Public Administration Albania - Thanasi Durata

An Overview of Public Administration in Albania by THANASI Durata 1.INTRODUCTION This paper proposes an overview of public administration in Albania. The aim is to rebuild the reputation of public authorities and increase their effectiveness in carrying out the Government’s programme. The crisis and its aftermath have worsened the situation of the public sector. Citizens and International institutions have lost trust in public authorities. There has been further qualitative weakening of management and policy implementation capacities. Yet public administration is more than ever needed for rebuilding and putting the country back on track to a pluralist democracy with a properly regulated market economy. It is vitally important that public administration reform be given high priority and that the government is seen to be strengthening institutions which defend the rule of law. This will help the internal situation and raise confidence of foreign investors and aid organisations. It is very clear that Rebuilding administration and it acts under the rule of law, is part of the conditionality imposed by the international community. The immediate goal of the administrative reform plan is to consolidate and protect democratic control institutions and key executive functions, especially those necessary to get the recovery plan underway. The Government is willing to stabilise public finances and to use the existing institutions and (draft) laws in which there has been considerable international investment. To complete the reforms, international aid must be harnessed. Experience shows that this must be lead by Albanians and carefully integrated into Albanian programmes. A mechanism is suggested. II. LESSONS FROM THE PAST Public administration has, during its brief democratic trial period, been one of the weakest links in the Albanian government system. Management of people and programs in a fiscally responsible way, based on sound technical data and modern administrative principles, has been undermined by “house of cards” strategies, formulated on demand by increasingly desperate political leaders whose popular support (and international sympathy) waned as their promises failed one by one. Ad hoc measures to “put out fires’ became the norm. Government had become totally reactive. Leadership into the modern world, of which Albanians dreamt in 1992, had devolved to a series of frantic and internationally embarrassing measures of social control.

First and foremost, today’s Albanian leaders have learned that promises must be followed by action. For this to happen, services and programs proposed by the Government must be realistic both in terms of content and timing. But Ministers do not design the detail of programmes and they do not deliver services to citizens. To translate political promises into action requires an effective administration which works according to the rule of law. Since no-one disputes that international support will be a critical factor in the new Government’s success in reforming administration, the management of reform in Albania must move to favour sound planning and analysis, although reforms will have to appropriate to the specific Albanian social and political context. III. A GENERAL VISION FOR OUR PATH AHEAD For Albania to flourish, its citizens must have a sense of fairness--that they will be treated equally under the law and that they will have the opportunity to reap the rewards of their personal and collective efforts. They must come to believe that their government works for them rather than to control them in order to pursue its own agenda and the personal benefits of political leaders. To many, at this point in time, that seems like an impossible dream. Public trust seems very, very remote in today’s atmosphere of every man for himself. As Albania struggles out of the current survival mode, the country seeks to build a new reputation. From one perspective, this may be easier to achieve in Albania than in other former command economies. Due to the repression and isolationism of the Hoxha years, Albania does not have ingrained administrative and technological infrastructure that must be torn down before it is rebuilt. Because of that -- and because of the social chaos of today has resulted in a common popular impression that everything must start anew -- the learning curve, while steep, can be short. A determining factor of Albania’s success will be its new leaders’ ability to infuse antipathy to corruption into the social conscience. We cannot do that by fostering collective guilt for imperfect motives and processes of the past. Although historical behaviours can be explained, they are nonetheless, inconsistent with the vision of the future. Corruption, by its nature, means gains for the few at the expense of many; opportunities for those in control, and suffering for those who are controlled. The new leadership should and will demonstrate by example that transparency translates into fairness for citizens and minimises risks for investors in Albania’s future. The success of new leaders’ attempts to change our culture will depend on the reform policies they develop and their personal example. Albania must learn the principles which govern public institutions in a democratic market

oriented society. We must learn how to listen to citizens and how to transform their desires into long-term institutions and programmes, operating under the rule of law. While sound central government for certain collective purposes will need to be developed and maintained power must be decentralised to regions and cities where local issues are managed. To make this work, a system of justice must be instituted to protect and defend both private and public rights. Mechanisms must be developed -- and used -- to enforce the law and implement rights to public hearing in advance of decisions that impact on competing interests. As a companion measure, an ombudsman system is envisaged to settle disputes quickly, efficiently and at the earliest possible stage. Success for the new generation of leaders will depend on the effective support of public institutions. These have to be rebuilt, and this in turn depends on six primary factors. Albania needs to: 1. embed the rule of law in institutions and behaviours 2. use public resources efficiently, effectively and economically 3. adopt policies and procedures which can respond to change 4. engage the public in policy debate and formulation 5. ensure transparent, predictable and equitable administration 6. create a sound system of public finance The first step is to communicate our vision for the future to citizens and employees in the public sector. This must be accompanied by a process to identify the missions of public institutions and draw up reform implementation strategies. Reform must yield early results which can generate sustained interest in continuing the process. As Albania follows this path, we must not lose sight of what the global business community has also learned -- that people are the country’s most important resource. A professional public service will regain public credibility for government and also provide the creativity, skills and effort to help design and carry out social and economic policies. Investing in and professionalising the public service must be the top priority. IV. IMPORTANT ELEMENTS WHICH NEED TO BE DEVELOPED, NATIONAL CAPACITIES TO MANAGE REFORM, AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE Albania needs support in the coming period. Hands-on assistance from foreign experts may provide direct and immediate transfer of skills and knowledge to Albanians. Financial aid will also be required to rebuild the

infrastructure for new institutions, provide resources for necessary training, and help stabilise the budget during a period of heavy outlays and investment. Although technical expertise and equipment are valuable, we have learned that western systems cannot work if managed by Albanians whose background and experience not only do not equip them to understand those systems, but may cause them -- consciously or not -- to misuse them and undermine longterm goals. We have also seen the good results of good trainings tha our people have had in western scools and working environments On the other hand foreigners who may be expert in “western” approaches, cannot understand sufficiently the Albanian context to succeed in introducing their techniques. Our experience of foreign technical assistance shows that there is a “paradox”: we need foreign assistance to help us manage reform; but we know that foreign assistance is only effective if it is managed by Albanians. In this regard, the following factors are absolutely critical to the success of future efforts. 1. We must start reform now, using the skills that we actualy have, and making the best use of assistance. We have immediat steps to be taken in order to satisfy immediat needs of the people and country, and we dont have to loose site of these needs while we look at the future, because the future starts now. So we will use all the investments done in human recources, will safegard them and continue to invest on them. 2. We must start to build long-term capacities for self-sufficiency especially in leadership. 3. Assistance is needed in a new way -- fully integrated into Albanian reform programmes. While we look forward to and appreciate the world’s benevolence toward our country and its people, we must take special care to avoid distortions and long-term dependency. Finally the Government could make a general proposal to the international community. Albania has suffered from decades of isolation and does not possess a political or managerial class. Although long-term, the international community, might consider special programmes aimed at the next generation: for example: •

“European Fullbright” programme

•

“Accelerated Leadership Programme (ALP) (e.g. run by Soros for Poland)

•

Bilateral programs for the “elite building”

•

A major public enlightenment campaign through media and schools

V. DESCRIPTION OF ALBANIA’S PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION The overall standing of the public sector is confused since not all legal distinctions have yet been made and the Constitution is not yet fully adapted to the new circumstances. The public sector includes typical central administrative functions, state territorial functions, local governments, state enterprises and utilities, and numerous miscellaneous institutions. There are three possible ways to differentiate: legal standing, revenue source, and legal status of employees. Prior to the crisis Albania did not invest sufficiently in upgrading its State institutions. They are under-equipped to handle essential tasks. These are primarily to manage transition, provide the regulatory/administrative framework for the market, establish relations with the international community and negotiate and manage aid flows. But these tasks must be carried out while re-establishing order and maintaining social safety nets, under conditions of budget stringency. While hard information on pay and numbers is difficult to obtain, and there is little information on public service demographics (age, sex, skill profiles etc.). Certain conclusions can be drawn. The core civil service is not fully defined in legal terms, is underpaid and of poor quality. The allocation of human resources within the public sector is inefficient, with some areas exhibiting over-staffing and low productivity, while others, especially in central administration, are certainly under-qualified and probably understaffed. The lack of information on personnel hinders the development of reform policy. As is confirmed in UNDP and WB studies, base salaries for public servants are at or below poverty rates; for top functionaries, they are only slightly above. This situation leads to several destructive effects: corruption; grade inflation, salary compression, low quality and low motivation. The role of civil servants and the concept of a “job” as a continuing, autonomous responsibility within a hierarchical structure are badly understood. Rational organisation, personnel management and job definition require cultural understanding of a “western-type” work context which is not always present. Roles and missions of main institutions and their component parts are not established clearly. Recent work by the Department of Public Administration (DPA) has increased understanding of the situation in central Ministries and institutions. DPA has clarified organigrammes and staff numbers and standardised grade nomenclature.

Local administration and agencies suffer for the most from inadequately defined and probably too limited responsibilities and powers. They have also very limited capacities and resources. Virtually no progress has been made on creating a rational system of territorial administration. The absence of a properly regulated structure for managing State powers over the territory, may have been one of the most significant factors in permitting the current situation to occur. The regulation and procedures of the Council of Ministers was a significant reform, but lacks institutional momentum. Reform of budgeting, treasury and financial management has not moved The State Control Service has made important progress but the law to make it a recognised Supreme Audit Institution has not passed. These are only the first steps in a long process. However, they provide a basis on which to work and a few people who have acquired knowledge and skills in the area and on whom the Government and international community can build. * Symptoms and effects The general situation of the public administration is characterised by inadequate quality. Although turnover may have reduced, this is probably because the best people have already left. Motivation is low, and, given the pay conditions, corruption (major and petty) is endemic. The understanding of rule of law in civil society and administration is low, and control institutions (audit, administrative courts etc., are weakly developed and of uncertain status. The administration functions without adequate checks on its powers. The quality of policy and law is low largely because of inadequate procedures and cross-ministerial checking, low policy capacities in the Ministries, and lack of experience in techniques such as legal drafting, impact analysis. There has been progress in this at least at the formal level (regulation on the Council of Ministers), but the system is not firmly embedded and is exposed to risk. The system still suffers from severe implementation deficits, partly because the policy system does not consider implementation as an issue. These deficits are particularly serious for policy areas where local governments are involved in implementation and where delivery depends on good cooperation amongst the deconcentrated services of the central administrations and with local authorities. Even before the crisis, the situation of territorial administration (local government and deconcentrated central administration) was in trouble. Reform attempts had failed to have significant impact. Currently the situation is close to autarky in some areas. To impose the re-establishment of State authority, the government will probably have to negotiating a reform of the central/local balance.

Apart from the security situation, weak definitions of roles of organisations and poor quality of substantive law, mean that public administration is not able, generally, to undertake the tasks of implementing policy effectively and fairly under the rule of law. Allocation of resources tends to be inefficient. Co-ordination of State functions at the prefectoral level is weak, with severe consequences for management investments. Corruption is endemic,the mecanisms for collecting taxation and other government revenues are weak; cash management, internal control and audit systems are under-developed. The partial exception is the SCS but it needs its status clarified and staff strengthened. There is no judicial oversight except from the Constitutional court and no administrative procedure act Aid flows, entrepreneurial activity, formulation and implementation of government policy, and consolidation of democracy and the market economy are all impeded by the inadequacies of public administration. Reform is urgent. Goals are easy to set; but feasible reform programmes hard to design and fit within budget constraints. V. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM Like any other area of policy, PAR needs a policy formulation and implementation mechanism. For personnel issues the DPA has served this purpose, but has, of necessity, focused on personnel problems. For the future, a broader strategic framework for PAR is to be developed, DPA will need to be strengthened, its change networks in Ministries developed, and it will need to build strategic alliances with “power centres” such as oversight bodies, legal, and Finance. In line with the remarks above, the Minister of State for Legislative Reform and Relations with Parliament (responsible for administrative reform and the civil service) should, with the support of DPA, also be responsible for technical assistance so that it is fully integrated into Albanian reform policy. DPA, in conjunction with the Minister of State for Development and Economic Cooperation, should be equipped to handle the tasks of negotiating assistance packages, managing procurement, orienting the work, and monitoring performance. Political will is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for success. PAR will not happen unless there is sustained political commitment and orientation. The new government has created a State Minster for Legislative Reform and Relations with Parliament, but this may have the appearance of strength and the reality of weakness. The crucial issue is the support of the Prime Minister, his Deputy and the power of finance (not necessarily the Minister). The

potential for reform will also depend on whether State Ministers have coordinating power over a substantive grouping of other Ministers.