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SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011 FACTS The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street andFernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of income. Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. ISSUE Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod abused its discretion in adopting Resolution No. 552. HELD

No. A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while an ordinance is a law that is permanent in character. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in the light of attendant circumstances. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of all gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally protected right.

CITY OF CALOOCAN, vs CA

G.R. No. 145004

FACTS On 02 August 1990, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Sanggunian) of Caloocan City passed Ordinance No. 068 s. 1990 authorizing the city mayor, then Mayor Asistio to negotiate and enter into a contract of sale of the patrimonial property of the city. Mayor Asistio, on behalf of Caloocan City, and Jose C. Go of Ever Gotesco (Gotesco), executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the aforementioned property. However, the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the Deed of Sale. On motion for reconsideration, COA approved the proposed sale with a few changes on the deal SP passed and ordinance regarding the amendment but it was initially vetoed by then incumbent mayor, Malonzo, but the vetoe was overridden by a resolution passed by the SP. ISSUE Whether or not the mayor is authorized to file cases on behalf of his city. HELD YES. The mayor has the authority to file suits “for the recovery of funds and property” on behalf of the city, even without the prior authorization from the Sanggunian. However, being the proper party to file such suits, the mayor must necessarily be the one to sign the certification against forum-shopping, and not the City Legal Officer, who, despite being an official of the City, was merely its counsel and not a party to the case.

[G.R. No. 155477. March 18, 2005] MUNICIPALITY OF LA LIBERTAD, NEGROS ORIENTAL, vs. PENAFLOR FACTS Before November 13, 1995, respondent, Rural Health Midwife who had been in the employ of the office of petitioner for about twenty years,[1] filed an application for a 15day leave of absence effective said date. At that time respondent had an accumulated unused leave credits of more than one year. The application for leave was recommended for approval by her superior. On November 13, 1995, unaware if her application for leave had been approved, respondent began availing of it. Subsequently, she was notified that she had been terminated effective November 13, 1995. ISSUE Wether or not Camero alone should be held liable since he acted beyond the scope of his legal duty and authority in terminating the services of respondent. HELD NO. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that public officials discharged their official duties in good faith remains. In the petition at bar, petitioner failed to prove malice – the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse, or a state of mind which prompts a conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another. Moreover, Camero has not acted beyond his authority. Since it is not claimed that respondent was a head of department or office in the office of petitioner, then following Sec. 444(5) of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, under which a mayor is empowered to “[a]ppoint all officials whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of municipal funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint,” former Mayor Camero did not have to secure the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan to terminate respondent’s services.

MASIKIP vs THE CITY OF PASIG, et. al. G.R. No. 136349 FACTS Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. In a letter, the then Municipality of Pasig notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the “sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. Masikip replied, stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to “provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.” ISSUE Whether or not it is necessary to establish a genuine necessity to justify the condemnation of Masikip’s property. HELD YES. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the necessity” and the taking must be limited to such necessity. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. In the case at bar, respondent has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

MUNICIPALITY OF STA. FE, MUNICIPALITY OF ARITAO,

G.R. No. 140474

FACTS On October 16, 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, filed for the Determination of Boundary Dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. As the parties failed to amicably settle during the pre-trial stage, trial on the merits ensued. The trial was almost over, with petitioner’s rebuttal witness already under crossexamination, when the court, realizing its oversight under existing law, ordered the suspension of the proceedings and the referral of the case to theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya.[3] In turn, the Sanggunian concerned passed on the matter to its Committee on Legal Affairs, Ordinances and Resolutions, which recommended adopting Resolution No. 64 dated September 14, 1979 of the former members of its Provincial Board.[4] Said resolution previously resolved to adjudicate the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan as parts of respondent’s territorial jurisdiction and enjoin petitioner from exercising its governmental functions within the same. Subsequently, as per Resolution No. 357 dated November 13, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved the Committee’s recommendation but endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for further proceedings and preservation of the status quo pending finality of the case. ISSUE Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the instant case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss the original jurisdiction to hear and decide, the case had been vested on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and no longer on the RTC. HELD NO. The difference in the factual setting notwithstanding, Municipality ofSogod still applies in the sense that similar thereto the pendency of the present case has also been overtaken by events – the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the enactment of the LGC of 1991. Since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has been the primary tribunal responsible in the amicable settlement of boundary disputes between or among two or more municipalities located in the same province. With the LGC of 1991, however, a major change has been introduced – that in the event the Sanggunian fails to effect a settlement, it shall not only issue a certification to that effect but must also formally hear and decide the case within the reglementary period. The LGC of 1991 grants an expanded role on the Sangguniang Panlalawiganconcerned in resolving cases of municipal boundary disputes. Aside from having the function of bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable settlement of the case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now specifically vested with original jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its implementing rules and regulations. This situation, in effect, reverts to the old rule under the RAC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 6128, under which the provincial boards were empowered to investigate, hear the parties and eventually decide the case on the basis thereof. On the other hand, under the LGC of 1991, the trial court loses its power to try, at the first

instance, cases of municipal boundary disputes. Only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should any party aggrieved by the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan elevate the same.

JAPZON vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY, G.R. No. 180088 FACTS Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the May 2007 local elections. Japzon filed before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He was born and raised in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to work in the USA and eventually became an American citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. ISSUE Whether or not Ty lost his domicile of origin when he became a naturalized American citizen. HELD NO. Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,Eastern Samar. There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof.

THE PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE vs. COMELEC, et. al., G.R. No. 165080 FACTS Months before the May 2004 national and local elections, Agusan del Norte was reclassified from third to second class province. Consequent to this upgrading, the COMELEC issued a resolution which allocated two additional SP seats for the 2nd District of Agusan del Norte. Later on, it issued another resolution which deferred the implementation of Res. No. 6662 in certain provinces, including Agusan del Norte, for perceived failure of their respective SPs to file with the COMELEC their petition for additional SP seats as required by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. ISSUE Whether or not there should be only seven slots for the SP since only 7 slots where allocated by the Commission in the official ballots. HELD As the requirements of R.A. No. 8553 and Res. No. 6662 appear to have been complied with insofar as Agusan del Norte was concerned, the Comelec en banc was, under the premises, correct in having the 8th and 9th winning SP candidates for said province’s Second District proclaimed. The COMELEC was not remiss in publishing the notice of deferment of the implementation of its Res. No. 6662 for all the provinces mentioned therein. Ideally, COMELEC should have had excluded Agusan del Norte from the deferment advice after the latter had expressed its intention to accept and avail of the allocation of the two additional SP positions. But considering that the COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters, in the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances.

NICASIO BOLOS, JR., vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 184082

FACTS For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected to the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol from 1994 to 2002. In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, petitioner ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office as Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as Punong Barangay. He served the full term of the Sangguniang Bayan position, which was until June 30, 2007. Thereafter, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the 2007 Barangay Elections. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner is qualified to run for the Position of Punong Barangay in the 2007 Barangay Elections. HELD Petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification. However, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead relinquished his office asPunong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.

PFDA vs CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, et. al. G.R. No. 178030 FACTS LFPC is one of the fishery infrastructure projects undertaken by the National Government under the Nationwide Fish Port-Package which was constructed on a reclaimed land. Pursuant thereto, Petitioner-Appellant PFDA took over the management and operation of LFPC in February 1992. On October 26, 1999, in a letter addressed to PFDA, the City Government of Lucena demanded payment of realty taxes on the LFPC property. ISSUE Whether or not PFDA is liable for the real property tax assessed on the Lucena Fishing Port Complex. HELD The PFDA is a government instrumentality not subject to real property tax except those portions of the Navotas Fishing Port Complex that were leased to taxable or private persons and entities for their beneficial use. As a government instrumentality, the PFDA is exempt from real property tax imposed on the Lucena Fishing Port Complex, except those portions which are leased to private persons or entities. Moreover, the Lucena Fishing Port Complex is a property of public dominion intended for public use, and is therefore exempt from real property tax under Section 234(a)11 of the Local Government Code. Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE LCP vs. COMELEC, et. al. ------------------------G.R. No. 177499 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x

G.R. No. 176951

G.R. No. 178056 FACTS On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents’ first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents’ second motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009. However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and compelling reason, the CourtEn Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21 December 2009. Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring the ISSUE Whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. HELD Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that “no x x x city shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code.” All the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code, provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

DAMASEN vs. TUMAMAO, G.R. No. 173165 FACTS On December 2, 2004, Nelia Tumamao, the Vice-Mayor of San Isidro, Isabela, died.[3] As a result, a permanent vacancy was created in the Office of the Vice-Mayor. Pursuant to Sec. 44 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160,[4] Alonzo was elevated to the position of Vice-Mayor, she being the highest-ranking member of the Sangguniang Bayan, that is, the one who garnered the highest number of votes for that office.[5] As a result, a permanent vacancy was created in the Sangguniang Bayan. To fill up the ensuing vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan, Mayor Lim recommended to Governor Padaca, the appointment of Tumamao, a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), the same political party to which Alonzo belonged. Later on Damasen became a member of the LDP and was able to secure from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag a letter of nomination addressed to Governor Padaca for his appointment to the Sangguniang Bayan, and was appointed. ISSUE Whether or not Damasen is entitled to the position. HELD No. The conditions for the rule of succession are: First, the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. Second, the appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate of Membership from the highest official of the political party concerned. Since the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian occurred because of the elevation of LDP member Alonzo to vice-mayor, it follows that the person to succeed her should also belong to the LDP so as to preserve party representation.

ONG, vs ALEGRE and COMELEC G.R. No. 163295 ----------G.R. No. 163354 FACTS ALEGRE and ONG were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor. Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis which is predicated on the three-consecutive term rule ISSUES Whether or not Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. HELD YES. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. The disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections.

UGDORACION vs. COMELEC and TUNGOL G.R. No. 179851 FACTS Ugdoracion and private respondent, Ephraim Tungol, were rival mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Albuquerque,Province of Bohol in the May 14, 2007 elections. Both filed their respective Certificates of Candidacy (COC). On April 11, 2007, Tungol filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., contending that Ugdoracion’s declaration of eligibility for Mayor constituted material misrepresentation because Ugdoracion is actually a “green card” holder or a permanent resident of the United States of America (USA). Specifically, Ugdoracion stated in his COC that he had resided in Albuquerque, Bohol, Philippines for forty-one years before May 14, 2007 and he is not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country. ISSUE Whether or not the representations contained in Ugdoracion’s COC, specifically, that he complied with the residency requirement and that he does not have “green card” holder status, are false. HELD Section 74, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that the facts stated in the COC must be true, and any false representation therein of a material fact shall be a ground for cancellation thereof. The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code pertains to material fact, and is not simply an innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a candidate’s qualification for elective office such as one’s citizenship and residence. In order to reacquire residency in the Philippines, there must be a waiver of status as a greencard holder as manifested by some acts or acts independent of and prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, Ugdoracion presented a photocopy of a document entitled Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status dated October 18, 2006. A close scrutiny of this document however discloses that it is a mere application for abandonment of his status as lawful permanent resident of the USA. Moreover, he failed to meet the one-year residency requirement. Although he won the elections, winning the election does not substitute for the specific requirements of law on a person’s eligibility for public office which he lacked, and does not cure his material misrepresentation which is a valid ground for the cancellation of his COC.

G.R. NO. 161984 ADAP et. al., vs COMELEC et. al. FACTS Petitioners were the proclaimed winning candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in their respective barangays in the municipality of Pagayawan, Lanao del Sur in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections (2002 Elections). Individual respondents were candidates for the position of barangay chairmen in said 2002 elections, some of whom are Punong-Barangays proclaimed in the barangay elections previous to the 2002 elections. Respondents filed a petition for declaration of failure of elections and the holding of special elections in the whole municipality of Pagayawan, Lanao del Sur and to annul for being void ab initio the proclamation of petitioners. ISSUE Whether or not COMELEC En Banc had commited grave abuse of discretion in ordering those who have been elected and proclaimed in the barangay elections prior to the 2002 elections to continue as Punong Barangays in a hold-over capacity until the holding of special barangay elections. HELD NO. First of all, petitioners' allegation that the COMELEC En Banc declared failure of elections in barangays not covered by the respondents' petition is highly inaccurate. Moreover, the COMELEC En Banc held that there was failure of elections in the thirteen (13) barangays subject of respondents’ petition, and nullified the proclamation of petitioners as punong barangays of the subject thirteen barangays. Secondly, it was not necessary for the COMELEC En Banc to examine and view the election paraphernalia inside the ballot boxes of the questioned precincts of subject barangays, considering that there is substantial evidence on record to convince said body that no elections had actually been conducted. Moreover, there was no actual casting of votes in subject barangays of Pagayawan, Lanao del Sur, is supported by substantial evidence, as discussed in the assailed Resolution dated January 27, 2004.

[G.R. No. 161414. January 17, 2005] CAMID, vs. DILG et. al. FACTS President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders[3] creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong. Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370,[6] and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.[7] After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and void. Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong. ISSUE Whether or not Andong should be classified as a regular existing municipality. HELD Based on Camid’s own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must “have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code.” Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all.[60] This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality. The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andong’s legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid, “to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,”[61] thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative.

G.R. No. 159022 MAYOR FLORES vs. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PAMPANGA, et. al. FACTS On December 19, 2001, an administrative complaint for dishonesty and gross misconduct against then Mayor Edgardo G. Flores of Minalin, Pampanga, petitioner, was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the same province, one of the respondents herein. It was alleged that on August 1, 2001, he executed Purchase Request No. 1 for the acquisition of a communication equipment amounting to P293,000.00 without any Resolution or Ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalin. The winning bidder was one Kai Electronics. On August 6, 2001, or while the bidding was still being conducted, Kai Electronics delivered the communication equipment to the municipality of Minalin. The Notice of Award of Bid to Kai Electronics states that the bidding took place also on August 1, 2001 when respondent executed the Purchase Request No. 1. The communication equipment delivered by Kai Electronics was overpriced by more than one hundred percent (100%) or in the amount of P129,600.00. ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner failed to exhaust first all administrative remedies. HELD YES. It is a well-settled rule that where, as here, the petitioner has available remedies within the administrative machinery against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, the intervention of the courts can be resorted to by him only after having exhausted all such remedies. The rationale of this rule rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. The strict application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies will also prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court. .

NAVARRO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et. al. G.R. No. 180050 FACTS Respodents allege that the province, which is composed of more than one island, is exempted from the land area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9 which states that “[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.” The certificate of compliance issued by the Lands Management Bureau was also based on the exemption under paragraph 2, Article 9 of the IRR. ISSUE Whether or not R.A. No. 9355 has failed to comply with either the territorial or population requirement contained in Section 461 of the LGC. HELD There are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be contiguous; and (2) the land area must be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. A sufficient land area in the creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as provided by Section 461 of the Local Government Code .Paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two instances of exemption from the requirement of territorial contiguity, thus:(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. However, said exemption pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly states that the requirement of territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province comprising two or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

NAZARENO et. al. vs CITY OF DUMAGUETE, G.R. No. 168484 FACTS Then incumbent Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo) and Agustin R. Perdices (Perdices) were among the candidates for mayor in Dumaguete City during the May 14, 2001 elections. Perdices won over Remollo and the former was to assume office on June 30, 2001. After the elections but before Perdices’ assumption, Remollo made (15) promotional appointments and (74) original appointments for various positions in the city government. Said appointments were reflected in the June 2001 Report of Personnel Actions (ROPA) of the city, that was submitted to the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSCFO)-Dumaguete. Soon after Perdices assumed office, or on July 2, 2001, during the flag ceremony for city hall employees, Perdices announced that he was not honoring or recognizing the appointments made by Remollo. ISSUE whether or not the petitioners have the legal personality to appeal the invalidation of their appointment HELD YES. The power to appoint is vested in the office of the chief executive and not in the person occupying the position. The local chief executive exercises such power in his official capacity. Applying it in the present case, the appointing authority who had the right to assail the invalidation of the appointment is the mayor occupying the position at the time of the institution of the appeal and not the former mayor who made the assailed appointment. Although the appointing authority is the real party-in-interest to institute an appeal or motion to reconsider the invalidation of an appointment, there is nothing to preclude the appointee from taking the same course of action. Aggrieved parties, including the Civil Service Commission, should be given the right to file motions for reconsideration or to appeal. The appointee is also injured by the CSC disapproval, because he is prevented from assuming the office in a permanent capacity. Moreover, he would necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved appointment would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.

G.R. No. 169435 Municipality of Nueva Era vs Municipality of Marcos FACTS The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 [5] dated September 30, 1916. The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte.” There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos’ boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: “on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary.” ISSUE whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era. HELD No part of Nueva Era’s territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753. Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos’ source of territory, Nueva Era’s territory is, therefore, excluded. Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory. Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent.

G.R. No. 179695 FERMIN va COMELEC and Dilangalen G.R. No. 182369 FACTS Fermin was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan.Claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his registration record to the said barangay. In the meantime, the creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006, formally makingBarangay Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan. COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the transfer of his voting record and registration as a voter to Precinct 21A of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan. On March 29, 2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections.Dilangalen, another mayoralty candidate, filed aPetition for Disqualification against Fermin alleging that the petitioner did not possess the period of residency required for candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his application for transfer of voting record. ISSUE Whether or not Fermin possess the period of residency required for candidacy HELD YES. Given that a voter is required to reside in the place wherein he proposes to vote only for six months immediately preceding the election,petitioner’s application for transfer on December 13, 2006 does not contradict his earlier admission that he was a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006. Be that as it may, the issue involved in the Dilangalen petition is whether or not petitioner made a material representation that is false in his CoC, and not in his application for the transfer of his registration and voting record. Dilangalen petition does not make out a prima facie case. Its dismissal is therefore warranted. The mere filing of a petition and the convenient allegation therein that a candidate does not reside in the locality where he seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the cancellation of his CoC. Convincing evidence must substantiate every allegation. A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favor is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced on the other side.

G.R. No. 172700 Office of the Ombudsman vs Rodriquez FACTS On 26 August 2003, the Ombudsman in Visayas received a complaint[4] for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty against Rolson Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. On 1 September 2003, the sangguniang bayan of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar complaint[5] against Rodriguez for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty. ISSUE whether or not the Ombudsman has first acquired jurisdiction in the case at bar. HELD Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. When herein complainants first filed the complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants. under Section 60 of the Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an electivebarangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove an erring public official other than members of Congress and the Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment.

G.R. No. 177597 SEMA vs COMELEC and G.R. No. 178628 MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC FACTS The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).[4] Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989. On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province ofShariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. ISSUES (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and HELD 1. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district, nor can it enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.