Property Digests 3

Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 177168 August 3, 2015 Facts: A Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) issued in Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc (NOVAI)’s name covers a land situated inside the former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation in Taguig. This property was previously a part of a larger parcel of land which TCT’s under the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The then President Garcia issued a Proclamation No. 423 which reserves for military purposes certain parcels of the public domain situated in Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Rizal and Pasay City. Thereafter, then President Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 461 which excluded Fort McKinley a certain portion of land situated in the provinces abovementioned and declared them as AFP Officers’ Village to be disposed of under the provisions of certain laws. However, this area was subsequently reserved for veterans’ rehabilitation, medicare and training center sites. The property was the subject of deed of sale between the Republic and NOVAI to which the TCT was registered in favour of the latter. The Republic then sought to cancel NOVAI’s title on the ground that the property was still part of the military reservation thus inalienable land of the public domain and cannot be the subject of sale. The RTC ruled that the property was alienable and disposable in character. The Court of Appeals reversed RTC’s decision. Issue: Whether or not the property covered by TCT issued under the name of NOVAI is inalienable land of public domain and cannot be the subject of sale. Held: Yes, the property remains a part of the public domain that could not have been validly disposed of in NOVAI’s favor. NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving that the property was not intended for public or quasi-public use or purpose. As provided in Article 420 of Civil Code, “property of the public dominion as those which are intended for public use or, while not intended for public use, belong to the State and are intended for some public service”. In this case, the property was classified as military reservation thus, remained to be property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the public use for which they have been reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President. Since there was no positive act from the government, the property had to retain its inalienable and non-disposable character. It cannot therefore, be subject of sale otherwise, the sale is void for being contrary to law.

Bliss Development Corp./Home Guaranty Corporation v. Diaz G.R. No. 213233 August 5, 2015 Facts: Petitioner Bliss Development Corporation (BDC), is the registered owner of a lot in Quezon City which executed a Deed of Sale over the property in favour of Sps. Melgazo, both are now deceased. Nacua sent a letter to BDC stating that Sps. Melgazo transferred to him their rights over the property. Before the property was fully paid, Nacua sold his rights to Garcia who later transferred his rights to Reyes who further sold his rights to respondent Diaz. BDC then issued a permit to occupy the property in favor of Diaz who later on introduced improvements on the said property. A Contract to Sell in favor of Diaz was executed but he was informed that a certain Arreza was claiming that the heirs of Sps. Melgazo sold to him the rights over the said property. The RTC ruled that Diaz failed to prove that he is an assignee in good faith. The CA reversed the decision of RTC stating that as a buyer and builder in good faith, Diaz is entitled to be paid reimbursement and damages. BDC is the one that acted in bad faith for issuing an occupancy permit despite its knowledge of Arreza’s claims over the property. Issues: (1) Whether or not respondent Diaz is a buyer and builder in good faith. (2) Whether or not BDC is liable to Diaz for the value of improvements the latter has introduced to the property. Held: (1) No, the Court failed to find sufficient basis for the CA’s ruling that Diaz is a purchaser for value and in good faith. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he or she has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. In the case at bar, Diaz failed to diligently inquire into the title of his predecessor before entering into the contract of sale. As such, he cannot be considered a buyer in good faith. (2) Yes, BDC is liable to Diaz. Article 453 of the Civil Code states that “If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith. It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.”

In this case, since both of the parties had acted in bad faith, the petitioner for giving a permit of occupation to the respondent despite the claims of Arreza and the respondent for not inquiring into the validity of the title of the seller, the Civil Code commands that the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both of them had acted in good faith. The BDC shall pay only the amortizations paid and the amount spent by Diaz for the improvements thereof.

Republic of the Philippines v. Alba G.R. No. 169710 August 19, 2015 Facts: Respondent Alba was the purchaser for value of the parcel of land in the province of Aklan. He applied for the original registration of title over this land in the MCTC. The OSG however, opposed the application for registration alleging that the respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands since June 12, 1945. The MCTC granted the application for registration of the parcel of land in favor of the respondent. The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision that the respondent was able to prove his title through documentary evidence like the tax declarations. Issue: Whether or not the respondent failed to prove possession and ownership over the property applied for registration. Held: Yes, the respondent has failed to sufficiently prove his and his predecessors-ininterest’s open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in the concept of owners. The respondent did not competently account for any act of occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance of the lands, either on his part or on the part of his predecessors-in-interest for the entire time they were supposedly in possession of the lands. Its claim of ownership on the basis of tax declarations alone did not suffice. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes will not prove ownership. Furthermore, tax declarations are not conclusive proof of possession or ownership and their submission will not lend support in proving the nature of possession required by the law.

Liwayway Andres, Ronnie Andres and Pablo Francisco v. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. G.R. No. 201405 August 24, 2015 Facts: Petitioners and Liza filed a complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way against respondent, Sta.Lucia Realty. They alleged that they are co-owners and possessors for more than 50 years of 3 parcels of unregistered land in Binangonan, Rizal. A few years back, respondent acquired the lands surrounding the subject property and developed the same into a residential subdivision and built a concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners and Liza were denied access to the nearest public road. Petitioners further alleged that they are the surviving heirs of the late Carlos who owned the subject property that the latter had acquired ownership over the same after he had been in a continuous, public and peaceful possession thereof for 50 years. The RTC ruled that the petitioners are entitled to the Easement of Right-of-Way since they are considered the owners of the property through extraordinary prescription. However, CA reversed the lower court’s decision. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent. Held: No, the petitioners are not entitled to demand such easement. Article 649 of the Civil Code provides, “an easement of right-of-way may be demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same.” In this case, the petitioners stressed that they have already become the owners of the subject property through extraordinary prescription since they have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession thereof for more than 50 years. However, it was clarified in the case of Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines that only lands of the public domain subsequently classified as no longer intended for public use can be converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership. As it appears, the subject property is an unregistered public agricultural land, thus being so, the petitioners shall be first able to show that the State has expressly declared through law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the property is no longer intended for public use. Absence of which, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription. Since, there was an absence of proof evidencing the subsequent classification of land as no longer intended for public use then,

the petitioners cannot demand an easement of right-of-way from the respondent for lack of personality.

Sps. Javier, Petitioners, vs. Sps. De Guzman, Respondents. G.R. No. 186204 September 2, 2015 Facts: Petitioners filed a Complaint against the respondents for Ejectment alleging that they are the absolute owners of the subject lot in Bakod Bayan, Cabanatuan City. Plaintiffs were also contending that they were in prior physical possession of the entire property. On December 13, 2004, the defendants unlawfully entered a portion of said land and arrogated unto themselves ownership thereof by enclosing the same with concrete hollow blocks fence. Plaintiff Romeo T. Javier then made a request to the Office of the City Engineer, Cabanatuan City to conduct a relocation survey so as to prove to defendants the metes and bounds of plaintiffs' property and in the said survey, it appears that defendants have encroached an area on plaintiffs' land. Several demands made by plaintiffs and their father Gregorio Javier, to defendants for them to desist from occupying subject land were just ignored by defendants and they persisted in completing their illegal acts. Respondents alleged in their Answer that the area they fenced in had always been in their possession as it was within the boundary of the lot they had been occupying. They maintained that the disputed area had originally been enclosed by a barbed wire fence and respondents were merely replacing the barbed wires with concrete hollow blocks, without changing or moving the boundaries. Respondents questioned the survey conducted by the Office of the City Engineer, pointing out that it was done unilaterally, without taking into consideration the boundaries of their lot. Issue: Whether the remedy of petitioners should be an action for recovery of possession and not one for ejectment. Held: The remedy of the petitioners should be in the context of accion reivindicatoria. On this matter, Manalang vs. Bacani is quite instructive: “A boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiffs property. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto.”

Opposing possessory rights over certain areas of adjacent lots, arising from claims of ownership thereof, cannot be resolved in a summary action such as an ejectment suit. The issues involved in such a controversy should be fully threshed out in an action like accion reivindicatoria, especially when plaintiff fails to establish actual prior possession. In a much earlier ruling of this Court, it was already held therein that “[i]f [a party] is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.”

Tomasa J. Sabellina, Petitioner, vs. Dolores Buray, et al., Respondents. G.R. 187727 September 2, 2015 Facts: On November 8, 2004, petitioner Tomasa J. Sabellina filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents Dolores Buray, et al. Tomasa claimed that she is the owner of the parcel of land in Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental. The subject lot had been declared for tax purposes since 1948 in the name of her father, Demetrio Jaramillo. She also claimed that she inherited the property after her parents’ death pursuant to a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement. She has possessed the property and has been paying realty taxes thereon since her father’s death. Her late sister Teodosia Jaramillo Abellanosa gave the respondents permission to occupy the subject lot. Tomasa allowed the respondents to construct their houses on the lot on condition that they would vacate the property when she needed it. In 2002, she mortgaged the subject lot to the Rural Bank of Guitagum as security for a loan and when she defaulted on the loan. In early 2003, she verbally requested the respondents to vacate the lot but they refused. Finally, she sent a written demand to the respondents to vacate on 2 August 2004. Respondents filed their answers denying Tomasa’s allegations. They claimed that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources declared the subject lot alienable and disposable; and so, they had possessed the subject lot in good faith since the 1970s and had acquired it through acquisitive prescription. They also claimed that they had introduced improvements on the lot by constructing their family homes and planting crops and fruit-bearing trees. Lastly, Tomasa did not object when they constructed a chapel on the lot without her permission. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a superior right of possession over the subject land than the respondents. Held: No. The Court is, however, convinced that the petitioner is the rightful owner of the subject lot. Nevertheless, this case is an ejectment proceeding where possession, not, ownership, is the central issue. In ejectment cases, the circumstances of the defendant’s entry into the property determines whether the cause of action is for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. While the petitioner’s tax declarations are good indicia of her possession in the concept of an owner, this only refers to possession dejure not possession de facto. Indisputably, the respondents are in the actual physical possession of the subject lot. The tax declarations do not shed light on the circumstances of the respondents’ entry into the property. From the petitioner’s evidence, only the affidavits of Tomasa Sabellina and Elena R. Jaramillo,

and the promissory agreement from Roberto Acido are instructive as to the nature of the respondents’ possession. The petitioner, however, is not left without a remedy in law. She may still avail of the plenary actions of accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria to recover possession and vindicate her ownership over the property.

Teresa D. Tuazon, Petitioner, vs. Sps Isagon, Respondents. G.R. No. 191432 September 2, 2015 Facts: Spouses Melencio Diaz and Dolores Gulay (Dolores) owned a lot in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. They had three daughters named Maria, Paciencia, and Esperanza. Melencio and Maria predeceased Dolores. On May 28, 1955, Dolores, Paciencia, and Esperanza the lot to Dolores through a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement. In 1956, Dolores sold the lot to Isabel Torres through a Deed of Absolute Sale; subsequently, Isabel sold the lot to Teresa. After several years, three of Maria’s children sold their shares to Teresa. On the other hand, Angel mortgaged his share to Teresa. However, the former refused and failed to redeem the mortgaged property. In 1972, petitioner’s brother, Antonio, allowed Spouses Angel and Marcosa to build a hut on a portion of the subject lot without Teresa’s knowledge. In 2000, respondents started to contrast a house; nevertheless, Teresa tolerated their possession and use of the contested area. After five years, Teresa sent a final demand letter to respondents to vacate and to pay rental fees. In the respondents’ answer, they alleged that they were occupying the subject property as owners and that Teresa fraudulently obtained the title over the land. Issue: Who has the better right of physical possession between the registered owner as shown in the certificate of title and the mortgagor as shown in the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan. Held: Teresa has the better right of physical possession over the subject lot. A person who possesses a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of ownership including possession. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack in an action for unlawful detainer. A collateral attack is made when, in an action to obtain a different relief, the validity of a certificate of title is questioned. In the present case, the respondents alleged in their answer that the certificate of title issued in the name of Teresa was fraudulently obtained. This defense constitutes a collateral attack on the title and should not therefore be entertained. To directly assail the validity of the title, a direct action for reconveyance must be filed. In the present case, based on the certificate of title, Teresa is the owner of the subject property and is entitled to its physical possession.

Republic, Petitioner, vs. Rev. Claudio R. Cortez G.R. No. 197472 September 7, 2015 Facts: Rev. Cortez, a missionary, established an orphanage and school in Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion of Palaui Island in Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana, Cagayan which he, with the help of Aetas and other people under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes. Proclamation No. 201 reserved a parcel of the public domain situated in Palaui Island for military. More than two decades later, Proclamation No. 447 was enacted declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding waters situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as marine reserve. In 2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction Biñas in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command in Sta. Ana, Cagayan. According to him, some members of the Philippine Navy, upon orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the said 50-hectare portion of Palaui Island when they commanded him and his men, through the use of force and intimidation, to vacate the area. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his men were constrained to leave the area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said Petition with the RTC seeking preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Biñas to restore to him possession and to not disturb the same, and further, for the said preliminary writ, if issued, to be made permanent. Issue: Whether or not Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction. Held: No, Rev. Cortez is not entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction. Jus possessionis or possession in the concept of an owner is one of the two concepts of possession provided under Article 525 of the Civil Code. Also referred to as adverse possession, this kind of possession is one which can ripen into ownership by prescription. As correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez, a possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. However, the following cannot be appropriated and hence, cannot be possessed: property of the public dominion, common things (res communes) such as sunlight and air, and things specifically prohibited by law. Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he, nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public domain and therefore

can

be

the

proper

object

of

possession.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land

as

alienable

and

disposable

must

be

established.

In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez' claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place.

Heirs of Castillejos v. La Tondeña Incorporada G.R. No. 190158 July 20, 2016 Facts: Respondent La Tondeña Incorporada filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Nullity of Tax Declarations and Damages against petitioner Liberato Castillejos, who was subsequently substituted by his heirs. The respondent contended that it is the absolute owner of the 2 parcels of land in Bauang, La Union covered by tax declarations. It further alleged that Liberato, through stealth and fraud, maliciously executed an affidavit of ownership over the properties and presented the same to the Provincial Assessor of La Union who in turn, issued in his name the tax declarations. The petitioner on his part however, claimed that the land and the subject properties are different from one another because they have different boundaries and the land was tilled by his father-in-law since 1940 and took possession of it in 1962. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent since it has older documents proving ownership. The CA thereafter, affirmed RTC’s decision stressing that the oldest tax declaration in favour of respondent was sufficient to prove ownership. Issue: Whether or not the action of the respondent to quiet title will prosper. Held: No. For the action to quiet title to prosper, 2 requisites must be present: (1) the plaintiff must have a legal or an equitable title to the real property which is the subject matter of the action and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff’s title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. In this case, there was no clear and concrete evidence that the properties covered by Liberato’s tax declarations are the same parcels of land described in the respondent’s tax declarations. The boundaries, nature and classification of the land claimed by the parties appear to be different. The respondent failed to illustrate or even allege which portion of the land covered by its tax declarations was allegedly encroached upon by Liberatos’ tax declarations. The Court deems it appropriate to remand the case to the RTC for the conduct of verification or relocation survey. In the event that the respondent’s claim is correct, the corresponding adjustment must be accorded