Pub Corp Liability for Damages

CITY OF MANILA VS TEOTICO [22 SCRA 267]It is not necessary for liability to attach to the City of Manila that thedefective road or street belong to it. It is sufficient that it has eithercontrol or supervision over the street or road.Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for theliability therein established to attach that the defective roads orstreets belong to the province, city or municipality from whichresponsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that theprovince, city or municipality have either "control or supervision"over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, anational highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detractfrom its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, underRepublic Act 409. The City of Manila is therefore liable for damagesto Teotico MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS FIRME [195 SCRA 692] FACTS: Laurence Banino, Sr., along with several other passengers in a jeepney they were riding in, died after collision involving said jeepney, a privately owned graved and sand trucks and a dump truckowned by the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, driven byAlfredo Bislig, a regular employee of said municipality. The heirsincluded in its complaint the municipality and the dump trucksdriver. The municipality invokes non-suability of the State. Is itcorrect? HELD: YES,1. The general rule is that the State may not be sued except when itgives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express of implied consent.Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law.The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of moneyclaims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No.3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue thegovernment for an alleged quasi-delict.Consent is implied when the government enters into businesscontracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contractingparty, and also when the State files a complaint thus opening itself to a counterclaim.Municipal corporations for example, like provinces and cities, areagencies of the State when they are engaged in governmentalfunctions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity fromsuit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performanceof such functions because their charter provided that they can sueand be sued.2. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. “Suability depends on t he consent of the state to be sued, liabilityon the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstancethat a State is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; onthe other hand, it can never be held allowing itself to be sued. Whenthe state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.” 3. About the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for thetorts committed by its employee, the test of liability of themunicipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality is performing governmental of proprietyfunctions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla, thedistinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agentswhich result in an injury to third persons.It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suablebecause their charters grant them the competence to sue and besued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committedby

them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be heldanswerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in apropriety capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the Statemerely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant is notacting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committedor that the case comes under exceptions recognized by law. Failingthis, the claimant cannot recover.4. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that “he was on his way to Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets.”

TORIO VS FONTANILLA [85 SCRA 599]Since the holding of a town fiesta is an exercise of a proprietaryfunction, the Municipality of Malasiqui is liable for any injurysustained on the occasion thereof. FACTS: The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed a resolutioncelebrating a town fiesta for 3 days on January, 1959. The resolutioncreated on Executive Committee which would oversee theoperations of the town fiesta. The Executive Committee in turn hada sub-committee in charge of building 2 stages, one of which was fora zarzuela program.Vicente Fontanilla was one of the actors of the zarzuela. While thezarzuela was going on the stage where the play was set collapsed.Fontanilla, who has at the rear of the stage, was pinned underneathand died the following day.The family and heirs of Fontanilla filed a complaint against theMunicipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council and the individualmembers of the Municipal Council. Can they be held liable? HELD: The Municipality of Malasiqui is liable and the individual members of the Municipal Council are not liable. REASONS: 1) The basic rule to be first followed is that a municipal corporationcannot be held liable for an injury caused in the course of performance of a governmental function. With respect toproprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporationcan be held liable upon contracts and in torts.2) The next question to be answered is that whether the fiestaabove-quota was performed by the municipality in the exercise of itsgovernmental or proprietary function. According to 2282 of therevised Administrative Code, municipalities are authorized to holdfiesta, but it is not their duty to conduct such.Thus, the fiesta is proprietary in nature. The same analogy can beapplied to the maintenance of parks, which is a private undertaking,as opposed to the maintenance of public schools and jails, which arefor the public service. (The key word then is duty.)3) Under the doctrine of respondent superior (see first paragraph of Art. 2180), the municipality can be held liable for the death of Fontanilla if a) the municipality was performing a proprietaryfunction at that time and b) negligence can be attributed to the municipality’s officers, employees or agents performing the proprietary function. The evidence proved that the committeeoverseeing the construction of the stage failed to build a strongenough to insure the safety of zarzuela participants. Fontanilla wasentitled to ensure that he would be exposed to danger on thatoccasion.4) Finally, the municipal council is not responsible. The Municipalitystands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation withthe

municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is anelementary principle that a corporation has a personality, separateand distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it andthe latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damagesfor tort or negligence culpa aquillana committed by the corporation’s employees of agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. To make an officerof a corporation liable for the negligence of the corporation theremust have been upon his part such a breach of duty as contributedto or helped to bring about, the injury; that is to say, he must be aparticipant in the wrongful act. SAN DIEGO VS MUNICIPALITY OF NAUJAN FACTS: ollowing a public bidding conducted by the municipality of Naujan,Oriental Mindoro for the lease of its municipal waters, Resolution 46was passed awarding the concession of the Butas River and theNaujan Lake to Bartolome San Diego. A contract was entered intobetween the said San Diego and the municipality, for a period of lease for 5 years.The lessee then requested for a five year extension of the originallease period, this was granted by the municipal council. After theresolution had been approved by the Provincial Board of OrientalMindoro, the lessor and the lessee, contracted for the extension of the period of the lease. The contract was approved and confirmedon December 29, 1951 by Resolution 229 of the municipal council of Naujan whose term was then about to expire. Pursuant to the saidcontract, the lessee filed a surety bond of P52,000 and thenreconstructed his fish corrals and stocked the Naujan Lake withbangus fingerlings.On January 2, 1952, the municipal council of Naujan, this timecomposed of a new set of members, adopted Resolution 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222, series of 1951. On the same date, thenew council also passed Resolution 11, revoking Resolution 229 of the old council which confirmed the extension of the lease period.The lessee requested for reconsideration and recall of Resolution 3,on the ground, among others, that it violated the contract executedbetween him and the municipality on December 23, 1951, and,therefore, contrary to Article III, section 1, clause 10 of theConstitution. The request, however, was not granted.The lessee instituted proceedings to annul the Resolution. Thedefendant asserted that the original lease contract, reducing thelease rentals and renewing the lease are null and void for not havingbeen passed in accordance with law. The trial court upheld thevalidity of the lease contract. ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222,series of 1951, of the municipal council of Naujan is valid HELD: YesThe law (Sec. 2323 of the Revised Administrative Code) requires thatwhen the exclusive privilege of fishery or the right to conduct a fish-breeding ground is granted to a private party, the same shall be letto the highest bidder in the same manner as is being done inexploiting a ferry, a market or a slaughterhouse belonging to themunicipality. The requirement of competitive bidding is for thepurpose of inviting competition and to guard against favoritism,fraud and corruption in the letting of fishery privileges. There is nodoubt that the original lease contract in this case was awarded tothe highest bidder, but the reduction of the rental and the extensionof the term of the lease appear to have been granted withoutprevious public bidding.Furthermore, it has been ruled that statutes requiring public biddingapply to amendments of any contract already executed incompliance with the law where such amendments alter the originalcontract in some vital and essential particular. Inasmuch as theperiod in a lease is a vital and

essential particular to the contract, webelieve that the extension of the lease period in this case, which wasgranted without the essential requisite of public bidding, is not inaccordance with law. And it follows the Resolution 222, series of 1951, and the contract authorized thereby, extending the originalfive-year lease to another five years are null and void as contrary tolaw and public policy.We agree with the defendant in that the question Resolution 3 is notan impairment of the obligation of contract, because theconstitutional provision on impairment refers only to contract legallyexecuted. While, apparently, Resolution 3 tended to abrogate thecontract extending the lease, legally speaking, there was no contractabrogated because, as we have said, the extension contract is voidand inexistent.The lower court, in holding that the defendant-appellantmunicipality has been estopped from assailing the validity of thecontract into which it entered on December 23, 1951, seems to haveoverlooked the general rule that the doctrine of estoppel cannot beapplied as against a municipal corporation to validate a contractwhich it has no power to make or which it is authorized to make onlyunder prescribed conditions, within prescribed limitations, or in aprescribed mode or manner, although the corporation has acceptedthe benefits thereof and the other party has fully performed his partof the agreement, or has expended large sums in preparation forperformance. A reason frequently assigned for this rule is that toapply the doctrine of estoppel against a municipality in such casewould be to enable it to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.Also, where a contract is violative of public policy, the municipalityexecuting it cannot be estopped to assert the invalidity of a contractwhich has ceded away, controlled, or embarrassed its legislative orgovernment powers.As pointed out above, "public biddings are held for the bestprotection of the public and to give the public the best possibleadvantages by means of open competition between the bidders."Thus, contracts requiring public bidding affect public interest, and tochange them without complying with that requirement wouldindeed be against public policy. There is, therefore, nothing toplaintiff-appellee's contention that the parties in this case being inpari delicto should be left in the situation where they are found, for"although the parties are in pari delicto, yet the court may interfereand grant relief at the suit of one of them, where public policyrequires its intervention, even though the result may be that abenefit will be derived by a plaintiff who is in equal guilt withdefendant. But here the guilt of the parties is not considered asequal to the higher right of the public, and the guilty party to whomthe relief is granted is simply the instrument by which the public isserved."In consonance with the principles enunciated above, Resolution 59,series of 1947, reducing the rentals by 20% of the original price,which was also passed without public bidding, should likewise beheld void, since a reduction of the rental to be paid by the lessee is asubstantial alternation in the contract, making it a distinct anddifferent lease contract which requires the prescribed formality of public bidding. Rivera vs Municipality of Malolos Facts: 1. 1. In August 1949, the municipality of Malolos called for bids for the supply of road construction materials. 2. 2. Pedro P. Rivera, having the lowest bid, was awarded by the municipal treasurer with the contract. The contract was signed by the mayor where it was stipulated that in consideration of P19, 235.00, Rivera will supply the municipality with 2,700 cubic meters of crushed stone and 1,400 cubic meters of gravel. 3. 3. Rivera delivered said construction materials but he wasn’t paid immediately. He demanded from the treasurer the amount due and the treasurer replied thru the principal clerk that the municipal treasurer will pay as soon as the funds are available.

4. 4.

Municipal council ratified the public bidding and the contract.

5. 5. Rivera filed a complaint against the municipality and sought the intervention of the Presidential Complaints and Actions Committee which endorsed the case to the Office of the Auditor General. Auditor General denied Rivera’s claim on the ground that there was no sum of money appropriated to meet the obligation incurred before the execution of the contract, as required by the Admin Code, thus it was a void contract. 6. 6.

Thus this petition for review before the SC

Issue: WON Rivera can demand the payment due for the delivery of stone and gravel even if there was no funds appropriated for such purpose before the execution of the contract? Held: No Ratio: -Municipal Mayor cannot enter into a contract with a private contractor for furnishing the municipality with public work materials. Sec. 1920 of Admin Code requires that such contracts should be entered by the district engineer and not the mayor. -The law requires that before a contract involving Php 2,000.00 or more is entered, the municipal treasurer must certify to the officer entering into such contract that funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose and the amount is available. -The law requires that provincial auditor or his representatives must check up the deliveries. No such check-up occurred in this case. -Motor Vehicle Law, which Rivera uses as reason to say that funds have been appropriated for the project merely states that 10% of the money collected will be allocated for the repair of roads and bridges and proportional to the population of the municipality. –This does not constitute the sufficient appropriation required by law.

RIVERA v. MACLANG

Facts: The municipality of Malolos called for bids for furnishing and delivering materials to be used in the maintenance and repair of barrio roads. Pedro Rivera won in the bidding and was asked by the Municipal Treasurer to come to his office for execution of the corresponding contract. The contract was signed by him and by Carlo P. Maclang in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Malolos. Pursuant to the contract, Rivera subsequently delivered to the municipality gravel and adobe stones valued at P19,235.00. The Municipal Council of Malolos passed a resolution approving the contract, but in spite of repeated demands by Rivera the price of the materials was not paid.

In 1954, Rivera sought the intervention of the Presidential Complaint and Action Commission, which referred the matter to the General Auditing Office. That Office turned down the claim for payment, whereupon Rivera filed in this Court a petition for review. The Court sustained the action of the General Auditing Office and held that the contract in question was void as far as Malolos was concerned on

the ground that no money had been appropriated to meet the obligation prior to the execution of the contract, as required by Section 607 of the Revised Administrative Code.

However, in the same decision, the Supreme Court indicated that Section 608 of the same Code afforded Rivera a remedy. Consequently, he filed the present action against Maclang in his personal capacity pursuant to the said provision.

The trial court dismissed the complaint since the contract had been declared null and void by the Court saying that "it cannot produce any legal effect for which thereafter no recovery can be made."

Issue:

WON the dismissal was proper

Held:No

Ratio: The ruling in the previous case is that the contract was null and void visa-vis Malolos, by reason of non-compliance with the requirement of Section 607 of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that:

"except in the case of a contract for supplies to be carried in stock, no contract involving the expenditure by any province, municipality, chartered city, or municipal district of two thousand pesos or more shall be entered into or authorized until the treasurer of the political division concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into such contract that funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract is available for expenditure on account thereof."

It should be noted however that the present action is against Maclang in his personal capacity on the strength of Section 608 of the same Code, which provides as follows:

SEC. 608. Void Contract - Liability of Officer - A purported contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void, and the officer assuming to make such contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties.

The position of Maclang, as the officer who signed the contract with Rivera in violation of Section 607, comes squarely under the provision just quoted. His liability is personal, as if the transaction had been entered into by him as a private party. The intention of the law in this respect is to ensure that public officers entering into transactions with private individuals calling for the expenditure of public funds observe a high degree of caution so that the government may not be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action by those assuming to represent it. Fernando vs Davao City FACTS: 

November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein

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Bascon won

November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. o

The bodies were removed by a fireman.

o

The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there.

The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. o

Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be the ones who did the reemptying.

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Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas

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November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order

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RTC: Dismissed the case

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CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and the indigent

ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can be liable for damages HELD: NO. CA affirmed.  test by which to

determine the existence of negligence in a

particular case: o

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence 

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standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law

Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences o

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case

o

Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist

Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury o

Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover

o

Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence

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Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public o

While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements

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accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers

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Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.

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proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot  demand damages from the public respondent.

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TUZON v. COURT OF APPEALS , mapagu FACTS The   Sangguniang   Bayan   of   Camalaniugan,   Cagayan   adopted  Resolution  No.   9.   Said resolution  authorized   the  municipal  treasurer  to  enter   into  an  agreement   with  all   thresher operators who apply for a Permit to Thresh Palay to donate 1% of all the palay threshed by them.   Thereafter,   Jurado   offered   to   pay   the   license   fee   for   thresher   operators.   Municipal Treasurer   Magapu  refused   to  accept  payment  and  required   him  to  first  secure   a  Mayor’s permit. Mayor Tuzon said that Jurado should first comply with Resolution No. 9 and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued. Jurado filed with the Court of First Instance of Cagayan   for   mandamus,   and   another   with   the   same   court   for  judgement  against   the   said resolution. CFI upheld the Resolution, and dismissed the claim for damages. CA affirmed the validity of the Resolution and found Tuzon and Mapagu to have acted maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurado’s application. ISSUE Whether or not   petitioners are liable in damages for having withheld Mayor’s permit and license because of respondent’s refusal to comply with said Resolution. HELD NO. Article 27 presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public official to perform his official   duty   is   attributable   to   malice   or   inexcusable   negligence.   There   was   no  evidence offered to show that petitioners singled out respondent for persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from  refusing  to issue the mayor’s permit and license. Moreover, the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality without preference. A public officer is not personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority and in line of his official duty. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring said Resolution invalid, its legality would have to

be presumed. As executive officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it. An erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor amount to bad faith.