 4+4+4 legislaion made educaion educaion in 16 urkey mandaory hrough he 12h grade or he firs ime.  Previously, urkish law required only eigh years o schooling and, prior o 1997, only five years. However, he expansion o mandaory schooling drew less atenion han he expansion o ImamHaips ha he bill enabled�and ha was almos cerainly he law’s law’s primary inen.17 5 Center for American Progress Progress | Re-Educating Turkey

In urkey, urkey, he ho-buton issue o religion in educaion is someimes oddly masked by he blandness o an arihmeical equaion. When W hen a miliary-influenced civilian governmen under Prime Miniser Mesu Yilmaz passed he eigh-year eigh-year schooling requiremen in 1997, he proposal was known as 5+3, meaning five  years o primary school plus hree years o secondary secondary school, wih high school  being opional.18 Wha i acually mean was ha eigh years o sricly secular schooling would be required, necessiaing he closing o he Imam-Haip Imam-Haip junior high schools, which hen served grades six hrough eigh.19  When he AKP governmen governmen el isel isel sufficien sufficienly ly independe independen n o miliary miliary conro conroll o reverse he earlier legislaion closing Imam-Haip junior high schools, is reorm  was dubbed dubbed “4+4+4. “4+4+4.”20 Specifically, he ormula means our years each o primary, middle�now grades five hrough eigh�and high schools. An ousider migh look a he model primarily as an exension o mandaory schooling. For many urks, however, he prolonging o mandaory schooling was seen as a secondary aspec o 4+4+4; raher, hey see he 4+4+4 plan oremos as code or he re-opening o Imam-Haip Imam-Haip middle schools, he mos significan recen developmen in urkey’s ongoing ug-o-war beween secular and religious influences in educaion.21  As imporan as he subsance o he 4+4+4 reorm was�providing ready access access o more religious educaion or more urkish children�is symbolism was probably a leas as imporan as is subsance or he AKP and is supporers. Te closure o he Imam-Haip middle schools had been among he op prioriies o he miliary and is Aaurkis supporers when he ormer saged is so-called pos-modern coup o February 28, 1997, which sough o orce urkey’s urkey’s firs Islamis-oriened Islamis-oriened prime miniser, Necemetin Necemetin Erbakan, rom office. Te miliary and is supporers saw he growh o he Imam-Haip school sysem as boh sympom and cause o urkey’s urkey’s drif away rom Aaurk’s secular vision; hey viewed v iewed Erbakan, he leader o he AKP’ A KP’ss predecessor pary, he Reah, R eah, or Welare Pary, Pary, as a primary driver and beneficiary o his process. Among he 18 “February 28” demands, closure o Imam-Haip Imam-Haip junior high schools was he firs sep aken by he pos-February pos-February 28 civilian governmen ha he miliary miliar y helped o insall.22 By reversing his cenerpiece o he so-called February 28 process, he AKP governmen avenged Erbakan’s humiliaion23 and signaled decisively ha he AKP civilian governmen was now n ow running he show in urkey. urkey. In he wake o passage o 4+4+4, Presiden Erdoğan gloaed ha “[]ascis pressures have been correced hrough democracy,” underscoring ha he new law “showed once again who he rue owners o naional sovereigny are.”24

6 Center for American Progress Progress | Re-Educating Turkey

By re-opening Imam-Haip middle schools, he AKP governmen vasly expanded he number o Imam-Haip schools and he sudens ha hey educae. Aside rom he 4+4+4 legislaion, a leas our oher acors have played a role in his expansion.

1. Revived mission for Imam-Hatip schools  When he miliary-influenced miliar y-influenced civilian governmen closed Imam-H Imam-Haip aip junior high schools in 1997, i also insised ha uure admission o Imam-Haip Imam-Haip high schools  be limied o hose sudens seeking seeking o join he clergy and ha he number o admissions be limied based on likely uure employabiliy as a religious official. Imam-Haip Imam-Haip schools were o be reaed  reaed sricly as vocaional schools. Tus, he number o Imam-Haip Imam-Haip high school sudens was seadily rimmed over he nex nex  five years, rom 193,000 in he 1998–1999 school year o 65,000 in 2002–2003 school year�a decrease o nearly 70 percen. (see able 1)  Afer he AKP was eleced or he firs ime in November November 2002, i reversed ha policy, a leas inormally. 25 Imam-haip high schools once more began welcoming more sudens han could possibly enjoy uure employmen as clerics�meaning ha parens could once more enroll heir children in Imam-Haip Imam-Haip high schools simply because hey liked li ked wha Imam-Haips Imam-Haips offered: religious educaion in a conservaive environmen. Te Imam-Haip Imam-Haip high school populaion once again mushroomed rom 65,000 in he 2002–2003 school year, year, which began shorly shor ly  beore he AKP came o power; o 85,000 in he 2003–2004 school school year, he firs ull school year afer he AKP came o power; and finally o 268,000 in he 2011– 2012 school year, he final school year beginning beore passage o 4+4+4 and he re-opening o Imam-Haip Imam-Haip middle schools. All old, he Imam-Haip high school populaion increased more han our-old over he firs nine years o AKP rule. r ule.

7 Center for American Progress Progress | Re-Educating Turkey

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