Public Corp Examination Coverage (Atty. Lapid).docx

October 2, 2017 | Author: Joime Ann Cabardo | Category: Eminent Domain, Virtue, Public Law, Legal Concepts, Justice
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Prof: Atty. Lapid (my MS word's grammar and spelling checker was not installed)...

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FLORES V. DRILON The constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of RA 7227 was challenged as it violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective official to other government posts. The said provision appointed Mayor Gordon of Olongapo City as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. Sec. 7 (1) Art. IX-B of the Constitution: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Held: The first paragraph uses the word “elective” while the second paragraph uses the word “appointive”. The exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the second paragraph. Exception: when the other office is held by the public official in an ex officio capacity. There is no violation because such other office does not comprise “any other position”. The ex officio position is actually and, in legal contemplation, part of the principal office. But the official concerned is not entitled to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position because his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. (National Amnesty Commission v. COA p. 449 Nachura)

Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an ordinance designating certain city and municipal streets as sites for flea markets and issued licenses to vendors for them to conduct vending activities therein. Held: The disputed areas are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract. The leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.

HEIRS OF ARDONA V. REYES The constitutionality of PD 564 and Proclamation No. 2052 are challenged, the said laws declared the some barangays in Cebu as tourist zones. Petitioners alleged that the constitution does not provide for expropriation of private property for tourism purposes and that the taking was not for public use in comtemplation of the eminent domain law. Held: The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation. The meaning of “public use” has been broadened to cover uses which, while not directly available to the public, redound to their indirect advantage or benefit. The petitioner’s contention that the promotion of tourism is not “public use” because private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities is impressed with less merit. At present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

ORTIGAS V. FEATI DACANAY V. ASSISTIO

JAC | 2016

The deed of sale contained restrictions on the use of the subject parcels of land which were then annotated in the TCTs. The restriction states that the lot should be used

Final exam pointers for Atty. Lapid’s Pub. Corp. class

exclusively for residential purposes whereas the zoning as per resolution of the city declares it to be for commercial. Issues: 1. whether the resolution is a valid exercise of police power 2. whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee. Held: In this particular case, the validity of the resolution was admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for plaintiff-appellant to raise the issue of the invalidity of the municipal resolution in question, We are of the opinion that its posture is unsustainable. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act," empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations"; for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee – referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee – it should be stressed, that while nonimpairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.

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Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of highway as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality, Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

The distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in injury to third persons. If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be. had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contract or ex delicto.

TORIO V. FONTANILLA The municipal council passed a resolution resolving to manage its town fiesta and another resolution creating an executive committee to organize the said fiesta. The committee constructed a stage for the “zarzuela”, however on the night of the performance, the stage collapsed and pinning Fontanilla (one of the performers) underneath it. Fontanilla died the following day. His heirs filed a complaint to recover damages. Defendant municipality interposed the defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. Issue:

Whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council under the Municipal Law is a governmental or a corporate or a proprietary function of the municipality.

Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.

RECALL Exercised by:

the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs

Ground:

loss of confidence

Process/Rules: FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE 1.

commenced by a petition of a registered voter in the LGU concerned and supported by the registered voters during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected subject to the percentage requirements provided by law.

2.

The petition shall contain:

(case: Rodriguez v. Marquez) Rodriguez and Marquez ran for governor of Quezon Province and it was Rodriguez who won in the May 1992 elections. Marquez challenged it before the COMELEC revealing that Rodriguez left the US were a charge filed on November 1985 was pending against him for fraudulent insurance claims and theft. Rodriguez is therefore a “fugitive from justice” which is a ground for disqualification / ineligibility. COMELEC dismissed and the dismissal was challenged by Marquez before the SC. The SC did not passed upon whether or not Rodriquez was a fugitive from justice was this task was upon COMELEC. During the next election, both parties once again became rivals for the same position. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ candidacy on the same ground.

3.

(long story! Kapoy summarize!) Held: Holding of a town fiesta is a proprietary function. The municipality is liable for the death of Fontanilla under the principle of respondeat superior. There can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise the function becomes private or proprietary in nature.

JAC | 2016

"A 'fugitive from justice' includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution."

Final exam pointers for Atty. Lapid’s Pub. Corp. class

the name and addresses of the petitioners

ii.

the LGU to which the petitioners belong

iii.

the name of the official sought to be recalled

iv.

brief narration justifications

of

the

reasons

and

COMELEC shall, within 15 days from the filing of the petition, certify to the sufficiency of the required number of signatures. If sufficient, publication.

Held: To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local position under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:

i.

COMELEC

shall

cause

its

If not sufficient, COMELEC may dismiss motu proprio. 4.

COMELEC shall set the date of the election or recall.

5.

The recall of an elective official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall.

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6.

7.

The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress. Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office.

-

Refers to an act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

-

All expenses incident to recall shall be borne by the COMELEC.

☼ ☼

Grounds: (for discipline, suspension, removal) See SECTION 60 Preventive suspension may be imposed by: a.

By the president, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city

b.

By the governor – elective official of a component city or municipality

c.

By the mayor – elective official of the barangay

There must be a valid and definite offer made to the owner which was refused by him Through the chief executive acting pursuant to an ordinance For public use or purpose Payment of just compensation

2. 3. 4.



Preventive suspension is imposed when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The official preventively suspended shall receive no salary or compensation during such suspension but upon subsequent exoneration and reinstatement he shall be paid such.

OTHER POSSIBLE TOPICS Devolution

4.

Plebiscite requirements: 1. 2. 3.

Beginning of corporate existence: 1. 2.

Filing of the expropriation proceedings Making a deposit with the proper court of 15% of the FMV at the time of the taking

a)

By law enacted by Congress For province,city, municipality

b)

By ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or panlungsod concerned For barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction

-

Upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the members of the sanggunian

Dual nature of LGUs: Political subdivision Local governance Exercise does not make it liable for damages EXC: Art. 2189 NCC for maintenance of road safety

Corporate entity Proprietary functions Vulnerable to liabilities on contracts it enters into

Reclassification of lands: Verifiable indicators of viability for creation of a LGU: 1. 2. 3.

Income Population Land area

1. 2. 3.

4.

JAC | 2016

Approved by a majority of the votes cast in The plebiscite called for the purpose in the political units directly affected Conducted by COMELEC within 120 days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance

The LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon:

Creation, division, merger, abolishment, alteration of boundaries how done: ☼

2. 3.

When its income, population or land area is below the minimum standards Through a law or ordinance The law or odinance shall specify the province, city or municipality with which LGU sought to be abolished will be incorporated Plebiscite requirements

Eminent Domain 1.

SUSPENSION OF AN ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICIAL

1.

It shall include the transfer to LGUs of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities.

No recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of assumption to office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election. 8.

Abolition of LGU how done:

Final exam pointers for Atty. Lapid’s Pub. Corp. class

City or municipality makes an ordinance After public hearing In the following cases: a. Land ceases to be economically feasible b. Land has a substantially greater economica value in another purpose Limitation shall be followed under Section 20.

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Closure and reopening of roads: 1. 2.

Through an ordinance If permanent closure: 2.1. Ordinance must be approved by at least 2/3 of all members of the sanggunian 2.2. Adequate substitute for the closed facility is provided

Disqualifications of elective officials: a.

b. c.

Qualifications of elective officials 1. 2.

3. 4.

Must be a citizen of the Philippines. Registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or in the district where he intends to be electedfor at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election Able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect (additional requirements:)

d. e. f.

Sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude OR for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence Removed from office asa result of an administrative case Convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the republic With dual citizenship Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad Permanent residents in a foreign country or thosewho acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right

For governor, vice-governor, member of the sangguniang panlalawigan For mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities -

Must be 23 years of age on election day

Mayor, vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities or municipalities -

Must be at least 21 on election day

Sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan -

Must be at least 18 on election day

Punong barangay or member of sangguniang barangay -

Must be at least 18 on election day

Sangguniang kabataan -

JAC | 2016

Must be at least 15 but not more than 21 on election day

Final exam pointers for Atty. Lapid’s Pub. Corp. class

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