Property Case Digests

Dean Domingo Navarro 2nd Year, 1st Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 CASE DIGESTS LEUNG YEE VS. STRONG MACHINERY CO. Facts: • Compana Agricola Filipina (CAF) purchased rice cleaning machines from Strong Machinery Co. • CAF executed Chattel Mortgage on machines and the buildings on which they were installed in favor of Strong Machinery Co. • said mortgage was foreclosed, and the building was purchased by Strong Machinery Co. • said sale was annotated in the Chattel Mortgage registry • the land on which the building had been constructed was also sold by CAF to Strong, but not registered • previously however, the said building had been purchased at an auction sale by Leung Yee, a creditor of CAF; said sale was recorded. • Leung Yee knew of the prior sale in favor of Strong mAchinery Co. • Leung Yee sues to recover the property from Strong Machinery. Issue: • who has a better right to the property? Answer: • Strong Machinery Co has better right to the property. Ratio Decidendi: • the building is a real property, therefore its sale as annotated in the Chattel Mortgage registry cannot be given legal effect in the Registry of Real property • the mere fact that the parties decide to deal with the building as personal property does not change its characteristics as real property. • Neither the original registry nor the annotation of the sale of the mortgaged property had any effect on the building • however, since the land and the building had first been purchased by Strong Machinery and this fact is known to Leung Yee, it follows that Leung Yee is not a purchaser in good faith., and should therefore not be entitled to the property. STANDARD OIL CO. VS. JARANILLO Facts: • de la rosa who was renting a parcel of land in Manila, constructed a building of strong material thereon which she conveyed to plaintiff by way of chattel mortgage. • Jaranillo, RD of Manila refused to record the same when presented by the mortgagee for registration in the registry of Chattel Mortgage on the ground that the building was a real property and not personal property, and therefore could not be the subject of a valid chattel mortgage Issue: • may the deed be registered in the chattel mortgage registry? Answer: • Yes Ratio Decidendi: • The parties to a contract may, by agreement, treat as personal property that which by nature real

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property. It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation, which on general purpose may be considered as personal property. When parties present to the registrar of property a document of chattel mortgage, the regsitrar must record it as such even if in his opinion, the object of the contract is a real property. This is because his duties in respect to the registration of chattel mortgages are of a purely ministerial character, as long as the proper fee has been made. There is no legal provision conferring upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of the document presented before him.

PRUDENTIAL BANK VS PANIS Facts: • Magcales obtained a 70k loan from Prudential Bank secured by REM ◦ 2-storey building with warehouses ◦ includes the right of occupancy on the lot where the above property is erected ◦ rider provision: AND IT IS FURTHER AGREED that in the event the Sales Patent on the lot applied for by the Mortgagors as herein stated is released or issued by the Bureau of Lands, the Mortgagors hereby authorize the Register of Deeds to hold the Registration of same until this Mortgage is cancelled, or to annotate this encumbrance on the Title upon authority from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which title with annotation, shall be released in favor of the herein Mortgage.'m • mortgagee (Prudential Bank) was at the outset aware of the fact that the mortgagors have already filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot, possessory rights over which, were mortgaged to it. • plaintiffs secured an additional loan from defendant Prudential Bank in the Sum of P20,000.00. To secure payment of this additional loan, plaintiffs executed in favor of the said defendant another deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the same properties previously mortgaged • On April 24, 1973, the Secretary of Agriculture issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 4776 over the parcel of land, possessory rights over which were mortgaged to defendant Prudential Bank, in favor of plaintiffs. • REM was commenced by Bank because of Magcales' failure to settle their obligations • auction sale was pushed through despite written letter by defendants' counsel to desist from the foreclosure sale; Bank was declared as highest bidder • CFI declared that the REM executed by Sps. Magcale in favor of Prudential Bank are null and void Issue: •

whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another.

Answer: • Yes Ratio Decidendi: • the inclusion of building separate and distinct from land in Art. 415 can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property • while a mortgage of land necessarily includes buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. • Such a mortgage would still be a REM for the building will still be considered an immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. • Possessory rights thus over a building before title is vested on the grantee may be validly transferred or conveyed as in a deed of mortgage. • It is therefore without question that the original mortgage was executed before the issuance of the final patent and before the government was divested of its title to the land, an event which takes effect only on the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds

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it is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own building which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to all intents and purposes a valid mortgage.

SIBAL VS. VALDEZ Facts: • Sibal’s sugarcane crops were attached and sold to Valdez in order to satisfy a judgment debt. The lot on which the crops were located had been previously attached and sold to another creditor, Macondray. Valdez later purchased the land from Macondray. • Sibal sought to redeem the sugarcane from Valdez on the assumption that it was real property (growing fruits attached to the land). • Plaintiff contends that the sugarcane is personal property and not subject to redemption. Issue: • How should the sugar cane be regarded – as real property or as personal property? Answer: • the sugarcane, although considered as growing fruits and therefore ordinarily real property under Par. 2 of Art. 415 must be regarded as personal property for purposes of the Chattel Mortgage law and also for purposes of attachment. Ratio Decidendi • the right to the growing crops mobilizes (makes personal) the crops by Anticipation. • The existence of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were, in advance rendering the crop movable. US vs CARLOS Facts: • defendant accused of theft of 2273 kilowatts of electric current owned by Meralco through a jumper • defendant argue that only corporeal and tangible things can be the object of theft • RTC held him guilty of theft Issue: • WON electricity is a personal property thus can be the subject of theft/larceny Answer: • electricity is a personal property capable of appropriation Ratio Decidendi: • the true test of what is proper subject of larceny seems to be not whether the subject is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by another than the owner. • Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article or merchandise bought and sold like other personal property and is capable of appropriation by another. • RTC decision affirmed DAVAO SAWMILL CO. VS CASTILLO Facts: • Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government of the Philippine Islands • the land upon which the business was conducted belonged to another person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it. Some of the implements thus used were clearly personal property, the conflict concerning machines which were placed and mounted on foundations of cement. • The trial judge found that those properties were personal in nature, and as a consequence absolved the defendants from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. Issue: • WON the properties in question are personal properties or real

Answer: • personal properties Ratio Decidendi: • as a rule, machinery should be considered as personal. Since it was not placed on the land by the owner of the land. • Immobilization by destination or purpose cannot generally be made by a person whose possession of the property is only temporary, otherwise we will be forced to presume that he intended to give the property permanently away in favor of the owner of the premises. B.H. BERKENKOTTER VS. CU UNJIENG, Facts: • Mabalacat Sugar Co., borrowed from defendant a sum of money, mortgaging as security 2 lots together with all its buildings and improvements • to increase its product capacity from 150 to 250 tons, the company purchased additional machines and a new sugar mill Issue: • WON the additional machines are also considered mortgaged. Answer: • Yes Ratio Decidendi: • The mortgage of a parcel of land generally includes all future improvement that may be found thereon • these improvements include real properties like the additional machines and sugar mill purchased • said additional properties are real properties because they are essential and principal elements of the sugar central. Without them, the sugar central would be unabe to carry out its industrial purposes. MINDANAO BUS CO. VS. THE CITY ASSESSOR Facts: • CTA found Mindanao Bus Co liable to pay realty tax on its maintenance and repair equipments • That the machineries sought to be assessed by the respondent as real properties; t he machineries are sitting on cement or wooden platforms Issue: • are the machineries in question real properties thus subject to realty tax? Answer: • these machineries are immovable properties therefore not subject to realty tax Ratio Decidendi: • So that movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be "essential and principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established." • the tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. • Aside from the element of essentiality the above-quoted provision also requires that the industry or works be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. • But in the case at bar the equipments in question are destined only to repair or service the transportation business, which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by the law. Said equipments may not, therefore, be deemed real property. • Resuming what we have set forth above, we hold that the equipments in question are not absolutely essential to the petitioner's transportation business, and petitioner's business is not carried on in a building, tenement or on a specified land, so said equipment may not be considered real estate within the meaning of Article 415 (c) of the Civil Code.

BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS VS MERALCO Facts: • Phil. Commission granted the municipal board of Manila to grant franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric street railway and electric light, heat and power system in the City of Manila and its suburbs to the person or persons making the most favorable bid. • Swift got the franchise which was subsequently transferred to Meralco • Meralco has constructed 40 steel towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it to transmit electricity from Laguna to Manila • City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property taxunder tax declarations • After denying respondent's petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken by respondent to the Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City, which required respondent to pay the amount of P11,651.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956. • CTA on the other hand ordered the cancellation of the tax declarations and further ordered the refund to the respondent the amount paid Issue: • are the steel towers or poles of the MERALCO considered real or personal properties? Answer: • they are personal properties Ratio Decidendi: • The word "pole" means "a long, comparatively slender usually cylindrical piece of wood or timber, as typically the stem of a small tree stripped of its branches; also by extension, a similar typically cylindrical piece or object of metal or the like". • that the concept of the "poles" for which exemption is granted, is not determined by their place or location, nor by the character of the electric current it carries, nor the material or form of which it is made, but the use to which they are dedicated. • It is evident, therefore, that the word "poles", as used in Act No. 484 and incorporated in the petitioner's franchise, should not be given a restrictive and narrow interpretation, as to defeat the very object for which the franchise was granted. The poles as contemplated thereon, should be understood and taken as a part of the electric power system of the respondent Meralco, for the conveyance of electric current from the source thereof to its consumers. If the respondent would be required to employ "wooden poles", or "rounded poles" as it used to do fifty years back, then one should admit that the Philippines is one century behind the age of space. It should also be conceded by now that steel towers, like the ones in question, for obvious reasons, can better effectuate the purpose for which the respondent's franchise was granted. • The steel towers do not come under Par. 1 of Art. 415 because they are neither buildings nor constructions adhered to the soil. • They do not come under par. 3 because they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, that is they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration of the object to which they are attached. • They do not come under par. 5 because they are not machineries, receptacle, or instruments, but even if they are, they are not intended for an industry to be carried on in the premises. STROCHECKER VS. RAMIREZ Facts: • Fidelity & Surety Co and Ildefenso Ramirez both as mortgagees of the insolvent Strochecker claimed preference in the distribution of assets of the said insolvent • RTC ruled that Fidelity & Surety Co. was entitled to preference over the assets • ramirez appealed saying that the mortgage in favor of Fidelity & Surety CO is invalid on the ground

that the property mortagged was not capable of being mortgaged (half interest in the drug business). Issue: • WON the half-interests of the mortgagor in the drug business was capable of being mortgaged Answer: • Affirmative Ratio Decidendi: • a half-interest in a drugstore business, being capable of appropriation, but not included in the enumeration of real properties under Art. 415, should be considered personal property and may thus be the subject of a chattel mortgage. TSAI vs. CA Facts: • 1975, Evertex obtained 3M loan from PBCom secured by REM (lot where its factory stands) and Chattel mortgage (listed on Annex A of motgage) • 1979, Evertex obtained a 2 nd loan of 3,356,000.00 secured by the same chattels listed on Annex A of the 1st mortgage • Evertex was declared insolvent in a proceeding and all the assets of the company were taken into the custody of the Insolvency Court, including those mortgaged under the 2 mortgages with PBCom • PBCom on the other hand commenced a EJF proceeding because of Evertex's default in the payment of its obligations • PBCom upon consolidation of its ownership over the properties, leased the property to Ruby Tsai for 50k a month & the properties were sold to Tsai for 9M • Evertex filed a case for annulment of sale & conveyance with damages against PBCom with Tsai saying that the sale was in violation of the Insolvency Law and that the properties conveyed to Tsai were not included in the 2 mortgages and were not even included in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale & COS • RTC ruled that the foreclosure of the subject properties were irregular and illegal as they were not included in the Notice of Sale and COS, decision affirmed by CA except for award of damages Issue: • whether or not the inclusion of the questioned properties in the foreclosed properties is proper. • whether or not the sale of these properties to petitioner Ruby Tsai is valid Answer: • the inclusion of the questioned properties in the foreclosure is improper because they were acquired in 1981 and not involve in the 1985 & 1979 mortgages • Sale to Tsai is invalid as she is not a purchaser in good faith. Ratio Decidendi: • both the trial and the appellate courts reached the same finding that the true intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. • assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. • an immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it (Navarro v. Pineda) • since the disputed machineries were acquired in 1981 and could not have been involved in the 1975 or 1979 chattel mortgages, it was consequently an error on the part of the Sheriff to include subject machineries with the properties enumerated in said chattel mortgages. • As the auction sale of the subject properties to PBCom is void, no valid title passed in its favor. Consequently, the sale thereof to Tsai is also a nullity under the elementary principle of nemo dat quod non habet, • Tsai cannot be considered a purchaser in good faith as she failed to substantially prove her claim • Moreover, a purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair

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price for the same, at the time of purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.1 Records reveal, however, that when Tsai purchased the controverted properties, she knew of respondent's claim thereon. the mere fact that the lot where the factory and the disputed properties stand is in PBCom's name does not automatically make PBCom the owner of everything found therein, especially in view of EVERTEX's letter to Tsai enunciating its claim.

TUMALAD VS VICENCIO Facts: • Vicencio executed a chattel mortgage of their house of strong material (being rented from Madrigal & Co. Inc) in favor of Tumalad to guaranty a loan of P4,800.00 • When defendants-appellants defaulted in paying, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed • MTC issued the writ of execution in favor of Tumalad but the decision on the writ of possession cannot be enforced because the house had already been demolished pursuant to the order of the court in a separate civil case (No. 25816) for ejectment against the present defendants for nonpayment of rentals on the land on which the house was constructed. Issue: • WON the chattel mortgage contract is void ab initio on the ground of fraud, deceit & trickery and that the mortgaged property is an immovable property, hence can only be the subject of REM and not chattel mortgage. Answer • there is no evidence of deceit, fraud or trickery • the parties intended that the house be a personal property Ratio Decidendi: • contention of deceit, fraud & trickery are not supported by evidence and are mere allegations. • Moreover, even granting that the charge is true, fraud or deceit does not render a contract void ab initio, and can only be a ground for rendering the contract voidable or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the New Civil Code, by a proper action in court. • General rule: buildings are immovable ◦ exception: the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property • the house on rented land is not only expressly designated as Chattel Mortgage; it specifically provides that "the mortgagor ... voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and TRANSFERS by way of Chattel Mortgage 23 the property together with its leasehold rights over the lot on which it is constructed and participation • the mortgagors also are only renting the said property from Madrigal & CO. Inc, thus, although ownership cannot in itself determine the character of the property, it does so when combined with other factors to sustain the interpretation that the parties, particularly the mortgagors, intended to treat the house as personalty • doctrine of estoppel applies since the parties themselves have treated the property as personal property • It follows that the court below erred in requiring the mortgagors to pay rents for the year following the foreclosure sale, as well as attorney's fees. SERG'S PRODUCT VS PCI LEASING (par. 5 of Art. 415) Facts: • PCI filed a writ of replevin with damages for the seizure of the mortgaged chattels which was opposed by the petitioners • petitioners submit that the mortgaged properties are immovable under Art. 415, notwithstanding their agreement on the contrary; and that giving effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to 3 rd parties (workers o f the company)

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Citing the Agreement of the parties, the appellate court held that the subject machines were personal property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners.

Issue: • whether the said machines are personal, not immovable, property which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin. Answer: • the questioned properties are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure Ratio Decidendi: • After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be considered as personal or movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence, such property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the other contracting party. • although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become “immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry.” In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code • The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal • Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. • in Tumalad v. Vicencio,[19] the Court upheld the intention of the parties to treat a house as a personal property because it had been made the subject of a chattel mortgage. • in Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textile Mills [20] also held that the machinery used in a factory and essential to the industry, as in the present case, was a proper subject of a writ of replevin because it was treated as personal property in a contract. • the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal property. • It should be stressed, however, that the holding -- that the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement – is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. In any event, there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected. • The validity of the lease agreement cannot be assailed in a Pet for Cert, it can only be determined in a full blown trial within the jurisdiction of the RTC. MAKATI LEASING & FINANCE CORP. VS WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS Facts: • Wearever obtained financial accommodations from MLFC secured by chattel mortgage of some raw materials inventory and a machinery • upon default of payment, MFLC commenced an EJF of the property but subsequently applied for judicial foreclosure • RTC issued the writ of seizure • CA reversed the RTC decision & ordered the return of the machine after ruling that the machinery in suit cannot be the subject of replevin, much less of a chattel mortgage, because it is a real property pursuant to Article 415 of the new Civil Code, the same being attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from respondent's plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete floor, the reason why all that the sheriff could do to enfore the writ was to take the main drive motor of said machinery. Issue: • whether the machinery in suit is real or personal property from the point of view of the parties Answer: • the intent of the parties gave the machinery in question the character of a personal property Ratio Decidendi: • If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as

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the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage. It must be pointed out that the characterization of the subject machinery as chattel by the private respondent is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. As stated in Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property, as long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby. On estoppel: As aptly pointed out by petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the status of the subject machinery as movable or immovable was never placed in issue before the lower court and the Court of Appeals except in a supplemental memorandum in support of the petition filed in the appellate court. Moreover, even granting that the charge is true, such fact alone does not render a contract void ab initio, but can only be a ground for rendering said contract voidable, or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the new Civil Code, by a proper action in court. the error of the appellate court in ruling that the questioned machinery is real, not personal property, becomes very apparent CA decision reversed and RTC decision reinstated.

ASSOCIATED INSURANCE & SURETY CO. VS ISABEL IYA Facts: • SPS. Valino were the owners and possessors of a house of strong materials. To obtain credit rice from Naric, the Spouse executed an alleged chattel mortgage of the subject house in favor of Associated Insurance; the latter guaranteed the loan of the spouses from Naric. • After the spouses had the title of the lot transferred in their name, they executed a REM in favor of Isabel Iya • Valino failed to pay her indebtedness to NARIC thus Associated Insurance was compelled to pay the obligation as a guarantor and thereafter demanded reimbursement from Valino • having failed to reimburse Associated Insurance, they foreclosed the property subject of chattel mortgage and the latter was declared the highest bidder in the auction sale • Associated Insurance learned of the REM in favor of Iya and filed a civil case for the exclusion of the house from the mortgage • RTC rendered judgment dated March 8, 1956, holding that the chattel mortgage in favor of the Associated Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., was preferred and superior over the real estate mortgage subsequently executed in favor of Isabel Iya. It was ruled that as the Valinos were not yet the registered owner of the land on which the building in question was constructed at the time the first encumbrance was made, the building then was still a personality and a chattel mortgage over the same was proper. Issue: • WON the house is a real or personal property to determine whose right over it shall be preferred Answer: • the house is by its nature an immovable property, its registration in the Chattel Mortgage registry is but a futile act as it did not changed its nature to personal. Ratio Decidendi: • while it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties (Art. 415, new Civil Code) could only mean one thing — that a building is by itself an immovable property . . . Moreover, and in view of the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. (Lopez vs. Orosa, G.R. Nos. supra, p. 98). • A building certainly cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the land on which

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it is constructed belongs to another. A mortgage creditor who purchases real properties at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale thereof by virtue of a chattel mortgage constituted in his favor, which mortgage has been declared null and void with respect to said real properties, acquires no right thereto by virtue of said sale (De la Riva vs. Ah Keo, 60 Phil., 899). Wherefore the portion of the decision of the lower Court in these two cases appealed from holding the rights of the surety company, over the building superior to that of Isabel Iya and excluding the building from the foreclosure prayed for by the latter is reversed and appellant Isabel Iya's right to foreclose not only the land but also the building erected thereon is hereby recognized, and the proceeds of the sale thereof at public auction (if the land has not yet been sold), shall be applied to the unsatisfied judgment in favor of Isabel Iya. Decision without prejudiced to the right of the surety company against Sps. Valino.

SANTOS EVANGELISTA VS. ALTO SURETY & INS. CO. Facts: • To satisfy the claim for sum of money of Evangelista against Rivera, a writ of attachment of the latter's house was obtained by Evangelista • Evangelista being the highest bidder in an auction sale sought possession of the property but was refused by Rivera on the ground that the he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is now the true owner of said property. • Alto had become the highest bidder on a separate auction sale over the same property; mortgage and auction sale preceded that of the auction sale in favor of Evangelista. • Evangelista instituted the present action against respondent and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his (Evangelista) title over said house, securing possession thereof, apart from recovering damages. • CFI rendered judgment in favor of Evangelista • CA reversed the CFI decision saying that although the writ of attachment in favor of Evangelista had been filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of respondent, Evangelista did not acquire thereby a preferential lien, the attachment having been levied as if the house in question were immovable property, although in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, it is "ostensibly a personal property." As such, the Court of Appeals held, "the order of attachment . . . should have been served in the manner provided in subsection (e) of section 7 of Rule 59," of the Rules of Court Issue: • whether the house of Ricardo Rivera is real property or not. Answer: • said house is a real property Ratio Decidendi: • said house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. • In such a case as a building is made the subject of a chattel mortgage, and the mortgage is registered in the chattel mortgage registry, the mortgage would still be void in so far as 3 rd persons are concerned. • "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by usufructuary or lessee • It is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for purposes of said contract. However, this view is good only insofar as thecontracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel. • the mere fact that a house was the subject of the chattel mortgage and was considered as personal property by the parties does not make said house personal property for purposes of the notice to be given for its sale of public auction. This ruling is demanded by the need for a definite, orderly and well defined regulation for official and public guidance and would prevent confusion and misunderstanding

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decision of CA reversed and CFI decision reinstated.

FELS ENERGY ONC. VS. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS (par. 9, Art. 415) Facts: • Polar & NPC entered into an Agreement wherein NPC is liable for the payment of all real property taxes (Art. 10.1 of Agreement) • Polar assigned its rights to FELS which was later on assessed of over 54M real property taxes for the barges • NPC argued before the LBAA that the barges are not real properties subject to real property tax (based on the decision of DOF) • LBAA rendered decision for FELS to pay the assessed tax. The LBAA ruled that the power plant facilities, while they may be classified as movable or personal property, are nevertheless considered real property for taxation purposes because they are installed at a specific location with a character of permanency. • FELS appealed the LBAA decision before the CBAA • the CBAA rendered a Decision finding the power barges exempt from real property tax. the CBAA reasoned that the power barges belong to NPC; since they are actually, directly and exclusively used by it, the power barges are covered by the exemptions under Section 234(c) of R.A. No. 7160. • said decision of the CBAA wa reversed by itself after MR of provincial assessor • Pet. For Review before the CA filed by FELS & NPC, but was dismissed by 12 th division for failure of the petitioners to refile their mot. For consolidation of the 2 cases Issue: • WON the power barges are real properties subject to real property raxation Answer: • As found by the appellate court, the CBAA and LBAA power barges are real property and are thus subject to real property tax. This is also the inevitable conclusion, Ratio Decidendi: • Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that "[d]ocks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast" are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work • in response to the allegation that petitioners are exempt from taxation because NPC is a government owned corporation, the Court affirm the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of the taxable properties is petitioner FELS, which in fine, is the entity being taxed by the local government. • It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes by invoking its exemption in Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160 INSULAR GOVERNMENT VS. ALDECOA & CO. Facts: • action to recover possession of 2 parcels of land on which defendant built a wharf & warehouses • defendant claim ownership by virtue of a verbal agreement with the politico-military governor of Surigao • land in question had been gradually raised by the action of the sea Issue: • WON the land in question is of public domain Answer: • affirmative Ratio Decidendi:

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the land is partly shore land and in aprt formed by the action of the sea the land is devoted to public uses and no grant whatever has been made of any portion of them to private persons, remain a part of the public domain and are for public uses such lands thrown up by the action of the sea, and the shores adjacent thereto are not susceptible of prescription, inasmuch as being dedicated to the public use, they are not subject of commerce among them.

CITY OF MANILA VS INSULAR GOVERNMENT Facts: • city of manila applied for the registration of a parcel of land, Insular opposed. • City of manila relied its claim on the fact that the old government of manila under the sovereignty of Spain received the rent Issue: • WON the city of manila is the owner of the subject land Answer: • negative Ratio Decidendi • mere renting and receiving of rent, absent of other proof, cannot support a claim of ownership over such property • petitioner were not able to present proof showing that the land in question had been granted to it by the former sovereign. TUFEXIS VS OLAGUERA Facts: • tufexis obtained from an auction a frame building intended for a public market erected on a pieceof land owned by the mun. of Guinobatan • building was constructed by virtue of a concession granted by the Spanish Government to the father of Pardo (judgment debtor) to build the market on the land & to enjoy usufruct for a period of 40 years • plaintiff claim that he bought not only the building but also its right, interest, and participation in the said property that may appertain to Pardo • plaintiff claims possession of the land on the ground that the concession granted was still in force Issue: • WON plaintiff is entitled to the all rights, interest, and participation over the property Answer: • negative Ratio Decidendi: • concession granted to the father of Pardo is personal and can only be transferred by inheritance • right of usufruct is not absolute in character. • Usufruct cannot be attached like any other right on account of its being of a public character. • Only right plaintiff was entitled to is the attachment of the income obtained from the use of floor space, which he wasn't able to avail because the building was burned GOVERNMENT VS CABANGIS Facts: • lots in question formerly form part of a large tract of land belonging to the predecessors of Cabangis • said land began to wear away because of the action of the waves of Manila Bay until it was completely submerged in water • government undertook the dredging of the Vistas Estuary; depositing all the lands covered by water tehreby slowly and gradually formng again the lots which had been previously submerged. Issue: • to whom do these lots belong?

Answer: • the lot belong to the government Ratio Decidendi: • private property may become public domain in cases of gradual encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide • owners has for all intents and purposes abandoned the property and permitted it to be destroyed • it is de facto case of eminent domain not subject to indemnity. • Reclamation by the government maintained the condition of being property of public domain • cabangis cannot immediately take possession of the property because it does not confer on him or his successors the ownership of the said lot which were already converted into property of the public domain. MERCADO VS MUNICIPALPRESIDENT OF MACABEBE Facts: • predecessor of Mercado is the owner of a haceinda in which flowed a river & a creek near each other. • Owner connected these 2 bodies of water (excavation )thus creating a canal (Batasan-Limasan) • owner eventually closed the 2 openings of the canal and converted it to a fish pond • government ordered the removal of the dikes Issue: • WON the creeks and river encroached in the registered land of the owner are considered private property Answer: • negative Ratio Decidendi: • although the Batasan-Limasan was done artificially, these waters are public domain • in converting the opening of the creeks into a fish pond, the owner appropriated to herself not only the channels of the creek but the creek itself, which is property of public domain • the right of the owner to the creek in question by virtue of excavation has prescribed since they failed to obtain the necessary authorization to devote it to their own use to the exclusion of others. • The certificate of title over the hacienda does not conferred any right upon the plaintiff over the creek inasmuch as the said creek is a public domain and is not subject to registration in favor of private persons.

MUNICIPALITY OF HINUNANGAN VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS Facts: • land registration court granted the registration of a parcel of land which on one side is bounded by the sea. • Upon the lot in question a stone fort which has stood there from time immemorial and was at times used as a defense against the invasion of the Moros Issue: • WON the land is still a property of the government Answer: • affirmative Ratio Decidendi: • fortresses are part of the public property • the fortress was for the protection of the State, and necessarily, the land on which it stands must also have been dedicated for the purpose. • The fact that the fortress has not been used for many years for the purpose for which it was originally built does not necessarily divest the state of ownership therein. • If the land has been used by the municipality for distinctly public purposes, there will be a presumption that that stae has granted such land to the municipality

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The municipality has not shown proof that it has used the land for purposes distinctly public

MUNICIPALITY OF OAS VS ROA Facts: • recovery of a tract of land with the claim that it was part of the public square of that town. Issue: • Answer: • Ratio decidendi:

CHAVEZ VS PEA AMARI (decision dated May 6, 2003) Facts: • the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio. • In the instant case, however, Amari has not transferred the Freedom Islands, or any portion of it, to any qualified party. In fact, Amari admits that title to the Freedom Islands still remains with PEA. Issue: Answer: Ratio Decidendi:

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Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations were allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. But since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, private corporations were banned from holding, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution continued this constitutional prohibition.

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The prevailing doctrine before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. This is one of the two main reasons why the Decision annulled the Amended JVA. The other main reason is that submerged areas of Manila Bay, being part of the sea, are inalienable and beyond the commerce of man, a doctrine that has remained immutable since the Spanish Law on Waters of 1886. Since the adoption of the Regalian doctrine in this jurisdiction, the sea and its foreshore areas have always been part of the public domain. And since the enactment of Act No. 1654 on May 18, 1907 until the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, statutory law never allowed foreshore lands reclaimed by the government to be sold to private corporations.

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REPUBLIC VS CA & DELA ROSA Facts: • The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. • Dela rosa filed an application for the registration of the subject land in his and his children's name; such application was opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. • said lands were acquired by Dela Rosa as they were sold to him and his children by Balbilao & Alberto • Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on

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September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that: ◦ "SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands." RTC dismissed petition saying that Dela Rosa failed to prove heir claim of possession and ownership Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and registerable. All of the Kelly claims had subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. "The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok. 'The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. "We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law." The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong. Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

MANILA LODGE 761 VS CA FACTS: • RTC & CA decided that the property in question is a public park or plaza therefore part of the public domain • Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1.360 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. And at the north end, a hotel was to be constructed which may be leased to persons or corporations for a

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period of 99 years at max Philippine Commission passed Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so as to authorize the City of Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site. The almost 25 hectares reclaimed land was registered in the name of the City of Manila. 5500+ sq. m was sold to Manila Lodge, BPOE and the latter was issued a title for the property a new TCT was issued to the City of Manila to refer to the property, excluding that portion already sold to MANila Lodge 5500+ sq. m sold to Manila Lodge was later on sold to Elks Manila Lodge wants the court to cancel the rights of the City of Manila to repurchase the property; said petition was granted BPOE sold the property to TDC for Php4.7; 1.7 was paid as downpayment and the remaining balance was paid by virtue of a mortagge over the same property no annotation of the subsisting lien over the property, City of Manila filed for a reannotation of its right to repurchase, which was granted by the court (50 years); appealed by BPOE with reservation on the rights of TDC to clear his rights over the property

Issue: • What kind of property of the City is the reclaimed land? Answer: • it is of public dominion, intended for public use. Ratio Decidendi: • The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a "public" nature, the same having been made to a local political subdivision. • Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila as its patrimonial property, the City could, by virtue of its ownership, dispose of the whole reclaimed area without need of authorization to do so from the lawmaking body. ◦ Act No. 1360, as amended, however, provides by necessary implication, that the City of Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed area without being authorized by the lawmaking body. ◦ If the reclaimed area were patrimonial property of the City, the latter could dispose of it without need of the authorization provided by the statute, and the authorization to set aside . . . lease . . . or sell . . . given by the statute would indeed be superfluous. • Secondly, the reclaimed area is an "extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila." 40 If the reclaimed area is an extension of the Luneta, then it is of the same nature or character as the old Luneta ◦ a power to extend (or continue an act or business) cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct. ◦ old Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. 42 Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a public park or plaza and for public use • Thirdly, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the Manila Bay. A bay is nothing more than an inlet of the sea. ◦ Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts of the national domain open to public use. These are also property of public ownership devoted to public use, according to Article 339 of the Civil Code of Spain. ◦ When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being property for public use • Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel site. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion. ◦ applying the rule of expresio unius est exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject property. • Fifthly, Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that "property of public use, in provinces and in towns, comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service paid for by such towns or provinces." ◦ A park or plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article.

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◦ properties of provinces and towns for public use are governed by the same principles as properties of the same character belonging to the public domain. 46 In order to be property of public domain an intention to devote it to public use is sufficient. It is only the executive and possibly the legislative department that has the authority and the power to make the declaration that said property is no longer required for public use, and until such declaration is made the property must continue to form part of the public domain. In the case at bar, there has been no such explicit or unequivocal declaration.

CEBU OXYGEN VS BERCILLES Facts: • The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. • City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193 declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan. • Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. • Being the highest bidder, Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene was granted the lot for a consideration of P10,800.00. (Deed of Sale) • Petitioner applied for the registration of the said property • Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Cebu on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man, Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual. Issue: • WON the City of Cebu has the power to declare as abandoned a property of public domain, thus converting it to patrimonial property which can be the object of a valid contract. Answer: • Affirmative – Sec. 31, RA 3857 (City Charter of Cebu) Ratio Decidendi: • clear from the Charter that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. • The city council is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. • Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. • Article 422 of the Civil Code ROPPONGGI CASES (LAUREL VS GARCIA/ OJEDA VS EXEC. SECRETARY) Facts: • 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan • The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots • The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. • Issue: Answer: Ratio Decidendi: PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE VS CITY OF ZAMBOANGA Facts:

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main decision: Republic Act 3039 is unconstitutional and void in so far as the same seeks to deprive the Province of Zamboanga del Norte of its shares in the 26 lots situated within the City of Zamboanga, and hereinafter enumerated, without just compensation, for the reason that said 26 lots are patrimonial property of the old Province of Zamboanga.

• Issue: Answer: Ratio Decidendi: • Congress cannot deprive a municipality of its private or patrimonial property without due process of law and without payment of just compensation since it has no absolute control thereof. SALAS VS JARENCIO Facts: • RTC declared Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional and invalid in that it deprived the City of Manila of its property without due process and payment of just compensation. • CFI 4, land registration court, declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila, containing an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. OCT was issued to it • City of Manila sold portions of land to Pura Villanueva; original OCT was cancelled and other certs were transferred to Villanueva for the portions she purchased • • Issue: • Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila? • Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution? Answer: • 1st issue: the Court finds and holds that the land in question is communal property of the City of Manila. • 2nd issue: RA 4118 constitutional/ vaild Ratio Decidendi: • 1st issue: ◦ The Torrens Title expressly states that the City of Manila was the owner in 'fee simple' of the said land. Under Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act, as amended, the decree of confirmation and registration in favor of the City of Manila . . . shall be conclusive upon and against all persons including the Insular Government and all the branches there . . . is nothing in the said certificate of title indicating that the land was 'communal' land as contended by the respondents. ◦ Congress has the power to classify 'land of the public domain', transfer them from one classification to another and declare them disposable or not. Such power does not, however, extend to properties which are owned by cities, provinces and municipalities in their 'patrimonial' capacity. ◦ Art. 324 of the Civil Code ◦ although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial property. ◦ Originally the municipality owned no patrimonial property except those that were granted by the State not for its public but for private use. Other properties it owns are acquired in the course of the exercise of its corporate powers as a juridical entity to which category a municipal corporation pertains. ◦ It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. • 2ND ISSUE:

◦ presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a law ◦ the law assailed does not in any manner trench upon the constitution ◦ Republic Act No. 4118 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the Government program of "Land for the Landless". ◦ The property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. ◦ One decisive fact that should be noted is that the City of Manila expressly recognized the paramount title of the State over said land when by its resolution of September 20, 1960, the Municipal Board, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio Villegas, requested "His Excellency the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the city property bounded by Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 25547, containing an area of 7,450 square meters, as patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof ." ◦ If it were its patrimonial property why should the City of Manila be requesting the President to make representation to the legislature to declare it as such so it can be disposed of in favor of the actual occupants? There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. ◦ the land in question pertains to the State and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the benefit of the people therein for whom the State can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers. ◦ Republic Act No. 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government: ◦ Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. ◦ Ra 4118 IS VALID VS VILLEGAS Facts: • Republic Act 3120 on the strength of the established doctrine that the subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition does not constitute infringements of the due process clause or the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of the legislature's right of control and power to deal with State property. • Demolition and ejectment from the houses in the oublic lot, (Malate, Manila) • Republic Act 3120 whereby Congress converted the lot in question together with another lot in San Andres, Malate "which are reserved as communal property" into "disposable or alienable lands of the State to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration" Issue: Answer: Ratio Decidendi: • lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation • Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the properties were "reserved as communal property" and ordered their conversion into "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale in small lots to the bona fide occupants thereof. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts.

MACASIANO VD DIOKNO Facts: • the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabrielle, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. • respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets. • petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabrielle St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondent Palanyag. Issue: Answer: Ratio Decidendi: Art. 427-439 GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES INC. VS CA Facts: • Sps. Jose, residents of USA are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal • Sps. Jose executed SPA authorizing GMS to develop their property into a subdivision but certain portions of the land were occupied by the private respondents who refused to vacate the property in spite demand from GMS • Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers; members of Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association & such organization was allowed by the provincial gov to improve the barangay roads ubject to the condition that it shall secure the needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be affected • MTC & RTC dismissed the private respondents' complaint for forcible entry • CA revered the RTC decision and gave due course to the complaint • The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession Issue: • whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner. Answer: • affirmative Ratio Decidendi: • Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. • Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. • There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops. • regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. • a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.

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Doctrine of self-help is unavailing because the doctrine can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. Article 536 of the Civil Code states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

CAISIP VS PEOPLE Facts: • CA & RTC convicted petitioners of the crime of Grave Coercion • complainant Cabalag, wife of Guevarra who cultivated a parcel of land; The said parcel of land used to be tenanted by the deceased father of Cabalag • Caisip, overseer of Hacienda Palico (owned by Roxas y Cia) • Guevarra filed an action with the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking recognition as a lawful tenant of Roxas y Cia • the Court of Agrarian Relations declared it has no jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as Guevarra is not a tenant on the said parcel of land. An appeal was taken by Guevarra to the Supreme Court, but the appeal was dismissed in a resolution • Roxas y Cia. filed an action against Guevarra for forcible entry, praying that Guevarra be ejected from the premises • lower court ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot • Cabalag was charged with grave coercion & unjust vexation; said cases dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt • Cabalag was dragged by herein petitioners to the municipal police station; Cabalag was then released with the help of Zoilo Rivera, the leader of the tenant org. to where Cabalg is affiliated. Issue: • WON Art 429, CC, as relied upon by the petitioners, is applicable Answer: • negative, (Art. 429 is inapplicable) Ratio Decidendi: • Cabalag was given a 20-days grace period, thus, when the “dragging” incident happened, which is within the 20-day grace period, Cabalag did not invade nor usurp the land • Appellants did not "repel or prevent in actual or threatened . . . physical invasion or usurpation." • although Gloria and her husband had been sentenced to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that they, as the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as "necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor," and the cost of cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to partake of the nature of necessary expenses. • It is, accordingly, clear that the petitioners had, by means of violence, and without legal authority therefor, prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law," (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something against" her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code. • Caisip, in spite the fact that he did not lay hands on Cabalag, is not acquitted from the crime, there was community of purpose between the policemen and Caisip, so that the latter is guilty of grave coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by induction.

CUSTODIO VS CA Facts: • Mabasa filed a civil action for the grant of right of easement against Custodios before the RTC of Pasig • The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Taguig • such property was acquired by Mabasa by virtue of a sale in favor of Rayos • Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. • As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property, there are two possible passageways. • When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. • Mabasa saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was constructed by the Santoses (petitioners) • RTC & CA decided in favor of Mabasa (ordering herein petitioners to give them permanent ingress and egress ) Issue: • WON the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper • WON the award of damages to herein respondents is proper Answer: • 1st issue: petitioners are already barred from raising the issue as they did not appeal such grant of right of way from the court a quo • 2nd issue: award of damages improper; damnum absque injuria Ratio Decidendi: • The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. • The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. 16 It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. • Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon." • At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. • It was only the decision of the RTC which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right. • prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. • whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria. • there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. • CA decision reversed ANDAMO VS IAC Facts: • Sps. Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated at Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. • Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to

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drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. Petitioners filed a crim case against officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of injunction under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners subsequently filed a civil case for damages RTC issued order suspending the civil case until after the judgment on the crm case has been promulgated

• Issue: • whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages Answer: • affirmative Ratio Decidendi: • It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. • adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. • Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. • If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. NAPOCOR VS IBRAHIM Facts: • civil case filed by Ibrahim et al against NAPOCOR for recovery of possession of land and damages • Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of several parcels of land described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters, divided into three (3) lots • NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents’ knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and constructed therein underground tunnels. • The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCOR’s projects. • respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi City Water District for a permit to construct and/or install a motorized deep well but his request was turned down because the construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives and property • RTC & CA ruled in favor of Ibrahim et al

Issue: • WON respondents are entitled to just compensation Answer: • Affirmative Ratio Decidendi: • the Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the property similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code • the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it • “The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.” (Republic vs CA & Dela Rosa) • the trial court found that respondents could have dug upon their property motorized deep wells but were prevented from doing so by the authorities precisely because of the construction and

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existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of their property. Respondents, therefore, still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for the construction of the deep well. The fact that they could not was appreciated by the RTC as proof that the tunnels interfered with respondents’ enjoyment of their property and deprived them of its full use and enjoyment, In the past, the Court has held that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years, the property owner may demand payment of just compensation in the event restoration of possession is neither convenient nor feasible. Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the property of respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in which the easement was created by petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due process of law. respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Just compensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss and is ordinarily determined by referring to the value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the expropriating authority. Just compensation computed from the year of 1992, valuation as computed by CA is upheld

REPUBLIC VS CA & DELA ROSA (supra) DEL BANCO VS IAC Facts: • The Pansacola brothers purchased the Island in 1859 as common property and agreed on how they would share in the benefits to be derived from the Island. • On April 11, 1868, they modified the terms and conditions of the agreement so as to include in the co-ownership of the island the children of their deceased brothers Eustaquio and the other children of Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Peña) who were committed in the agreement of February 11, 1859. • The new agreement provided for a new sharing proportion and distribution of the Island among the co-owners. • About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private respondents brought a special action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, under the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the second contract of co-ownership • RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that the Cagbalite island has already been partitioned by the original co-owners • CA reversed said decision Issue: • WON Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successors-ininterest of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola. Answer: • Ratio Decidendi: • There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest.

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The agreement entered into in 1859 simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island. With the distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of the whole, and in this sense, over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the sole owner of a portion, in the instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners) of the Island which is truly abstract, because until physical division is effected such portion is merely an ideal share, not concretely determined in the previous case involving the Cagbalite island, the Court used the word "partition" to refer to the distribution of the Cagbalite Island agreed upon by the original owners and in the later agreements, by the heirs and their subsequent successors-in-interest. There need not be a physical partition; a distribution of the Island even in a state of indiviso or was sufficient in order that a co-owner may validly sell his portion of the co-owned property There was a distribution of the Island in 1868 as agreed upon by the original co-owners in their agreement of April 11, 1868. What is important in the Court's ruling in the three aforementioned cases is that, the fact that there was a distribution of the Island among the co-owners made the sale of Domingo Arce of the portion allocated to him though pro-indiviso, valid. He thus disposed of all his rights and interests in the portion given to him. A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court (Rule 71 of the Old Rules), adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of other co-owners no individual co-owner can claim any definite portion thereof It is therefore of no moment that some of the co-owners have succeeded in securing cadastral titles in their names to some portions of the Island occupied by them Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by some of the petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is undisputed that the Cagbalite Island was purchased by the original co-owners as a common property and it has not been proven that the Island had been partitioned among them or among their heirs. Furthermore, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners petition denied

PARDELL vs. BARTOLOME Facts: • Issue: Answer: Ratio Decidendi: AGUILAR vs. CA Facts: • Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of seven (7) children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth. • The 2 purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. • Initially, the brothers agreed that the share of Virgilio is 2/3 while the share of Senen is 1/3. but, by virtue of a written agreement, they agreed that their share will be equal with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage debt with SSS • Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen.

After the death f their father, Virgilio demanded for Senen to vacate the property and that it be sold so that the proceeds may be divided equally between them • because of Senen's refusal, Virgilio filed a case to compel the latter to effect the sale and that the proceeds be divided based on the 2/3 – 1/3 division, he also asked for payment of monthly rentals for the stay of Senen in the property after the death of their father • RTC rendered decision upholding the equal share of the brothers in the proceeds of the sale; that since the parties cannot agree on the amount of the sale, the RTC ruled that it be sold to a 3 rd party; Senen was ordered to vacate the property and to pay the monthly rent computed from the date of death of their father up to the time of the filing of the case • CA reversed RTC decision Issue/ANswer: • WON the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally among the co-owners – affirmative • WON Senen should pay the monthly rents with his continued possession in the property – affirmative, but only from the rendering of the decision of the RTC, when Virgilio sought to dissolve the co-ownership, and not from the death of their father Ratio Decidendi: • on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence presented ex parte, petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the same of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests. • Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. • Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. • being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common so long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. • Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale can be effected immediately. • When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. •

CASILAO vs. CA Facts: • Casilao filed a case for recovery of property and damages with notice of lis pendens against the Celestino Afable. • The subject property is registered in the name of the Bailons as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share. • Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the said land consisting of 16,283 square meters to Donato Delgado. • Rosalia Bailon alone sold the remainder of the land consisting of 32,566 square meters to Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza. On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado the 16,283 square meters of land which the latter had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. • Lanuza then sold the property to Afable

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In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not registered under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is. Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through prescription and contended that the petitioners were guilty of laches. RTC adjudged Afable as co-owner of the 2/6 share sold by Gaudencio & Rosalia CA affirmed the RTC decision with regard its ruling that prescription does not lie against plaintiffsappellees because they are co-owners of the original vendors. However, the appellate court declared that, although registered property cannot be lost by prescription, nevertheless, an action to recover it may be barred by laches.

Issue: • WON an action by Casilao to recover the registered property they co-own is barred by laches Answer: • negative, not all the elements of laches were present in the case at bar Ratio Decidendi: • “Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.” • if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale • the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. • since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one coowner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. • The proper remedy in this case is the DIVISION of the common property as of it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it (Action for Partition under Rule 69) • As to the action for petition, neither prescription nor laches can be invoked. • Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, "(n)o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." • the action for partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription. • prescription will not lie in favor of Afable as against the petitioners who remain the registered owners of the disputed parcel of land. • On the contention that prescription lies against the heirs of one co-owner: If prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing against the latter's hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law. • Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein petitioners. • Elements of laches ◦ conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; ◦ delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; ◦ lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and, ◦ injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred • Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. • It must be noted that while there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights, such delay was not

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attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any opportunity to bring suit. In the first place, petitioners had no notice of the sale made by their eldest sister. The petitioners were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit inasmuch as until 1981, they were kept in the dark about the transactions entered into by their sister. if knowledge of the sale by Rosalia was conveyed to the petitioners only later, they cannot be faulted for the acts of their co-owner who failed to live up to the trust and confidence expected of her. In view of the lack of knowledge by the petitioners of the conduct of Rosalia in selling the land without their consent in 1975 and the absence of any opportunity to institute the proper action until 1981, laches may not be asserted against the petitioners. The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainants would assert the right on which they base the suit. Afable is guilty of bad faith in purchasing the property as he knew that the property was co-owned by six persons and yet, there were only two signatories to the deeds of sale and no special authorization to sell was granted to the two sellers by the other co-owners. Moreover, the undisputed fact is that petitioners are relatives of Afable's wife. As a genuine gesture of good faith, he should have contacted the petitioners who were still listed as co-owners in the certificate of title which was already in his possession even before the sale. It may be gleaned from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino Afable is not a buyer in good faith. Laches being an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to the court with clean hands.

ROQUE vs. IAC Facts: • the 312 sq.m parcel of land originally registered in the name of Januario Avendaño, who died intestate was partitioned by the Avendano siblings (¾ shares for the 3) and ¼ undivided share to Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque. • The Avendano siblings, in consideration of the aggregate amount of P500.00, transferred their collective and undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the subject lot to Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and complete ownership of the property. • in an unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan, Ernesto and Victor Roque purportedly sold ¾ undivided portion of thesubject lot to their half-sister, petitioner Concepcion Roque, for the same amount. (P500.00) • Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however, refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion of Lot No. 1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land. • Concepcion Roque filed a complaint for Partition with Specific Performance • CFI rendered a decision acknowledging that the Concepcion Roque is the owner of the undivided ¾ share in the subject lot • IAC reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed both the petitioner's complaint and the respondents' appeal. Issue: • WON the action for Partition brought by petitioner co-owner is proper. Answer: • affirmative Ratio Decidendi: • An action for partition — which is typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners — may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues. ◦ First, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. ◦ Second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s) — i.e., what

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portion should go to which co-owner. an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved. This is the import of our jurisprudence on the matter 12 and is sustained by the public policy which abhors multiplicity of actions. "the action for partition of the thing owned in common does not prescribe." This statement bears some refinement. ◦ In the words of Article 494 of the Civil Code, "each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." No matter how long the co-ownership has lasted, a co-owner can always opt out of the co-ownership, and provided the defendant co-owners or co-heirs have theretofore expressly or impliedly recognized the coownership, they cannot set up as a defense the prescription of the action for partition. ◦ But if the defendants show that they had previously asserted title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff and for the requisite period of time, the plaintiffs right to require recognition of his status as a co-owner will have been lost by prescription and the court cannot issue an order requiring partition. If the co-heir or co-owner having possession of the hereditary or community property, holds the same in his own name, that is, under claim of exclusive ownership, he may acquire the property by prescription if his possession meets all the other requirements of the law, and after the expiration of the prescriptive period, his co-heir or co-owner may lose their right to demand partition, and their action may then be held to have prescribed Concepcion Roque — the co-owner seeking partition — has been and is presently in open and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of the property owned in common. co-ownership of the property had continued to be recognized by all the owners. Consequently, the action for partition could not have and, as a matter of fact, had not yet prescribed at the time of institution by Concepcion of the action below. if indeed it is true that respondents, as they claim, are the absolute owners of the whole of subject lot, it is most unusual that respondents would have allowed or tolerated such prolonged occupation by petitioner of a major portion (3/4) of the land while they, upon the other hand, contented themselves with occupation of only a fourth thereof. This latter circumstance, coupled with the passage of a very substantial length of time during which petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and uninterrupted in her occupation and possession, places respondents here in laches: respondents may no longer dispute the existence of the coownership between petitioner and themselves nor the validity of petitioner's claim of a three-fourths (3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549, as they are deemed, by their unreasonably long inaction, to have acquiesced in the co-ownership. CFI decision affirmed

DE LIMA vs. CA Facts: • Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the government. Lino Delima later died in 1921 and survved by his 4 siblings who then co-owned the property • Galileo Delima, one of the heirs (brother) of Lino executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." based on this, a new title has been issued on his name alone • the heirs of the other supposed co-owners filed an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment of the title in the name of their uncle Galileo • RTC rendered decision declaring that each co-owner is entitled to ¼ undivided share in the property and further held that since it was only Galileo who paid the taxes on the property, each coowner shall give their share of the fruits of the lot in question • CA reversed the trial court's decision and upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon

Issue: • WON petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property. Answer: • affirmative. The 10 year period from the date Galileo was issued a TCT has already prescribed Ratio Decidendi: • As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. • It is understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee • no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership • However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership. Action based on ownership is prescriptible • In order that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: ◦ that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; ◦ that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and ◦ that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive • when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder • Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted • when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1963, such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this time.