[PROPERTY] Co-ownership Case Digest

[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP

CONCEPT, CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES THAT GIVE RISE TO OWNERSHIP DE GUIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Two parcels of land covering a fishpond equally owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego. The one half undivided portion owned by Araniego was later purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo, the only heir of the original owner (husband of Araniego). Prior to this sale, the whole fishpond was leased by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of De Guia. De Guia continues to possess the entire fishpond and derived income therein despite the expiration of the lease contract and several demands to vacate by Teofilo Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, Jose Abejo. Abejo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against De Guia. However, Abejo failed to present evidence of the judicial or extrajudicial partition of the fishpond. ISSUE: Whether a co-owner can file ejectment case against a co-owner? Whether Abejo was entitled to rent the property? HELD: Under Article 484, “there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. A coowner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.” Article 487 also provides that ‘anyone of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment”. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. However, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as a co-owner he has a right of possession. If one co-owner alone occupies the property without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house. The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIA’s lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent.

PARDELL vs. BARTOLOME FACTS: Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively. Prior to her death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan, whereby she made her four children,

named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property. Manuel and Francisca were already deceased, leaving Vicenta and Matilda as heirs. In 1888, the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the properties left by Calixta and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of Vicenta’s interest. Despite repeated demands to divide the properties and the fruits accruing therefrom, Sps Gaspar and Matilde had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkempt promises and other excuses. Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC. RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned, Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. That motion was denied by the lower court. Thus, this petition. ISSUE: WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the coowned property. RULING: Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes: “Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them according to their rights.” Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership ; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs. Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder cannot be determined and every one of the co-owners exercises together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made

to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter, especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of coownership of the defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the property of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants. The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her co-owner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as a co-owner of the property.

SALANTADOL vs. RETES FACTS: On January 17,1965, EUFEMIA OMOLE sold her one-third (1/3) share of said Lot No. 513 for P l,000.00 to defendant CATALINA RETES. On January l8, 1965 the Register of Deeds or the Province of Negros Oriental wrote to plaintiff Flavia Salatandol which letter was received on January 21, 1965 informing her about the document presented for registration affecting the one-third (1/3) share of Lot No. 513 in favor of Defendant Catalina Salatandol to surrender the owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title. Plaintiffs were never notified by the late EUFEMIA OMOLE nor by Defendant Catalina Retes about the proposed sale. On January 30, 1965, Plaintiffs wrote to Defendant CATALINA RETES informing her of their desire to repurchase the said one-third (1/3) share of Lot No. 513 which the late Eufemia Omole sold to her and failing to get a favorable action from Defendant Catalina Retes, Plaintiffs on February 5, 1965 deposited the amount of Pl,000.00 with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental and who, on February 13, 1965 wrote Defendant Catalina Retes informing the latter about the deposit and of Plaintiffs' desire to exercise their right of pre-emption as co-owners of Eufemia Omole. When Defendant Catalina Retes failed to get the deposit with the Clerk of Court, on February 16, 1965 (plaintiffs) filed the instant action for Legal Pre-emption. on February 22, 1965 while this case was still pending, Defendant Catalina Retes resold the said one-third (1/3) share of Lot No. 513 back to EUFEMIA OMOLE. On March 11, 1965 Eufemia Omole donated the said one-third (1/3) share of Lot No. 513 to Defendant Catalina Retes as evidenced by a Deed of Donation. ISSUE: Whether or not SALANTADOL has a right of legal pre-emption, given that no notice was given by Omole regarding the sale

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[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP RULING: The Court ruled that Art. 1623 of the Civil Code clearly and expressly prescribes that the thirty (30) days for making the pre-emption or redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by the vendor. In the case at bar, the plaintiffs have not been furnished any written notice of sale or a copy thereof by Eufemia Omole, the vendor. Said plaintiffs' right to exercise the legal right of preemption or redemption, given to a co-owner when any one of the other co-owners sells his share in the thing owned in common to a third person, as provided for in Article 1623 of the Civil Code, has not yet accrued. But, even assuming ex gratia argurmenti, that the notice from the Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental to co-plaintiff Flavia Salatandol of the document transferring the one-third (1/3) share of Eufemia Omole to defendant, was equivalent to notice from the vendor, still, it appears that, while the disputed one-third (1/3) portion of Eufemia Omole and the onethird (1/3) share of the plaintiffs, (there is no mention of the other third portion) are embraced in one certificate of title, there had been an actual partition of the land described in the certificate of title and each co-owner is in possession of his respective share. This is deduced from the order of the trial court, dated 30 July 1966, where the court restrained the parties from harvesting the nuts on the "and in question," referring to the one-third (1/3) share of Eufemia Omole. As expressed in Article 484 of the Civil Code, a co-ownership exists whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Under such concept, a co-owner cannot point to a particular portion of the property owned in common as his own, because his portion thereof is intangible rather than identifiable. Here, the portion of Eufemia Omole as well as those of the plaintiffs had been identified and localized, so that co-ownership, in its real sense, no longer exists. Hence, the right of redemption or pre-emption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code can no longer be invoked by the plaintiffs over the portion appertaining to Eufemia Omole.

parents name and they had been living in the said house and lot since birth. The only reason why the said house and lot was transferred in Dominador’s name was when their parents were in need of money for renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain a loan and since Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of Dominador. The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelito’s filiation and the settlement of the estate are conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of execution which was opposed by the nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot. The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-heirs thus he cannot eject them from the property via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar. ISSUE: Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit HELD: NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of Dominador. Since he was survived was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus making them co-owners as well. Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed. Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation of the ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition should be dismissed.

RIGHT OF ANY CO-OWNER (TO RECOVER)/LIMITATION OF RIGHT OF COOWNER

A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of (petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is the sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his father to occupy the property provided that they vacate when asked. Time came when he demanded that they vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment suit against them. His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming that the said lot was registered in their

Respondent developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 occupied by him into a resort known as the Borromeo Beach Resort. In his desire to expand and extend the facilities of the resort that he established on the subject properties, respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the property. Petitioners, however, refused to vacate their homes. On 16 February 1994, respondent filed a Complaint5 for ejectment with the MTC against the petitioners. MTC Found that Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 were owned in common by respondent with other persons. It ruled that respondent did not have a preferential right of possession over the portions occupied by petitioners, since Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 were not yet partitioned nor the disputed portions assigned to respondent as his determinate share. Thus, the MTC held that respondent had no right to evict petitioners therefrom. Consequently, respondent’s Complaint was dismissed. Notably, the MTC held that respondent and the spouses Bascon were the owners in common of Lot No. 2587 and their respective shares had not yet been determined by partition as proven by a testimony given by respondent. RTC: The RTC reversed the Decision of the MTC. It held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which allows any one of the coowners to bring an action in ejectment, may successfully be invoked by the respondent because, in a sense, a co-owner is the owner and possessor of the whole, and that the suit for ejectment is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners. The RTC also ruled that assuming petitioners were authorized to occupy a portion of the co-owned property, they could resume this occupation when the properties shall have been partitioned and allocated to the ones who gave them permission to reside therein. CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC

RESUENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

ISSUE

FACTS:

Whether or not the respondents have the right to evict the petitioners from the property therefrom

ADLAWAN vs. ADLAWAN FACTS:

original co-owners of Lot No. 2587. Respondent claims that all petitioners have occupied portions of the subject property by virtue of his own liberality.

Private respondent, the late Juanito Borromeo, Sr., is the co-owner and overseer of certain parcels of land located in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu, designated as Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 of the Talisay-Manglanilla Estate. Respondent owns six-eighths (6/8) of Lot No. 2587 while the late spouses Inocencio Bascon and Basilisa Maneja own two-eights (2/8) thereof. On the other hand, Lot No. 2592 is owned in common by respondent and the heirs of one Nicolas Maneja. However, the proportion of their undivided shares was not determined a quo. Prior to the institution of the present action, petitioners Tining Resuena, Alejandra Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima Resuena resided in the upper portion of Lot No. 2587, allegedly under the acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon and their heir, Andres Bascon. On the other hand, petitioner Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592, allegedly with the permission of the heirs of Nicolas Maneja, one of the

RULING: it is unmistakable that respondent has a right to eject the petitioners from Lot No. 2587. Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that "[a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment," is a categorical and an unqualified authority in favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the portions of Lot. No. 2587. This provision is a departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that an action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. Thus, a coowner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When

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[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights.

On May 25, 1991, after remand of the case to the court of origin, private respondent was placed in possession of the entire property covered by TCT 34341.

Respondent’s action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since petitioners were not able to prove that they are authorized to occupy the same.

Petitioners then filed with Respondent Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the aforesaid judgment against private respondent and the implementing sheriff. The case was docketed as CA GR SP No. 24846. On May 8, 1991, Respondent Court issued a resolution directing petitioners "to implead as party defendant the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 50, Dagupan City."

Petitioners’ lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with respondent’s right under Article 487, clearly settles respondent’s prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. 2587. Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. WITH REGARDS TO RESPONDENTS BEING ESTOPPED FROM FILING AN EJECTMENT CASE: "[e]stoppel is effective only as between the parties thereto or their successors in interest;" thus, only the spouses Bascon or their successors in interest may invoke such "estoppel." A stranger to a transaction is neither bound by, nor in a position to take advantage of, an estoppel arising therefrom.

ARCELONA, ET AL vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioners Marcelino Arcelona, Tomasa Arcelona-Chiang and Ruth Arcelona are natural-born Filipinos who are now naturalized Americans residing in California, U.S.A. Petitioner Ruth Arcelona is the surviving spouse and legal heir of the deceased Benedicto Arcelona, brother of Marcelino and Tomasa. Together with their three sisters — Pacita Arcelona-Olanday, Maria Arcelona-Arellano and Natividad Arcelona-Cruz (hereinafter collectively referred to as Olanday, et al.) — petitioners are co-owners pro-indiviso of a fishpond which they inherited from their deceased parents. The six Arcelonas (two brothers and four sisters) are named as co-owners in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34341 which evidences ownership over the fishpond. On March 4, 1978, a contract of lease over the fishpond was executed between Cipriano Tandoc and Olanday, et al. The lease contract was for a period of three (3) years but was renewed up to February 2, 1984. Private Respondent Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as caretaker-tenant of the same fishpond, effective on the date the contract of lease was executed. After the termination of the lease contract, the lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession of the leased premises to the lessors, Olanday, et al. Three days thereafter, on February 7, 1984, Private Respondent Farnacio instituted Civil Case D-7240 for "peaceful possession, maintenance of security of tenure plus damages, with motion for the issuance of an interlocutory order" against Olanday, et al. The case was intended to maintain private respondent as tenant of the fishpond.

ISSUES: Whether or not the final judgment be annulled on the ground of lack jurisdiction for not including petitioners who, as co-owners of the subject property, are indispensable parties RULING: YES.

“Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the coowned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.” “The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion.” FACTS: Leonor, Luz and Norma are co-owners of a parcel of land. Norma allowed Teofila to build a house on a lot adjacent to their co-owned land. The house intruded on a portion of their property. Leonor was surprised to see a part of Teofila's house intruding unto a portion of the co-owned property. She then made several demands to demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the portion encroaching their property.

Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

Leonor then filed a forcible entry against Teofila.

Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. Private respondent does not deny this fact, and the Court of Appeals did not make any contrary finding. The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of the property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion belongs to petitioners. Thus, it is not possible to show over which portion the tenancy relation of private respondent has been established and ruled upon in Civil Case D-7240. Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded as indispensable parties.

She counters that the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues that since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not just possession de facto but also one of possession de jure since it involves rights of coowners to enjoy the property.

Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." It was subsequently held that a co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the other co-owners.

WON the consent given by one of co-owner of a parcel of land to a person to construct a house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against that person?

Leonor's contention: She contends that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until partition. Teofila's Contention:

ISSUE:

HELD: NO. Clearly, the decision in Civil Case D-7240 cannot bind petitioners and cannot adjudicate the entire co-owned property, not even that portion belonging to Olanday et al., ownership of the property being still proindiviso. Obviously, the failure to implead petitioners barred the lower court from making a final adjudication. Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment therein cannot attain finality.

ALTERATION OF A PROPERTY UNDER COOWNERSHIP

A co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the coownership. A co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use. Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the coownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the coowned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.

CRUZ vs. CATAPANG

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[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property.

Leis’ half of the property to be divided among his legitimes. Co-ownership of the land then began.

Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the classification "through strategy or stealth".

SEGURA vs. SEGURA

Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondent's act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondent's acts constitute forcible entry.

FACTS:

CRUZ vs. LEIS (132 SCRA 97) Redemption by a co-owner doesn't terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the whole property subject of the co-ownership

On April 6, 1961, three of the nine grandchildren - Nicolas, Santiago and Gaudencio Segura, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating the entire property to themselves alone as equal pro indiviso owners. The partition was not registered immediately, but only 5 years later, in 1946.

FACTS:

Before such registration, the following developments transpired:

Leis and Isidro married each other in 1923. Isidro subsequently acquired from the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources a parcel of land, which was titled in her name, with the description that she was a “widow”. Leis only passed away in 1973 without executing a will.

The land was sold to Amojido with right to repurchase. Such right was not exercised. In November 28, 1946, Amojido executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and obtained a TCT with a reservation of the rights of the other heirs annotated therein. Amojito sold the land to Mirope Mascarenas vda. de Eliso who obtained the TCT in her name, which did not retain the annotation. In turn, Elison sold the land to Mildred Elison vda. de Javelosa. Mildred sold the land to Ernesto and Igmedio Amojido.

Isidro then secured a loan from Cruz (PhP 15,000, with 5% interest) secured by a mortgage on the land from DANR, but failed to pay on due date. Isidro executed 2 contracts in favor of Cruz: a Deed of Absolute Sale and a Contract indicating a pacto de retro sale. Isidro still failed to repurchase the property within 1 year, so she consolidated the ownership of the land in favor of Cruz. When Isidro died, Cruz demanded her heirs to vacate the premises. The heirs then filed a complaint with the RTC averring that the land was conjugal property having been purchased during their marriage. The RTC found in favor of the heirs. The case was appealed to the CA, but the CA merely affirmed the ruling because Cruz failed to get a judicial order to have the land consolidated in his name after failure of Isidro to comply with the requirements of the right to repurchase (Art. 1607). ISSUE: Whether or not the land in question is conjugal property, and therefore subject to the rules on co-ownership? HELD: Although the land was purchased during the marriage, upon Leis’ death, the conjugal property regime ceased, and gave Isidro an equal portion of

However, upon failure of Isidro the heirs to exercise the right to repurchase, the ownership of the land transferred to Cruz. Despite the TCT being void for non-compliance with 1607, the ownership did not transfer back to the heirs, for compliance with 1607 is merely for purposes of registering the title in the Torrens System.

The claim of prescription is based first on the contention that under the Rules of Court the deed of extrajudicial partition should have been impugned within two years from the date of its execution in 1941. As the challenge in the instant case was made only in 1956, when Civil Case No. 3941 was filed, that first case, and more so the case at bar which was commenced in 1968, should be and were properly dismissed for tardiness under Rule 74, Section 4, of the Rules of Court. It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions.

No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon those who did not participate in it. FACTS:

This involves a parcel of land owned by Gertrudes Zamora. She died intestate and without debt and was suvived by her 4 children who never decided to divide the property among themselves. The conflict arises when Gertrudes' grandchildren filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of the disputed inheritance.

On January 16, 1958, the Civil Case was dismissed on motion of the plaintiff's counsel. The complaint in the case at bar involves the six excluded children. They alleged that the partition and all subsequent transfers of the subject land were null and void insofar as these transactions deprived them of their shares as co-owners of the said property. The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the action was barred by prior judgment and that in any even whatever rights might have pertained to the plaintiffs had already been prescribed under the Rules of Court and the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs are barred by prescription from questioning the alleged extrajudicial partition RULING:

The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.

RAUL ARAMBULO vs. GENARO NOLASCO A co-owner may dispose a portion of his share without the need of consent from other co-owners. FACTS: Petitioners, together with their siblings and their mother co-owned a 233sq.m. Land in Tondo, Manila. When their mother died, she was succeeded by her husband, Genero Nolasco and their children. On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all co-owners, except for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their respective shares to the properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more coowners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief. Nolasco responded that they did not know about the intention to sell, because they were not called to participate in the negotiations regarding the sale of the property. RTC: ruled in favor with petitioners and ordered Nolasco to give their consent to sale. Nolasco filed a notice of appeal to the CA. CA: reversed the RTc decision, saying that the petitioners cannot compel Nolasco to give their consent. ISSUE: Whether the respondents are withholding their consent and whether this withholding is prejudicial to the petitioners. RULING: From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co–owner without the consent of the other co–owners is not null and void. However,

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[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP only the rights of the co–owner–seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the property.

alive when she died, they are co-owners of the estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded him in the co-ownership of the property.

November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.

To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained.

When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the same thus he can only sell his undivided portion of the property. Art. 493 states that “each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”

On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s house without any special permit of demolition from the court.

EXTENT OF CO-OWNER’S RIGHT PAULMITAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other co-owners, only his pro indiviso share on the property is transferred to the buyer. FACTS: The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned by Agatona Paulmitan. She had 2 children, Pascual and Donato. Pascual’s (7) children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking, Anito) are the respondents and Donato and his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners. Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating to himself Lot 757 claiming that he is the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a TCT was issued in his name. He executed a deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment of taxes, the lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the Provincial Gov’t of Negros Occidental, however, Juliana was able to redeem the property. Upon learning these, the children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint against petitioners to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners’ defense was that the action has already prescribed for it was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana has acquired exclusive ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said property. The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. With respect to Lot 1091, the court decided in favor of respondents. They are entitled to ½ of Lot 1091, pro indiviso. The redemption did not in anyway prejudice their rights. The land was ordered to be partitioned and the petitioners were ordered to pay the respondents their share of the fruits and the respondents to pay their share in the redemption of the land. The CA affirmed the decision thus the case at bar. ISSUE: (1) (2)

Whether or not Pascual’s children and Donato and Juliana were co-owners of their mother’s lot Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the property

HELD: (1) YES When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states that “Where there are 2 or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased”. Since Pascual and Donato were still

Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer (Juliana) a co-owner. (2) NO When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner w/ respect to his/her share alone as stated in Art. 1612. But she may compel them to reimburse her for half of the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel other co-owners to contribute to the expenses for the preservation of the thing and to taxes.

Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as the house’s toilet and laundry area. On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioner’s appeal memorandum. RTC decision: denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. CA (Petition for Certiorari): dismissed the petition for lack of merit ISSUE: Whether or not the portion of the petitioner should be included in the sale, notwithstanding the fact that she did not affix her signature in the alleged deed of sale RULING:

SANCHEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS A co-owner’s share of the property shall not be included if she did not consent to the sale FACTS: Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez. On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995 by all six (6) coowners in her favor. Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the MeTC. MeTC decision: in favor of Teria, declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery. RTC decision: affirmed the RTC, because they failed to submit their pleadings. On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of private Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4

Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners. But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication. Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.

SALE OR MORTGAGE OF COMMON PROPERTY AURORA DEL BANCO, ET AL vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ALEJANDRA PANSACOLA, ET AL FACTS: Pansacola Brothers (Benedicto, Jose and Fr. Manuel) entered into an agreement which provided the following terms: -

They will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising the Island of Cagbalite which has an area of 1,600 hectares. The land shall be considered as their COMMON PROPERTY

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[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP -

The co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at that time represented by their father, Fr. Manuel who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite Island Whatever benefits may be derived from the island shall be shared equally by the co-owners in the following proportion: a. Benedicto – ¼ share b. Jose – ¼ share c. Domingo and Baldomera – 2/4 share (which shall be placed under the care of their father, Fr. Manuel)

dominion, but he is at the same time the sole owner of a portion, in the instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners) of the Island which is truly abstract, because until physical division is effected such portion is merely an Ideal share, not concretely determined.

The co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the island. 2 years later, they agreed to modify the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into. The new agreement provided for a new sharing and distribution of the lands and whatever benefits may be derived therefrom:

Definitely, there was no physical partition of the Island in 1859. Neither could there have been one in 1894 because the manner of subdividing the Island was only provided for in the later agreements entered into by the heirs in 1907 and 1908. There was a distribution of the Island in 1868 as agreed upon by the original co-owners in their agreement of April 11, 1868. Any agreement entered into by the parties in 1894 could be no more than another agreement as to the distribution of the Island among the heirs of the original co-owners and the preparation of a tentative plan by a practical surveyor, a Mr. Jose Garcia, mentioned in the first paragraph of the 1907 agreement, preparatory to the preparation of the real plan to be prepared by the surveyor Amadeo, mentioned in the agreement of April 18, 1908.

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The first ¼ portion shall belong to Benedicto The second ¼ shall belong to Jose The third ¼ shall belong to the children of their deceased brother, Eustaquio Pansacola, namely: Mariano, Maria and Hipolita The fourth and last ¼ shall belong to their nephews and nieces – Domingo, Baldomera, Marcelina, Francisca, Candelaria, Gervasia, who being all minors, are still under the care of their brother, Fr. Manuel. The latter is the real father of said minors

In 1907, the representative of the heirs of all the original owners of Cagbalite Island intered into an agreement to partition the island, supplemented by another agreement dated 1908. 100 years later, in 1968, private respondents (Alejandra Pansacola, et al) brought a special action for partition, including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the 2 nd contract of co-ownership. In their answer, the petitioners herein (Del Banco, et al) interposed such defenses as prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership, estoppel and laches. ISSUE: Whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successors-in-interest of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Fr. Manuel RULING: YES. There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into in 1859 simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island.

In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented agreed on how the Island was to be partitioned. The agreement of April 18, 1908 which supplements that of January 20, 1907 reveals that as of the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual partition of the Island had as yet been done.

A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of other co-owners. It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership both under the present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889 that no individual coowner can claim any definite portion thereof. lt is therefore of no moment that some of the co-owners have succeeded in securing cadastral titles in their names to some portions of the Island occupied by them. It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. CORNELIA PAMPLONA vs. VIVENCIO MORETO, ET AL FACTS: Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545 and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, covered by certificates of title issued in the name of “Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega”. They had 6 children – Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed Moreto.

In the second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners agreed not only on the sharing proportion of the benefits derived from the Island but also on the distribution of the Island each of the brothers was allocated.

More than 6 years after the death of his wife, Monica, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his deceased wife, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, the Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot No. 1495 for P900.00, covered by a TCT in the name of “Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega” although the lot was acquired during their marriage.

With the distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of the whole, and in this sense, over the whole he exercises the right of

As a result of the sale, a new TCT was issued in the name of “Geminiano Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte”.

The agreement, in fact, states that the Island to be purchased shall be considered as their common property.

After the execution of the Deed of Sale, Spouses Pamplona constructed their house on the Eastern part of Lot No. 1496, as Flaviano pointed to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano. Shortly thereafter, Rafael (Son of Spouses Pamplona), also built his house within lot 1496 about 1 meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. Flaviano Moreto and vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781 square meters which was the subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496. Flaviano died and 5 years after, the plaintiffs demanded the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on the ground that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano as it belonged to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and wife Monica, and the latter was already dead when the sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. Spouses Pamplona refused to vacate the premises occupied by them; hence, a case was instituted by the heirs of Monica seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale as regards to the ½ of the property. The defendants claimed that the sale made in their favor is valid as the lot sold is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers believing in good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold. After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it was found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their sale transaction. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the same RULING: PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE FULL OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY The records show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated, settled and divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership were not instituted by the heirs either in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act 3176 amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial partition between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor was an ordinary action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly, the estate became the property of a community between the surviving husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership. The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership and becomes the property of a community, by operation of law, between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower or the widow, it he or she be the heir of

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[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP the deceased spouse. Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and Apolonia Onte as well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period of over nine (9) years. And during said period, the private respondents who are the heirs of Monica Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956, lived as neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the occupation, possession and ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel by laches to claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting the same. We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was already dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega. We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the coownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitionersvendees on which the latter built their house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging to him at the time of the sale. therefore may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question. The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erected without objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created, and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaiano Moreto. Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-ininterest included all the property rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said obligation.

SPOUSES DEL CAMPO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE REGALADO, SR. FACTS: The Bornales were the original co-owners of Lot 162. The lot was divided in aliquot shares among the 8 co-owners as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Salome – 4/16 Consorcia – 4/16 Alfredo -2/16 Maria – 2/16 Jose – 1/16 Quirico – 1/16 Rosalia – 1/16 Julita – 1/16

Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, Soledad immediately took possession of the land and built a house thereon. A few years later, Soledad and husband, Simplicio, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as security for a P4000 debt to Jose Regalado Sr. This was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage. Three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162 (Salome, Consorcia, and Alfredo) sold portions of the said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr. Simplicio, heir of Soledad, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr, who in turn executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of Soledad’s heirs. On the same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500 to herein petitioners (Spouses Del Campo). Meanwhile, Jose Regalado caused the reconstitution of OCT No. 18047. The Reconstituted OCT initially reflected the shares of the original coowners in Lot 162. However, the title was transferred later to Jose Regalado Sr. who subdivided the entire property into smaller lots, each covered by a respective title in his name.

ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even without the consent of the other co-owners. Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his proindiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. Since Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent. We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common. Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three coowners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the principle that "no one can give what he does not have," Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-ownership. We have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other coowners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint for "repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs of the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they owned an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as residential dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the Distajos way back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes.

In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect on the second disposition is to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land. Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalado’s name in 1977.

ISSUE:

FACTS:

Whether or not the sale made by Salome in favor of Soledad be valid, notwithstanding that it is a physical portion of the undivided co-owned property

This involves a parcel of land owned by Gertrudes Zamora. She died intestate and without debt and was suvived by her 4 children who never decided to divide the property among themselves. The conflict arises when Gertrudes' grandchildren filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of the disputed inheritance.

RULING: SALE IS VALID. There can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-

FELIPE SEGURA, ET AL vs. NICOLAS SEGURA, ET AL

On April 6, 1961, three of the nine grandchildren - Nicolas, Santiago and Gaudencio Segura, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating the entire property to themselves alone as equal pro indiviso owners. The partition was not registered immediately, but only 5 years later, in 1946.

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[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP Before such registration, the following developments transpired: The land was sold to Amojido with right to repurchase. Such right was not exercised. In November 28, 1946, Amojido executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and obtained a TCT with a reservation of the rights of the other heirs annotated therein. Amojito sold the land to Mirope Mascarenas vda. de Eliso who obtained the TCT in her name, which did not retain the annotation. In turn, Elison sold the land to Mildred Elison vda. de Javelosa. Mildred sold the land to Ernesto and Igmedio Amojido. On January 16, 1958, the Civil Case was dismissed on motion of the plaintiff's counsel. The complaint in the case at bar involves the six excluded children. They alleged that the partition and all subsequent transfers of the subject land were null and void insofar as these transactions deprived them of their shares as co-owners of the said property. The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the action was barred by prior judgment and that in any even whatever rights might have pertained to the plaintiffs had already been prescribed under the Rules of Court and the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs are barred by prescription from questioning the alleged extrajudicial partition RULING: The claim of prescription is based first on the contention that under the Rules of Court the deed of extrajudicial partition should have been impugned within two years from the date of its execution in 1941. As the challenge in the instant case was made only in 1956, when Civil Case No. 3941 was filed, that first case, and more so the case at bar which was commenced in 1968, should be and were properly dismissed for tardiness under Rule 74, Section 4, of the Rules of Court. It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO FACTS: Respondents Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated in San Pablo City from Sandra Dalida. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was

executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo as vendee to the exclusion of his wife. Marcelino executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner (Homeowners Bank) to be secured by Spouses Dalio’s house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00. As security, Gesmundo executed a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of the bank. The transactions entered into by Gesmundo took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent (Miguela).

Effects of Redemption of Co-Owned Property By One Co-owner Abille vs CA Facts: -

the land in question is Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay originally belonged to Felisa Alzul as her own private property

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she married twice (she had an only child Rustico Adille herein defendant and her children to the 2nd marriage were the plaintiffs)

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Felisa sold the property with a right to repurchase for a period of 3 years (she died on 1942 without being able to redeem)

After the lapse of 1 year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its Vice-President, consolidated the ownership by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.

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during the period of redemption Abille repurchased by himself alone and executed a deed of extrajudicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of his mother Felisa

In the meantime, Marcelino died. In one of her visits to the property, Miguela learned that HB had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford Sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.

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after some efforts of compromise had failed, his half-siblings filed the case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed

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trial court rendered decision in favor of Abille sustaining the position that the defendant was and became the absolute owner

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CA reversed the decision of the trial court

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner (Homeowners Bank) instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner (HB) as the highest bidder.

Miguela instituted a case for nullity of real estate mortgage and certificate of sale, affidavit of consolidation of ownership, deed of sale, reconveyance with prayer for preliminary injunction and damages against petitioner HB, claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property. In its Answer, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino. ISSUE:

Issue: WON a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common Held: -

Whether or not the property is an exclusive property of Marcelino; hence, the sale made in favor of HB was valid RULING: IT IS A CONJUGAL PROPERTY; THE SALE IS VOID. In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.

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no, the right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone, though the records show that petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, it did not make him the owner of all of it. It did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership (refer to Art 488) the other co-owners are liable to reimburse him for their shares in redemption expenses since he cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in common there was fraud committed in registration of the property prescription cannot be applied in the case for prescription as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation of the co-ownership in the instant case petitioner failed to comply with the requisites of repudiation petition is denied

TAN vs CA “Consolidation of ownership by mortgagee after expiration of redemption period terminates co-ownership. A co-owner who redeems a property with her own funds after such consolidation becomes the sole owner thereof.”

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[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP FACTS: Tan Tiong Tick, married to Tan Ong Hun was the registered owner of a parcel of land and its improvements in Binondo Manila. They had six children George Laurel, Teodora, Rosa, Rosita, Mauro Umali, and D. Annie Tan. The land was mortgaged to China Bank to secure payment for several obligations. Tan Tiong Tick and Tan Ong Hun died without paying their obligations. China Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Two weeks before the redemption period expired, China Bank and the Heirs of Tan Tiong Tick entered into a settlement. It provided that the heirs were given right to repurchase even after the redemption period but before August 3, 1973. The heirs failed to redeem before the legal redemption period so China Bank consolidated its ownership and was issued a new TCT. However, D. Annie Tan exercised the right to repurchase pursuant to the settlement using her personal funds. But the title to the land was registered in the name of all the heirs. D. Annie Tan filed an action to reconvey the property to her and damages. RTC ruled that the property was co-owned by the heirs. CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownership among the heirs was dissolved by the foreclosure and consolidation of title by the bank after the redemption period has expired? HELD: Yes. Since the lot and its improvement were mortgaged by the deceased parents, there can be no question that a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption by one during this period would have inured to the benefit of all. The records show, however, that when the petitioner purchased the disputed property on August 30, 1974, any co-ownership among the brothers and sisters no longer existed. The period to redeem had expired more than one year earlier, on July 6, 1973. The respondent China Bank consolidated its ownership and a new title was issued in the bank's name. When the heirs allowed the one year redemption period to expire without redeeming their parents' former property and permitted the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title, the co-ownership was extinguished. Since D. Annie Tan used her personal fund to repurchase the property, she is the lawful sole owner. The respondent China Banking Corporation is ordered to execute the deed of sale over the disputed property in favor of the petitioner alone.

TERMINATION OF CO-OWNERSHIP MARIANO vs De Vega Facts: sps Urbano Panganiban and Roberta Espino owned as conjugal property, during their lifetime 29 parcels of unregistered land without improvements and all situated in Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan both died intestate Mariano instituted an action with the CFI for partition and delivery of possession of their corresponding shares in the conjugal estate of decedents-spouses petitioners filed the case because private respondents had taken possession of the whole conjugal property and appropriated to themselves to the exclusion of petitioners the products coming from the 29 parcels of land the trial court denied the petition Issue: WON the trial court erred in deciding the case Held: no

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SC found the trial courts decision on the ground of prescription under Sec 40 of PA No 190 to be inaccurate since under Art. 494 no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership there’s no repudiation of co-ownership. In view of their lack of a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, duly communicated to the petitioners (the other co-owners), private respondents cannot acquire the shares of the petitioners by prescription. assailed order is set aside

PAULMITAN VS CA Facts: Agatona Paulmitan died in 1952 left 2 parcels of land located in the Province of Negros Occidental in 1963 the estate of Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles to the 2 lots remained in the name of Agatona. in August 11, 1963, petitioner Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757 based on the claim that he is the only surviving heir of Agatona. TCT No. 35979 was issued in Donato’s name As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter in 1952 Lot No. 1091 was forfeited for non-payment of taxes and was sold at a public auction with the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental being the buyer in 1974, Fanesa redeemed the property the respondents filed before the CFI upon learning of the transactions CFI dismissed the complaint upon finding merit in petitioners’ affirmative defense (Lot No. 757) as regard to Lot 1091, CFI decided in favor of respondents ruled that as descendants of Agatona they are entitled to 1/2 of 1091 pro diviso Fanesa did not vest exclusive ownership over the entire land but only gave her the right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem the property CA affirmed trial court’s decision Issue: WON respondents are entitled to 1/2 of Lot 1091, pro diviso Held: Yes the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in question with the respondents, her first cousins. the redemption of the land did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership (same issue raised in Adille vs CA) Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of the redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to be reimbursed for half of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on behalf of her co-owners (Article 1613 of CC) petition is denied AGUILAR vs CA Facts: Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers on October 28, 1969, the 2 brothers purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood

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they initially agreed that Virgilio’s share was 2/3 while Senen was 1/3 but by virtue of a written memorandum in 1970 they agreed that their interests in the house and lot should be equal after the death of their father petitioner demand respondent to vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof shall be divided among them

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because of the refusal of Senen, Virgilio filed an action to compel the sale of the house and lot so they could divide the proceeds On July 26, 1979 trial court found both to be co-owners of the house and lot in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement. But ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendant to delay partition. trial court ordered defendant to vacate the property for they could not agree to the amount CA set aside the order of the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well as the assailed judgment rendered by default. Issue: WON CA erred in not holding that the motion of defendant through counsel to cancel the pre-trail was dilatory in character WON CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial Held: -

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first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pretrial is mandatory and a party who fails to appear may be considered as in default. In the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial court has authority to declare respondent in default. the trial court is correct in denying the motion to postpone pre-trial for lack of merit for pre-trial should be much more than mere perfunctory treatment. Its observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its objective i.e speedy and inexpensive disposition of cases SC uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as coowner which we here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July 1979.L Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co- ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common so long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. when petitioner file an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased the respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate petition is granted

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[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP PRESCRIPTION AND REPUDIATION OF COOWNERSHIP

When the case reached the CA, the CA reversed decision of trial court saying that petitioners have not acquired the land thru acquisitive prescription.

DELIMA VS CA

Adverse possession circumstances:

requires

the

concurrence

of

the

following

ISSUE: Facts: WON the petitioners have acquired land thru acquisitive prescription -

Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the government leaving as his only heirs his 3 brothers and a sister

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TCT 2744 was issued in the name of “The Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima” On 1953 Galileo executed an affidavit of extrajudicial declaration of heirs, TCT 2744 was cancelled and TCT 3009 was issued in 1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs. He paid taxes from 1954 to 1965 in 1968 petitioners who are surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita filed with the CFI an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and annulment of TCT 3009 against Galileo and Vicente (joined as party defendant for his refusal to joint in their action) trial court rendered decision in favor of the petitioners respondents appealed to the CA, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and upheld the claim of Galileo that all the brothers and sister had already relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that he alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes Issue: WON petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property Held: the petitioners are already barred by prescription having only filed the action in 1968 (more than 10 years have already lapse) the moment when Galileo executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs, in effect denying or repudiating the ownership, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by Galileo seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder. since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes after 10 years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted petition is denied PANGAN VS. CA FACTS: The subject property is a 635 sq. meter lot owned by Leon Hilario. Petitioners are Hilario’s grand children thru Silveria (daughter) and respondent, Teodora Garcia, thru Catalina (daughter of Hilario). Petitioners filed an application of title on the ground of their continuous possession of the property. There were no oppositors, so the application was approved. Subsequently, respondent claims to have a right over the property as an heir of Leon (since her mother is a daughter of Leon).

HELD: Petitioners claim that they have acquired acquisitive prescription by possessing and paying the taxes of the land. SC said that tax declarations are not conclusive proofs of ownership. SC said that tac declarations cannot be sole proof because the tax declaration in their name could have been done out of convenience for the co-owners. According to the petitioners, there was such repudiation which was admitted by the private respondent herself Testifying for herself at the hearing on her opposition in the registration proceedings, she declared: ATTY. CANLAS: Q: After the death of Tomas Pangan, did you ask the heirs of Tomas Pangan of your alleged share in the property in question? A: Yes, sir. Q: What did they tell you? A: They said that I have no right to a share and they won't give me my share. Q: How many years ago did you ask from them? A: Immediately after the death of their father. Q: That was some 20 years ago? A: I do not know how many years ago.

1. That the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2. That such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3. That the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive. SC said that the case at bar did not meet all 3 requirements. MARITEGUI VS. CA FACTS: This is a case for partition of several pieces of land belonging to Lupo Mariategui, who died without a will. During his lifetime, Lupo contracted three (3) marriages. The first wife died, so he contracted a second marriage. The second wife also passed away so he contracted a third marriage. The third wife also preceded Lupo in death. The issue in this case arose because at the time of his death, Lupo left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Later, Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves a certain lot of the Muntinglupa Estate and title was issued. Now, Lupo’s children by his third marriage filed a complaint with the lower court, contending that since they were co-heirs of Lupo’s estate they were deprived of their respective shares in the lot mentioned. In answer, the other party said that the complaint was not really for annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition but for recognition of natural children. The lower court ruled in favor of Lupo’s heirs from the first and second marriage. Thus, the case was elevated to the CA, where they raised the issue of their parents’ lawful marriage and their legitimacy as children.

Q: And during all that span of more than 20 years ago you did not file any action to recover your share on the land in question?

CA ruled that all the heirs of Lupo were entitled to equal shares in the estate. Hence, this petition.

A: No sir, it was only this time .

ISSUES:

For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there must be a clear showing that he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and that they have been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is making to the property in question. It is only when such unequivocal notice has been given that the period of prescription will begin to run against the other co-owners and ultimately divest them of their own title if they do not seasonably defend it.

Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to successional rights over the said lot HELD:

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[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP The case is really one for partition. The question of the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Existence of the Marriage Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo to his son who testified that “when his father was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal.” The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale: “The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact. Filiation Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto’s birth certificate was a record of birth referred to in Article 172 of the Code. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo in the same manner as their brother Jacinto. Prescription of Action for Partition

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner. Petition dismissed. HEIRS OF MANINGDING VS CA Facts: Heirs of Maningding and Bauzon claim that they own the disputed lots in common and pro-indiviso. Bauzon aver that their father Roque was the owner of the lots by virtue of a deed of donation. According to the Maningdings, Roque repudiated the co-ownership over the sugarland in 1965 and adjudicated it to himself and Maningding renounced and quitclaimed their shares over the riceland in favour of Roque. Roque transferred the Riceland to his son, Luis and the sugarland to his daughter, Eriberta, both evidenced by deeds of sale. Heirs of Maningding allegedly discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the properties as well as the accounting of the produce but were unsuccessful. Bauzon’s contentions: * the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation over the riceland was executed not only by Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding but also by Segunda Maningding. * denied having executed the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with regard to the sugarland. * had been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse and actual possession of the subject properties. Issue: WON Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. Ruling: YES. Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the

possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good faith. The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being covered by tax declarations formerly in the name of Ramon Bauzon and transferred to Luis and Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations receipts are strong evidence of ownership.

only now and with and

In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the concept of owner by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and public considering that the parcels of land are located in a municipality wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally known to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted and in good faith because of his wellfounded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly executed and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective shares in his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the parcels of land to the exclusion of all others. Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. 11 Coowners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period would begin to run. Mere refusal to accede to a partition, without specifying the grounds for such refusal, cannot be considered as notice to the other co-owners of the occupant's claim of title in himself in repudiation of the co-ownership. The evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights of the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie. 12 Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost

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[CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction.

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