Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on God's Knowledge of the Particulars Author(s): Binyamin Abrahamov Source: Oriens, Vol. 33 (1992), pp. 133-155 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1580602 Accessed: 05/04/2010 00:48 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
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FAKHR AL-DIN AL-RAZI ON GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTICULARS by
BinyaminAbrahamov Tel Aviv
Introduction Orthodox Islam teaches that God knows every existent in the temporal world, be it an event or an entity, and that this knowledgeappliesto past, present and future times. This idea is well attested in the Qur'an,1 according to which God even knows thoughts.2 Thus, nothing escapes His knowledge. As in other theological issues, the Muslim theologians did not content themselves with Qur'an verses and tried to prove God's knowledge, especially His knowledge of the particulars in a logical way. Logical proofs were needed, since the philosophers denied God's knowledge of the particulars on the ground that, e.g., His essential unity and simplicity contradict a knowledge which supposedly divides His essence. The theologians learned God's knowledge of the particulars through several arguments. They inferred it from the notion that God creates everything through His free will; God must know the objects He willed.3 They also gathered this knowledge from the perfection observed in things; only whoever knows the particulars can create such perfect, well designed and purposeful things.4 According to al-Ghazali, God's will and His knowledge of this will entail His being living, and every living being is conscious of things other than its own self, hence God knows Himself and other things.5 Al-Hilli and al-Iji deduced God's knowledge of the particulars from His power.6
sira 34, v. 2: "He knowswhatpenetratesinto the earth,and whatcomesforth fromit, what theAll-forgiving." comesdownfromheaven,andwhatgoes up to it; He is theAll-compassionate, Trans.A.J. Arberry,TheKoranInterpreted,Oxford1983.Cf. suira35, v. 11,sura6, v. 59, sOra4, v. 166. 2 sura 50, v. 16. Leaman,p. 108. 3 Bello, p. 111. MatQlib,vol. III, p. 117. 4 Matalib,vol. III, p. 164. Mawaqif,vol. VIII, p. 65. Muhammadibn al-Hasanal-Tasi, alIqtiSdftlm yata Cllaqubi l-ictiqad,Beirut1986, p. 54f. Schmidtke,p. 231. 5 Bello, p. 117. 6 Mawdqif,vol. VIII, p. 66, 1. 1 from the end - p. 67. Schmidtke,ibid.
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The philosophers, on the other hand, had different views. They were divided, as reported by al-Amidi, on this issue, into three groups: a. Those who absolutely denied God of knowledge, whether it is knowledge of Himself or of other things. b. Those who affirmed only God's knowledge of Himself. c. Those who affirmed God's knowledge of things other than Himself, but limited this knowledge to the universals.7 In al-Ghazali the first group are the Neoplatonic philosophers who held that the world necessarily emanates from God. This emanation implies depriving God of the attributes of will and knowledge, and hence of life. And whoever is not living cannot know himself. However, the Neoplatonic philosophers themselves thought that God knows Himself.8 The second view is that of the Aristotelians.9 Most of the Muslim philosophers belonged to the third group. They argued that in order to know the particulars one must have senses10and imagination which are inadmissible with regard to God."l Furthermore, on account of God's unity of essence, they assumed that God's knowledge is one12and immutable. Now, knowledge of particulars involves knowledge of changes in the particulars, and if one knows changes one's knowledge changes,13 for knowledge follows its objects. Or to put it in other words, that which is eternal, namely God, cannot be subject to change.14 Moreover, the multiplicity of the objects of knowledge causes the multiplicity of knowledge, and this is impossible where God is concerned.15 These considerations led the philosophers to the denial of God's 7 Al-Amidi, p. 76. 8 Bello, p. 111.
9 Metaphysics,XI, 9, 1074a. 10Al-Ghazali,Tahafut,vol. I, p. 276 (457). Marmura,p. 301. 1 Leaman,pp. 108f., 112f.
12 Marmura, p. 301. 13 Al-Shahrastani, p. 222. The most famousexampleof the
changein knowledgeis the eclipse of the sun. "We shallexplainthisthroughan example,namelythat the sun, for example,suffers an eclipse,after not havingbeeneclipsed,and afterwardsrecoversits light. Thereare therefore in an eclipsethreemoments:the momentwhentherewasnot yet an eclipsebut the eclipsewasexpectedin the future, the time when the eclipsewas actuallythere-its being-and thirdly,the momentthe eclipsehad ceasedbut had been. Now we have in regardto these threeconditionsa threefoldknowledge:we know first that there is not yet an eclipse,but that therewill be one; secondlythat it is now there;and thirdly,that it has beenpresentbut is no longerpresent.This threefoldknowledgeis numericallydistinguishable and differentiated,and its sequenceimpliesa changein theknowingessence,for if thisknowingessencethoughtafterthecessationof theeclipse that the eclipsewas presentas before, this wouldbe ignorance,not kowledge,and if it thought duringits presencethatit wasabsent,thisagainwouldbe ignorance,andtheone knowledgecannot take the placeof the other." Al-Ghazali,Tahafut,vol. I, p. 275 (455f.) 14 The notionof God's immutabilitycan be tracedbackat least to Plato. See e.g., Republic, II, 379-382.Againstthose who adhereto God's immutableknowledge,al-Ghazaliarguesthat whoeveracceptschangesin the eternalworldmustacceptchangesin the eternalGod. Al-Ghazali, Tahafut,vol. I, p. 281 (464). 15 Marmura, p. 301.
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knowledgeof the particularsand to the conclusionthat since the knowledge of generaand speciesdoes not implychangenor pluralityin God's knowledge, God knowsthe universals.16Ibn Sina, however,went fartherand developeda theoryaccordingto whichGod knowsthe particularsin a universalway.17Ibn Rushd had a different solution to the problem. He differentiatedbetween man's originatedknowledge and God's eternal knowledge. The former is causedby the existenceof beings, while the latteris the cause of beings.18In settingforththisnotion, IbnRushdseemsto stressthe differencebetweenthese two kindsof knowledge,but to dodgethe question:a. He does not explainthe differencebetweenGod's knowledgebefore the things are createdand after theircreation;b. In his systemeternalknowledgemay implyan eternalobject of knowledgewhich cannot be explainedin a world of originationand destruction.19 Fromthe point of view of religion,the theoryof the philosophersis irreligious, for accordingto it, God cannotknow whethera man obeys or disobeys Him, or whethera man becomesa hereticor a true believer.That is because Godcan knowonly the obedienceor the disobedience,the beliefor the unbelief in general,not as a particularbehaviourof a certainman.20 Fakhral-Din al-Razi's(d. 1209)21chapteron God's knowledgeof the particulars is presentedhere in an annotated translation. I have preferredto choosethischapterin Matflib ratherthanthe chapterin Mabahithto introduce to the readeral-Razi'sview on this question,becausethe formerdeals more fullywiththe Kalamargumentsof our issuethanthe latter.However,parallels betweenthe two workswill be pointedout in the notes. I would now like to give a short descriptionof this chapter,its framework The structureof the chaptercan be introducedthroughthe and arguments.22 following outlines: 1. The philosophers'stand that God knows neitherthe changeablethingsnorthe corporealones andtheirfirstargumentto provethis stand;2. The Mutakallimun'sanswerto the philosophers'argument:a. The argumentsof thosewho holdthat God's firstknowledgeremainsas it was;and 16 Ibid. 17 This theorywas thoroughlyexplainedby Marmura.
18 Ibn Rushd,Damima,p. 74. Bello, p. 118.Cf. Maimonides,TheGuideof thePerplexed,III, ch. 21. 19 Cf. Marmura,p. 302f. 20 Al-Ghazali,Tahafut,vol. I, pp. 277 (457), 222f. (376). 21 G.C. Anawati,EI2,vol. II, pp. 751-55.S.H. Nasr, "Fakhral-Dinal-Rzi", in A Historyof MuslimPhilosophy,ed. M.M. Sharif,Wiesbaden1963,pp. 642-656. 22 For the purposeof creatingcontinuityin the descriptionof the chapter,I do not bringthe argumentsin the order of their appearancein the chapter;for example,al-Razi'sarguments againstthe notion of the durationof God's knowledgecomes immediatelyafter this notion, whereasin the text it comeslater.
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b. The arguments of those who hold that God's knowledge changes; 3. AlR&zi's rejoinder to 2a; 4. The reaction of some later Mutakallimun to 2b; 5. The philosophers' second argument; 6. The philosophers' third argument; 7. Al-Razi's own arguments which prove God's knowledge of the particulars. According to al-Razi, the philosophers, whose hidden spokesman here is Ibn Sina, state that God does not know the particulars because of their changeability nor does he know the corporeal things. To prove their view they bring forward as an example a simple event, namely Zayd's changing his position from sitting to standing. The continuation of God's knowledge of Zayd's sitting when he is standing means God's ignorance of Zayd's standing, which is inconceivable. On the other hand, the discontinuation of this knowledge implies change in God's knowledge, which is also inconceivable with regard to God. Some Mutakallimun accept the possibility of the continuation of God's knowledge of the particulars, on the following grounds: a. Just as plurality of the objects of knowledge does not cause plurality of knowledge23, so the change of the objects of knowledge does not cause change in knowledge. God knows everything through one knowledge. Al-Razi absolutely rejects this notion, for according to him, knowledge does multiply due to the multiplicity of the objects of knowledge, whether knowledge is perceived as a form which corresponds to its objects or as a special relationship between the knower and the object of knowledge. Al-Razi's second objection to the theory of the continuation of knowledge consists in a defect occurring in the analogy which compares multiplicity of objects to multiplicity of changes: the analogy has no common principle. The view of the duration of knowledge is also based on the argument that knowledge is a quality through which the objects of knowledge are disclosed. Knowledge resembles a mirror in which forms are seen. Just as the forms change and the mirror does not, so objects of knowledge change and knowledge itself does not.24 Admitting that knowledge is a disclosure, al-Razi, however, says that this disclosure means a special relationship between the knower and the object of knowledge. The disclosure is a cause of this knowledge. Thus, when the cause disappears the effect too disappears.25 23 The premisewhich lies behindthis argumentis that one piece of knowledgecan perceive manyobjects. 24 See note 43 below.
25 In a chapterdealingwiththe real meaningof knowledgeand perception(Matalib,vol. III, pp. 103ff.), al-Razibringsforwardfour possibilitiesof definingknowledge: a. Knowledgeindicates only a special relationshipbetween the knower and the object of knowledge.This view of knowledgeis preferredby al-Rzl. b. The notion of most of the philosophersthat knowledgeis a real quality,which meansthat knowledgeis the occurrenceof the form of the objectof knowledgein the knower.This idea is totallyrejectedby al-Razi.
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The third argument, or rather assertion, which advocates the continuation of knowledge, assumes that the knowledge of a future event continues until the event occurs. This is easily refuted by al-Razi on the ground that objects of knowledge are accidents which come into being successively. Hence, the knowledge which follows its object cannot endure; one cannot know through one piece of knowledge what will occur in the next moment. Moreover, the contention that knowledge continues ignores the element of time, which is an integral part of the knowledge of every occurrence in the corporeal world. The last argument, which is put forth in defense of the duration of knowledge, considers knowledge a real quality of the knower's essence. The quality's connection to the object of knowledge is a relationship between the knowledge and its object.26 The change of the object of knowledge causes a change of relationship between the knowledge and its objects, but the essence of knowledge does not change. The relationship is thus external; it does not influence the essence of knowledge.27 Pointing at the previous arguments, in which he demonstrates that knowledge does change, al-Razi does not refute this argument directly. Four arguments are adduced in support of the view, shared by Jahm ibn Safwan, Hisham ibn al-Hakam and Abu al-Husayn al-Ba$rl, that following the change of the objects of knowledge, knowledge changes: a. There is a knowledge that something will happen tomorrow. If a man does not know that tomorrow will come, he will not know the occurrence of this event. Events are connected with time, hence ignorance of time prevents one from knowing the occurrence of an event. This proves that the knowledge that an event will occur is not the same as the knowledge of its occurrence when it occurs. b. Essences do not change. Since knowledge is an essence, it does not change. The knowledge that a thing will exist is an essence opposite to the knowledge of the thing's present existence. c. The knowledge that a thing is existent now is conditioned on its actual existence, whereas the knowledge of its future existence is not conditioned on its actual existence. Thus these two pieces of knowledge are different from each to the effect that knowledgeis a realqualityexistingin c. The viewof mostof the Mutakallimun the knower'sessenceandhavinga specialrelationshipto theobjectof knowledge.Thisrealquality is not a form identicalwith the essenceof the object of knowledge. d. Knowledgeis a realand specificqualitywhichpertainsto negation.Two groupsaresubsumed underthis definition:1. A groupof earlyMutakallimun,who saidthat knowledgemeansabsence (ornegation)of ignorance.2. Philosopherswhoadhereto theviewthatthemeaningof theintellect (= that whichperceivesthings)is somethingwhichis deprivedof matter. 26 See the precedingnote. 27 Cf. al-Ghazali,Tahafut,vol. II, p. 153.
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other; furthermore, they are contraries, because they cannot coexist. d. This argument is based on the definition of knowledge as a form which accords with its object. Now, since objects of knowledge are contraries, those things which accord with them must be contraries. This is a slightly different formulation of the previous argument. The later Mutakallimun do not accept the view that God's knowledge changes. First they say that the coming of a knowledge into being entails its having someone who brings it into being who in turn must know the act he does. Thus the bringing of a knowledge into being is dependent upon another knowledge. Such an endless chain of pieces of knowledge is inconceivable. AlRazi points out that this argument is based on the premise that the knowledge is brought into being by a person who has ability and choice. However, if knowledge is perceived as obliged by the knower's essence on the condition that the object of knowledge exists the case is different. The second argument refutes the notion of the change of knowledge through examining the substrate of its taking place. This argument scans three possibilities of the place in which knowledge occurs, namely, in God's essence, in another essence and in no substrate. All three possibilities are cancelled; hence it is proved that knowledge does not come into being. The third argument is also based on a triparitite division of which the Mutakallimun were fond. God's essence is sufficient either for the causation of knowledge (knowledge being perceived here as a quality to which reason points), or for its nullification28, or neither for one nor for the other. The first two possibilities mean continuation of knowledge and its privation respectively. In both cases change is prevented. The third possibility, according to which God's essence is sufficient neither for causation nor for rejection, implies that the causation or rejection of this quality is dependent upon something other than this essence. And that which is dependent on another thing is possible by virtue of itself, whereas God's essence is necessary by virtue of itself. The fourth argument shows a contradiction in God's knowledge of the world in case His previous knowledge of the non-existence of the world continues after the creation of the world, which entails a knowledge of its existence. This contradiction enjoins the author to examine another possibility, that is, the disappearance of the previous knowledge, which is assumed to be either eternal or temporal. Both possibilities are inconceivable. The two famous proponents of the change in God's knowledge, Jahm ibn Safwan and Hisham ibn 28 Al-Raziuses heretwo words daf andsalb, but salb seemsto me the moreappropriate,because dafC (rejection)refersto somethingwhich exists and will exist-which is not the casewhereassalb (nullificationor negation)meansto preventsomethingfrombeingexistent-which is the contraryof causation.
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al-Hakam, rejoin by distinguishing between two kinds of knowledge: a. knowledge of the essences of things; and b. knowledge of the actual things. The first knowledge is eternal, while the second is temporal. To recapitulate the course of our description until now, al-Razi begins his discussion with setting forth the philosophers' first argument, which proves that God cannot know the changeable and corporeal things. He adds to this the arguments of those Mutakallimun who advocate the continuation of God's knowledge, the arguments of those who advocate change in God's knowledge and the contra-arguments to these two kind of arguments. Now al-Razi comes to deal with the philosophers' second and third arguments. The second argument is based on a sketch of a square winged by two other squares. In the first phase the philosophers prove that the distinction between the two squares occurs in the mental existence. In the second phase it is demonstrated that the two squares have two substrates, not one. These two substrates differ from each other in state and place. Since the two squares have bodily qualities (state and place), their perceiver must be a body29, and God is not a body so that he can have the squares inhere in Him. This proof, al-Razi responds, is based on the notion, which was already refuted,30that the perception of a thing is conditioned on the presence of the object of knowledge in the knower's mind. The third argument of the philosophers can be summarized as follows: a. Knowledge is the effect of the existence of its object; b. God's essence is based on His knowledge; c. Consequently, God's essence is based on the object of knowledge, which means that His essence needs a possible thing for its existence, and hence God's essence is possible; d. Thus, the Necessary Existent by virtue of Himself must be a possible existent by virtue of itself, which is absurd. The present argument denies God's knowledge of the particulars. However, God knows the essence of things, for this knowledge takes place whether the things exist or not; it is not dependent upon their actual existence. This argument incurs al-Razi's rejoinder. He deduces from the philosophers' argument that God cannot produce an effect on another thing, for this production needs another thing. Thus, the conclusion implied is that just as this notion is inconceivable so too is the notion that God cannot know the particulars. The last part of the chapter consists of arguments adduced by al-Razi in the name of those who adhere to the view that God knows the particulars. Al-Razi has already proved God's knowledge of His acts through the perfection observed in them. Now, perfection is seen only in the particulars, therefore God knows them. Second, he shows that the element of individualization is either 29 In orderfor a thing to be a body it needsa state and a place. 30 See note 25 above, the secondnotion.
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an integral part of the essence of a thing, or a possible essence (mahiyya mumkina). Since God, according to the philosophers, knows the essences, he must know the particulars. Al-Razi also uses the philosophers' idea that the knowledge of the cause entails the knowledge of its effect in order to show that God's knowledge of His essence implies His knowledge of the individual things which are the effect of His knowledge. The premise of the third argument is that knowledge of things is a quality of praise and perfection. God is the greatest among all existents, therefore he is necessarily more entitled to be qualified by qualities of perfection. In the last argument al-Razi has recourse to man's deeds, which, in his opinion, show man's predisposition (fitra), whose evidence is more appropriate than the divisions of the Mutakallimun to be accepted as true. That people beseech God for mercy in time of distress even if they deny His knowledge of the particulars serves as proof for His knowledge of the particulars. The use of such an argument in the context of philosophical arguments seems odd even though we may regard the predisposition as a necessary knowledge. However, it is not the first time that an argument like this occurs in Kalam texts. In a chapter which treats "God's sitting Himself upon the Throne", al-AshCari, after interpreting some Qur'an verses in favor of the idea that God is on the Throne, brings as proof of God's existence in the heaven the fact that when praying all Muslims raise their hands towards the heaven.31 The contents of the arguments put forth in defense of God's knowledge of the particulars deviate from the topics dealt with in the Mutakallimun's arguments which al-Razi introduces in this chapter. Due to al-Razi's criticism of the arguments which try to prove either the changeability of God's knowledge or its continuation, he seems to regard them as inconclusive.32 Notwithstanding, most of al-Razi's own arguments do not seem definitive; they can easily be refuted. The notion that a perfect act entails knowledge of the particulars can be rejected on the ground that in nature we observe perfect acts of animals to which we cannot ascribe knowledge.33 Referring to the third argument one
31 Al-AshCari, al-Ibana'an usal al-diyana,Dar al-Tiba'aal-Muniriyya,Cairon.d., p. 32. Cf. Ibn Taymiyya,Bayan talbTsal-Jahmiyyafi ta'sis bidacihimal-kaldmiyya,ed. Muhammadibn also uses man'sfeelingin distinCAbdal-Rahmanibn Qasim,n.p., 1396H.,p. 446f. Al-AshCari guishingbetweenappropriatedmovement(harakatiktisab)and involuntarymovement(harakat Mannecessarilyknowsthe differencebetweenthesetwo kindsof movementthroughhis iq(tirar). consciousness;he knowsthat he cannotpreventinvoluntarymovements(shakingfrom palsyor movements(goshiveringfromfever)fromoccurring,whiletheoppositeis truewithappropriated ing and coming, approachingand withdrawing).B. Abrahamov,"A Re-examinationof alAshcari'sTheoryof Kasbaccordingto Kitabal-lumac",JRAS (1989),p. 211. 32 The only exceptionis the third argumentwhich refutes the notion of change in God's knowledge.Al-Raziconsidersthis argumentexcellent. 33 Matalib,vol. III, pp. 109ff.
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can ask: Does God's quality of praise necessitate knowledge of the particulars if it contradicts another quality of praise which is assigned to God, namely, incorporeality? In the second argument, al-Razi tries to prove that individualization forms a part of the essence or that it is the essence itself. Here al-Razi ignores the definition of an essence and the conditions of individualization, namely, accidents, which cannot be a part of the essence or the essence itself. In sum, these three proofs which advocate the notion that God knows the particulars appear questionable. This may explain why al-Rizi prefers at the end of the chapter to bring forth an argument rooted in man's predisposition and not in his speculative ability. This argument cannot be refuted on speculative grounds. A Discussion of God's Knowledge of the Particulars (Matalib, vol. III) (p. 151) There are some people who, on the authority of the philosophers, relate the following statement: God does not know the particulars (juz'iyyat). This statement needs consideration. That is because God's peculiar essence (dhatuhu al-makhsusa) is a fixed essence (dhat muCayyana)34and He knows this fixed essence.35 The particular has no meaning but this36, so that God can know it. Furthermore, God's essence is the cause of the First Intellect.37What clearly arises from their method is that they admit that God knows the First Intellect inasmuch as it is the First Intellect.38 Moreover, it is right to say that they deny His knowledge of the changeable things (mutaghayyirat) inasmuch as they are changeable and His knowledge of the corporeal things according to their specific and fixed measures. They (the philosophers) adduced some arguments to prove their method: a. They said: Let us assume God's knowledge that Zayd is sitting in this place, then if Zayd rises from this place His knowledge of Zayd's sitting, if it remains [as it is], will be ignorance, which is inconceivable (muhal) concerning God, and if it does not remain it will be a change, and a change regarding I.e. it does not change. 35 Cf. Nihayat,p. 215, 1. 8. Introductionp. 134. 36 Al-Raziascribesto the philosophersthe notionthatGod's essenceis a particular;henceGod knowsit andnot otherparticulars.InhisMabdhith(vol. II, p. 475f.)al-Razidividestheparticulars into four classes:a. particularswhichneitherchangenor are composedof formand matter,e.g. God and the intellects;b. particularswhichdo not changebut whicharecomposedof form and mattersuchas the celestialspheres;c. particularswhichchangebut whichare not composedof formandmatter,e.g., the accidentswhichcomeinto being,formsin the sublunaryworldandthe rationalhumansouls;d. particularswhichchangeand whichare composedof formand matter, such as the bodieswhich are generatedand corrupted.Marmura,p. 305. 37 Very probablythis refersto the theoryof Ibn Sina accordingto whichGod's act of selfknowledgenecessitatesthe FirstIntellect.Marmura,p. 305. Netton, p. 163. Bello, p. 121. 38 Cf. Mabahith,vol. II, p. 476, 11.5-6. 34
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God is inconceivable. This is the wording38a on which the philosophers depend.39 Know that the Mutakallimun were divided into two parties concerning this doubtful opinion (shubha).40 Some of them said: (p. 152) The first knowledge remains.41Some others adhered to [the notion of] change, and said: The first knowledge does not remain. As for the first party, they said: The knowledge that a thing will come into being (sa-yahduthu) is the same knowledge of its coming into being (hudath) when it comes into being, for the knowledge remains and the change takes place in the thing known (maclim). They adduced some arguments to prove the soundness of their opinion: a. God knows through one knowledge all the known things. Since the multiplicity of the objects of knowledge does not result in the multiplicity of knowledge, it is necessary that the change of the objects of knowledge will not result in the change of knowledge.42 b. Knowledge is a quality (sifa) through which the objects of knowledge are revealed as they are. For this meaning we shall cite a parable: If we assume a mirror fixed on a wall, the form of everyone who passes in front of the mirror is revealed in it. When people pass in front of this mirror, forms have not ceased to be revealed, but the mirror does not change. The change, however, occurs in the people who pass in front of it.43 If you know this, we shall say: Knowledge is a quality ready for the perception of what is present in front of it. This quality remains in its state, and the change occurs in the. objects of knowledge. c. If we assume that a person thought that Zayd would enter the house tomorrow and if we assume this thought [to remain] until he entered the city, then [through] the fixation of this thought, he thinks the entrance of Zayd to the city now; thus it is proved, through what we have mentioned, that the knowledge that a thing will exist is the same as the knowledge of its existence when it exists.44 38a The text has harf (lit. letter). 39 Cf. Mabfhith, vol. II, p. 476. 40 For the translation of this term see van Ess, ifi, index. The Mutakallimun used to indicate by this term the arguments of their adversaries. Peters, pp. 75, 364, renders this term "sophism". 41 According to al-Shahrastani this is the Muctazila's stand. Nihayat, p. 221. Al-Iji adds that most of the Ash'arites agree with it. Mawaqif, vol. VIII, p. 75, 11.4-9. Cf. Nihayat, pp. 218, 219, 1. 19. Al-Iji explains that this view is taken from the philosophers who hold that God's knowledge
doesnot takeplacein timeandhasno connectionto time.Mawaqif,ibid., p. 75,1. 10- p. 76,1. 15. 42 Cf. MabQhith,vol. II, p. 477, 11.6-7. 43 ThecomparisonbetweenGod's knowledgeand a mirrorthroughwhichthingsarerevealed seemsunconvincing,for a mirrordoes not retainthe form whichpassedin front of it, whereas God's knowledgedoes not lose the objectof knowledge. 44 Cf. Nihayat,p. 219, 11.12-18.Mawaqif,ibid., p. 75,1. 5. The basisof this argumentis the premisethat God's knowledgeis not connectedwith time. Ibid., 11.10-11.Al-Ghazali,Tahafut, p. 278 (459). Note 41 above.
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d. Knowledgeis a real qualityexistingin the knower'sessence,and the connection(taealluq)of knowledgeto its objectmeansa (p. 153)relationship(nisba) betweenthe knowledgeand its object. If the objectof knowledgechanges, the relationshipof this knowledgeto its object will changebut the essenceof the knowledgewill not. Do you not understandthat if a person(a) sits in his own placeand anotherperson(b) comesand sits beside(a), (a) is on (b)'s right side; then, if (b) rises and moves from this side to the other side, (a) is on his left side after sittingon his right side. Here a changein this relationship(betweenthe knowledgeandits object)occurswhileclear[perceptionof] senseand reasonprovesthat no changetook placein the knowledgealtogether,and that it remainsas it was.44a This is the sum of the argumentsheld by whomeversays that the first knowledgeremainsas it was. As for those who say that it is necessaryfor knowledgeto changewith the changeof its object, they adducesome argumentsto prove the soundnessof their opinion: a. If we assumethata manthoughtthatZaydwouldenterthe citytomorrow, then we supposethat this man was seatedin a darkhousewithoutdistinguishing betweennight and day and that his thoughtremainedas it had been until dawn came [and]Zayd enteredthe city, but this sittingpersondid not know that dawn had come. The thought that Zayd would enter the city tomorrow wouldnot causethis manto knowthatZaydwasenteringthe city now. [Now], if the knowledgethat a thing will exist wereidenticalto the knowledgeof the existenceof the thing when it exists, this last knowledgewould occur in the same form as the former,45and since it does not,46we know that the knowledgethat a thingwill exist is not identicalto the knowledgeof the existenceof the thing whenit exists. Indeed,if he has a piece of knowledgethat Zaydwill enterthe citytomorrowthenhe hasa secondpieceof knowledgethattomorrow had come;from thesetwo piecesof knowledgea thirdpieceof knowledgewill deriveto the effect that Zaydis enteringthe city now. This (thethird)is a new pieceof knowledgewhichderivesfrom the two precedingones and it does not infringeon the first piece of knowledge.47 (p. 154) b. The second argumentwith regardto the explanationthat the 44aBello, p. 119 at the bottom. Al-Ghazali,Tahafut,p. 277f. (458). Ibn Rushd,.)amima, of the philosophersis that the relationshipbetweenthe knowledge p. 74. The counter-argument and its object enters the knower'sessence. Al-Ghazali, Tahafut,p. 278 (459). (This scheme describesthe root of the argument:bl [a] b2). 45 I.e. it would be the same knowledge. 46 Sincethe knowledgeof what will happenis not identicalto the knowledgeof what really happened.Cf. Ibn Rushd,JpamTma, p. 73. 47 Cf. Nihayat,p. 217, 1. 18 - p. 218, 1. 2. Mawaqif,vol. VIII, p. 74. The examplegivenat the headof the paragraphis broughtforwardby al-Ijias Abu al-Husaynal-Basri'ssaying.Ibid., p. 77, 11.7-8.
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knowledgethat a thing will exist is not identicalto the knowledgeof its existence when it exists is this: It is intuitively(fi badihatal-caql)48clearthat the essences of things (haqa'iq al-ashy7')49do not change; blacknessdoes not changeinto whitenessand knowledgedoes not changeinto its opposite.If you know this, we shall say: The knowledgethat a thing will exist is an essence50 oppositeto the essence[of the knowledge]that the thingexistsnow. The proof of this is that it is impossiblefor one of them to replaceanother,for if one thoughtthat a thinghad existedbefore its existenceit wouldbe ignorance[on his part],and if one thought,whenthe thingexists, that the thinghad not existed and would exist it would [also] be ignorance[on his part]. Thus it is provedthat the essenceof each of these two piecesof knowledgeis opposite to the essenceof the other. If this is proved,we shall say: We have explained that the essences(al-mahiyyatwa'l-haqa'iq)are unchangeable.As a result,it is necessarilyimpossiblethat one of the two pieces of knowledgeshould becomeidenticalto the other,andthusit is provedthatthe knowledgethata thing will exist cannot be the same as the knowledgeof its existencewhen it exists. c. The thirdargumentis to say that it is intuitivelyclearthat a thing which is conditionedby a condition(mashratbi-shart)differs from a thingwhichis not conditionedby this condition.Moreover,a thingwhichexistsnow differs from a thing which does not exist now but will exist after that. If you know this, we shall say: The knowledgethat a thing will exist is not conditionedby the existenceof the thing now, but its condition [if it exists] opposes this knowledge.As for the knowledgethat the thing exists now, it is conditioned by the existenceof this thingnow. Therefore,one necessarilyjudgesthat each of the two pieces of knowledgediffers from one another. Furthermore,the knowledgethat a thingwill existoccursnow andwillnot remainwhenthe thing does exist. And the knowledgethat a thing does not exist does not occurnow and will exist whenthe thing does [not] exist. These two pieces of knowledge are like two opposingcontraries(al-mutanafiyaynial-mutaddadayni);hence the statementthat one of themis the sameas the other(p. 155)is like the statementthat each of two contrariesis the same as the other. This is an absurdity whichreasondoes not accept. d. Knowledgeis a formwhichaccordswith its object. Now, it is necessarily knownthat the essenceof our statement"it will happen"(sa-yahduthu)opposesthe essenceof our statement"it is now happening"(hadith,hasil). Since 48 Al-Jurjani,K. al-tacrifat,p. 44, 11. 16-20. 49 Ibid., p. 95, 11. 1-4. 50 The two terms which occur here, mahiyya and haqiqa, indicate that through which a thing is what it is (ma bihi al-shay' huwa huwa). Each of the two terms refers to a different aspect. Haqiqa refers to that through which a thing is what it is considering its actuality, and mahiyya refers to it without considering its actuality. Ibid., pp. 95, 205.
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these two essences oppose each other, the forms which accord with them necessarily oppose each other, because that which accords with the opposing thing must be opposing. And if one form of the two opposes the other it is impossible to state that one of them is the same as the other. These are clear nearly intuitive arguments considering the explanation that it is impossible for the knowledge that a thing will exist to be identical to the knowledge of its existence when it exists. Now we come to answer the arguments to which they adhered for the purpose of elucidation of their opinion.51 The answer to the first argument, which states that since knowledge does not multiply on account of the multiplicity of its objects, it does not necessarily change on account of the change of its objects, is based on two arguments: a. We do not admit that knowledge does not multiply with the multiplicity of its objects. The proof of this [runs as follows]: Knowledge is either a form which accords with its object or a specific relationship between the knower and the object of knowledge.52 The first [possibility] necessitates the multiplicity of the pieces of knowledge when the objects of knowledge multiply, since things which accord with different essences must be different. The second [possibility] necessitates the same [conclusion], for we have explained that a relationship [of one thing] to "a" (lit. to a thing ila 'I-shay') is different form [its] relationship to "b" (lit. to another). The proof of this is that it is admissible to conceive that one of these two relationships overlooks the existence of the other.53 b. let us suppose that we admit that knowledge does not necessarily multiply when its objects multiply; why then did you say that it must not change when its objects change? For this is an analogy without a common principle.54The forcible proof which we have mentioned demonstrates that knowledge necessarily changes with the change of its objects. The answer to the second wrong argument, which states that knowledge is a peculiar quality (p. 156) through which the essences of knowledge are revealed,55 is to say that we have mentioned in the book of knowledge (kitab alcilm) that there is no meaning to knowledge except for this revelation and 51
See p. 152, 1. 5ff. of the Arabictext, p. 136 of the translation. 52 Cf. Mab.hith, vol. I, p. 331. Note 25 of the introduction. 53 I.e. the two relationshipsaredifferentfromeachotherandthereforetherearetwo piecesof knowledgewhichsometimeshave no connectionwith each other. 54 Qiyasminghayrjdmi meansan analogywithouta commonprinciplewhichcorrespondsto majortermin syllogism.Horten,p. 145. For majortermsee Maimonides,Maqolafti indat almantiq,ed. and trans.into Frenchby M. Ventura,Paris 1935,ch. 6. Al-Razimeansto say that thereis no commonprinciplebetweenchangein piecesof knowledgeandtheirmultiplicityso that one can drawan analogy. 55 See p. 152, 1. 8ff. of the Arabictext, p. 136 of the introduction.
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except for this peculiar exposition.56 As for the affirmation of a quality beyond this peculiar relationship and apart from this peculiar ascription, we have mentioned in Kitdb al-Cilmthat there is no proof which demonstrates its affirmation. If this is affirmed, we shall say: Since it is proved that this peculiar relationship (i.e. the relationship between the knowledge and its object) changed, this adjudicates that the knowledge had changed. Then we say: We admit that the knowledge is something different from this peculiar relationship, but we ask (lit. say) whether this peculiar knowledge (lit. thing) necessitates a peculiar relationship to the peculiar object of knowledge or not? If it necessitates (this relationship), then it is not knowledge, for knowledge means revelation (inkishdf, tajallT),and there is no doubt that revelation is a state of relationship between the knowledge and its object. If we assume a quality which is not this very revelation and which does not necessitate this revelation, it will not be knowledge. However, if we say that this peculiar quality necessitates this peculiar relationship and this peculiar ascription, then when this peculiar relationship disappears the result (ldzima)57 of this knowledge disappears. The disappearance of the result proves the disappearance of its cause (malzum). Here we must also definitely state that this knowledge disappears. The answer to the third wrong argument58,which states that if we suppose that the thought that Zayd will enter the city tomorrow continues until he enters then the knowledge (that he will enter) is the same as the knowledge of the occurrence of this entrance, is as follows: Most of the Mutakallimun say: The continuation of the object of knowledge is impossible (al-baqdl Caldalmaclum mumtanic), since it is59 an accident which takes place successively.60 If this continuation is impossible how do they know that if this impossible thing occurred the case would be such and such. Who is the one who informs them that the matter is as they say? Then (p. 157) we say: We have already explained that if this thought continued but the thinker did not know that the day had come, then he would not know, on account of this thought that someone was now entering the city. Therefore it is proved that the form which they have mentioned is the best proof of the soundness of our statement. The answer to the fourth wrong argument,61which states that knowledge is a quality which has a peculiar relationship [to its object] and that what changes
56 Al-Razi may refer here to the chapter on 'ilm in Mablhith, vol. I, p. 319. Cf. note 25 of the introduction. 57 Ldzima seems to be an equivalent to lazim which means a result, a consequence. Van Ess, Iji, index. 58 See p. 152, 1. 15ff. of the Arabic text, p. 137 of the translation. 59 The text has bal innahu. 60 Hence there are pieces of knowledge which follow the objects of knowledge. 61 See p. 152, the last line of the Arabic text, p. 137 of the translation.
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is the relationship, not the quality, is the previous discussion, which exposes the problems involved in this view. And God knows best. The second party of the Mutakallimun adhered to the notion that change occurs in the knowledge, and said: When the object of knowledge disappears, the knowledge of it disappears, and another knowledge comes into being. The explanation of this statement is as follows: This peculiar essence (al-dhat almakh!f4a)62 necessitates the knowledge of the object on the condition that this object takes place; if this object takes place according to this aspect, then a necessary condition occurs and the knowledge of this thing necessarily occurs in this peculiar essence. If this object disappears, the necessary condition disappears and a condition of another knowledge occurs. Thus the first knowledge certainly disappears and another knowledge occurs. This is the opinion of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri63,who is counted among the Muctazilite scholars, and of Jahm ibn Safwan64 and Hisham ibn al-Hakam65, who are counted among the ancient scholars. As for the later Mutakallimun, they proved the unsoundness of this view through several arguments: a. Since this knowledge comes into being after its nonexistence, it must have something which brings it into existence and makes it, and the bringer into existence and the maker of this knowledge must know it, because we have explained that the coming of a perfect action out of the maker is conditioned by the latter's being a knower. Hence, the bringing of this knowledge into existence is conditioned on the occurrence of another knowledge preceding the former. And the statement with regard to that previous knowledge is like the statement concerning this knowledge. This necessitates an endless chain (tasalsul) [of pieces of knowledge], which is absurd. [However], one has a right to say: This argument is weak, for you arrange your statement so that knowledge (p. 158) comes into being only because the choosing free maker (al-facil al-mukhtar) brings this knowledge into existence through ability and choice. We do not adhere to this opinion, but we say that
62 I.e. man. 63 One of the mastersof
'Abd al-Jabbar(d. 1025).Ibn al-Murta
