Province of North Cotabato v Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines (G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, & 183962) (14 October 2008)

Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.

Facts: On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as “associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the existing legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact. Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a

Issues and Ruling: 1. W/N the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments. YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessary changes shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down as unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments. Because although the President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace negotiations, may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. 2. W/N there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28), including public consultation under RA No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991). YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda:

a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society; b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment; c. RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP). 3. W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. 4. W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional. NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions, but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

5. W/N the GRP can invoke executive privilege. NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. Carpio-Morales, J. The people’s right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while the policy of public disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination—a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral

secession) arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act. Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.